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---
license: mit
tags: [security, poc, executorch]
---
# Harmless PoC: ExecuTorch MethodMeta memory_planned_buffers vector length OOB
`MethodMeta::num_memory_planned_buffers` / `memory_planned_buffer_size` index `ExecutionPlan.non_const_buffer_sizes[index+1]` using a forged FlatBuffer vector length with no bound against the program buffer. Under default `Program::Verification::Minimal`, loading a malicious `.pte` and calling `memory_planned_buffer_size(0)` triggers ASan heap-buffer-overflow READ at `method_meta.cpp:357`.
Distinct from submitted MethodMeta `Tensor.sizes`, packaged MethodMeta I/O index (`inputs`/`outputs`), Program `execution_plan` / `backend_delegate_data`, and Method::init values/operators/delegates/list-items.
## Files
- `poc_method_meta_memory_planned_asan.cpp`, `asan.log`
- `method_load_stub.cpp` (link stub for unused `Method::load`)
- `NOTES.md`
```bash
./poc_method_meta_memory_planned_asan
```