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---
license: mit
tags: [security, poc, executorch]
---
# Harmless PoC: ExecuTorch `Program::get_method_name` execution_plan vector length OOB
`Program::num_methods` / `get_method_name` index `Program.execution_plan[plan_index]` using a forged FlatBuffer vector length with no bound against the program buffer. Under default `Program::Verification::Minimal`, loading a malicious `.pte` and calling `get_method_name(0)` triggers ASan heap-buffer-overflow READ at `program.cpp:361`.
Distinct from packaged Method::init values/chains/instructions/operators/delegates, READY `backend_delegate_data`, READY constant/mutable offsets, MethodMeta sizes, Vela, VGF, Vulkan.
## Files
- `poc_execution_plan_asan.cpp`, `asan.log`
- `method_load_stub.cpp` (link stub for unused `Method::load`)
- `NOTES.md`
```bash
./poc_execution_plan_asan
```