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308 RUIN AND RSCOT£»T, &C.
every city of the universe, and in every age of man since the first
creation.
Sect. II. — A particular Hew of the Miseries of Man.
But we will lay aside the sins and follies oj mankind , a nd
only take his miseries into our present view ; l et us see whether
from them alone we cannot infer, that we are a very degene-
rate race of beings, with most evident marks of the displeasure
of our Maker upon us, and under tlie punishment of the wise and
righteous Governor of all things^.
Let us take a turn amongst the historians of the world ;
and what is almost all history but a description of the wretcbed-
ness of mankind, under the mischiefs they bring upon tiiem-
«elves, and the judgments of tlie great God I The scenes of
happiness and peace are very thin set among all the nations, and
they have had rather a transient glimpse of these bright scenes
here and there appearing and vanishing, than any pretences to
durable felicity. Let us spread our thoughts over the universe,
what public desolations by plague and famine, by storms and
earthi(uakes, by wars and pestilence, whicli strike and aflfect
our ears continually r Even the report is terrible. What secret
mischiefs reign among men, whicU pierce into the soul, and cor-
rode the \itais of nature ? Wliat smarting wounds and bruises
what lingering diseases attack and torment the animal frame ?
Surely those who sustain these maladies would not suppose our
great poet had exaggerated matters when he describes themtLus,
as set before Adam our forefather by the angel Raphael ;
*' A lazar house it seemed, therein were laid
Numbers of ail diseasM, all maladies
Of ij^hastly spasm, or racking torture, qualms
Of heart-sick agony, all feverous kinds.
Convulsions, epilepsies, fierce cattarrhs,
Intestine stone and ulcer, colic pangs.
Demoniac plirenzy, moa[)ing melancholy,
Aud moon-struck madness, pining atrophy,
- Consimiption, and wide-wasting pestilence,
l>ropsies, and asthmas, and joint- racking rheums.
Dire was the tossing, deep ihe groans, despair
Tended the sick, busiest fi-oni couch to couch ;
And over them triumphant death his dart
i)liook, but delay M to strike, though oft invokM.''
But lazar-honses are not the only places whereby we ma?
jnd^e of the numbers of the wretched. Whore is the family, if
there are seven or eii^lit persons in it, wherein there is nol one
or other of them aflhctcd with some troublesome malady, or some
♦ I h ope the reader will forgive a short repetition of somr of thf$ani«
thongbu which maj be fouud under the first qu«'iition io this book : f or it **^
iiardly potsihte to avoid them ; especially coii'^idering, that thfiie tuo fliscuors'^'
^ere trrrtten with a dtsliucl vicWy and were uol at itrst dcs:gued to bt puhliibel
111 ihe 8«ai« buukw | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 401 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | every city of the universe, and in every age of man since the first creation.
Sect. II.—A particular View of the Miseries of Man.
But we will lay aside the sins and follies of mankind, and only take his miseries into our present view; let us see whether from them alone we cannot infer, that we are a very degenerate race of beings, with most evident marks of the displeasure of our Maker upon us, and under the punishment of the wise and righteous Governor of all things*.
Let us take a turn amongst the historians of the world; and what is almost all history but a description of the wretchedness of mankind, under the mischiefs they bring upon themselves, and the judgments of the great God? The scenes of happiness and peace are very thin set among all the nations, and they have had rather a transient glimpse of these bright scenes here and there appearing and vanishing, than any pretences to durable felicity. Let us spread our thoughts over the universe, what public desolations by plague and famine, by storms and earthquakes, by wars and pestilence, which strike and affect our cars continually: Even the report is terrible. What secret mischiefs reign among men, which pierce into the soul, and corrode the vitals of nature? What smarting wounds and bruises what lingering diseases attack and torment the animal frame? Surely those who sustain these maladies would not suppose our great poet had exaggerated matters when he describes them thus, as set before Adam our forefather by the angel Raphael:
"A lazar house it seemed, wherein were laid
Numbers of all diseas'd, all maladies
Of ghastly spasm, or racking torture, qualms
Of heart-sick agony, all feverous kinds,
Convulsions, epilepsies, fierce cattarrhs,
Intestine stone and ulcer, colic pangs,
Demoniac phrenzy, moaping melancholy.
And moon-struck madness, pining atrophy,
Consumption, and wide-wasting pestilence,
Dropsies, and asthmas, and joint-racking rheums.
Dire was the tossing, deep the groans, despair
Tended the sick, busiest from couch to couch;
And over them triumphant death his dart
Shook, but delay'd to strike, though oft invok'd."
But lazar-houses are not the only places whereby we may judge of the numbers of the wretched. Where is the family, if there are seven or eight persons in it, wherein there is not one or other of them afflicted with some troublesome malady, or some
* I hope the reader will forgive a short repetition of some of the same thoughts which may be found under the first question in this book: for it was hardly possible to avoid them; especially considering, that these two discourses were written with a distinct view, and were not at first designed to be published in the same book. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ESSAY I. 399
resome weakness or inconvenience ? These indeed ore often-
mes wisely concealed by the persons who suffer them, and by
le f amiUes where they dwell. But these are the miseries which
re discovered, in a glaring light, in the hospitals, the infirmaries,
nd the bedlams, which are provided by the public for the poor :
Lnd if we were to walk round a natiqn, we should find perhaps
M in every twenty or thirty households, there were some
fflicted and miserable creatures, that would be fit company for
bese public monuments of unha])pincs9, if their private circum*
taoces did not extend to make provision for their support and
elief; and in the whole, they would be enough to make half m
rovince in a nation, rather than a town or a village.
Let ns ])rocecd a little in this en((uiry. What toils and hard-
lips, what dangers and deaths, what inward anxieiies and sor-
»ws, disappointineots and calamities, are dil!\isoJ and scattered
trough every age and country of mankind ? Do not the rich
el them as well as the poor, and the prince to^etlier with the
fasaut ? Are they not all teazed with their own restless and
rmeoting appetites which are never satisfied, but are still re-
ruing u|)on them, and their impetuous passions give them no
St ? What keen ans^uish of mind arises from pride, and envy,
d resentment? What tortures and racking disquietudes do
sappointmcuts in ambition, or love, and wild jealousy, infuse
to the bosoms of the rich, while tlie poor, together with tliese
mc inward vexations and corroding maladies of the mind, sua-
in also endless drudgeries in procuring their daily and common
bsistence ? And how are many of them half starved in thciif
rry cottages, or fed and nourished at a miserable rate ?
Let us survey this sorry creature man through every stage :
irst, mark what a wretched figure* he makes at his entrance
to life. This animal^ says Phny, who is to govern the rest of
matures round hiniy how he lies bound hand and footy all in
irSy and begins his life in misery and punishment ; and for
is only reason^ because he is b orn. Thus, that Roman author^
his preface to one of his writings. If we trace the educatioa
the human race, from the cradle to the state of mature age,
d especially among the ))oor, which are the bulk of all nations^
i wretchedness of mankind will app^^ar still in a mournful lights
3W are they dragged up in their tender age in Europe, Asia,
rica, and America, througli a long train of nonsense, mad-
is, and miseries ? What millions of uneasy sensations dotU
Hr infancy and childhood endure by reason of those pains and
?s.sing necessities which in their youngest years they can tell
ly i n cries and groans, and which their parents in extretn'e po-
rty cannot relieve, or they are so brutish and savage that they
II not i\o it ? How wretchedly are these young generations
rcied onward tiirough the folly and weakness of childhoodi | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 402 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | ESSAY I.
These indeed are often
mes wisely concealed by the persons who suffer them, and by
the families where they dwell. But these are the miseries which
are discovered, in a glaring light, in the hospitals, the infirmaries,
and the bedlams, which are provided by the public for the poor:
And if we were to walk round a nation, we should find perhaps
that in every twenty or thirty households, there were some
afflicted and miserable creatures, that would be fit company for
these public monuments of unhappiness, if their private circum-
tances did not extend to make provision for their support and
relief; and in the whole, they would be enough to make half a
province in a nation, rather than a town or a village.
Let us proceed a little in this enquiry. What toils and hard-
ips, what dangers and deaths, what inward anxieties and sor-
ows, disappointments and calamities, are diffused and scattered
through every age and country of mankind? Do not the rich
el them as well as the poor, and the prince together with the
peasant? Are they not all teazed with their own restless and
imenting appetites which are never satisfied, but are still re-
ruing upon them, and their impetuous passions give them no
st? What keen anguish of mind arises from pride, and envy,
d resentment? What tortures and racking disquietudes do
appointments in ambition, or love, and wild jealousy, infuse
to the bosoms of the rich, while the poor, together with these
une inward vexations and corroding maladies of the mind, sus-
in also endless drudgeries in procuring their daily and common
absistence? And how are many of them half starved in their
erry cottages, or fed and nourished at a miserable rate?
Let us survey this sorry creature man through every stage:
first, mark what a wretched figure he makes at his entrance
to life. This animal, says Pliny, who is to govern the rest of
features round him, how he lies bound hand and foot, all in
urses, and begins his life in misery and punishment; and for
is only reason, because he is born. Thus, that Roman author,
his preface to one of his writings. If we trace the education
of the human race, from the cradle to the state of mature age,
and especially among the poor, which are the bulk of all nations,
we wretchedness of mankind will appear still in a mournful light.
Now are they dragged up in their tender age in Europe, Asia,
Africa, and America, through a long train of nonsense, mad-
ess, and miseries? What millions of uneasy sensations doth
their infancy and childhood endure by reason of those pains and
cessing necessities which in their youngest years they can tell
ly in cries and groans, and which their parents in extreme po-
ry cannot relieve, or they are so brutish and savage that they
will not do it? How wretchedly are these young generations
married onward through the folly and weakness of childhood, | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ibO tttlN AKD RECOTERYi &C.
under these miseries, till the addition or new calartiitiMi iitM
their own crimes and madnesses, their ungoverned ajipefites and
passions, swells the load to a huge and painful degree ? Tkef
practise what they haire seen with their tiathers, and ar]^ pliioged
into earl}' ^nischier.
As )'outh advances, tlie ferments of the blood rise bigheri
and the appetites and the passions become much stronger, and
give more abundant vexation to the race of mankind, than thqf
do to any of the young brutal creation, whether in air^ earth, or
sea. Their natural appetites are abundantly relieved and aatiafied
without those vexing cares, anxieties and inconveniences, which
beset mankind of both sBXes in the same part of Iife« The same
desires and indinaiions which belong to the rest of the animal
kind, attack the human race also, but with greater rage and via-
lence, and seem to demand their present gratification : And thati
as has been observed by moralists, not at one season of the year
only, but at all seasons, with more constancy than in other crea*
tures, and give the younger crouds of mankind many more dis-
turbances. The aiU-wise God the Creator, for just and kind
designs and reasons, has limited the gratification of these appe*
tites by rules of virtue and piety : But perhaps these very rules
and confinements, however holi/y just and goody have served very
much ttirough the corruption of our nature, to irritate and pro-
"voke mankind to greater excesses, and pursue their vitiated
animal inclinations with warmer violence than ever man woahl.
have been exiKMed to iu the days of innocence. So the hoathea
Writers confess :
" Nitimnr in vetituro semper, cnpimusqae negata.*'
•* We are ever desiring forbidden things^ and press ajtef^mnhw"
ful delights. So St. Paul acknowledges ; Kom. vii. 8. 5iir,
taking occasion bi/ t ht commandment^ wrought in me ail rnannet
of concupiscence. So a wild young bull or a lion would beat
themselves against the grates and restraining bars of their prison,
and make more furious assaults there to gain their full freedom.
And in the midst of these distracting circumstances of mankind,
between the law of God and their own appetites, they lead 8ome«
times but a misorable and most unquiet life. If their iDclinations
are gratified in an unlawful manner, what anguish of cousciencfi
what inward vexations and keen reflections of mind perpetually
haunt and torment them ! What terrible and pressing tempta-
tions assault them to conceal their shame, by the murder of them-
Strives, or the harmless babes to whom they gave birth and life!
How shameful and liateful are the scenes of life into which they
bring th(ur wretched offspring f How iunumerabl<f and grievous
the iitronvtriieuces which they entail upon their yoong spurious
d<*ttceiHlantb ^ What lasting reproach and distreaS| wi£ b^;gary
and iuuix sorrow ? | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 403 | 635 | 640.8 | 1,239.84 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | under these miseries, till the addition of new calamities, from their own crimes and madnesses, their ungoverned appetites and passions, swells the load to a huge and painful degree? They practise what they have seen with their fathers, and are plunged into early mischief.
As youth advances, the ferments of the blood rise higher, and the appetites and the passions become much stronger, and give more abundant vexation to the race of mankind, than they do to any of the young brutal creation, whether in air, earth, or sea. Their natural appetites are abundantly relieved and satisfied without those vexing cares, anxieties and inconveniences, which beset mankind of both sexes in the same part of life. The same desires and inclinations which belong to the rest of the animal kind, attack the human race also, but with greater rage and violence, and seem to demand their present gratification: And that, as has been observed by moralists, not at one season of the year only, but at all seasons, with more constancy than in other creatures, and give the younger cronds of mankind many more disturbances. The all-wise God the Creator, for just and kind designs and reasons, has limited the gratification of these appetites by rules of virtue and piety: But perhaps these very rules and confinements, however holy, just and good, have served very much through the corruption of our nature, to irritate and provoke mankind to greater excesses, and pursue their vitiated animal inclinations with warmer violence than ever man would have been exposed to in the days of innocence. So the heathen writers confess:
“Nitimur in vetitum semper, cupimusque negata.”
“We are ever desiring forbidden things, and press after unlawful delights. So St. Paul acknowledges; Rom. vii. 8. Sin, taking occasion by the commandment, wrought in me all manner of concupiscence. So a wild young bull or a lion would beat themselves against the grates and restraining bars of their prison, and make more furious assaults there to gain their full freedom. And in the midst of these distracting circumstances of mankind, between the law of God and their own appetites, they lead sometimes but a miserable and most unquiet life. If their inclinations are gratified in an unlawful manner, what anguish of conscience, what inward vexations and keen reflections of mind perpetually haunt and torment them! What terrible and pressing temptations assault them to conceal their shame, by the murder of themselves, or the harmless babes to whom they gave birth and life! How shameful and hateful are the scenes of life into which they bring their wretched offspring? How innumerable and grievous the inconveniences which they entail upon their young spurious descendants? What lasting reproach and distress, with beggary and long sorrow? | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ESSAY I. tot
Or, if <hcy ptiniue ilirir desfres in a l awful manner^ hcrif
ihappy are the bulk of the cxtrcmft poor ? And y.:t how manjf
iMitiands are there that arc but ju^t capable rt ] >\\d\ng Ibod
(i r aiment for themselves in the world, wlio, aftw some (TonfiidC
lb Ihese restless incHnaiiuns, rush into tho connubial State and
isery at once ^ How unnble are they to provide the same
€es9aries for a youngs nursery of mortals, a new tncreasing
Deration ? What endless solicitudes, night and day, afflict
em in their contrivances to support themeelves And their infant
oud ? And what a len^h of years is it belore these y6ini«^
S)less c reatures can poMsibly release their parents from this care
anxiety, and are capable of providing food and raiment for
smselves ? Would the affairs of human life in infancy, child*
od, and youth, liave ever been constitute<l iri such a sore afid
ioful situation, if man had been hiich a being as Uo<I at first
ide him ; and if he had always stood obedient to his Maker,
d continued in his favour ? Could divine wisdom and good--
BS admit of these scenes, if there bad not been some great and
iversai degeneracy spread over all the race, which, by t he wise
d righteous permission of God, exerts itself some way or
iCT in every stage of life ?
If we follow this track which mankind treads to the perfec-
•n of manhood, the age of jiublic appearance and activity upon
e stage of the world, what shall we find there but iniinite cares,
lonrs and toil, attended with fond hopes almost always frusti*a«
1, warm wishes scarce ever fulfilled, endless crosses and dis-
pointments, through ten thousand accidents that arc every
)ment flying across tins mortal stage ; and whatever their pur«
its be, wliether honour or wealth, ease or pleasure, some inter*
ning incidents or oppositions blast all their designs, and plunge
em into long vexation. As for the poor, who have no such
irsuits, but seek their broad from day to day, how does the
kry toil exhaust their lives in summer, and what pinching
Irving wretchedness do they feel amon^^ wintry snows ana
Mrms ? How is a miserable and distressed life sustained amon^
I t he fatigues and pkins of nature, the oppression, cruelty and
orn of the rich, ani£i''.their . o wn inbred maladies both of body
id inind, as I said before ?
I^et us follow on the track of this sorry life, and enter into
c iscenes of old and decrepid age ; h ow innumerable and how
expressible are the disasters and sorrows, the gfpans and aches^
e pains and wretchednesses that s|)riug up every livhere to meet
is poor long-lived animal on the borders of the grave, before
ey plunge him iiito it ? And indeed is there anv perion upoii
iTth, high or low, without such distressing di^culties, such
ossing accidents and perplexing cares, such troubles, such paia-
I i nfimiities such disquieting fears, anxieties and fliorrovf'», iU
{
Vol. iy. C c | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 404 | 635 | 640.8 | 1,239.84 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | ESSAY I.
Or, if they pursue their desires in a lawful manner, how happy are the bulk of the extreme poor? And yet how many thousands are there that are but just capable of providing food and raiment for themselves in the world, who, after some conflict with these restless inclinations, rush into the connubial state and sery at once? How unable are they to provide the same necessaries for a young nursery of mortals, a new increasing generation? What endless solicitudes, night and day, afflict them in their contrivances to support themselves and their infantood? And what a length of years is it before these young pless creatures can possibly release their parents from this care and anxiety, and are capable of providing food and raiment for themselves? Would the affairs of human life in infancy, childhood, and youth, have ever been constituted in such a sore and painful situation, if man had been such a being as God at first made him; and if he had always stood obedient to his Maker, did continue in his favour? Could divine wisdom and goodness admit of these scenes, if there had not been some great and universal degeneracy spread over all the race, which, by the wise and righteous permission of God, exerts itself some way or other in every stage of life?
If we follow this track which mankind treads to the perfection of manhood, the age of public appearance and activity upon the stage of the world, what shall we find there but infinite cares, pours and toil, attended with fond hopes almost always frustrated, warm wishes source ever fulfilled, endless crosses and disappointments, through ten thousand accidents that are every moment flying across this mortal stage; and whatever their pursuits be, whether honour or wealth, ease or pleasure, some interning incidents or oppositions blast all their designs, and plunge them into long vexation. As for the poor, who have no such insuits, but seek their bread from day to day, how does the trry toil exhaust their lives in summer, and what pinching surviving wretchedness do they feel among wintry snows and froms? How is a miserable and distressed life sustained among the fatigues and pains of nature, the oppression, cruelty and sorrow of the rich, and their own inbred maladies both of body and mind, as I said before?
Let us follow on the track of this sorry life, and enter into the scenes of old and decrepid age; how innumerable and how expressible are the disasters and sorrows, the groans and aches, the pains and wretchednesses that spring up everywhere to meet is poor long-lived animal on the borders of the grave, before they plunge him into it? And indeed is there any person upon earth, high or low, without such distressing difficulties, such lossing accidents and perplexing cares, such troubles, such pain-infirmities such disquieting fears, anxieties and sorrows, ill- | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
^0.4 UriN 4ND VCOVXRT, &e,
in this tUw, look like an innocent tribe of cualures, w Im (1#
Atigiticl state of favour trifh their Maker? -
To Ia1}( of "olid comfort and satisfacUon, and rral happlnm
fohc fn.iuycil in lliislifo, iscnnlrary to alltlie common sense ui4
expcrit'nce of almost every thoiightt'ul mati hIto Iiub taken k jint
aiifTcy of these niimerouK Kenes of evil. Sorry aatislftotton in-
deed, and poor comfort in the midst of siieli superior nikniet!
if a man were placed in seine upper region, and had the wisdon
of on angel, with all that Jnst knowledge and experience what
tnic happiness is, and could look ilonn from alwve, and tale
a compile aiirvf'y of human life, even in ilH licst circumatanca,
aa things now stand, ond as it is sii[)})oscd to be enjoyed by sone
flf the happiest men on earth, without the hopea of a better life
afterwards, he would be very loath to acce|)t of it; nor indeed
would it b e worth his acceptance.
Is there an angel in heaven who woiiM not rather chaae to
lose his existence at once, than to be sent into our world, and
trace the round of twenty or thirty, or threescore yeara of homu
life, without any hereafter ? And mdccd,wero it not froniaprhi-
ciple of obedience to God, and from the hopes nf a liappv futu-
rity, ftflcr we have piously and honourably sustained tlic labour^
loiseries and trials of this life, I know not what wise man wocdd
willingly oome into tlieac tiresome scenes of mortality, or go
tlirough them with any patienoe.
What ! To be trained up from infuicy, under so Toftny ne-
cessary follies, unavoidable prejudices, and wrelohod deluuou,
through tlie power of flesh and sense ? To be sunk into swdi
gross ignorance both of our souls, our belter selvea, and of the
fflorious being that made us } To lie under such heavy aliadei of
darkness, such a world of mistakes and errora as are minded
with our little faint glimpses, and low notices of God our Cre-
ator }W hat ! T o be so far distant from God hnd endure auch i
long estrangement and utter absence from the wisest and best of
beings, in this foolish ami fleshly state, with so few and slender
romiimniCations with or from him ! What ! To be in bondage ts
BO inuny powerful and dUtpiieting appGtiti!S, ao many restless
and unruly passions, which want the perpAual guard of a j;«k>ut
eye, and a strong restraint over their, and wbicb will be e«r
breaking ont into some new mischief, notwithstanding our cver-
tasling watchfulness! What! To be ever surrounded with such
wrt of dangerous dcliirhts of si'use, which though they wers
tniicii safer in tlir' innocent state, jiet arc now constant and stroi)*
temptations to fully, guilt, and misery ! To have acatvc any juys
but what are closely attended with huge dangers ? To have no
ftulis tact ions but what we are liable lo pay dear for by excessive i
<jr irregularindulgcnce, anA vfteAiMe mw.v.X'i*.^') v« ^•«kw«<* ihA I
means of transgiesmoB «v»^ \«!Cvft% aav^^yift, «ai«t to *« xum^ | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 405 | 635 | 647.25 | 1,156.5 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | in this view, look like an innocent tribe of creatures, or in the original state of favour with their Maker!
To talk of solid comfort and satisfaction, and real happiness to be enjoyed in this life, is contrary to all the common sense and experience of almost every thoughtful man who has taken a just survey of these numerous scenes of evil. Sorry satisfaction indeed, and poor comfort in the midst of such superior miseries! If a man were placed in some upper region, and had the wisdom of an angel, with all that just knowledge and experience what true happiness is, and could look down from above, and take a complete survey of human life, even in its best circumstances, as things now stand, and as it is supposed to be enjoyed by some of the happiest men on earth, without the hopes of a better life afterwards, he would be very loath to accept of it; nor indeed would it be worth his acceptance.
Is there an angel in heaven who would not rather chuse to lose his existence at once, than to be sent into our world, and trace the round of twenty or thirty, or threescore years of human life, without any hereafter? And indeed, were it not from a principle of obedience to God, and from the hopes of a happy futurity, after we have piously and honourably sustained the labour, miseries and trials of this life, I know not what wise man would willingly come into these tiresome scenes of mortality, or go through them with any patience.
What! To be trained up from infancy, under so many necessary follicies, unavoidable prejudices, and wretched delusions, through the power of flesh and sense? To be sunk into such gross ignorance both of our souls, our better selves, and of the glorious being that made us? To lie under such heavy shades of darkness, such a world of mistakes and errors as are mingled with our little faint glimpses, and low notices of God our Creator? What! To be so far distant from God and endure such a long estrangement and utter absence from the wisest and best of beings, in this foolish and fleshy state, with so few and slender communications with or from him! What! To be in bondage to so many powerful and disquieting appetites, so many restless and unruly passions, which want the perpetual guard of a jealous eye, and a strong restraint over them, and which will be ever breaking out into some new mischief, notwithstanding our everlasting watchfulness! What! To be ever surrounded with such sort of dangerous delights of sense, which though they were much safer in the innocent state, yet are now constant and strong temptations to folly, guilt, and misery! To have scarce any joys but what are closely attended with huge dangers? To have no insultations but what we are liable to pay dear for by excessive or irregular indulgence, and which are most likely to become the means of transgression and lasting anguish, either to the whit- | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ESSAY I. 405
<
tlie body, or both ! Can tliis be a desirable state for aay wise
augelic beiu^, who knows what happiness is, to be joined to
eh a body as ours, to be united to suoU a disorderly machine of
tsb and bloody with ail its uneasy and unruly ferments?
These which 1 now mentioned are indwelling mischiefs,
bich teaze and defile die soul : But there is another train of
bred miseries which afiect this sensible ualure of ours, this
liinal frame, with huge agonies and distresses. Wjiat wise
lirit would willingly put on such flesh and blood as ours is, with
I t lio springs of malady and pain, anguish and disease in it?
^hat ! To be in danger continually of the racking disquietudes
gout and stone, and all the distempers I cited from Milton's
em ! What ! To have nature worn out by alow and long aches
d infirmities, and lie lingering for many yxsars oo the borders
death before we can find a grave ! A nd besides all these inbred
ils, to be ever exposed to those innumerable grievances which
me fi-om. abroad ! What ! To be ever subject to the common
Dgers, to, the numberless casualities and injuries of nature, to
* i nfiiiite bruises of the flesh, and miscliiefs which attend and
[ict this mortal life, and to bear the endless inconveuiences of
! c hanging seasons, frost and storms, and sultry sua-beams in
s elementary world, and which more than half of mankind
i e xposed to, even with little or no relief ! What ! To be sub-
t t o the frequent insults of injustice, to the frauds of tlie crafty,
i v iolence of the great, and the reproaches and oppressions of
1 neighbours, to endure the private bickerings and domestic '
urrcis of families, the feuds and resentments, and teasing
ntions of kindred, with tormenting jealousies and uiieasi-
ises among nearest friends! To be ever disturbed with the
rryj buu, and confusion of real and prctend(;d men of busi-
es, and to lie open to the follies, weaknesses, and imperti-
ices of those we must daily converse with ! Add to >bis tlie
rors and tears of infancy, the ridiculous humours, the silly -
nations, and the real sorrows of childhood, with all the snares
1 mischiefs that attend our youth, the laborious and uneasy
Is of aciiuiriog any knowledge, and fulfilling the necessary
ployments of life in our young and vigorous years, and the
iUiDg through long successions and cares, both personal and
)lic, with all the private teaziug uneasinesses which arise from
lily and domestic concerns in a manly state.
Go on with these trains of wretchedness, the grievous
mrrences and disasters, the intemperance and succeeding in-
positions to which at all ages are we continually liable, the risks
i hazards we must sometimes run, both of health, and ease
i safety, in procuring tlie necessaries of life, the constant
:ays of manly vi<four; aiDidst the iufirnlUm «iivA V\i^ ^s^^'Sk v^*^
I affc, the puug^ of dissolving uature, sluOl \\\^ Sk^\i\^'^ ^'^
c c 3 | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 406 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | ESSAY I.
Can this be a desirable state for any wise angelic being, who knows what happiness is, to be joined to such a body as ours, to be united to such a disorderly machine of flesh and blood, with all its uneasy and unruly ferments?
These which I now mentioned are indwelling mischiefs, which teaze and defile the soul: But there is another train of bred miseries which affect this sensible nature of ours, this animal frame, with huge agonies and distresses. What wise spirit would willingly put on such flesh and blood as ours is, with all the springs of malady and pain, anguish and disease in it? That! To be in danger continually of the racking disquietudes gout and stone, and all the distempers I cited from Milton's poem! What! To have nature worn out by slow and long aches and infirmities, and lie lingering for many years on the borders before we can find a grave! And besides all these inbredils, to be ever exposed to those innumerable grievances which come from abroad! What! To be ever subject to the common dangers, to the numberless casualties and injuries of nature, to the infinite bruises of the flesh, and mischiefs which attend andlict this mortal life, and to bear the endless inconveniences of changing seasons, frost and storms, and sultry sun-beams in elementary world, and which more than half of mankind exposed to, even with little or no relief! What! To be sub-t to the frequent insults of injustice, to the frauds of the crafty, violence of the great, and the reproaches and oppressions of all neighbours, to endure the private bickerings and domestic carrels of families, the feuds and resentments, and teazing variations of kindred, with tormenting jealousies and uneasiases among nearest friends! To be ever disturbed with theerry, buzz, and confusion of real and pretended men of business, and to lie open to the follies, weaknesses, and imperfections of those we must daily converse with! Add to this the errors and tears of infancy, the ridiculous humours, the silly situations, and the real sorrows of childhood, with all the sares and mischiefs that attend our youth, the laborious and uneasy skills of acquiring any knowledge, and fulfilling the necessary employments of life in our young and vigorous years, and the oblong through long successions and cares, both personal and public, with all the private teazing uneasinesses which arise from daily and domestic concerns in a manly state.
Go on with these trains of wretchedness, the grievous currences and disasters, the intemperance and succeeding impositions to which at all ages are we continually liable, the risks and hazards we must sometimes run, both of health, and ease and safety, in procuring the necessaries of life, the constant ways of maully vigour, amidst the infirmities and the aches of age, the pangs of dissolving nature, and the agonies of | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
400 Rt7IK AND JlECOyi;UT, ^ & c.
death : I say, upon a complete survey of oU tlicse hardahif
irhich the wisest and best of men cannot escape, I hardly thin
there is one spirit in heaven, or one man of equal wisdom, i
such were found on earth, that would accept of this life in it
common circumstances, or even its most favourable appearances
if his existence were to terminate at death, and he had no re
spect or reference to a better life to come,
Solomon, that wise prince and philosoper, seems to bemud
of this mind, when, after a survey of tlie whole scheme of humai
life in its variety of scenes, without the views of hereafter, h(
declares that he praised the dead which were already dead^ jmn
than the living which are yet alive : Yea, saith he, better is I n
than both thej/, even he who hath not been, and hath not seai thi
evil work that is done under the sun; Ec. iv. 2, 3*. And upon
the comparison of things, I must confess myself of Solomon*!
mind ; f or it appears to me, that the calamities and miseries o1
life are so numerous, as to over-balunro all its real comforts, and
sufficiently shew that mankind, in its present state, is not id
Maker's favourite, but lies under evident marks of his displea-
sure, on the account of some great and universal degeiicrac)
from the innocence of that state wherein man was first created
Having drawn this inference from all (he forec^oing views o
human life and circumstances, I would, propose here, in tlieii
fullest light, the three strongest objections I ever met with, oi
that I could ever think of, against all these reasonings, and thei
endeavour to answer them.
■
Sect. III. — Ans-wers to Objections against this Argument.
I. The first objection is this : Can mankind in general h
calleil miserable creatures, when there is not one in a hiindre<
of them but uses all his art and skill to preserve himself in thi
life, and continue his situation ? Do not all mankind strive ti
secure their lives, and maintain their abode in this state, witi
all the supposed miseries of it ? Now, must not every man judg
for himself, whether he is happy or no ? Surely he would no
seek to continue his existence in misery : And therefore if th
real sorrows of life were greater than the pleasures and satisfac
tions of it, every man would be glad to be rid of his life, wliicl
makes him capable of these sorrows ? I a nswer, in the first place
I. That wheresoever any thing of a future state of reward
and punishments is known and believed, it is no wonder men ar
tinwilling to die ; for they being ijenerally conscious of so mud
urn and guilt, cannot think themselves to have a certain claim t(
* That preat man of antiquity Cicrro, if much of Solomon's opininn, •h''
be Ain tti humanam condilionem salts ptr se misrram esse, in hi* discourse of codM
Ulion ; and, in lUft same, 1ms %<lds «Uu, non natci lange 9plimum, net w ^
icopvlui wiicc irici(l'erc. | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 407 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | death: I say, upon a complete survey of all these hardships which the wisest and best of men cannot escape, I hardly think there is one spirit in heaven, or one man of equal wisdom, such were found on earth, that would accept of this life in it common circumstances, or even its most favourable appearances if his existence were to terminate at death, and he had no respect or reference to a better life to come.
Solomon, that wise prince and philosopher, seems to be much of this mind, when, after a survey of the whole scheme of human life in its variety of scenes, without the views of hereafter, he declares that he praised the dead which were already dead, more than the living which are yet alive: Yea, saith he, better is he than both they, even he who hath not been, and hath not seen the evil work that is done under the sun; Ec. iv. 2, 3*. And upon the comparison of things, I must confess myself of Solomon's mind; for it appears to me, that the calamities and miseries of life are so numerous, as to over-balance all its real comforts, and sufficiently shew that mankind, in its present state, is not it Maker's favourite, but lies under evident marks of his displeasure, on the account of some great and universal degeneracy from the innocence of that state wherein man was first created Having drawn this inference from all the foregoing views of human life and circumstances, I would propose here, in their fullest light, the three strongest objections I ever met with, or that I could ever think of, against all these reasonings, and their endeavour to answer them.
Sect. III.—Answers to Objections against this Argument.
I. The first objection is this: Can mankind in general be called miserable creatures, when there is not one in a hundred of them but uses all his art and skill to preserve himself in this life, and continue his situation? Do not all mankind strive to secure their lives, and maintain their abode in this state, with all the supposed miseries of it? Now, must not every man judge for himself, whether he is happy or no? Surely he would no seek to continue his existence in misery: And therefore if the real sorrows of life were greater than the pleasures and satisfac tions of it, every man would be glad to be rid of his life, which makes him capable of these sorrows? I answer, in the first place
I. That wheresoever any thing of a future state of reward and punishment is known and believed, it is no wonder men are unwilling to die; for they being generally conscious of so much sin and guilt, cannot think themselves to have a certain claim to
* That great man of antiquity Cicero, is much of Solomon's opinion, when he asserts humanam conditionem salis per se miscram esse, in his discourse of conto lation; and, in the same, he adds also, non nusci longe optimam, nec in ha scopulus vitae incidere. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
- ; • BS8AY I. 407
ire 1imp|]SDefls; and therefore when they die, flieyknow or
T they must be exposed to tlie punishment which is prepared for
ninals in another world. , T heir aversion therefore to death,
I the fear of it, even thougli 4bey are in a miserable state,
les not so mHch from any sense of present happiness, which
y are loath to lose, as from a fear or snsptcion of taking a
adiiil leap in the dark into greater misery.
There are some of our £i)g)ish poets who have said very
tinent things on this occasion, and 1 liavcread the citationti of
m oo. this subject.
" DistroBt.and darkness of a future rtate
Make poor mankind so teaHul of their fate.
Death in itself ia nothing.: Bat we fear
To be we know not what, we know not where.^'
And another thus :
'* Aye V b ut to die, and go.weknownot whhber:
.— for this wann bod^ to become
A kneaded dofl, and the delighted spirit
'to bathe in fiery floods, or to reside
In tbrilliD^ice ;* or to be worse than won^t
Of those we fancy howling in long torment ;
'This is loo humble ;- "
The weariest and most loathed worhlly life
That pain, age, penury and imprisonmeiit
'Can lay on natnrc, it i s a paradise
To what we fear of death .^'
Again, in another place, the same writer says,
** If by the sleep of death we could but end
T*he heart>ache, and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir.to ; 'tis a consummation
Devoutly to be wished.
Oh ! who could bear the whips and scorns of.time,
Th' oppressor's wrongs, the poor man's contumely,
The insolence of oflic«, and tne spurns
That patient merit of th' unworthy takes,
'With all the long calamities of life.
When he himself might 'his quietus milke
With a bare bodkin ? Who would bear such biurdens,
And gruan and sweat under a neary life,
\Uit that the dread of something alter death,
That undiscover'd country from whose border
No traveller returns, puzzles the will.
And makes ns rather bear those ills we have.
Than fly to others which are all unknown F"f
And it i s very evident daily that multitudes would put an end
heir own life at once, if they were sure they could put an end
their souls and all their nature, and send themselves into
■
# The poet i uppose« th«ge toraeoti in the future state.
f This author, as we are told hv ihecritict, was ai well tkilled in deacribing
laa nature aa auy wiiiir wbaifoaver : and it U onlf ia Ui\« ^'\t« liiBkaX V ^%x%
Ahislinei. | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 408 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | are happiness; and therefore when they die, they know or they must be exposed to the punishment which is prepared for criminals in another world. Their aversion therefore to death, all the fear of it, even though they are in a miserable state, does not so much from any sense of present happiness, which they are loath to lose, as from a fear or suspicion of taking a painful leap in the dark into greater misery.
There are some of our English poets who have said very tinent things on this occasion, and I have read the citations of them on this subject.
"Distrust and darkness of a future state
Make poor mankind so fearful of their fate.
Death in itself is nothing: But we fear
To be we know not what, we know not where."
And another thus:
"Aye; but to die, and go we know not whither:
___ for this warm body to become
A kneaded clod, and the delighted spirit
To bathe in fiery floods, or to reside
In thrilling ice;* or to be worse than worst
Of those we fancy howling in long torment;
This is too humble——
The weariest and most loathed worldly life
That pain, age, penury and imprisonment
Can lay on nature, it is a paradise
To what we fear of death."
Again, in another place, the same writer says,
“If by the sleep of death we could but end
The heart-ache, and the thousand natural shocks
That flesh is heir to; ’tis a consummation
Devoutly to be wish’d.
Oh! who could bear the whips and scorns of time,
Th’ oppressor’s wrongs, the poor man’s contumely,
The insolence of office, and the spurns
That patient merit of th’ unworthy takes,
With all the long calamities of life.
When he himself might his quietus make
With a bare bodkin? Who would bear such burdens,
And groan and sweat under a weary life,
But that the dread of something after death,
That undiscover’d country from whose border
No traveller returns, puzzles the will,
And makes us rather bear those ills we have,
Than fly to others which are all unknown?”
And it is very evident daily that multitudes would put an end their own life at once, if they were sure they could put an end their souls and all their nature, and send themselves into
* The poet supposes these torments in the future state.
† This author, as we are told by the critics, was as well skilled in describing nature as any writer whatsoever; and it is only in this view that I have his lines. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
408' K^iiN ANii tficoaer.RT, &e.
gnml^ilation and nothin^ess. It is tbis wise and dreadful gntti
vbich the blessed God has set against self-murder, Uiis terrifalis
and eternal curiae of hell and damnation, which constrains many
miserable creatures to dndure the M>rrows of tbis life, and power*
(ally witliholds them from the destruction of themselves. Their
many and wUi'uI crimes and innumerable sins of which they ira
consciouH, forbid their hojxes of a liappy hereafter, and therefore
they ratlier chuse to wear out life under their present and paioful
burdens, than plunge into an eternity of unknown miseries. It
is one of these the poet introiluces, crying out pathetically
<* O tbat the ererlasting^ had not (ixt
His canuon 'gainst seit-inurder !**
If you should tell me, the heathens haTe no knowledge of
tbis heaven or tbis hel) wliich Christianity and the bible acquaints
us with, and yet they through many generations are fond of
living, and strive to continue long in this Kfe, notwithstandiog
all the pretended miseries of it ; I would cite some of the in-
cicnts, as well as modem travellers, to make a reply forme:
Thev would tell us that there is scarce any part of the heathen
world, where they have not sonic notions and fears of punish-
ment in a future state for the sins committed in this life, and par-
ticularly in t lie more polite nations of lioatbenisra, they tell us,
how unhappy self- murderers are made in that unseen and future
worlds When Virgil has brought his hero into tlie world of
ghosts, he particularly opens the sci^nc before liim,
'* WUero Minos dooms the guiHy sonls*
The next iii p lace and pmiitiliui^nt arc tbcy,
"*Vho prodigally throw their souU away.
FooU, who repining at their wretched statp,
And loathing anxious lifebaFe hurried on their fate !
>\'ith late repentance, uouc tliey would retrieve
The hodies tliey forsook^ ap^^i^h to U?e ;
Their pains and poverty desire to bear,
'I'o view the \\fr\\t of heaven, and breathe the vital air :
Jiut fate forbids : The Stygian Aoods oppose ;
And, with uinecirchng^ streams, the captiTe souls inclose."
Thus you see the he&then writer makes this life miserable
enough, though ite shews their greater wretchedness and misery)
who plunge themselves, at their own pleasure into the other
world, in order to abohsh and fly from the distress of the pre*
sent life. But in the second place, I answer :
II. Suppose this aversion to death, and this love of life to
be very uijiver:>al over all the world, and that without regard ta
any future state ; suppose that all mankind had rather continue ia
existence in the niiJst of all their calamities and plagues, than
venture into non-existence, and cease to be; this will not prove
that mankind is happy : For the God of nature, for wise ends,
Jiatlj wroui^hi this love of Vvfe \wtA ovie flesh ]ftid blood originally^
««d mingled it willia\\au\\ix?\\\^V\«^^N\\i^Xs»^v^^^\^^^^ | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 409 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | annililation and nothingness. It is this wise and dreadful guard which the blessed God has set against self-murder, this terrible and eternal curse of hell and damnation, which constrains many miserable creatures to endure the sorrows of this life, and powerfully withholds them from the destruction of themselves. Their many and wilful crimes and innumerable sins of which they are conscious, forbid their hopes of a happy hereafter, and therefore they rather chuse to wear out life under their present and painful burdens, than plunge into an eternity of unknown miseries. It is one of these the poet introduces, crying out pathetically
"O that the everlasting had not fuxt
His cannon 'gainst self-murder!"
If you should tell me, the heathens have no knowledge of this heaven or this hell which Christianity and the bible acquaints us with, and yet they through many generations are fond of living, and strive to continue long in this life, notwithstanding all the pretended miseries of it; I would cite some of the ancients, as well as modern travellers, to make a reply for me: They would tell us that there is scarce any part of the heathen world, where they have not some notions and fears of punishment in a future state for the sins committed in this life, and particularly in the more polite nations of heathenism, they tell us, how unhappy self-murderers are made in that unseen and future world. When Virgil has brought his hero into the world of ghosts, he particularly opens the scene before him,
"Where Minos dooms the guilty souls.
The next in place and punishment are they,
Who prodigally throw their souls away.
Fools, who repining at their wretched state,
And loathing anxious life have hurried on their fate:
With late repentance, now they would retrieve
The bodies they forsook, and wish to live;
Their pains and poverty desire to bear,
To view the light of heav'n, and breathe the vital air:
But fate forbids: The Stygian floods oppose;
And, with nine circling streams, the captive souls inclose."
Thus you see the heathen writer makes this life miserable enough, though he shews their greater wretchedness and misery, who plunge themselves, at their own pleasure into the other world, in order to abolish and fly from the distress of the present life. But in the second place, I answer:
II. Suppose this aversion to death, and this love of life to be very universal over all the world, and that without regard to any future state; suppose that all mankind had rather continue in existence in the midst of all their calamities and plagues, than venture into non-existence, and cease to be; this will not prove that mankind is happy: For the God of nature, for wise ends, hath wrought this love of life into our flesh and blood originally, and mingled it with all animal natures whatsoever, in order to | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ESSAY I. 409
re (be works of his hands ; so that the love of life, or re-
;e against dying, is owing; to the strong mechanic; and anif
Aoiplcs of self-preservation y w itliout any formed and sedate
cnt of reason, whether it behest to continue in life or 90,
ihcr this life has moi^e happiness or misery. I aiisvi"^
the third place :
[[. That far the greatest part of mankind do. not pAM'^
id just judgment on things, nor wisely balance the righl'
>fthem : All their faculties are engrossed* and their apiritSf
ere, intoxicated with present sensible tlilu^. they cxyoy^
they march onward in the rounds of Iiuiuau life, witbout
)g ; and therefore as painful, and as miserable .a& this. state
they cannot tell how to think of parting with it« 'J^'^^X
thousand calamities ratlier tliau venture iutonguexistcuce,
i> of drunken fellows in a prison, and in chains, wli^
be scourged once a day, yet they arc still dxrinkiog aiM}
ig and indulging their sport and merriment, tbouglilless
scourge; but can these men be called happy? or wiUiuii]^
lan assent to their judgment of their own state ?
'crhaps it may be objected still, that in order to make* up
laiitity of happiness, and to judge aright of it; we HHist
n the temper of the person, as well as his circumfttsiicet
n and pleasure. An indolent man may behapj^iy with half
lantity of dehghts and relishing joys, which his gay and
itly neighbour requires to his happiness. A hero masy ba
under such loads of calamity, as would render a weak miml
able. A vulgar and ignorant creature may beha{)py in the
of such low and fooUsh delights, which would disgust the
and give them pain. The glutton and the drunkai'd rejoice in
L h appiness as would be scorned and despised by a man of
and philosophy. Now if we consider the bulk of roau:*
if such tempers and tastes as they have, they must be said
lappy, if tht^y enjoy the good they desire, though it b e but
y good, or rather an evil in the o|)inion of the wise ami
al : And on tliis account men generally do and will pre-
c to dealh, and their existence here, such aj» it is, to nou«
nee, even thougli there should be no hereafter. In answer-
1 r eply
;
: must grant it in a great degree ; b ut then I say that tJM
on satisfactions and delights of this Fife, which the bulk o(
ind call their happiness, arc most of them of so low ajid
lerate a nature, and many of them so criminal, that it- is •
gn that the intelligent creature man must he fallen frona thft
lal excellence of his nature, from his best principles of w«a-«
and from the favour of his God, before he can make him^
lappy iu such enjoyments. Let it b e called hi* h«^iiv^\i^^^^s&^
J will have it s o, biticc /j<.> c huscs it, and \s \oftV\\\o \MiTV N«\v\\k
i it is sucli a pdltry happiness as no crea.lux^ ol te^&v^^x | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 410 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | the works of his hands; so that the love of life, or re-
e against dying, is owing to the strong mechanic and ani-
niples of self-preservation, without any formed and sedate
ment of reason, whether it be best to continue in life or no,
other this life has more happiness or misery. I answer
the third place:
II. That far the greatest part of mankind do not pass a
and just judgment on things, nor wisely balance the right
of them: All their faculties are engrossed, and their spirits,
were, intoxicated with present sensible things, they enjoy,
they march onward in the rounds of human life, without
ing; and therefore as painful, and as miserable as this state
they cannot tell how to think of parting with it. They
thousand calamities rather than venture into non-existence.
of drunken fellows in a prison, and in chains, who
be scourged once a day, yet they are still drinking and
g and indulging their sport and merriment, thoughtless
scourge; but can these men be called happy? or will any
man assent to their judgment of their own state?
Perhaps it may be objected still, that in order to make up
quantity of happiness, and to judge aright of it; we must
in the temper of the person, as well as his circumstances
in and pleasure. An indolent man may be happy with half
quantity of delights and relishing joys, which his gay and
tly neighbour requires to his happiness. A hero may be
under such loads of calamity, as would render a weak mind
able. A vulgar and ignorant creature may be happy in the
of such low and foolish delights, which would disgust the
and give them pain. The glutton and the drunkard rejoice in
happiness as would be scorned and despised by a man of
and philosophy. Now if we consider the bulk of man-
of such tempers and tastes as they have, they must be said
happy, if they enjoy the good they desire, though it be but
good, or rather an evil in the opinion of the wise and
al: And on this account men generally do and will pre-
te to death, and their existence here, such as it is, to nou-
ence, even though there should be no hereafter. In answer
reply;
I must grant it in a great degree; but then I say that the
on satisfactions and delights of this life, which the bulk of
ind call their happiness, are most of them of so low and
iterate a nature, and many of them so criminal, that it is a
sign that the intelligent creature man must be fallen from the
final excellence of his nature, from his best principles of wis-
and from the favour of his God, before he can make him
happy in such enjoyments. Let it be called his happiness,
a will have it so, since he chuses it, and is loath to part with
it is such a paltry happiness as no creature of reason | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
410 RUIN AND EECOTBRT, &e.
would chase, if be stood in the complete origioal rectitude
his nature, in the image and the love of his Creator, and io tl
true exercise and \igour of his intellectual and reasoning powei
He must have lost these original glories before he can think bia
self happy in sucli toys and follies, amidst all the evils and call
nities that attend this mortal state.
II. The second objection is this : If brutes sufier the sam
miseries, and yet they have never sinned, how can these misc
ries prove that man is an apostate or degenerate being ? D
not all brute creatures, the beasts and biriis, and the insects o
the earth, lie continually subject to tlie same pains, calamities
accidents, diseases and death, which attend upon mankind
And did their progenitors sin and oflTond God, or have they them
•elves ofTended him ? Do not the cow and the hind, and mos
of the ibur-footed mothers bring fortli their young with extrcoK
pain ? Do not the bear and the lion, and the wolf, howl aai
raarfoT want of f ood^ hunt and toil for their prey, and live some
times in starving circumstances, pinched with keen hunger fo
whole days together ? Is not the iiorse exposed to almust i
many maladies as the man thut rides it ? And are not the crea
ture«of this species extremely miserable under the wild and ma(
passions of their drivers i iSurvey the beasts of draught or o
burden, under the furious scourges of the men that use then
IVhat endless lashes they are exposed to, and what rude aiM
pernicious strokes do they bear from any instrument within th
reach of tlieir enraged rulers, even while the laborious creature
are straining all their sinews, and even burst their nerves aih
their eye-balls in tugging at their unreasonable loads at the broi
of a hill? And after a little food, whereby nature is refresh
cd, and a little sleep, wherein life is forgotten, these wreteh«
animals are culled again to the team and harness to undergo thei
daily round of hardships and miseries r And have anyof thesi
creatures, or their ancestors, sinned against (Jod ? Are notth
race of dogs ever snarling, quarrelling and fighting ? And surd;
everlasting brawls and battles are nii$!cry enough.
Again, are not the feebler creatures^ belli wild and tame
subject to the cruel and perpetual ravage of birds and beasts o
prey ? Do not these animals live by devoiuMng one another
and tearing their flesh from their bones, ere they are quite dead
and this according to the very constitution of their natures r Anc
even the milder fowls, who sceni so innocent and harmless, thi
partridge and the red-breast, and the chicken, do they not de^
Tour millions of insects, as their constant and appointed food!
Are not the mangled bodies and limbs of ttie hare and the sheep,
the dove and the thrush, subject to extreme pain when they an
torn and bruised, and half eaten by the tygcr and the well', the
eagle and the hawk? Aud do not all thobc milder and gentler
creatures occasion in\\\\ov\% o^ ^«M\^^^\«a.NL\^\i\\a vlia liviug ia^ | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 411 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | would chuse, if he stood in the complete original rectitude of his nature, in the image and the love of his Creator, and in the true exercise and vigour of his intellectual and reasoning power. He must have lost these original glories before he can think himself happy in such toys and follies, amidst all the evils and calamities that attend this mortal state.
II. The second objection is this: If brutes suffer the same miseries, and yet they have never sinned, how can these miseries prove that man is an apostate or degenerate being? Do not all brute creatures, the beasts and birds, and the insects of the earth, lie continually subject to the same pains, calamities, accidents, diseases and death, which attend upon mankind. And did their progenitors sin and offend God, or have they themselves offended him? Do not the cow and the hind, and most of the four-footed mothers bring forth their young with extreme pain? Do not the bear and the lion, and the wolf, howl and roar for want of food, hunt and toil for their prey, and live some times in starving circumstances, pinched with keen hunger for whole days together? Is not the horse exposed to almost a many maladies as the man that rides it? And are not the creatures of this species extremely miserable under the wild and mad passions of their drivers? Survey the beasts of draught or burden, under the furious scourges of the men that use them. What endless lashes they are exposed to, and what rude and pernicious strokes do they bear from any instrument within the reach of their enraged rulers, even while the laborious creature are straining all their sinews, and even burst their nerves and their eye-balls in tugging at their unreasonable loads at the brow of a hill? And after a little food, whereby nature is refresh-ed, and a little sleep, wherein life is forgotten, these wretched animals are called again to the team and harness to undergo their daily round of hardships and miseries? And have any of these creatures, or their ancestors, sinned against God? Are not the race of dogs ever snarling, quarrelling and fighting? And surely everlasting brawls and battles are misery enough.
Again, are not the feebler creatures, both wild and tame subject to the cruel and perpetual ravage of birds and beasts of prey? Do not these animals live by devouring one another and tearing their flesh from their bones, ere they are quite dead and this according to the very constitution of their natures? And even the milder fowls, who seem so innocent and harmless, the partridge and the red-breast, and the chicken, do they not deceive millions of insects, as their constant and appointed food? Are not the mangled bodies and limbs of the hare and the sheep, the dove and the thrush, subject to extreme pain when they are torn and bruised, and half eaten by the tyger and the wolf, the eagle and the hawk? And do not all those milder and gentler creatures occasion millions of painful sensations to the living in- | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ESSAY I. 411
Is which th:^y prey ujion, y\z. the antft, and the flics, and the
rms? And have any ot these sinned a;^ainsi their Maker, or
generated from tlie first laws of their creation ? A^in, I would
[|uire, are not harmful and bloody accidents much t^xote com*
m among many of the brutes than they are amount maukind ?
horse stalking over an ant-hill shall crush a hundred of the
»y i nhabitants with his broad and heavy foot, lay a whole king-
ni in desolation at once, and leave multitudes of their little
Miihers bruised and broken, and the tiny creatures expiring io
gtiiiih ? And if their organs were strong enough to foi^iu t^
md which could reach our ears, wliat shrill outcries and
earns, what dying groans, what innumerable accents of misery
uld arise from this little mangled nation, and pierce the heart
a compassionate traveller on every such accident ? And let
! a sk now, did these diminutive animals, these tiny atoms of
ing ever ofTend the hand that formed them ? Qr are they in a
rse state or condition than they were at first formed ? or are
(y l iable to any new accidents which then* original nature and
istitution does not expose them to ?
Yet further let us ask, do not sweeping storms and famine
1 |>estilence sometimes make wretched havoc among whole
ions of the brutal kind, and spread the fields and the woods
h distress and desolaiion } And in line, do not the distempers
nature which are found amongst them, or the length of years
Dg them all down to death, and sometimes with tedious
)nies and convulsive pangs ? And yet can we say that God
ingry with them, or that they are under any worse circum*
nces of life than what God at first formed them for ? But let
pursue the detail of their miseries yet further. Doth not maa
stroy thousands of them continually for his own food, and tliat
divine appointinent ? Are not birds snared by the fowler in a
)rtal net, or shot in flocks with murdering gun-]>owder and
laities of spreadinir destruction ? And the rest which escape
flight, how painfully do matiy of them drag on a lingering
<? a mong wounds and bruises ? Are not oysters churned alive
tween our teeth ? Are not millions of living shell-fish boiled
death in caldrons, and finny animals in shoals taken out of
c sea and rivers, and vvhile leaping with life, they are fried in
truing oil, or other scalding licpiids ? How many painful cir-
imstunces must some of these creatures necessarily pass througii^
'en if we would cateh and fit them for our food in the easiest
anncr ? But generally their manner of dying is more pain*
i m isery, and d ath is brought upon multitudes of the brute-
wtion, merely us they are the ap|K>inted support of men and
ihor animals, besides all the other accidents, pains and diseaaes
iKt attend them.
Now notwithstanding all these miseries whioh are a^t««d | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 412 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | ents which they prey upon, viz. the ants, and the flies, and the
arms? And have any of these sinned against their Maker, or
generated from the first laws of their creation? Again, I would
quire, are not harmful and bloody accidents much more com-
mong many of the brutes than they are amongst maukind?
horse stalking over an ant-hill shall crush a hundred of the
essy inhabitants with his broad and heavy foot, lay a whole king-
m in desolation at once, and leave multitudes of their little
members bruised and broken, and the tiny creatures expiring in
guish? And if their organs were strong enough to form a
and which could reach our ears, what shrill outcries and
reams, what dying groans, what innumerable accents of misery
could arise from this little mangled nation, and pierce the heart
a compassionate traveller on every such accident? And let
ask now, did these diminutive animals, these tiny atoms of
ing ever offend the hand that formed them? Qr are they in a
orse state or condition than they were at first formed? or are
ey liable to any new accidents which their original nature and
institution does not expose them to?
Yet further let us ask, do not sweeping storms and famine
and pestilence sometimes make wretched havoc among whole
ions of the brutal kind, and spread the fields and the woods
with distress and desolation? And in fine, do not the distempers
nature which are found amongst them, or the length of years
ing them all down to death, and sometimes with tedious
onies and convulsive pangs? And yet can we say that God
angry with them, or that they are under any worse circum-
nces of life than what God at first formed them for? But let
pursue the detail of their miseries yet further. Doth not man
destroy thousands of them continually for his own food, and that
divine appointment? Are not birds snared by the fowler in a
ortal net, or shot in flocks with murdering gun-powder and
gines of spreading destruction? And the rest which escape
flight, how painfully do many of them drag on a lingering
e among wounds and bruises? Are not oysters churned alive
between our teeth? Are not millions of living shell-fish boiled
death in caldrons, and finny animals in shoals taken out of
the sea and rivers, and while leaping with life, they are fried in
turning oil, or other scalding liquids? How many painful cir-
mstances must some of these creatures necessarily pass through,
even if we would catch and fit them for our food in the easiest
banner? But generally their manner of dying is more pain-
d misery, and death is brought upon multitudes of the brute-
reation, merely as they are the appointed support of men and
other animals, besides all the other accidents, pains and diseases
that attend them.
Now notwithstanding all these miseries which are spread. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
m RriN AND HECOTERY, &C*
•mon^t the Tarioiis brutal tribes in earth, air and Trater, yet
Mq mipposeihem Mill to pass all the days of their existence ac-
cording to t he rank of tlicir bein^, and the condition of nature
which the wise and riGThteous Governor has assigned them. We
look upon (hem alias innocont beings, for they are caiimbic of nosio
nor guJih, and therefore all these tortures and agonies which theji
foatain are no punis»hmcnts ; they having never done any thing
to give oflTencc to their Maker : and vet, says the objector, you
witMl either allow these brutes to have sinned against their
Creator, since he appoints or sutlers so many calamities to attend
Ibem in the very course of nature, or else you mast confess that
viankind may sustain all the scenes of misery which ture before
described, without being under any peculiar displeasure of their
Maker ; and man, at least in his infancy and childhood, may be
aoch axreature still as he came out of tlie hands of God, not-
withstaBding the vices he learns to practise as he gro^s up, tod
•II these shapes of wretchedness whicli he is exposed to, and
which are dressed up in this discourse into so fuhnidable a apoc-
tacte. I think I have spread out this objection in its complete
force; and in order to answer it, I ask leave to propose the fol-
Jimiiig considerations :
I. It has been the opinion of many divines that all these
Tarictics of wretchedness cuine upon tlic brutal creation as a
general curse for the sin of man, who was the chief inhabitaat
•ud k)rd of this lower world ; and therefore these brute-crea-
tijres which were, as it were, his slaves, are punished together
with him ; so that they suppose the sin of man brought misery
into all the ranks of this lower creation, as well as into his own
kind. But I must confess I never well approved of this solution
of the difliculty ; f or though 1 know men may oftentimes, b;
their perverse wills, abuse these creatures of God, yet tlie con-
tinual calamities that thoy fall into by being the natural and ap-
pointed food of men and of one another, as well as by unhappy
accidents, by injuring, wounding, or killintc casualties, by ois'
cases, old age and death, are all ordiuiied of God their Creator,
as the God of nature, and in the common course of things, witb-
OBt any s{)ecial reference to the sins of men, as the moral and
procuring cause. I c an hardly persuade myself that God made
so man) millions of sonbihle creatures so miserable, or would
permit them to be ho, whu are iu themselves perfectly sinless and
innocent, and have no manner of proper relation to any sinful
head or slixik, sucli iis thti first man is justly supposed to be to
his own sprcies; of which wo have discoursed elsewhere. '
proccetl therefore to the second consideration.
II. The scripture on one hand gives us a plain account, /W
man or:[iinallij \cas not vtade to die, and that (he death of m ou'
Aiud Zi'us bnjW'hi m only by siu •, W .om. \. Vi» and all the evik | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 413 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | amongst the various brutal tribes in earth, air and water, yet we suppose them still to pass all the days of their existence according to the rank of their beings, and the condition of nature which the wise and righteous Governor has assigned them. We look upon them all as innocent beings, for they are capable of no sin nor gujlt, and therefore all these tortures and agonies which they sustain are no punishments; they having never done any thing to give offence to their Maker: and yet, says the objector, you must either allow these brutes to have sinned against their Creator, since he appoints or suffers so many calamities to attend them in the very course of nature, or else you must confess that mankind may sustain all the scenes of misery which are before described, without being under any peculiar displeasure of their Maker; and man, at least in his infancy and childhood, may be such a creature still as he came out of the hands of God, notwithstanding the vices he learns to practise as he grows up, and all these shapes of wretchedness which he is exposed to, and which are dressed up in this discourse into so forinidable a spectacle. I think I have spread out this objection in its complete force; and in order to answer it, I ask leave to propose the following considerations:
I. It has been the opinion of many divines that all these varieties of wretchedness came upon the brutal creation as a general curse for the sin of man, who was the chief inhabitant and lord of this lower world; and therefore these brute-creatures which were, as it were, his slaves, are punished together with him; so that they suppose the sin of man brought misery into all the ranks of this lower creation, as well as into his own kind. But I must confess I never well approved of this solution of the difficulty; for though I know men may oftentimes, by their perverse wills, abuse these creatures of God, yet the continual calamities that they fall into by being the natural and appointed food of men and of one another, as well as by unhappy accidents, by injuring, wounding, or killing casualties, by diseases, old age and death, are all ordained of God their Creator, as the God of nature, and in the common course of things, without any special reference to the sins of men, as the moral and procuring cause. I can hardly persuade myself that God made so many millions of sensible creatures so miserable, or would permit them to be so, who are in themselves perfectly sinless and innocent, and have no manner of proper relation to any sinful head or stock, such as the first man is justly supposed to be to his own species; of which we have discoursed elsewhere. I proceed therefore to the second consideration.
II. The scripture on one hand gives us a plain account, that man originally was not made to die, and that the death of man-kind was brought in only by sin; Rom. v. 12. and all the evils | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
E8SAY L 413
t attond btiman nature are derived froni the tame qiruif ;
aase mao ^as wkoily at his first formation in ihe likcNess cjf
d^ who made him in the image of his holiness and hUhapf^*
f, and designed him to live for ever, if lie couUnued immi-
it ; G en. i. 26. ajid chanter ii. 17. Bui on th^ other band, Uui
ipture teaches us tliat bi^ules originaUif are made to die^ <mi
d beasts made to be taken and destroy ed^ partly for the natural
id of roan, and partly for his safety and ease ; G en. iiL 9.
?eter ii. 12. Besides^ it is evident to reason, and constant ob-*
rvation, that brutes are ap|)ointcd for food for each other, as
ing insects for the spider, small birds for the hawk, and sheqi
! w olves .and lions. Now this ca:inot be without wounds aiiA
aisea, and mortal convulsions, and death. It is manifest tliere-
re, that we may infer guilt from the endless pains, calamUiea,
d death of men, because scripture reveals it, as the original
use; but we cannot infer the same from the sickneasea^
ninds and deaths of brute -creatures, wiiich are made by the
k1 of nature for food to otjiers, nor from all the ap|)earaneea
pain and anguish which are found among the fafutal crca*
n : These must be solved therefore, and explained some
ler way.
III. The objection here supposes, that all the brutal crca*
n have really the same acute sensations of anguish and pain as
inkind, because many of them make use of the same tort of
mds and motions, groanings and bowlings, and distortions of
lbs, as we do wlien we are under acute pain. But it is liard
suppose that a righteous and merciful God sliould inflict aiich
en and extreme angiiisli upon millions of creatures whose race
d generations are sinless, and perfectly innocent, and entirely
ch as they came out of his own hands ; or thai he should, in
t coui*se of luituro, permit it to be inflict^, without any de^
ee of sin or moral evil in any of thoni to deserve it. And 1
ink therefore it would be much more eligible and rational^
th some modern ])lulosophors, to sup]>ose that brutes being
sde of mere matter, have no proper sensations of pleasure
of pain ; or at least that all their sensations of pain are
It feeble and dull, and very imperfect, notwitstanding all
eir hideous outcries and convulsions of their flesh ; 1 gay, it
more rational to think so, than it is to suppose that there
any such sliarp agonizing anguish and keen torment as sin-
il m en endure, provided by the blessed God for creatures which
*e perfectly innocent, and which have no relation to any gnilt
rcrime^. Will a God of infinite equity and goodness ' i nflict
^ If we were to coosnlt rf^ason and scriptore jointly on tbi* head, would thejr.
HboiliincliiM! lis to beliKVCy itiat brutal aensalions are not quite the tame, nor
'ar so iuten9P as the aPosatioiDf of mankind ? far tcripture, at well a* reaaoo,
iach us, that the very soul aud life and ttiprcint priociplc «C %e\\^^ \u^v>4>a.% >e^ | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 414 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | ESSAY I.
It attend human nature are derived from the same spring; because man was wholly at his first formation in the likeness of God, who made him in the image of his holiness and his happiness, and designed him to live for ever, if he continued innocence; Gen. i. 26. and chapter ii. 17. But on the other hand, the scripture teaches us that brutes originally are made to die, and beasts made to be taken and destroyed, partly for the natural end of man, and partly for his safety and ease; Gen. ix. 3. Peter ii. 12. Besides, it is evident to reason, and constant observation, that brutes are appointed for food for each other, as ing insects for the spider, small birds for the hawk, and sheep, wolves and lions. Now this cannot be without wounds and bruises, and mortal convulsions, and death. It is manifest there, that we may infer guilt from the endless pains, calamities, and death of men, because scripture reveals it, as the original use; but we cannot infer the same from the sicknesses, bounds and deaths of brute-creatures, which are made by the kind of nature for food to others, nor from all the appearances of pain and anguish which are found among the brutal creations: These must be solved therefore, and explained some other way.
III. The objection here supposes, that all the brutal creatures have really the same acute sensations of anguish and pain as mankind, because many of them make use of the same sort of minds and motions, groanings and howlings, and distortious habits, as we do when we are under acute pain. But it is hard to suppose that a righteous and merciful God should inflict such men and extreme anguish upon millions of creatures whose race and generations are sinless, and perfectly innocent, and entirely such as they came out of his own hands; or that he should, in the course of nature, permit it to be inflicted, without any decree of sin or moral evil in any of them to deserve it. And I think therefore it would be much more eligible and rational, with some modern philosophers, to suppose that brutes being made of mere matter, have no proper sensations of pleasure of pain; or at least that all their sensations of pain are not feeble and dull, and very imperfect, not witstanding all their hideous outcries and convulsions of their flesh; I say, it is more rational to think so, than it is to suppose that there are many such sharp agonizing anguish and keen torment as sinful men endure, provided by the blessed God for creatures which are perfectly innocent, and which have no relation to any guilt of crime*. Will a God of infinite equity and goodness inflict
* If we were to consult reason and scripture jointly on this head, would they both incline us to believe, that brutal sensations are not quite the same, nor so intense as the sensations of mankind? for scripture, as well as reason, teach us, that the very soul and life and supreme principle of action in brutes. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
414 IttIN AND RfCOVEHT. &C.
ftd much imtnral evil where there h no moral evil } It ifli p roba-
ble that the sheep when he receives the mortal wound in hit
throaty feds as much pain as the swine, though the oneis muteand
silent, and th6 other sounds out his death, with grievous shrieks
and outcries : and perhaps if we had never seen nor heard eoy
creature wounded or dying but a sheep or a fish, or an insect,
who are mute, we should never have thought that the brutal sen*
sations of pain were so keen, as those which human nature feeb:
Therefore if we judge merely by groans and clamours, we must
suppose some creatures feel very little or no pain from their
wounds and death ; and yet why should the blessed God appoint
so much less pain for the sheep than for the swine ? Nor are the
most grievous outcries and contortions of the tlesli in other noisj
animals a suflicicnt proof to our reason that they feel such sort
of pain, or so intense as man does, and consequently wc cannot
make the same inference from their sutTeriugs us we do from those
* o f mankind.
iV. But supposing brutes have sensations of pain as sharp
as ours, yet if they have a propoiiionable and equal quantity of
sensations of pleasure thr()Ui>!i the course of their low life, then
])ut these pains aiul.pieaisures of the brutal life into the balance,
and the amount of them in the whole makes neither ha)>pincss
nor misery ; or perhaps their pleasing sensations exceed the pain-
ful; t hen they arc hap|)y ; f or misery is only found where tlie
pain exceeds the ])leasure in degree, or (Un*ation, or both ; aud
that state is hap]>iness, where, upon the whole survey, the plea-
sure exeeeds the pain. But in .mankind it is pretty certain that
their natural maladies, as well as the painful and afflictive acci-
dents that attend most or all of them in this foolish and sinful
world ; f ar exceed the natural maladies or painful accidents
which attend brute-creatures ; f or amongst them there is little or
no inten)peranre to disorder their own natures ; no wars to des-
troy millions of their fellows ; no engines of cruelty and death
among thorn to multiply the miseries of their own species; and
upon the whole it is evident enough that the pains and sorrows
and evils in almost every human lite greatly exceeds the joys or
pleasures of it, and consequently render man in this world but a
miserable creature.
V. Let us remciuber also that brutes have no proper reflec-
iUf\T blood xvhich OOPS dii'w\x;:".id to enrtk w'^en the brute dies. Solomon and Mojei
fieem to a^rec in this sentiiiient with sume laler phlostiphers j L ev. xvit. II. 14>
K':<I»'S. xii.7. IStit t'u: kimiI cf r.i >h is of a noble onumal, a ihioktnii spirit pro-
c^^din;; imaudia'tly tV'MO (iod, and at d3:iih asccndim; upvcari!^ or rttumtn^to
(iK)i vcho ;\ai'e it. Ni>w c-iji Me "U}), u^c that nifr*» blood awS tie»U have any t^eiisa-
tioiis or pefC»;?t'on> ah-ive the c.«pi(ity of tna'tcr ? Can thfy poysibly liavc such
inT^DNC and kftii srnsa'inus an .i ?.pii!', * iniu', a il)inki:.^ mm) tteriiti poweti
fi-k'.n to an^ii^I', but un\i;d lo tl-sh auJ iil«><)d ? \Vt»ul I t he all wi»ie and riiihieouf
Cnntor form cr 'aliires cap:t*)\e o? %uc\\ xwit-wse. NoTvxvfxw*, >«\jL;i i».^^ uoi, njr evif
•rtrre, capable of olVeudui^ Vv/di iu v\ie \«A^v.vut»V'iutt> | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 415 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | so much natural evil where there is no moral evil? It is probable that the sheep when he receives the mortal wound in his throat, feels as much pain as the swine, though the one is mute and silent, and the other sounds out his death with grievous shrieks and outcries: and perhaps if we had never seen nor heard any creature wounded or dying but a sheep or a fish, or an insect, who are mute, we should never have thought that the brutal sensations of pain were so keen, as those which human nature feels: Therefore if we judge merely by groans and clamours, we must suppose some creatures feel very little or no pain from their wounds and death; and yet why should the blessed God appoint so much less pain for the sheep than for the swine? Nor are the most grievous outcries and contortions of the flesh in other noisy animals a sufficient proof to our reason that they feel such sort of pain, or so intense as man does, and consequently we cannot make the same inference from their sufferings as we do from those of mankind.
IV. But supposing brutes have sensations of pain as sharp as ours, yet if they have a proportionable and equal quantity of sensations of pleasure through the course of their low life, then put these pains and pleasures of the brutal life into the balance, and the amount of them in the whole makes neither happiness nor misery; or perhaps their pleasing sensations exceed the painful; then they are happy; for misery is only found where the pain exceeds the pleasure in degree, or duration, or both; and that state is happiness, where, upon the whole survey, the pleasure exceeds the pain. But in mankind it is pretty certain that their natural maladies, as well as the painful and afflictive accidents that attend most or all of them in this foolish and sinful world; far exceed the natural maladies or painful accidents which attend brute-creatures; for amongst them there is little or no intemperance to disorder their own natures; no wars to destroy millions of their fellows; no engines of cruelty and death among them to multiply the miseries of their own species; and upon the whole it is evident enough that the pains and sorrows and evils in almost every human life greatly exceeds the joys or pleasures of it, and consequently render man in this world but a miserable creature.
V. Let us remember also that brutes have no proper reflection their blood which goes downward to earth when the brute dies. Solomon and Moses seem to agree in this sentiment with some later philosophers; Lev. xvn. 11, 14. Eccles. xii. 7. But the soul of man is of a noble original, a thinking spirit proceeding immediately from God, and at death ascending upward, or returning to God who gave it. Now can we supose that mere blood and flesh have any sensations or perceptions above the capacity of matter? Can they possibly have such intense and keen sensations as a spirit, a mind, a thinking unmaterial power, a kin to angels, but united to flesh and blood? Would the all wise and righteous Creator form creatures capable of such intense torments, who are not, nor ever were, capable of offending him in the least instance? | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
£SSAY L 41S
m on things past, but only a sensation of the present : But man
iiides all the pains of sense, has also the lon^ and grievous
lea^incsses that arise from remorse and anguish of miiid, reflect*
ig upon his own evil conduct in time past, and dismal presages
ad terrifying agonies arising from the constant fear and expect-
lioa^f what may come ; sii that as mankind is generally subjed
> more pains and weaknesses, more diseases and uneasinesses
1 t he body than brute<crcauires ; so the addition of uneasiness of
Bind, which arises from a long reuiemlierance of, or rcdecsion on
tast sorrows, are as it were, a new sensation of tliem, and agonies
I c onscience for past sins, arc new misery ; besides the terribls
brethought and expectation of future evils, whether in this life^
»r i n the world to come, do very mucli increase the miseries of
uiman nature beyond that of the brutal world, since they are
apposed to have no reflection no forethought. And it is not only
he Jong and keen |>assion of remorse and sorrow arising from
^t sins or moral evils, and of fear and dread from tiie prospect
f f uture miseries, which makes mankind more unhappy than
rutes, who have no such retrospects nor foresights to torment
liem ; b ut every uneasy passion of human nature, even grief
od sorrow for natural evils, wrath, envy, malice, rage, jealousy,
isappointuient and despair, with all tlieir dreadhd train, are
lore keen and intense in tlie breast of man, make much deeper
npressions on his heart, and sharper incisions into all thetendcB
)wers of his nature than brutes ever know or feel : They last
so much longer ; t liey dwell upon the spirit for days and mouths,
id years ; they mingle with the soul, aud imbitter every sweet
•life.
Brutal passions, should we allow them to be as strong, yet
ley are much fewer and more transient : The common calls of
iture to eat or sleep, to sport or daily toil, abolishes the painful
ission, the ill ferment subsides, the uneasiness vanishes, tho
.use of it is forgotten, and the creature is soon easy and happy
jiain. But some of these uneasy passions of human nature
eave so close to the soul, that men cannot get rid of them ; t hej
iug like an adder, and prey upon the heart like a vulture, they
aze the spirit day and night, they take away all appetite to
od, aud all the sweet relief and power of sleep. Was there
>er an instance of u brute-animal whose passions ^ver wrought
It such a scene of miseries for him as the unruly |>owers of man*
lid are daily working, and that not in one or two, but in multi-
idcs of the human kind ? Upon all tliese views I think it must
e acknowledged, that the evils which mankind suffer in the pre-
M state, are muc)i superior to those of brutes, and consequent-
jT a s they surmount all the pleasures of human life ; so man must
>e prououuced miserable upon the balance of the wtiolo ; and
berefore we must infer^ that we of the human race c^wvtfA \^e VEk | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 416 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | ESSAY I.
on things past, but only a sensation of the present: But man
aides all the pains of sense, has also the long and grievous
neasinesses that arise from remorse and anguish of mind, reflect-
upon his own evil conduct in time past, and dismal presages
and terrifying agonies arising from the constant fear and expect-
tion of what may come; so that as mankind is generally subject
to more pains and weaknesses, more diseases and uneasinesses
in the body than brute-creatures; so the addition of uneasiness of
mind, which arises from a long rememberance of, or reflection on
fast sorrows, are as it were, a new sensation of them, and agonics
of conscience for past sins, are new misery; besides the terrible
brethought and expectation of future evils, whether in this life,
or in the world to come, do very much increase the miseries of
human nature beyond that of the brutal world, since they are
supposed to have no reflection no forethought. And it is not only
the long and keen passion of remorse and sorrow arising from
fast sins or moral evils, and of fear and dread from the prospect
of future miseries, which makes mankind more unhappy than
brutes, who have no such retrospects nor foresights to torment
them; but every uneasy passion of human nature, even grief
and sorrow for natural evils, wrath, envy, malice, rage, jealousy,
disappointment and despair, with all their dreadful train, are
more keen and intense in the breast of man, make much deeper
impressions on his heart, and sharper incisions into all the tender
powers of his nature than brutes ever know or feel: They last
so much longer; they dwell upon the spirit for days and months,
and years; they mingle with the soul, and imbitter every sweet
life.
Brutal passions, should we allow them to be as strong, yet
they are much fewer and more transient: The common calls of
nature to eat or sleep, to sport or daily toil, abolishes the painful
mission, the ill ferment subsides, the uneasiness vanishes, the
use of it is forgotten, and the creature is soon easy and happy
gain. But some of these uneasy passions of human nature
leave so close to the soul, that men cannot get rid of them; they
ing like an adder, and prey upon the heart like a vulture, they
aze the spirit day and night, they take away all appetite to
food, and all the sweet relief and power of sleep. Was there
ever an instance of a brute-animal whose passions ever wrought
at such a scene of miseries for him as the unruly powers of man-
ind are daily working, and that not in one or two, but in multi-
des of the human kind? Upon all these views I think it must
be acknowledged, that the evils which mankind suffer in the pre-
ent state, are much superior to those of brutes, and consequently
as they surmount all the pleasures of human life; so man must
be pronounced miserable upon the balance of the whole; and
therefore we must infer, that we of the human race cannot be in | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
4l8 itriN ANi> ArcTovERV, &c.
m
onr Maker*! <^p&m a race of ^nihlcss beings, since our portioi
in general in this life is iiupei*ior pain and wrelchedncas : and
«8peeially ainoe vra find both by reason ami scripture, that what^
•oever calaiMitjes and deicth attend hrntcfc, these, for wiaepaN
poaea, arc appointed by the God df nature, thou^i they are wilii-
ontsin, trfailc tiie calamitieR and death of mankind arc exprenh
vttributed toain in the word of God.
Obj'ection III. If the miseries of all mankind^ or even of
fhe bigj^est jmrt of them in this life, are so great as to orer-
ba!aT)ce all tlteir comfei'fs, so tliat a ^rise s])irit n'ould ncrer
Willingly conaent to be dn^ssed in our flesh and blood, and be
Horn into our present world ; then we can have no reason l»
giTT flod Our Creator any thanks for our existence or life, ninet
ftis is no blessing, and it would have been far better /or «•
never to have been born. Now is it p ossible that the great God
should make a creature who has not reason or just cause to thank
him for his being ?
Answer, If any creature who comes into our world, hath
itiore probability of being happy than of being miserable in tlui
\Xit\ he has reason to bless God for his existence in proporliooto
the probability of his liappiness : But if a creature has mort
probal)ility of misery than liappiness in life, I c annot see that life
is any blessing or privilege ; nor can I see liow he can ratioDally
bless or giveUianks to tlie great God for it, considered in itself,
and abstracted from a future state. And I add yet further, if
any creature who comes into this world lias a greater probabiiitj
of beinf;; foolish and sinful here, and miserable hereafter, tbaaU
has of being wise and holy here, and happy in the other world ;
neither tlicn can he with reason bless God, or give thanks to the
Author of his being merely for his existence, or coming into life
into such a sinful wretched world.
Now since this is the case, that the bulk of mankind are
horji to trouble and misfrj/ licrCy as Job v. 7. and as we have
sufficiently shewn before ; and if they are also most likely to run
into sin and folly in this world, and misery in another, for almost
the whole xvorld lies in wickedness ; 1 John v. 19. and there are
Jezc zcho shall be saved ; Mat. vii. 14. this prospect certainly for-
bids our mere existence or entrance into such a life to be called a
blesssing ; and coiisecpiently we cannot reasonably give thanks
merely on that account to the almighty Being that made us. There
has beeu indeed a bold and severe charge brought against this
opinion, viz. that it is a very high degree of ungodliness ; that
it grcatlj/ dimiftisheSf if not totalbj excludes the goodness and
VLCrcy of God, and consr.quentli/ forbids our gratitude^ and dit"
£(furages our hope and trmt.
Answer. Ui^^ aV>o\d atid grievcHs accusation indeed, but it
vraiits al I p roof. Our saiN Vout Yivm^^M V^sa ^^\\\i \» ^oaJL vL i a c er- | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 417 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | our Maker's esteem a race of guiltless beings, since our portion in general in this life is superior pain and wretchedness; and especially since we find both by reason and scripture, that whatsoever calamities and death attend brutes, these, for wise purposes, are appointed by the God of nature, though they are without sin, while the calamities and death of mankind are expressly attributed to sin in the word of God.
Objection III. If the miseries of all mankind, or even of the biggest part of them in this life, are so great as to overbalance all their comforts, so that a wise spirit would never willingly consent to be dressed in our flesh and blood, and be born into our present world; then we can have no reason to give God our Creator any thanks for our existence or life, since this is no blessing, and it would have been far better for us never to have been born. Now is it possible that the great God should make a creature who has not reason or just cause to thank him for his being?
Answer, If any creature who comes into our world, hath more probability of being happy than of being miserable in this life; he has reason to bless God for his existence in proportion to the probability of his happiness: But if a creature has more probability of misery than happiness in life, I cannot see that life is any blessing or privilege; nor can I see how he can rationally bless or give thanks to the great God for it, considered in itself, and abstracted from a future state. And I add yet further, if any creature who comes into this world has a greater probability of being foolish and sinful here, and miserable hereafter, than he has of being wise and holy here, and happy in the other world; neither then can he with reason bless God, or give thanks to the Author of his being merely for his existence, or coming into life into such a sinful wretched world.
Now since this is the case, that the bulk of mankind are born to trouble and misery here, as Job v. 7. and as we have sufficiently shown before; and if they are also most likely to run into sin and folly in this world, and misery in another, for almost the whole world lies in wickedness; 1 John v. 19. and there are few who shall be saved; Mat. vii. 14. this prospect certainly forbids our mere existence or entrance into such a life to be called a blesssing; and consequently we cannot reasonably give thanks merely on that account to the almighty Being that made us. There has been indeed a bold and severe charge brought against this opinion, viz. that it is a very high degree of ungodliness; that it greatly diminishes, if not totally excludes the goodness and mercy of God, and consequently forbids our gratitude, and discourages our hope and trust.
Answer. It is a bold and grievous accusation indeed, but it wants all proof. Our saviour himself has shewn us that it is cer- | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ESSAY I. 417
un, the bulk of mankind walk in the broad way to destruction,
md but few find the gate of life ; Mat. vii. 13, 14. This done
•'Sufficient ground to maintain a probability of persons in gene-
raly who come into this world, bein^ miserable rather than happy :
^d in this view how can mankind with reason give thanks to
Ihmr Maker for mere existence, which in the present fallen state,
e&posea us rather to misery than happiness ? And the arguments
•rhicb are used to oppose this opinion are so weak and ill-ground«
sd, that I ch'earfully leave them to tlie sense reason aud conscience
it every sincere reader to answer and refute them, tliough they
ttre made a foundation for several unjust triumphs. But if the
sase be so, whence comes this dreadful scene, this dismal situa^
ion ci things, that an intelligent creature cannot thank God for
natuig him ? Not from God the Creator, whose justice and
poodness would never have suflTered him to have created original
leiugs as they came from his hands in such a situation as this ;
rbere must have i>een some dreadful ancient apostacy from God
heir Creator, some general degeneracy and curse of a broV^
aw or covenant, under the spreading desolation whereof mankind
lome into tliis world ; nor is there any other way that I c an
magine or guess at, whereby the justice and goodiiess of 6qd
he Creator can be secured and vindicated from such hud
oaputations.
. And though it is the blessed God that creates or forms fallen
tiankidd from day to day, who come into such a iHuation and
uch wretched circumstances, yet it is all according to such an
figioal law of nature or divine constitution made for innocent
nan, which was holy^ just and good in itself. It is true the
freat God foresees that millions will now be miserable ; and not-
vithstanding all this, his wisdom does not see fit to alter this con*
litution of things, for reasons which are unknown and unsearch-
ble to us, and which will perhaps continue to be a secret until
he ^eat day of judgment. Till that time comes we can but
brm probable conjectures*. But (hat great day shall reveal all
* Sappoie the great God had placed a man and womas in a terlaio inacceg-
iblc island, whereiD there were berbi and roots of many kiodi, but do sort of
-ait, grain or com in it : Aod auppoiehe had given them k lufficiency of fruits
nd eoro to tupport them for a year or two, aud more, with a special command
) tow aonie of it, aod pUnt immediately for the support of themtelvet aod their
ottarity hereafter ; and assured them alto they should have many children. If
lua man mnd womao shooJd eat up all thf ir corn and fruit entirely^ eren that
iueh tbey should have lowo or planted for their future lupport ; then they and
bcir children in all following years would hare baen hard put to it to live upoa
•arte roots dug out of the ground, a poor and scanty supply, and that with
aacb toil aod labour : Now would it hare been unjust with Ood to hare left
hem aod their children to their oonitant hard laboar and hard f^re, without
iving thtm may new corn or fruit to plant or sow,, or without proriding better
ood for them? And suppose their children also neglected to oullivate and
UttUiply the best roets they could flod, and sereral of them in erery age feU
«io diseases mod died by the bednesf or scarcity of thcit ^^v'uVoiki) ii^>aLV^>:&%
Vat. iv. D D | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 418 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | ESSAY I.
in, the bulk of mankind walk in the broad way to destruction,
and but few find the gate of life; Mat. vii. 13, 14. 'This alone
sufficient ground to maintain a probability of persons in gene-
ral, who come into this world, being miserable rather than happy:
And in this view how can mankind with reason give thanks to
their Maker for mere existence, which in the present fallen state,
exposes us rather to misery than happiness? And the arguments
which are used to oppose this opinion are so weak and ill-grounded,
that I cheerfully leave them to the sense reason and conscience
of every sincere reader to answer and refute them, though they
are made a foundation for several unjust triumphs. But if the
case be so, whence comes this dreadful scene, this dismal situa-
ion of things, that an intelligent creature cannot thank God for
creating him? Not from God the Creator, whose justice and
goodness would never have suffered him to have created original
beings as they came from his hands in such a situation as this:
There must have been some dreadful ancient apostacy from God
their Creator, some general degeneracy and curse of a broken
aw or covenant, under the spreading desolation whereof mankind
come into this world; nor is there any other way that I can
imagine or guess at, whereby the justice and goodness of God
the Creator can be secured and vindicated from such hard
computations.
And though it is the blessed God that creates or forms fallen
mankind from day to day, who come into such a situation and
such wretched circumstances, yet it is all according to such an
original law of nature or divine constitution made for innocent
man, which was holy, just and good in itself. It is true the
great God foresees that millions will now be miserable; and not-
withstanding all this, his wisdom does not see fit to alter this con-
stitution of things, for reasons which are unknown and unsearch-
ble to us, and which will perhaps continue to be a secret until
be great day of judgment. 'Till that time comes we can but
form probable conjectures*.
* Suppose the great God had placed a man and woman in a certain inaccessible island, wherein there were herbs and roots of many kinds, but no sort of fruit, grain or corn in it: And suppose he had given them a sufficiency of fruits and corn to support them for a year or two, and more, with a special command to sow some of it, and plant immediately for the support of themselves and their osteria hereafter; and assured them also they should have many children. If his man and woman should eat up all their corn and fruit entirely, even that which they should have sown or planted for their future support; then they and their children in all following years would have been hard put to it to live upon some roots dug out of the ground, a poor and scanty supply, and that with much toil and labour: Now would it have been unjust with God to have left them and their children to their constant hard labour and hard fare, without giving them any new corn or fruit to plant or sow, or without providing better food for them? And suppose their children also neglected to cultivate and multiply the best roots they could find, and several of them in every age fell into diseases and died by the badness or scarcity of their provisions, would the | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
the tnuMMtioiit •f God with, men, ud tetihm fai % g1
Gcht, to the jutt viDdication of kH iidt own perfectioiift, •
lilence of all oar ctvib. But observe, tbere are theae thfc
aidaralione which may lerTe to alkviato and oiodenrte this •
■apeotand atoatioii ot things at present;
I. AU mankind are justly required to adore and worid
great and glorious Being, whose wisdom and goodnesa, i
as his power, shine bright in the creation of this world,
tiie ibrmation of mankind, as well* as all other animals whc
upoii the earth ; thiey ooffht to admire and praise hioi <
aoDount, though no reasonsiile creature can properly giro i
but Cmt some ml benefit.
n. Every miin who comes into this worlds as cnn<||i
our common head and representative Adam^ in his state ol
cenee and trials with full power to obey his Maker's law, ad
far superior motiviBS to obedience, hath good reason, e*
Adam our fiUher b^Id, to thank God for his existence ; l or I
4lule in suc)i circumstances, under Jdam his head, whi<
ried in them a much greater probability of standing and
happy, than of fidlingand being miserable.
* III. Thoojgh the greatest part of mankind may nc
sufficient reason to give thanks to God for their mere ex
in this fallen state, yet all the sons and daughters of Jdm
reason to^praise the divine goodness for many favoul
receive, m. that they are not so miserable as Uiey migl
been by reason of their sins and follies, that they have an;
factions or comforts in life, and any lesser degrees of j
sorrow than others sustain, or any relief for their own m
and troubles : And especially if |hey are born and educat
nation where the light of the gospel shines, they have
reason to acknowledge and bless the distinguishing good
thdr Creator, who has placed them within the nearer and
reach of hi4q)iness, if their own evil inclinations and ob
do not withhold them from seeking after it* And»
Cretlor lie nnder an inpoUtioo of iojui lice for continaing tieir eafitM
Ibote ditadvaiiUfet, and iboi panitbiog Uieir original rabellion aoHl U
•egligenca ?
And tappoie further, that thia aolicary and inaccetaible ialaad I
asidu of aany other iilandi in the tea, whoee inbabiianti are coatinaall]
ed by aome revelatton ordiviBemeiaenger of the original atate and tb
cirOttnttancea of thia unhappy couotryy in order to reiirain the reii froi
dience to their Maker and Lord in liaiiUr inatanoea of any kind ^ might
aayt here it a j oatand ▼■luable reaaon for #hich God ■hould continne ti
of rebelf undy their punishment ? Thi> may be applied in aome measi
forlorn caie ot.mtnkiod on this xlobe of earth, when compared vitk I
other planetary arorldii who may be preserved in their duty by being
of enr sad circumstao<;^y though we know little of theirs. Bnt ai
before /these are but mere oonjectoral thoughts t It is only God bimsi
CjTMtday of judgment can nnawer •rary diAeslty, aadaesUw aiaqr
iHIMB sU kit wsriu sf vcsVU%ns«% ^ | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 419 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | the transactions of God with men, and set them in a glorious light, to the just vindication of all his own perfections, and silence of all our cavils. But observe, there are these three siderations which may serve to alleviate and moderate this aspect and situation of things at present.
I. All mankind are justly required to adore and world great and glorious Being, whose wisdom and goodness, as his power, shine bright in the creation of this world, the formation of mankind, as well as all other animals who upon the earth; they ought to admire and praise him account, though no reasonable creature can properly give but for some real benefit.
II. Every man who comes into this world, as condition our common head and representative Adam, in his state of cence and trial, with full power to obey his Maker's law, and far superior motives to obedience, hath good reason, e Adam our father had, to thank God for his existence; for made in such circumstances, under Adam his head, whit ried in them a much greater probability of standing and happy, than of falling and being miserable.
III. Though the greatest part of mankind may not sufficient reason to give thanks to God for their mere ex in this fallen state, yet all the sons and daughters of Adam reason to praise the divine goodness for many favou receive, viz. that they are not so miserable as they might been by reason of their sins and follies, that they have any factions or comforts in life, and any lesser degrees of sorrow than others sustain, or any relief for their own m and troubles: And especially if they are born and educat nation where the light of the gospel shines, they have reason to acknowledge and bless the distinguishing good their Creator, who has placed them within the nearer and reach of happiness, if their own evil inclinations and ob do not withhold them from seeking after it. And,
Creator lie under an imputation of injustice for continuing their existen those disadvantages, and thus punishing their original rebellion and the negligence?
And suppose further, that this solitary and inaccessible island midst of many other islands in the sea, whose inhabitants are continually ed by some revelation or divine messenger of the original state and the circumstances of this unhappy country, in order to restrain the rest fro dience to their Maker and Lord in similar instances of any kind; might say, here is a just and valuable reason for which God should continue the rebels under their punishment? This may be applied in some meas forlorn case of mankind on this globe of earth, when compared with other planetary worlds, who may be preserved in their duty by being of our sad circumstances, though we know little of theirs. But as before, these are but mere conjectural thoughts: It is only God himself great day of judgment can answer every difficulty, and scatter every from all his works of providence. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
E88AY I. 419
IV. When any of the race of mankind are made sensible of
their sins and misery, and by repentance and faith in the grace of
God, so far as it i s revealed to them, liave arrived at any toler-
able hopes of their interest in his favour, and their acceptance
unto life and happiness in another world, then they are caUed
aloud to bless their divine Creator^ as Tvell as their Saviour, and
to give thanks to the God of nature and ^racc together. And I
think there is not one place in scripture where man is required to
) give thanks to the Lord but on one or other of these accounts
,; which I have here menlioucd^. «
Upon the whole, the result of things is this, that if any of
us cannot upon rational grounds give thanks to God as our Crea«*
i (or for fur existence, it is owing merely to our original apostacy
[ f rom God in and by our first parents ; f or otherwise God would
1 never have made intelligent creatures, who could not reasonably
> thank him for making them. And then furtlier I add, if we can-
not rationally thank God for our creation here, until we have some
hope of his favour and grace hereafter, this should awaken «•
all with utmost diligence in the midst of our miseries to enquire
after the way of salvation, and pursue every appointed duty that
is necessary for this end : For then we shall be able to bless
God for bringing us into being, and we shall no longer lie under
.auch a sad and dismal reproach of nature, as not to give thanks
for our existence to the hand that formed us. Thus far I have
endeavoured to ^o prove, that by the miseries of hankind we
may have sufficieut evidence that they arc in a f allen aud degene-
rate atatc.
Sect. IV. — A full Proof of MafCs Apostacy by Scripture and
Reason, derived from their Sinfulness.
But after all, if i t s hould be found upon the justest survey and
balance of tilings, that the miseries of human nature considered
alone, are not a sufficient and satisfactory evidence of the apos-
tacy and fall of mankind from their Maker^s favour, and of some-
remarkable displeasure of the hand that created them ; yet I am
vreli assured that the earhf corrupt inclinations, the endless
iniquities and crimes of men from their childhood, and that iiwi-
versal propensity to sin which is f ound among all the inhabitants
of our world, joined with the loads of misery they sustain, are
._ both together an effectual and convincing argument that we are a
B- degenerate and fallen race of creatures. Now that we are such
' a sort of criminal, guilty, sinful, and degenerate beings, and
* Tbere i* no plaio text that I can find where naokinil ii comminded or
jfiTiied to thank God merely foe thf>ir exitteoce ; and io thote placea where all
Bacion», or %\\ ibe earth are ralfed upon to bleu the Lord, and give thaoka to
bim, it ia btilt in view of their baymi; the koowledgc and grace or uWaiiva of
^od maoifeitcd iu then.
td2 | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 420 | 635 | 640.8 | 1,239.84 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | IV. When any of the race of mankind are made sensible of their sins and misery, and by repentance and faith in the grace of God, so far as it is revealed to them, have arrived at any tolerable hopes of their interest in his favour, and their acceptance unto life and happiness in another world, then they are called aloud to bless their divine Creator, as well as their Saviour, and to give thanks to the God of nature and grace together. And I think there is not one place in scripture where man is required to give thanks to the Lord but on one or other of these accounts which I have here mentioned*.
Upon the whole, the result of things is this, that if any of us cannot upon rational grounds give thanks to God as our Creator for our existence, it is owing merely to our original apostacy from God in and by our first parents; for otherwise God would never have made intelligent creatures, who could not reasonably thank him for making them. And then further I add, if we cannot rationally thank God for our creation here, until we have some hope of his favour and grace hereafter, this should awaken us all with utmost diligence in the midst of our miseries to enquire after the way of salvation, and pursue every appointed duty that is necessary for this end: For then we shall be able to bless God for bringing us into being, and we shall no longer lie under such a sad and dismal reproach of nature, as not to give thanks for our existence to the hand that formed us. Thus far I have endeavoured to prove, that by the miseries of mankind we may have sufficient evidence that they are in a fallen and degenerate state.
Sect. IV.—A full Proof of Man's Apostacy by Scripture and Reason, derived from their Sinfulness.
But after all, if it should be found upon the justest survey and balance of things, that the miseries of human nature considered alone, are not a sufficient and satisfactory evidence of the apostacy and fall of mankind from their Maker’s favour, and of some remarkable displeasure of the hand that created them; yet I am well assured that the early corrupt inclinations, the endless iniquities and crimes of men from their childhood, and that universal propensity to sin which is found among all the inhabitants of our world, joined with the loads of misery they sustain, are both together an effectual and convincing argument that we are a degenerate and fallen race of creatures. Now that we are such a sort of criminal, guilty, sinful, and degenerate beings, and
* There is no plain text that I can find where mankind is commanded or invited to thank God merely for their existence; and in those places where all nations, or all the earth are called upon to bless the Lord, and give thanks to him, it is still in view of their having the knowledge and grace or salvation of God manifested in them. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
4S0 EDIN AND KfiCOTBET, &C.
wretchedly foreaken of God who made us, or fallen m
heavy dtsplcasare eren from the beg^Doing of life, will e^
appear both from the express witness of scripture concern
sinfulness, from the necessity of renewing grace, and fr
light of nature surveying the heathen world.
First, there are many represensations in scripture i
universal degeneracy and corruption that has come upon
sons and daughters of Adam, and which have been large
ported by many writers who have explained these tei
Gen. vi. 5. Every imagination of the thoughts of t he >
man is otUyevil coiitinually; and chapter viii. 21. it is
that it is evil from his youth. Psal. xiv. 3. The Lord
down from heaven upon the children of fhe/i, to see.i)
uere any that did understand and seek God: They[
gone aside ; there is none t/iat doth good ; noy not one.
vil. 20. There is not a J ust man upon the earth wlw do
and sinneth not* Jsa. liii. 6. All we like sheep ha\
ftstray^ we have turned every one to his own way. £
wanderings, but all are wanderers. Rom. iii. 10.12. !
none righteous ; no^ not one: There is none that dothgo\
not one. Ver. 19. Eteri/ month is stopped^ and all tl
become guilty before God. And ver. 23. All are fallt
of the glory of God, because all have sinned*. 2 Cor.
* If StiPaul had not uied fucb itroog expresfions heri*, ar pUiol
every indinduai of maakindy yet his arfrumeDt requires thisienae;
wise there would be some who wooid not want the salvation of Christ .
it is kit great design to prove, that all men arc condemned by the law, .
ID need of this salvation, without any e!fception at all.
Objection. Some have asserted this law, which requires perfect el
and which condemns the sinner to deaths to have been abrogated «a soon
sinned, and that another covenant, even the covenant of grace was si
and introduced, even before the sentence of dearth was pranoan>
Adam.
Answer. Tbit objeetian baa been often and effectually refuted;
very easy to shew, that the law by which all mankind are bound under
nation, can never be said to be abrogated, while it holds men, or bi
under guilt and death. ** It is that Uw which now brings indignation i
Upon every soul that does amiss,*' Rom. ii. 9. '* That law which is wrHl
heart tf man by- nature,'* ver^e 15. '< The same law which whosoever i
one pomt, it guilty of «ll,» Jam. ii. 10. ** That law by which is the ki
of sin, and by which no flesh shall be justified, fur all have broken it,"
19, 20, 93. ** It is that law which curseth e\ery one who continnetb i
things there required, and from whose curse Christ hath redeemed tbe d
well as the Jews,^> Gal iii. 10, II, 13. This is tbe original law of vorl
though all mankind may be said perhaps to be under tbe covenant of
thoie general proposals of repentance and trust in tbe divine mercy, v
made to fallen men by their own reasonings, or by divine levelatioo, yeti
freed from tbe- curse and candemnation of tbe original broken lav, b
who have accepted of this covenant of grace by sincere repentance asd
trust in the mercy of God. Now this is but a very small part of nsok
there are « few that shall be saved." And till this covenant of grace ill
cepted, every ion and daughter of Adam, of mature years, are coodes
actual linnert by this law. This law therefore sUnds in full force agsioil'
fides siactrs peaitsatSi sad tuicl^ m «xt ^^v\^«d by the gospel. | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 421 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | wretchedly forsaken of God who made us, or fallen under heavy displeasure even from the beginning of life, will ever appear both from the express witness of scripture concern and sinfulness, from the necessity of renewing grace, and from light of nature surveying the heathen world.
First, there are many representations in scripture of universal degeneracy and corruption that has come upon sons and daughters of Adam, and which have been large ported by many writers who have explained these texts. Gen. vi. 5. Every imagination of the thoughts of the man is only evil continually; and chapter viii. 21. it is that it is evil from his youth. Psal. xiv. 3. The Lord down from heaven upon the children of men, to see if were any that did understand and seek God: They gone aside; there is none that doth good; no, not one. vii. 20. There is not a just man upon the earth who does and sinneth not. Isa. liii. 6. All we like sheep have satray, we have turned every one to his own way. D wanderings, but all are wanderers. Rom. iii. 10. 12. none righteous; no, not one: There is none that doth good not one. Ver. 19. Every mouth is stopped, and all the become guilty before God. And ver. 23. All are fallen of the glory of God, because all have sinned*. 2 Cor.
* If St. Paul had not used such strong expressions here, as plainly every individual of mankind, yet his argument requires this sense; wise there would be some who would not want the salvation of Christ, it is his great design to prove, that all men are condemned by the law, in need of this salvation, without any exception at all.
Objection. Some have asserted this law, which requires perfect objection and which condemns the sinner to death, to have been abrogated as soon as sinned, and that another covenant, even the covenant of grace was superseded, even before the sentence of death was pronounced Adam.
Answer. This objection has been often and effectually refuted; very easy to shew, that the law by which all mankind are bound under nation, can never be said to be abrogated, while it holds men, or binds under guilt and death. "It is that law which now brings indignation upon every soul that does amiss," Rom. ii. 9. "That law which is written heart of man by nature," verse 15. "The same law which whosoever one point, is guilty of all," Jam. ii. 10. "That law by which is the knight of sin, and by which no flesh shall be justified, for all have broken it," 19, 20, 23. "It is that law which curseth every one who continueth things there required, and from whose curse Christ hath redeemed the God well as the Jews," Gal. iii. 10, 11, 13. This is the original law of world though all mankind may be said perhaps to be under the covenant of those general proposals of repentance and trust in the divine mercy, which made to fallen men by their own reasonings, or by divine revelation, yet freed from the curse and condemnation of the original broken law, by whom have accepted of this covenant of grace by sincere repentance and trust in the mercy of God. Now this is but a very small part of mankind there are "few that shall be saved." And till this covenant of grace is accepted, every son and daughter of Adam, of mature years, are condemned actual sinners by this law. This law therefore stands in full force against sides sincere penitents, and such as are justified by the gospel. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
B8SAYL 421
thu$ judge, thai if one died Jor all, then were all dead^
18, ipirituallif dead in trespasses and sins. Now can we
O0e that God would create such a world of beings, that every
of them coming oat of his own hi^nds in their origins' purity
innocence^ should so universally break his law, run into sin
spiritual death, and naturally incline to practices which tend
sole and destroy themselves, and that without any one ex-
ion, if it had not arisen from some root of bitterness^ some
inal iniquity, which diffused itself through all of them from
: very birth or entrance into this world ? Surely this univer-!
ximiption would incline any 'person to believe, either that
. h ad not given to each of his creatures in their original for--
OD a full and practical sufficiency to answer the demands of
aw, and to preserve themselves from iniquity and guilt, or
it was lost in some hand or other. It is a strange and incre-
3 thing to suppose that every single peraon among the roil-
I of mankind should be born innocent and pure, with suffi*
t and practical powers of all kinds to fulfil the law of God
their duty, ana that they should yet, by free and voluntary
ce, every one for hin^elf^ for near six thousand years toge-
, b reak his holy law, and rebel against him that madethem^
lere were not some original and universal contagion spread
*agh them all at their entrance into life. See Quest. I. Sect
. at the end.
Secondly, I argue the same point from the scriptural doc-
B of our recovery by divine grace. Let us consider in what
iner the scripture represents tiie necessity of a great and
ne change to he made upon the souls of all men, in order to
r recovery from the ruins of their nature, and to obtain the
mr and image of Gh)d, and future happiness. John iii. 3.
:ept a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God:
1 i n other scriptures it is represented that ihtl^ must be bom
the Spirit, verses 6, 8. Thei/ must be born of God, John
8. They must be created anew in Christ Jesus unto good
*b, Ephes. ii. 10. They must be quickened, or be raised again
M their death in trespasses and sins; Eph. ii. 5. They must
renewed in their Spirit, or created after the image of God in
hteoMsness and true holiness ; E ph. iv. 23, 24. They must be
onciled to God by Jesus Christ ; 2. Cor. v. 18, 19. They
Ube washed from their sins in his blood ; 1 Cor. vi. II. Rev.
y And since all have sinned and come short oj the glory of
d, therefore if ever they are saved, they must be justified
^ by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus,
^ God has set forth to be a propitiation through Jaith in his
od ; R om. iii. 23 — 25. Now can any one suppose that Crod
1 m ade such a world of creatures as have come into being
ti Adam^s time to our's, which have ali enJUxeiiL Vtto ^%
DdS | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 422 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | ESSAY I.
Thus judge, that if one died for all, then were all dead, is, spiritually dead in trespasses and sins. Now can we pose that God would create such a world of beings, that every of them coming out of his own hands in their original purity innocence, should so universally break his law, run into sin spiritual death, and naturally incline to practices which tend to file and destroy themselves, and that without any one ex-ion, if it had not arisen from some root of bitterness, some final iniquity, which diffused itself through all of them from every birth or entrance into this world? Surely this univer-sorruption would incline any person to believe, either that he had not given to each of his creatures in their original for- on a full and practical sufficiency to answer the demands of law, and to preserve themselves from iniquity and guilt, or it was lost in some hand or other. It is a strange and incre- thing to suppose that every single person among the mil- of mankind should be born innocent and pure, with suffi- t and practical powers of all kinds to fulfil the law of God their duty, and that they should yet, by free and voluntary ce, every one for himself, for near six thousand years toge- , break his holy law, and rebel against him that made them, there were not some original and universal contagion spread through them all at their entrance into life. See Quest. I. Sect. at the end.
Secondly, I argue the same point from the scriptural doc- e of our recovery by divine grace. Let us consider in what manner the scripture represents the necessity of a great and une change to be made upon the souls of all men, in order to recover from the ruins of their nature, and to obtain theour and image of God, and future happiness. John iii. 8. Rept a man be born again he cannot see the kingdom of God: in other scriptures it is represented that they must be born the Spirit, verses 6, 8. They must be born of God, John 8. They must be created anew in Christ Jesus unto good works, Ephes. ii. 10. They must be quickened, or be raised again in their death in trespasses and sins; Eph. ii. 5. They must renewed in their Spirit, or created after the image of God in righteousness and true holiness; Eph. iv. 23, 24. They must be coniled to God by Jesus Christ; 2. Cor. v. 18, 19. They must be washed from their sins in his blood; 1 Cor. vi. 11. Rev. 5. And since all have sinned and come short of the glory of death, therefore if ever they are saved, they must be justified by his grace through the redemption that is in Christ Jesus, from God has set forth to be a propitiation through faith in his God; Rom. iii. 23—25. Now can any one suppose that God made such a world of creatures as have come into being in Adam's time to our's, which have all entered into this | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
422 mniN and Accotcry, ko.
tvorld^ pure, boly, and innocent in their original state, and yet
that there should not one of them retain his itnaio^e in holineui
nor be fit for his favour and the blessings of his love, without .
being born again^ being new-createdy t>eing raised from t/iede&d^
being redeemed by the blood of his own Son^ and being washed
in so precious and divine a laver ? Do not all these representa-
tions make it appear highly reasonable to conclude, tliat every
inan is born into this world witli some original contagion about
him, or under some early degeneracy and guilt, and crimiiial
imputation in the sight of God ? is it not a most incredible thing i
that not one among all the millions of these creatures should k t
lit to be made partakers of his favoui*, widiout such amaziojf t
purifications as require the blood of the Son of God, and the [;
almighty operations of his blessed Spirit to redeem, and to
Dew-<:reate them, if they were born in their original purii; i
Do not all these tilings eifectually teach us that manluDd ii
their present generations even from their birth are not snek
ereatures as God first made them ? But without entering into in
these arguments from scripture, which represent the wretoli- i;
edness of all mankind ; I think we may evidently prove, in i\
the third place,
III. Ttiat far the greatest part of (be world are born under i
some sort of degenerate and guilty circumstances by a mere sur- -S
vey of tlie heathen nations with the eye of reason, and by tbt I
light of nature.
A few days ago I was taking a view of the map of tlie ^
world, and measuring with my eye the breadth and extent of f
the nations. I took a spreading survey of the vast Asiatic ein- ^
pires of Tartary and China, and a great part of the kingdom f
of Alogul, with the multitude of islands in the East Indies ; I }
went on to survey the large brutal countries of all the southern I'
part of Africa,* with the savage nations of the American world. -
I observed the thousands or rather millions of mankind who ^
dwell on this globe, and walk and trifle, and live and die then '
under the heaviest cloud of i&:norance and darkness, who know '
not the true God, nor the way to his favour, who are drenched -
in gross impieties and superstitions, who are continually guihyof '
national immoralities, and practise idolatry, malice and lewd-
ness, fraud and falsehood, with scarce any regret or restraint.
Then sighing within myself, I said, It is not many years since \
these were all infants, wretched helpless infants, without anj
knowledge of the things of God or man. The inhabitants of
whole regions have been bom and brought up under parents who i
know not the true God, nor are acquainted with the path tbit }
loads to lifo and happiness. Are not these unhappy children, t
/said I, formed and born under difficulties almost unsurmounti« b
bJe.^ Are they noi\^Oi ^Wo^ xsiidsc^ moral impossibility o( j | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 423 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | world, pure, holy, and innocent in their original state, and yet that there should not one of them retain his image in holiness, nor be fit for his favour and the blessings of his love, without being born again, being new-created, being raised from the dead, being redeemed by the blood of his own Son, and being washed in so precious and divine a laver? Do not all these representations make it appear highly reasonable to conclude, that every man is born into this world with some original contagion about him, or under some early degeneracy and guilt, and criminal imputation in the sight of God? Is it not a most incredible thing that not one among all the millions of these creatures should be fit to be made partakers of his favour, without such amazing purifications as require the blood of the Son of God, and the almighty operations of his blessed Spirit to redeem, and to new-create them, if they were born in their original purity? Do not all these things effectually teach us that mankind in their present generations even from their birth are not such creatures as God first made them? But without entering into these arguments from scripture, which represent the wretchedness of all mankind; I think we may evidently prove, in the third place,
III. That far the greatest part of the world are born under some sort of degenerate and guilty circumstances by a mere survey of the heathen nations with the eye of reason, and by the light of nature.
A few days ago I was taking a view of the map of the world, and measuring with my eye the breadth and extent of the nations. I took a spreading survey of the vast Asiatic empires of Tartary and China, and a great part of the kingdom of Mogul, with the multitude of islands in the East Indies; I went on to survey the large brutal countries of all the southern part of Africa, with the savage nations of the American world. I observed the thousands or rather millions of mankind who dwell on this globe, and walk and trifle, and live and die there under the heaviest cloud of ignorance and darkness, who know not the true God, nor the way to his favour, who are drenched in gross impieties and superstitions, who are continually guilty of national immoralities, and practise idolatry, malice and lewdness, fraud and falsehood, with scarce any regret or restraint. Then sighing within myself, I said, It is not many years since these were all infants, wretched helpless infants, without any knowledge of the things of God or man. The inhabitants of whole regions have been born and brought up under parents who know not the true God, nor are acquainted with the path that leads to life and happiness. Are not these unhappy children, said I, formed and born under difficulties almost unsurmountable? Are they not laid almost under a moral impossibility of | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
nSAYI.
488.
'enkiBg their way of themselves, through so much darkness
iid error, to the |cuowle4ge, the fear, and the love of him who
iftde tlicin ? Dreadful truth indeed ; b ut so far as I c an see, it
sems to be certain and uncontestable ! Such, 1 fear, is the case
f t hose of the human race, who at present cover a great part of
£iis earthly globe, with very few exceptions.
Then I ranbaclcin my thoughts four or five thousand yearr,
iid said within myself, what multitudes in every age of thu
rorld have been born in these deplorable circumstances in the
nidst of idolatry and profaneness, sin and death ? They are
Dured from their birth to barbarous customs and impious prac^
iees : They have an image of the life of brutes and devils wrought
D them by their early education : They have had the seeds of
nany immoralities and wretched wickedness sown and planted,
tnd cultivated in them by the rude and savage instructions of
hose who went before them ; and their own imitation of such
KNrrible examples has confirmed this mischief long before they
mew or heard of the being of the true God, or the discoverita
it his will, or their duty : And perhaps tiiey have never heard it
o this day. Scarce any of Ihem have admitted of one thought-
ill enquiry, whether they follow the rules of reason, or whether
hey are in the way of happiness and peace, any more tlian their
Mureots before them ; and as they are born in this gross darkness,
bev grow up through all the stages of life to practise these vile
dofatries, and all the shameful abominations of their country,
ind they go on to death in the same course : Nor have they
ig^t enough from without to make them plainly see their own
oily and danger, nor have they had any probable workings of
udgment or conscience within them strong enough to awaken
hem eflfectually to ask, Js there not a lie in my right hand? Am
\ n ot in the way of sin and destruction ? Then after a length
ijearn in such impieties and madness, such ignorance of the
rye God and universal wickedness, they are plunged into the
DTisible world at death, without any evident or reasonable hope
f divine favour in the other world, or at least at the utmost peril
if h is displeasure, and a dark and dismal uncertainty of the cir-
umstances oi that state into which they are delivered at the hour
€ death or the resurrection.
St. Paul confirms all that I have said, who, by his long and
irequent visits and sojournings among the heathen nations, well
jiew their tem|>er and state, and he represents tliem to us as a
Qoat abominable herd of creatures, in several of his epistles ;
torn, i, 21 — 31, Even the wise and the learned among them,
he Greeks and the Romans changed the glory of the incorrupti-
\l€ God into the image of birdsy beasts, and creeping things, and
jfonAipped the creature more than the Creator. Their foolish
ieart waihar4€n€d: They were justly abaixdouj&dol Ql^^^ aui | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 424 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | breaking their way of themselves, through so much darkness and error, to the knowledge, the fear, and the love of him who made them? Dreadful truth indeed; but so far as I can see, it seems to be certain and uncontestable! Such, I fear, is the case of those of the human race, who at present cover a great part of his earthly globe, with very few exceptions.
Then I ran back in my thoughts four or five thousand years, and said within myself, what multitudes in every age of the world have been born in these deplorable circumstances in the midst of idolatry and profaneness, sin and death? They are ensured from their birth to barbarous customs and impious practices: They have an image of the life of brutes and devils wrought on them by their early education: They have had the seeds of many immoralities and wretched wickedness sown and planted, and cultivated in them by the rude and savage instructions of those who went before them; and their own imitation of such horrible examples has confirmed this mischief long before they knew or heard of the being of the true God, or the discoveries of his will, or their duty: And perhaps they have never heard it on this day. Scarce any of them have admitted of one thoughtful enquiry, whether they follow the rules of reason, or whether they are in the way of happiness and peace, any more than their parents before them; and as they are born in this gross darkness, they grow up through all the stages of life to practise these vile dolatries, and all the shameful abominations of their country, and they go on to death in the same course: Nor have they right enough from without to make them plainly see their ownolly and danger, nor have they had any probable workings of judgment or conscience within them strong enough to awaken them effectually to ask, Is there not a lie in my right hand? Am not in the way of sin and destruction? Then after a length of years in such impicties and madness, such ignorance of the true God and universal wickedness, they are plunged into the invisible world at death, without any evident or reasonable hope of divine favour in the other world, or at least at the utmost peril of his displeasure, and a dark and dismal uncertainty of the circumstances of that state into which they are delivered at the hour of death or the resurrection.
St. Paul confirms all that I have said, who, by his long and frequent visits and sojournings among the heathen nations, well knew their temper and state, and he represents them to us as a most abominable herd of creatures, in several of his epistles; Rom. i. 21—31. Even the wise and the learned among them, the Greeks and the Romans changed the glory of the incorruptible God into the image of birds, beasts, and creeping things, and worshipped the creature more than the Creator. Their foolish heart was hardened: They were justly abandoned of God, and | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
484 kuiN AND RECOTCRT, &C.
given up to work all uncUanness tcith gretdinets: Theyivterefilki
with all unrighteousness^ fornication^'malicey Sfc. They were
back'biterSf haters of God, vcithoul understandings without na-
iural efiectiofij implacable^ unmercijul. In Eph. iv. 18. Theif
were atienatedfrom the life of God through the ignorance that ti
in theniy because of t he blinaness of their hearts. In Colos. i. S l|
They tcere alienated from Gody and enemies in their minds brf
wicked works. It is true, we are told that there was so much of
the law of G od written in their hearts^ that their consciences hon
witness to it, in some instances, and thtir thoughts excused or ffc-
cuied them; Rom;ii. 14, 15. But we seldom read of the return
of any of them to sincere repentance of their wickedness, by t he
reproofs of conscience. St. John tells his disciples, that though
thejf are of Gody yet the whole world lies in wickedness ; 1 J oha ▼.
10. And St. F^aul again assures us, that those who have sifind
without mny express knou-ledgeor revelation of a law, shall perish
without law. Doubtless their conbciences, in the great daj of
jud^ent, will accuse them abundantly and join with the sen*
tence of God the judge in condemning them, and will hardly be
able to make just excuses for any ol" tUcm ; and therefore ibey
are represented as without God^ without Christy and without
hope in the world. Eph. ii. 12. A dismal and deplorable state !
St. Peter says indeed, that God is no respecter ofpmom^
that is, whether Jews or Gentiles : huty in every nation he that
feareth Gody and worketh righteousness y shall be accepted of
him; Acts X. 34, 35. But if tliere were very few among the
Jews, who feared God, and wrought righteousness, very few
that shall be savedy as our Saviour saith ; M at. irii. 14. If there
are very few in these learned nations of the Gentiles, that feared
God or loved him, how much fewer may we suppose to find in t he
more barbarous countries, which have no knowledge of God nor
godliness*? What kind and gracious allowances the blesied
God will make 'at last for such unhappy creatures, he has not
revealed to us in his word.
Now, upon this survey of things, I cannot but enquire,
would this have been the case of mankind in these wide and un-
haj>py nations ? Would these have been the wretched cuxaim-
stanccs both of their young oflTspring and their advancing yean,
in a hundred long successions, if they had been such a race of
* Though the cage stands thus with the heathen world, yet there arc, vA
there must be some grounds of a sufficient Tindicttion of the equity and goo^*
nrss of God, notwithstanding these scenes of wickedness and destruction anoBf
men. This has been made to appear in some measure, by several writtn, *oi
particularly in the third and fourth conferences of a book, entitled, " Tkt
Strength and Weakness of Human Reason.*' And what the reasoning* of m^
cannot fully soWe and vindicate now, the great God will explain hereafter, aai
Bain tain the equity of hia own conduct, to the confictioD of all hit iatellifnl
ereaturcs, men and asge\i« Aia«iu | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 425 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | given up to work all uncleanness with greediness: They were filled with all unrighteousness, fornication, malice, &c. They were back-biters, haters of God, without understanding, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful. In Eph. iv. 18. They were alienated from the life of God through the ignorance that is in them, because of the blindness of their hearts. In Colos. i. 21. They were alienated from God, and enemies in their minds by wicked works. It is true, we are told that there was so much of the law of God written in their hearts, that their consciences bore witness to it, in some instances, and their thoughts excused or accused them; Rom. ii. 14, 15. But we seldom read of the return of any of them to sincere repentance of their wickedness, by the reproofs of conscience. St. John tells his disciples, that though they are of God, yet the whole world lies in wickedness; I John v. 19. And St. Paul again assures us, that those who have sinned without any express knowledge or revelation of a law, shall perish without law. Doubtless their consciences, in the great day of judgment, will accuse them abundantly and join with the sentence of God the judge in condemning them, and will hardly be able to make just excuses for any of them; and therefore they are represented as without God, without Christ, and without hope in the world. Eph. ii. 12. A dismal and deplorable state!
St. Peter says indeed, that God is no respecter of persons, that is, whether Jews or Gentiles: but, in every nation he that feareth God, and worketh righteousness, shall be accepted of him; Acts x. 34, 35. But if there were very few among the Jews, who feared God, and wrought righteousness, very few that shall be saved, as our Saviour saith; Mat. vii. 14. If there are very few in these learned nations of the Gentiles, that feared God or loved him, how much fewer may we suppose to find in the more barbarous countries, which have no knowledge of God nor godliness*? What kind and gracious allowances the blessed God will make at last for such unhappy creatures, he has not revealed to us in his word.
Now, upon this survey of things, I cannot but enquire, would this have been the case of mankind in these wide and unhappy nations? Would these have been the wretched circumstances both of their young offspring and their advancing years, in a hundred long successions, if they had been such a race of
* Though the case stands thus with the heathen world, yet there are, and there must be some grounds of a sufficient vindication of the equity and goodness of God, notwithstanding these scenes of wickedness and destruction among men. This has been made to appear in some measure, by several writers, and particularly in the third and fourth conferences of a book, entitled, "The Strength and Weakness of Human Reason." And what the reasonings of men cannot fully solve and vindicate now, the great God will explain hereafter, and maintain the equity of his own conduct, to the conviction of all his intelligent creaturcs, men and angels. Amen. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ESSAY L
42i
creatures as they came out of the hand of their Creator, harm-
less and innocent ? If the children had been esteemed, in liie
^e of God, as such undefiled, holy, and guihless beius^ as some
men are ready to imagine, could this have been their portion t
In short, can we suppose, that the wise and righteous, and mer-
ciful Creator of the world, would have established and continued
such a constitution for the propiBt2i:ation of mankwul, whicli should
naturally have led so nianv millions of them so early into such
dismal circumstances and temptations of almost unuviodable
iniquity? Or would the blessed God have ever thus treated
whole nations of infants, who are the work of his hands, if
there had not been some dreadful and universal degeneracy
spread over them and their fathers, by some original crime, and
which even met and seized them at their entrance into moral life,
according to some just and ancient constitution ? And what con«
stitution can this be, but' the original covenant with Adam in
innocence, and the spreading consequences of his sin ? But as
I have insisted upon several of these things at large, under some
of the first questions in this treatise, I chuse not to repeat them
here ; but I will only stay to answer three or four general
objections.
Objectiop I. It is a most unreasonable and unrighteous thing,
to impute the sin of one person to another, and to make the
children and posterity of a sinner suffer any of the punishments
which were due to the fatlicr's sin ; therefore the righteous and
holy God has never appointed any such constitution, nor caa
he do it.
Answer. It is evident that death was the punishment threat-
ened to m an for sin, while he stood in innocence, to deter him
from it : It is evident again from other scriptures, thai death is the
actual usages or punishment o/* 5 m : It is plain also from universal
experience, that death passes upon all m^.tt^ even upon children,
and a thousand other miseries of life attend them ; and it is
granted by many of those writers who oppose our doctrine, that
these miseries and death come upon children by the means of the
sin of their first father. Now I could never yet learn any fair
and justifiable account, how such sickness and jiain, misery and
death should come upon all mankind by means of the sin otAdam^
if it be not in some sense imputed to them, even in the sense in
which I have explained it in the second essay. Let those writers
give a fair and rational account, how this can come to pass but
by such a constitution as I have represented. It is not enough to
aav, ttiat the just and righteous God ap()ointed or even per-
initted it, in order to bring about greater glory to himself, and
greater blessedness to mankind by the gospel of Christ, unless
every one of those who suffer on the account of Adam*s sin are
made partakers of this greater blessedness, the coivUax^^Vy»^^
is sufficient]/ evident. | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 426 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | creatures as they came out of the hand of their Creator, harmless and innocent? If the children had been esteemed, in the eye of God, as such undefiled, holy, and guiltless beings as some men are ready to imagine, could this have been their portion? In short, can we suppose, that the wise and righteous, and merciful Creator of the world, would have established and continued such a constitution for the propagation of mankind, which should naturally have led so many millions of them so early into such dismal circumstances and temptations of almost unaviodable iniquity? Or would the blessed God have ever thus treated whole nations of infants, who are the work of his hands, if there had not been some dreadful and universal degeneracy spread over them and their fathers, by some original crime, and which even met and seized them at their entrance into moral life, according to some just and ancient constitution? And what constitution can this be, but the original covenant with Adam in innocence, and the spreading consequences of his sin? But as I have insisted upon several of these things at large, under some of the first questions in this treatise, I chuse not to repeat them here; but I will only stay to answer three or four general objections.
Objection I. It is a most unreasonable and unrighteous thing, to impute the sin of one person to another, and to make the children and posterity of a sinner suffer any of the punishments which were due to the father's sin; therefore the righteous and holy God has never appointed any such constitution, nor can he do it.
Answer. It is evident that death was the punishment threatened to man for sin, while he stood in innocence, to deter him from it: It is evident again from other scriptures, that death is the actual wages or punishment of sin: It is plain also from universal experience, that death passes upon all men, even upon children, and a thousand other miseries of life attend them; and it is granted by many of those writers who oppose our doctrine, that these miseries and death come upon children by the means of the sin of their first father. Now I could never yet learn any fair and justifiable account, how such sickness and pain, misery and death should come upon all mankind by means of the sin of Adam, if it be not in some sense imputed to them, even in the sense in which I have explained it in the second essay. Let those writers give a fair and rational account, how this can come to pass but by such a constitution as I have represented. It is not enough to say, that the just and righteous God appointed or even permitted it, in order to bring about greater glory to himself, and greater blessedness to mankind by the gospel of Christ, unless every one of those who suffer on the account of Adam's sin are made partakers of this greater blessedness, the contrary whereof is sufficiently evident. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
486 l%IN AND ttECOTBRTi &C.
Objection 11. The common doctrine of original sin inberenti
which supposes every man and woman to be born with sinfal qua*
litiesi vihfies and pours great contempt on human natm^, &c If
we act up<Hi this principle, we shall rather hale than Ioyo om
another.
Answer I. A depression of human nature under a due and
deep sense of such universal sin and misery, is the first step to-
wards our n^ovcry by the grace of God and the gospel. Bieued
are the poor in spirity for tlitiYs is the kingdom of heaven^ or ths
blessedness of the gospel ; R ^at. v. 3. There were many who
professed Christianity in Laodicidy knaw not that theif were wretch-
ed and miserable^ andpoor^ and blindj andnaked, therefore they
did not seriously apply to Christ to be made partakers of his
blessings; Rcy. iii. 17. // is f rom a knowledge qf our sin and
finserybyth^ law, tKf^ we come to seik after the salvation of
grace; Hoin. iii. 19, 24. And lam persuaded that It i s t he
pride and self-sufficiency of men not acknowledging tlieir folly
wretchedness and ruin, that is one of the chief hindrances to the
acceptance of the grace of Christ, II. It is vet more unrea-
aonaole to suppose, that the acknowledgment of this universal
wretchedness of mankind should incline us to hate one another;
are we not rather led hereby to pity each other under our com-
mon frailties and miseries ? And is not this pity the first proper
expression of love to the miserable ?
Objection III. There can be no man born with principles of
ain or sinful qualities, unless God be made (he author of sin, be*
cause God who makes the nature of every man, makes all his
qualities also. Nor could such a constitution of nature be a
righteous constitution, \vhich continues the propagation of every
^hild with sinful principles in him, for it is the same thing as if
God infused sin into them, and therefore there is no such coDsti-
tution. Answer, Hath not a wise and good God, considered
as Creator, ordained such a constitution of nature, whereby the
inost monstrous births arc brought into the world by sinful mix-
tures, if m ankind abuse themselves with brutes ? And may not
the great God be good and wise even in this constitution ? Cannot
a God of equity and goodness appoint such a course of nature
among fallen mankind, whereby a drunkard or a lewd person
may produce a child hearing the vicious qualities of the parent, or
the miserable eflccts of the parentis sins ? And yet the order of
nature may be wise and righteous. Is not madness pro|)agated
through whole families, and sometimes in several successions, by
the fixed constitution of the God of nature, without God's own io-
fusing madness into the brain or blood ? lias not God appointed
a seed to bring forth a plant ? But if the seed be any way cor-
rii/)ted, it m ay by the divine ap|iointmeut of the course of nature
bring forth a corrupt tree. \% vl God that infuses all these efi/ | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 427 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | Objection II. The common doctrine of original sin inherent, which supposes every man and woman to be born with sinful qualities, vilifies and pours great contempt on human nature, &c. If we act upon this principle, we shall rather hate than love one another.
Answer I. A depression of human nature under a due and deep sense of such universal sin and misery, is the first step towards our recovery by the grace of God and the gospel. Blessed are the poor in spirit, for their's is the kingdom of heaven, or the blessedness of the gospel; Nat. v. 3. There were many who professed Christianity in Luodicia, knew not that they were wretched and miserable, and poor, and blind, and naked, therefore they did not seriously apply to Christ to be made partakers of his blessings; Rev. iii. 17. It is from a knowledge of our sin and misery by the law, that we come to seek after the salvation of grace; Rom. iii. 19, 24. And I am persuaded that it is the pride and self-sufficiency of men not acknowledging their folly wretchedness and ruin, that is one of the chief hindrances to the acceptance of the grace of Christ.——II. It is yet more unreasonable to suppose, that the acknowledgment of this universal wretchedness of mankind should incline us to hate one another; are we not rather led hereby to pity each other under our common frailties and miseries? And is not this pity the first proper expression of love to the miserable?
Objection III. There can be no man born with principles of sin or sinful qualities, unless God be made the author of sin, because God who makes the nature of every man, makes all his qualities also. Nor could such a constitution of nature be a righteous constitution, which continues the propagation of every child with sinful principles in him, for it is the same thing as if God infused sin into them, and therefore there is no such constitution. Answer, Hath not a wise and good God, considered as Creator, ordained such a constitution of nature, whereby the most monstrous births are brought into the world by sinful mixtures, if mankind abuse themselves with brutes? And may not the great God be good and wise even in this constitution? Cannot a God of equity and goodness appoint such a course of nature among fallen mankind, whereby a drunkard or a lewd person may produce a child bearing the vicious qualities of the parent, or the miserable effects of the parent's sins? And yet the order of nature may be wise and righteous. Is not madness propagated through whole families, and sometimes in several successions, by the fixed constitution of the God of nature, without God's own infusing madness into the brain or blood? Has not God appointed a seed to bring forth a plant? But if the seed be any way corrupted, it may by the divine appointment of the course of nature bring forth a corrupt tree. Is it God that infuses all these evil | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ESSAY I.
427
ind corrupt qualities into men or plants, because lus appointed
>rder of nature, or his sovereign interposing will, doe^ not liiu'
der and prevent them ? It is a very needless tiling to tell us that
known truth, that the course of nature separate from the agency
i(f G ody is no cause j or is nothing; for this piece of instructiou
in metaphysical science, abates not tlie force of my argument.
Objection IV. The notion of derivins^ a sinful nature from
Adaniy runs foul u|)on tliis rock, that Qoti doth not make or cre-
ate the nature of every man who cometh into the world, because
Ood cannot make a thing that is sinful ? Answer, suppose^ God
is c onstantly producing by the sun, air, and rain, the harvest of
die field according to his great law of vegetation ; b ut if soma
person should sprinkle the seed-corn with a poisonous juice
which miglit infect every grain, the seed might produce corn of
a mortal quality. Now if it be asked, Did tJod make this har-
vest of c orn ? The answer is, yes; But did he make this corn
poisonous ? No, by no means. Now in these conceptions thera
IS no diflliculty or danger of mistake. But if men have a mind
to be captious, they may spend whole pages in cavilling. Tha
plain case is this, God the Creator makes the nature of every
mao by his original and almighty order of oreatiou or propaga-
tion ;B ut it was ytJam brought sin into the nature, and made it
sinful. There are some other objections which have been raised
asaiost this doctrine, viz. If original sin be natural^ it is unavoid*
oo/e, then it i s necessar^j then it cannot be culpable^ Xc. But all
of this kiod, with many others, are suflScientiy answered, not
only in the lute vindication of tlie scripture doctrine of original
iiiij but in many smaller papers which Mr. Hebden, of Suffolk,
has lutcly publislied on this occasion, as well as in many other
excellent writers ancient and modern. Yet it is evident that
some of the opposers of truth find it a more easy and a morA
pleasant thing to repeat witli assurance what they have said
themselves, than to take due notice qf what their fathers, or
their oeiglibuurs have answered. | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 428 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | and corrupt qualities into men or plants, because his appointed order of nature, or his sovereign interposing will, does not hinder and prevent them? It is a very needless thing to tell us that known truth, that the course of nature separate from the agency of God, is no cause, or is nothing; for this piece of instruction in metaphysical science, abates not the force of my argument.
Objection IV. The notion of deriving a sinful nature from Adam, runs foul upon this rock, that God doth not make or create the nature of every man who cometh into the world, because God cannot make a thing that is sinful? Answer, suppose, God is constantly producing by the sun, air, and rain, the harvest of the field according to his great law of vegetation; but if some person should sprinkle the seed-corn with a poisonous juice which might infect every grain, the seed might produce corn of a mortal quality. Now if it be asked, Did God make this harvest of corn? The answer is, yes: But did he make this corn poisonous? No, by no means. Now in these conceptions there is no difficulty or danger of mistake. But if men have a mind to be captious, they may spend whole pages in cavilling. The plain case is this, God the Creator makes the nature of every man by his original and almighty order of creation or propagation: But it was Adam brought sin into the nature, and made it sinful. There are some other objections which have been raised against this doctrine, viz. If original sin be natural, it is unavoidable, then it is necessary, then it cannot be culpable, &c. But all of this kind, with many others, are sufficiently answered, not only in the late vindication of the scripture doctrine of original sin, but in many smaller papers which Mr. Hebden, of Suffolk, has lately published on this occasion, as well as in many other excellent writers ancient and modern. Yet it is evident that some of the opposers of truth find it a more easy and a more pleasant thing to repeat with assurance what they have said themselves, than to take due notice of what their fathers, or their neighbours have answered. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
SECOND ESSAY.
A Plain Explication of the Doctrine of Imputed Sin end
Imputed Righteousness.
X HE doctrine of the imputation of sin and righteousness hath
been attended with many noisy eontroversies in the christiaa
ivorld ; A nd though these things may be frequently met with in
common Hfe, and that without any controversy, yet they seem to
have created such difficuUies in religion, as are iiard to be eom-
promised. Let us make one more attempt and try, whether these
Dotions and expressions may not be set in so fair and easy a l ight,
by tracing out the plainest ideas of them in the common afiairs of
mankind, that when they are applied to religious subjects and
iexts of scripture, it may vanquish these difficulties, and recon-
cile the sentiments of several contesting parties in Christianity.
When a man has broken any of the laws of his country,
and is actually fined or imprisoned, or put to public shame or
death, or is condemned to fines or imprisonments, to the pillory
or the gallows, it is plain tliat sin is imputed to him^ his mcked'
fiess is upon him^ and he bears his iniquity ; that is, he is ac«
counted or reputed a criminal by the court of justice, and heii
condemned or dealt with as an offender, he is made liable to, or
obliged to bear the punishment, or he is actually punished. On
the other hand, if a righteous or innocent man is falsely aocuied
of any crime, and he is acquitted by the court, then sin is not
imputtd to him by that court, or he is not condemned, but right*
eous7iess is imputed to him^ or he is reputed and pronounced
righteous, and dealt with as an innocent or as a righteous roan ;
or, in another scripture phrase, his righteousness is upon him.
Or if a reward be either assigned or actually given to a man
according to the law upon the account of any righteous or good
action he has done, this act of virtue or goodness is imputed to
himy and his righteousness is upon him^ he is dealt with as a
righteous and deserving person, the retcard of righteousness i«
given him.
If a man has been guilty of a crime which deserves capital
punishment, but the punishment is remitted by the mercy of the
prince u|)on his repentance, at the intercession of some nobleman,
and he is entirely pardoned, then sin is not imputed to him^ he is
justified from that crime, and righteousness is imputed to himhj
the free favour of the prince, that is, he is not condemned but
Bbsohed ; h e is not liable lo ^vvwUlvmeat now, but he has a right | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 429 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | SECOND ESSAY.
A Plain Explication of the Doctrine of Imputed Sin and Imputed Righteousness.
THE doctrine of the imputation of sin and righteousness hath been attended with many noisy controversies in the christian world; And though these things may be frequently met with in common life, and that without any controversy, yet they seem to have created such difficulties in religion, as are hard to be compromised. Let us make one more attempt and try, whether these notions and expressions may not be set in so fair and easy a light, by tracing out the plainest ideas of them in the common affairs of mankind, that when they are applied to religious subjects and texts of scripture, it may vanquish these difficulties, and reconcile the sentiments of several contesting parties in Christianity.
When a man has broken any of the laws of his country, and is actually fined or imprisoned, or put to public shame or death, or is condemned to fines or imprisonments, to the pillory or the gallows, it is plain that sin is imputed to him, his wickedness is upon him, and he bears his iniquity; that is, he is accounted or reputed a criminal by the court of justice, and he is condemned or dealt with as an offender, he is made liable to, or obliged to bear the punishment, or he is actually punished. On the other hand, if a righteous or innocent man is falsely accused of any crime, and he is acquitted by the court, then sin is not imputed to him by that court, or he is not condemned, but righteousness is imputed to him, or he is reputed and pronounced righteous, and dealt with as an innocent or as a righteous man; or, in another scripture phrase, his righteousness is upon him. Or if a reward be either assigned or actually given to a man according to the law upon the account of any righteous or good action he has done, this act of virtue or goodness is imputed to him, and his righteousness is upon him, he is dealt with as a righteous and deserving person, the reward of righteousness is given him.
If a man has been guilty of a crime which deserves capital punishment, but the punishment is remitted by the mercy of the prince upon his repentance, at the intercession of some nobleman, and he is entirely pardoned, then sin is not imputed to him, he is justified from that crime, and righteousness is imputed to him by the free favour of the prince, that is, he is not condemned but absolved; he is not liable to punishment now, but he has a right | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ESSAY IL* 420
to impmiity and life, or he is dealt with as a rigliteous person, or
is though he had not transgressed. Or suppose a man has been
guilty of treason, and his estate is taken away from him, and
from his children for ever, thdh the sin of the /other is'nat im^
puted to the father onluj but to the children alsOj that is, they
bear the iniquity of. their father j h ii punishment i$ laid upom
theniy they sutfer for their father's sin or crime, and that in their
following generations even to late posterity, they are exposed to
poverty and hardships for the treason of their ancestor, and hia
sin is imputed to them as well as Jto him.
If the. crime- of which a man is guilty be murder of the
innocent, and the criminal forfeits his li^ and estate by the sen-
tence of t he law, and his children become begs^ars and vaga-
bonds, then the blood of the innocent man is said to be upon the
murderer, and upon his children, because they also suflTer for
their fathers crime. When tlie Jews imprecate the gailt of the
Mood of 'Christ which they shed, to be imputed to them, and
Snished on them and their children, tliis is their language-;
at. xxvii. 2^- His blood be on us and on our children. Or if
we should suppose some criminal to have incurred the penalty of
imprisonment, banishment, or scourging, and the laws of the
state should permit a friend of his to become his surety, and to
suflTer these penalties in his room, then the crime is said to be im^
puted to the surety j or to be laid upon him^ he bears the iniquity
of the criminal, he stands liable to the penalty, and actually
suffers for the sin of another man : And thus the crime is not
unputed to the original offender, but upon his submisiiion to hie
prince, and trusting in his mercy, he is entirely acquitted, and
dealt with as an innocent or righteous man : then rig^iteoasness
is imputed to liim, though his orime was imputed to his kind
surety, when he suffered for it ; and the sufferings of the sul^ety
are imputed to the criminali when he is absolved or acquitted oa
that account.
And if we shontd suppose the prince, or the laws of the
land, to permit this kind friend or surety to exert himself in
some eminent act of obedience or service to which a reward is
promised ; and all this to procure some further favour for the
criminal, and to entitle him to the promised reward, then this
act of eminent service may be said to be imputed to the original
criminal, that is, he is rewarded on the account of it: so that
upon the whole, tlie criminal comes to have not only a freedom
from guilt, and a right to impunity, but a right also to the re-
ward, in v irtue of what his kind friend and surety has suffered
and done for him^ The criminal is both pardoned, jiislified and
rewarded for the sake of what his friencl has done or suffered,
and his friend's doings as well as his sufferings may be said to be
imputed to him. Or if any man practise obedience and rigjbtt- | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 430 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | to impunity and life, or he is dealt with as a righteous person, or as though he had not transgressed. Or suppose a man has been guilty of treason, and his estate is taken away from him, and from his children for ever, then the sin of the father is not imputed to the father only, but to the children also, that is, they bear the iniquity of their father, his punishment is laid upon them, they suffer for their father’s sin or crime, and that in their following generations even to late posterity, they are exposed to poverty and hardships for the treason of their ancestor, and his sin is imputed to them as well as to him.
If the crime of which a man is guilty be murder of the innocent, and the criminal forfeits his life and estate by the sentence of the law, and his children become beggars and vagabonds, then the blood of the innocent man is said to be upon the murderer, and upon his children, because they also suffer for their father’s crime. When the Jews imprecate the guilt of the blood of Christ which they shed, to be imputed to them, and punished on them and their children, this is their language; Mat. xxvii. 25. His blood be on us and on our children. Or if we should suppose some criminal to have incurred the penalty of imprisonment, banishment, or scourging, and the laws of the state should permit a friend of his to become his surety, and to suffer these penalties in his room, then the crime is said to be imputed to the surety, or to be laid upon him, he bears the iniquity of the criminal, he stands liable to the penalty, and actually suffers for the sin of another man: And thus the crime is not imputed to the original offender, but upon his submission to his prince, and trusting in his mercy, he is entirely acquitted, and dealt with as an innocent or righteous man: then righteousness is imputed to him, though his crime was imputed to his kind surety, when he suffered for it; and the sufferings of the surety are imputed to the criminal, when he is absolved or acquitted on that account.
And if we should suppose the prince, or the laws of the land, to permit this kind friend or surety to exert himself in some eminent act of obedience or service to which a reward is promised; and all this to procure some further favour for the criminal, and to entitle him to the promised reward, then this act of eminent service may be said to be imputed to the original criminal, that is, he is rewarded on the account of it: so that upon the whole, the criminal comes to have not only a freedom from guilt, and a right to impunity, but a right also to the reward, in virtue of what his kind friend and surety has suffered and done for him. The criminal is both pardoned, justified and rewarded for the sake of what his friend has done or suffered, and his friend’s doings as well as his sufferings may be said to be imputed to him. Or if any man practise obedience and right- | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ISO KI'IN AND RECOtEIlY, &C.
votis'ness in an eminent or illustrious manner, and he together
-viitli his |Kwterity are dignified and rewarded on tbc acoouut of
that eminent obedience, then (his obedience and righteousness of
the father is imputed to the chMreUy hi$ righteousness is upon
them; that is^ tliey are dignified and dealt with as though Ibey
bad been eminently righteous and obedient, upon the account of
ib'hat their father was and did.
Now, if among the histories of the nations we have siiy
transactions of this kind recorded by ancient writers, do we not
easily understand what these writers say ? Is not their meaoisg
^ery plain and intelligible ? Should wc stand debating with long
chichanery and cavilling, by rules of grammar, logic and politics,
whether such tilings were possible or no i Is not the sense easy
to a common reader ? Then why should we think these same sort
of tilings and phrases, in matters of religion, are so dark, and
80 difficult, as to need hugfe comments aud quarrelsome folios to
explain them ? Why should we not agree in the plain (beaning of
them, when we meet witli any such phrases among the sacred
writers ? And when we find such representations made to us io
the things that relate to God and man, sin and righteousness, in
the books that teach us tlic way to salvation, why should we not
receive them in their plain common sense, without contending
about them ?
The chief difliculty in adjusting our common ideas in any of
these cases seems to me to be this : How can the particular acts
of the treason of the ])arent be imputed to a child, especially in
its infancy, though it is granted Uiat he suffers banishment and
poverty for the sake of his father's treason ; I say. How can
these particular criminal actions be imputed to him, since this
infant was never capable of committing these acts of treason,
they being quite out of the reach of a child, and im|N)ssible for
him to commit ^ C ir how can those eminent aud illustrious acts of
obedience or righteousness which were performed by a father, be
imputed to a child, if that child never stood either under a direct
ohli{^a'.ion, nor had any capacity to perform those very actions
and services? To these enquiries, I make these two plaia
I. Those acts of treason, or acts of service, by very plain
and common forms and figures of speech, arc said to be imputed
to the chihireii, or to be upon them, when they suffer or enjoy the
obvious and legal consequences of tlieir father's treasons, or of
their eminent services taken in the gross and comprehensive view
of tlien), us they are criminal or meritorious ; though the parti-
Oiilar actions and circumstances of those treasons, or of those
services, could never have been practised by the children, at
least in their niinority. This would give no difficulty at aU to
jiic n'4d^r, viliiy should y cruse theMJMM|Llu4loriefl^ ao^r^aA | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 431 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | cousness in an eminent or illustrious manner, and he together with his posterity are dignified and rewarded on the account of that eminent obedience, then this obedience and righteousness of the father is imputed to the children, his righteousness is upon them; that is, they are dignified and dealt with as though they had been eminently righteous and obedient, upon the account of what their father was and did.
Now, if among the histories of the nations we have any transactions of this kind recorded by ancient writers, do we not easily understand what these writers say? Is not their meaning very plain and intelligible? Should we stand debating with long chichanery and cavilling, by rules of grammar, logic and politics, whether such things were possible or no? Is not the sense easy to a common reader? Then why should we think these same sort of things and phrases, in matters of religion, are so dark, and so difficult, as to need huge comments and quarrelsome folios to explain them? Why should we not agree in the plain meaning of them, when we meet with any such phrases among the sacred writers? And when we find such representations made to us in the things that relate to God and man, sin and righteousness, in the books that teach us the way to salvation, why should we not receive them in their plain common sense, without contending about them?
The chief difficulty in adjusting our common ideas in any of these cases seems to me to be this: How can the particular acts of the treason of the parent be imputed to a child, especially in its infancy, though it is granted that he suffers banishment and poverty for the sake of his father’s treason; I say, How can these particular criminal actions be imputed to him, since this infant was never capable of committing these acts of treason, they being quite out of the reach of a child, and impossible for him to commit? Or how can those eminent and illustrious acts of obedience or righteousness which were performed by a father, be imputed to a child, if that child never stood either under a direct obligation, nor had any capacity to perform those very actions and services? To these enquiries, I make these two plain answers:
I. Those acts of treason, or acts of service, by very plain and common forms and figures of speech, are said to be imputed to the children, or to be upon them, when they suffer or enjoy the obvious and legal consequences of their father’s treasons, or of their eminent services taken in the gross and comprehensive view of them, as they are criminal or meritorious; though the particular actions and circumstances of those treasons, or of those services, could never have been practised by the children, at least in their minority. This would give no difficulty at all to the reader, who should peruse these human histories, and read | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ESSAY If. 4SL
ach narratives in them ; and why should it g ive as any difficulty
vben we readtliis divine account of things in the holy writings,
»r i n human disconrses on divine subjects ?
i a nswer also in the secona place, The words sin and right*
M>u8ncts may be taken in common authors, as I shall shew pre*
lently they are often taken in scripture, in these two senses : Sin
>r iniquity signifies either the particular acts of di8ob«.^Jicnce to a
law, or it signifies the legal result of those disobedient acts, that
ky the gnilt or the liableness to condemnation, and obligation to
bear punishment which arises from tliose acts of disobedience
locording to the law. And thus when we say the sin or iniquity
df the father is imputed to tlie children of a traitor, who never
were nor could be precisely in their fittlier^s situation or eircum-
itances, we do not mean that every single evil act of the father
is c hareed upon the child, as if the child had done it ; b ut that
the guilt or liableness to punishment which arises from those acts
j{ the father is so far transferred or imputed to the child, that
Ihe child suffers banishment or poverty for the sake of it : and
Ibis according to the law and custom of nations is esteemed just
lad rigliteous. In like manner righteousness has two senses : I t
rither signiKcs the particular acts of obedience to any law or
Dommand of a superior, or it signifies the result of those actions,
that is, a right to impunity, a freedom from punishment, and a
right to life, or liberty, or honour, or any reward which be*
buged by the law to such acts of obedience.
And so when we say th€ righteousness of ihe father is im^
outed to the child of a person who has performed some eminent
ict of service or obedience, we do not mean that all those special
sets and circumstances of the father's service or obedience are
minutely and particularly imputed to the child; but the/ general
result of those acts, that is, the rectitude in court, or the right
to impunity and reward, which is the result of the father's per-
formances, iis mputed to the child. Now if we would but try to
explain every text of scripture wherein eitlier imputed sin or im«
puted righteousness are mentioned in the word of God, either in
express words, or in the plain sense and meaning of them, I
am persuaded we should find them all easy and intelligible, and
free from cavils and controversies.
If we meet with such narratives in common history as I ha va
suggested, surely we should not expect that the writer should
express himself in such a nice accuracy of learned and scholastic
bmguage, as men of modern controversy are almost constrained
to use, in order to guard tlieir expressions against all possible
savil and objection. Nor should we enter such a detail of critical
and perplexing debates about every punctilio both of word and
in tins history, as is too often done wh^n we read these
anripiure^ as relating to Adam and Christ. AndaloM
d'±U | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 432 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | such narratives in them; and why should it give us any difficulty when we read this divine account of things in the holy writings, or in human discourses on divine subjects?
I answer also in the second place. The words sin and righteousness may be taken in common authors, as I shall shew presently they are often taken in scripture, in these two senses: Sin or iniquity signifies either the particular acts of disobedience to a law, or it signifies the legal result of those disobedient acts, that is, the guilt or the liableness to condemnation, and obligation to bear punishment which arises from those acts of disobedience according to the law. And thus when we say the sin or iniquity of the father is imputed to the children of a traitor, who never were nor could be precisely in their father’s situation or circumstances, we do not mean that every single evil act of the father is charged upon the child, as if the child had done it; but that the guilt or liableness to punishment which arises from those acts of the father is so far transferred or imputed to the child, that the child suffers banishment or poverty for the sake of it: and this according to the law and custom of nations is esteemed just and righteous. In like manner righteousness has two senses: It either signifies the particular acts of obedience to any law or command of a superior, or it signifies the result of those actions, that is, a right to impunity, a freedom from punishment, and a right to life, or liberty, or honour, or any reward which be-louged by the law to such acts of obedience.
And so when we say the righteousness of the father is imputed to the child of a person who has performed some eminent act of service or obedience, we do not mean that all those special acts and circumstances of the father’s service or obedience are minutely and particularly imputed to the child; but the general result of those acts, that is, the rectitude in court, or the right to impunity and reward, which is the result of the father’s performances, is imputed to the child. Now if we would but try to explain every text of scripture wherein either imputed sin or imputed righteousness are mentioned in the word of God, either in express words, or in the plain sense and meaning of them, I am persuaded we should find them all easy and intelligible, and free from cavils and controversies.
If we meet with such narratives in common history as I have suggested, surely we should not expect that the writer should express himself in such a nice accuracy of learned and scholastic language, as men of modern controversy are almost constrained to use, in order to guard their expressions against all possible cavil and objection. Nor should we enter such a detail of critical and perplexing debates about every punctilio both of word and sense in this history, as is too often done when we read these things in scripture, as relating to Adam and Christ. And since | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
432 RUIN AND REC0YER7, &C.
' t lie holy scriptures were written for the goididod use of mankiodi
anil their general ineauiug is obvious and plain, why should we
rnck every syllable, and put every expression to the torture to
make it c oul'css what we have a Aiind to have it speak acoordioj
to tlie different parties under which we list ourselves.
If we consider that account which scripture gives us of all
mankind falling under sin, and the legal or penal consequences
tliereof by the sin of Adam ; or if we consider Christ's taking
npon htm the sins of men, bearing their sins, and suffering for
them as a surety or sacrifice ; or if w e consider righieousness
imputed to those that believe, oreven the righteousness or obedi-
ence of C hrist imputed to penitents and believers ; I think we
should find no great ditficulty to adjust our ideas of these things,
if we would but suflcr ourselves to form our seutimeuts of these
natters by the plain, natural and common expressions and ideas
of men about these subjects, and in a candid manner receive the
obvious meaning of such language. In order to confirm what I
have said, 1 desire to make these three remarks :
I. That t!)CTe are several such histories in the bible,' wherein
instuncos of tlic like kinds umoiig the transactions of men arc
deiivorcd down to us in such sort of expressions or words of the
same import. Abraliam's eminent obedience to God in bringing
his son Isaac to the altar, was rewarded, not only in blessings to
Abraham himself, but to his seed. Gen. xxii. 16 — 18. Thy
sefd shall pos}<ess the gate of his enemies, and in thy seed shall all
the nations o/* the earth be biassed, because thou hast obeyed my
zoice. Here it muy be said, that Abrahanfs obedience, at least
in the result and consequences of it, is imputed to his seed.
This same promise is repeated again to Isaac, and assigned to
his posterity, for the sake of Abraham's eminent piety and obedi-
ence. Gen. xxvi. 4, 5. / Kill perform the oath that I sware
vnto ylbraham thy father, and I mil make thy seed to multiply
as the stars of heaven, and I will give unto thy seed, all these
countries, because that Abraham obeyed my voice, and kept my
charge, my .statutes and v\if laws. Abraham^s righteousness wis
thus imputed to Isaac and his seed.
r/timhas the son of lilcazar zsas zealous for the Lord
avion i^ the children of Israel, and God gave him and his seed
aUcr him the covenant of an everlasting priesthood, because he
teas zealous for his God, und slew the criminals in Israel ; N umb.
XXV. 1 1. J his eminent act of ris^hteousness was so far imputed
to his children, as that they received the reward of it as well as
himself. Achan uho had stolen the silver and the rich garment
and the wedge of gold from among the spoils of Jericho, pro-
"voked the Lord to anger; and his crime, by the ap|K)intment of
Qoi], was >o tar imputed to his children, that they xvere all stoned
for (he sake of his crime. Tiie guilt or punishment of it was im- | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 433 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | the holy scriptures were written for the common use of mankind, and their general meaning is obvious and plain, why should we rack every syllable, and put every expression to the torture to make it confess what we have a mind to have it speak according to the different parties under which we list ourselves.
If we consider that account which scripture gives us of all mankind falling under sin, and the legal or penal consequences thereof by the sin of Adam; or if we consider Christ’s taking upon him the sins of men, bearing their sins, and suffering for them as a surety or sacrifice; or if we consider righteousness imputed to those that believe, or even the righteousness or obedience of Christ imputed to penitents and believers; I think we should find no great difficulty to adjust our ideas of these things, if we would but suffer ourselves to form our sentiments of these matters by the plain, natural and common expressions and ideas of men about these subjects, and in a candid manner receive the obvious meaning of such language. In order to confirm what I have said, I desire to make these three remarks:
I. That there are several such histories in the bible, wherein instances of the like kinds among the transactions of men are delivered down to us in such sort of expressions or words of the same import. Abraham’s eminent obedience to God in bringing his son Isaac to the altar, was rewarded, not only in blessings to Abraham himself, but to his seed. Gen. xxii. 16—18. Thy seed shall possess the gate of his enemies, and in thy seed shall all the nations of the earth be blessed, because thou hast obeyed my voice. Here it may be said, that Abraham’s obedience, at least in the result and consequences of it, is imputed to his seed. This same promise is repeated again to Isaac, and assigned to his posterity, for the sake of Abraham’s eminent piety and obedience. Gen. xxvi. 4, 5. I will perform the oath that I swear unto Abraham thy father, and I will make thy seed to multiply as the stars of heaven, and I will give unto thy seed, all these countries, because that Abraham obeyed my voice, and kept my charge, my statutes and my laws. Abraham’s righteousness was thus imputed to Isaac and his seed.
Phinehas the son of Eleazar was zealous for the Lord among the children of Israel, and God gave him and his seed after him the covenant of an everlasting priesthood, because he was zealous for his God, and slew the criminals in Israel; Numb. xxv. 11. This eminent act of righteousness was so far imputed to his children, as that they received the reward of it as well as himself. Achan who had stolen the silver and the rich garment and the wedge of gold from among the spoils of Jericho, provoked the Lord to anger; and his crime, by the appointment of God, was so far imputed to his children, that they were all stoned for the sake of his crime. The guilt or punishment of it was im- | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ESSAY II. 449
efl to (he children together ivitb the father ; J osh. vn. 24.
e falsehood and covetousness cS Gehazi were imputed to his
tority ; 9 Kings y. 25. When God by the mouth of his pro-
!t |)rontHiiiced that leprosy should cleave unto him, and to his
I J ot ever.
Many otiier instances of this kind might be collected front
sacred writings^ to slicw us ho\? persons . m ay not only have
ir OATH sin, or their own rigliteousness imputed to them in tlie
tisiiracnts or the rewards they receive ; b ut other persons also
y have that sin or rigliteousness imputed to them ; t hat is, t hey
y fall under condemnation and punishment, or have a right to
jHiuity and reward by a wise and holy constitution of God^
DO the account of the crime or obedience of their forefathers.
ite. It is not my business and design in this place to justify at
gfe the conduct of providence in these instances, but only to
iresent the actual tacts or matter of history, and show how
ry easy and intelligible these sort of representations are, and
U they would afford no difficulty to a reader, nor occasion any
ntroversy about the sense of them, if we came with honest
uds to read them, and not -under any former prejudices or bias;
II. It is pretty evident that the scriptures of the old and
w testament use the words sin and iniquity^ HDH or HMIOn and ])y
d ^A^a^i% both in tlic Hebrew and Greek languages, to sig-
fy n ot only the criminal actions themsslves, but also sometimes
3y signify the legal result and consequences of these actions^
It' i s, the guilt or liablcness to punishment, and sometimes the
nishroent itself, whether it fall upon the original criminal, or
ion others for his sake, and on his account. In the same man-
r the scripture uses the word righteousness, pny or nplTL and
cfttom/m, to signify, that right to impunity, that rectitude in
irt, tliat justification, or being pronounced righteous, or that
^t to reward, which is the result of those particular acts of
ety and obedience, as well as to signify the particular acts of
edience or piety themselves. If this has not been sufficiently
cwn already by wiiters in this controversy, a moderate study
' s ome of tliose texts where these words are used, will convince
\ of it.
I might give a short specimen of it in a few scriptures,
ob xxxiii. 20. God Kill render to a man his righteousness, that
not tlie very righteous actions, but tiie proper result of them,
' those blessings which are the fruits of righteousness. Psali
jciv. 5. lie shall receive the blessing ^rom the Lofd, and rights'
nsness from the God of his salvation, that is, the reward of
gliteousncss. Hosea x. 12. Sow to yourselves in righteousness,
lat is, in and by actions of piety and goodness \ till the Lord
me, and rain righteousn^ upon i^ou, lYv^l K^^^SJiV^ \Rk>».
•ir// on yon the reii ards or fruits of pW\^\
Vol. TV. ' 1 2 ^ | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 434 | 635 | 640.8 | 1,239.84 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | ESSAY II.
448
led to the children together with the father; Josh. vii. 24.
the falsehood and covetousness of Gehazi were imputed to his
terity; 2 Kings v. 25. When God by the mouth of his pro-
nounced that leprosy should cleave unto him, and to his
t for ever.
Many other instances of this kind might be collected from
sacred writings, to shew us how persons may not only have
ir own sin, or their own righteousness imputed to them in the
pishments or the rewards they receive; but other persons also
may have that sin or righteousness imputed to them; that is, they
fall under condemnation and punishment, or have a right to
punity and reward by a wise and holy constitution of God,
on the account of the crime or obedience of their forefathers.
Note, It is not my business and design in this place to justify at
gle the conduct of providence in these instances, but only to
present the actual facts or matter of history, and show how
very easy and intelligible these sort of representations are, and
that they would afford no difficulty to a reader, nor occasion any
introversy about the sense of them, if we came with honest
ends to read them, and not under any former prejudices or bias.
II. It is pretty evident that the scriptures of the old and
new testament use the words sin and iniquity, נַתְבָּרוֹן or נַתְבָּרוֹן and
'Δμαγία both in the Hebrew and Greek languages, to sig-
fy not only the criminal actions themselves, but also sometimes
they signify the legal result and consequences of these actions,
it is, the guilt or liableness to punishment, and sometimes the
punishment itself, whether it fall upon the original criminal, or
on others for his sake, and on his account. In the same man-
r the scripture uses the word righteousness, נַתְבָּרוֹן or נַתְבָּרוֹן and
to signify, that right to impunity, that rectitude in
urt, that justification, or being pronounced righteous, or that
right to reward, which is the result of those particular acts of
sety and obedience, as well as to signify the particular acts of
edience or piety themselves. If this has not been sufficiently
wn already by writers in this controversy, a moderate study
some of those texts where these words are used, will convince
of it.
I might give a short specimen of it in a few scriptures.
ob xxxiii. 26. God will render to a man his righteousness, that
not the very righteous actions, but the proper result of them,
those blessings which are the fruits of righteousness. Psal.
xiv. 5. He shall receive the blessing from the Lord, and right-
ousness from the God of his salvation, that is, the reward of
righteousness. Hosea x. 12. Sow to yourselves in righteousness,
that is, in and by actions of piety and goodness; till the Lord
time, and rain righteousness upon you, that is, till he pour
own on you the rewards or fruits of piety.
Vol. iv. E. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
431 RUlH ANn EEeoTBKT, &C.
I
I might add here, that in aeYeral placet df St Paul^i tf
ties, the word righteousness is used to sigoify jostificatioa ii
passive sense of the word, or a justined state, n reedtnli
oourtj or a right to impanity and life. Rom* x. 3. Christ u
end of the law for righteousness to every one thai hthtst
whioh must mean that Ciirist is the great design or aocompE
ment of the law of God, in order to the justificatioQ of
Hovers, or to tlieir obtaining a right to life. Rom. z. 19. R
the heart man belitvelh unto Hghteousneu^ that ia, to obtain j
tilication, or a justified slate. Oal. ii. 23. i/* ri^hteousneuc
h}f t he law, then Christ is dead in vain ; that is, if a justi
siate, or a right to life came by the law &c. And particnli
where the word xoyi^o^au, or impute, is joined with rigitc
ness, as^Rom. iv. 3. Gal. iii. 6. Abraham believed God, em
teas counted or imputed to- him for righteousness ; Rom. iv
His faith is counted for righteousness ; it is not am or tm^,
19, for and instead of righteous works, but ik iiKatoavtnt, thi
in order to justification, or acccptanee with God.
And so in other places of scripture, work whether gom
evil, is put for the reward of it. Job xxxiv. 11. Thevorki
man will he rendtr unto him ; that is, the recompence or fill
his work : So the word iniquity is u sed to signify the puniahi
of it. Uos. xii. 13. Ye have plt^ued zcickeaness, ye have re
iniquity ; that rr, the punishment ttiat it deserves. So :
desires Philemon to; impute any zrrong he had received
Otiesimus to himself; FliiTcm. ver. 18, Not the evil ac
but the damage lie sustained.
And upon this account when sin or righteousness are
to be imputed to any man upon the account of the works of ri
euusnQss or sin which he himsell* iias done ; then these w
perhaps may sometimes denote the good or evil actions tl
selves, together with the legal result of them in guilt and
demuation, er the legal rectitude in absolution and justifies
But when tlie shiful or righteous actions of one jierson a
imputed to another as to bring punishments or rewards upoc
other, then generally the words imputed sin and righteon
signify the legal and forensic result of these sinful or right
actions, that i«, an obligation or a liableness to punishraei
One side, or a rfght to impunity, and the reward on the o
It may be granted indeed, if one man commit murder, and t
or four other men contrived or encouraged, aided or abetted
murderer in tlie commission of the crime, perhaps the aotio
murder, as well as the legal penalties of it, may be in a m
imputed to all these men, because they are all actual sharer
the fact : But this is not the case in these scriptural imputtti
we are speaking of, therefore it is only guilt or penalty ihn
imputed or trausferted. ^om^ ^^^xviii may be ready to enqoi | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 435 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | I might add here, that in several places of St. Paul's writings, the word righteousness is used to signify justification in a passive sense of the word, or a justified state, a rectitudinal court, or a right to impunity and life. Rom. x. 3. Christ is the end of the law for righteousness to every one that believes which must mean that Christ is the great design or accomplishment of the law of God, in order to the justification of his verses, or to their obtaining a right to life. Rom. x. 19. He the heart man believeth unto righteousness, that is, to obtain justification, or a justified state. Gal. ii. 23. If righteousness by the law, then Christ is dead in vain; that is, if a justified state, or a right to life came by the law &c. And particularly where the word λογίζωμα, or impute, is joined with righteousness, as Rom. iv. 3. Gal. iii. 6. Abraham believed God, and was counted or imputed to him for righteousness; Rom. iv. IIis faith is counted for righteousness; it is not artn or vnth, is, for and instead of righteous works, but us διακινοῦν, this in order to justification, or acceptance with God.
And so in other places of scripture, work whether good evil, is put for the reward of it. Job xxxiv. 11. The work man will he render unto him; that is, the recompence or fruit his work: So the word iniquity is used to signify the punishment of it. Hos. xii. 13. Ye have plowed wickedness, ye have reinquity; that is, the punishment that it deserves. So desires Philemon to impute any wrong he had received from Onesimus to himself; Philem. ver. 18. Not the evil act but the damage he sustained.
And upon this account when sin or righteousness are to be imputed to any man upon the account of the works of righteousness or sin which he himself has done; then these words perhaps may sometimes denote the good or evil actions they selves, together with the legal result of them in guilt and demotion, or the legal rectitude in absolution and justification. But when the sinful or righteous actions of one person are imputed to another as to bring punishments or rewards upon other, then generally the words imputed sin and righteous signify the legal and forensic result of these sinful or right actions, that is, an obligation or a liableness to punishment one side, or a right to impunity, and the reward on the other. It may be granted indeed, if one man commit murder, and that or four other men contrived or encouraged, aided or abetted murderer in the commission of the crime, perhaps the action murder, as well as the legal penalties of it, may be in a manner imputed to all these men, because they are all actual shares the fact: But this is not the case in these scriptural imputations we are speaking of, therefore it is only guilt or penalty that is imputed or transferred. Some person may be ready to enquire. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ESSAY n. 4S5
[ow can (he guilt of sin or the condemnation for it.
uted or transferred from one n^n to another, witli-
ation of the sinful actions themiielves ; O r bow can
;tude, that is, the right to impunity and life, or the
of one be imputed to another, without the righte*
icmselves beidg imputed $ T o this I answer. The
it constitution or law, whether human or divine, by
tions themselves, whether good or evil, could be
e imputed, is dufiknent for the imputation of the
)f those actions, and that with as much justice,
add) with much more justice in many cases, may
lit or punishment of sinful actions be imputed to
isferred to them than the actions themselves : For
1 of the evil actions to an innocent persooi if it
, w ould carry more of crime and blame, and shame^
ed defilement and demerit in it, than the mere im-
*ir ^uilt, that is, a liableness to condemnatioa and
And indeed when the punishment is transferred to
le sin or guilt is said to be imputed to them, aa I
fore.
It will be objected, may not the tei7 Sftme sinful
father be imputed to the posterity, since the child-
» f ather naturally when he committckl those sins?
d to pay tithes in Abraham^ Heb. vii. 9. because
\he loins of his great grandfather^ vchtn he paid
I'sedec
?
The apostle expresses it n ot as a matter of strict
ause he adds the wortis, ds I may say sOf to inti-
er an allusion or emblem, than strict reasoning.
:c could be supposed any advantage by t his natural
men in Adam to support the imputation of his sin
lere can be no necessity of it, for Christ was not
, though our sins zcere imputed to him. This im«
therefore to the one or tlie other signifies only the
} guih, conderonation or punishment, and not the
the same evil actions, or the transferring them
us, or from us to our Jblessed Saviour.
\ third argument to prove the good or evil actions
uted, as some suppO!»e, may arise from the strong
scripture, especially in Rom. v. 19. where there
a comoarison between our being made or ^' con-
s by me disobedience of Adam, and our beinic
luted righteous by the obedience of Christ." To
that the «)ewish and all the Eastern writers deal
ligures and expressions to signify plain and obvious
erefore there is some. allowance lo beisv^4^VsL^%
\hem, or when we reduce them lo ^\^va\aai^%%^
£ e 2 | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 436 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | how can the guilt of sin or the condemnation for it be imputed or transferred from one man to another, with the intention of the sinful actions themselves; Or how can attitude, that is, the right to impunity and life, or the right of one be imputed to another, without the righteousness being imputed; 'To this I answer, The constitution or law, whether human or divine, by actions themselves, whether good or evil, could be imputed, is sufficient for the imputation of the of those actions, and that with as much justice. Add, with much more justice in many cases, may guilt or punishment of sinful actions be imputed to transferred to them than the actions themselves: For of the evil actions to an innocent person, if it would carry more of crime and blame, and shame, real defilement and demerit in it, than the mere immeir guilt, that is, a liableness to condemnation and And indeed when the punishment is transferred to the sin or guilt is said to be imputed to them, as I fore.
It will be objected, may not the very same sinful father be imputed to the posterity, since the child-father naturally when he committed those sins? did to pay tithes in Abraham, Heb. vii. 9. because the loins of his great grandfather, when he paid risedec?
The apostle expresses it not as a matter of strict cause he adds the words, as I may say so, to intier an allusion or emblem, than strict reasoning.
We could be supposed any advantage by this natural men in Adam to support the imputation of his sin there can be no necessity of it, for Christ was not though our sins were imputed to him. This therefore to the one or the other signifies only the guilt, condemnation or punishment, and not the same evil actions, or the transferring them us, or from us to our blessed Saviour.
A third argument to prove the good or evil actions imputed, as some suppose, may arise from the strong scripture, especially in Rom. v. 19. where there is a comparison between our being made or "consus by the disobedience of Adam, and our being instituted righteous by the obedience of Christ." To that the Jewish and all the Eastern writers deal figures and expressions to signify plain and obvious therefore there is some allowance to be made in the them, or when we reduce them to plain language. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
I
4d6 RCTN ANH RECOTERY) &e.
And besides, as Adum was the head and spring noionlj 6t mt
guilt and death by imputation, but of our inherent sin by iiatHr4.
|)ropagatiou also ; so Christ was the hc^d and apring; not onlyii
Qur justification and life by his imputed rightcousQeaa^ but a
puc inherent lioliness or righteousness by sanctifipatioii : And JM^
baps the strength of the expressions might be used to intimate si*
thisto.ua.
But if only the resuU of their good or. evil actions wer^kk
puted to us, those strong expressions might he use<jL I am san
vhen '^ all the iniquities of the ehildren. of Israel and all tMf
transgfcsniona in all their sins, arc confessed over the headof tks;
goat^ while Aaron lays both his hands upon it, and he is said W
put or transfer thera all upon the head of the goat, and thaiths.
goat should bear upon him all tlieir iniquities into the wilderne%
or a. land of separation ;** Lev. xvi. 21. All tliese words eii^
signify nothing more than transferring to the goat th^ nih ar
condemnation or liafaleness to punishment, misery and dcall^
which these sins deserved, and to which the goat might beet*
posed ; f or a brute creature cannot have human sins any other-
\\ise imputed or ti'ansforrcd to it: the particular sinful actiom st
man cannot be transferred to the brutal sacrifice in any otber I
sense : Nor do I see a necessity of any other sense in which the. j
sin of Adam was imputed to his posterity, or the sins of meo to '
the Son of Grod*. If one would keep our ideas of these thiifi '
as clear and distinct as possible, 1 think we may do it by viitDC \
of this distinction, or this two-fold sense of the words sin sad ;
righteousness.
Fourthly, It is possible some may in the fourth place olgect ^
that it cannot properly be called imputed righteousness, if t hs |
righteous actions themselves are not imputed ; f or in proper |
speech the result of ChrisCs righteousness, that is, the right to ;
impunity and eternal life which he procured for us, is given to ui '
rather than imputed. Answer. To this I answer and grast,
that this is the very language of scripture : It is called, the gift
of righteousness ; R om. v. 17. arid eternal Itje, which istlis
result of Christ's righteousness, is the gift of God ihrwtgk |
Jesus Christ; Horn. vi. 23. A fid the /orgivenens of sins i»
given to Israel ; A cts v. 31. \et let it b e observed also, thst :
tho very reward itself is sometimes said to be reckoned or im* I
4
* Let what will be said to confiDe the lenie of thit impnUUoB of i'ip «r i
richteousoess to the legal or fureobic result of s;oud or evil actions ; Ici wktf j
Will be laid to exclude and deny the imputatioo of the actioos tb^mselTCi ts ;
others ; yet those who oppose this doctrine will and do level almost all Ihnr •
arguments against the imputation of the actioos tbemseUfs, and then triaafh
io having demolished wh.it we iierrr built, aod in refuting what wt •crtr -_
asserted or maiutaiued. Nor do 1 know any other r<*a8on for this their coadsctf .
but that while they iputsuch senses upon our words as we disdain, ibey eaa
flory in th«ir own {i^a«'it4 ^wuut«\ W\ 'aV%\% tkic truth or iDUKritj of ii i Miy
IJtaowiot. | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 437 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | And besides, as Adam was the head and spring not only of our guilt and death by imputation, but of our inherent sin by natural propagation also; so Christ was the head and spring not only of our justification and life by his imputed righteousness, but of our inherent holiness or righteousness by sanctification: And perhaps the strength of the expressions might be used to intimate all this to us.
But if only the result of their good or evil actions were imputed to us, those strong expressions might be used. I am sure when "all the iniquities of the children of Israel and all their transgressions in all their sins, are confessed over the head of the goat, while Aaron lays both his hands upon it, and he is said to put or transfer them all upon the head of the goat, and that the goat should bear upon him all their iniquities into the wilderness, or a land of separation;" Lev. xvi. 21. All these words can signify nothing more than transferring to the goat the guilt or condemnation or liability to punishment, misery and death, which these sins deserved, and to which the goat might be exposed; for a brute creature cannot have human sins any otherwise imputed or transferred to it: the particular sinful actions of man cannot be transferred to the brutal sacrifice in any other sense: Nor do I see a necessity of any other sense in which the sin of Adam was imputed to his posterity, or the sins of men to the Son of God*. If one would keep our ideas of these things as clear and distinct as possible, I think we may do it by virtue of this distinction, or this two-fold sense of the words sin and righteousness.
Fourthly, It is possible some may in the fourth place object that it cannot properly be called imputed righteousness, if the righteous actions themselves are not imputed; for in proper speech the result of Christ's righteousness, that is, the right to impunity and eternal life which he procured for us, is given to us rather than imputed. Answer. To this I answer and grant, that this is the very language of scripture: It is called, the gift of righteousness; Rom. v. 17. and eternal life, which is the result of Christ's righteousness, is the gift of God through Jesus Christ; Rom. vi. 23. And the forgiveness of sins is given to Israel; Acts v. 31. Yet let it be observed also, that the very reward itself is sometimes said to be reckoned or im-
* Let what will be said to confine the sense of this imputation of sin or righteousness to the legal or forensic result of good or evil actions; let what will be said to exclude and deny the imputation of the actions themselves to others; yet those who oppose this doctrine will and do level almost all their arguments against the imputation of the actions themselves, and then triumph in having demolished what we never built, and in refuting what we never asserted or maintained. Nor do I know any other reason for this their conduct, but that while they put such senses upon our words as we disclaim, they can glory in their own favored victories; but where the truth or integrity of it lies, I know not. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ted ID flciiphire. Rmi. W. 4. The word is Xoyi^rrai, which our
kiMaton hate construed impiUcd in the next verse. But tlktt
dtme to the next remark.
III. The senpture does not, as I remember, any where id
press words assert, ^' that the sin of Adam is imputed to his
Idren, or that the sins of mankind, or of bclievem were im-
te«l to Christy or that the righteousness of Christ is imputed
believers ;^' yet still I think the sense and true meaning of all
me expressions is sufficiently found in several places of
ipture.
If we consult the language of the prophets Isaiah^ and
remy^ and Daniel^ and the apostles John, and Paul, and
Her, in their representation of some of these subjects, Isa.
i. 4 — 12. and Jer. xxiii. 6. and xxxiii. 16. Dan. ix. 34. Rom.
12—19. 1 Cor. x¥. 3, 21, 22. Gal. iii. 13. 2 Cor. v. 21.
phes. i. 7. and ii. 5, 13. Phil. iii. 9. Col. i. 14, 20. lleb. ix.
I, 26. 1 Pet. ii. 24. and iii. 18. 1 J ohni. 7. and ii. 2. andiv.
I. and Rev. i. 5. and v. 9. and many other scriptures, we shall
id the substance and true sense of these phrases as I have ex-
ained them. Yet since these express words and phrases of the
imputation of Adam^s sin to us, of our sins to Christ, or of
hrist's righteousness to us," are not plainly written in scripture,
t should not impose these very expressions on every christian ;
t e very one take their liberty in manifesting their sense of these
ain scriptural doctrines in such words and phrases of their own,
I are modest and secure from ofiencc and danger, or confine
lemselves to scripture-language. But if these words were ex-
resslv written in the bible, they could not reasonably be inter-
reted to any other sense, than that which I have explained in
id by so many examples, both in the scripture- history and in
immon life. Let us make this appear in a few instances.
When wc say, the sin of Adam is imputed to all his pos-
rilyy can we possibly mean that every evil motion of Adani's
re or his heart towards tlie forbidden fruit, with every thought
' u nbelief of tlie threatening, or every working of ingratitude
ward God in his mind, or pride in his heart, together with the
stion of eating this fruit at his wife^s request, is minutely and
srticularly imputed to all his infant seed ^ Can these criminal
loughts be im|)uted to them who never were under any tempta*
on or capacity of tasting that fruit, or of breaking that particu-
ir law of God ? Must we not necessarily therefore mean, that it
< t he guilt of Adam in that sin, or his liablcness to condcmna-
lon and punislimeut, to misery and death, is imputed or traus-
irred to his posterity ? Imputation of sin in this case signifies
le imputation or trans/erring of the legal or penal conse^uenca
fsin; that 18, misery and death.
Wbeu the sins of David, and oi ^W^ \Vs:i,^^'»i
& e 3 | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 438 | 635 | 640.8 | 1,239.84 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | ed in scripture. Rom. iv. 4. The word is λογίζεται, which our
philators have construed imputed in the next verse. But this
deserve to the next remark.
III. The scripture does not, as I remember, any where in
press words assert, "that the sin of Adam is imputed to his
children, or that the sins of mankind, or of believers were im-
ted to Christ, or that the righteousness of Christ is imputed
believers;" yet still I think the sense and true meaning of all
use expressious is sufficiently found in several places of
scripture.
If we consult the language of the prophets Isaiah, and
remy, and Daniel, and the apostles John, and Paul, and
eter, in their representation of some of these subjects, Isa.
i. 4—12. and Jer. xxiii. 6. and xxxiii. 16. Dan. ix. 24. Rom.
12—19. 1 Cor. xv. 3, 21, 22. Gal. iii. 13. 2 Cor. v. 21.
phes. i. 7. and ii. 5, 13. Phil. iii. 9. Col. i. 14, 20. Heb. ix.
l, 26. 1 Pet. ii. 24. and iii. 18. 1 John i. 7. and ii. 2. and iv.
l. and Rev. i. 5. and v. 9. and many other scriptures, we shall
and the substance and true sense of these phrases as I have ex-
ained them. Yet since these express words and phrases of the
imputation of Adam's sin to us, of our sins to Christ, or of
christ's righteousness to us," are not plainly written in scripture,
we should not impose these very expressions on every christian;
it every one take their liberty in manifesting their sense of these
main scriptural doctrines in such words and phrases of their own,
we are modest and secure from offence and danger, or confine
themselves to scripture-language. But if these words were ex-
ressly written in the bible, they could not reasonably be inter-
reted to any other sense, than that which I have explained in
and by so many examples, both in the scripture-history and in
common life. Let us make this appear in a few instances.
When we say, the sin of Adam is imputed to all his pos-
rity, can we possibly mean that every evil motion of Adam's
ve or his heart towards the forbidden fruit, with every thought
"unbelief of the threatening, or every working of ingratitude
ward God in his mind, or pride in his heart, together with the
action of eating this fruit at his wife's request, is minutely and
particularly imputed to all his infant seed? Can these criminal
oughts be imputed to them who never were under any tempta-
on or capacity of tasting that fruit, or of breaking that particu-
lar law of God? Must we not necessarily therefore mean, that it
is the guilt of Adam in that sin, or his liableness to condemnation
and punishment, to misery and death, is imputed or trans-
ferred to his posterity? Imputation of sin in this case signifies
the imputation or transferring of the legal or penal consequences
of sin; that is, misery and death.
When the sins of David, and of Mary Magdalen, | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
43S RtTXK AKB ESeOTEETj |cC« ,
Rahftb, and of ajl the adultercrsi the harloti^ and Ae mi
that e^er repented and believad on Christ, are aaid in gencraU
he imputed to Christ, ia it proper to explain it by saying idl ^
particular lustful thoughts, with eTery adulterous wish,
every impious and bloody purpose in their hearts, together i
mil the lewd and vile actions hoth of men and women, are
themselves imputed, reckoned, or trfinsferred io the pure
holy Jesus, wnen he was made a sacrifice for their sins ?
Christ be counted or reputed as the lewd or bloody transgressor^
Can any thing else therefore be meant by such an expression
Magdalen's, or of David's sins imputed to Christ, than that ^
guilt or liableness to punishment, which is the legal resoki
their crimes, was laid upon Christ when he bore all theh tm '
hik body 9 o n the cursed tree ?
Let it be considered, that if all their sinfiil actions could
and were imputed to Christ, which are only and properly
sonal, I cannot "Vfell see bow to avoid the imputation
vitiosity and sinfulness and dreadful demerit of all these t
to Christ, together with the actions themselves, and thus ttf
defilement of their sips in every bad sense of it, will be Inns*
ferred and imputed to the blessed Jesus, the holy one of God,
which I fear would too nearly border upon the language of bW
phemy. It is evident indeed in many places of scripture, ihiii
our '^ sins were imputed to our blessed Saviour, when Chri^
bore the sins of many, when he was made sin for us ;'* that is, a
sin-offering, when '^ the Lord laid on him the iniquities of us
all,*' when ^^ the Lord pleased to bruise him, and put him ti
grief, and made his soul an offering for sin */' But I think it c sa
never mean any more than this, that he was made a proper
sacrifice of atonement or expiation for those sins, by bearing sor^
rows and punishments, and death upon that account, which were
the legal result of bur sins, in order to deliver us from them*.
So when we say, the righteousness of Christ , i s imputed (•
believers^ I think it can never mean that every particular riglit-
ecus action of Christ, as he was a holy observer of the Jewish
law, a preacher of the gospel, a master of a family, er a worker
of miracles, can be imputed to women or children, who w«rt
never called to any such oflice, or to perform these actions ; Bor
ean his sufferings of circumcision, or his celebration of Jewilk
festivals in the temple, among the males of the house of Israd
be minutely and particularly Imputed to the Gentile christian^
both male and female, who never were under the command of
circumcision, or who would have sinned in practising Jcwitb
* If any one will doubt whether in scripture the linB of one prrtoo are tftr
imputed to aootUer, or borne by another^ in the seoBe drclarrd, iet bin r«i4
even Doctor Whitby bioiielf io biy expoiitlon on I Pet. ii. '2*, «5. where / tfcw*
any man may find «UUUcV\oi\ \ik \Y»\% ^«>\m, bow Chriit burt our sins in kit ^^ | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 439 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | Rahab, and of all the adulterers, the harlots, and the murderer that ever repented and believed on Christ, are said in general be imputed to Christ, is it proper to explain it by saying all the particular lustful thoughts, with every adulterous wish, and every impious and bloody purpose in their hearts, together with all the lewd and vile actions both of men and women, are the themselves imputed, reckoned, or transferred to the pure and holy Jesus, when he was made a sacrifice for their sins? Can Christ be counted or reputed as the lewd or bloody transgressor? Can any thing else therefore be meant by such an expression of Magdalen's, or of David's sins imputed to Christ, than that the guilt or liableness to punishment, which is the legal result of their crimes, was laid upon Christ when he bore all their sins in his body, on the cursed tree?
Let it be considered, that if all their sinful actions could be and were imputed to Christ, which are only and properly personal, I cannot well see how to avoid the imputation of the vitiosity and sinfulness and dreadful demerit of all these actions to Christ, together with the actions themselves, and thus the defilement of their sins in every bad sense of it, will be transferred and imputed to the blessed Jesus, the holy one of God, which I fear would too nearly border upon the language of blasphemy. It is evident indeed in many places of scripture, that our "sins were imputed to our blessed Saviour, when Christ bore the sins of many, when he was made sin for us;" that is, a sin-offering, when "the Lord laid on him the iniquities of us all," when "the Lord pleased to bruise him, and put him to grief, and made his soul an offering for sin:" But I think it can never mean any more than this, that he was made a proper sacrifice of atonement or expiation for those sins, by bearing sorrows and punishments, and death upon that account, which were the legal result of our sins, in order to deliver us from them*.
So when we say, the righteousness of Christ is imputed to believers, I think it can never mean that every particular righteous action of Christ, as he was a holy observer of the Jewish law, a preacher of the gospel, a master of a family, or a worker of miracles, can be imputed to women or children, who were never called to any such office, or to perform these actions; nor can his sufferings of circumcision, or his celebration of Jewish festivals in the temple, among the males of the house of Israel be minutely and particularly imputed to the Gentile Christians, both male and female, who never were under the command of circumcision, or who would have sinned in practising Jewish
* If any one will doubt whether in scripture the sins of one person are ever imputed to another, or borne by another, in the sense declared, let him read even Doctor Whitby himself in his exposition on 1 Pet. ii. 24, 25. where I think any man may find satisfaction in this point, how Christ bore our sins in his own body on the tree. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ipmanics : And (beMfi>re ike righUousneu of Christy when it
mid io be imprnted to believeref ^can mean .no more than that the
|al reaull of his righteous acts, or acts of obedience to God, is
•puled Io 4hein, or bestowed upon them. This gijt qf righte^
MUesf therefore, m m riglit Io im|Minity, a legal rectitude in the
Wt of God, an absoiutton fmira sin and punithaienty a pardon
f s in and justification in the sight of God, and a Tight .to eternal
|b^ w hich are 'conferred ^qion ;4^eni for .ibceake 4)? what Christ
IS d one and suffeved.
And indeed for tiiis reason I hare sometimes scrupled to use
ialaogaage, tiiougli some very good writers have usedit, viv.
iB44he merits of Christ, or his satisfaetiou are imputed to us.
1w satisfaction of Christ is the rccorapence wliich he made io
lodforour breach of his -law: His merit in its most natund
Bse signifies his proper desert.and worthiness of all those divine
iBOurs and blessings which were his own personal rewards, as
dl as of that pardon of sin and eternal life whieh he obtained
r-«a' And this -merit and satisfaction arises from thetranscend*
It v alue and dignity ef the person of -Christ. Surely this -satis-
:tioB cannot be imputed to us properly, lest we should be said
have .satisfied^ and made God a.recompence for our eins. His
erit.eannnot be impotod to us in a strict aensc, for that would
4ce4is foferiters, either /of such peculiar glories as be had, or
least of our own pardon of sin , and eternal life. But if we
ik the sense, of the word merit so as to mean nothing but those
easinffs of pfirden, grace, aad eternal life which Christ has
erited for us, or rather the legal right of true believers to tliose
Bpinngs, according to the covenant of grace ; then the plirase
bis merits imputed, may be used ^ithc^t fijSeoce or error,
ere let npe ma|Le these two refl^ieiif :
I. It i^ the explaining ^his doctrine of imputed sin and
ipoted righteousness, so as to include aU the particular acts of
I a nd ri^itepusness, with their proper merit or demerit, &c.
It has ,teiii||ted so many persons to deny the doctrine itself.
fl. |f it s\iould be allowed that ;the very act of Adam*s dis-
edience was imputed to all bis posterity ; i f the very same sin-
I a ctions of men could be i^iputed to Clirist ; .if i he very actions
CbrisCs obedieqce and righteousness ceidd be imputed to
lievera, what greater {Hinisbments could the one justly and rea-
aahly suffer ? Or what blessings ceuld the other reasonably be
ktitled to, or enjoy, according to scriptural c epresentations of
ings, beyond what scripture has assigned, either to mankind as
e result of the sin of Adam, or to Christ as tlie result of the
Bs of men, or to believers as the result of the righteousness of
hrist?
Upon the whole, I c onclude, the imputation of Adam*s first
I to hia offipringy the imputation of our am \» CYtt\vX> ^sl^ | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 440 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | ESSAY II.
wemonies: And therefore the righteousness of Christ, when it said to be imputed to believers, can mean no more than that the legal result of his righteous acts, or acts of obedience to God, is imputed to them, or bestowed upon them. This gift of righteousness therefore, is a right to impunity, a legal rectitude in the part of God, an absolution from sin and punishment, a pardon for sin and justification in the sight of God, and a right to eternal life, which are conferred upon them for the sake of what Christ is done and suffered.
And indeed for this reason I have sometimes scrupled to use in language, though some very good writers have used it, viz. at the merits of Christ, or his satisfaction are imputed to us. The satisfaction of Christ is the recompence which he made to God for our breach of his law: His merit in its most natural use signifies his proper desert and worthiness of all those divine mours and blessings which were his own personal rewards, as all as of that pardon of sin and eternal life which he obtained thus. And this merit and satisfaction arises from the transcendence value and dignity of the person of Christ. Surely this satisfaction cannot be imputed to us properly, lest we should be said have satisfied, and made God a recompence for our sins. His merit cannot be imputed to us in a strict sense, for that would make us meritors, either of such peculiar glories as he had, or least of our own pardon of sin and eternal life. But if we ask the sense of the word merit so as to mean nothing but those passages of pardon, grace, and eternal life which Christ has written for us, or rather the legal right of true believers to those passages, according to the covenant of grace; then the phrase his merits imputed, may be used without offence or error. Here let me make these two reflections:
I. It is the explaining this doctrine of imputed sin and imputed righteousness, so as to include all the particular acts of and righteousness, with their proper merit or demerit, &c. that has tempted so many persons to deny the doctrine itself.
II. If it should be allowed that the very act of Adam's disdience was imputed to all his posterity; if the very same sin actions of men could be imputed to Christ; if the very actions Christ's obedience and righteousness could be imputed to believers, what greater punishments could the one justly and reasonably suffer? Or what blessings could the other reasonably be titled to, or enjoy, according to scriptural representations of things, beyond what scripture has assigned, either to mankind as the result of the sin of Adam, or to Christ as the result of the sins of men, or to believers as the result of the righteousness of Christ?
Upon the whole, I conclude, the imputation of Adam's first to his offspring, the imputation of our sins to Christ, and | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
linpitalita of ikit rightomaaw to o^r^iilMi^^ to ofles 19
our ypolMliiildiviimy 'tan tevcrjr'wdllusdirMMdliii'Aiii
nd Mme^ or A •eBw «lh. iwfoorod ?f cy toriptaro, ooooit
tteooniipoii.idoMond-oolkntwIiiobfeo^ m?o of onefM
•oftittf ftir tbo (rim or crinm of «iialli«v •r oiM
iag ipyolfceMftU |br thoyoddfcadb pf MWther, M«p|^
the-b^KUkQioffof thi^eiiojf wHlioot nmnhic mto neodiete
orooBtroTortict^iiilo improper buiginge^ ood duigeiroiisoi^
And IB gonendy I nmj make this jott infarenoe i If wo
iKit o|low tbo* oxproMKNM of seripliiure, or the plain 1^ 0
•enie mkI moHiiiig of tboio exprenons tiie tanieoivd
iatffpi|rti!limi oa we oUow to aU men who write of civil orli
Ofl aiidiifiDti ia tho liko o«Mo,«ad not oavil tt them in on
ivnii««» wo night anffioteotly enter into the aenae nnd om
of Qm wUi word, and And a greater unifbrmlty in oiv
menta : And woa)>o|ild ttm abmind more in oiutftfj wh
towmheaflh 0i)par, if fny leaaer diffionkiea and darneai 1
raBMhi4qpononriBind%anddiooldleadnatoaonio diflfcrei
opinion and expression about these subjects.
« • k • | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 441 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | Imputation of his righteousness to us, which are so often used our protestant divines, may be very well understood in a real sense, or a sense much favoured by scripture, according to common ideas and notions which people have of one person's suffering for the sins or crimes of another, or one person's ing special benefits for the good deeds of another, as apprehining the beginning of this essay, without running into needless or controversies, into improper language, and dangerous extents. And in general, I may make this just inference: If we but allow the expressions of scripture, or the plain and o'r sense and meaning of those expressions the same can be interpreted as we allow to all men who write of civil or local subjects in the like cases, and not cavil at them in our writings, we might sufficiently enter into the sense and manner of God in his word, and find a greater uniformity in our actions: And we should also abound more in charity and towards each other, if any lesser difficulties and darkness remain upon our minds, and should lead us to some different opinion and expression about these subjects. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
THIRD ESSAY.
ike Quilt and Defilement of iSi/?, and how fyp thiif fuaj be
^ trans/erred to Qthcn.
order to dear the doctrine of imputed sin froin alt fiirllipr
mlties, it may be proper to enter into a di«(]uisitioii of the
sense of those words^^ viz. wi^ gi^^-lty and dejilemtnt^* which
requently made use of in scripture, and in the common lau-
^ of christians : Let us try to c)ear them from all ambiG^iity,
ettiog tlie seveiral distinct senses in which they arc used in a
picttous liglit. Sin is the most general name for all manner
io|ral oTil, and in its general or abstract nature, or rather the
Jness of it, is want of conformity to the law of God in the
^s which that law rcquiresy or the transgreision of that law
\o^e things which it forbids ; and thus it includes both die
of omission and sins of commission. Again, Sin is to be
idercd as it is a principle or haliit in the mind, wliich inclines
» b reak the law of God ; or as it appears in tlio actions of
which arc actual traii«^grcssions or violations of this law.
further, there arc two things to be considered in sin, viz^
'eal and the relative evil of it.
First, The real evil of sin consists in its hurtful nature and
qualities, whether it be considercil in the habits of the mind,
I t he actions of life. Let us survey them both briefly. The
evil of sin is that disorder in the habits, or principles, or
^rs of the soul, which inclines it to act contrary to the holy
re, perfections and image of Go<l, as well as against his law.
a disorder also in these very actions, as they are contrary to
laturc of Grod, defacing his image, spoiling the souPs original
tude, breaking the true order of tilings, and destroying tho
it h appiness of roanf. This disorder in the soul, or its priu-
8 of action, is called in scripture, lust^ concupiscence^ tor^
ion, sin that dwells in us, the body of death y t hejlesliy the
Though the abstract sabltantiTet guilt and defilement are nnt much ufei|
iptore in our translation, yet I presume none will be no weak as to object
»t IB7 reprcfeotatioD of them as acripture-Uoguace, siit<: • ihrir conjuKatet
rivatives, guilty, guiltioess, guiltless, d):&le, defiled^'* &c. are frequeotljr
As Tirtue and holiness are arb the true rectitude and order of the bttaia«
wbta all its powers are in proper subjection to God^ and harmony with
ntber ; to sio if properly the disorder of it, when the inferior powers of
ts and affection rebel against the superior and |(uid\\\|; v^w^t% ^\ t«%.\^^
»Mcieiice, sod tbff will aad passions aro cot kf pi in VVkcu \>x« ^\k«^\^^^« n» | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 442 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | THIRD ESSAY.
The Guilt and Defilement of Sin, and how far they may be transferred to Others.
In order to clear the doctrine of imputed sin from all further culties, it may be proper to enter into a disquisition of the sense of those words, viz. sin, guilt, and defilement,* which frequently made use of in scripture, and in the common lauage of Christians: Let us try to clear them from all ambiguity, setting the several distinct senses in which they are used in a spurious light. Sin is the most general name for all manner moral evil, and in its general or abstract nature, or rather the illness of it, is want of conformity to the law of God in the ways that law requires, or the transgression of that law whose things which it forbids; and thus it includes both the off omission and sins of commission. Again, Sin is to be considered as it is a principle or habit in the mind, which inclines to break the law of God; or as it appears in the actions of which are actual transgressions or violations of this law. Further, there are two things to be considered in sin, viz. real and the relative evil of it.
First, The real evil of sin consists in its hurtful nature and qualities, whether it be considered in the habits of the mind, the actions of life. Let us survey them both briefly. The evil of sin is that disorder in the habits, or principles, or orders of the soul, which inclines it to act contrary to the holy ree, perfections and image of God, as well as against his law. A disorder also in these very actions, as they are contrary to nature of God, defacing his image, spoiling the soul's original attitude, breaking the true order of things, and destroying the happiness of man†. This disorder in the soul, or its prin- sion of action, is called in scripture, lust, concupiscence, cor- ion, sin that dwells in us, the body of death, the flesh,
Though the abstract substantives guilt and defilement are not much used in our translation, yet I presume none will be so weak as to object at my representation of them as scripture-language, since their conjugates rivatives, guilty, guiltiness, guiltless, defile, defiled," &c. are frequently
As virtue and holiness are the true rectitude and order of the human when all its powers are in proper subjection to God, and harmony with other; so sin is properly the disorder of it, when the inferior powers of hate and affection rebel against the superior and guiding powers of reason conscience, and the will and passions are not kept in their due obedience to creator. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
412 RVIK AM> REC0T2RT, fce.
carnal mind^ the law of sin^ and the law in the members. Tbi
same disorder id the actions of life makes them be called $ins^
abominations^ iniquity ^ w ickedness f e vil works or wa^Sj 4rc. I sdd
yet further, sin considered as a real evil, and a disorder of heart
and life, hath its natural effects and consequences following it,
fwcb M pw or anguish of conscience, self-vexatiop, aliaroe, &^
Secondly, Let us consider the relative evil of sin. This consists
more particularly in its respect to the governing authority and
law of God ; i t is a contrariety to the precepts of that law, partly
in the Very principles and habits of the soul, as well as in the
actions of life*. But as this relative evil chiefly belongs to sin-
ful actions, it is more properly an actual opposition to, or viola-
tion of G oA^B righteous law, and so it subjects the sinner to the
punishment which that law threatensf. The terms of unrightt-
ousfiesSy disobedience^ trespass and transgression are semetiroei
applied to this relative evil of sin in the actions of life in serip-
tiire, or more properly it is called guilt, or guiltiness before God,
and it signifies our liableness to punishment because of sin. As
the real evil of sin hath its natural effects and consequences on
the sinner : so the punishment wliich the law threatens may be
called the le^l consequences of sin, and includes pain, misery,
or death, inflicted upon sinners. Again, as the relative evil of
sin is removed by pardon through the atonement of Christ, so
the real evil of it is removed by sanctification by the Holy Spirit.
The first chaiiges our condemned state into reconciliation with
Qod ; the last changes our sinful nature and temper intp the image
of God and holiness.
Perhaps some person may object against this scheme, and
say all the evil that is in sin is relative, for the mere natural
action abstracted from alt its relations hath no real evil in it ;
therefore this distribution of the relative and real evil of sin ii
Dot just and proper. I answer, Sin considered as a b ad principle in
t}ie soul, or as a bad action in life, is indeed a real evil, for it h ath
mafiy positive evil qualities and natural evil effects, which all man-
kind know and feel, and which are too many to be reckoned up ;
but tbc abstract idea of sin, or rather the sinfulness of any action,
is granted .to be relative, because it consists in a want of con-
formity to t he law of God. I grant also that sin may in some
sense be called a relative evil, because it bears a contrariety to the
image of God, as well as it consists iu a contrariety of the law of
* Tb« tpodtle John deicribef it Ihuf ; J nbn iii. i. f> i^jLa^na. rnv ^i awfxict, sin
ii unlMmfulneu f which our translator! have caifed the transgression of the Lam,
f I fay, Che reUtive evil of tin bcloofra chipny to sinful actions, ratbfr tfuo
to the habits and principles of sin in the soul, because 1 tak« ihe evil ioclioaUoDf
of the heart prompting us to act contrary tu the law of OoH, and to be psrtof
tbfi real eril of sin : And besides I do not remember the word guilt, wbicb if the
proptr rclatiTe twW of sin, is ev^-r m icriptura aicribrd to the habit or prJDc«'pir
•f jj'o iritiioict the act. | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 443 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | carnal mind, the law of sin, and the law in the members. The same disorder in the actions of life makes them be called sins, abominations, iniquity, wickedness, evil works or ways, &c. I add yet further, sin considered as a real evil, and a disorder of heart and life, hath its natural effects and consequences following it, such as pain or anguish of conscience, self-vexation, shame, &c. Secondly, Let us consider the relative evil of sin. This consists more particularly in its respect to the governing authority and law of God; it is a contrariety to the precepts of that law, partly in the very principles and habits of the soul, as well as in the actions of life*. But as this relative evil chiefly belongs to sinful actions, it is more properly an actual opposition to, or violation of God's righteous law, and so it subjects the sinner to the punishment which that law threatens†. The terms of unrighteousness, disobedience, trespass and transgression are sometimes applied to this relative evil of sin in the actions of life in scripture, or more properly it is called guilt, or guiltiness before God, and it signifies our liableness to punishment because of sin. As the real evil of sin hath its natural effects and consequences on the sinner: so the punishment which the law threatens may be called the legal consequences of sin, and includes pain, misery, or death, inflicted upon sinners. Again, as the relative evil of sin is removed by pardon through the atonement of Christ, so the real evil of it is removed by sanctification by the Holy Spirit. The first changes our condemned state into reconciliation with God; the last changes our sinful nature and temper into the image of God and holiness.
Perhaps some person may object against this scheme, and say all the evil that is in sin is relative, for the mere natural action abstracted from all its relations hath no real evil in it; therefore this distribution of the relative and real evil of sin is not just and proper. I answer, Sin considered as a bad principle in the soul, or as a bad action in life, is indeed a real evil, for it hath many positive evil qualities and natural evil effects, which all mankind know and feel, and which are too many to be reckoned up; but the abstract idea of sin, or rather the sinfulness of any action, is granted to be relative, because it consists in a want of conformity to the law of God. I grant also that sin may in some sense be called a relative evil, because it bears a contrariety to the image of God, as well as it consists in a contrariety of the law of
* The apostle John describes it thus; John iii. 4. n μαρτυρία εἰστὴν αὐτοία, sin is unluckfulness, which our translators have called the transgression of the law.
+ I say, the relative evil of sin belongs chiefly to sinful actions, rather than to the habits and principles of sin in the soul, because I take the evil inclinations of the heart prompting us to act contrary to the law of God, and to be part of the real evil of sin: And besides I do not remember the word guilt, which is the proper relative evil of sin, is ever in scripture ascribed to the habit or principle of sin without the act. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
)£SaAY m,
443
od*. Yet iincc sin in the heart or in the life, in h|iMt or in act,
m real bad quality, 4knd is contrary to tliq iina^ of Qody and
kturmlly tends to ruin a soul by destroying its good qualities, its
ly rectitude or holiness, its peace aqd happiness, as well as
^ly by subjecting it to punishment ; I chuse to call that dfsr
der which hath such a real and naturul tendency to s|)oi| God*s
\VLse and our happiness, the real evil of sin : and I would ca|l
demerit or d^^^i*^ ^f death, or its legal subjection of us to pun-
imeiit, the relative evil : And I d esire leave to do so at present,
at I may not admit confusion into this discourse, and may pre*
nt all contention about words.
The general term sin in scripture is frequently used to sigr
*y s ometimes the relative, and son^etimcs the real evil of it. It
used promiscuously and indifferently in the Old Testament and
the New, both for the sinful disorder of our hearts and liv/'s,
d also for the demerit or pfmishmpnt of some sinful action. It
used for the opposition that is in ^in to the holy nature of God,
d to the sour^ real happiness, as well as for the opposition of
to the law of God; and its subjecting us to the legal penalty.
)W let us consider what is the guilt of sin, and what is m defile*
^nt, and distinguish them as far as scripture and common speech,
roits.
First, we will enquire into the meaning of the guilt of sin ;
d this will afford us the following observations :
I. The words guilt and guilty ^ i n their original and roost
3per sense denote the relation of a sinful action or ])erson ib,
me law, and tlie obligation w|iich the sinner lies under to make
tisfaction to the law, by suffering some penalty. The English
>vA is supposed to be derived from the Saxon word gild a ta^
fine ; and giUlan is a person obliged, or liable to make amends^
pay for a fault committed. In the learned languages it hath
isamc sense. Reus and reatus in latin, and cfo^^? and cfO%«i ii^
3 G reek, seem to be entirely confined in their significations to
I relation or situation in which the sinner stands with regard to
\ |aw, and represent a person bound to answer for a f ault or
.nsgresssion of the law. So our guilt or guiltiness before God^
ginally and properly denotes the relative evil of sin, oritf
nsgression of the law, and the sinncr^s obligation to makc{
ends for it by suffering some penalty.
II. It must be granted that the word guilt by some writeri
sheen distinguished into these two senses, viz. there is a guilt
the fault, which is called reatus culpa^ and there is a guilt of
i p unishment, which is usually termed reatus panct : And tbaa
term guilt or guiltiness, is applied to a person three ways,
mctimes it signifies his having done the prime, or the siniu^
ion, as when we say a man is g uilty of blasphemy, that v^^ h ^ | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 444 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | ESSAY III.
Yet since sin in the heart or in the life, in habit or in act, a real bad quality, and is contrary to the image of God, and naturally tends to ruin a soul by destroying its good qualities, its holy rectitude or holiness, its peace and happiness, as well as regularly by subjecting it to punishment; I chuse to call that disorder which hath such a real and natural tendency to spoil God's age and our happiness, the real evil of sin: and I would call demerit or desert of death, or its legal subjection of us to punishment, the relative evil: And I desire leave to do so at present, that I may not admit confusion into this discourse, and may prevent all contention about words.
The general term sin in scripture is frequently used to signify sometimes the relative, and sometimes the real evil of it. It used promiscuously and indifferently in the Old Testament and the New, both for the sinful disorder of our hearts and lives, and also for the demerit or punishment of some sinful action. It used for the opposition that is in sin to the holy nature of God, and to the soul's real happiness, as well as for the opposition of to the law of God, and its subjecting us to the legal penalty. Now let us consider what is the guilt of sin, and what is its defilement, and distinguish them as far as scripture and common speech permits.
First, we will enquire into the meaning of the guilt of sin; and this will afford us the following observations:
I. The words guilt and guilty, in their original and most proper sense denote the relation of a sinful action or person to some law, and the obligation which the sinner lies under to make satisfaction to the law, by suffering some penalty. The English word is supposed to be derived from the Saxon word gild a tax fine; and gildan is a person obliged, or liable to make amends, pay for a fault committed. In the learned languages it hath same sense. Reus and reatus in latin, and ποχος and ποχη in Greek, seem to be entirely confined in their significations to the relation or situation in which the sinner stands with regard to the law, and represent a person bound to answer for a fault or insigngression of the law. So our guilt or guiltiness before God, originally and properly denotes the relative evil of sin, or its insigngression of the law, and the sinner's obligation to make ends for it by suffering some penalty.
II. It must be granted that the word guilt by some writers has been distinguished into these two senses, viz. there is a guilt of the fault, which is called reatus culpa, and there is a guilt of punishment, which is usually termed reatus pana: And thus the term guilt or guiltiness, is applied to a person three ways, sometimes it signifies his having done the crime, or the sinful action, as when we say a man is guilty of blasphemy, that is, ha- | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ill mUIN AND RKCOVERY, &C.
tilasplicfned : S ometimes it denotes hiB his demerit or desert of
the punishment threatened, and at other times it means only the
legal subjeelion of a person to punishment thereby ; as when we
say^ the blasphemer is guilty of death, we mean he baa deserved
it, or at l east he is liable to it.
III. Observe also, that by usinc^ this word in these three
distinrt senses, we are led sometimes to mingle and unite all these
senses in one ; and so in the word guilt we sometimes include
/K»meidea of the actual fault or crime, and the personal demerit
of the sinner, as well as its legal subjection of him to punish-
mcnt ; yet it is not always used in all these senses, but always io
uao or other of them.
IV. Observe further, that we never say a roan is guilty of
ibe fault, but when he is tlie actual personal sinner, and bas
deserved the punishment : But he may be said to bear the guilt
of sin, or have the guilt laid on him, when he is made liable or
subject to the punishment by the imputation of sin to him, accord-
ing to a ny righteous compact or constitution, though he be not
the personal or actual sinner, nor has merited punishmcDt
liimseir.
V. When we speak of tJie guilt of comciejice^ or a guilty
conscience, it means thai sensible grief, or anguish of soul, which
arises from a painful consciousness, or remembrance of our
]ia\ing committed sin against God and bis law ; and so it includes
in it not only the fear and terror of the punishing justice of God
which is a legal consequent of sin, but also the shame tliat arises
from our having done amiss, and from our unfitness to appear
before a God of holiness under that sinful disorder, which is a na-
turul consequent or effect of sin. This guilt of conscience belongs
only to the personal off^'uder, and can never be transferred by i m-
putation to a nother. But in the main, I think we may determine,
that this word, the guilt of sin, or of a sinful action, as it was
originally designed, so is much more frequently, and more obvi-
ously used and understood concerning the legal consequent of
that sin, or iis ju!^t subjection of the sitiner to punishment, whicb
Is its relative cv}\ than it is concerning the disorder of the sinful
action, or tJie real ciil of it. An<l indeed this is the only thing ifl
shi which can be traui^Tred and imputed to any other person,
that is, the obiiga'iion to suffer tlie penalty, or to make amends for
the violation of the hw. In the following part of this discourse
therefore, wh^n I u«e the won! gi-Hty 1 desire to be understood
chiefly, or only, concerning that liableness, obligation, or subji-c-
tion topuiiiKhmcnt under which sin may bring any roan, whether
it b e actually and jiei'sonally committed by himself, or whether
H be transferred to him only by imputation. The use of words
in dr.TcTcrit senses, auA aa \x\clv\dlu^ different • i deas, haa been | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 445 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | blasphemed: Sometimes it denotes his his demerit or desert of the punishment threatened, and at other times it means only the legal subjection of a person to punishment thereby; as when we say, the blasphemer is guilty of death, we mean he has deserved it, or at least he is liable to it.
III. Observe also, that by using this word in these three distinct senses, we are led sometimes to mingle and unite all these senses in one; and so in the word guilt we sometimes include some idea of the actual fault or crime, and the personal demerit of the sinner, as well as its legal subjection of him to punishment; yet it is not always used in all these senses, but always in one or other of them.
IV. Observe further, that we never say a man is guilty of the fault, but when he is the actual personal sinner, and has deserved the punishment: But he may be said to bear the guilt of sin, or have the guilt laid on him, when he is made liable or subject to the punishment by the imputation of sin to him, according to any righteous compact or constitution, though he be not the personal or actual sinner, nor has merited punishment himself.
V. When we speak of the guilt of conscience, or a guilty conscience, it means that sensible grief, or anguish of soul, which arises from a painful consciousness, or remembrance of our having committed sin against God and his law; and so it includes in it not only the fear and terror of the punishing justice of God which is a legal consequent of sin, but also the shame that arises from our having done amiss, and from our unfitness to appear before a God of holiness under that sinful disorder, which is a natural consequent or effect of sin. This guilt of conscience belongs only to the personal offender, and can never be transferred by imputation to another. But in the main, I think we may determine, that this word, the guilt of sin, or of a sinful action, as it was originally designed, so is much more frequently, and more obviously used and understood concerning the legal consequent of that sin, or its just subjection of the sinner to punishment, which is its relative evil, than it is concerning the disorder of the sinful action, or the real evil of it. And indeed this is the only thing in sin which can be transferred and imputed to any other person, that is, the obligation to suffer the penalty, or to make amends for the violation of the law. In the following part of this discourse therefore, when I use the word guilt, I desire to be understood chiefly, or only, concerning that liableness, obligation, or subjection to punishment under which sin may bring any man, whether it be actually and personally committed by himself, or whether it be transferred to him only by imputation. The use of words in different senses, and as including different ideas, has been often an unhappy spring of confusion and mistake, which we | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
Bt»SAY IIL
441
iil4 avoid as much aa we can> by confiiuDg^ wor4a to a partt<»
ar 8eo8c*.
Now Ictus consider what is the filth or defilement of sia.
e filthioessy poiluiioiiy or defilement of sin, which is ao frc«
^ntly lueDtioiied in scripture, is not any third thing rcailr
tiDct from the two foremeutioned evils of sin, vis. the guik
t, and the disorderly nature of it, t hat is, the relative and the
I e vil : D efilement is only a metaphor used by t he Spirit of God
aeiimes to express one of these, viz. the legal guilty b«4
ch more frequently to sig^nify tlie other, viz. the criminal dis-*
!cfr i even as the word sin itself is used to denote both the ro«
ve and the real evil of it, v iz. the leg^l guilt, and the moral or
ninal disorder.
The words defilement 9LnA poUutionf are mere figures bor*
red from things of the body, and applied to the soul, which
. s pirit, and whidi in a strict and proper sense cannot be de-
d; A body is said, to be defiled, when it has somctliing of a.
cr nature mingled with it or cast upon it, or when a body !•
tainted and corrupted, that it becomes ofiensive to our senses :
I t liis bodily filth many times is removed by passing through
water, or through tlie fire, whereby the body attains its prt-
ive purity either in whole or in part. Now because there are
* Here let it be obserTed, that Unguagct are at firat formed by the balk of
kiod, who hare not aay great solicitude to lecure the lenie of each word,
coafina. it to one proper idea : and when different ideas approach near a*
another, the same word is often used by them for two or three ideas, especi*
sinct m jokind bath many more ideas than there are words in any language
LBoever to represent or signify them. And hereby it happens, that ideas tun*
linlo one another by so near an approximation, the woids that signify them«
gkthey might be at first different, yet by degrees th«y run into onr another'a
aiog, and bring much confusion into our conception of things. The words
:« sin, demerit, are instances of this. Let it be added also, that the figurative
metaphorical way of speakiug is introduced into any language, by endea-
ing to describe spiritual ideas by some resemblance to seiiMible aud corporeal
If. And though this may give a brightness and force, beauty and seusibilitjr
w expression, where tb^ idea* are perfectly known, yet it is toa often in dan*
if introducing some miUake and error into the minds of tbote who after*
I b eard and read it. The words filth and pollution, fltc. will evidence this.
If you ask» why this sort of langnage, with its various defects aud dangers of
ake, is made use of by the sacred writers in scripture, the answer is obvious :
scripture was written for the bulk of mankind, who are not called lo eotar
acouraciea and mce punctilios, and therefore it must speak their language,
it may be the better understood by them, how imperfect and ambiguoua
sr it may happen to be. And besides, as the use of fiitures and metaphors
itensaod aggraudize^ the things they represent, so the holy writers saw it
ssary to represent their important ideas in the brightest and strungrst images,
Sgures, and srnsibilitie::, to strike the minds of the people with their great
rtanoe. And this was the custom also ufeastitrn writers. Therefore in ex*|
ing.the scriptures, as well as other writings, in a clear and d.stinct manner,
would speak mpre exactly and accbrately concerning tilings, and guar4
lit avery mistake in a critical and distiuct explication of tht>m, we should
ivour to keep the "iamc ideas to the same words a^ far as ever we can j and
i|r d istinguished the different senses in which a word hath been nued^ «a
d coufioc, as Ur as j/u^fit^l-, ooe word lo ona mcW\i\^, ut \^«k t^T\'|^. | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 446 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | should avoid as much as we can, by confining words to a particular sense*.
Now let us consider what is the filth or defilement of sin, the filthiness, pollution, or defilement of sin, which is so frequently mentioned in scripture, is not any third thing really distinct from the two forementioned evils of sin, viz. the guilt it, and the disorderly nature of it, that is, the relative and the evil: Defilement is only a metaphor used by the Spirit of God sometimes to express one of these, viz. the legal guilt, but more frequently to signify the other, viz. the criminal disorder; even as the word sin itself is used to denote both the reverence and the real evil of it, viz. the legal guilt, and the moral or criminal disorder.
The words defilement and pollution, are mere figures borrowed from things of the body, and applied to the soul, which spirit, and which in a strict and proper sense cannot be deed: A body is said to be defiled, when it has something of a certain nature mingled with it or cast upon it, or when a body isainted and corrupted, that it becomes offensive to our senses: If this bodily filth many times is removed by passing through water, or through the fire, whereby the body attains its private purity either in whole or in part. Now because there are
* Here let it be observed, that languages are at first formed by the bulk of kind, who have not any great solicitude to secure the sense of each word, confine it to one proper idea: and when different ideas approach near so another, the same word is often used by them for two or three ideas, especially since mankind bath many more ideas than there are words in any language soever to represent or signify them. And hereby it happens, that ideas run into one another by so near an approximation, the words that signify them, though they might be at first different, yet by degrees they run into one another's ning, and bring much confusion into our conception of things. The words sin, demerit, are instances of this. Let it be added also, that the figurative metaphorical way of speaking is introduced into any language, by endeavoring to describe spiritual ideas by some resemblance to sensible and corporeal gr. And though this may give a brightness and force, beauty and sensibility expression, where the ideas are perfectly known, yet it is too often in dan-of introducing some mistake and error into the minds of those who after heard and read it. The words filth and pollution, &c. will evidence this. If you ask, why this sort of language, with its various defects and dangers of sake, is made use of by the sacred writers in scripture, the answer is obvious: scripture was written for the bulk of mankind, who are not called to enter accuracies and nice punctilios, and therefore it must speak their language, it may be the better understood by them, how imperfect and ambiguous it may happen to be. And besides, as the use of figures and metaphors enters and aggraudizes the things they represent, so the holy writers saw it necessary to represent their important ideas in the brightest and strongest images, figures, and sensibilities, to strike the minds of the people with their great importance. And this was the custom also of eastern writers. Therefore in ex- ing, the scriptures, as well as other writings, in a clear and distinct manner, would speak more exactly and accurately concerning things, and guard every mistake in a critical and distinct explication of them, we should favour to keep the same ideas to the same words as far as ever we can; and distinguish the different senses in which a word hath been used, we d cousin, as far as possible, one word to one meaning, or idea only. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
44S ittriN Aifb tttcottnry 8l6.
wome things in «in which are its proper CTibi that bear a rettcM^
blaiice to bodily defilements, therefore the same word is meta-«
phoricallf applied to the sins of the soul.
Bnt «nce it is but a metaphor, a figure, or impropriett
of speech, it must have something literal and proper whira
18 signified thereby: Now all that I know of, that can he
called the proper evil of sin, is either relative or real, and con-
sists either in the guilt or in the disorder of it. I have no idea
0r conception of any thing, different from these two, when I
use the word defilement or pollution : And we must not abuse
ourselves with scripture-metaphors and figurative words, in-
stead of r eal ideas, nor persuade ourselves into a fancy of
more realities than there are or can be in nature. This would
be to dishonour scripture instead of explaining of it. If I were
to prove that these are the two only ideas in which we find the
terms of filthiness, defilement, or pollution, used in scripture, or
in our best writers on sacred subjects, I might confirm it these
three ways.
I. If we consider the effects which are represented to flow
from the defilement of sin, they arc all such as may be attributed
either to the guilt or to the disorder of it. 1. The holy scrip-
ture and our divines represent the filth or defilement of sin, as
tfiat which makes us offensive to Gud, as any corporeal defiled
thing is offensive to ourselves. Now it is tiie guilt of sin that
makes us offensive to the divine justice, for that is the attribute
that vindicates the honour of his law, and executes the penalty
upon those tliat have broken it, and are become guilty. And it
is the disorderly nature of sin, whether in our hearts, or in our
actions, that makes us offensive to the divine holiness ; f or sin in
this sense is a contrariety to his holy nature, to all his moral per-
lections, his complete rectitude, his goodness, and his truth : It
is in tliis sense, God is of purer eyes than to behold iniquity ;
Ileb. i. 13. lie will not let tliosc come into his presence
with approbation, whose hearts or lives are defiled^ that is,
tinder sinful disorders. This was typified by the levitical pol-
lutions of o ld, when some bodily defilement excluded tlie Is-
raeiitcK from the camp, and the tabernacle where God dwelt :
He dwelt there in his majesty and justice, and tlireatened
death to defiled persons that came near his altar, to repre-
sent his punisiiment of the guilt of sin ; h e dwelt there in his
holiness, and commanded them to stand at a distance, to shew
that tlic disorderly nature of sin made persons unfit to converse
with God. Thus all the ceremonial pollutions of the Jews ty-
pified one of these two, either the guilt of sin, or its disorder and
vitiosity.
2. 'i'he defilement of tivu \a represented as producing shame
and fear in the siuncr \u iVie \>t\i%^iivc^ ^^ Vivi^* \.^^\^Vk.v!CL for- | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 447 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | some things in sin which are its proper evils, that bear a resemblance to bodily defilements, therefore the same word is metaphorically applied to the sins of the soul.
But since it is but a metaphor, a figure, or impropriety of speech, it must have something literal and proper which is signified thereby: Now all that I know of, that can be called the proper evil of sin, is either relative or real, and consists either in the guilt or in the disorder of it. I have no idea or conception of any thing, different from these two, when I use the word defilement or pollution: And we must not abuse ourselves with scripture-metaphors and figurative words, instead of real ideas, nor persuade ourselves into a fancy of more realities than there are or can be in nature. This would be to dishonour scripture instead of explaining of it. If I were to prove that these are the two only ideas in which we find the terms of filthiness, defilement, or pollution, used in scripture, or in our best writers on sacred subjects, I might confirm it these three ways.
1. If we consider the effects which are represented to flow from the defilement of sin, they are all such as may be attributed either to the guilt or to the disorder of it. 1. The holy scripture and our divines represent the filth or defilement of sin, as that which makes us offensive to God, as any corporeal defiled thing is offensive to ourselves. Now it is the guilt of sin that makes us offensive to the divine justice, for that is the attribute that vindicates the honour of his law, and executes the penalty upon those that have broken it, and are become guilty. And it is the disorderly nature of sin, whether in our hearts, or in our actions, that makes us offensive to the divine holiness; for sin in this sense is a contrariety to his holy nature, to all his moral perfections, his complete rectitude, his goodness, and his truth: It is in this sense, God is of purer eyes than to behold imquity; Heb. i. 13. He will not let those come into his presence with approbation, whose hearts or lives are defiled, that is, under sinful disorders. This was typified by the levitical pollutions of old, when some bodily defilement excluded the Israelites from the camp, and the tabernacle where God dwelt: He dwelt there in his majesty and justice, and threatened death to defiled persons that came near his altar, to represent his punishment of the guilt of sin; he dwelt there in his holiness, and commanded them to stand at a distance, to shew that the disorderly nature of sin made persons unfit to converse with God. Thus all the ceremonial pollutions of the Jews typified one of these two, either the guilt of sin, or its disorder and vitiosity.
2. The defilement of sin is represented as producing shame and fear in the sinner in the presence of God. A person in for- | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ESSAY llh 411
dlto afid defiled garments, or besmeared with mire and nasti**
Sy is afraid to come into the presence of his prince, a wise
i j ust Governor, as well as ashamed to appear befiire him as
erson of bi|rh dignity. Now one of these is the efl!»t of tbo
It o f sin ; the other of its disorder. A sinner fears the jus-
'. a nd majesty of God, because of his guilt, and the injury he
^done to the divine law ; h e knows he is liable to death, he
I his own defilement and God^s justice, and ia afraid and
nbles. A sinner, in his sinful disorder of soul, is also asham-
n the presence of a holy God, seeing every thing in the
ne nature so contrary to his own heart and lus own actions^
ig d efiled, that is, disordered by sin. Thus the guilt of sia
luces fear, and the disorder of sio produces shame. A
dlel might be drawn in this instance also between the levitical
lemcnts of the flesh and the more spiritual evils of «n« The
e suggestion of this thouglit is sufficient for those who are
lainted with the Mosaical ceremonies, and the repreaenta*
B of God, as dwelling in the holy of holies, in the glories eC
justice and holiness.
3. The defilement of sin sometimes is represented as de- ^
ng the nature of the soul, and rendering it vile. Ps.
. 20. ji man without undeistanding^ that t>, without
fear or love of Gody or true holiness^ is mean and vile^.
the beasts that perish : This arises from the inward
rity or real evil tliat is in it. Villous disorders either ia
t or life, debase the character of a creature ; but under
idea the guilt of sin, or relative evil of it, is notcoDtaia*
but only the disorder, or the real evil : ' But still it ia
I tluit this representation always means the one or the other.
II. Another way to prove that the defilement of sin is
bird thing distinct from the guilt and the disorder of it, m ay
lis : The methods or means of removing the defilement of
ire 'such as are suited to remove either the guilt or the disor-
of It.
1. Washing is the most general means to remove bodily
ements ; and this is a metaphor which the scripture abounds
ometimes to express the removal of guilt by atonement aUd
Ion, and sometimes the removal of the disorder of sin in
louls by sanctification. When we are said to hetwashed Inf
blood of Christ from our sim ; Rev. i. 5. there the de-
lent impKed must signify guilt : But when we are said to
raslied and cleansed from a sinful nature, by having tht
it of God poured upon i/j, or by being sprinkled with
\ water ; Isa. xliv. 3. Ezek. xxxvi. 25. which is done ia
ism, and regeneration ; or when we are bid to wash u$
to wake us clean ; I sa. i. 10. in these places the defile*
t w hich is implied must hi<;nify the aiutuv d£iSAt^«c% ^^ ^>» | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 448 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | ESSAY III.
den and defiled garments, or besmeared with mire and nastiness, is afraid to come into the presence of his prince, a wise just Governor, as well as ashamed to appear before him as person of high dignity. Now one of these is the effect of the lt of sin; the other of its disorder. A sinner fears the jus- and majesty of God, because of his guilt, and the injury he done to the divine law; he knows he is liable to death, he his own defilement and God's justice, and is afraid and nibles. A sinner, in his sinful disorder of soul, is also asham-in the presence of a holy God, seeing every thing in the same nature so contrary to his own heart and his own actions, defiled, that is, disordered by sin. Thus the guilt of sin induces fear, and the disorder of sin produces shame. A allel might be drawn in this instance also between the levitical elements of the flesh and the more spiritual evils of sin. The e suggestion of this thought is sufficient for those who areainted with the Mosaical ceremonies, and the representatives of God, as dwelling in the holy of holies, in the glories of justice and holiness.
3. The defilement of sin sometimes is represented as de-ng the nature of the soul, and rendering it vile. Pa. 20. A man without understanding, that is, without fear or love of God, or true holiness, is mean and vile, the beasts that perish: This arises from the inward city or real evil that is in it. Vitious disorders either in t or life, debase the character of a creature; but under idea the guilt of sin, or relative evil of it, is not contain-but only the disorder, or the real evil: But still it is that this representation always means the one or the other.
II. Another way to prove that the defilement of sin is third thing distinct from the guilt and the disorder of it, may his: The methods or means of removing the defilement of re 'such as are suited to remove either the guilt or the disor-of it.
1. Washing is the most general means to remove bodily elements; and this is a metaphor which the scripture abounds sometimes to express the removal of guilt by atonement and ion, and sometimes the removal of the disorder of sin in souls by sanctification. When we are said to be washed by blood of Christ from our sins; Rev. i. 5. there the de-ent implied must signify guilt: But when we are said to washed and cleansed from a sinful nature, by having the fit of God poured upon us, or by being sprinkled with water; Isa. xliv. 3. Ezek. xxxvi. 25. which is done inism, and regeneration; or when we are bid to wash us to make us clean; Isa. i. 10. in these places the defile-which is implied must signify the sinful disorders of our | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
44V Rl l\ A>?D nKl'OTl^KY, &C.
Baliircs and lives*. This also i^ Yery evident in the levitioal xhe^
tliods oi cleaiisiiiq^ the typicai cloliloinciitsi uf old : rametimcs the
blotxi of the sacrifice was to be put on |UThoii9 defiled, to signi-
fy the removal of squill by the doath of Chriitt tlie great sacri-
fice : s oniPlimcs thry were to Ijt* washed in clean water, to
ii|B^nify the removal of the in\>ard moral diiK)rder of aiu by the
tanctifying Spirit ,
2. Another inetha;! of removing bodily defilements is by
fire : so silver and gold passing through the tire los^ their dross
and impurity, and are relined and made pure : Now when the
defilement of sin Is represented as removed by fire, sometimes
it signifies the removing the disorderly temper arui qualities of
mind, by the Spirit of (Jod, or by aftticltve providences; see
Mai. lii, 2. IJe is like a reft iier^s fire: lie sfiall pnrijy t/te soia
<lf Levi^ and pttrrre tfiein as gold and silvery ikat ifietf may
offer tx) tfic Lord an offering in rigfiteousness; Zecli. kiii. ^.
j4nd I xvill bring a tliird part of them tfiwngfi ifte /fir, and
refive tfiem as silver is refined. This was typified by the levi-
tical purifications : The gold and other metals that were under
k'gal or typical defilements, by having been abused to idolatry
by heathens, must pass through the fire to be cleansed and fitted
for the use of God's holy people, and his holy teQij)le ; N um.
^xxi. -23. whereas those materials which con/d not bear the Jin
were to bepttrijiid btf zcater for the same service, in the sixth
cliapter of tiie prophecy of Isaiah, where he gives an account of
his complaint in the p-resence of the liord, / am a man of an-
clean lips: 11 oe is me^Jor I am undone^ ;//// n/cs liaxe san
the kingy the Lord of fiosts ; a seraph took a live coal Jwm
the altar of burnt qf/'eringy and laid if npon his mouthy and
saidy to this liaih touched tluj lipsy and thine inifjuiff/ is taken
arcai/ : and tin/ sin purged. It is hard to say whether this chietty
refers to a partlon of the guilt of ])ast sins of the tongue, or a
puriiieation of his lips and heart from siuful disorders. But it i i
certainly oik; or botl; these.
In the last pluee, I might add another ])roof that the defile-
ment of s in is not any thing different both from the guilt and dis-
order of s in, if we consider, that when the guilt of sin is re-
moved by | )ardon and juslilioutiun, and the disorder or evil qui-
litiesof ^i^; are removed jierRvtiy by sanctification, what is there
remaining that can be hurtful to man or ofiensive to God r It it
possible in the nature of things, that tlie guilt of sin and all ob-
ligations to p unishment may be taken away from a person by
pardoning grace, and >et tiic impurity or sinful disorder of the
aoul may remain. It is possible also that the sinfulness or tbe
Qiural disorder and evil qualities of the soul may be removed by
aaijciifying grace, and yet the guilt of past sins may remain:
But wi'icie liiviue ^vacc \volV\\ W\\v ^^tdcow^d tiud sanctified (be | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 449 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | natures and lives. This also is very evident in the levitical methods of cleansing the typical defilements of old: sometimes the blood of the sacrifice was to be put on persons defiled, to signify the removal of guilt by the death of Christ the great sacrifice; sometimes they were to be washed in clean water, to signify the removal of the inward moral disorder of sin by the sanctifying Spirit.
2. Another method of removing bodily defilements is by fire: so silver and gold passing through the fire lose their dross and impurity, and are refined and made pure: Now when the defilement of sin is represented as removed by fire, sometimes it signifies the removing the disorderly temper and qualities of mind, by the Spirit of God, or by afflictive providences; see Mal. iii. 2. He is like a refiner's fire: He shall purify the sons of Levi, and purge them as gold and silver, that they may offer to the Lord an offering in righteousness; Zech. xiii. 9. And I will bring a third part of them through the fire, and refine them as silver is refined. This was typified by the levitical purifications: The gold and other metals that were under legal or typical defilements, by having been abused to idolatry by heathens, must pass through the fire to be cleansed and fitted for the use of God's holy people, and his holy temple; Num. xxxi. 23. whereas those materials which could not bear the fire were to be purified by water for the same service. In the sixth chapter of the prophecy of Isaiah, where he gives an account of his complaint in the presence of the Lord, I am a man of unclean lips: Woe is me, for I am undone, my eyes have seen the king, the Lord of hosts; a scaph took a live coal from the altar of burnt offering, and laid it upon his mouth, and said, to this hath touched thy lips, and thine iniquity is taken away; and thy sin purged. It is hard to say whether this chiefly refers to a pardon of the guilt of past sins of the tongue, or a purification of his lips and heart from sinful disorders. But it is certainly one or both these.
In the last place, I might add another proof that the defilement of sin is not any thing different both from the guilt and disorder of sin, if we consider, that when the guilt of sin is removed by pardon and justification, and the disorder or evil qualities of sin are removed perfectly by sanctification, what is there remaining that can be hurtful to man or offensive to God? It is possible in the nature of things, that the guilt of sin and all obligations to punishment may be taken away from a person by pardoning grace, and yet the impurity or sinful disorder of the soul may remain. It is possible also that the sinfulness or the moral disorder and evil qualities of the soul may be removed by sanctifying grace, and yet the guilt of past sins may remain: But where divine grace hath both pardoned and sanctified the | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
£S8AV lit 440
ul completely, there remaini no more moral defilement, no ain*
1 p oUation, nothing more than can gif« us either fear or ahatoe,
bcAlier we appear before tSod in the justice of bis goYarnroent|
* i n the hobness of his nature. This defilement nerefore
^peara evidently to be nothing but a figure of speech bor«'
iwed from material things, whereby cither the g^ilt, or the
iionler of sin, the relative or real evil of it are represented.
Now though, this metaphor of the defilement of sin may
ometimea signify the guilt, sometimes the disoiderly nature of
t, y et let it oe noted, that the scripture, in its common forma
i s peech, does, I think, more frequently use or imply the me-
iphor of filth or pollution* to signify the inherent disorder or
m evil that is in sin, than the guilt or relative evil of it ; and I
lelieve we may so understand it i n most places where such kind
if m etaphors are used : and consequently when we use this n|e«
iphor of defilement, pollution, &c. we should rather apply it
0 the pravity and disorder of sin than to the guilt of it. And
Mfticularly let it be observed, that wheresoever the guilt of sint
lod the defilement of sin are mentioned together in the writinga
if o ur divines, and represented as distinct and different thinn
liere the guilt evidently signifies that offence against the di-
rise law which subjects us to punishment ; and the defilement
sQst mean only that evil quality in sin which is contrary to thtf
lifine nature or holiness, which makes us unlike to God, and
isfit for bis presence, service or enjoyment. If this explics*
tion of th»' filth or defilement of sin be admitted, that it some^
tinea may signify the relative evil, but more frequently and pro-
perly the r eal evil of sin, it w ill be easy to answer tliose perplex-
log questions which some per&ons have raised about this sub«
ject, viz.
JU Can the defilement of Adanrs first sia be transferred
to h is ofllspring by imputation ? Answer. If we will speak of
the defikment of sin to express the guilt of it, or its relative
ml, which exposes us to the just anger of God and to punish-
nenL aocordine to tlie threatenings of his law ; i t is evident by
the llbr^;oing mscourscs in this book, that it may be imputed to
u, for we suffer a thousand painful evils and death at the end
)f t hem for the sin of Adam. But if by the defilement of sin
^e mean as we rather ought to do in accurate speech the real
nU of it, or its disorderly nature and contrariety to the image
' God in the soul, and as spoiling the best powers of man, un-
Stting oa for converse with God, and naturally tending to our
leslnicdbn and misery, this is not properly imputed to us from
* Note, I Uiiok Uiewe expr«t« wordi or tnbtfaDtlTex, pollution, Sm, tra scares
^•r oMii in leriptare, or io human writiogf, Co ttgoify inertly tht guilt of liot
r tbo obltgAtios to punithmeMt, without carryiDf in tkeoi ths idea of tht rtal
^il or diiordflr, or culpable dt mt rit of fio.
Vol. it. F W | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 450 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | ESSAY 111.
449
completely, there remains no more moral defilement, no sin-
pollution, nothing more than can give us either fear or shame,
bether we appear before God in the justice of his government,
in the holiness of his nature. This defilement therefore
appears evidently to be nothing but a figure of speech bor-
owed from material things, whereby either the guilt, or the
disorder of sin, the relative or real evil of it are represented.
Now though this metaphor of the defilement of sin may
sometimes signify the guilt, sometimes the disorderly nature of
it, yet let it be noted, that the scripture, in its common forms
of speech, does, I think, more frequently use or imply the me-
aphor of filth or pollution* to signify the inherent disorder or
real evil that is in sin, than the guilt or relative evil of it; and I
believe we may so understand it in most places where such kind
of metaphors are used: and consequently when we use this me-
aphor of defilement, pollution, &c. we should rather apply it
to the pravity and disorder of sin than to the guilt of it. And
particularly let it be observed, that wheresoever the guilt of sin
and the defilement of sin are mentioned together in the writings
of our divines, and represented as distinct and different things,
here the guilt evidently signifies that offence against the di-
rine law which subjects us to punishment; and the defilement
must mean only that evil quality in sin which is contrary to the
divine nature or holiness, which makes us unlike to God, and
unfit for his presence, service or enjoyment. If this explica-
tion of the filth or defilement of sin be admitted, that it some-
times may signify the relative evil, but more frequently and pro-
perly the real evil of sin, it will be easy to answer those perplex-
ing questions which some persons have raised about this sub-
ject, viz.
1. Can the defilement of Adam's first sin be transferred
to his offspring by imputation? Answer. If we will speak of
the defilement of sin to express the guilt of it, or its relative
evil, which exposes us to the just anger of God and to punish-
ment, according to the threatenings of his law; it is evident by
the foregoing discourses in this book, that it may be imputed to
us, for we suffer a thousand painful evils and death at the end
of them for the sin of Adam. But if by the defilement of sin
we mean as we rather ought to do in accurate speech the real
evil of it, or its disorderly nature and contrariety to the image
of God in the soul, and as spoiling the best powers of man, un-
itting us for converse with God, and naturally tending to our
destruction and misery, this is not properly imputed to us from
* Note, I think these express words or substantives, pollution, &c. are scarce
ever used in scripture, or in human writings, to signify merely the guilt of sin,
or the obligation to punishment, without carrying in them the idea of the real
evil or disorder, or culpable demerit of sin.
Vol. iv. F | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
4M mOlK AND UOOtfeiYy kt^
Adam ; b ut this mnfid nature kHItellj traatferrtii or deri
horn Adam to us by the l^irsof generaUoii or propogadon wl
wf re gtfen at first to man, as in quesdon ^i. and vti. ,
«enoMk cornea to pass that original st^ is divided bTOoi
nes Inio imputed and inherttU: theoneis.relaU?e,.aim9ulg
us to the misery threatened, the other is real, and makes us
tually sin&l. #
II.^H^iyr wasour Lord Jesus Christ our great sa
concerned iiyk filth or defilement ci our sm i Some |
Bounoe it b old^lthat he took upon him the filth and poUutio
our sins, though at the same time they mistake and suppo
to mean somethipg really distinct from the guilt. Others ai
r^ounce and abomijipUe that thought, lesC Christ should
i^presented as defiiSl with sin ; b ut at the same time t
giu no fair account or intelligible notion of the filth of
diflnct -from the giult of it, & at guilt which was certs
imputed to Cnrist, when '' he was made sin for us, and w
%e bore our sins in^his body on the cursed tree ;** 2 Cor. t.
1 Pet. ii. 24.
I think it is evident from*- many scriptures*, that our 1(
subjection to punisbment and misery by the guilt of sin, whic
the relative evil of it, was imputed or transferred to Christ,
he took it away by offering himself a sacrifice of atonement
expiation, which .hath procured pardoning mercy for us ;
neitlier scripture nor reason will allow that the moral diso
of sin, the vicious impurity or crinunal pollution, or Iktl evi
it; was transferred any way to our blessed Saviour, the ^1
one of Gh>d who knew no sin.*': While men of coutroversy
much in metaphors they fight in the dark ; b ut if we could |
suade them to turn tliesc metaphors into proper expressions,
bring the.disputants into clear and open ligli^.^ they would <
tend no mqre.
If we would sfieak moHs distinctly and accurately, and ^
ouj^a figure on this subject, I think we should not indulge (
selves to say the ^^ g uilt of sin cannot be transferred by iinn
tiou, or that the defilement of sin may be imputed -to anoti
for either of these will be ready to lead those who hear us
some mistake ; since, in my opinion, it is evident that thej
of Adam^s sin, or its subjection of the sinner to punishment,
imputed to us, and thereby we are born hi sufferings. It if
* Several scripturet tell ut, *' that Christ i>ore our lins in bis own body e
tree, that be was oitde sin for ds, that all oor iniquities were laid upon bin
be bare the tins of many, that his soul was made an oflfering for sin, kc**
what is it in or of sin that ht bare or took upon him, if not the gttilt of it, c
obligation to punishment ; or suffering thereby, when he willingly becao
surety } there u nothing else of sin that he could be charged or burdened
or that coald be impated to him, or reckoned to his account, and for which k
SatUj OMuls alsacnkeal Viy \iu%ul&tu«^> %a4 %<k ^<i)<ik away tbia guilt of sii' | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 451 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | Adam; but this sinful nature is really transferred or derived from Adam to us by the laws of generation or propagation which were given at first to man, as in question vi. and vii. The consequence comes to pass that original sin is divided by our sins into imputed and inherent: the one is relative, and subject us to the misery threatened, the other is real, and makes us tually sinful.
II. How far was our Lord Jesus Christ our great sin concerned in the filth or defilement of our sin? Some people nounce it boldly that he took upon him the filth and pollution of our sins, though at the same time they mistake and support to mean something really distinct from the guilt. Others renounce and abominate that thought, lest Christ should be represented as defiled with sin; but at the same time they give no fair account or intelligible notion of the filth of the distinct from the guilt of it, that guilt which was certain imputed to Christ, when "he was made sin for us, and we bore our sins in his body on the cursed tree;" 2 Cor. v. 1 Pet. ii. 24.
I think it is evident from many scriptures*, that our subjection to punishment and misery by the guilt of sin, which the relative evil of it, was imputed or transferred to Christ, he took it away by offering himself a sacrifice of atonement expiation, which hath procured pardoning mercy for us; neither scripture nor reason will allow that the moral disoof of sin, the vicious impurity or criminal pollution, or real evil it; was transferred any way to our blessed Saviour, the "one of God who knew no sin." While men of controversy much in metaphors they fight in the dark; but if we could suade them to turn these metaphors into proper expressions, bring the disputants into clear and open light, they would tend no more.
If we would speak more distinctly and accurately, and write out a figure on this subject, I think we should not indulge ourselves to say the "guilt of sin cannot be transferred by imputation, or that the defilement of sin may be imputed to another for either of these will be ready to lead those who hear us some mistake; since, in my opinion, it is evident that the guilt of Adam's sin, or its subjection of the sinner to punishment, imputed to us, and thereby we are born in sufferings.
* Several scriptures tell us, "that Christ bore our sins in his own body of tree, that he was made sin for us, that all our iniquities were laid upon him he bare the sins of many, that his soul was made an offering for sin, &c." What is it in or of sin that he bare or took upon him, if not the guilt of it, obligation to punishment; or suffering thereby, when he willingly became surety? there is nothing else of sin that he could be charged or burdened or that could be imputed to him, or reckoned to his account, and for which usually made atonement by his sufferings, and so took away this guilt of sin. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
ESSAY ilT.
451
fident ihaft the guilt of ari^ sins was imputed to Christ, for
Uoh be suffered and obtained our pardon ; b ut the disorder
r eyil nature and qualities of sin» which are transmitted to^
s from Adam by natural propagation, can never ba^mputed
» our blessed Saviour, nor tran^erred to him any way whal^
lever.
Yet to express my charity for all sincere enquiries after
nitliy I would lay down this conclusion, that tf s uah « sincere^
amble and diligent enquirer will neither ackiMM^ledge the guilt
f a in capable of being transferred to another by imputation, nor
le defilement or sinfulness of nature to be conveyed by propaga-
OD, I wUl not be angry with him, while he allows what I think
le sense of scripture incontestably reve«b and maintains, vis.
Mt we justly suner for the sin of Adam in the providence an4
gfateous government of God, that hereby the children of A^am
re bom with inclinations to sin, and that Jesus Christ the Son
r C h>d was justly *^ made an offering for our sins, being with
is own consent devoted to death for us sinners by God thd
sther.
If christians will but acknowledge the ^^ f irst Adam was our
ead," who some way conveyed unto ns natural life, sinful incli-'
itions, diseases and death, according to some righteous divine
institution or covenant, and that ^^ J esus Christ, the second
dam, was also our better head,'' who conveys to us spiritual
fe, jNurdon and justification, resurrection from the dead, and
nmortarty by a new and better covenant; and if they practise
le f iuth, repentance and new obedience of the gospel, peace be
ith them all, and everlasting grace in my sincerest wishes^
KHigh they do not subscribe to all my words, nor speak precisely
le same language with me. '^ Grace and peace be with all those
tr ever that honestly seek the truths of God, and love our Lord
esus Christ in sincerity.'' Amen.
#f a | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 452 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | evident that the guilt of our sins was imputed to Christ, for which he suffered and obtained our pardon; but the disorder of evil nature and qualities of sin, which are transmitted to us from Adam by natural propagation, can never be imputed to our blessed Saviour, nor transferred to him any way what ever.
Yet to express my charity for all sincere enquiries after truth, I would lay down this conclusion, that if such a sincere, humble and diligent enquirer will neither acknowledge the guilt of sin capable of being transferred to another by imputation, nor defilement or sinfulness of nature to be conveyed by propagation, I will not be angry with him, while he allows what I think the sense of scripture incontestably reveals and maintains, viz. that we justly suffer for the sin of Adam in the providence and righteous government of God, that hereby the children of Adam are born with inclinations to sin, and that Jesus Christ the Son of God was justly "made an offering for our sins, being with his own consent devoted to death for us sinners by God the Father.
If Christians will but acknowledge the "first Adam was our dead," who some way conveyed unto us natural life, sinful inclinations, diseases and death, according to some righteous divine institution or covenant, and that "Jesus Christ, the second Adam, was also our better head," who conveys to us spiritual life, pardon and justification, resurrection from the dead, and mortality by a new and better covenant; and if they practise faith, repentance and new obedience of the gospel, peace be with them all, and everlasting grace in my sincerest wishes, though they do not subscribe to all my words, nor speak precisely the same language with me. "Grace and peace be with all those ever that honestly seek the truths of God, and love our Lord Jesus Christ in sincerity." Amen. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
POSTSCMPr TO THBSB E88AY8.
OOME of the doctrines maintuned in tt
of Itntiuteddn, orb translatinn of guilt *i
Sotlier, w Mcbl trnvcexi'lnined at large i
ere are some nrttm in tbe ptewnt a^ whg bftrs MM>led, ibal af'jjfiiUii
^nlii^f perMnnt and can oever b« lnii>lni«d,M iDiiDcencM UM MHiiifaBMiiiill
incnnsistenl ideas : anil C(m«ei)ii«ndj DO tib Of AdUtt MU be pfl^iil^ "^
bti iHisterity, oor can they b« jMdrlwd.Uider niMry fer uj' Mfe •TlHr
~ b ti iHisterity, oor can they b« Wiiid7
ftllier: Norean the •IM <X mf pK* U amiduA b* pnMMi t^H !■■
Cfatiat Ibe BtMliator. Tbtw grMt andanident #rilen th«,lMRM4 Omrm
■nd Dr.. SSlliilllliiDDggfflleeeett,, iinn iiBBlluu ^DDeeffeeoocceMa ooff ttee BBaMtnnAAccttiiqqaa oeff OOiirriiaall,, nnff--
B ibe e M ac t t m n T aT d de M a w ei t ' o f " p n n i * i h ' i n n i t ■ t ■ o b • e pe nanl and. i. M . t,p u a .t ^ l.i. I- M
■A oir adotl ■
.^ pObiMntMrt tt»y . ,
■ay, am maj be fmpued as to the fxinwbiiwiit thereof to paneaiwlt
t DM actually eoainoU.tbat wi. 1 aupbo)
were veryf wneellll aaccffjiiiiiaaiiiiiittccdd H«iitthh ltlhiee cciivviill Ilna w, aa ncll as trilb the li^dT ba-
tnrc, anc) the reason of iliiug^ ; anil I nni^t acknuwledge I fall in with
it cooaiiitent with retWMi and Eeriptiire. Buta certabi
and ingenioiia wnier, wbooppoaealbem in tbeae senlimeula, maiolaiae, 1^
" there ia no such llitDf; as an obligation to puDishment, but what CUDmN
in a real desert of pUDicbment ; n«r is there any real guilt but wbal ia f^
jonnl ; nnd that the punishmeDt of an innocent pprsnn, whether with or wrib-
out his eoDMiit, is not nnly a Tiolatton of truth, btii is a matal ooBka-
dictioii, for he is no subject of piinisfameBt in any respect. No ri([hl em
be in the universe to puniab the innocent, uoleas there cao b<fc nghl W
riokle trull) nuij equity. To punish an innocent person, would M Ueate
him directly contrary to what he h, ttbicb i^ aa manifest a fiolalioB N
truth as can Well be conceive<l." Therefore some infer that the poeMritr
of Adamcanuerer be punished for kit sio.Dor could our SavioHr bo pwdM
fiorthe sins of mauliini]*.
lie grants mdecd, that the BCri|>tnre uae« these tenna of " CWM
bearing our sins, that he was woundoil lor our transgressions, and Ilfeini|n9
•fuaaTl was laid upon luin," will^ many other expressions oftbclitonataie:'
Bntthese eipresniins, he says, ate merely figurative, tbr strinlly apeakiog,
he could no more hear our piiniahmcnt, than he could bearonriniqailj.oc
beeomesin forua, being both alike esieutially repugnant in a litetalMMeti
the Inilb an<t nature oflhings. Thus I have set this objection ia the iHiiaKMI
Jight, and almost in (be autbor'a ovo words ; and yet 1 think it tnay beefte-
tnally answered in tfaia manner :
I. Thi« ingenious autbor'a asiertinns concerning " guilt, <A1lgatioa It
punishment, and translation of this obligalion, and, ficarionspunisbmenl" U
one Tar the sins of anutber, See, are plainly contrarjto thecomroonsenMial
practice of mankind, whooften punish the crimesof parentsonlltechiUm,
and of oflenders on their sureties, Tliis is known more especialty by tboH
who are conversant with the civil law on these subjecu ; I think diereforemtb
assertions onght not to influcnfte our assent, without n»o« evident proof, taj
more lh»n the assertions of Dr. Slilllngfleel and tirotius, and infcny other wn-
ters upon ibis theme, who express themaelves in direct contradiction to what
* See '* A d V.mv on %^n<n\\Von, bein^ the lecond Pait of Dvv*
Il«;tilmle," page 4—30 -, \ >s iVx. SuWBvi^o^. | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 453 | 635 | 647.25 | 1,156.5 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | POSTSCRIPT TO THESE ESSAYS.
Some of the doctrines maintained in this book depend upon a right act of imputed sin, or a translation of guilt and punishment from one person to another, which I have explained at large in the second and third essay: But there are some writers in the present age who have asserted, that as guilt is entirely personal and can never be transferred, so innocence and punishment are inconsistent ideas; and consequently no sin of Adam can be published upon his posterity, nor can they be jointly laid under misery for any sins of their father: Nor can the sins of any part of mankind be punished upon Jesus Christ the Mediator. These great and eminent writers the learned Grotius and Dr. Stillingfleet, in their Defences of the Satisfaction of Christ, suppose the actual desert of punishment to be personal and inseparable from the agent or actual sinner; but they suppose still that the guilt or obligation to punishment may be transferred from one person to another; that in any sin may be imputed as to the punishment thereof to persons who will not actually commit that sin. I suppose all men will allow those authors were very well acquainted with the civil law, as well as with the light of nature, and the reason of things; and I must acknowledge I fall in with their sentiments as most consistent with reason and scripture. But a certain learned and ingenious writer, who opposes them in these sentiments, maintains that "there is no such thing as an obligation to punishment, but what consists in a real desert of punishment; nor is there any real guilt but what is personal; and that the punishment of an innocent person, whether with or without his consent, is not only a violation of truth, but is a moral contradiction, for he is no subject of punishment in any respect. No right can be in the universe to punish the innocent, unless there can be right to violate truth and equity. To punish an innocent person, would be treating him directly contrary to what he is, which is as manifest a violation of truth as can well be conceived." Therefore some infer that the posturity of Adam can never be punished for his sin, nor could our Saviour be punished for the sins of mankind*.
He grants indeed, that the scripture uses these terms of "Christ's bearing our sins, that he was wounded for our transgressions, and the iniquity of us all was laid upon him," with many other expressions of the life nature; But these expressions, he says, are merely figurative, for strictly speaking, he could no more bear our punishment, than he could bear our iniquity, or become sin for us, being both alike essentially repugnant in a literal sense to the truth and nature of things. Thus I have set this objection in the strongest light, and almost in the author's own words; and yet I think it may be effectually answered in this manner:
1. Thus ingenious author's assertions concerning "guilt, obligation to punishment, and translation of this obligation, and vicarious punishment" of one for the sins of another, &c, are plainly contrary to the common senses and practice of mankind, who often punish the crimes of parents on the children, and of offenders on their sureties. This is known more especially by those who are conversant with the civil law on these subjects; I think therefore such assertions ought not to influence our assent, without most evident proof, any more than the assertions of Dr. Stillingfleet and Grotius, and many other writers upon this theme, who express themselves in direct contradiction to what
* See "An Essay on Redemption, being the second Part of Divine Rectitude," page 3—30; by Mr. John Balguy. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
POSTSCRIPT. 453
Ilis author maintains. Is it not a thing- very commonly practised aniontrsi
neo, that the children are banished or disiiilierited of their father's estate, and
>ecome |)oor aad miserable for the sake of their father's treason, or other
nrimes ? is not something of this kind done in almost every nation, without
ui^ complaint of injustice, and without any censure upon the magistrate on
this acooimt T And why should it b e esteemed utterly unjust in things sacred,
hat the great God should impute sin to the postenty of Adam, by brinfi^iiig
misery and death upon them ? Or that he should impute the sins of mankind
0 his Sod Jesus Christ, who was a voluntary surety, and punish them upon
lim, which is acknowledged to be the plain, natural and literal sense of the
acpressiops of scripture ? But we are told, fbese must be flgum and meta-
ihors, because this author does not allow the literal seme to lie consistent with
ruth and justice.
II. This argument for the same reason would forbid any veward to be
^▼CD lo families and posterity, upon the accoimt of great and worthy actions
icribnned by their ancestors : For when the son or ffrandson of some eminent
atrtot, or deliverer of his country, has the honour ot nobility paid him, which
rare first given to his fatlier upon his personal merit, this is as much contrary
> troth, and as much a f alsehood in i'act, as if the treasons of a father wer^
unished upon a son. This son or grandsou did never perform these giorioup
od honourable services himself, which is evidently known to the world, and
et the rewards being continued to them, seem to say, that this son or ^rand-
OB did pertorm them, in the same sense as this author supposes suiKcieut to
ontradict truth, and to destroy all imputation of guilt to another. The trans-
itioD of rewards u this manner, is as contrary to truth in fact as a transJatiop
r p enalties.
III. The force of this argument seems to be all taken from the late Mr.
Foollaston's supposed foundation of moral virtue and religion, which is built
Blirely upon natural or logical truth, in his book oi* the Helitfiou of Aaiurt
tHenatea. Truth, as he supposes, may be expressed in actions as well as in
ronls ; and Gouse(|iiently, that all such actions as do not represent things ex-
cdy in their natural or logical tnith, are fahiehoods in fact, or a sort m lies,
BO therefore unlawful and unjust ; b ein^ contrary to truth, they are contrary
> morality, religion and justice. But this notion of Mr. Woollaston has never
et been pnived to be true, though there are many excellent sentiments tound
1 t hat treatise. Jt is not evident, that God has any where, either by the light of
easoo or revelation, told us, tliat actions have the same power to distinguish
ad determine veracity and falsehood as words have. It has always been
raalad by our best casuists, that simulaticm in action, that is, a f eint, ordis-
utse, or a mere appearance, 6r counterfeit of things, may be otten good
nd virtuous, where dissimulation, however it be explained, or falsclio'id in
rordit is never lawful or viituous. But tliis notion of Mr. Woollaston tends
> b ring in much superstition, that is to make more sins than God hath for-
idden, and more duties than God hath prescribed, by making all simulation
I a ction to be unlawful. And if ever that general doctrine should obtain, it
tands indeed of many cautions and limitations to cuard our consciences
rom endless scruples, or from intrenching upon mor^ity and truth at every
am. I say yet further, Tliis doctrine seems to forbid all the common con<
Incteveu of wise and good men, in coveting or disguising any action or
leaitfn in tlie civil life, even though the« same was practised by our Saviour
ir h »s Apostles : It renders all stratagems in war immoral and uulawful, even
hoi^ appointed by God himself. Let us survey this matter a little.
When God ordered Joshua and all Israel to lay an amlnah behind the city
if Ai, and when by Joshua's command they fled from the battle, mndmuuie
u if t Jtey were beaten ^ J osh. viii. 2, 15, were they guilty of such a falsehf»od
ID f act, by their flyinu^ when they were not afraid, ns turns this action into
immoralityy or made it unlawful? When Gideon with three huudre^vl \!cv«\i^
r f 3 | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 454 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | POSTSCRIPT.
this author maintains. Is it not a thing very commonly practised amongst men, that the children are banished or disinherited of their father's estate, and become poor and miserable for the sake of their father's treason, or other crimes? Is not something of this kind done in almost every nation, without any complaint of injustice, and without any censure upon the magistrate on this account? And why should it be esteemed utterly unjust in things sacred, what the great God should impute sin to the posterity of Adam, by bringing misery and death upon them? Or that he should impute the sins of mankind to his Son Jesus Christ, who was a voluntary surety, and punish them upon him, which is acknowledged to be the plain, natural and literal sense of the expressions of scripture? But we are told, these must be figures and metaphors, because this author does not allow the literal sense to be consistent with truth and justice.
II. This argument for the same reason would forbid any reward to be given to families and posterity, upon the account of great and worthy actions performed by their ancestors: For when the son or grandson of some eminent patriot, or deliverer of his country, has the honour of nobility paid him, which were first given to his father upon his personal merit, this is as much contrary to truth, and as much a falsehood in fact, as if the treasons of a father were punished upon a son. This son or grandson did never perform these glorious and honourable services himself, which is evidently known to the world, and yet the rewards being continued to them, seem to say, that this son or grandson did perform them, in the same sense as this author supposes sufficient to contradict truth, and to destroy all imputation of guilt to another. The transposition of rewards in this manner, is as contrary to truth in fact as a translation of penalties.
III. The force of this argument seems to be all taken from the late Mr. Woollaston's supposed foundation of moral virtue and religion, which is built entirely upon natural or logical truth, in his book of the Religion of Nature alienated. Truth, as he supposes, may be expressed in actions as well as in words; and consequently, that all such actions as do not represent things exactly in their natural or logical truth, are falsehoods in fact, or a sort of lies, and therefore unlawful and unjust; being contrary to truth, they are contrary to morality, religion and justice. But this notion of Mr. Woollaston has never been proved to be true, though there are many excellent sentiments found in that treatise. It is not evident, that God has any where, either by the light of reason or revelation, told us, that actions have the same power to distinguish and determine veracity and falsehood as words have. It has always been granted by our best casuists, that simulation in action, that is, a feint, or disguise, or a mere appearance, or counterfeit of things, may be often good and virtuous, where dissimulation, however it be explained, or falsehood in words, is never lawful or virtuous. But this notion of Mr. Woollaston tends to bring in much superstition, that is to make more sins than God hath forbidden, and more duties than God hath prescribed, by making all simulation action to be unlawful. And if ever that general doctrine should obtain, it stands in need of many cautions and limitations to guard our consciences from endless scruples, or from intrenching upon morality and truth at every turn. I say yet further, This doctrine seems to forbid all the common conduct even of wise and good men, in covering or disguising any action or design in the civil life, even though the same was practised by our Saviour for his Apostles: It renders all stratagems in war immoral and unlawful, even though appointed by God himself. Let us survey this matter a little.
When God ordered Joshua and all Israel to lay an ambush behind the city of Ai, and when by Joshua's command they fled from the battle, and made us if they were beaten, Josh. viii. 2, 15, were they guilty of such a falsehood in fact, by their flying when they were not afraid, as turns this action into immorality, or made it unlawful? When Gideon with three hundred men, | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
45i posTscniPT.
whoni God bad chosen for thii purpose, broke lieir piteheri, ducmertA ihtir
lamps, tnd toanihd their tiumpeli, Judft, vii. l(i. whereby the host of
Miiiiun were led la believe ihatlhcri: were tlirEe hundred troops or compaiiks
-nther tlian three hundred men ; was Gideon guilty of sucb a falsehood in
'fiwt, Bs^hauld turn this straUgem into iniauitj- T When our blesseil Saiioar,
£uAe xxiv. 28. walking with tome of his aiaciples toward a ritiage, maiU at
though he would liavc gone further, did he exert any action by this siinulatioD,
whied wms inconiistent witfa truth or rigbieousuew ? And yet i Ldoh dik
bow it van be def«uded by Mr. WoolUston's prind|ilcB. When tk. PidI
herame lu a Jem mmumg the Jews, and «■ a gentile among the gentiles, I Cor,
ix. 30, 21. When he look a v»k upon him, aiul pui-ifird httatel/i Acta xiL
23— 2fl. When Iw areutaeittd Timothff ; A cts xvi. 3. Did be fklaUy Dutk
BO as to become criminal ?
But to come nearer to the present controrersy : fVhen the propliet Eliibt
JroDOunced a leproty upon GehaH and hi* teed, for Ibe gross critoe of bit
'ing and coTetoumcM ; 2 Kingi >. 27. and when tiiii curse ivas inflidBd
tinon any of his posterity ; did this event say to the world, that theae cbildm
of Gebazi were guilty of inch covetnusuesa and lying too f Or waiitM
consistent wiih divine veracity to inltict such k curse? When Phinehiliai
txttuitd judyatent by tlaying Iko tdolatert, and God gtaie him and hit ttfi
the coeeaant of an enrlatling prictthood. Numb. xxr. 11, 13, and biachiU-
dren were BUCcesiiiTely made priests, was here any criminal felsEbood in fact,
although each of these children had perii>rmed that glorious executioii ^miiri
idolatry ? When tbc seed of Abraham and Jacob met with many sncces-
■ive blessings from God, upon the nco^Mut of the special artx of tlietrfiith
and obedience, wlilch werepmmised to be thus rewarded; did these nEnDerow
blessings on the IsmeUtcs declare to the world, that each of these pniale
persons so blewed were nctosi perfonnenoftfaoseactsoffBithandobadmcrf
Or was there any criminal falsehood that belong-ed to these providenon F h
short, a number of such inKtancca might be cited, wherein it 'a auAieialily
evident, that the doctrine of imputed sia and imputed righteouetiMS isbvM
ineaas to be charged with those cODsequences, which learned meo who fiunr
this Mbeme would cast upon them.
It may be queried also, whether this learned author dotli not allow, dut
ve are parilonca and made hap[)y on the account of what Christ bath done
and suflered, so that the benefit is transferred to us who have never ilooe the
meritorious action « ? Is this perfectly consistent ^ith the truth of Ihincs ?
' indeed, Jluit aU mir bteuintj* are properfy s rovons ti
abce the reward terminates upon^ns, may it not jusllyoccaMI
• doubt whether this be entirely agreeable to the Mntimcnt r>f trutfaand faht-
hood in actions as the test of all moralily and Justice ? It must be icfenowMid
io thn honour of this reVereud author, who has espoused tbia nounn of Hr.
^Toollaslria's, that he hath srgfued with ju>t rcanoD and uiianswet^le fom
agvinst llie daisls of the age, and in vindicatioB of the dinne mtihidi b
treation and providence ; and he hath very iugeniously and happily prom:!
in Ihi* same treatise, that mere repnttaner toid ncto lAttHeiae tre net 4
fiffficieitt gnmud for tiimert to claim pardaa and aceeptatice trith Gei.
the nniversai Cioveroor of the world : But if any such wntera Bhoohl procctd
upon these sentiments of Mr. Woollaston, to delnoli^b the divine dodiUMi
of die " translation of guilt, and of viearioni pnniihment; of oar mfiriiig
misery and death on the account of the ain of Adam ; and of Cbrirt^
being a proper sacrifice for the sins of men in hi« death, atul beariug Ibot
■ins so 08 to make atonement for them ;" 1 a idt leave,' with all the moeA
Ibeartotheirchaiacler,to yield up neitber mylaiUi, Bor'ny naEOD to utic | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 455 | 635 | 647.25 | 1,156.5 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | whom God had chosen for this purpose, broke their pitchers, discovered their lamps, and sounded their trumpets, Judg. vii. 18. whereby the honour of Muhan were led to believe that there were three hundred troops or companies rather than three hundred men; was Gideon guilty of such a falsehood in fact, as should turn this stratagem into unquity? When our blessed Navarre, Luke xxiv. 28 walking with some of his disciples toward a village, made it though he would have gone further, did be exert any action by this simulation, which was inconsistent with truth or righteousness? And yet I know out how it can be defended by Mr. Woollaston's principles. When St. Paul became as a Jew among the Jews, and as a gentile among the gentiles, I Cor. ix. 20, 21. When he took a vow upon him, and purified himself; Acts xxi. 23—26. When he circumcised Timothy; Acts xvi. 3. Did he falsify truth so as to become criminal?
But to come nearer to the present controversy: When the prophet Eliah pronounced a leprosy upon Gebazi and his seed, for the gross crime of lying and covetousness; 2 Kings v. 27. and when this curse was inflicted upon any of his posterity; did this event say to the world, that these children of Gebazi were guilty of such covetousness and lying too? Or was it not consistent with divine veracity to inflict such a curse? When Phinechos had executed judgment by slaying two idolaters, and God gave him and his son the covenant of an everlasting priesthood, Numb. xxv. 11, 13, and his children were successively made priests, was here any criminal falsehood in fact, as though each of these children had performed that glorious execution against Idolatry? When the seed of Abraham and Jacob met with many successive blessings from God, upon the account of the special acts of their faith and obedience, which were promised to be thus rewarded; did these numerous blessings on the Israelites declare to the world, that each of these priests persons so blessed were actual performers of those acts of faith and obedience? Or was there any criminal falsehood that belonged to these providences? In short, a number of such instances might be cited, wherein it is sufficiently evident, that the doctrine of imputed sin and imputed righteousness is by no means to be charged with those consequences, which learned men who follow this scheme would cast upon them.
It may be queried also, whether this learned author doth not allow, but we are pardoned and made happy on the account of what Christ hath done and suffered, so that the benefit is transferred to us who have never done the meritorious actions? Is this perfectly consistent with the truth of things? He will any indeed, That all our blessings are properly a reward to Christ: But since the reward terminates upon us, may it not justly accuse a doubt whether this be entirely agreeable to the sentiment of truth and falsehood in actions as the text of all morality and justice? It must be acknowledged to the honour of this reverend author, who has capused this notion of Mr. Woollaston's, that he both argued with just reason and unanswerable facts against the deeds of the age, and in vindication of the divine rectitude in creation and providence; and he both very ingeniously and happily proved in this same treason, that mere repentance and new obedience are not a sufficient ground for sinners to claim pardon and acceptance with God, the universal Governor of the world: But if any such writers should proceed upon these sentiments of Mr. Woollaston, to demolish the divine doctrine of the "translation of guilt, and of vicarious punishment; of our suffering ministry and death on the account of the sin of Adam; and of Christ being a proper sacrifice for the sins of men in his death, and bearing their sins so as to make atonement for them;" I ask leave, with all the respect I bear to their character, to yield up neither my faith, nor my reason to that assertion. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY.
ike Freedom of Will in God and in Creatures.
. — Of Liberty and Necessity, ajid how far they are
consistent.
IT Y 18 a word which has been attributed to ideas very
id different ; and necessity has also its varieus signifi«
tience proceeds that confusion and seeming inconsistency
Qetimcs appears among our thoughts, and may have
id perhaps in some writings on this subject ; nor is it
roid it in argument of so much difficulty: And there^
peak the candour of the reader while I am altemptiiir
I l ittle light into a theme, which has been snrroundra
II d arkness and perplexity. I shall not inm into a wild
ill the distinctions of necessity which the schools have
: but it seems to be needful for us to take notice in
that a thing is called necessity, '^ when it must be so,
ot be otherwise, whatsoever be the reason and cause of
sity." If the cause or reason of this necessity arise
fery nature of the thing j i t is called an internal or
necessitjf ; so a bowl may be said necessarily to roll
ill : and a beast necessarily to avoid the fire, or to
s thirst when a fountain is near. But if this neces-
from some apparent outward constraint or restraint,
called an external or forcible necessity: Thus «
riven up a hill by the force of a stroke impelling it;
t necessarily goes through the fire when he is con«
»r dragged into it by outward force ; or an ox ne-
ibstains from drink when he is withheld by bars or fet*
a neiglibouring fouutun. What other distinctions of
are needful, will afterwards appear.
rty stands generally in opposition to necessitjrof each
ii i nward and outward ; b oth a necessity of nature, and
f o f force : and that is certainly the best and most pro-
of it ; yet there seem to be some cases wherein
ons whicli are necessary, have also been called free :
; would make a more careful enquiry in this matter, we
\ a brief survey of the different sorts or I^inds of liberty,
le different cases to which this word is applied, and
lay better judge how far necessity is consistent or incoQ«
Ih it. | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 456 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
the Freedom of Will in God and in Creatures.
Of Liberty and Necessity, and how far they are consistent.
TY is a word which has been attributed to ideas very different; and necessity has also its various significance proceeds that confusion and seeming inconsistency sometimes appears among our thoughts, and may have and perhaps in some writings on this subject; nor is it void it in argument of so much difficulty: And there-peak the candour of the reader while I am attempting a little light into a theme, which has been surrounded in darkness and perplexity. I shall not run into a wild all the distinctions of necessity which the schools have: but it seems to be needful for us to take notice in that a thing is called necessity, "when it must be so, not be otherwise, whatsoever be the reason and cause of necessity." If the cause or reason of this necessity arise every nature of the thing, it is called an internal or necessity; so a bowl may be said necessarily to roll till: and a beast necessarily to avoid the fire, or to s thirst when a fountain is near. But if this neces-from some apparent outward constraint or restraint, called an external or forcible necessity: Thus a driven up a hill by the force of a stroke impelling it; it necessarily goes through the fire when he is con-dragged into it by outward force; or an ox neb-stains from drink when he is withheld by bars or fet-a neighbouring fountain. What other distinctions of are needful, will afterwards appear.
TY stands generally in opposition to necessity of each inward and outward; both a necessity of nature, and of force: and that is certainly the best and most pro- of it; yet there seem to be some cases wherein ons which are necessary, have also been called free: we would make a more careful enquiry in this matter, we a brief survey of the different sorts or kinds of liberty, the different cases to which this word is applied, and may better judge how far necessity is consistent or incon-ith it. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
450 FREEDOM or WILL.
I. LibeHy or freedom may be attributed in a fignratifa
aenae to iDanimate beings ; so we aay by way of simile, free u
the air or wind. It is yet a little more properly applied to ani-
mals ;s o a bird released from its cage is free, or a horse from
bis bridle or harness. All manner of outward necessity, that is,
restraint or constraint, is inconsistent with this freedom of brute
creatures. But there are some actions which a beast peribrmi
with a kind of brutal freedom, and vet by a sort of natural neces-
sity also^ A hor&e naturally avoids the fire by an inward necei-
aity, though he doth it freely, that is, with all the freedom he
has : and when he is thirsty, he freely drinks, yet it is by
an inward or natural necessity, where nothing restrains him.
But leaving these ideas of a less proper freedom, let us
rather consider liberty in its more proper sense, as it belong
to men or other intelligent creatures, or to God himself, who
k the Creator.
II. Liberty, as ascribed to intellectual beings, is rither
moral or natural. Natural liberty has various ideas, as wiD
appear immediately. ^* Moral liberty is a freedom from all supe-
rior authority :'' in this sense, God alone is universally and per-
fectly free, having no antliority superior to himself. But there
are many instances of particular moral freedom among men ; an
apprentice is free from tlic authority of his master when hehu
served seven years ; and the lad is free from the government of
his tutor when his childhood is past, and he commences mtOi
It is no longer necessary that the apprentice should obey his rasi-
ter*s commands, nor the youth those of his tutor, which it was
morally necessary or plain duty for them to obey before. In thi«
moral sense, necessity or restraint and liberty are evidently in-
consistent.
III. Natural liberty must be distinguished into a liberty of
volition^ or a liberty of action : The first is a liberty of the will,
the last is rather a liberty of the executive powers*. It is this
freedom of volition or chusing which is properly the liberty of
an intelligent being, and the chief subject of dispute, and not
the freedom of the inferior powers from restraint or constraint in
acting or executing the determinations of the will. There arc
many cases wherein the will may be free to chuse^ but the
man is not free to act. The freedom of the will is very con-
sistent with the restraint of action : so a person whose mouth *
is stopped, may be willing or chuse either to speak or to keep
i»ilence ; and he is free in this choice, so far as the volition
* Kote^ When action it contradistini^QiBhed from volitioB, I mean cbirfy
the action or motion of the inferior aod executive powera ; for io the nature of
thiB?«i, the will ii the chief agent, and volition is action in the properctt icau j
but I f cdr it deviates too moch from the seoie of mankind to permit the words
action and ayeot to be applied only to the will, and to nothing else, as loae
vr.'teri havs dona ia Kh)* aoalrovtny. However, it it but a debate about vordfc | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 457 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | I. Liberty or freedom may be attributed in a figurative sense to inanimate beings; so we say by way of simile, free as the air or wind. It is yet a little more properly applied to animals; so a bird released from its cage is free, or a horse from his bridle or harness. All manner of outward necessity, that is, restraint or constraint, is inconsistent with this freedom of brute creatures. But there are some actions which a beast performs with a kind of brutal freedom, and yet by a sort of natural necessity also. A horse naturally avoids the fire by an inward necessity, though he doth it freely, that is, with all the freedom he has: and when he is thirsty, he freely drinks, yet it is by an inward or natural necessity, where nothing restrains him. But leaving these ideas of a less proper freedom, let us rather consider liberty in its more proper sense, as it belongs to men or other intelligent creatures, or to God himself, who is the Creator.
II. Liberty, as ascribed to intellectual beings, is either moral or natural. Natural liberty has various ideas, as will appear immediately. "Moral liberty is a freedom from all superior authority:" in this sense, God alone is universally and perfectly free, having no authority superior to himself. But there are many instances of particular moral freedom among men; an apprentice is free from the authority of his master when he has served seven years; and the lad is free from the government of his tutor when his childhood is past, and he commences man. It is no longer necessary that the apprentice should obey his master's commands, nor the youth those of his tutor, which it was morally necessary or plain duty for them to obey before. In this moral sense, necessity or restraint and liberty are evidently inconsistent.
III. Natural liberty must be distinguished into a liberty of volition, or a liberty of action: The first is a liberty of the will, the last is rather a liberty of the executive powers*. It is this freedom of volition or chusing which is properly the liberty of an intelligent being, and the chief subject of dispute, and not the freedom of the inferior powers from restraint or constraint in acting or executing the determinations of the will. There are many cases wherein the will may be free to chuse, but the man is not free to act. The freedom of the will is very consistent with the restraint of action: so a person whose mouth is stopped, may be willing or chuse either to speak or to keep silence; and he is free in this choice, so far as the volition
* Note, When action is contradistinguished from volition, I mean chirly the action or motion of the inferior and executive powers; for in the nature of things, the will is the chief agent, and volition is action in the properest sense; but I fear it deviates too much from the sense of mankind to permit the words action and avent to be applied only to the will, and to nothing else, as some writers have done in this controversy. However, it is but a debate about words. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY 457
oes( ' b ut he w not free to act, for he hath not power to
jeak if he did chuse it; he is under a necessity to keep
ilence. Suppose Stmou and Ijepidus were locked up in prison
rith their friend Crato : Lepidus chiises to go out, but can*
oty and is uneasy ; 8 imon chuses to tarry there, and there he
arries chearfully : They are ccfually free in tlieir diflTorent choice
nd ifoiition ; I mt both are under a necessity to act the same
tiing, viz. to abide in prisoiiy one according Co his choice, Uie
ther against it.
IV. The liberty of the will is generally distinguished by
rriters on this suhjcH^t, into a liberty of indiference or choice^
.nd a liberty of spontaneity or voluntarintss. Actbns of the
toul are said to be free with this spontaneous or voluntary free«
loiDy when tlie soul of man pursues any object or performs any
kct, or chuses any pleasure, without dny consideration wlietlier
t c an chuse any other objcH^t, or perform the contrary action.
This is a most large and extensive sense of the word liberty ;
br in this sense every act of the will is and roust be free, for
Bvery act is spontaneous or voluntar v ; and indeed this freedom
if the will seems to be but a dilute idea, for it siguilies
learce any thing more than it is an act of the will. So we are
Mid with the greatest freedom to do those actions to wliich we
bave the strongest inclination, and wherein we take the greatest
pleasure; not considering or enquiring whether these actions
ire necessary or no : that consideration does not come into this
notion of liberty. It is a common instance in this case, that all
leusibie beings with spontaneity and freedom pursuse what they
icall pleasure or happiness ; yet they are generally said to do
this by a sort of necessity too, because it belongs to their nature,
Mid tliey cannot do otherwise. This is attributed to brutes as
well as men. And so the blcsse<l above with perfect liberty love
Grod ; yet so constantly, that it a ppears almost natural and neces-
sary. So G od with the strongest and most exalted freedom,
and yet unchangeably and necessarily, loves himself as the highest
good, and pursues his own glory as the noblest end. Every ne-
cessary and immanent action that Uod doth with regard to him-
lelf, and many transient actions towards his creatures, are
perfectly spontaneous and free with an absolute liberty of this
jUnd ; and yet perhaps he cannot do otherwise, that is, his will
Oa^^lly and eternally and unchangeably determines itself to these
|K:don$ ; h e freely and necessarily consults himself in all his de-
Bgns, and decrees and always acts agreeably to his own per-
fections ; h e 19 freely and necessarily Just and true to his
creatures.
} know some great writers distinguish here between a
matural and a moral nccessitj/^ and call all those actions of the
will which are really natural, as well as constant, certain and
(uuvertali such as acts of truths and justice iu G^d^ \Gk»<c^^ | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 458 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY
but he is not free to act, for he hath not power to speak if he did chuse it; he is under a necessity to keep silence. Suppose Simon and Lepidus were locked up in prison with their friend Crato: Lepidus chuses to go out, but cannot, and is uneasy; Simon chuses to tarry there, and there he carries chearfully: They are equally free in their different choice and volition; but both are under a necessity to act the same thing, viz. to abide in prison, one according to his choice, the other against it.
IV. The liberty of the will is generally distinguished by writers on this subject, into a liberty of indifference or choice, and a liberty of spontaneity or voluntariness. Actions of the soul are said to be free with this spontaneous or voluntary freedom, when the soul of man pursues any object or performs any act, or chuses any pleasure, without any consideration whether he can chuse any other object, or perform the contrary action. This is a most large and extensive sense of the word liberty; or in this sense every act of the will is and must be free, for every act is spontaneous or voluntary; and indeed this freedom of the will seems to be but a dilute idea, for it signifies scarce anything more than it is an act of the will. So we are said with the greatest freedom to do those actions to which we have the strongest inclination, and wherein we take the greatest pleasure; not considering or enquiring whether these actions are necessary or no: that consideration does not come into this notion of liberty. It is a common instance in this case, that all sensible beings with spontaneity and freedom pursue what they call pleasure or happiness; yet they are generally said to do this by a sort of necessity too, because it belongs to their nature, and they cannot do otherwise. This is attributed to brutes as well as men. And so the blessed above with perfect liberty love God; yet so constantly, that it appears almost natural and necessary. So God with the strongest and most exalted freedom, and yet unchangeably and necessarily, loves himself as the highest good, and pursues his own glory as the noblest end. Every necessary and immanent action that God doth with regard to himself, and many transient actions towards his creatures, are perfectly spontaneous and free with an absolute liberty of this kind; and yet perhaps he cannot do otherwise, that is, his will naturally and eternally and unchangeably determines itself to these actions; he freely and necessarily consults himself in all his designs, and decrees and always acts agreeably to his own perfections; he is freely and necessarily just and true to his creatures.
I know some great writers distinguish here between a natural and a moral necessity, and call all those actions of the will which are really natural, as well as constant, certain and universal, such as acts of truth, and justice in God, morally | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
488 fEBftooM OTimjttJm,
aeoetttrr; md will allow toaree soy tiring to b* Bilm%«e^
oesttry bot what belongs to matter, or to the mare paaai? e^ or
perceptiYe powers of a spirit : I i^raat indeed^ dM the wiU^
which is influenced by rational motivesi finot under sooh a sort
of inflnence in its actions as bodies are, beei^uiie bodies de me-
obanicaliy moved ; yet the necesMty may l>e as strong andiintl*
terable : and if it be the very nature of Ood . t o not jumj wxA
fidihfialtf, so t(at he cannot will^por act otherwise. It may be
called^ I think, a natural ne^^ssity, since it springs from Ins
aature ; as well as it may be called a niond one, because it b
the action of an intelligent and free agent.
Now let us enquire what is a liberty of choice or of indifler*
anee. Though necessary actions are sometimes said to be free,
when they are done thus spontaneously, as I have described, vet
a liberty of choice or indifference in things not necessary is the
more common sense in which the word liberty is used : This i|
Ihe second branch of this fourth distinction, and this implies ** a
power to chuse or refuse*, to chuse one thing or another amon;
, aeveral thinjga which are proposed, without any Inward or out-
ward restraint, force or constraining bias or influence.*' Sol
feel myself at liberty, and I cliuse to stand or walk ; I am free
and ciitise either to speak or keep silence, to point upward or
liownward ; I chuse one egg and refuse another out of two thit
are o3bred. Man is free nvhcther he will chuse to honour God
his Maker, or dishonour him ; t o do good to his neighbour, or
do him hurt, to keep himself sober, or to make himself drunk:
In all these things he may chuse or refuse which he pleasee.
This is what the schools call libertas indifferentia ad oppotitSf
that is^ a liberty of indifierence to chuse one tiling, or its oppo-
•ite. This liberty is utterly inconsistent with all necessity, wbe-
j^. t her natural or forcible, that is, with all necessity of every kind :
whatsoever is any way necessary, or imiK>scd or oonstrained,
cannot in this sense be called free. Whensoever the will is necei*
aarily determined to any act or object by any thing without or
within itself, it has not a liberty of choice or indifierence; for
upon this sapposition of its being necessarily determined' to one
tiling, it is eyidentthat it could not chuse the contrary.
V. In the last place, liberty or freedom of the vrill is either
absolute and perfect, or imperfect and comparative. When we
chuse or deteriniue any thing without any manner of constraint
* Hert note, I do not devcribi! liberty of choice or indiffiercoce, ai atof
bsvc done, by • power to act, or not to act, bat a power to chate or refute ; f ot
there is a ;reat deal of difference between a freedom of willing or obotiof , •a'
B freedom of acting what we choie, as I have shewn before : and muob darkaM
and confu^on la brought in upon this subject of liberty, by not keeping ikii
distinct ion clear. Perhaps that great man, Mr. Locks, had writ more perspiea*
oiisly on this sobject, if be had always msintained this diflincUoSy for ks
deflcribes liberty, a j^ower te act or sot to net, &c. | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 459 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | necessary; and will allow scarce any thing to be naturally necessary but what belongs to matter, or to the mere passive, or perceptive powers of a spirit: I grant indeed, that the will, which is influenced by rational motives, is not under such a sort of influence in its actions as bodies are, because bodies are mechanically moved; yet the necessity may be as strong and unalterable: and if it be the very nature of God to act justly and faithfully, so that he cannot will, nor act otherwise, it may be called, I think, a natural necessity, since it springs from his nature; as well as it may be called a moral one, because it is the action of an intelligent and free agent.
Now let us enquire what is a liberty of choice or of indifference. Though necessary actions are sometimes said to be free, when they are done thus spontaneously, as I have described, yet a liberty of choice or indifference in things not necessary is the more common sense in which the word liberty is used: This is the second branch of this fourth distinction, and this implies "a power to chuse or refuse*, to chuse one thing or another among several things which are proposed, without any inward or outward restraint, force or constraining bias or influence." So I feel myself at liberty, and I chuse to stand or walk; I am free and chuse either to speak or keep silence, to point upward or downward; I chuse one egg and refuse another out of two that are offered. Man is free whether he will chuse to honour God his Maker, or dishonour him; to do good to his neighbour, or do him hurt, to keep himself sober, or to make himself drunk: In all these things he may chuse or refuse which he pleases. This is what the schools call libertas indifferentia ad opposita, that is, a liberty of indifference to chuse one thing, or its opposite. This liberty is utterly inconsistent with all necessity, whether natural or forcible, that is, with all necessity of every kind: whatsoever is any way necessary, or imposed or constrained, cannot in this sense be called free. Whensoever the will is necessarily determined to any act or object by any thing without or within itself, it has not a liberty of choice or indifference; for upon this supposition of its being necessarily determined to one thing, it is evident that it could not chuse the contrary.
V. In the last place, liberty or freedom of the will is either absolute and perfect, or imperfect and comparative. When we chuse or determine any thing without any manner of constraint
* Here note, I do not describe liberty of choice or indifference, as many have done, by a power to act, or not to act, but a power to chuse or refuse; for there is a great deal of difference between a freedom of willing or chusing, and a freedom of acting what we chuse, as I have shewn before: and much darkness and confusion is brought in upon this subject of liberty, by not keeping this distinction clear. Perhaps that great man, Mr. Locke, had writ more perspicuously on this subject, if he had always maintained this distinction, for he describes liberty, a power to act or not to act, &c. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY,
459
• one Bide, or restraint on the other ; when we act or deter^
line one way, without any reluctance or any bias towards the
)ntrary side, this is called absolute and perfect freedom: so
rod chuses to be just and true; so a wise beings chuscs to follow
le d ictates of reason wheresoever they appear ; so every sen-
ble being is said to chusc and pursue in general what it calls
easure or happiness, thout^h sometimes it mistakes wherein
ippiness consists, and follows instead of it a shadow or mis-
ief. Comparative liberttf or freedom is when the mind has
me inward reluctance or aversion to those actions which yet it
ills to perform for other more prevailing reasons ; or when it
^ an inward inclination and desire to do some action which yet
wills to neglect, being powerfully impelled by other consider*
ions : so a malefactor may be said freely or voluntarily to go to
I execution ; f or though he has an inward aversion to it, yet
I chuses it comparatively, that is, rather than to be dragged
ither by force : so a sick man is comparatively free in chusing to
ink a bitter potion ratiier Uian to bear continued sickness.
Now this sort of volition in common speech is sometimes
id not to be free, because the man doth not absolutely chuse
18, but only prefers a less evil to a greater; and the wordst
•t free, in this place signify only a less degpree of fpeedom*
en are ready to conclude in this case, that because in common
eaktn^ the man was constrained, or as it were, necessitated to
i t o the gibbet by a superior motive, therefore he went not freely ;
ough indeed it was an act of choice, or comparative freedom^
at is, rather than be dragged : And, by this way of speaking,
s. tliat he went not freely, we come also to imagine that frcodona
d necessity are utterly inconsistent things : yet it is plain that
ough here was a sort of necessity or constraint, yet the man
ui free and voluntary in his own act. It is no wonder now
at there should be such contests and controversies about the
turc of liberty, or the use of the word, since it plainly appears
at the words not free sometimes signify only less free ; and
ICC the same action may be said at the same time to be not freo,
at is, absolutely, because we do it with some reluctanoy, and
t it is said to be free, that is, comparatively, because we do
at last voluntary, and prefer it before something worse. We
ay also take occasion to remark, that if such actions which are
it d one with a full freedom may be called comparatively free,
cii there can be no voluntary acts, or acts of the wi)l, but have
me natural freedom also, that is, at least a comparative free-
im : for the will cannot act without so much freedpm as this is ;
id consequently the will itself cannot be really compelled, but
itural freedom or liberty will still belong to it in all possible
iions ; though not always a liberty of choice or indifference.
After all this debate, I will readily acknowledge^ that some | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 460 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
one side, or restraint on the other; when we act or determine one way, without any reluctance or any bias towards the contrary side, this is called absolute and perfect freedom: so good chuses to be just and true; so a wise being chuses to follow the dictates of reason wheresoever they appear; so every sensible being is said to chuse and pursue in general what it calls measure or happiness, though sometimes it mistakes wherein happiness consists, and follows instead of it a shadow or mis-ief. Comparative liberty or freedom is when the mind has some inward reluctance or aversion to those actions which yet it tells to perform for other more prevailing reasons; or when it is an inward inclination and desire to do some action which yet wills to neglect, being powerfully impelled by other considerations: so a malefactor may be said freely or voluntarily to go to execution; for though he has an inward aversion to it, yet chuses it comparatively, that is, rather than to be dragged either by force: so a sick man is comparatively free in chusing toink a bitter potion rather than to bear continued sickness.
Now this sort of volition in common speech is sometimes did not to be free, because the man doth not absolutely chuse is, but only prefers a less evil to a greater; and the words, at free, in this place signify only a less degree of freedom. Men are ready to conclude in this case, that because in common speaking the man was constrained, or as it were, necessitated to to the gibbet by a superior motive, therefore he went not freely; though indeed it was an act of choice, or comparative freedom, that is, rather than be dragged: And, by this way of speaking, that he went not freely, we come also to imagine that freedom and necessity are utterly inconsistent things: yet it is plain that though here was a sort of necessity or constraint, yet the man as free and voluntary in his own act. It is no wonder now that there should be such contests and controversies about the nature of liberty, or the use of the word, since it plainly appears that the words not free sometimes signify only less free; and since the same action may be said at the same time to be not free, that is, absolutely, because we do it with some reluctancy, and it is said to be free, that is, comparatively, because we do at last voluntary, and prefer it before something worse. We may also take occasion to remark, that if such actions which are done with a full freedom may be called comparatively free, then there can be no voluntary acts, or acts of the will, but have some natural freedom also, that is, at least a comparative freedom: for the will cannot act without so much freedom as this is; and consequently the will itself cannot be really compelled, but natural freedom or liberty will still belong to it in all possible situations; though not always a liberty of choice or indifference.
After all this debate, I will readily acknowledge, that some | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
'^FuuoM
or WIIX.
of Ihew dimtet, whether tudi uid lueh letfoM ire ft«0 or
ore nUher dupates about words then thiim : And if the m
ivoald all ngteb to confine the words uoerty and freedom,
aignify nofliing bat a f reedom of choioe, o liberty of imUflfera
or a power to dinae or refuaoi which is inoonatsCcat i^ ;
latotssitj of dioice, and wliich must be allowed to bo the ■
inoal sense of it, I diould be so ftr from disapproving ei
iha( I tlunk it would be the beot^way of speaUnr and wrilf
And therefi>re I giTe notice here, ttiat I shall «liiefly use
word freedom in thissense in the following peetions. If we eo
|||| always oonflne every term to one certain determinate k
fik should gun and preserve much clearer ideas of tilings )
should mske much swifter and larger advaiKses in knowle^i
wo should cut off a thousand occasions of uustidLo^ and t
away a multitude of controversies. Bui when we are enquii^
what is Kbhrty of freedom, vrhich in the present sense andfuto
Iho^wwd among flmnkfaid is, a pplied to various oases, we qj
Bot osjplsiin the word so as utterly to exclude any qMmtane
ontisHi or aotioos of die will, wliich men have fits^ently esU
ft^^ Ihooffh they also may appear necessary, or in some SH
ooBOtrainedi Among other remarks on this subject, it is prsj
olso to tske notice, that our judging concerning ike inoi
fmhdnoodf Jiineu or UMfUne$$j good or evil of things^ is eenertl
•scribed to that power of the soul which is oidled ue mi
or mnkriianding : And because when we do pass a judgmo
we have no power to Judge otherwise than as things appear
^ mind at tiiat time, therefore judgment is called a neeetm
iking ; and indeed ** judgment is but an assent or diment
the mind, as things appear true or false to the mind ;'' sad <
this account it is supposed to have no freedom or liberty bdsBj
fng to it But if we will make a careful observation of vA
passes in the transactions of the soul on these occaiuons, we ib
find that though the mind cannot assent or dissent, cannot jod|
of things contrary to what they plainly appear, yet the will hsi
great deal to do in our judgments concemmg objects proposed'
Itiemind*
The win is sometimes fed by apoetite or passion^ and h
an inclination to chuse a particuhr ooject, and then it with
that dbject to be fit and good : It readily yields lo the prejoiUn
that lie on that side, it fixes the mind upon those argumcfll
which tend to prove what it w ishes, and turns the thoughts am
fit>m those evidences, which lie on the other side of the qneslioi
and does not sufi*er them to be brought into foil view and cooi
parison; and thus secretly it influences the soul to judge Ik
thing it desires to be good or fit, that is, to assent to those ai|«
menu, ivliich are brought to prove its fitness, keeping the eos
Crary argiuncuts much out of sight. It is an old Roman jve | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 461 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | of these disputes, whether such and such actions are free or are rather disputes about words then things: And if the word would all agree to confine the words liberty and freedom, signify nothing but a freedom of choice, a liberty of indifference or a power to chuse or refuse, which is inconsistent with the necessity of choice, and which must be allowed to be the usual sense of it, I should be so far from disapproving of that I think it would be the best way of speaking and writing. And therefore I give notice here, that I shall chiefly use the word freedom in this sense in the following sections. If we could always confine every term to one certain determinate idea, we should gain and preserve much clearer ideas of things; should make much swifter and larger advances in knowledge, we should cut off a thousand occasions of mistake, and take away a multitude of controversies. But when we are enquiring what is liberty of freedom, which in the present sense and use the word among mankind is applied to various cases, we may not explain the word so as utterly to exclude any spontaneous actions, or actions of the will, which men have frequently called free; though they also may appear necessary, or in some and constrained. Among other remarks on this subject, it is proper also to take notice, that our judging concerning the truth, falsehood, fitness or unfitness, good or evil of things, is general ascribed to that power of the soul which is called the mind or understanding: And because when we do pass a judgment we have no power to judge otherwise than as things appear in the mind at that time, therefore judgment is called a necessary thing; and indeed "judgment is but an assent or dissent in the mind, as things appear true or false to the mind;" and of this account it is supposed to have no freedom or liberty belonging to it. But if we will make a careful observation of what passes in the transactions of the soul on these occasions, we shall find that though the mind cannot assent or dissent, cannot judge of things contrary to what they plainly appear, yet the will has great deal to do in our judgments concerning objects proposed to the mind.
The will is sometimes led by appetite or passion, and has an inclination to chuse a particular object, and then it wishes that object to be fit and good: It readily yields to the prejudice that lie on that side, it fixes the mind upon those arguments which tend to prove what it wishes, and turns the thoughts away from those evidences, which lie on the other side of the question and does not suffer them to be brought into full view and comparison; and thus secretly it influences the soul to judge the thing it desires to be good or fit, that is, to assent to those arguments, which are brought to prove its fitness, keeping the contrary arguments much out of sight. It is an old Roman pro- | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY.
461
^rb, Quod votnmus facile creiimmy We easily believe that which
e mrish to be irue : Tliere is indeed a secret dishoDesty and io-
nceritj io this conduct, though we are not willing to take notice
:* i t. The will also has povTer to hasten and precipitate our
Ked assent or dissent to propositions in the mind, and to hurry
1 the judgment to determine concerning the fitness or eoodoesa
f t hings upon a slight and insufficient view. The soiu of maa
soon tired and weary of suspense, and the will hastening to
tioice and action before due evidence, is really guilty of that
lah judgment and rash action : For the will has power to with-
lid the assent in many cases, and to delav the judgment when
liogs do not appear to the mind with full and bright evidence^
xl to set the mind upon searching further, and viewing the
)ject again on all sides, before it judges concerning its trulliy
tness or goodness : And by this means the will may take care
lat the soul pass a juster judgment on things, after a fuller and
nger survey of them. And even where things appear with a
*etty good degree of evidence, the will is able to delay our
sent, and withhold it for a season ; as for instance, if any
urned and knowing friend stand by and warn us of danger and
Utake, atul bid us take heed of assenting too soon, lest we ure
i))Osi'd upon by false appearances, the will is able to prolong
e di^lay of the judgment, and to withhold it from pronouncing
K>n the fitness or goodness of that^ object.
Let it b e observed, that I do not alter our common forms
speech, nor attribute judgment to the will, tliough indeed it
ems to be some determining operation of the soul, consequent
the appearances of ideas in the mind ; and therefore it is not
erely what some great writers have represented it, viz. feeling
hat we feelf or hearifig what we hear ; f or we can suspend and
;lay our assent or judgment, even when a good degree of evi*
tace appears to the mind ; and we are also led sometimes te
ve a stronger or weaker assent, according to the inclinations
' t he will, or desires of the heart, neither of which can bepro«
Tly said with regard to feeling or hearing. I say again, I will
)t d irectly call judging an act of choice or voluntary operation ;
id yet there is so much of this kind of operation in the soul
:erted about its passing a judgment on things, that I think we
ust agree that the will has a great deal to do in it : and there-
re the errors, derived from these wilful rash judgments, have
mething criminal in them, as well as they lead us into further
iminal actions. And were not this the true account of things,
[rannot see how faith or unbelief of the gospel could have any
ing in themnvorthy either of praise or blame : But this is only
lint by the way.
Mr. liodie in his Essay, book II. chapter 21. section 47.
,er some other representations of human liberty, which seem | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 462 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
Quod volumus facile credimus, We easily believe that which we wish to be true: There is indeed a secret dishonesty and incerity in this conduct, though we are not willing to take notice of it. The will also has power to hasten and precipitate our mixed assent or dissent to propositions in the mind, and to hurry on the judgment to determine concerning the fitness or goodness of things upon a slight and insufficient view. The soul of man is soon tired and weary of suspense, and the will hastening to voice and action before due evidence, is really guilty of that rash judgment and rash action: For the will has power to withhold the assent in many cases, and to delay the judgment where things do not appear to the mind with full and bright evidence, and to set the mind upon searching further, and viewing the object again on all sides, before it judges concerning its truth, fitness or goodness: And by this means the will may take care that the soul pass a juster judgment on things, after a fuller and longer survey of them. And even where things appear with a pretty good degree of evidence, the will is able to delay our assent, and withhold it for a season; as for instance, if any warned and knowing friend stand by and warn us of danger and mistake, and bid us take heed of assenting too soon, lest we are imposed upon by false appearances, the will is able to prolong the delay of the judgment, and to withhold it from pronouncing on the fitness or goodness of that object.
Let it be observed, that I do not alter our common forms of speech, nor attribute judgment to the will, though indeed it seems to be some determining operation of the soul, consequent on the appearances of ideas in the mind; and therefore it is not merely what some great writers have represented it, viz. feeling what we feel, or hearing what we hear; for we can suspend and delay our assent or judgment, even when a good degree of evidence appears to the mind; and we are also led sometimes to give a stronger or weaker assent, according to the inclinations of the will, or desires of the heart, neither of which can be properly said with regard to feeling or hearing. I say again, I will not directly call judging an act of choice or voluntary operation; and yet there is so much of this kind of operation in the soul perted about its passing a judgment on things, that I think we must agree that the will has a great deal to do in it: and there are the errors, derived from these wilful rash judgments, have something criminal in them, as well as they lead us into further criminal actions. And were not this the true account of things, cannot see how faith or unbelief of the gospel could have any thing in them-worthy either of praise or blame: But this is only hint by the way.
Mr. Locke in his Essay, book II. chapter 21. section 47. over some other representations of human liberty, which seem | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
it
FESSDOH Of WIU.
■ot Co be perfecdy jait, repretentt it t o amdd mwck in a pomerqf
ddaying ihe extcutiim of our detires, or nupeading ike aeU u
voKtitm or choice, untiithe man has dUigemtfy examined on M
mde» what is%ed : Now this no doubt is a ver? great part d
human fiberty ; and Des Cartea, the Frendi philoaophef , with
good appearance of reason^ makes this power of sospending the
acts of the soul to extend to onr assent to troth, as well as to the
pnrsoit of good ; and therefore he proceeds so far, as to mska
judgment rather to Mang to the will, and to be j ustly laudable or
'iUme worthy. Mr. IjSke seems also to come pretty near to the
dWon whicn I haTo proposed, as appears in the prosecution of
tJ5i discourse of his about our judgments of good and e? il, and
3
choice and practice consequent thereon ; on which sulgect he
many excellent thoughts on morality.
Sxcil^. — What determines the Will to chuse or act*
Let uslRm consideriAi; human will in the common sense of
Up ns that power of the soul whereby we chuse or refuse what is
proposed to the mind. The usual principles which are supposed
by pbiloBophers to be causes of the determination of the will to
act, in chusinc: one thing, or in refusing another, are chiefly these
three, viz. The greatest apparent good as it is discovered to the
mindy or the last dictate of the understandings or the removal of
some uneasiness. Let us consider tliesc three particularly. First,
the greatest apparent good. This does not properly mean moral
good or virtue, but natural good, or that which most conduces
to aur ease, pleasure or happiness. Now this greatest apparent
, natural good as it is d iscovered to the understanding, and consi-
dered as t he cause which certainly influences and determines the
will, doth not differ really from the last assent or dictate of the
understanding* considered in this same view of influence : f or it
b the last assent of the understanding concerning the apparent
goodness of a thing which is supposed to determine the will to
chuse it, and therefore these two are really but one thin|^imder
different names or appearances ; and as such I shall consider
theiD. Now among other evidences or proofs that <Atf greo/ei^
mparent good does not always determine the will to chuse or ad,
1 shall mention but these three :
I. If the greatest apparent good always and necessarily 1|
determines the will to chuse it, t hen the will is never free tri/A n t
liberty of choice or indifference ; f or things placed in such a oer- |
tain -view, or seen in spch a certain light, will necessarily appear
to that individual understanding, and at that time in such a par«
ticular manner, viz. as lit or unfit, as good or evil, as a greater or
* The last Mient of the underttaoding perhmpt it « better tenn» bectait ^
tbe iftit dictate teems to deoote too much of aotioii, whereat Um nadertuadtfC
I
U represtatcd properly %% % pt^uvie ^ii«r.
^
I* | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 463 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | not to be perfectly just, represents it to consist much in a power of delaying the execution of our desires, or suspending the acts of volition or choice, until the man has diligently examined on all sides what is best: Now this no doubt is a very great part of human liberty; and Des Cartes, the French philosopher, with good appearance of reason, makes this power of suspending the acts of the soul to extend to our assent to truth, as well as to the pursuit of good; and therefore he proceeds so far, as to make judgment rather to belong to the will, and to be justly laudable or blame worthy. Mr. Locke seems also to come pretty near to the opinion which I have proposed, as appears in the prosecution of this discourse of his about our judgments of good and evil, and our choice and practice consequent thereon; on which subject he has many excellent thoughts on morality.
Sect II.—What determines the Will to chuse or act.
Let us now consider the human will in the common sense of it, as that power of the soul whereby we chuse or refuse what is proposed to the mind. The usual principles which are supposed by philosophers to be causes of the determination of the will to act, in chusing one thing, or in refusing another, are chiefly these three, viz. The greatest apparent good as it is discovered to the mind, or the last dictate of the understanding, or the removal of some uneasiness. Let us consider these three particularly. First, the greatest apparent good. This does not properly mean moral good or virtue, but natural good, or that which most conduces to our ease, pleasure or happiness. Now this greatest apparent natural good as it is discovered to the understanding, and considered as the cause which certainly influences and determines the will, doth not differ really from the last assent or dictate of the understanding* considered in this same view of influence: for it is the last assent of the understanding concerning the apparent goodness of a thing which is supposed to determine the will to chuse it, and therefore these two are really but one thing under different names or appearances; and as such I shall consider them. Now among other evidences or proofs that the greatest apparent good does not always determine the will to chuse or act, I shall mention but these three:
1. If the greatest apparent good always and necessarily determines the will to chuse it, then the will is never free with a liberty of choice or indifference; for things placed in such a certain view, or seen in such a certain light, will necessarily appear to that individual understanding, and at that time in such a particular manner, viz. as fit or unfit, as good or evil, as a greater or
* The last assent of the understanding perhaps is a better term, because the last dictate seems to denote too much of action, whereas the understanding is represented properly as a passive power. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY 468
iser good ; and conseqaently such appearances to tlie under-
indingy will, according to this hypothesis, necessarily determine
e will to chuse this greatest appearing g^d. And this is ttie
ry scheme of the fatalists, whereby they proT# all human
lions to be necessary, and that there is no such thing as free*
im of choice in any intelligent being whatsoever : And accord-
^ t o this hypothesis, it will not be easy to give a f air and satis-
;tory answer to the arguments which the fatalists bring against
I o ur notions of moral good and evil, if all human actions are ia
is manner necessary : But of this more hereafter.
2. The greatest apparent good does not always detcrmKe
e will ; f or there are many persons convinced that niture happi-
ss pursued in a way of piety and virtue, is really the grealtit
Ltural good : this appears very plain to their understanding,
id yet their will chuscs |)resent sensualities and vicicMk pleasures,
id pursues them in opposition to this greatest a|)|^areut good,
id the last dictate of their understanding about it. The power
the will to chuse and act in this case continues the same after
e last dictate of the understanding as it d id before ; and in
eak and foolish creatures, the will sometimes exerts this power
r a cting and chusing contrary to it, Some indeed will say, that
thiscasctlie mind or understanding being influenced and blind-
I b y sensual appetite, makes a rash judgment, and then the
oderstanding finally dictates, that for this present moment vicious
easure is the greatest good, and is to be prefeiTed ; and so tho
ill pursues it.
But I rather think it is the violence of appetite or passioa
at many times biasses and inclines the will strongly, yet not
!cessarily, to follow vicious pleasure ; and this it does without
tanging the dictate of the understanding, or convictions of the
ind about the greatest apparent good, but rather overpowering
em by present influences ; according to the old poet, video
eliora proboque, deUriora sequor. Ask the vicious man, when
i wills and onuses to pursue his lust contrary to the convictions
' his mind and conscience, whether his conscience be not still
>Dvinced that it is better to pursue virtue, that is, not only
lorally better, or more agreeable to the will of God, but it is
aturaliy better as it condi|ces to a greater natural good, pr final
apiHness : and he will frequently confess it, that considered as a
Eitural good, the practice of virtue, with all its consequences of
iturc or final happiness, ia better than vice with its consequences
f f inal misery : But his strong passions and present appetites
nrry on his will to chuse vice before virtue, and thus contradict
le dictates of the understanding or conscience concerning the
reatest apparent good, botbrnatural and moral. Mr. Lockey in
is Essay J h ook IL chapter 21. sections ^5, 38, 43, 44. talks more
'^piously on this subject^ and confirms what I h ave hcrt exprt^^d. | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 464 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY
and consequently such appearances to the understanding, will, according to this hypothesis, necessarily determine he will to chuse this greatest appearing good. And this is the very scheme of the fatalists, whereby they prove all human actions to be necessary, and that there is no such thing as freedom of choice in any intelligent being whatsoever: And according to this hypothesis, it will not be easy to give a fair and satisfactory answer to the arguments which the fatalists bring against our notions of moral good and evil, if all human actions are in this manner necessary: But of this more hereafter.
2. The greatest apparent good does not always determine he will; for there are many persons convinced that future happiness pursued in a way of piety and virtue, is really the greatest natural good: this appears very plain to their understanding, and yet their will chuses present sensualities and vicious pleasures, and pursues them in opposition to this greatest apparent good, and the last dictate of their understanding about it. The power of the will to chuse and act in this case continues the same after the last dictate of the understanding as it did before; and in weak and foolish creatures, the will sometimes exerts this power acting and chusing contrary to it. Some indeed will say, that this case the mind or understanding being influenced and blinded by sensual appetite, makes a rash judgment, and then the understanding finally dictates, that for this present moment vicious measure is the greatest good, and is to be preferred; and so the will pursues it.
But I rather think it is the violence of appetite or passion at many times biasses and inclines the will strongly, yet not necessarily, to follow vicious pleasure; and this it does without changing the dictate of the understanding, or convictions of the mind about the greatest apparent good, but rather overpowering them by present influences; according to the old poet, video deliora proboque, deteriora sequor. Ask the vicious man, when he will and chuses to pursue his lust contrary to the convictions of his mind and conscience, whether his conscience be not still convinced that it is better to pursue virtue, that is, not only morally better, or more agreeable to the will of God, but it is naturally better as it conduces to a greater natural good, or final happiness: and he will frequently confess it, that considered as a natural good, the practice of virtue, with all its consequences of nature or final happiness, is better than vice with its consequences of final misery: But his strong passions and present appetites curry on his will to chuse vice before virtue, and thus contradict the dictates of the understanding or conscience concerning the greatest apparent good, both natural and moral. Mr. Locke, in his Essay, book II. chapter 21. sections 35, 38, 43, 44. talks more hopelessly on this subject, and confirms what I have here expressed. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
484 FftEEBOM OP WILL.
And let it be considered, that if things be not as I have hert
represented them, but if on the contrary the will citnnot cbuse
Vice unless the last dictate of the understanding determine that
tice is at present the greatest apparent good, or vice in to be pre-
ferred and pursued, and if then the will must obey the under**
■tandingy and chuse sensual vices ; t hen there is no such thing
as sin against the convictions of the mind, or the last dictates of
the understanding : which is a very absurd proposition, and con*
trary to all experience ; and it f rees the criminal from all blame
even in the sight of God who has formed his nature and his powers
in Aia connexion.
3. My last reason to prove that the last dictate of the under-
•tuiding, or the greatest apparent good, does not always deter-
mine the will, is, because sometimes two tiilngs are proposed to
the will, wherein the understanding can give no dictate, because
it sees no mataner of diflTerence, or at least no superior fitness,
nor can possibly represent one as a greater good than anodier;
and here the will cannot be determined by the uuderstaudiog.
Of this I shall say more afterward.
Other philosphers, and particularly Mr, Locke snppom
ttneasiness to be the great principle of all the determinuiiom of
' the nilL See his Essay, book II. chapter 21. section -2i), 33-^
89. But I think it may be proved that the will is not always ue-
Icrmincd by some uneasiness, as I shall shew immediately : yet
by the way I may take notice, that wheresoever uneasiuess doth
determine the will, this docs very little diifer from the former
principle, viz. that it is determined by the greatest a})parert
good ; f or this uneasiness proceeds, as Mr. Locke confesses,
from the absence of some natural good ; and the will determines
itself to pursue this absent good, in order to remove this uueasi'
ness. Tiius it is good apprehended by the mind in its lastdic-
tates, that in these cases is still supposed to determine and direct
the will. Or thus : The removal of this present uneasiness is
itself the greatest apparent good, and if the will be determined
to act thus or thus Ifor the removal of this present uneasiness,
then it is still determined by the greatest apparent good. In the
8:3. and 42. section, Mr. Locke himself grants, that it is g ood
thai determines the xcilly though not immediately ; and his doc-
ti'ine seems to be this, viz. that goody as it is apt to produce ease
and pleasure in Mjt, is the object of our desire ; and tt is this rfe-
sire of goody raided by the present uneasiness in the want of i ty
that dctti-mines the wilL Does it not then follow, that uneasiness '
is the remote mover of the will, and desire of good the proxime
mover of it ? I see no great difference betwixt this and the
I'oinmon opinion, nor ground enough for that great o|>positioB
between liis doctrine in this point, and the common doctrine,
u i nch he sceius lo re^)reseut in two whole sections ; f or in tht | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 465 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | And let it be considered, that if things be not as I have here represented them, but if on the contrary the will cannot chuse vice unless the last dictate of the understanding determine that vice is at present the greatest apparent good, or vice is to be preferred and pursued, and if then the will must obey the understanding, and chuse sensual vices; then there is no such thing as sin against the convictions of the mind, or the last dictates of the understanding: which is a very absurd proposition, and contrary to all experience; and it frees the criminal from all blame even in the sight of God who has formed his nature and his powers in this connexion.
3. My last reason to prove that the last dictate of the understanding, or the greatest apparent good, does not always determine the will, is, because sometimes two things are proposed to the will, wherein the understanding can give no dictate, because it sees no manner of difference, or at least no superior fitness, nor can possibly represent one as a greater good than another; and here the will cannot be determined by the understanding. Of this I shall say more afterward.
Other philosophers, and particularly Mr. Locke supposes uneasiness to be the great principle of all the determinations of the will. See his Essay, book II. chapter 21. section 29, 33—39. But I think it may be proved that the will is not always determined by some uneasiness, as I shall shew immediately: yet by the way I may take notice, that wheresoever uneasiness doth determine the will, this does very little differ from the former principle, viz. that it is determined by the greatest apparent good; for this uneasiness proceeds, as Mr. Locke confesses, from the absence of some natural good; and the will determines itself to pursue this absent good, in order to remove this uneasiness. Thus it is good apprehended by the mind in its last dictates, that in these cases is still supposed to determine and direct the will. Or thus: The removal of this present uneasiness is itself the greatest apparent good, and if the will be determined to act thus or thus for the removal of this present uneasiness, then it is still determined by the greatest apparent good. In the 33. and 42. section, Mr. Locke himself grants, that it is good that determines the will, though not immediately; and his doctrine seems to be this, viz. that good, as it is apt to produce ease and pleasure in us, is the object of our desire; and it is this desire of good, raised by the present uneasiness in the want of it, that determines the will. Does it not then follow, that uneasiness is the remote mover of the will, and desire of good the proxime mover of it? I see no great difference betwixt this and the common opinion, nor ground enough for that great opposition between his doctrine in this point, and the common doctrine, which he seems to represent in two whole sections; for in the | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY. 46^
i^ of the niioji which are instaDtaneous^ and many, sis it w ere,
'c sometimes erouded into a moment, such as an uneasiness
uder the absence of good, and a desire of its presence, &c. it
dtflicult sometimes to say, this or that is first or last : How-
ver in this place it is the view and desire of good is allowed to
e the next and most immediate mover of the will, I thui]^, by
It. Locke's own arguing.
Mr. Lee, in his notes upon Mr. Locke, gives some proba-
te argument^ against his opinion, and proves that uneasiness is
ot the sole motive to voluntary actions. This uneasiness, saith
le, i s a trouble, a kind of pain, a natural evil, and seems rather
0 be the spring of animal actions and of vicious acts, than of
uch as are exercises of virtue, and piety, and charity ; and thus
t i s rather the motive to the wills of the worst or meanest of
oen, than to noble and virtuous spirits. So the fear of evil is
be motive to the vilest of men to various actions and abstinences ;
»ut love to do as well as receive good, moves the best-constituted
3inds. This doctrine of uneasiness seems to govern the actions
f men by the principle of brutes, for they are carried by bun-
er and thirst and uneasiness towards their natural actions : there-
ire it is more honourable and safe to ascribe at least all virtuous
2tions to a diviner principle.
To this, let me add another reason or two, to make it more
rident tliat this uneasiness can never be the universal and con-
ant cause of determining the will. Suppose a man is pleased
id easy, and perfectly satisfied in his present circumstances, be
in his present habitation, in his company, in his manner of
fe, in his trade and business, or any thing else : I would ask,
That is it determines him to will his continuance in these cir-
imstances, his abiding in the same habitation, his conversing
itk the same company, &c. ? Is it any uneasiness that deter-
ines him ? Is it not rather his present easiness and sense of
easure'that moves him to will the continuance of his present
se ? And Mr. Locke confesses this in section' 34. Now I
>u1d ask whether a will to continue be not a vohtion, as well aa
tcill to change.
Again, Is it uneasiness that determines the blessed God,
id all the holy and happy spirits in heaven, to do what they do ?
^ould it not have a profane sound to say, that present uneasi-
«8 determined God to make beasts and men, birds and flowers^'
create a heaven and an earth ? Can we believe tliat present
leasiness determines every angel to chuse and love God the
kief good, or to will the several actions wherein he obeys hi»
Laker, and executes his orders ? Or that it is some present
neasiness that causes the saints in heayen to perform their seve-
il a cts of duty and adoration, or to will their continuance in
In sMTviee and enjoyment of God ? Uyou >kQ yi\c(A^> \V. ^ ■^
Vol, ir. Q a | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 466 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
its of the mind which are instantaneous, and many, as it were, sometimes crowded into a moment, such as an uneasiness under the absence of good, and a desire of its presence, &c. it is difficult sometimes to say, this or that is first or last: Howver in this place it is the view and desire of good is allowed to be the next and most immediate mover of the will, I think, by Mr. Locke's own arguing.
Mr. Lee, in his notes upon Mr. Locke, gives some probable arguments against his opinion, and proves that uneasiness is not the sole motive to voluntary actions. 'This uneasiness, saith he, is a trouble, a kind of pain, a natural evil, and seems rather to be the spring of animal actions and of vicious acts, than of such as are exercises of virtue, and piety, and charity; and thus it is rather the motive to the wills of the worst or meanest of men, than to noble and virtuous spirits. So the fear of evil is the motive to the vilest of men to various actions and abstinences; but love to do as well as receive good, moves the best-constituted minds. 'This doctrine of uneasiness seems to govern the actions of men by the principle of brutes, for they are carried by hunter and thirst and uneasiness towards their natural actions: therefore it is more honourable and safe to ascribe at least all virtuous actions to a diviner principle.
To this, let me add another reason or two, to make it more evident that this uneasiness can never be the universal and constant cause of determining the will. Suppose a man is pleased and easy, and perfectly satisfied in his present circumstances, be in his present habitation, in his company, in his manner of life, in his trade and business, or any thing else: I would ask, What is it determines him to will his continuance in these circumstances, his abiding in the same habitation, his conversing with the same company, &c.? Is it any uneasiness that deterines him? Is it not rather his present easiness and sense of measure that moves him to will the continuance of his present use? And Mr. Locke confesses this in section 34. Now I would ask whether a will to continue be not a volition, as well as will to change.
Again, Is it uneasiness that determines the blessed God, and all the holy and happy spirits in heaven, to do what they do? Would it not have a profane sound to say, that present uneasiness determined God to make beasts and men, birds and flowers, to create a heaven and an earth? Can we believe that present uneasiness determines every angel to chuse and love God the chief good, or to will the several actions wherein he obeys his maker, and executes his orders? Or that it is some present uneasiness that causes the saints in heaven to perform their several acts of duty and adoration, or to will their continuance in the service and enjoyment of God? Upon the whole, it is
Vol. iv. G a | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
460 'FBEEpOU OF WILL.
grantod that these tliree principles, tiz. The greater apparat I
good, the las' dic>ale pJ the understanding, or the removal of l
present vneaiiness, whetiier you 8U|ir>08e tbem distinct or (lie
same, may have a persuasive influence so far as to prevail npM
ancllo incline the ivill of men to fur the greatest part of tbor
volitions or acts of cliuice : But we have proved that these are
not ilic universal and certain or necessary principles of oil the
will's ilcltriiiiimtiuus.
Let us enquire now whether there are not many
wherein llie will is determined neither by present ui
nor by tlie t^eatest apparent good, nor by the lost dictate of the
nnderstandins;, nor by any thing else, but merely by itieif mt
sovereign and self'determhiing power oj theioul: or whether the
eoul does not will tliis or that action in some cases, nut by aay
other influence but because it will, and perhaps to shew ita own
sovereignty or self-deti/rcnining power. Let ua put this cue:
{Suppose I have a mind to prove to an atheist, or a fatalist, thai 1
am a free being, for I c an turn my face to the aoutlt or the north,
I can point wtlh my finger upward or downward, juat as I
jilease, and according as my soul wills ; and that I have a power
to will aiul chuse which of these motions 1 shall perform : N ov
if to demonstrate tliis freedom, 1 determine to move my finga
upward, or turn my face to the north, it is not because I wu
und^r any (iresent uneasiness by Btandint* still without motioa ;
nor was tiie pointing upward or the looking uorthward a grcala
apparent good than looliing to the south or )K>inting downward:
Nor coutd my understanding dictate one rather than the other:
but it w as' a mere arbitrary volition, to shew that I have witUs
nic this self- determining {wwer. And thus in some caaes tin
will determines its own actions in a very sovereign manoer be-
cause itw ill, and without a reason burrowed from the undef-
Slanding ; and hereby it discovers its own perfect power of clioice
arising from within itself, and free from all influence or rcstruat
of any kind. And perhaps this may be aa good a way ta resolTe
aome difficulties that relate to the actions of choice, aad liberty of
tliG will, eithet in God or in man, as any otiier laborious methods
of solution which have not attained the desired success, uor satis-
fied the enquiring part of mankind. I will not deny buttliall
am indebted to archbishop King in his treatise of the Origin t^
£T/V,many years ago, for my ^ rst tlioughts of tliis kind : A nd
in my review of these papers, I am oonlirmcd in these scntimeoH
by an English translation of tliat book in quarto, with ingnu*
ous notes upon it by a writer who conceals his name, printed ia
ITdl*. Though 1 ask leave in some points to differ from tlw
sentiments of the archbishop in that treatise.
* Sioca thi( «■■ vriuen, llwri ii ■aniheT cditioo af that Ironk an orti**.
wlUi nlnabla ■■tpliflcatiant ■od eerrecttou*, aod tha learaed aatbor, Mr. UMif
1", bu DO loDtti coacck\«&b\i auu. | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 467 | 635 | 647.25 | 1,156.5 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | granted that these three principles, viz. The greatest apparent good, the last dictate of the understanding, or the removal of present uneasiness, whether you suppose them distinct or the same, may have a persuasive influence so far as to prevail upon and to incline the will of men to far the greatest part of their volitions or acts of choice: But we have proved that these are not the universal and certain or necessary principles of all the will's determinations.
Let us enquire now whether there are not many instances wherein the will is determined neither by present uneasiness, nor by the greatest apparent good, nor by the last dictate of the understanding, nor by anything else, but merely by itself as a sovereign and self-determining power of the soul: or whether the soul does not will this or that action in some cases, not by any other influence but because it will, and perhaps to show its own sovereignty or self-determining power. Let us put this case: Suppose I have a mind to prove to an atheist, or a fatalist, that I am a free being, for I can turn my face to the south or the north, I can point with my finger upward or downward, just as I please, and according as my soul wills; and that I have a power to will and chuse which of these motions I shall perform: Now if to demonstrate this freedom, I determine to move my finger upward, or turn my face to the north, it is not because I was under any present uneasiness by standing still without motion; nor was the pointing upward or the looking northward a greater apparent good than looking to the south or pointing downward: Nor could my understanding dictate one rather than the other: but it was a mere arbitrary volition, to show that I have within me this self-determining power. And thus in some cases the will determines its own actions in a very sovereign manner because it will, and without a reason borrowed from the understanding; and hereby it discovers its own perfect power of choice arising from within itself, and free from all influence or restraint of any kind. And perhaps this may be as good a way to resolve some difficulties that relate to the actions of choice, and liberty of the will, either in God or in man, as any other laborious methods of solution which have not attained the desired success, nor satisfied the enquiring part of mankind. I will not deny but that I am indebted to archbishop King in his treatise of the Origin of Exil, many years ago, for my first thoughts of this kind: And in my review of these papers, I am confirmed in these sentiments by an English translation of that book in quarto, with ingenuous notes upon it by a writer who conceals his name, printed in 1781*. Though I ask leave in some points to differ from the sentiments of the archbishop in that treatise.
* Since this was written, there is another edition of that book in actus, with valuable amplifications and corrections, and the learned author, Mr. Edward Law, has no longer concealed his name. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY. 467
BiCT. ni. — The Will is a selj'deierminwg Power.
Liet Oft tee whether this doctrine of the telf-determining
wer of the will may not be formed into a regular scheme, at^
ided with irarious advantages, and guarded agailist the most
objections^ in the foUowing manner :
I. In eyery spirit or thinking bein^, whether
rfect or imperfect, finite or innnite, Ihere are two such principles
powers as may properly be distingubhed by our conceptions,
to the understanding and the will. These are by no means to
oonceived as two real substances or proper distinct beinffs ; f or
is p ne and the same spirit that both understands and wills : and
t we haye very clear and distinct ideas of these two principles
powers of agency in ourselves, viz. We have a power of
rceiving and assenting to truth, and of seeing and taking no-
se of t he fitness or unfitness, the goodness or evil of tfajngs ;
b is called the understanding, or sometimes the mind ; A nd
5 h ave also a power of willing or chusing one thing, and refus->
g a nother, of preferring one thing before another, of determining
tr chcNce to one thing rather than another ; and this is called
e will. As we are evidently and strongly conscious of these
»wers in ourselves, so we reasonably ascribe the same lo other
irits, supposing Uiem to be of a similar constitution : And
t are taught also to form the same ideas of God, our Maker,
iNNn tlie light of nature and scripture represent to us as a Spi^
t, and we are made after his imager as well as are his offspring :
ibo iv. 24. Gen. i. 2d. Acts xvii. 28.
II. The eternal reason and nature of things seems to point
it this practical truth to us, or rather this rule of action, viz*
at where a being is possessed of two such powers j one of them,
:. the understandings which perceives (he fitness or unfitness,
<fd or evil of things, should he a director or guide to the other
wer which is active, viz the will, that it may regulate and de-
nnine its actions wisely, and chuse and refuse objects proposed
it according to the fitness or unfitness, good or evil which is
icovered by the understanding : And that wheresoever greater
grees of fitness or goodness are discovered by the understand-
f i n any object, there also the will should determine its choice
ther than to objects les9 fit, or less good.
HI. But where there is no such superior fitness or goodness
things, or where it c annot be discovered by the understanding,
t the objecst which are proposed appear equally fit or good,
ere the will is left without a guide or director : And therefore
must make its own choice only by its own determination, it
ing propc rly a self-determining power. And in such cases tlie
ill d oes as ii were make a good to itself by its own choice, that
» creates its own pleasure or delight in tliis self chosen good ;
ough it be not abstractly and in itself belter, \Vi^\.vs,^\.\<(tt^^\3k.
o g *
I | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 468 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
Exct. III.—The Will is a self-determining Power.
Let us see whether this doctrine of the self-determining power of the will may not be formed into a regular scheme, attended with various advantages, and guarded against the most imidable objections, in the following manner:
Proposition I. In every spirit or thinking being, whether perfect or imperfect, finite or infinite, there are two such principles of powers as may properly be distinguished by our conceptions, to the understanding and the will. These are by no means conceived as two real substances or proper distinct beings; for it is one and the same spirit that both understands and wills: and it we have very clear and distinct ideas of these two principles of powers of agency in ourselves, viz. We have a power of perceiving and assenting to truth, and of seeing and taking notice of the fitness or unfitness, the goodness or evil of things; this is called the understanding, or sometimes the mind: And we have also a power of willing or chusing one thing, and refusing another, of preferring one thing before another, of determining our choice to one thing rather than another; and this is called the will. As we are evidently and strongly conscious of these powers in ourselves, so we reasonably ascribe the same to other spirits, supposing them to be of a similar constitution: And we are taught also to form the same ideas of God, our Maker, from the light of nature and scripture represent to us as a Spirit, and we are made after his image, as well as are his offspring: John iv. 24. Gen. i. 26. Acts xvii. 28.
II. The eternal reason and nature of things seems to point at this practical truth to us, or rather this rule of action, viz. that where a being is possessed of two such powers, one of them, viz. the understanding, which perceives the fitness or unfitness, good or evil of things, should he a director or guide to the other power which is active, viz the will, that it may regulate and determine its actions wisely, and chuse and refuse objects proposed it according to the fitness or unfitness, good or evil which is discovered by the understanding: And that whenever greater degrees of fitness or goodness are discovered by the understanding in any object, there also the will should determine its choice further than to objects less fit, or less good.
III. But where there is no such superior fitness or goodness things, or where it cannot be discovered by the understanding, it the object which are proposed appear equally fit or good, where the will is left without a guide or director: And therefore must make its own choice only by its own determination, it being properly a self-determining power. And in such cases the will does as it were make a good to itself by its own choice, that creates its own pleasure or delight in this self chosen good; though it be not abstractly and in itself better, that is, fitter than | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
168 TKEtDOU 07 WIUU
it wu before: Eren ts m mtn by teixing upon ft i poC of mioo-
cupied Ind in an uninliabited couutfj Biiukei it hb. own pottei^
•ion and prop^ty, and as such rqoioes iu it. Where duoga wert
indifferent before, the will finds nothing to make them mort.
agreeable than they were, considered merely in themaelvcsp i^
sides the |deasure it feels arising from ,ita own chmce^ tad ill
perseverance therein. We lote many things which 'wiBiaf^
chosen, and purely because we chose them. Let us surrej
ihese two casen supposed in the second and third propotitiont a
little more particularly. And, first, let as coosiiter the die
where some supmor fitness or goodness doth appear to the aa*
IV» If the thinking being or spirit be wise or perfect, tkm
it wilt act according to thai eternal rule cf aciiom wkick.rim
from reasQB and the nature of things ; that is, whatsoever tkt
mnderstanding apprehends and judges to have « greater «
superior fitness or goodness in it, the will being goiaed b| A e
Understanding, prefers and determines itself to <muae it, and it*
liiseth the thin^ that appear less fit, as well as those which ire
unfit or evil. This it doth constantly afid certainly, so' far u
the being is wise ; f or this is one chief thing wherein consists tbe
perfection or wisdom of a spirit, viz. to chuse and prefer whit
appears to be fit and good above what is unfit or evil, and shots
chuse that which is better or more fit, above that which has kn
fitness or goodness.
V. Though the will of intelligent beings is generally ud
should be always led or influenced by the greatest fitness aud
goodness of tilings wheresoever it appears to the understandingt
yet it is not necessarily and absolutely determined thereby : f cr
tlie will of an unwise being may possibly determine itself with-'
out regard to the understanding ^ and even co/z/rary to what tbe
mind judges to be fit or good. And it may do this mtay wayiy
Tiz. 4y negligence f b i/ s udden humour, caprice j or tcaniimness:
The will through these infiuences may suddenly and rashly pre-
fer evil to good, er that which is less tit to what is more fit. Or
the will may be tempted and led away to chuse what is not really
good, by the enticing and soliciting powers of strong appetite
and passion, contrary to the judgment of the understauding.
ft is true indeed, the will may chuse and determine to resist those
importunate passions, but it is true also that it may obey them
Without regarding the mind, or in opposition to the better die*
tates of the understanding : For though the mind is given us for
a director or adviser j t/et 7iot as an absolute lord or ruler. It i f
t'le will that is properly the moral principle or agent within i»>
the proper subject of virtue or vice, and therefore it must be a
free and a self-determining power, aud must chus6 of itself, whe-
ther itw ill follow leasQu or ap{)etite, judgment or passion. And
— — ^' - | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 469 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | it was before: Even as a man by seizing upon a spot of unoccupied land in an uninhabited country makes it his own possession and property, and as such rejoices in it. Where things were indifferent before, the will finds nothing to make them more agreeable than they were, considered merely in themselves, besides the pleasure it feels arising from its own choice, and its perseverance therein. We love many things which we have chosen, and purely because we chose them. Let us survey these two cases supposed in the second and third propositions a little more particularly. And, first, let us consider the case where some superior fitness or goodness doth appear to the understanding.
IV. If the thinking being or spirit be wise or perfect, then it will act according to that eternal rule of action which rises from reason and the nature of things; that is, whatsoever the understanding apprehends and judges to have a greater or superior fitness or goodness in it, the will being guided by the understanding, prefers and determines itself to chuse it, and refuses the things that appear less fit, as well as those which are unfit or evil. This it doth constantly and certainly, so far as the being is wise; for this is one chief thing wherein consists the perfection or wisdom of a spirit, viz. to chuse and prefer what appears to be fit and good above what is unfit or evil, and also to chuse that which is better or more fit, above that which has less fitness or goodness.
V. Though the will of intelligent beings is generally and should be always led or influenced by the greatest fitness and goodness of things wheresoever it appears to the understanding, yet it is not necessarily and absolutely determined thereby: for the will of an unwise being may possibly determine itself without regard to the understanding, and even contrary to what the mind judges to be fit or good. And it may do this many ways, viz. by negligence, by sudden humour, caprice, or wantonness: The will through these influences may suddenly and rashly prefer evil to good, or that which is less fit to what is more fit. Or the will may be tempted and led away to chuse what is not really good, by the enticing and soliciting powers of strong appetite and passion, contrary to the judgment of the understanding. It is true indeed, the will may chuse and determine to resist those importunate passions, but it is true also that it may obey them without regarding the mind, or in opposition to the better dictates of the understanding: For though the mind is given us for a director or adviser, yet not as an absolute lord or ruler. It is the will that is properly the moral principle or agent within us, the proper subject of virtue or vice, and therefore it must be a free and a self-determining power, and must chuse of itself, whether it will follow season or appetite, judgment or passion. And | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
. . A N ESSAY. iSJt
herefore it isy <faat whensoever the will determines contrary to
he dictates of the understanding or conscience, it is botii ufiwise
\ud highly criminate because such a spirit acts directly con-
rary to the light or law of nature, the great rule of reason, and
he appearing fitness of things : And this gives just occasion to
harp reproaches and torments of conscience, when the will has
letermiued contrary to the dictates of conscience, that is, of the
indefstanding.
VI. Though sins against conscience are too frequently com*
littcd, yet the chief reason why imperfect beings so ofteuchuse
nfit or evil things, and prefer them to what are fit and good, is
ot merely from this negligent humour, or a wanton and capri*
ous turn of tlie will, or the mere compliance witli violent appe«
te or passion in determining its choice contrary to appearing fit^
esa or goodness, as represented by the understanding ; b ut it
rises perhaps most frequently from the wtderstandingj appre*
mding ana judging some ihitigs to be fit or good upon a
ight view of them^ which really are not so, and from the will's
tcUnation or wish, through the false bias of appetite or passion,
lat such a thing slwula be fit and goody before mature exa^
lioation, and from its determining to search no farther ; the
ill precipitates the judgment, hurries it into error, and acts
ud chuses rashly upon present slight appearances. And indee<l
I this case the will, which might yet longer suspend the judg-
lent by putting the understanding upon a farther search, 'is
riminal in permitting a judgment to pass on things upon such
light appearances of fitness or goodness, and determining its
hoice according to them, instead of delay, and further seai*ch
nd enquiry.
Mankind, of whom I chiefly speak here, are often led
Atray in this mstter by the false representations which passion
jid appetite, sense and fancy make of things to the understand-
ng. We commit many mistakes about the fitness or good-
less of tilings, bt/ seeing them in a deceiving situationy in a
afse lights and under a disguise; by beholding things but in
tart and in an imj)erfect manner, by the numerous prejudices
»f many kinds that lead imperfect creatures astray in their judg-
Dent of things. And we are generally too ready to pass a
ash and hasty judgment and determination of what is fit aiid
rood, before a tliorough examination. We soon grow weary
»f a state of suspense and doubt about the fitness or goodness of
hiogs : and there is often found an impatience in the will to
ietennine itself one way or another with speed, as well as an
nclioation that such a thing should appear fit and good ^c-
»ording to the bias of sense and ajipetitc ; and thus it o ften chuses
lul instead of good,
YII. Indeed, if wa happen to pass a false judgment from
G g 3
1 | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 470 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
therefore it is, that whensoever the will determines contrary to the dictates of the understanding or conscience, it is both unwise and highly criminal, because such a spirit acts directly contrary to the light or law of nature, the great rule of reason, and the appearing fitness of things: And this gives just occasion to harp reproaches and torments of conscience, when the will has determined contrary to the dictates of conscience, that is, of the understanding.
VI. Though sins against conscience are too frequently committed, yet the chief reason why imperfect beings so often chuse infit or evil things, and prefer them to what are fit and good, is not merely from this negligent humour, or a wanton and capricious turn of the will, or the mere compliance with violent appetite or passion in determining its choice contrary to appearing fitness or goodness, as represented by the understanding; but it arises perhaps most frequently from the understanding, apprehending and judging some things to be fit or good upon a right view of them, which really are not so, and from the will's declination or wish, through the false bias of appetite or passion, that such a thing should be fit and good, before mature examination, and from its determining to search no farther; the will precipitates the judgment, hurries it into error, and acts and chuses rashly upon present slight appearances. And indeed in this case the will, which might yet longer suspend the judgment by putting the understanding upon a farther search, is criminal in permitting a judgment to pass on things upon such light appearances of fitness or goodness, and determining its choice according to them, instead of delay, and further search and enquiry.
Mankind, of whom I chiefly speak here, are often led astray in this matter by the false representations which passion and appetite, sense and fancy make of things to the understanding. We commit many mistakes about the fitness or goodness of things, by seeing them in a deceiving situation, in a false light, and under a disguise; by beholding things but in heart and in an imperfect manner, by the numerous prejudices of many kinds that lead imperfect creatures astray in their judgment of things. And we are generally too ready to pass a dash and hasty judgment and determination of what is fit and good, before a thorough examination. We soon grow weary of a state of suspense and doubt about the fitness or goodness of things: and there is often found an impatience in the will to determine itself one way or another with speed, as well as an inclination that such a thing should appear fit and good according to the bias of sense and appetite; and thus it often chuses still instead of good.
VII. Indeed, if we happen to pass a false judgment from | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
i70 FREEDOM 6t WILL.
the mere imperfection of our natural capadties, or under the in-
fluence of auy of tliese prejudicea which we had no manner of
means nor power to resist or subdue ; this mistake of judgmeot,
and the unliappy choice of tlie will according to it, seem to be
innocent, and merit no blame. But when we give up ourseWes
to a rash determination of judgment or choice under such preja-
dices as might be resisted, or when we yield to this impatieoeeof
the will, and wilfully neglect a further search where we might
have justly delayed, and searched further, and by this means our
tfill prefers real evil to good, or chuses thin^ less fit before
things which are more fit, we herein become culpable : And this
faultincss hath greater or less degrees, according to the difierent
opportunities, advantages and capacities we had to examine
judge and chuse aright
And let it be observed, that as unwise spirits determine
aibiss in their judgment and choice of things, through haste or
rashness f or through a sudden and strong h\9L%oi appetite orpas*
sioHy Sfc, so a spirit which is w ise may, through unwatchfulness, suf-
fer itself to be betrayed into such a rash and false judgment, and
such an unhappy and criminal action, and chuse evil instead of
J;ood. A nd pcriiaps this was the true spring of the fail of wan
rowi his state of innocevcey and the entrance of s in into the uorld.
Hitherto we have spoken chiefly concerning the detenninatioD
and choice of the will in those cases wliere the uuderstandini^ re-
presents one thing as fitter and better than another : But K-t us
now consider the case supposed in the third proposition, where
there is no such superior fitness or goodness, or where it doth it
not appear to the understanding.
VIII. There may be several things proposed to the under-
standing even of a wise and knowing, but imperfect spirit, where-
in the superior fitness or unfitness is concealed, and doth not suf-
ficiently appear to the understanding, so as to give any jostaiKi
certain direction to the will, which of them to chuse or refuse. In
some cases it is plain that the understanding, after all proper
surveys and enquiries, is left in perfect suspense about the greater
or lesser fitness of things, and the will may be perfectly indiffer-
ent to t hem : And yet the will may without fault or folly deter-
mine itself to chuse the one or tlie other ; as for instance, if I
am hungry, and two pieces of bread, or two cakea lie before me,
which appear to be equally good for food, at equal distance from me,
and in ail other circumstances have no discernabic inequality, so
that I am entirely indifferent to either of them in particular, yet
luy will may determine itself to chuse and eat one of them to
satisfy my hunger : but which of tlie two I shall chuse must be
determined by the mere act of my will, for I c annot stay ao hour
in suspense and trifling enquiries. Perhaps one of these picoes
ft bread might be really in itself much fitter &r oay nouriskmeot | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 471 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | the mere imperfection of our natural capacities, or under the influence of any of these prejudices which we had no manner of means nor power to resist or subdue; this mistake of judgment, and the unhappy choice of the will according to it, seem to be innocent, and merit no blame. But when we give up ourselves to a rash determination of judgment or choice under such prejudices as might be resisted, or when we yield to this impatience of the will, and wilfully neglect a further search where we might have justly delayed, and searched further, and by this means our will prefers real evil to good, or chuses things less fit before things which are more fit, we herein become culpable: And this faultiness hath greater or less degrees, according to the different opportunities, advantages and capacities we had to examine, judge and chuse aright.
And let it be observed, that as unwise spirits determine affess in their judgment and choice of things, through haste or rashness, or through a sudden and strong bias of appetite or passion, &c. so a spirit which is wise may, through unwatchfulness, suffer itself to be betrayed into such a rash and false judgment, and such an unhappy and criminal action, and chuse evil instead of good. And perhaps this was the true spring of the fall of man from his state of innocence, and the entrance of sin into the world. Hitherto we have spoken chiefly concerning the determination and choice of the will in those cases where the understanding represents one thing as fitter and better than another: But let us now consider the case supposed in the third proposition, where there is no such superior fitness or goodness, or where it doth it not appear to the understanding.
VIII. There may be several things proposed to the understanding even of a wise and knowing, but imperfect spirit, wherein the superior fitness or unsitness is concealed, and doth not sufficiently appear to the understanding, so as to give any just and certain direction to the will, which of them to chuse or refuse. In some cases it is plain that the understanding, after all proper surveys and enquiries, is left in perfect suspense about the greater or lesser fitness of things, and the will may be perfectly indifferent to them: And yet the will may without fault or folly determine itself to chuse the one or the other; as for instance, if I am hungry, and two pieces of bread, or two cakes lie before me, which appear to be equally good for food, at equal distance from me, and in all other circumstances have no discernable inequality, so that I am entirely indifferent to either of them in particular, yet my will may determine itself to chuse and eat one of them to satisfy my hunger: but which of the two I shall chuse must be determined by the mere act of my will, for I cannot stay an hour in suspense and trifling enquiries. Perhaps one of these pieces of bread might be really in itself much fitter for my nourishment | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN EflfiAY. 471
I t he otlier; or, perfaapt there might be secret poison in the
and not in the other ; b ut I knew it not ; t hey were equal to
D appearance, and therefore was not led to determine my choice
ny superior appearance of fitness or goodness ; yet my will
rmined itself to chuse one of them because it is a self-deter*
ing power, and hath perfect freedom of choice within itself :
herein there is nothing foolish or criminal, even though I
lid happen to be poisoned by it, by taking that piece wTiich
unfit for my nourishment.
IX. As there may be several things proposed to a very wise
intelligent being, wherein he can discern no superior fitness
^dness, so there may be some things proposed wherein
c is really no superior fitness or goodness at all ; yet it may be
t particular seasons that dne of them should be chosen. This
common case ; as when two brick^ suppose them called A
B, lie before a builder, which are equally fit to fill up such
icaixcy in the wall, and both lie equally near his liana, and
equal in every other appearing circumstance ; the builder
it not stay an hour to debate with himself, and to determine
sh brick to chuse for filling up this vacancy ; that wouhl b«
f i ndeed : But his will freely and of itself xshuses the brick
merely because he will, and leaves B, or refuses it : Then,
hinted before, this brick A becomes so far better by hischus-*
it, as that he approves of it in its place in the builmng above
other, and delights in his own choice or work. Or take
ther instance : Suppose a man be desired to shew liis power
self-determination, or of pointing with liis finger, and he
Its to the North, or to the East, to the heavens or to the
.h ; here is no superior fitness or unfitness in tlic one or the
T, but he points upward, or nortliward as he pleases ; h is
determines for no other reason but because he will, and
eby shews his own self-determining power in all this ; though
t perfectly arbitrary, yet there is nothing foolish or faulty.
We may find instances of this kind in moral actions as well as
ira] ' Suppose Qod requires Abraham to offer a lamb out of
flock in sacrifice, and Abraham taking a survey of the twenty
»t lambs of his jloiqk, cannot find which is the best of them ;
own will must /inally determine and chuse any one of them
the altar. Or let it be supposed that I have ten farthings in
purse, and I meet with a dozen beggars, all so equally poor
miserable, that I c annot discern which is the most or which
iie least indigent : I must necessarily leave two of these mea
of my distribution, but my understanding cannot direct me
ch these two are, nor can it tell me which are the ten fittest
^sof my charity. What can determine my choice here but
own will by its self-determining power ? The understanding
uch instances as these, has no pretence of power to direct or | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 472 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
471
In the other; or, perhaps there might be secret poison in the and not in the other; but I knew it not; they were equal to appearance, and therefore was not led to determine my choice any superior appearance of fitness or goodness; yet my will remained itself to chuse one of them because it is a self-deterring power, and hath perfect freedom of choice within itself: wherein there is nothing foolish or criminal, even though I would happen to be poisoned by it, by taking that piece which unfit for my nourishment.
IX. As there may be several things proposed to a very wise intelligent being, wherein he can discern no superior fitness goodness, so there may be some things proposed wherein he is really no superior fitness or goodness at all; yet it may be at particular seasons that one of them should be chosen. This common case; as when two bricks, suppose them called A and B, lie before a builder, which are equally fit to fill up such vacancy in the wall, and both lie equally near his hand, and equal in every other appearing circumstance; the builder not stay an hour to debate with himself, and to determine each brick to chuse for filling up this vacancy; that would be indeed: But his will freely and of itself chuses the brick merely because he will, and leaves B, or refuses it: Then, hinted before, this brick A becomes so far better by his chus-it, as that he approves of it in its place in the building above other, and delights in his own choice or work. Or take other instance: Suppose a man be desired to shew his power self-determination, or of pointing with his finger, and he puts to the North, or to the East, to the heavens or to the earth; here is no superior fitness or unsitness in the one or the other, but he points upward, or northward as he pleases; his determines for no other reason but because he will, and thereby shews his own self-determining power in all this; though perfectly arbitrary, yet there is nothing foolish or faulty.
We may find instances of this kind in moral actions as well as natural: Suppose God requires Abraham to offer a lamb out of flock in sacrifice, and Abraham taking a survey of the twenty best lambs of his flock, cannot find which is the best of them; own will must finally determine and chuse any one of them the altar. Or let it be supposed that I have ten earthings in purse, and I meet with a dozen beggars, all so equally poor miserable, that I cannot discern which is the most or which the least indigent: I must necessarily leave two of these men of my distribution, but my understanding cannot direct me such these two are, nor can it tell me which are the ten fittest acts of my charity. What can determine my choice here but own will by its self-determining power? The understanding much instances as these, has no pretence of power to direct or | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
472 FREEDOM 09 l¥ILt.
determine the Trill, because it sees no sqperior fitnets, and the
will would be for ever undetermined, ii it did not determiiiB
itself.
Sect. IV. — IIow the Will of God determines itself.
Now let us try to apply these things to the great and blessed
God in his counsels and actions ; always remembering, that
when we speak of these divine and unsearchable themes, wc do
not pretend nor assume so much as to determine that things muat
be literally just so transacted in the divine counsels, but that we
speak of God as acting according to the manner of men, and so
hit as our ideas can reach those sublimities.
X. The great God, whose understanding is perfect, sees
all the real and possible fitnesses and unfitnesses, good or evil,
which are in things, as tlicy arc contained in liis own eternal
ideas : lie beholds all that is fit or unfit, whether the things
themselves are actually existent, or only possible, because he
aees all the infinite relations of things to one another, with all
their consequences, in a simultaneous and comprehensive view.
—Here note, that I do not meddle with the debate whether
there can be any fitness or goodness in things antecedent to or
abstracted from the being of a God. Had there not been a God,
there had never actually existed such real fitnesses, nor such
ideas at all. Yet it is certain we may conceive of such fitnesses
antecedently to our conception of the being of a God. This is
plain and evident, that God is eternal, and his ideas are eternal,
and these fitnesses of things also are eternal : and perhaps
these fitnesses of things can have no original existence nor
eternity but in the divine ideas, and consequently are included in
the unchangeable nature of God.
And this is one argument whereby, as I remember, the late
ingenious Mr. Xorris someuhere proves tlie being of a God, viz.
tliut there are certain eternal truths or propositions, natural, ma*
then.atical and moral, such as, thne and three viakesix\ tuo
parallel lines Tci/l never meet ; the xchole is greater than any of
its parts ; and (iod is to be honoured by his intelligent creatures.
Now these eternal unchangeable truths are not a mere nothing,
and therefore thev must iiavc an eternal existence somewhere,
and this cannot I)o \n\i in some eternal mind which is God. But
however that matter be resolved, this is certain, that all these
eternal fitnesses lio open to the divine mind, and are part of his
unchani;eable ideas, which is all that my present argiunent
requires.
XI. ^Vhen we consider or speak of the decrees of God, or
his dotermiiiations what he will do, or what he will not do, wp
are constrainevl tv> ucknowlede^e tliat his will alwavs chuses and de-
tcnnines to net what is fit and good : that is, i n our way of conceiv-
ing, wlieresocvcr there is an eternal fitness or unfitness, good or | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 473 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | determine the will, because it sees no superior fitness, and the will would be for ever undetermined, if it did not determine itself.
Sect. IV.—How the Will of God determines itself.
Now let us try to apply these things to the great and blessed God in his counsels and actions; always remembering, that when we speak of these divine and unsearchable themes, we do not pretend nor assume so much as to determine that things must be literally just so transacted in the divine counsels, but that we speak of God as acting according to the manner of men, and so far as our ideas can reach those sublimities.
X. The great God, whose understanding is perfect, sees all the real and possible fitnesses and unfitnesses, good or evil, which are in things, as they are contained in his own eternal ideas: He beholds all that is fit or unfit, whether the things themselves are actually existent, or only possible, because he sees all the infinite relations of things to one another, with all their consequences, in a simultaneous and comprehensive view.
Here note, that I do not meddle with the debate whether there can be any fitness or goodness in things antecedent to or abstracted from the being of a God. Had there not been a God, there had never actually existed such real fitnesses, nor such ideas at all. Yet it is certain we may conceive of such fitnesses antecedently to our conception of the being of a God. This is plain and evident, that God is eternal, and his ideas are eternal, and these fitnesses of things also are eternal: and perhaps these fitnesses of things can have no original existence nor eternity but in the divine ideas, and consequently are included in the unchangeable nature of God.
And this is one argument whereby, as I remember, the late ingenious Mr. Norris somewhere proves the being of a God, viz. that there are certain eternal truths or propositions, natural, mathematical and moral, such as, three and three make six; two parallel lines will never meet; the whole is greater than any of its parts; and God is to be honoured by his intelligent creatures. Now these eternal unchangeable truths are not a mere nothing, and therefore they must have an eternal existence somewhere, and this cannot be but in some eternal mind which is God. But however that matter be resolved, this is certain, that all these eternal fitnesses lie open to the divine mind, and are part of his unchangeable ideas, which is all that my present argument requires.
XI. When we consider or speak of the decrees of God, or his determinations what he will do, or what he will not do, we are constrained to acknowledge that his will always chuses and determines to act what is fit and good: that is, in our way of conceiving, wheresoever there is an eternal fitness or unfitness, good or | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY
47»
ivil io thiogtf he always dctermiDes to act aocording^ to this fit-
lessy. and Uiia goodness ; f or to act au unfit thing would be un-
vise, and to act a thing which is evil, would not be good ;
vhereas the blessed God is perfectly wise and perfectly good in
11 bis works and his decrees, in bis creation and providence, and
ro¥ernment of the world ; h e is faithful to his promises, he is
ighteous and jiuf in his determinations, he is kind in bis con-
luct towards his creatures so far as the rules of wisdom and
ustice admit : N or is it possible that God should be or act other-
vise than according to thU fitness, where there is any fitness or
roodnessin things, since these eternal and unchangeable fitnesses
sxist in his ideas, and for God to act agi^inst them, would be
mfit and unwise, aud unbecoming the character and nature of
I G od.
JCII. For the same reason his will exerting itself in a way
)f government, determines all the rules of moral virtue and
nety for the practice of his creatures, according to the original
ind eternal fitness of things, wheresoever there is such an eternal
itneas. As for instance, that God our Creator is io behonoured,
md loved, and worshipped, and obeyed; that promises and con^
tracts are to befuljilied; that one man must not take awajf
mother mtin^s life o r property by force or fraud, S^cJ All which
ire moral propositions of eternal truth.
XIII. (sod has made these moral rules kntfirn to men to he
hi9 will two ways, viz. by reason and by revelation. I. Bt/ rea*
son, that is, by forming their natural powers of thinking and
reasoning in such a manner, that when they set themselves to a
Careful and due consideration of the relation of God to his crea-
tures, and of creatures to one another, they cannot but infer
these propositions to be true, and to be most proper rules to
govern their practice||^ and that God, who lias formed their rea-
soning powers in this manner, has hereby made these things their
duty. As our reason is so formed, that in natural things it is
impossible we should judge otherwise than that three and three
make six, or the whole is greater than a part : so in moral things
we cannot judge otherwise, when we have the idea of a GckJ,
than that God our Maker is io be honoured and worshipped, l^'c.
And when our reason judges tlius, then it appears to he the will
of God, and we are obliged to perform and ohey it as our
Maker's will.
2. By revelation, or scripture, God has also manifested
these rules of moral virtue or natural religion, and thus con*
firmed the law of nature or dictates of reason, and given a dou-
ble discovery of these duties to those who live where this rcvela-
^on is published, and a double obligation to the performance of
them* Here let it be observed, that I enter not into the contro'j-
- W hether these moral propositions about eternal fitnc^^ | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 474 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY
evil in things, he always determines to act according to this fitness, and this goodness; for to act an unfit thing would be unwise, and to act a thing which is evil, would not be good; whereas the blessed God is perfectly wise and perfectly good in all his works and his decrees, in his creation and providence, and government of the world; he is faithful to his promises, he is righteous and just in his determinations, he is kind in his conduct towards his creatures so far as the rules of wisdom and justice admit: Nor is it possible that God should be or act otherwise than according to this fitness, where there is any fitness or goodness in things, since these eternal and unchangeable fitnesses exist in his ideas, and for God to act against them, would be unfit and unwise, and unbecoming the character and nature of God.
XII. For the same reason his will exerting itself in a way of government, determines all the rules of moral virtue and society for the practice of his creatures, according to the original and eternal fitness of things, wheresoever there is such an eternal fitness. As for instance, that God our Creator is to be honoured, and loved, and worshipped, and obeyed; that promises and contracts are to be fulfilled; that one man must not take away another man's life or property by force or fraud, &c.' All which are moral propositions of eternal truth.
XIII. God has made these moral rules known to men to be his will two ways, viz. by reason and by revelation. 1. By reason, that is, by forming their natural powers of thinking and reasoning in such a manner, that when they set themselves to a careful and due consideration of the relation of God to his creatures, and of creatures to one another, they cannot but infer these propositions to be true, and to be most proper rules to govern their practice and that God, who has formed their reasoning powers in this manner, has hereby made these things their duty. As our reason is so formed, that in natural things it is impossible we should judge otherwise than that three and three make six, or the whole is greater than a part: so in moral things we cannot judge otherwise, when we have the idea of a God, than that God our Maker is to be honoured and worshipped, &c. And when our reason judges thus, then it appears to be the will of God, and we are obliged to perform and obey it as our Maker's will.
2. By revelation, or scripture, God has also manifested these rules of moral virtue or natural religion, and thus confirmed the law of nature or dictates of reason, and given a double discovery of these duties to those who live where this revelation is published, and a double obligation to the performance of them. Here let it be observed, that I enter not into the controversy, Whether these moral propositions about eternal fitnesses | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
HIA msiKm 0w mum
of tUnpfi wooM hate Ae fiNnoe tif lawi, tad eurj^ nrpiffMr
^blintuMi with than apoo the mind and wiOof rmui xridwiittht
conuderatioB of the existeooe of God, and of his will thus fbuad
out bv oar reaaooinif powers. I am rather inclined to think tbal
it it the will of God a» maaiferted by reaeoA or revelatiooy wlndi
lajF* t he true and proper nidral dbUgalion on the praotioe of ia*
telligettt oreetnree ; b ut I avoid the embirrampg my pretoit
nshmie of thousfatt with that dbpute. It is evident enoogli,
Ibat in the grand linep of moral virtue and piety there are thae
eternal fitnetees ; and our reasoning powers, when they hsTs
fmnd oat the being of a God, and our relation to him, must $k^
tMknowledge they are so far the will of God, that we are obliged
to practise aooording to these moral fitnesses, these eternal rules
oi virtue.
XIV. But there may be several things supposed to come
vriHun the view of the divine mind, or the understanding ot flod,
considered as a Creator, which have no real fitness or goodneM
in themselves, or at least which have all an equal fitness or eqssl
goodness to answer any general or special design of God : A sd
if they are considered in all the various relations in which tbey
stand either to God himself, or to oltier tbiogs in the universe^
Aere is no real superior fitness or goodness in any of them absve
the rest, so that they appear perfectly indifferent in the difint
ifleas. Now i^bauch instances the will of God, as a soverdgo
agent, has no determination from his own ideas, and therefiNV
in and of itself determines itself to chuse one thing and not^
another ; and, as it were, makes that thing good, that is, m akes
it pleasing to himself, by his own determination or choice of it
Wheresoever the infinite knowledge of God sees no goodoen
nor evil in the ideas of things themselves, be can make them IQ
far good by fixing his own free will and chpice upon them, that
thev then are agreeable and pleasing because of bis free choice,
which before were entirely indifferent,. And I think we may,
without injury to the dignity of godhead, suppose him to be
better pleased now with those his works which he has sctusllf
wrougntor determined into actual existence^ than with those
which he has left in the state of mere possibilitj/^ though antece*
dent to this determination they might be both equally fit or good.
And indeed there seems to be a great number of instsnces
of this kind relating to God and his works : as, What sort of
aystem of beings be would make, and whether minds, bodies, or
both ? What should be the precise shape, and what the precise
place of every corporeal being in the world? Whether tliis whole
universe, or the sun in our system, should have one atom io it
more or less ? Whether the w hole or any part of it should haie
been created one moment sooner or later ? Io what precise spot
of our solar world Jupiter or Satanic or any of their sateliitut | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 475 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | of things would have the force of laws, and carry any proper obligation with them upon the mind and will of man without the consideration of the existence of God, and of his will thus found out by our reasoning powers. I am rather inclined to think that it is the will of God as manifested by reason or revelation, which lays the true and proper moral obligation on the practice of intelligent creatures; but I avoid the embarrassing my present scheme of thoughts with that dispute. It is evident enough, that in the grand lines of moral virtue and piety there are these eternal fitnesses; and our reasoning powers, when they have found out the being of a God, and our relation to him, must also acknowledge they are so far the will of God, that we are obliged to practise according to these moral fitnesses, these eternal rules of virtue.
XIV. But there may be several things supposed to come within the view of the divine mind, or the understanding of God, considered as a Creator, which have no real fitness or goodness in themselves, or at least which have all an equal fitness or equal goodness to answer any general or special design of God: And if they are considered in all the various relations in which they stand either to God himself, or to other things in the universe, there is no real superior fitness or goodness in any of them above the rest, so that they appear perfectly indifferent in the divine ideas. Now in such instances the will of God, as a sovereign agent, has no determination from his own ideas, and therefore in and of itself determines itself to chuse one thing and not another; and, as it were, makes that thing good, that is, makes it pleasing to himself, by his own determination or choice of it. Wheresoever the infinite knowledge of God sees no goodness nor evil in the ideas of things themselves, he can make them so far good by fixing his own free will and choice upon them, that they then are agreeable and pleasing because of his free choice, which before were entirely indifferent. And I think we may, without injury to the dignity of godhead, suppose him to be better pleased now with those his works which he has actually wrought or determined into actual existence, than with those which he has left in the state of mere possibility, though antecedent to this determination they might be both equally fit or good.
And indeed there seems to be a great number of instances of this kind relating to God and his works: as, What sort of system of beings he would make, and whether minds, bodies, or both? What should be the precise shape, and what the precise place of every corporeal being in the world? Whether this whole universe, or the sun in our system, should have one atom in it more or less? Whether the whole or any part of it should have been created one moment sooner or later? In what precise spot of our solar world Jupiter or Saturn, or any of their satellites | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN BSSAY. 475
T this earth or its moon should be first placed ; or whether any
f tbem should haTe one particle of matter more or less in them,
ban they have, or this or that particle lie in any other situation i
Vbether this single atom of mould or clay should be part of the
;lebe at Taunton or Yorkf or whether this grain of sand or peb-
ile should be found on the shore of Deal or Dover j or on the
onM»o( Jfrica or the East Indies'f* Whether this particle of
rater should belong to the Severn or the Thames^ or should be
lowing this moment in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean Sea ;
r whether this particle of air shoaUl be found in Essex, or
Hertfordshire^ or in America on this day, this hour, and this
eoond of time ? On what particular branch sueh a bird should
it at such a minute, and what nfotes it should sing ; and how
lany leaves should grew on such a bough, and how many in-
entings on the edge of every leaf ; h ow ifiany colours should
^low on the cheek of such a tulip, or yollow seeds lie in the
K>som of a rose ; whether this particulur human soul should be
iDited to a body born in Lapland or Russia^ Britain or China ;
»r this child shQuld be created for a tall stfKure or a dwarf, or be
wrought intQ the world in the seventh or seventeenth century ;
vbetber Uiis^drop of rain should fall upon a ploughed field or a
ock, or this briglit sun-beam sliould light on me or my neigh-
bour, on the earth or the moon : And perhaps ten thousand
>ther things, and that of much greater importance in their con-
leqaences, may have no superior fitness or unfitness in them-
lelves, but arc all equal and all indifferent. And here the will
if God, by and of itself, as a free and sovereign power, deter-
mines itself in its choice, and as it were makes it so far more
igreeablc and good to himself by his own choice and detcrmina-
Lion, and he delights in his own will and purpose, and in t}|6
correspondent workyf his hands.
XV. When God out of mere sovereignty and good pleasure
hath determined by his will to chuse and create one sort of world
or system of things out of two or two thousand which perhaps
were equally fit, or to make this or that sort of creatures in this
world ; h e then may be said to be led by the nature and relations
of those things, and by consequential proper fitnesses which be-
long to t hat Kystem, or to those creatures, to determine those
things of a natural or moral kind, which are proper for those
creatures, or for that system, As for instance : Supposing just
such a world to be created as ours is, then perhaps consequently
it must have such laws of motion : Or, if mau be created eic-
* I have dwelt too long perpapt on inch ntnuteftnd iocoosiderable ioftances
ai tfaeie; but 1 did it partly to iutimate how uuiverially the great God in laid
poder pecciMry and nioote lioiitatiOD9, if theie tbiogs vere not indiflferent ; a nd
panly to give occasion to diffuse our thoughti into like iosiaocet in the animate,
human, and angelic woridf, which perbapi are as little and iodiffereAt in the
uiceiQ of Ood, »a tbes« minute incooiiderablei are in out t«Vfiv.m, | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 476 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
or this earth or its moon should be first placed; or whether any of them should have one particle of matter more or less in them, than they have, or this or that particle lie in any other situation? Whether this single atom of mould or clay should be part of the glebe at Taunton or York, or whether this grain of sand or pebble should be found on the shore of Deal or Dover, or on the coasts of Africa or the East Indies?* Whether this particle of water should belong to the Severn or the Thames, or should be flowing this moment in the Atlantic or the Mediterranean Sea; or whether this particle of air should be found in Essex, or Hertfordshire, or in America on this day, this hour, and this second of time? On what particular branch such a bird should sit at such a minute, and what notes it should sing; and how many leaves should grow on such a bough, and how many indentings on the edge of every leaf; how many colours should glow on the cheek of such a tulip, or yellow seeds lie in the bosom of a rose; whether this particular human soul should be limited to a body born in Lapland or Russia, Britain or China; or this child should be created for a tall stature or a dwarf, or be brought into the world in the seventh or seventeenth century; whether this drop of rain should fall upon a ploughed field or a rock, or this bright sun-beam should light on me or my neighbour, on the earth or the moon: And perhaps ten thousand other things, and that of much greater importance in their consequences, may have no superior fitness or unfitness in themselves, but are all equal and all indifferent. And here the will of God, by and of itself, as a free and sovereign power, determines itself in its choice, and as it were makes it so far more agreeable and good to himself by his own choice and determination, and he delights in his own will and purpose, and in the correspondent works of his hands.
XV. When God out of mere sovereignty and good pleasure determined by his will to chuse and create one sort of world or system of things out of two or two thousand which perhaps were equally fit, or to make this or that sort of creatures in this world; he then may be said to be led by the nature and relations of those things, and by consequential proper fitnesses which belong to that system, or to those creatures, to determine those things of a natural or moral kind, which are proper for those creatures, or for that system. As for instance: Supposing just such a world to be created as ours is, then perhaps consequently it must have such laws of motion: Or, if man be created ex-
* I have dwelt too long perpaps on such minute and inconsiderable instances as these; but I did it partly to intimate how universally the great God is laid under necessary and minute limitations, if these things were not indifferent; and partly to give occasion to diffuse our thoughts into like instances in the animate, human, and angelic worlds, which perhaps are as little and indifferent in the esteem of God, as these minute inconsiderables are in our esteem, | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
47B FREEDOM OF WILL.
gdly mich a being as he is, then it is proper that he shoaM hKs%
atich ideas, such notions and sentiments, &c. and that he should
live under snch certain laws and rules of action. But perhaps
several of these are not eternal laws or rules eitheir of nature,
or motion, or morality to other sorts of creatures, or other systemi
which God might have chosen to create. Therefore though we
may assert some to be eternal laws or rules for all posmble worldsi
jet it is hard for us to say in all cases, how far these eternal fit-
nesses extend. And we have reason enough to suppose that roaoy
things even in oar present system of nature arc not determined
from their eternal superior Jitness ; but that thousands of possi-
bles even in our system might be equally fit in themselves, and
h was the will of God, the Creator, that sovereignly chose some
particulars above others, and made them actually exists and he-
hold they are all very good.
XVI. So when we consider God as .a Governor in appoint-
ing such positive laws and rules of duty for his creatures, ^vliich
are not contained in the law of nature, there may be iDstnnces
wherein among a thousand possible rules or laws each of ihem
may be fit, and yet there is no superior fitness in une above tbe
rest: Then the will of God by and of itstlt dctiTmines and
cfauses what positive laws, wliat duties lie will command or pre-
scribe to h is creatures, and he makes the thing which he pre-
scribes more fit and good for us to practise merely by his otrn
choice, determination, and command: as whether the takrnacU
of Moses should have just such a number of hoards or curiaim
pins or tacks in it : whether every hoard or every curiam should
be just so long and so broad, to the thousandth part of an inch ;
whether the sacrifice of the paschal lawb, the red heiJtTy and
the whole burnt -offering on the great day of atonement, should
have every the least ceremony of zcashings^urningSy spnnklivgs^
ic. belongii>g to them, so jjrecisely adjusted in that very form
as they are a])pointcd in the books of Moses : In short, I w ould
ask whether every point and tittle of every ceremony and posi-
tive duty which (jlod has appointed from the beginning of the
world to this day, had in itself and in the nature of things, such
a superior fitness, that it could not be determined otherwise:
Surely it i s much more becoming and proper for us to think and
say, that God has determined these things by his own will or
self-deterrainini;' power and free choice : For it seems tonic a
Tery harsh and bold aHirniation, that not one of all these punc-
tilios could ever huve boon otherwise appointed by God hirobclf,
as we shall take notice' iiiimediately.
XVH. Thus ^vhcther we consider man as a natural or a
moral ai^cnt, and \\licther we consider God either as a Creator
or as a (iovernor, there seem to be several instances whereiu
there is no su\>¥r\ov (\U\^^^ ov unlitness of things, that appears | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 477 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | actly such a being as he is, then it is proper that he should have such ideas, such notions and sentiments, &c. and that he should live under such certain laws and rules of action. But perhaps several of these are not eternal laws or rules eitheir of nature, or motion, or morality to other sorts of creatures, or other systems which God might have chosen to create. Therefore though we may assert some to be eternal laws or rules for all possible worlds, yet it is hard for us to say in all cases, how far these eternal fitnesses extend. And we have reason enough to suppose that many things even in our present system of nature are not determined from their eternal superior fitness; but that thousands of possibilities even in our system might be equally fit in themselves, and it was the will of God, the Creator, that sovereignly chose some particulars above others, and made them actually exist, and hold they are all very good.
XVI. So when we consider God as a Governor in appointing such positive laws and rules of duty for his creatures, which are not contained in the law of nature, there may be instances wherein among a thousand possible rules or laws each of them may be fit, and yet there is no superior fitness in one above the rest: Then the will of God by and of itself determines and chuses what positive laws, what duties he will command or prescribe to his creatures, and he makes the thing which he prescribes more fit and good for us to practise merely by his own choice, determination, and command: as whether the tabernacle of Moses should have just such a number of boards or curtains pins or tacks in it: whether every board or every curtain should be just so long and so broad, to the thousandth part of an inch; whether the sacrifice of the paschal lamb, the red heifer, and the whole burnt-offering on the great day of atonement, should have every the least ceremony of washings, burnings, sprinklings, &c. belonging to them, so precisely adjusted in that very form as they are appointed in the books of Moses: In short, I would ask whether every point and title of every ceremony and positive duty which God has appointed from the beginning of the world to this day, had in itself and in the nature of things, such a superior fitness, that it could not be determined otherwise: Surely it is much more becoming and proper for us to think and say, that God has determined these things by his own will or self-determining power and free choice: For it seems to me a very harsh and bold affirmation, that not one of all these punctilios could ever have been otherwise appointed by God himself, as we shall take notice immediately.
XVII. Thus whether we consider man as a natural or a moral agent, and whether we consider God either as a Creator or as a Governor, there seem to be several instances wherein there is no superior fitness or unfitness of things, that appears | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY. 477
» the tinderstanding to give any direction to the will in its
hoice : And as the nature of the will in itself is a power of
boice or self-determination, so in these instances it eminently
ppears that it must be left to detei*mine and chuse for itself
ritliout any direction of the understanding.
Sect. V. — The Advantages of thU Scheme of Liberty.
This scheme of the liberty of the will, and of the spring <if
ts choice and determination, as residing within itself, has many
dvantages attending it ; and they are such as these :
I. We are hereby led evidently to a self- moving powevy t9
k p riaciple of motion or proper action in man, which we are eoa«
icious of continually, and which we feel and experience in our*
teWes to be the active spring of those voluntary motions which
f e excite in our own bodies, and thereby in the bodies that are
'ound about us : And this leads us by fair reasoning to infer,
hat since we neither did nor could give being to ourselves, I0
Hir self- moving |)owers, or to other creatures, there must be
vome wach supreme self ^ moving power which is the Author ani
Creator both of bodies and spirits^ that is, of all active and pas-
live beings. Whereas the contrary opinion, which supposes the
nrill to be always necessarily determined by the understandings
and the understanding always determined by the appearances of
thingSy gives us no discovery of any self-moving principle or
power in this world ; and while the same opinion supposes the
will of Ood to be in the same manner universally, eternally and
imaltcrably moved and determined by the appearances of things
in his ideas, and their superior fitness, it gives perhaps too muck
advantage Xo the atheist and the sceptic to doubt whether there
be any self- moving power at all or no, whether there be any first-
moving spirit, that is, a God. This doctrine has in fabt beea
employed to this wretched purpose.
II. This opinion asserts and attributes the most proper and
roost rational doctrine of full freedom to every inteihgent crea^
ture, and conveys a clear idea of their liberty both in those spon«
taneous actions where the fiitness of tilings so fully and evidently
appears, as powerfully to persuade tlie will, as well as in au
other actions where the fitness doth not appear with such full evi*^
dence and power, or finally in those things where there is no
superior fitness at all appearing. Every action determined by
Ibe will of man is free, because the will is a self^determining
power. Whereas in the other scheme, which supposes that the
will of man in every action whatsoever is certainly and necessarily
determined by the last dictate or judgment of the ujiderstanding^
and that the understanding is necessarily determined in its judz-
mtnt by presetU appearances of things as to their fitness or unnt-
ness, there is really no perfect liberty of indifference ot Stc^^^ta^ | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 478 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
to the understanding to give any direction to the will in its choice: And as the nature of the will in itself is a power of choice or self-determination, so in these instances it eminently appears that it must be left to determine and chuse for itself without any direction of the understanding.
Sect. V.—The Advantages of this Scheme of Liberty.
This scheme of the liberty of the will, and of the spring of its choice and determination, as residing within itself, has many advantages attending it; and they are such as these:
I. We are hereby led evidently to a self-moving power, to principle of motion or proper action in man, which we are conscious of continually, and which we feel and experience in ourselves to be the active spring of those voluntary motions which we excite in our own bodies, and thereby in the bodies that are found about us: And this leads us by fair reasoning to infer, that since we neither did nor could give being to ourselves, to our self-moving powers, or to other creatures, there must be some such supreme self-moving power which is the Author and Creator both of bodies and spirits, that is, of all active and passive beings. Whereas the contrary opinion, which supposes the will to be always necessarily determined by the understanding, and the understanding always determined by the appearances of things, gives us no discovery of any self-moving principle or power in this world; and while the same opinion supposes the will of God to be in the same manner universally, eternally and unalterably moved and determined by the appearances of things in his ideas, and their superior fitness, it gives perhaps too much advantage to the atheist and the sceptic to doubt whether there be any self-moving power at all or no, whether there be any first-moving spirit, that is, a God. This doctrine has in fact been employed to this wretched purpose.
II. This opinion asserts and attributes the most proper and most rational doctrine of full freedom to every intelligent creature, and conveys a clear idea of their liberty both in those spontaneous actions where the fitness of things so fully and evidently appears, as powerfully to persuade the will, as well as in all other actions where the fitness doth not appear with such full evidence and power, or finally in those things where there is no superior fitness at all appearing. Every action determined by the will of man is free, because the will is a self-determining power. Whereas in the other scheme, which supposes that the will of man in every action whatsoever is certainly and necessarily determined by the last dictate or judgment of the understanding, and that the understanding is necessarily determined in its judgment by present appearances of things as to their fitness or unfitness, there is really no perfect liberty of indifference or freedom. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
4TB FREEDOM or WfLk
of obcMce left to muy or to any intelligent being tn way aetiMrt
but all 18 neoeseary with a natural necemijf, all ia ftte ; f cr
nothing oan be otherwise than it is : And this dpinioB has given
an unlwppy ooeasion to the prindplea of the fiUalista in all sgei.
III. This scheme of things supposes the truth of what ws
dttly find in common life, that there are many otgecta and aciioiii
which are equal or indifferent to us, and wluch ha^e no i^peir-
faig superior fitness or goodness in them ; and yet it g ives as letfe
to enjoy the pleasure &[ aov of these indifiereot objects or actiooi
by the free choice and self-determining power of the will. Where*
as if the will must always be determined in its choice by some
superior appearing goodness or fitness, we could never come It
' ^ iQ^T ^^y ^ ^be satisfactions that may arise from these equal sii4
* indiferent actions or objects, because we should l>e held ia efer-
lasting suspense between them, as the an in the prcMca
between two like and equal thistles, and never be aide to tsite
one of them, having nothing that could determine our dioice.
IV. This doctrine of the self-determining power of the wil
9etsthe nature and distinction of virtue and vice in tkispmad
state in the truest lights together with the rewardable or punish"
nhle properties thereof: This shews how acceptable to God are
the fi^od actions of men, as being the cflTects o{Jree choice ; t be
will having always a natural, free and self-determining power
of its own choice, even after things are represented tcf the under*
standing in their fitness or unfitness, in tlieir good or evil appear-
ances :A nd at the name time it lays the fault of every criminal
action only upon the creature^ by allowing the will to have a na-
tural free power either to determine suddenly and rashly, and to
^precipitate the judgment concerning the fitness of things, and
thus betray itself into a wrong choice, and by allowing it a f ree
power also to suspend the judgment of the understanding^ in
opposition to any sliglit appearances of fitness or goodness, and
to seai*ch yet further, and wait for further evidence. This scheme
al8oy/>e5 the guilt of evil actions entirely on the will of the cfteh
iurcy by ascriUng to the will a free power to determine itsei(
cither to chuse or to refuse after any representations of good or
«vil, fitness or unfitness made by the understanding. This doo»
trine tliereibre sets vice and virtue in their true natures, tbetr
merit or demerit, and represents them as suited to their different
rewards.
Whereas the other scheme, which determines the will alwajt
and certainly by the understanding, and determines the under-
standing byt he situation and appearance of things, seems to
tiike away the true nature and distinction of vice and virtue ; f or
the snblimest virtues and the vilest of vices actually practised
would rather be matters of late and necessity, flowing naturally I
Mad necessarily tVoui W\c ^7L\s\^Ttf^<^) the circumstances, ani pre- | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 479 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | of choice left to man, or to any intelligent being in any action: but all is necessary with a natural necessity, all is fate; for nothing can be otherwise than it is: And this opinion has given an unhappy occasion to the principles of the fatalists in all ages.
III. This scheme of things supposes the truth of what we daily find in common life, that there are many objects and actions which are equal or indifferent to us, and which have no appearing superior fitness or goodness in them; and yet it gives us leave to enjoy the pleasure of any of these indifferent objects or actions by the free choice and self-determining power of the will. Whereas if the will must always be determined in its choice by some superior appearing goodness or fitness, we could never come to enjoy any of the satisfactions that may arise from these equal and indifferent actions or objects, because we should be held in everlasting suspense between them, as the ass in the problem between two like and equal thistles, and never be able to taste one of them, having nothing that could determine our choice.
IV. This doctrine of the self-determining power of the will sets the nature and distinction of virtue and vice in this present state in the truest light, together with the rewardable or punishable properties thereof: This shews how acceptable to God are the good actions of men, as being the effects of free choice; the will having always a natural, free and self-determining power of its own choice, even after things are represented to the understanding in their fitness or unfitness, in their good or evil appearances: And at the same time it lays the fault of every criminal action only upon the creature, by allowing the will to have a natural free power either to determine suddenly and rashly, and to precipitate the judgment concerning the fitness of things, and thus betray itself into a wrong choice, and by allowing it a free power also to suspend the judgment of the understanding in opposition to any slight appearances of fitness or goodness, and to search yet further, and wait for further evidence. This scheme also fixes the guilt of evil actions entirely on the will of the creature, by ascribing to the will a free power to determine itself, either to chuse or to refuse after any representations of good or evil, fitness or unfitness made by the understanding. This doctrine therefore sets vice and virtue in their true natures, their merit or demerit, and represents them as suited to their different rewards.
Whereas the other scheme, which determines the will always and certainly by the understanding, and determines the understanding by the situation and appearance of things, seems to take away the true nature and distinction of vice and virtue; for the sublimest virtues and the vilest of vices actually practised would rather be matters of fate and necessity, flowing naturally and necessarily from the existence, the circumstances, and pre- | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY. 470
•ent ttiuatioQ of persons and thingt : For this existence and situ-
Atton necessarily makes such an appearance to the mind ; from
this mppearance flows a necessary perception and judgment con-
cerning these things ; this judgment necessarily de(ermine$ the
mli i and thus by this chain of necessary causes, virtue and vice
would lose their nature, and become natural ideas and necessary
things, instead of moral and free actions ; and thus there would
be nothing really rewardable in the one, or blameable and punish-
able in t he other. This also the atheists and the fatalists have
formed into so strong an argument, as it is very difficult to give a
£ur answer to thcra, if w e suppose the will to be necessarily deter-
mined in e very act by the iaeas and assent of the understanding.
To confirm this notion of virtue and vice proceeding from the
sdf-determining power of the will ; l et us consider, that all man-
kind natnrally and constantly suppose the determinations of their
wills to be their own actions^ whether they be good or evil : for
however they might, from a principle of pride and vanity, assume
the honour of good actions to themselves, though they were not
entirely their own, yet they would not impute evil actions to
^themselves, if t hey did not feel themselves to be the proper cause
^of them by the free determinations of their own will. The soul
or conscience of man charges him with actiog amiss, when hie
will has chosen that which is evil, and brought misery upon biin-
HMlf ; and hence arise sharp and bitter inward reflections, and
sorrows of another kind than those which proceed from mere
calamities .which were necessary, and which he could not avoid.
Nor can we suppose the God of nature would have placed such
a principle in mankind, as should naturally excite him to bitter
anguish and self accusation for actions which were naturally ne-
cessary, that is, if he were determined to them necessarily by
his perceptions, and in which his will had no self-dcterminijig
power or choice.
Y. This doctrine of the self-determining power of the will^
shews us a wise and good man in his true character, viz. whose
will, though it be a self- determining power, and can chuse con-
trary to t he understanding, and can obey the influences of appe-
tite and sinful passion, yet it sutTers itself to be directed and always
determines it choice by the fitness or unfitness of things, as they
are represented by the understanding after a due examination and
survey, wheresoever this fitness or unfitness appears. And ill
this conduct he imitates the blessed God, who never acts contrary
to these appearances of fitness or unfitness, never determines any
tiling contrary to the eternal reasons and relations of things as
contained in his own ideas, but always chuses and acts in co^or-
mity to them.
YI. This gives us the clearest, the easiest, and the most
nnexceptionable account how sin came Jir^st into the, xorld. W%.^ | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 480 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | sent situation of persons and things; For this existence and situation necessarily makes such an appearance to the mind; from this appearance flows a necessary perception and judgment concerning these things; this judgment necessarily determines the will; and thus by this chain of necessary causes, virtue and vice would lose their nature, and become natural ideas and necessary things, instead of moral and free actions; and thus there would be nothing really rewardable in the one, or blameable and punishable in the other. This also the atheists and the fatalists have formed into so strong an argument, as it is very difficult to give a fair answer to them, if we suppose the will to be necessarily determined in every act by the ideas and assent of the understanding.
To confirm this notion of virtue and vice proceeding from the self-determining power of the will; let us consider, that all mankind naturally and constantly suppose the determinations of their wills to be their own actions, whether they be good or evil: for however they might, from a principle of pride and vanity, assume the honour of good actions to themselves, though they were not entirely their own, yet they would not impute evil actions to themselves, if they did not feel themselves to be the proper cause of them by the free determinations of their own will. The soul or conscience of man charges him with acting amiss, when his will has chosen that which is evil, and brought misery upon himself; and hence arise sharp and bitter inward reflections, and sorrows of another kind than those which proceed from mere calamities which were necessary, and which he could not avoid. Nor can we suppose the God of nature would have placed such a principle in mankind, as should naturally excite him to bitter anguish and self accusation for actions which were naturally necessary, that is, if he were determined to them necessarily by his perceptions, and in which his will had no self-determining power or choice.
V. This doctrine of the self-determining power of the will shews us a wise and good man in his true character, viz. whose will, though it be a self-determining power, and can chuse contrary to the understanding, and can obey the influences of appetite and sinful passion, yet it suffers itself to be directed and always determines it choice by the fitness or unfitness of things, as they are represented by the understanding after a due examination and survey, wheresoever this fitness or unfitness appears. And in this conduct he imitates the blessed God, who never acts contrary to these appearances of fitness or unfitness, never determines any thing contrary to the eternal reasons and relations of things as contained in his own ideas, but always chuses and acts in conformity to them.
VI. This gives us the clearest, the easiest, and the most unexceptionable account how sin came first into the world. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
480 PREBDOM OF ITILL.
in paradise was wise and innocent^ but imperfect in a statt of <ritl.
SeiiHe, or a]i{>etite9 or passion, or all these toother, joined wilh
the dovil in the serpent to make a false representation of thingi
to his understundini;^, without i^ivin^ him sufficient evidence to
have determined his judgment on their side, and influenced fab
dioice : Then his will, which ought to have suspended his judg-
ment till h e had made further seafch and enquiry, did in some
heedless and unwatchful moment, rashly suffer tlie soul to assent
to falsehood, and as rashly and hastily followed these false repre-
sentations, and d etermined its choice to evil inst<^ad of s^ood. Or
we may suppose, that the will being tempted and (*nticeil strongly
by appetite and passion, l^oth by an inordinate sensual appetite to
the forbidden fruity and inordinate desire of knoKled^rt and am-
bition of b eing as a gody determined itself rashly, witliout delay
'and enquiry, to obey and comply with the strong bias of present
appetite and passion, without wuiting for a mature judgiueot of
the understanding ; and thus man ehose what was evil, and
disobey cd his Maker : And herein man appeared highly crimioil
in his first i^n, and the fault must be laid entirely upon himself,
Because it w as a free act of his will, which was a self-determining
power. And indeed there is no such thing as actual sin, properly
speaking, but in free acts of the will. VVhereas if we sup|)ose
tilt understanding to be necessarily determined to judge accord*
ivg to the appearances of thwgSy and the wiU necessarily to fol-
low the judgment of the understatiding ; then the blame will be
ready (o be cast on the providence of God which placed Adam in
such circumstances, as that such false representations should be
made to his understanding which he could not avoid, and which
would necessarily first determine his judgment, and conseqaently
his choice of evil, and his disobedience to his Maker. 1 will not
assume so much as to pretend this is the only way whereby we
can account for sin's coming into the world, and making its first
entrance into the innocent heart of the first man ; but I think
this gives as fair and easy a solution of it, as any that 1 ha\e
found.
VII. This doctrine shews us the excellency and rewardable-
ness o( faith in the gospel of Christy and the criminal nature of
unl>elief. Wlien the Christian revelation is proposed to man ai
coming from God, it becomes man as a rational creature to con-
sider the proofs and evidences brought to confirm it, the propbc-
cit s, the miracles, the internal excellencies, and all external tei-
tinionies that come with it : And it is the will which must employ
and determine the mind to dwell upon these enquiries diligently
and faithfiiliy, in projM)rtion to the merits of the cause, to keep
the li(\irt sincere and unbiassed in tlie enquiry, to attend care-
iully to every gleam of light, and every argument, and to suffer
I t seiV to be cou\u\c\iAj bl\\^s\^ b^ the 9reponderatin|r nf eight o( | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 481 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | in paradise was wise and innocent, but imperfect in a state of trial. Sense, or appetite, or passion, or all these together, joined with the devil in the serpent to make a false representation of things to his understanding, without giving him sufficient evidence to have determined his judgment on their side, and influenced his choice: Then his will, which ought to have suspended his judgment till he had made further search and enquiry, did in some heedless and unwatchful moment, rashly suffer the soul to assent to falsehood, and as rashly and hastily followed these false representations, and determined its choice to evil instead of good. Or we may suppose, that the will being tempted and enticed strongly by appetite and passion, both by an inordinate sensual appetite to the forbidden fruit, and inordinate desire of knowledge and ambition of being as a god, determined itself rashly, without delay and enquiry, to obey and comply with the strong bias of present appetite and passion, without waiting for a mature judgment of the understanding; and thus man chose what was evil, and disobeyed his Maker: And herein man appeared highly criminal in his first sin, and the fault must be laid entirely upon himself, because it was a free act of his will, which was a self-determining power. And indeed there is no such thing as actual sin, properly speaking, but in free acts of the will. Whereas if we suppose the understanding to be necessarily determined to judge according to the appearances of things, and the will necessarily to follow the judgment of the understanding; then the blame will be ready to be cast on the providence of God which placed Adam in such circumstances, as that such false representations should be made to his understanding which he could not avoid, and which would necessarily first determine his judgment, and consequently his choice of evil, and his disobedience to his Maker. I will not assume so much as to pretend this is the only way whereby we can account for sin's coming into the world, and making its first entrance into the innocent heart of the first man; but I think this gives as fair and easy a solution of it, as any that I have found.
VII. This doctrine shews us the excellency and rewardableness of faith in the gospel of Christ, and the criminal nature of unbelief. When the Christian revelation is proposed to man as coming from God, it becomes man as a rational creature to consider the proofs and evidences brought to confirm it, the prophecies, the miracles, the internal excellencies, and all external testimonies that come with it: And it is the will which must employ and determine the mind to dwell upon these enquiries diligently and faithfully, in proportion to the merits of the cause, to keep the heart sincere and unbiassed in the enquiry, to attend carefully to every gleam of light, and every argument, and to suffer itself to be convinced, at last, by the preponderating weight of | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY. 49i
*eaw>nin^9 laying aside every prejudice of flesh and mind, of
ippetite and passion, of pride and self-sufficiency, of antiquity
ind novelty, of educalioo and company, &c. and not to pass a
ud^ment without such evidence as appears to be just and suffi-
nent. This is a work of self-denial and sincerity, dilis^ence and
labour, to keep the mind in a wise suspense till arguments appear
sonviucing, and then to yield up all its former mistakes and pre-
udices to this conviction. This is truly rewardable in the sight
>f Grod. Blessed are tliey that have not seen, and yet have
Mieved; John xx. 29.
On the other hand, it is the will of man that hath die chief
land in infidelity : It is the will that indulges prejudices against
he gospel, it refuses to apply an^Miold the mind close to a dili-
gent and faithful survey of it with all its evidences ; or it wisheth
he gospel may not be tnie, because it restrains its appetites or
!vil inclinations ; or it determines against it rashly upon slight
ind insufticient grounds ; i t indulges an aversion to it without
'o&aon, and thereby becomes culpable, and is justly punishable.
He that believeth not shall be damned ; M ark xvi. 16. Whereas
;he contrary opinion, which makes fahh or unbelief, assent or
iisscnt to the gospel, and acceptance or rejection of it, to be the
necessary eifcct of present appearances of things to the under-
standing, and s upposes things necessarily to appear according to
Llie circumstances and situation in which they arc placed, without
interesting the free will and choice of man at all in (he matter of
Pailli or unbelief ; this opinion, I say, gdes a great way toward
the excusing of iufidclity as innocent, and taking away the vir-
tuous ciiaracter and rewardableness of faith in the gospel.
VIII. This doctrine of the self-determining power of the
will allows the blessed God a full freedom of choice in distribute
ing his favours to which of his creatures he pleases, and in what
degrees. It hiys a just foundation of praise and thankfulness for
all the free actions of his goodness and kindu«'ss to his ereaturesy
according to those degrees of mercy and bounty which he distri-
butes among them ; b ecause he is not obliged to all those particu-
lar actions or objects by a necessary and superior fitness, since
he might have cliosen to neglect those objects, or to manifest
equal or superior goodness to other creatures, or to do it i n much
less degrees, or in other ways and manners, any of which might
have been equally tit and proper : as for instance, God might
have brought forth the soul of an American savage in the British
iKlands, surrounded with light and knowledge ; or Iiave protluc-
ed me among the savages in America in gross darkness, as well
aa in Great nritain, a land of light. My soul might have been
united to a body born of African idolaters : he might have made
me blind and a cripple, as well as given me health and eye- sight ;
I might fiavc had the brain of an idiot, and becu bi'ed vi^ viv^\v^
Vol, IV. II u | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 482 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
reasoning, laying aside every prejudice of flesh and mind, of appetite and passion, of pride and self-sufficiency, of antiquity and novelty, of education and company, &c. and not to pass a judgment without such evidence as appears to be just and sufficient. This is a work of self-denial and sincerity, diligence and labour, to keep the mind in a wise suspense till arguments appear convincing, and then to yield up all its former mistakes and prejudices to this conviction. This is truly rewardable in the sight of God. Blessed are they that have not seen, and yet have believed; John xx. 29.
On the other hand, it is the will of man that hath the chief hand in infidelity: It is the will that indulges prejudices against the gospel, it refuses to apply and hold the mind close to a diligent and faithful survey of it with all its evidences; or it wiseth the gospel may not be true, because it restrains its appetites or evil inclinations; or it determines against it rashly upon slight and insufficient grounds; it indulges an aversion to it without reason, and thereby becomes culpable, and is justly punishable. He that believeth not shall be damned; Mark xvi. 16. Whereas the contrary opinion, which makes faith or unbelief, assent or dissent to the gospel, and acceptance or rejection of it, to be the necessary effect of present appearances of things to the understanding, and supposes things necessarily to appear according to the circumstances and situation in which they are placed, without interesting the free will and choice of man at all in the matter of faith or unbelief; this opinion, I say, goes a great way toward the excusing of infidelity as innocent, and taking away the virtuous character and rewardableness of faith in the gospel.
VIII. This doctrine of the self-determining power of the will allows the blessed God a full freedom of choice in distributing his favours to which of his creatures he pleases, and in what degrees. It lays a just foundation of praise and thankfulness for all the free actions of his goodness and kindness to his creatures, according to those degrees of mercy and bounty which he distributes among them; because he is not obliged to all those particular actions or objects by a necessary and superior fitness, since he might have chosen to neglect those objects, or to manifest equal or superior goodness to other creatures, or to do it in much less degrees, or in other ways and manners, any of which might have been equally fit and proper: as for instance, God might have brought forth the soul of an American savage in the British islands, surrounded with light and knowledge; or have produced me among the savages in America in gross darkness, as well as in Great Britain, a land of light. My soul might have been united to a body born of African idolaters: he might have made me blind and a cripple, as well as given me health and eye-sight; I might have had the brain of an idiot, and been bred up with-
Vol. iv. II x | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
4S2 rurxDOM of will.
out knowIc(1t;«*, as well as eujoyecl my aliare of intellectual poweri
and advantagcH ut' learning ; h e might have formed me the child
of a beggar, made roe an heir to filth and wretchedneasi and
trained me up to ask my bread from <loor to door, instead ^ the
comfortable circumstances which I enjoy, and Uie parents from
whence I c ame. Wc cannot but suppose it possible for the great
Gud tu have found a way to have made these things comjportwith
his grand scheme and counsels in the universe, if he had so plea-
sed ;b ut he huB chosen and determined better things &>r me
from his own free will and sovereign goodness, and blessed be
liis name.
IX. This doctrine manifests and maintains the just distinc-
tion between the moral und positive commands of God, while we
8up|M)se his moral commands and iirohiliitions to be drawn from
the eternal fitness or untilness of tlungs, whereas his positive com-
mands and ])rohibitions are for the most part, if not entirelv, the
free and arbitrary (leterminations of his will and choice. I do not
call them arbitrary, us though Go<l had no reason at all for
up|K)intiiig them, or that they are not suited to attain very happy
and divine purposes in the graiul scheme of his counsels ; but
they are arbitrury in tliis respect, tliut he might have chosen and
appointed other positive commands or prohibitions, which might
have been equally lit, and have attained purposes as happy and
glorious, and which he might have introduced with equal reason :
For it is very hard to suppose, as 1 hinted above, that every
punctilio and all the little circumstances of every positive com-
mand and prohibition ot'Ciod throughout all the ages of his church,
patriurclKil, •Jewish and christian, were determined by the neces-
sary superior fitness of them. I shall enquire immediately,
w heiher any thing more than this can he said concerning his moral
commands ; and then what dillerence is there between the oue
and the other ?
X. This scheme of the self- determining power of the ^vill
represents the doctiine of the freedom of man's will, and the
power and prevalence of divine grace in a most happy harmony
and consistency, perhaps beyond what any other scheme can
repri'sent. Su])posc God decree and determine to convert such
a sinner as Oik siinus to faith and holiness : he can represent to
his uikdcrsianding, hy his own word, und by the additional opera-
tion of h is own .Spirit, tlie fitness and goodness of faith in Christ,
and true repentance, in such a superior light, as he who knows
the hearts and sentiments, the circunistanci*s and situations of all
men, duth certainly foreknow will be not only sufficient but effec-
tual tu i nfluence and persuade tlic will of OnesimuH to comply
with it : And yet perhaps God need not mechanically or physi-
cally, nt'ce^Kurily or irrisistibly move and constrain the will oftlie
creature to comply. And though the will is left to its own free | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 483 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | out knowledge, as well as enjoyed my share of intellectual powers and advantages of learning; he might have formed me the child of a beggar, made me an heir to filth and wretchedness, and trained me up to ask my bread from door to door, instead of the comfortable circumstances which I enjoy, and the parents from whence I came. We cannot but suppose it possible for the great God to have found a way to have made these things comport with his grand scheme and counsels in the universe, if he had so pleased; but he has chosen and determined better things for me from his own free will and sovereign goodness, and blessed be his name.
IX. This doctrine manifests and maintains the just distinction between the moral and positive commands of God, while we suppose his moral commands and prohibitions to be drawn from the eternal fitness or unfitness of things, whereas his positive commands and prohibitions are for the most part, if not entirely, the free and arbitrary determinations of his will and choice. I do not call them arbitrary, as though God had no reason at all for appointing them, or that they are not suited to attain very happy and divine purposes in the grand scheme of his counsels; but they are arbitrary in this respect, that he might have chosen and appointed other positive commands or prohibitions, which might have been equally fit, and have attained purposes as happy and glorious, and which he might have introduced with equal reason: For it is very hard to suppose, as I hinted above, that every punctilio and all the little circumstances of every positive command and prohibition of God throughout all the ages of his church, patriarchal, Jewish and Christian, were determined by the necessary superior fitness of them. I shall enquire immediately, whether any thing more than this can be said concerning his moral commands; and then what difference is there between the one and the other?
X. This scheme of the self-determining power of the will represents the doctrine of the freedom of man's will, and the power and prevalence of divine grace in a most happy harmony and consistency, perhaps beyond what any other scheme can represent. Suppose God decree and determine to convert such a sinner as Onesimus to faith and holiness: he can represent to his understanding, by his own word, and by the additional operation of his own Spirit, the fitness and goodness of faith in Christ, and true repentance, in such a superior light, as he who knows the hearts and sentiments, the circumstances and situations of all men, doth certainly foreknow will be not only sufficient but effectual to influence and persuade the will of Onesimus to comply with it: And yet perhaps God need not mechanically or physically, necessarily or irrisistibly move and constrain the will of the creature to comply. And though the will is left to its own free | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY. 483
ft^ency and self-deterinininsf power, yet (lie li^bt in which God
•eta the gospel before the eyes of the mind is so great, as will
finally and certainly persuade the will, tliough not necessarily im-
pel or constrain it. And the great God, who knows intimately
the make and constitution of our natures, and our present situa-
tion, sees clearly that this light will be finally effectual io influence
the will freely to comply with the proposals of grace. Thus the
virtuous and pious actions of men are praise- worthy and reward-
able, and approve themselves to their own consciences as well as
to God, the righteous Governor and Judge ; b ecause the will
had a natural self-determining power to cliuse the contrary.
And yet these good actions may be effectually secured as to their
performance, by such a powerful representation of divine tilings
to the understanding, as God foreknows will certainly, though
not necessarily, be an occasion of the final free determination of
the will to piety and virtue ; and thus also the free favour or grace
of God stands entitled to its due and divine honours.
It is the opinion of a considerable writer on this subject, that
herein lies a great deal of the pleasure of a self-approving con-
•cicnce, that the good man had a power tochuse an evil object or
action, but he actually refused it, and chose the good. And
herein God, as a tf u dge and Rewarder, shews his equity, in
giving happiness to the man of virtue. Whereas if the divine
power physically and irresistibly move and deter:nine the will to
chuse what is good, this would make the divine illumination of
the mind needless, since the will rniglii thf^n be moved to chuse
virtue without it : This, say some, wouUI do violence to nature,
would quite invert the method of treating free agents ; and many
oih«;r evil consequences are reekonrd u{> hy some authors. Now
1 would only en(|uire whether all these iire not avoided by sup-
poVintc the influence of the grace of God upon the soul of man to
be only illuininative and persuasive, and yet liiially efficacious
and certain ; which efficacy and certainly seem to bo tuu^'ht us by
the express and evident language of several scrijUures. Whether
these scriptures do cortuiniy imply an im.uediatc and physical
hitluence of divine power on the will, to give it a new general
bias and inclination over and above tliis effieacijUH iiluminaiion of
the mind, I l eave to be determined by divines, always supposing
it t o bo as effectual on the will, as if it were immediate, and the
final event to be as certain.
If any |)erson suirgest here, that all the powers of the soul,
viz. the will and affections, are grievously corrupted and ]HTvert-
edby the fall of man, and tlierefore there is need ofun almighty
physical or sujiernatural influence on them as well as on the un-
dentunding, in order to give a new bias, and cliangc the.n to
holiness ; 1 w ould also suggest in my turn, and enquire, whetber
such a trauHCcudent and supernatural iiiuminatiou of tlie under*
standing may not be the proper and usv&'A dvNvwv^ \\\^\.VwsA ^\
ji h 2 | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 484 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | agency and self-determining power, yet the light in which God sets the gospel before the eyes of the mind is so great, as will finally and certainly persuade the will, though not necessarily impel or constrain it. And the great God, who knows intimately the make and constitution of our natures, and our present situation, sees clearly that this light will be finally effectual to influence the will freely to comply with the proposals of grace. Thus the virtuous and pious actions of men are praise-worthy and rewardable, and approve themselves to their own consciences as well as to God, the righteous Governor and Judge; because the will had a natural self-determining power to chuse the contrary. And yet these good actions may be effectually secured as to their performance, by such a powerful representation of divine things to the understanding, as God foreknows will certainly, though not necessarily, be an occasion of the final free determination of the will to piety and virtue; and thus also the free favour or grace of God stands entitled to its due and divine honours.
It is the opinion of a considerable writer on this subject, that herein lies a great deal of the pleasure of a self-approving conscience, that the good man had a power to chuse an evil object or action, but he actually refused it, and chose the good. And herein God, as a Judge and Rewarder, shews his equity, in giving happiness to the man of virtue. Whereas if the divine power physically and irresistibly move and determine the will to chuse what is good, this would make the divine illumination of the mind needless, since the will might then be moved to chuse virtue without it: This, say some, would do violence to nature, would quite invert the method of treating free agents; and many other evil consequences are reckoned up by some authors. Now I would only enquire whether all these are not avoided by supposing the influence of the grace of God upon the soul of man to be only illuminative and persuasive, and yet finally efficacious and certain; which efficacy and certainty seem to be taught us by the express and evident language of several scriptures. Whether these scriptures do certainly imply an immediate and physical influence of divine power on the will, to give it a new general bias and inclination over and above this efficacious illumination of the mind, I leave to be determined by divines, always supposing it to be as effectual on the will, as if it were immediate, and the final event to be as certain.
If any person suggest here, that all the powers of the soul, viz. the will and affections, are grievously corrupted and perverted by the fall of man, and therefore there is need of an almighty physical or supernatural influence on them as well as on the understanding, in order to give a new bias, and change them to holiness; I would also suggest in my turn, and enquire, whether such a transcendent and supernatural illumination of the understanding may not be the proper and usual divine method of | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
486 FREEDOM OF WILL.
something extrinsical } It is granted indeed, that the will some-
times borrows a reason for its determination from various oocs-
sions or arguments ; S ometimes from very strong motives, sod
the transcendently superior fitnesses of things does but just appear
superior ; a nd sometimes itself determines its own choice between
things in themselves indifferent, and where there is no superior
fitness at all, or at least none that appears.
Yet let it be again observed here, as I have intimated be-
fore, that when two equal things are pro|K>Hed to the will, tbere
may be a very sufficient r(>ason why it should determine its choice
in general some way or other, though there be no suflTicient res-
son in the things themselves for determining in this way rather
than that. There is very suifioient reason why a hungry luso
should eat, when two equal pieces of bread lie before him ; b ut
he may chusc which piece he will eat, without any other reaaoo
than bccau8(^ he will. So there may be very sufficient reason
why God should create a world ; hut if you ask why he should
create this sort of world rather than another, and this sort of
creatures rather than other's, wliich may Le equally Ht, he bor-
rows the reason for it only from himself; his own good pleasure
is a sutVicicnt reason : lie dotli it because he will ; nor is SDf
other reason necessary besides his own self-determiuin^ power.
It is supremely lit he should do what he pleases. Why must
the will of God be such a passive power as is not able to act of
and from itself ?
Objection III. This doctrine of liberty represents the will
of an intelligent being as a sort of blind power determining itself
without reason in many instances, acting without any motive,
chusing and preferring one thing to another without any ground
of choice or preference ; whereas in all intelligent beings, whe-
ther God or man, there are no such blind principles of choice
or action.
Answer I. It is granted indeed, that this doctrine does not
ascribe understanding, or sight and perception to the will, tor
that would be to conlound those two distinct pcu'ors or principles
in a spirit : But this doctrine keeps those two powers of under-
stiuulingand will in their proper characters ; the understandia^
sees or perceives truth and falsehool, titncss and unfitness, good
and evil, as far us ai^y such characters or qualities appear, snd
ihe will freely (leterniines and chuses after this perception, as i t
pleases. Generally indeed, and according to nature, the will
receives direction for its own choice or determination from the
perceptions of the understanding, where superior fitness or good-
iK'ss appears : In an unwise being it does not certainly and con-
stantly so c huso and determine : In a wise and good being it s i-
ivays chuses according lo this appearing fitness. But where (bii
superior f * -"— * -^ -^•^cs^ evvV^t \% >5kK>v^ oc does not «pp«"V | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 485 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | something extrinsical? It is granted indeed, that the will sometimes borrows a reason for its determination from various occasions or arguments; Sometimes from very strong motives, and the transcendently superior fitnesses of things does but just appear superior; and sometimes itself determines its own choice between things in themselves indifferent, and where there is no superior fitness at all, or at least none that appears.
Yet let it be again observed here, as I have intimated before, that when two equal things are proposed to the will, there may be a very sufficient reason why it should determine its choice in general some way or other, though there be no sufficient reason in the things themselves for determining in this way rather than that. There is very sufficient reason why a hungry man should eat, when two equal pieces of bread lie before him; but he may chuse which piece he will eat, without any other reason than because he will. So there may be very sufficient reason why God should create a world; but if you ask why he should create this sort of world rather than another, and this sort of creatures rather than others, which may be equally fit, he borrows the reason for it only from himself; his own good pleasure is a sufficient reason: He doth it because he will; nor is any other reason necessary besides his own self-determining power. It is supremely fit he should do what he pleases. Why must the will of God be such a passive power as is not able to act of and from itself?
Objection III. This doctrine of liberty represents the will of an intelligent being as a sort of blind power determining itself without reason in many instances, acting without any motive, chusing and preferring one thing to another without any ground of choice or preference; whereas in all intelligent beings, whether God or man, there are no such blind principles of choice or action.
Answer I. It is granted indeed, that this doctrine does not ascribe understanding, or sight and perception to the will, for that would be to confound those two distinct powers or principles in a spirit: But this doctrine keeps those two powers of understanding and will in their proper characters; the understanding sees or perceives truth and falsehood, fitness and unfitness, good and evil, as far as any such characters or qualities appear, and the will freely determines and chuses after this perception, as it pleases. Generally indeed, and according to nature, the will receives direction for its own choice or determination from the perceptions of the understanding, where superior fitness or goodness appears: In an unwise being it does not certainly and constantly so chuse and determine: In a wise and good being it always chuses according to this appearing fitness. But where this superior fitness either is not, or does not appear, | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY. 487
hat can possibly remain, but that the will of the wisest being;
unt forbear tocliu^e, act and determine at all, or else it must
stermine^ chase and act of itself and from itself.
AnsvTcr 11. Let it be remembered here, what has been hint-
i in some of the former sections, that thou<;h the understanding
nd will are not improperly represented as twu distinct powers of
spirit, yet they are not two dijstinct bein*^ or substances : It
I o ne and the same spirit, the same intelligent and rational being
lat both understands and wills, that perceives the fitness or
tM>duess of things, and that generally acts or chuses accord-
ig to this perce|)tioo : And therefore this one spirit, this
itional being which has the determinin*^ power as well as
le perceptive power, and which pro])erly determines and chu-
;s as well as perceives, is no such blind agent as the objec-
00 represents.
And yet it must be acknowledged, that where the fitnsss or
nfitness, the good or evil of things does not ap|>car to this ra*
onal being, or this spirit, where it can discover no sujicrior fit-
ess or goodness, there it must act by its own choice, and deter-
line itself as it pleases, when it has no other guide or rule for
df-determination : And the matter of fact in many instances is
> plain as not to be denied. >Vhen two cakes are set before a
ungry roan, in which no manner of difference appears either in
le colour, situation, qucintitv or inviting Qualities of them, it is
ideed his hunger is the motive which really determines him to
at one of them ; a nd it i s a rational, and not a b lind irrational action
f take one of these cakes and eat it. The man is guided by
^ason, so far as reason can possibly guide him. But when rea-
m utterly ceases to guide or direct the man, because of the
pality of the two cakes, there it must be merely the self-mo v-
1:^ power or the will of this rational being which determines
hich of the two cakes he shall eat, because there is no superior
lotive or reason to chuse one rather than the other. One might
ly the same concerning two new guineas, or new halfpence
fercd to our choice. In sucti a case, I plainly feel mysolf to
etcrmine my own choice in and of myself, and I am conscious
' n o superior motive, I know of nothing* without me that makes
e prefer one to the other : Now is i t po^tsible that I c an lyy deter-
lined by a superior motive or moral cause, of which I have no
lanner of knowledge, no consciousness, no idea? Js this a mo-
ve? Is t his suasion or moral casualty !
In this place I c annot forbear to cite what I have lately read
pon my review of these essay^^ in the notes on Archbishop
ung*s Treatise on the Origin of Evil : To argue still fhaf some
uuatt itnpercrptible causeSf some particular circumstances in our
v« bodie^^ or those about w,v, must determine even these setmia^*}^
^^differenl actions, is c ither running inlu ike absurdllij ojf ii\aku\ | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 486 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | that can possibly remain, but that the will of the wisest being must forbear to chuse, act and determine at all, or else it must determine, chuse and act of itself and from itself.
Answer II. Let it be remembered here, what has been hinted in some of the former sections, that though the understanding and will are not improperly represented as two distinct powers of spirit, yet they are not two distinct beings or substances: It one and the same spirit, the same intelligent and rational being that both understands and wills, that perceives the fitness or goodness of things, and that generally acts or chuses according to this perception: And therefore this one spirit, this national being which has the determining power as well as the perceptive power, and which properly determines and chuses as well as perceives, is no such blind agent as the object on represents.
And yet it must be acknowledged, that where the fitness or fitness, the good or evil of things does not appear to this rational being, or this spirit, where it can discover no superior fitness or goodness, there it must act by its own choice, and determine itself as it pleases, when it has no other guide or rule for self-determination: And the matter of fact in many instances is plain as not to be denied. When two cakes are set before a hungry man, in which no manner of difference appears either in colour, situation, quantity or inviting qualities of them, it is indeed his hunger is the motive which really determines him to eat one of them; and it is a rational, and not a blind irrational action to take one of these cakes and eat it. The man is guided by reason, so far as reason can possibly guide him. But when reason utterly ceases to guide or direct the man, because of the quality of the two cakes, there it must be merely the self-moving power or the will of this rational being which determines which of the two cakes he shall eat, because there is no superior motive or reason to chuse one rather than the other. One might say the same concerning two new guineas, or new halfpence offered to our choice. In such a case, I plainly feel myself to determine my own choice in and of myself, and I am conscious of no superior motive, I know of nothing without me that makes me prefer one to the other: Now is it possible that I can be determined by a superior motive or moral cause, of which I have noanner of knowledge, no consciousness, no idea? Is this a move? Is this suasion or moral casualty!
In this place I cannot forbear to cite what I have lately read upon my review of these essays, in the notes on Archbishop King's Treatise on the Origin of Evil: To argue still that some minute imperceptible causes, some particular circumstances in our own bodies, or those about us, must determine even these seemingly different actions, is either running into the absurdity of making | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
48S FREEDOM OF WtU*
US act upon motives which we do not apprehend : ar saving that
toe act mechanical Ij /y fhatis^ do not act at all; jind in the last
place, to saijy that zee are determined to chase any of these trifles
just as we happen to fix our thoughts upon it in particular at the
very instant of action, is either attributing all to the self-moving
poicer of the mind^ which is granting the question; or else re-
f erring us to the minuteand imperceptible causes above-mentioned;
or else obtruding upon us that idle unmeaning tcord cliance instead
of a pht/sical cause^ tchich is saying nothing at alL How hard
must men be pressed under an hypothesis, when they fly to such
evasive shifh as these ! How much easier and belter would it b e to
give up ail such unknown and unaccountable impulses, and otrn
that both common sense and experience dictate an independent,
free, self moving principle, the true, the obvious, the only source
of action? pa'jjc 165, edit. 1st.
Objociioii IV. But whatsoever may be said of the blind and
arbitrary determinations of the will of man, without reason and
without motive, surely it is not so with the great and blessed
(lod ; all his actions are wise, and fit, and ^ood : Ills will al-
ways chnses and determines iiccoi'din;2^ to the fitness or unfitness
of things : Me never does any tiling in an virbilPiiry manner, or
by mere will and plea^jure ; and tlioui^h wu are at a loss to find
o'lt the superior filncss or uiifilHes.s oi* many things by which the
divisic A>ill is drterniined to ohuse or k':*rus(», yrt he who hath
all the infiJiite ideas of things real ii!:»? po^bible within the
grasp of liis understanding, can sec t[.^ v' sujjciior fitnesses
or unfitnesses which are unsearchable to r.s, and he always de-
termines and acts according to them : for infinite wisdom can-
not act otherwise.
Answer. To guard against the charge of supposin;; the
groat (iod to act in an arbitrary manner, without good reason,
and without fit motives, let it b e again considered, what has Lceii
often hinted heibre, that Goil never decrees or acts in general
without a just design and reason for it, and a proper end to be
obtained by it : as ibr instance ; i f God determine to create ra-
ther than not to create, there was probably a reason for it taken
from the consecjurnces of creation which the blessed God design-
ed, and iKid in his view : But when several distinct and difl'erebt
creatures or worlds a])pear in idea to his infinite uuderstandin;,
in any of wiiich there is no superior litness, but which in them-
selves are r<|uallyfit, and by each of wi:ich, considered as means,
he may ecpially obtain the same end, then he must chnse one of
these means, tirat is, one of these worlds in particular, only by
the determination of his own will : And if this be called sove-
reign and arbitrary conduct, it is still no more than the eter-
nal nature of things nqniirs, and it shews him to be a pro-
per vovc-reigu oser a\V \\\s et\i^\\\ves^ and to have a complete | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 487 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | us act upon motives which we do not apprehend: or saying that we act mechanically, that is, do not act at all; And in the last place, to say, that we are determined to chuse any of these trifles just as we happen to fix our thoughts upon it in particular at the very instant of action, is either attributing all to the self-moving power of the mind, which is granting the question; or else referring us to the minute and imperceptible causes above-mentioned; or else obtruding upon us that idle unmeaning word chance instead of a physical cause, which is saying nothing at all. How hard must men be pressed under an hypothesis, when they fly to such evasive shifts as these! How much easier and better would it be to give up all such unknown and unaccountable impulses, and own that both common sense and experience dictate an independent, free, self-moving principle, the true, the obvious, the only source of action? page 165, edit. 1st.
Objection IV. But whatsoever may be said of the blind and arbitrary determinations of the will of man, without reason and without motive, surely it is not so with the great and blessed God; all his actions are wise, and fit, and good: His will always chuses and determines according to the fitness or unfitness of things: He never does anything in an arbitrary manner, or by mere will and pleasure; and though we are at a loss to find out the superior fitness or unfitness of many things by which the divine will is determined to chuse or refuse, yet he who hath all the infinite ideas of things real and possible within the grasp of his understanding, can see those superior fitnesses or unfitnesses which are unsearchable to us, and he always determines and acts according to them: for infinite wisdom cannot act otherwise.
Answer. To guard against the charge of supposing the great God to act in an arbitrary manner, without good reason, and without fit motives, let it be again considered, what has been often hinted before, that God never decrees or acts in general without a just design and reason for it, and a proper end to be obtained by it: as for instance; if God determine to create rather than not to create, there was probably a reason for it taken from the consequences of creation which the blessed God designed, and had in his view: But when several distinct and different creatures or worlds appear in idea to his infinite understanding, in any of which there is no superior fitness, but which in themselves are equally fit, and by each of which, considered as means, he may equally obtain the same end, then he must chuse one of these means, that is, one of these worlds in particular, only by the determination of his own will: And if this be called sovereign and arbitrary conduct, it is still no more than the eternal nature of things requires, and it shews him to be a proper sovereign over all his creatures, and to have a complete | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY. 489
iccloni of iudifierencc or absolute clioioc in these his deter*
nations.
Objection V. Pcrlinps it will be objected here, that if two
inga are perfectly rqiiul, and if the will of God or man deter-
iues itself to chuse one of (hem withont a sulTiiiifnt reason
ken from the thin<^ii, to determine it, then it is deleniiined by
ere chance or accident : Now it in very hard to snppjse con.
ming any wise bein^, and especiitlly concerninn^ t!ie all -wise
od, that in any instance of action he is determined by chance.
Answer. Chance is a word invonted to sij^^niry the produc-
>n of an effect in the corporeal world, wliosc cause wc see not,
id for which we cannot account ; then we say, it cumc by
lance, as thougli there was no cause of it. Clinnces or acci-
.'nts are such events as wc see n(»t the train of causes which
rodncc them. But in the act^ of the will tliere is nothin:;^ can
e ascribed to chance, for the will itself is the obvious cause of
8 own determinations. The word chance always means some-
iiug done without desii^n. CIranco and design stand in direct
[ipoMtion to each oilier ; ami ronscqui'ntly chance can never be
roperly applied to acts of the i\iil, which is the spring of all de-
fTfif and which designs to chuse whatsoever it doth chuse, wlie«
ler there be any superior fitness in the thin*; it chuses or no;,
nd it d esigns to determine itself to one thing where two things
erfectly equal are proposed, inorrly because it will. Nor can I
[link of any way to refute this doctrine which I have here pro-
ofed, unless we could prove that amongst all the infinite medi-
ms which may appear to the human or the divine mind towards
lie attiunment of any proposed end, there are no two mecliums
liat are equal, or which cannot be equally accommodated to
beir own purposes : And I think this is more than any man can
»rove. But this introduces the last objection.
VI. If we may judge of things by the nicest observations
hat we can possibly make among all the beings we know or con*
erse with^ there is no such thing in nature, nor ever was, as
wo things prop<'sed to the will of God or man which are per*
pctly equal or inditterent, or wherein every circumstance was so
ntirely alike, that there is no reason for the will to incline to
me aiae rather than the other. There is no such thing as two
caves of a tree exactly alike; you may travel and search till
four feet and your eyes ache, and never find them. Even in
wo grains of sand, or two dro]>s of milk or water, microscopes
ifill always shew you some difference ; and therefore this doctrine
)f two or more things perfectly eciual is founded upon a mere
maginary supiiosition, and the hypothesis that is built upon it
auinot stand.
Answer. What if there are no two leaves of tree*, w^ Vk^
^ins of sand, or dropn of water or uV\\k YctfccA>i ^^fi^^^ ^^^i- | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 488 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
489
sedom of indifference or absolute choice in these his determinations.
Objection V. Perhaps it will be objected here, that if two things are perfectly equal, and if the will of God or man determines itself to chuse one of them without a sufficient reason taken from the things, to determine it, then it is determined by mere chance or accident: Now it is very hard to suppose concerning any wise being, and especially concerning the all-wise god, that in any instance of action he is determined by chance.
Answer. Chance is a word invented to signify the production of an effect in the corporeal world, whose cause we see not, and for which we cannot account; then we say, it came by chance, as though there was no cause of it. Chances or accidents are such events as we see not the train of causes which produce them. But in the acts of the will there is nothing can be ascribed to chance, for the will itself is the obvious cause of our own determinations. The word chance always means something done without design. Chance and design stand in direct opposition to each other; and consequently chance can never be properly applied to acts of the will, which is the spring of all designs, and which designs to chuse whatsoever it doth chuse, whether there be any superior fitness in the thing it chuses or no; and it designs to determine itself to one thing where two things perfectly equal are proposed, merely because it will. Nor can I think of any way to refute this doctrine which I have here proposed, unless we could prove that amongst all the infinite mediums which may appear to the human or the divine mind towards the attainment of any proposed end, there are no two mediums that are equal, or which cannot be equally accommodated to their own purposes: And I think this is more than any man can prove. But this introduces the last objection.
VI. If we may judge of things by the nicest observations that we can possibly make among all the beings we know or converse with, there is no such thing in nature, nor ever was, as two things proposed to the will of God or man which are perfectly equal or indifferent, or wherein every circumstance was so entirely alike, that there is no reason for the will to incline to one side rather than the other. There is no such thing as two caves of a tree exactly alike; you may travel and search till your feet and your eyes ache, and never find them. Even in two grains of sand, or two drops of milk or water, microscopes will always shew you some difference; and therefore this doctrine of two or more things perfectly equal is founded upon a mere imaginary supposition, and the hypothesis that is built upon it cannot stand.
Answer. What if there are no two leaves of trees, no two grains of sand, or drops of water or milk perfectly alike, be- | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
490 FREEDOM or 1»1tX.
eansc tliey are all compounded bodies * Yet in two bodiei per-
fectly simple, such as two pioces of solid matter without a pore,
there may be perfect ef]iiality and likeness. And surely if Dot ia
fact, yet in the divine idea of poswbles there may be many parts
of matter perfectly like and eiiual. If we are allowed to talk of
two diHiiiict parts of time, or disltnct parts of space in which iha
wwld might have bcoo created, it must be confessed that tboie
parts of space or time are perfectly alike, and consequently that
the determination of the will of Ood to create llic world in ooc
of thrse parts of lime or space rather than anoilicr, was entirely
from liis own will. If one would descend to the minute spedte
particles of which distinct bodies arc comjrased, we should lee
tbuudaot reason to believe llierc are thousands nf such little {ar-
ticles or atoms of matter, which are perfectly equal and alike,
aud could i^ve no distinct dclenniiialion 1o the will of God where
to place thvm. Id it not acknowledged by philosophers that the
diuerent kinds of bodies are made up of corpuscles, of diAereat
shapes and diifc re lit sizes; but that eacli particular kind is made
nf similar corpuscles, and nearly equal also i Thus for instance,
the particles of commou water have some eascntiul difference
from the particles uf oil, blond, (juicksilvcr, animal or vegetable
juices, and other liquids; but they are, iu a great measure, if
not universally, similar among themselves : N ow if we consider
the immense quantity of pure water which is iu this world, and
the innumerable ^mall essential particles tliatcompose it, ia there
not abundant reason to suppose that millions of these particles are
equal and alike, rather tlian to imuginc that God the Creator
took special care that among the iDiuimerable niillioDs of these
aqueous particles wliicli he made in all the rivers and oceans in
the ivorld, there should not he two of them alike and equal ;
and yet that all of them should he lio nearly equal, and somui^
alike, as to distinguish them from the particles of all othur
bodies ?
Wo miglit use the same sort of reasoning concerning Ibe
particles that compose air, lii^ht, sun-beams, concerning earth,
sand, stone and chalk, concerning grass, herbs, leaves and
trees ; t he hair, skin, flesh and boueN i>{ animals, and all other
specific particles of bodies whether solid or fluid, that compoic
(his lower world: VVc might ascend lo the sun, the vastest of
all the bodies, and consider the iiilinite myriads of luminous or
fiery panicles which go to compose it, o r which have been issuing
from it every moment siucc its orealion, and all these perhipi
are vastly more iu number than go to com|>Dse all the planets put
together, and then enquire wliethcr there ore nut two of all
thc!ie )>ar1icles exactly alike : This argument would run through
the whole universe of the planetary worlds, with all their cou-
tents and iuhabilants ; and can we supposv that the Creator took | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 489 | 635 | 647.25 | 1,156.5 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | cause they are all compounded bodies? Yet in two bodies perfectly simple, such as two pieces of solid matter without a pore, there may be perfect equality and likeness. And surely if not in fact, yet in the divine idea of possibilities there may be many parts of matter perfectly like and equal. If we are allowed to talk of two distinct parts of time, or distinct parts of space in which the world might have been created, it must be confessed that these parts of space or time are perfectly alike, and consequently that the determination of the will of God to create the world in one of these parts of time or space rather than another, was entirely from his own will. If one would descend to the minute specific particles of which distinct bodies are composed, we should see abundant reason to believe there are thousands of such little particles or atoms of matter, which are perfectly equal and alike, and could give no distinct determination to the will of God where to place them. Is it not acknowledged by philosophers that the different kinds of bodies are made up of corpuscles, of different shapes and different sizes; but that each particular kind is made of similar corpuscles, and nearly equal also? Thus for instance, the particles of common water have some essential difference from the particles of oil, blood, quicksilver, animal or vegetable juices, and other liquids; but they are, in a great measure, if not universally, similar among themselves: Now if we consider the immense quantity of pure water which is in this world, and the innumerable small essential particles that compose it, is there not abundant reason to suppose that millions of these particles are equal and alike, rather than to imagine that God the Creator took special care that among the innumerable millions of these aqueous particles which he made in all the rivers and oceans in the world, there should not be two of them alike and equal; and yet that all of them should be so nearly equal, and so much alike, as to distinguish them from the particles of all other bodies?
We might use the same sort of reasoning concerning the particles that compose air, light, sun-beams, concerning earth, sand, stone and chalk, concerning grass, herbs, leaves and trees; the hair, skin, flesh and bones of animals, and all other specific particles of bodies whether solid or fluid, that compose this lower world: We might ascend to the sun, the vastest of all the bodies, and consider the infinite myriads of luminous or fiery particles which go to compose it, or which have been issuing from it every moment since its creation, and all these perhaps are vastly more in number than go to compose all the planets put together, and then enquire whether there are not two of all these particles exactly alike: This argument would run through the whole universe of the planetary worlds, with all their contents and inhabitants; and can we suppose that the Creator took | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AS ESSAY. 491
:^h exact care as never to make tvro particles of any bo<1y per*
;lly equal and similar, and at the Hame time that he look care
make I'ach of them so nearly equal and similar as to kee|> all
3 particles of one species of bo<livs in shape and size siiiiicieutly
lUnct from the pai'tioles that compose every other sjM'cies ? llo
It can suppose this, plainly appears to serve an hypothesis. It
evident enough thut the objector^s supposition, tliat there are
two thinc^s equal und alike, is only brought in to oppose this
ctrine which 1 have laid down, and that without any proof, or
leed |)robahility : And the sup[)osition that there are or may
a multitude of things which ai-e entirely alike and equal, is
rtainly a possible thing, and vastly the more probable of the
o. If we had no proof of it, yet the various ditKeuUies or
laming absurdities that i>re88 hard upon the contrary sup|k)ftition,
s. that no two thinga arc eqnaly and that the will of God or
m is alwat/s detauiinvd by soma superior Jifncss of IhiagSp
Kild incline one to renounca that hy^xithcsis. These will be
presented at large in the next section.
Since the first edition of this bot>k an ingenious friend hat
3|K>sed this objection, viz. If dod cxcrls his creating power^
hath some reason for it taken from the prefer ableness of the
'stencc of xehat he creates to its non-existence ; otherwiie he
aid never create at all. To this I answer, This is more thau
] b e proved, fur the non-existenco of that creature may be as
in itself as the existence of it ; and Clod might have created
other being o(|ually fit in the room of if, by the mere deter-
nation of his own will. My friend goes on, If of two possible
'^ects eq I f a/ It/ J it to be c/ioseny he gives existence to ontj leaV'^
If t he other in its non-existent statf, the reason of his creating
t one is the absence of am/ good reason J o r creating of both,
iswer. It is possible there might be equal reason foir the crea«
n of one or of both, that is, no reason at all in superior fit*
ss : but the existence of one rather than both may be entirely
ing to the will of God. Or suppose God was determined by
lerior fitness to create one out of two |K>ssibles rather than
ih, yet the existence or the non-existence of either of them
•ne, may have equal fitness, though the existence of both
)uid be supposed unfit. But liow ready are we to lose and
ifound our thoughts in this abstract reasoning u|K)n divine
us and decrees, which are iudced too high and too hard for us ;
li i t becomes us not to be too |>ositive and presumptuous upoa
licr side of such sublime and abstruse reasonings.
CT. VII. — The Dijjiculties that attend the contrary Scheme.
When we enter into a narrow disquisition of the eternal
msels of God, and the determinations of his will, perhaps we
ill find some difiicultics pressing us ou all sides, which cannot | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 490 | 635 | 640.8 | 1,239.84 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
such exact care as never to make two particles of any body perfectly equal and similar, and at the same time that he took care to make each of them so nearly equal and similar as to keep all the particles of one species of bodies in shape and size sufficiently distinct from the particles that compose every other species? He can suppose this, plainly appears to serve an hypothesis. It evident enough that the objector's supposition, that there are two things equal and alike, is only brought in to oppose this doctrine which I have laid down, and that without any proof, or slight probability: And the supposition that there are or may be a multitude of things which are entirely alike and equal, is certainly a possible thing, and vastly the more probable of the two. If we had no proof of it, yet the various difficulties or seeming absurdities that press hard upon the contrary supposition, that no two things are equal, and that the will of God or man is always determined by some superior fitness of things, would incline one to renounce that hypothesis. These will be presented at large in the next section.
Since the first edition of this book an ingenious friend has opposed this objection, viz. If God exerts his creating power, with some reason for it taken from the preferableness of the existence of what he creates to its non-existence; otherwise he would never create at all. To this I answer, This is more than to be proved, for the non-existence of that creature may be as in itself as the existence of it; and God might have created another being equally fit in the room of it, by the mere determination of his own will. My friend goes on, If of two possible objects equally fit to be chosen, he gives existence to one, leaving the other in its non-existent state, the reason of his creating one is the absence of any good reason for creating of both. Answer. It is possible there might be equal reason for the creation of one or of both, that is, no reason at all in superior fitness: but the existence of one rather than both may be entirely ingenuous to the will of God. Or suppose God was determined by superior fitness to create one out of two possibles rather than both, yet the existence or the non-existence of either of them one, may have equal fitness, though the existence of both should be supposed unfit. But how ready are we to lose and confound our thoughts in this abstract reasoning upon divine laws and decrees, which are indeed too high and too hard for us; and it becomes us not to be too positive and presumptuous upon her side of such sublime and abstruse reasonings.
CT. VII.—The Difficulties that attend the contrary Scheme.
When we enter into a narrow disquisition of the eternal insols of God, and the determinations of his will, perhaps we will find some difficulties pressing us on all sides, which cannot | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
492 FRFFEnM or WILL.
be clearly and cnrnplotcly relieved by the understandiD^ and
reasoning porvcTs of man, at Icust in this present state. I do
not prrlrpi'l that my set of sentiments is entirely free from all:
But the chief diflicnlty is to fnul any scheme which has less or
fewer than this which 1 have re|)resented. Till I see that done,
I think I must be content to abide where I am. It is possible I
may meet with some new objections against mine, which I had
not thought of before ; b ut while every scheme has some barri-
ahips, 1 |>ersuade myself that hypothesis may still be aih>wcMl to
come nearest to the trutli, which has the least and fewest difli-
cullies attending it. But when the diilictilties are many more
and greater which hang upon any ono human scheme than do
upon another, we are naturally led to suppose that such a scheme
can never be true, or at least that it is by no means so probable
as the opposite. Let us then consider what will be the oontie-
quences of supposing that the divine will in all its determination!!
and decrees whatsoever, is universally, certainly and unalterably
influenced by the superior fitness of things.
Difficulty I. Then there is nothing amongst all the works of
God's creation, or his provideiico, or his government of creatures
througli tiuie or eternity, left free to him with a liberty of choice
or indiflerence, since this opinion supposes there is but one single
train of fittest things, or one set of things supremely lit anioDS[
all the millions of supposed possibles that come within the divine
survey. Has it not beeii always said, and that with great truth
and justice, that all creatures ure contingent beings, and that
they might not have been. But according to this 8up|)osition no
creature existinjr is a contingent being, ior its superior fitneiis
made its existence necessary. And upon this hypothesis every
atom in j':e creation, togeth'-r with the shape of it, and the wze
and .-.ifriaiion of it through the whole universe, every motion in
the Horlfl of eorj)oreal nature appointed by God, together willi
th<' limes and ju-riods, minutes and moments of every event, the
Jea^t as well as the greatest, except those which are introduced
by inferior sj>irils, are all eiernally necessary, because they are
the fittest that could be.
And [ might a<ld, then are i:s unchangeably necessary as the
being of (iod himself, that is, vviih a conseipiential, if not uitb
a sinujjtaiieuus ntcessity ; f or at least from the very position of
his essence ami existence, nil conculvable thincTs, with all their
infinite relations and their eter;ial Illnesses aiise, and they all
appear to his \ie\v : And the only one scheme of things which is
most fit, is necessarily determined by him into existence and
actual fufiirity, \\h\i all theminiiles,! j)aris audajipendices thereof,
becJMJse Ik* sets the superior iitiiv'>s of then) all : Thus the least
n/)/)earance and <'\enl in the corjuireal world throughout fill
the nin's of ei\»A\\ou awA yyoVwVvwv^v^ U unulierahly necessary, | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 491 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | be clearly and completely relieved by the understanding and reasoning powers of man, at least in this present state. I do not pretend that my set of sentiments is entirely free from all: But the chief difficulty is to find any scheme which has less or fewer than this which I have represented. Till I see that done, I think I must be content to abide where I am. It is possible I may meet with some new objections against mine, which I had not thought of before; but while every scheme has some hardships, I persuade myself that hypothesis may still be allowed to come nearest to the truth, which has the least and fewest difficulties attending it. But when the difficulties are many more and greater which hang upon any one human scheme than do upon another, we are naturally led to suppose that such a scheme can never be true, or at least that it is by no means so probable as the opposite. Let us then consider what will be the consequences of supposing that the divine will in all its determinations and decrees whatsoever, is universally, certainly and unalterably influenced by the superior fitness of things.
Difficulty I. Then there is nothing amongst all the works of God’s creation, or his providence, or his government of creatures through time or eternity, left free to him with a liberty of choice or indifference, since this opinion supposes there is but one single train of fittest things, or one set of things supremely fit among all the millions of supposed possibles that come within the divine survey. Has it not been always said, and that with great truth and justice, that all creatures are contingent beings, and that they might not have been. But according to this supposition no creature existing is a contingent being, for its superior fitness made its existence necessary. And upon this hypothesis every atom in the creation, together with the shape of it, and the size and situation of it through the whole universe, every motion in the world of corporeal nature appointed by God, together with the times and periods, minutes and moments of every event, the least as well as the greatest, except those which are introduced by inferior spirits, are all eternally necessary, because they are the fittest that could be.
And I might add, they are as unchangeably necessary as the being of God himself, that is, with a consequential, if not with a simultaneous necessity; for at least from the very position of his essence and existence, all conceivable things, with all their infinite relations and their eternal fitnesses arise, and they all appear to his view: And the only one scheme of things which is most fit, is necessarily determined by him into existence and actual futurity, with all the minutest parts and appendices thereof, because he sees the superior fitness of them all: Thus the least appearance and event in the corporeal world throughout all the ages of creation and providence, is unalterably necessary, | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY. 4d3
if not equally necessary with Grocrs own bcins;. Let us see now
how such a propositioo would sound, and with what aspect such
macheroe of things wouhl appear to our minds, if we enter into
the detail of them. Then God could not have abstained from
making this our world at all, nor from making it just such as it
is, nor withheld his hand from creation one moment longer :
then he could not have made one more planet or star, or one less
than he has done : nay, not so much as one atom or dust more or
less in any star or planet, nor have placed them in any other
brm. He could not have given the sun one more beam, nor
any morning since the creation one more gleam of light, or ono
less siiade of darkness. Then the ever-blessed God oould not
bave been happy one moment longer in solitude, or without crea-
tures, nor begun to form any part of this universe, or this globe
earlier or later than he did ; nor could he liave caused one spire
of ^rass to grow on this earth, nor one drop of water in the sea,
nor one sand more or less at the bottom of it. He could not con-
tinue the material world, nor any atom of it a moment longer
in existence, nor have fixed the periods even of the minutest
beins^ any otherwise than he has done. Not a drop of rain
cuultl fail, not a particle of water flow, nor a dusky atom of
smoke ascend in any other manner, nor at any other minute
than it doth ; nor could the great God have decreed it other*
ivise in the least ])unctilio, so far as mere corporeal nature la
concerned therein, because each of these was supremely fit,
log^c*thcr with the original train of causes which necessarily pro-
duced them.
But if it be allowed, that in any of these minute and incon-
kftiderable things, God may determine freely and merely by hia
Dwii will without superior fitness, why may he not determine ten
thousand other tilings, whicli seem to us of greater importance,
merely by his own will without superior fitness ? But on the
ooiitrary, if God cannot do any thing without the view of supe-
rior fitness, this difficulty will extend to the aflkirs of human
nature also, and to the works of providence, redemption and
qrace, as well as to the inanimate world and God's creating
iniluences. The Americans and the Hottentots could not have
heen formed otherwise than under such special disadvantages;
nor could Great Britain have had tlie gospel withheld from
it one moment longer. Xor indeed, according to this scheme,
could God have withheld his Son from being sent to redeem
the world, nor withheld his Spirit with all its gifts and in-
fluences from the inhabitants of this globe, nor have omitted
any one miracle towards the propagation of this gos^pel ; f or
the will of God was absolutely determined to do all this by itsf
luperior fitness.
What strange doctrine is this, contrary to a\V oMt \>\^^s ^1 | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 492 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
if not equally necessary with God’s own being. Let us see now how such a proposition would sound, and with what aspect such a scheme of things would appear to our minds, if we enter into the detail of them. Then God could not have abstained from making this our world at all, nor from making it just such as it is, nor withheld his hand from creation one moment longer: then he could not have made one more planet or star, or one less than he has done: nay, not so much as one atom or dust more or less in any star or planet, nor have placed them in any other form. He could not have given the sun one more beam, nor any morning since the creation one more gleam of light, or one less shade of darkness. Then the ever-blessed God could not have been happy one moment longer in solitude, or without creatures, nor begun to form any part of this universe, or this globe earlier or later than he did; nor could he have caused one spire of grass to grow on this earth, nor one drop of water in the sea, nor one sand more or less at the bottom of it. He could not continue the material world, nor any atom of it a moment longer in existence, nor have fixed the periods even of the minutest beings any otherwise than he has done. Not a drop of rain could fall, not a particle of water flow, nor a dusky atom of smoke ascend in any other manner, nor at any other minute than it doth; nor could the great God have decreed it otherwise in the least punctilio, so far as mere corporeal nature is concerned therein, because each of these was supremely fit, together with the original train of causes which necessarily produced them.
But if it be allowed, that in any of these minute and inconsiderable things, God may determine freely and merely by his own will without superior fitness, why may he not determine ten thousand other things, which seem to us of greater importance, merely by his own will without superior fitness? But on the contrary, if God cannot do any thing without the view of superior fitness, this difficulty will extend to the affairs of human nature also, and to the works of providence, redemption and grace, as well as to the inanimate world and God’s creating influences. The Americans and the Hottentots could not have been formed otherwise than under such special disadvantages; nor could Great Britain have had the gospel withheld from it one moment longer. Nor indeed, according to this scheme, could God have withheld his Son from being sent to redeem the world, nor withheld his Spirit with all its gifts and influences from the inhabitants of this globe, nor have omitted any one miracle towards the propagation of this gospel; for the will of God was absolutely determined to do all this by its superior fitness.
What strange doctrine is this, contrary to all our ideas of | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
401 FREEDOM OF WILL.
the Nonunion of God ? Does it not destroy the s:lory of hu
liberty of choice, and take away from the Creator and Uovernor
and Benefactor of tlic world, that must free and sovereijs^n a^nl^
all iho g^lory of this sort of freedom t Does it not seem to
muke liim a kind of intelligent instrument of eternal necessity,
an almost medianical medium of fate, and introduce Mr.
Uohbes^s doctrine of fatality and necessity into all things thit
ih}A hath to do with P Doth it not seem to represent Gcd ass
being of vast understanding and consciousness, as well as of
power and etticicncy, but still to leave him without a will to chuie
among all the objects within his view ? In short, it seems to
make the blessed God a sort of almighty minister of fate under
its universal and supreme influence. Thus speaks the heatiiea
stoic in a tragedy :
" Qnse nexa suis curnint caosis
Noil licet i|isum vertisse Jovsm." — Seneat,
*' Thus causes nio, a lun^ connected train ;
Not Jove himself can break tli' eternal chiiin."
And it was the professed sentiment of sonic of the andentSy
tli'dt fate zcas above the gods.
Is it not abundantly better to suppose that among theinfi*
nite variety oi possibles in the survey of the great God, there
niii^hlbe many schemes of grand design, and many mediums of
aeeoni|>]ishment, both in the larger and minuter parts of tbeniy
wliicli inigiit be equally fit and proper ? And that God by hii
own will determined which scheme he would chuse, and wbich
medium he would tnuke use of to bring it to pass ? And tlist he
made or rendered this particular scheme and these mediums be-
come, if I may so express it, more fit and good, that is, pleas-
ing and agreeable by his own chusing them ? So a man, when
be has once chosen for himself one thing out of many which he
proposed to himself, and all which before ap|>eared to him to be
ecpially good, makes that which he has chosen particularly more
agreeable and good to himself by his choice of it, and for ever
after prefers it because his own will has actually chosen it : H e
delights in his own free choice.
Objection. Perhaps it may be replied hti^e^ that even accord'
iNg to the scheme that 1 have proposed^ all those things arc al-
lo'Ct'd to be etenialljj and ttnchungtabhf necessary in zvhich G(td
beholds a superior fitness ; and these perhaps are far more i«
number than those uhich have no such superior fitnessy or
which in themselves are equal and indijferent : And then i^
xiciU follow that even in this scheme of viine^/ataliti/ is iidrO'
iluced into Jar the greatest parts of the works of Cod,* For
* Another objection is raised here. If therr be any one tbin|r to which
God if luflaeuced by tupetiot (ivueM, x^sivi \%f4V%\vv^ : and if «acb a fjitalitj b< | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 493 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | the dominion of God? Does it not destroy the glory of his liberty of choice, and take away from the Creator and Governor and Benefactor of the world, that most free and sovereign agent, all the glory of this sort of freedom? Does it not seem to make him a kind of intelligent instrument of eternal necessity, an almost mechanical medium of fate, and introduce Mr. Hobbes's doctrine of fatality and necessity into all things that God hath to do with? Doth it not seem to represent God as a being of vast understanding and consciousness, as well as of power and efficiency, but still to leave him without a will to chuse among all the objects within his view? In short, it seems to make the blessed God a sort of almighty minister of fate under its universal and supreme influence. Thus speaks the heathen stoic in a tragedy:
"Quæ nexa suis current causis
Non licet ipsum vertisse Jovem."—Seneca.
"Thus causes run, a long connected train;
Not Jove himself can break th' eternal chain."
And it was the professed sentiment of some of the ancients, that fate was above the gods.
Is it not abundantly better to suppose that among the infinite variety of possibles in the survey of the great God, there might be many schemes of grand design, and many mediums of accomplishment, both in the larger and minuter parts of them, which might be equally fit and proper? And that God by his own will determined which scheme he would chuse, and which medium he would make use of to bring it to pass? And that he made or rendered this particular scheme and these mediums become, if I may so express it, more fit and good, that is, pleasing and agreeable by his own chusing them? So a man, when he has once chosen for himself one thing out of many which he proposed to himself, and all which before appeared to him to be equally good, makes that which he has chosen particularly more agreeable and good to himself by his choice of it, and for ever after prefers it because his own will has actually chosen it: He delights in his own free choice.
Objection. Perhaps it may be replied here, that even according to the scheme that I have proposed, all those things are allowed to be eternally and unchangeably necessary in which God beholds a superior fitness; and these perhaps are far more in number than those which have no such superior fitness, or which in themselves are equal and indifferent: And then it will follow that even in this scheme of mine, fatality is introduced into far the greatest parts of the works of God.* For
* Another objection is raised here. If there be any one thing to which God is influenced by superior fitness, this is fatality; and if such a fatality be | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY. 4»5
^thert be the least degree of inequality in anv trto or more
MettSj the divine visdom beholds ity a?td Jlmh out the supe*
mrfitnestf and is determined threby ; And then profmbly
there are but few thins^s left xvhick hare such a perftrt equality
'n t hem^ as to be the objects of f ree choice : All the rest is mere
ite.
Answer. But to this I answer, That if we suppose no more
lisn two diBerent sorts of worlds to have had e(|ual fiiiioss in the
ifine view, before lie chose to create one of them, tos^ctlicr with
lie creatures and the inhabitants in tlieni, then it follows that
iTcrj creature and every circumstance of every creature in this
ne universe or world, which God lias actually chosen and
retted, were all matters of indiRerence, and conserjuentiy were
he object of his free choice : F^or thous^h every creature in this
iniverse, or the world which is now made, sliould be allowed to
lave a superior fitness with rej^rd to the place it hohls in this
iresent universe, which is very im])robable, and more than can
>e proved, yet I think we must own that every individual part
If creature of this world, together with this world itself, once
itood in the view of God as a matter of more indiderence, and
ID object of free choice, since another sort of world miii;ht have
been created, with all its diftereut parts, creatures or inhabitants.
AVe might proceed furthur, and say the same concerning every
aingle planet, and the creatures or inhabitants in it, and perhaps
eoQcerniiig every large spot of land, every mountain, every
inland, every sea and river in any of these planets, that they
miglit have been altered as to some atoms or drops that com-
poiethem, though the other parts of that planetary world had
Wen the same : And this reasonable supposition provides objects
^ughforthe divine choice, and the freedom of the will of God
to exert itself. We niiglit also descend to niucli minuter ])arts
of t lie creation, to every tree, and leaf, and ilower, to every ])lant
ittd animal, to every feather and hair of fowl and beast, as well
u to the inanimate parts of any of these globes : There does
Dot seem to be an absolute necessity that every minute part, and
Ere a nd fibre of every species and of every individual should
precisely what they now are, even though tlie chief part of
>lliwcd in nn« thing why may it not in all ? Or if one or a few tuch iostanrns
loGudS workt do tiui infer fAtnlity, why shoulil many ur aU infer it? Aiihwer
'• A f we do riot charge the doctrin* uf fiiijlity ou men upon a Kuppniition of !<omr
»f the voliiionn or actions of mftn to be detf^rnained necessarily, sinre the rtsl
id jzretttst part are free, to neither can fatality he charged on f^od, since the
hiet and largest partftf hia actions ad extra are free also, a« will appear further
ti what fillowtf: II. WhatHntver ideas or propnnitiuns, wh'tt^oeT^r eternal
'uihf, or nilea of virtue may he necessary in the divine mind, yet there 'n not
) much aa the real existence of one creature necessary, and so fiitalitv is nt-
srly excluded ; since aU ciftAtr.d hein^^s are contingent t.Il th« will of Ood d'-
rrnainc tbem into existence. See JiHljuhy I. pfCeding. H'.c dUo the answer to
i« ubjectioD in this very page. | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 494 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
If there be the least degree of inequality in any two or more objects, the divine wisdom beholds it, and finds out the superior fitness, and is determined thereby; And then probably there are but few things left which have such a perfect equality in them, as to be the objects of free choice: All the rest is mere fate.
Answer. But to this I answer, That if we suppose no more than two different sorts of worlds to have had equal fitness in the divine view, before he chose to create one of them, together with the creatures and the inhabitants in them, then it follows that every creature and every circumstance of every creature in this universe or world, which God has actually chosen and created, were all matters of indifference, and consequently were the object of his free choice: For though every creature in this universe, or the world which is now made, should be allowed to have a superior fitness with regard to the place it holds in this present universe, which is very improbable, and more than can be proved, yet I think we must own that every individual part or creature of this world, together with this world itself, once stood in the view of God as a matter of mere indifference, and an object of free choice, since another sort of world might have been created, with all its different parts, creatures or inhabitants. We might proceed further, and say the same concerning every single planet, and the creatures or inhabitants in it, and perhaps concerning every large spot of land, every mountain, every island, every sea and river in any of these planets, that they might have been altered as to some atoms or drops that compose them, though the other parts of that planetary world had been the same: And this reasonable supposition provides objects enough for the divine choice, and the freedom of the will of God to exert itself. We might also descend to much minuter parts of the creation, to every tree, and leaf, and flower, to every plant and animal, to every feather and hair of fowl and beast, as well as to the inanimate parts of any of these globes: There does not seem to be an absolute necessity that every minute part, and pore and fibre of every species and of every individual should be precisely what they now are, even though the chief part of allowed in one thing why may it not in all? Or if one or a few such instances to God's works do not infer fatality, why should many or all infer it?
As we do not charge the doctrine of fatality on men upon a supposition of some of the volitions or actions of men to be determined necessarily, since the rest and greatest part are free, so neither can fatality be charged on God, since the chief and largest part of his actions ad extra are free also, as will appear further on what follows: II. Whatsoever ideas or propositions, whatsoever eternal truths, or rules of virtue may be necessary in the divine mind, yet there is not so much as the real existence of one creature necessary, and so fatality is merely excluded; since all created beings are contingent till the will of God determine them into existence. See difficulty I. preceding. See also the answer to the objection in this very page. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
406 FREEDOM OF WILL.
tlie form of each of tlimi were tlic same an it i s : And this vrill
8(ill provide now olijccU for the choice of God, and his perfect
liberty. Thus his actions of free choice in our world will Im
vastly more numerous tlian those to which he is any way deter*
niined hy a 8U peri or fitness. Nay, every act of God and his de«
termination of any or every circumstance relating to every crea-
ture in t lie present universe, will be an act of his free choice or
liberty of indifference, if we allow, as I said before, but two gt^
heral schemes of a creable universe to have been equally fit:
even though every particular part of each universe were sappo*
sod to be necessary to its own whole, and therefore supremely
fit in that particular universe, if language will allow such an ex-
pression. This doctrine therefore is so far from fatality in every
part of it, that it makes every creature or existent being in the
present natural world the object of God's free choice.
Didiculty II. According to this supposed scheme, that is,
if one sin<;le thing be the only fittest, and if God be determined
iiecesj^arily to this one thing, then the free grace and goodness
of (iod, and the special thuiikfulneMS of man for his benelitsi,
siem to bo much diminishcfd, and in some measure precluded ;
For in this >io\v of tiiinsrs, God could not bestow one grain of
favolu* more or less upon any creature than lie hath done ; uor
could lie have cho&en any other object for tlic exercise of bis
mercy arid goodness, either among the varieties of the animal or
intellectual creatures than what he has chosen. And would not
this take away a great part of my obligation to thankfulness for
any of his benolits, and in some measure cancel my obligations
to thank him for his choice of me to be the object of them, if I
nniai believe that God could not have withheld these benefits from
n.e, nor could have chosen any other object for those blessings
which he has made mcjmrtaker of, nor given me a grain less of
any good thing wiiich I enjoy relating to this life or another ?
It is true, you will say, God has done me as much good as he
could do, and therefore I am under the highest obligations to
him : liut lot it be remembered also, if I may dare to express
tin: co.':se«{ucnce of this opinion, that he has made me as un-
tujpjiy as 1)0 could make me, according to this seheme, and
's'-ii \\\\'}{\ior tins docs not diminish or vacate a great part of
this oinii;;itl(m.
V> ill not iliis destroy, or at least vastly abate the reasons of
t^ruliiinli- :ind l«)\e to God in those who receive his favours, wiiea
kind's ji:id slaves, rieh men and beggars, strong men and crip*
jiles, crealures \\ii()so lifo is fdled with pain and poverty, or
whose wiiolo period of life is alHuence and ease, were distin-
i^Miisijei cn!y an t necessarily by the superior fitness of their cir-
i'lnns^iii.c^'s r What is there of free uiercy in his ilisposal of be-
(M'fii^ ' WliaioaA VQ&a^o( tcv!(^vc^ vu the decree or providence | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 495 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | the form of each of them were the same as it is: And this will still provide new objects for the choice of God, and his perfect liberty. Thus his actions of free choice in our world will be vastly more numerous than those to which he is any way determined by a superior fitness. Nay, every act of God and his determination of any or every circumstance relating to every creature in the present universe, will be an act of his free choice or liberty of indifference, if we allow, as I said before, but two general schemes of a creable universe to have been equally fit: even though every particular part of each universe were supposed to be necessary to its own whole, and therefore supremely fit in that particular universe, if language will allow such an expression. This doctrine therefore is so far from fatality in every part of it, that it makes every creature or existent being in the present natural world the object of God's free choice.
Difficulty II. According to this supposed scheme, that is, if one single thing be the only fittest, and if God be determined necessarily to this one thing, then the free grace and goodness of God, and the special thankfulness of man for his benefits, seem to be much diminished, and in some measure precluded: For in this view of things, God could not bestow one grain of favour more or less upon any creature than he hath done; nor could he have chosen any other object for the exercise of his mercy and goodness, either among the varieties of the animal or intellectual creatures than what he has chosen. And would not this take away a great part of my obligation to thankfulness for any of his benefits, and in some measure cancel my obligations to thank him for his choice of me to be the object of them, if I must believe that God could not have withheld these benefits from me, nor could have chosen any other object for those blessings which he has made me partaker of, nor given me a grain less of any good thing which I enjoy relating to this life or another? It is true, you will say, God has done me as much good as he could do, and therefore I am under the highest obligations to him: But let it be remembered also, if I may dare to express the consequence of this opinion, that he has made me as unhappy as he could make me, according to this scheme, and see whether this does not diminish or vacate a great part of this obligation.
Will not this destroy, or at least vastly abate the reasons of gratitude and love to God in those who receive his favours, when kings and slaves, rich men and beggars, strong men and cripples, creatures whose life is filled with pain and poverty, or whose whole period of life is affluence and ease, were distinguished only and necessarily by the superior fitness of their circumstances? What is there of free mercy in his disposal of benefits? What can we find of mercy in the decree or providence | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY.
407
nf God, which distinguishes the hajipy from the miserable ?
Whwt \^ it that raises them above the others, but that God was
leeessarily determined to divide these distinct portions to them
ill by the superior fitness of things ? And have not Abraham the
Heod of God, David the King, Paul the apostle, Sir Isaac
Sfewton the philosopher, Judas the traitor, irus the cripple^
Daviis the slave, and Jack Adams the idiot, all equal reason
tt thankfulness to the free bounty of their Maker, since so far
IS he acted- in their composition of mind or body, or in their
Nriginal circumstances of h'fo, he determined each in such a
Murticular manner, because his own will was thus necessarily
Ictermined, and therefore he could not have done otherwise.
III. If there be but one such superior fitness among all the
mds and means which are in the comprehensive survey of God,
lod if God be under an unalterable necessity of determining
iccording to tliis superior fitness, thence it will follow that every
ihing possible is necessary, and every thinc^ that is not necessary
a i mpossible. There is scarce any real difference between thin^
lecessary, and things possible, even in the view of Go<l himseu^
looording to this scheme of all things being determined by su-
preme fitness. The difference is chieflv in our apprehension, by
reason of our short-siglited views of thmgs, who cannot discover
this superior fitness. But in reality, and in the sight of God,
leoording to this hypothesis, nothing is possible to be done by
Ghnl himself but what hath this superior fitness, and that is
ibrays necessary, and must be done. And according to this
Dfiinion also, what is not necessary is really impossible, and can
never come into existence, because it has not this superior fitness.
[n this way of thinking, there neither is, nor ever was a medium
leCween the necessity of what is future, and the impossibility of
bat which is not future, since there is but one fittest means or
nd, and is necessarily future ; b ut what is not fittest is for ever
mpossible, and always was so. Now does not this appear strange
ina incredible doctrine ?
I know it will be ol^ected here, that this way of talking
onfounds metaphysical necessity with moral necessity, which are
rery distinct things. A metaphysical necessity, say some, is a
lecessity arising from the essence or nature of things, and takes
ilace only where the opposite implies a contradiction ; so all the
temi- diameters of a circle are necessarily equal, because it i s in-
consistent in t he nature of things they should be unequal. But
I moral necessity is that whereby a most wise being is n ecessarily
ed to chuse that which is best, or to act that which is fittest.
ffow in this view there is a wide difference, say they, betwixt
;biDffS necessary and possible, that is, things that are mctaphy-
lically possible wherein there is no inconsistence in the nature of
ifalngs, and such are ten thousand essences which yet shall never
Vol. 17, I I | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 496 | 635 | 640.8 | 1,239.84 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
of God, which distinguishes the happy from the miserable?
What is it that raises them above the others, but that God was necessarily determined to divide these distinct portions to them all by the superior fitness of things? And have not Abraham the friend of God, David the King, Paul the apostle, Sir Isaac Newton the philosopher, Judas the traitor, Irus the cripple, Davus the slave, and Jack Adams the idiot, all equal reason of thankfulness to the free bounty of their Maker, since so far as he acted in their composition of mind or body, or in their original circumstances of life, he determined each in such a particular manner, because his own will was thus necessarily determined, and therefore he could not have done otherwise.
III. If there be but one such superior fitness among all the ends and means which are in the comprehensive survey of God, and if God be under an unalterable necessity of determining according to this superior fitness, thence it will follow that every thing possible is necessary, and every thing that is not necessary is impossible. There is scarce any real difference between things necessary, and things possible, even in the view of God himself, according to this scheme of all things being determined by supreme fitness. The difference is chiefly in our apprehension, by reason of our short-sighted views of things, who cannot discover this superior fitness. But in reality, and in the sight of God, according to this hypothesis, nothing is possible to be done by God himself but what hath this superior fitness, and that is always necessary, and must be done. And according to this opinion also, what is not necessary is really impossible, and can never come into existence, because it has not this superior fitness. In this way of thinking, there neither is, nor ever was a medium between the necessity of what is future, and the impossibility of what which is not future, since there is but one fittest means or end, and is necessarily future; but what is not fittest is for ever impossible, and always was so. Now does not this appear strange and incredible doctrine?
I know it will be objected here, that this way of talking confounds metaphysical necessity with moral necessity, which are very distinct things. A metaphysical necessity, say some, is a necessity arising from the essence or nature of things, and takes place only where the opposite implies a contradiction; so all the semi-diameters of a circle are necessarily equal, because it is inconsistent in the nature of things they should be unequal. But a moral necessity is that whereby a most wise being is necessarily used to chuse that which is best, or to act that which is fittest. Now in this view there is a wide difference, say they, betwixt things necessary and possible, that is, things that are metaphysically possible wherein there is no inconsistence in the nature of things, and such are ten thousand essences which yet shall never | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
498 FREEDOM »r WILL.
exiit : And tUs is very different from a thing; which u moraHf
DQceMary, that is, which an all^wise Being wills and chases out
of ten thousand supposed possibles, because of its superior fit-
ness, even though divine wisdom cannot chuse otherwise. Bat
to this I answer,
That in phifosophieal strictness and the troth of things, tiib
moral necessity and impossibility ^ and this metaphysical neoessittf
attd impossibility will appear to be very near a*kin : And thou^
there may be some difference between these two necessaries, viz.
moral and metaphysical, as to the immediate and proxime cause
aiwi reason of their necessity, yet the necessity oi both of them
is a physical or natural necessity, they are both equally strong
and unalterable, and the origiual cause and reason why both of
them are necessary, lies in the very nature of things. I might
say the same also concerning their impossibility : As for exam-
pie ; i f the being A cannot possibly exist because it carries in i t
some ideas or properties wliich are naturally inconsistent, so nei-
ther can B possibly exist, because it doth not carry in it a supe- '
rior fitness ; since, according to this hypothesis, it is inconsistent
^vith tlie nature of the all-wibe God to make B exist, because it
was not supremely fit ; and it is inconsistent in the ^nature of
tliiugs that B should ever come into existence, because it wanted
one property necessary to the possibility of its existing, and that
is supreme fitness : Thus from the very nature of God, and from
the nature of things, it is impossible that B should ever exiit.
And how much does tliis differ from a natural or physical impos-
sibility ? H ence it appears, according to this hy{xithesis, that it
was true from eternity that every thing was naturally impossible
which had not in its nature this superior fitness ; and if it
had in its nature this superior fitness, then it was not onlj
possible, hut had a sort of natural necessity to exist, which vms
the thing I undertook to prove, and which is the difficulty under
which this opinion still seems to labour, notwithstanding tlie ofier-
cd distinction.
IV. Another difficultv that seems to bear hard upon this
hypothesis, of all things being determined by superior fitness ^ i s
this, viz. Then there would be scarce any real difference between
the moral and the positive laws of God. The one would be
every whit as necessary as the other, both in themselves as laws,
and with regard to God the law-giver : For if all the positive
commands and institutions of God are given because he saw an
antecedent fitness and goodness in tliem superior to any other
commands that could be given at that time, and in Uiose circum-
stances ;a nd if ail his moral commands are given upon the same
reason, will it not follow that tiie positive laws are as ne^iessary
for that time and those circumstances as the moral laws are in c Il
1
titfies aiid circum^lauc(^%> l.^^^^ >vUQwing this difference, that | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 497 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | exist: And this is very different from a thing which is morally necessary, that is, which an all-wise Being wills and chuses out of ten thousand supposed possibilities, because of its superior fitness, even though divine wisdom cannot chuse otherwise. But to this I answer,
That in philosophical strictness and the truth of things, this moral necessity and impossibility, and this metaphysical necessity and impossibility will appear to be very near a-kin: And though there may be some difference between these two necessaries, viz. moral and metaphysical, as to the immediate and proxime cause and reason of their necessity, yet the necessity of both of them is a physical or natural necessity, they are both equally strong and unalterable, and the original cause and reason why both of them are necessary, lies in the very nature of things. I might say the same also concerning their impossibility: As for example; if the being A cannot possibly exist because it carries in it some ideas or properties which are naturally inconsistent, so neither can B possibly exist, because it doth not carry in it a superior fitness; since, according to this hypothesis, it is inconsistent with the nature of the all-wise God to make B exist, because it was not supremely fit; and it is inconsistent in the nature of things that B should ever come into existence, because it wanted one property necessary to the possibility of its existing, and that is supreme fitness: Thus from the very nature of God, and from the nature of things, it is impossible that B should ever exist. And how much does this differ from a natural or physical impossibility? Hence it appears, according to this hypothesis, that it was true from eternity that every thing was naturally impossible which had not in its nature this superior fitness; and if it had in its nature this superior fitness, then it was not only possible, but had a sort of natural necessity to exist, which was the thing I undertook to prove, and which is the difficulty under which this opinion still seems to labour, notwithstanding the offered distinction.
IV. Another difficulty that seems to bear hard upon this hypothesis, of all things being determined by superior fitness, is this, viz. Then there would be scarce any real difference between the moral and the positive laws of God. The one would be every whit as necessary as the other, both in themselves as laws, and with regard to God the law-giver: For if all the positive commands and institutions of God are given because he saw an antecedent fitness and goodness in them superior to any other commands that could be given at that time, and in those circumstances; and if all his moral commands are given upon the same reason, will it not follow that the positive laws are as necessary for that time and those circumstances as the moral laws are in all times and circumstances? I say, allowing this difference, that | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY.
400
he moral commands are necessary at all times and occasions, and
he positive only on some particular occasions. And upon this
lypothesis, it is no more in the power of Qod to have altered
he positive commands on those particular oc9asions, than it is in
lit power to change the moral commands on any occasion what-
loever. Then every pin and tack in the tabernacle of Moses,
(Very little punctilio and circumstance in all the Levitical rites of
>arification and sacrifice, every colour and thread which is of
livine appointment in the curtains of the tabernacle, or the vest-
Dents of the priest, were as necessary at that time and place as
he ten commands, or any rule of virtue and piety whatso-
!ver ; aince they did necessitate and determine the will of Qod
0 appoint them by his seeing a superior fitness and ffoodness in
hem all. It is true indeed, we who are short-sighted creatures,
nd cannot penetrate so far into the fitness and unfitness of things
annot find oiit the positive commands of God by our reasoning.
It we can many of the greater and more obvious moral laws ; yet
et it be observed also, that these moral laws in some of the
branches of them, and in their application to particular
I, perhaps can hardly be found out by our short and feeble
eaaonings ; and ii> this respect the difference between moral and
Kwitive laws would grow less aud less, even with regard to ns,
ill in many instances the diflerence would vanish. But with re*
(ard to Qod hiinsel'*, and in the nature of thipgs, they would be
loth equally necessary, and Qod could not appoint any Of them
otherwise tlian he has done.
V. Then there would be no such thing as any liberty of
hoice and inf.^frerence in the world, or at least only among im-
icrfect intelligent beings who are endowed with wills, and that
lut seldom too : And this very liberty would arise merely from
heir imperfection, that is, because in some things they could not
ind the superior fitness, since they cannot extend their know*
edge deep and wide enough to see alt the fitnesses and unfit*
ie!»cs of things. For according to this scheme, all the decreed
tnd actions of Qod the most perfect Spirit, about himself, or
>bout his creatures, would be ever necessary ; and all the ma^
erijl creation, tlie whole universe of bodies, and every natu-
ml motion therein, so far as ordained by God even in their
cmotest causes, would be necessary from the beginning to
he end of all things : And a very wise man who sees the
itneKKes of things, weuld have scarce any thing of this firee-
kmi, for he would be always necessarily determined in his choice
ly t his superior fitness.
.But let us think a little further on this point : If this opinipn
were true in the whole scheme, and all spirits, perfect or imper-
bfct, were necessarily determined to act according as things ai{j*
peared fit or unfit to the mind, and if these ik^^easaKie^^ x^^t^
I i 2 | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 498 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
the moral commands are necessary at all times and occasions, and the positive only on some particular occasions. And upon this hypothesis, it is no more in the power of God to have altered the positive commands on those particular occasions, than it is in his power to change the moral commands on any occasion whatsoever. Then every pin and tack in the tabernacle of Moses, every little punctilio and circumstance in all the Levitical rites of purification and sacrifice, every colour and thread which is of divine appointment in the curtains of the tabernacle, or the vestments of the priest, were as necessary at that time and place as the ten commands, or any rule of virtue and piety whatsoever; since they did necessitate and determine the will of God to appoint them by his seeing a superior fitness and goodness in them all. It is true indeed, we who are short-sighted creatures, and cannot penetrate so far into the fitness and unfitness of things cannot find out the positive commands of God by our reasoning, as we can many of the greater and more obvious moral laws; yet it be observed also, that these moral laws in some of the lesser branches of them, and in their application to particular cases, perhaps can hardly be found out by our short and feeble reasonings; and in this respect the difference between moral and positive laws would grow less and less, even with regard to us, till in many instances the difference would vanish. But with regard to God himself, and in the nature of things, they would be both equally necessary, and God could not appoint any of them otherwise than he has done.
V. Then there would be no such thing as any liberty of choice and indifference in the world, or at least only among imperfect intelligent beings who are endowed with wills, and that out seldom too: And this very liberty would arise merely from their imperfection, that is, because in some things they could not find the superior fitness, since they cannot extend their knowledge deep and wide enough to see all the fitnesses and unfitnesses of things. For according to this scheme, all the decrees and actions of God the most perfect Spirit, about himself, or about his creatures, would be ever necessary; and all the material creation, the whole universe of bodies, and every natural motion therein, so far as ordained by God even in their remotest causes, would be necessary from the beginning to the end of all things: And a very wise man who sees the fitnesses of things, would have scarce any thing of this freedom, for he would be always necessarily determined in his choice by this superior fitness.
But let us think a little further on this point: If this opinion were true in the whole scheme, and all spirits, perfect or imperfect, were necessarily determined to act according as things appeared fit or unfit to the mind, and if these appearances were | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
009 niEBnoBi or will.
the necessary result of 4he situation of man or other mteDigent
creatures, whether wise or uuwise, amonij; a irariety of •lyMli;
then, 1 t hingt there would be no free<k>tn of choice, no Iibeftj
of indifiereore at all, no pro|ier 8i*If-determiniug power, eitber
in beaircn or eurtb, either in Gad^ aitgfeis, or men, bat sU
would be one huge scheme of fatalitj both in the intelleotual aaid
material worlds
Shall it b e replied here, what ? Is there no liberty of indif*
ibrence to be found an^ where but where the ol^eota are entirelj
^iial ? Have I not liberty of choice, when I GbttM one boose
to dwell in, or prefer one piece of cloth to wear rathei^ thsa
another, Jbccanael 6nd ono bkter and fitter for my aaa tiian aoo-
ther ? Does not all the world call this a liberty of choice^
tnd proper freedom of the will, notwitlistanding the snperior
quafificationa or motives that inclined me to chnae this aad
refuse thai ? ,
I answer, and allow this to be aiproper freedom or fiberty
eC choice, supposing the will only to be^ directed and ioelined by
these motives, and not powerfully and necessarily determined by
them. But if once we assert the will to be necesaari/y determiB-
ed by these motives, then it h as no proper sclf-determmicg power
in tliese instances, and the very idea of proper liberty vanishes
and is lost. And indeed what great difference will there be be-
tween matter and spirit, if both are determined to move or set
only by external influences ? Both would be inactive or incapable
of self activity ; b ut one would have a consciousness of its actioas
which the other has not Is it not much better tberetbre to sop*
pose, that the influence of motives in the understanding reacbies
no further than to direct the willy without a certain or necessary
determination of it, wheresoever there are motives arising from
superior fitness ? And may we not reasonably conceive both ia
this miiverse, as well as in the world of |>ossible8, tliat there are
millions of objects wherein this superior fitness either is not, or
does net appear ; and here is still a larger space for the exercise
ii perfect freedom of choice, and wherein tiie will is determined
by notlqpg )>ut itself!.
VI. It may be considered as another difiicttltv and hardshiii
which would attend this opinion, that there are e great number
of scriptures which would have a most absurd sound, if they
were to be interpreted o)K>n this foot, viz. the neceMsarif determi*
nation of the will of God in every thing by the antecedent and
superior Jitness of things. There is no act of providence or
grace which the scripture represents as a f ree favour of the bits*
aed God, but would be hereby made necessary, and Chnl woald
be limited to that one object and that one action. JLiet laa coou*
der a few particulars :
Numb. Vv. Sn. Mnae% wfiaxn ^te UcaelittiB, Becttme k | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 499 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | the necessary result of the situation of man or other intelligent creatures, whether wise or unwise, among a variety of objects; then, I thing, there would be no freedom of choice, no liberty of indifference at all, no proper self-determining power, either in heaven or earth, either in God, angels, or men, but all would be one huge scheme of fatality both in the intellectual and material world.
Shall it be replied here, what? Is there no liberty of indifference to be found any where but where the objects are entirely equal? Have I not liberty of choice, when I chuse one house to dwell in, or prefer one piece of cloth to wear rather than another, because I find one better and fitter for my use than another? Does not all the world call this a liberty of choice, and proper freedom of the will, notwithstanding the superior qualifications or motives that inclined me to chuse this and refuse that?
I answer, and allow this to be a proper freedom or liberty of choice, supposing the will only to be directed and inclined by these motives, and not powerfully and necessarily determined by them. But if once we assert the will to be necessarily determined by these motives, then it has no proper self-determining power in these instances, and the very idea of proper liberty vanishes and is lost. And indeed what great difference will there be between matter and spirit, if both are determined to move or act only by external influences? Both would be inactive or incapable of self activity; but one would have a consciousness of its actions which the other has not. Is it not much better therefore to suppose, that the influence of motives in the understanding reaches no further than to direct the will, without a certain or necessary determination of it, whereas ever there are motives arising from superior fitness? And may we not reasonably conceive both in this universe, as well as in the world of possibles, that there are millions of objects wherein this superior fitness cither is not, or does not appear; and here is still a larger space for the exercise of perfect freedom of choice, and wherein the will is determined by nothing but itself.
VI. It may be considered as another difficulty and hardship which would attend this opinion, that there are a great number of scriptures which would have a most absurd sound, if they were to be interpreted upon this foot, viz. the necessary determination of the will of God in every thing by the antecedent and superior fitness of things. There is no act of providence or grace which the scripture represents as a free favour of the blessed God, but would be hereby made necessary, and God would be limited to that one object and that one action. Let us consider a few particulars:
Numb. iv. 37. Moses with to the Israelites, Because he | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] | |
AN ESSAY. 501
rrf /Ay father Sf Abraham, haac and Jacobs therefore he
$e their seed after them: But in trutli, according to this doc-
le, i ic loved thcro because they wore tlie fittest for his love, and
d could not do otlicrwlMc; and lie chose them and their seed,
aiise be could make no other choice. Deut. xxi. 5. The
^tt the sons of L evi, the Lord thy God hath chosen to minister
o him ; that is, because he saw such a superior fitness in the
s of Levi, that he could not chuse any other tribe. 1 Sam.
24. God chose Saul to make him a kingy but he was de«
nincd to it by the superior fitness of this choice. Ps. cxxxii.
The Lord hath chosen Sion^ he hath desired it for his
itation ; that is, because he saw it so fit, that he could not
ise any otlier dwelling in that a^e. 1 Cor. i. 2 7. God hath
sen the foolish things of this "joorld^ and the weak ihings^ and
9gs that arc despised. It is true, he gives a reason for it, v iz.
\ h e might confound the wise^ &.c. but then it is plain, be could
have chosen the wise, the uiiglity and the honourable.
*he88. ii. 13. God hath from, tne beginning chosen you to
nation; that is, because it was supremely fit, that he could
pass you by witliout chasing you. How frequent is the ex*
MrtOQ in scripture of (iod^s chusing this or that person or
ig, tliis or tliat family or nation, lor particular purposes in
providei\pe and grace ? And it is represented still as a
Iter of free favour : But according to this interpretation, there
0 true liberty of choice or free mercy in all these things, since
*e was such a superior fitness on that side, that it was not {}os-
e f or God to have determined or chose otherwise.
But let us proceed to some other texts, Eph. ii. 4. God
} i s rich in merely for hjs ^reat love wherewith he loved us, —
i quickened us together with Christ : But according to this
lion, be could not possibly have loved the Ephesians less
1 be did, nor let them go on in their death of trespasses and
I w ithout quickening grace. 1 Tim. i. JO. / reus before a
phemer and a persecutor^ saith St. Paul, but I obtained
cy — and the grace of God, was exceeding abundant. But
opinion would interpret the words, that God could not with-
1 m ercy from me, and therefore I obtained it : and the grace
(rod was exceeding abundant to me, because it w as not possible
bould have been less. Roqa. ix. 23, 24. That he might
fce known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy —
of the Jews onli/y but also of the Gentiles : But tliis
lion obscures these riches of glorious grace, by shewing that
I c ould chuse no other vessels of mercy but the Jews of old
5, and the Gentiles afterward, and in tlrat proportion in which
diosethem. Rom. x. 20. Isaiah grows very bold and saithy
as f ound of them that sought me not ; that is, God was ne-
«nly determined by the superior and auVece^^uX ^Vvl^^a;^ v!l
gu to be found of tbo$e who never soug\\X\u\u.
1 i 3 | watts_works_vol_4.pdf | 500 | 635 | 635.52 | 1,231.2 | Internet Archive PDF 1.4.25; including mupdf and pymupdf/skimage | D:20240625100741Z | The works of the Rev. Isaac Watts D.D. in nine volumes | https://archive.org/details/worksrevisaacwa04wattgoog | Watts, Isaac, 1674-1748 | Internet Archive | Dissenters, Religious -- England; Theology -- Early works to 1800; Theology -- History -- 18th century; Dissenters, Religious; Theology; England | D:20240625100741Z | AN ESSAY.
ed thy fathers, Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, therefore he se their seed after them: But in truth, according to this doc-
e, he loved them because they were the fittest for his love, and could not do otherwise; and he chose them and their seed,
because he could make no other choice. Deut. xxi. 5. The rests the sons of Levi, the Lord thy God hath chosen to minister to him; that is, because he saw such a superior fitness in the sons of Levi, that he could not chuse any other tribe. 1 Sam. 24. God chose Saul to make him a king, but he was de-
nined to it by the superior fitness of this choice. Ps. cxxxii.
The Lord hath chosen Sion, he hath desired it for hisitation; that is, because he saw it so fit, that he could not use any other dwelling in that age. 1 Cor. i. 27. God hath seen the foolish things of this world, and the weak things, and things that are despised. It is true, he gives a reason for it, viz. he might confound the wise, &c. but then it is plain, he could have chosen the wise, the mighty and the honourable. Thess. ii. 13. God hath from the beginning chosen you to nation; that is, because it was supremely fit, that he could pass you by without chusing you. How frequent is the ex-
sition in scripture of God's chusing this or that person or ing, this or that family or nation, for particular purposes in providence and grace? And it is represented still as a matter of free favour: But according to this interpretation, there is true liberty of choice or free mercy in all these things, since we was such a superior fitness on that side, that it was not pos-
e for God to have determined or chose otherwise.
But let us proceed to some other texts. Eph. ii. 4. God is rich in mercy, for his great love wherewith he loved us,—h quickened us together with Christ: But according to this notion, he could not possibly have loved the Ephesians less than he did, nor let them go on in their death of trespasses and without quickening grace. 1 Tim. i. 10. I was before a ephemer and a persecutor, saith St. Paul, but I obtained mercy—and the grace of God, was exceeding abundant. But opinion would interpret the words, that God could not with- mercy from me, and therefore I obtained it: and the grace God was exceeding abundant to me, because it was not possible should have been less. Rom. ix. 23, 24. That he might be known the riches of his glory on the vessels of mercy—of the Jews only, but also of the Gentiles: But this notion obscures these riches of glorious grace, by shewing that I could chuse no other vessels of mercy but the Jews of old e, and the Gentiles afterward, and in that proportion in which chose them. Rom. x. 20. Isaiah grows very bold and saith, was found of them that sought me not; that is, God was nearly determined by the superior and antecedent fitness of things to be found of those who never sought him. | [{"model_id": "zai-org/GLM-OCR", "model_name": "GLM-OCR", "column_name": "markdown", "timestamp": "2026-02-20T01:56:27.011765", "task": "ocr", "temperature": 0.01, "top_p": 1e-05, "repetition_penalty": 1.1, "max_tokens": 8192}] |
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