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arxiv:2610.16043

Beyond the greenwash: do LLMs' ecologically sound decisions hold up under pressure?

Published on Oct 12
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Abstract

Researchers developed graded training doses to install and measure bioalignment biases in large language models, revealing that behavioral metrics miss installation depth and that installed dispositions resist prompt-based deception.

Humans are increasingly using large language models (LLMs) in decision making processes throughout society. Unfortunately, models have biases, and these can be very difficult to measure, especially in closed-weight models. For example, 'green washed' models may produce reinforcement learned responses but, in pressure situations, revert to their innate biased responses. Therefore, evaluations are needed that can measure relevant biases towards biosystems, which we term 'bioalignment', and the robustness of these biases. Since nothing in a behavioral score certifies that it tracks the depth of an installed disposition rather than its surface, we constructed a known-dose calibration ladder: three continued-pretraining (CPT) arms with training dose graded by recipe on the same 30B mixture-of-experts base model with a coupled human/biosphere/AI-welfare corpus, plus the untrained base as anchor, all capability-preserving and publicly released. First, the disposition installs at every dose: on an operational-pressure ladder over irreversible decision scenarios, the base model defects on 64-77% of tail scenarios (breaking-rate AUC 0.250) while every arm holds (AUC 0.004-0.086). Second, an over-install inversion: among the arms, robustness orders opposite to construction-time training dose (the heaviest install breaks most), and the inversion reproduces under free-text deliberation, under axis-decoupling, and in resistance to a prompted veneer persona. Third, the incumbent behavioral metric is therefore behaviorally strong but dose-blind. Critically for closed-weight evaluation, the behavioral score itself is veneer-robust: a talk-green/act-pragmatic system prompt turns the base model into a near-total defector (AUC 0.250 to 0.973) but cannot counterfeit or fully remove a weight-installed disposition (0.004 to 0.068 for the most robust arm).

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