text stringlengths 9 408 |
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[1404.52 --> 1405.78] and it looks for certain |
[1405.78 --> 1406.80] patterns of packets. |
[1406.96 --> 1407.12] Yeah, |
[1407.16 --> 1408.50] or bandwidth charts as well. |
[1408.58 --> 1408.72] You know, |
[1408.74 --> 1409.34] that sometimes |
[1409.34 --> 1410.32] will be an indication |
[1410.32 --> 1410.98] something's up |
[1410.98 --> 1411.40] as you'll see |
[1411.40 --> 1412.22] your bandwidth usage |
[1412.22 --> 1412.86] spikes up. |
[1414.14 --> 1415.14] And would you guys say |
[1415.14 --> 1416.02] that containerizing |
[1416.02 --> 1417.24] some of your services |
[1417.24 --> 1418.14] is a way to |
[1418.14 --> 1419.06] help this situation? |
[1419.06 --> 1421.56] No. |
[1421.94 --> 1422.30] No. |
[1424.72 --> 1425.08] No, |
[1425.18 --> 1425.38] I mean, |
[1425.40 --> 1425.62] really, |
[1425.68 --> 1425.96] in a way, |
[1426.02 --> 1426.70] it makes it worse. |
[1426.84 --> 1427.56] I think it makes it worse |
[1427.56 --> 1428.74] because there's more processes |
[1428.74 --> 1429.80] and more things going on |
[1429.80 --> 1430.96] on a box in some cases. |
[1431.48 --> 1432.18] But you do have |
[1432.18 --> 1432.76] better security |
[1432.76 --> 1433.58] in terms of networking |
[1433.58 --> 1434.22] control |
[1434.22 --> 1435.70] and process isolation |
[1435.70 --> 1436.84] and the ability |
[1436.84 --> 1437.68] to just destroy |
[1437.68 --> 1438.20] a container |
[1438.20 --> 1439.00] and recreate it |
[1439.00 --> 1439.46] if something did |
[1439.46 --> 1439.88] go sideways. |
[1440.02 --> 1440.36] So it's, |
[1440.68 --> 1440.96] I mean, |
[1440.96 --> 1441.40] it's a mix. |
[1441.48 --> 1442.28] I think it's good and bad. |
[1442.40 --> 1442.74] But I'm sure, |
[1442.82 --> 1442.96] Alex, |
[1443.00 --> 1443.58] you must have thoughts. |
[1443.66 --> 1444.24] You must have thoughts. |
[1444.58 --> 1444.70] Well, |
[1444.88 --> 1445.52] containers good, |
[1445.60 --> 1446.40] everything else bad, |
[1446.52 --> 1446.76] right? |
[1446.76 --> 1447.52] That's my viewpoint. |
[1447.52 --> 1451.56] But I think containers |
[1451.56 --> 1452.66] are better in this situation |
[1452.66 --> 1453.40] because let's say |
[1453.40 --> 1454.82] you've got an NGINX web server |
[1454.82 --> 1456.44] listening with your |
[1456.44 --> 1458.46] vault warden behind it |
[1458.46 --> 1459.88] or whatever the web server is |
[1459.88 --> 1461.18] that's exposing your passwords |
[1461.18 --> 1462.38] to you. |
[1462.90 --> 1464.46] If somebody was to compromise |
[1464.46 --> 1466.46] something in that code |
[1466.46 --> 1468.04] and do a buffer overflow |
[1468.04 --> 1468.76] or do something |
[1468.76 --> 1469.76] that meant they could get |
[1469.76 --> 1470.56] something out of memory |
[1470.56 --> 1471.30] that they shouldn't |
[1471.30 --> 1473.58] and extrapolate some data |
[1473.58 --> 1474.94] that they shouldn't get, |
[1474.94 --> 1476.98] the blast radius of that |
[1476.98 --> 1477.80] is going to be limited |
[1477.80 --> 1478.76] to the scope |
[1478.76 --> 1480.32] that that container |
[1480.32 --> 1481.48] has access to. |
[1482.22 --> 1483.72] And so running things |
[1483.72 --> 1484.22] in a container |
[1484.22 --> 1485.20] is more secure |
[1485.20 --> 1486.74] simply by virtue |
[1486.74 --> 1487.26] of the fact |
[1487.26 --> 1488.46] that you are scoping |
[1488.46 --> 1489.48] what that container |
[1489.48 --> 1490.44] has access to |
[1490.44 --> 1491.60] on the host system. |
[1492.36 --> 1492.38] Yeah, |
[1492.46 --> 1492.68] I mean, |
[1492.68 --> 1493.32] it will have access |
[1493.32 --> 1494.24] to any of the data |
[1494.24 --> 1495.02] that the container |
[1495.02 --> 1495.78] has access to |
[1495.78 --> 1496.92] which is likely |
[1496.92 --> 1497.64] important data |
[1497.64 --> 1498.72] but it's contained |
[1498.72 --> 1499.84] to that region. |
[1500.06 --> 1500.94] That's inherently more safe |
[1500.94 --> 1501.84] than say running Apache |
[1501.84 --> 1502.92] or NGINX on a box |
[1502.92 --> 1504.02] and you pop Apache |
[1504.02 --> 1505.20] and now you've got |
[1505.20 --> 1506.08] access to anything |
[1506.08 --> 1506.98] on that host |
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