Daily Papers

Generative AI and coding agents are intensifying a central governance tension in open-source software (OSS): they scale contribution generation faster than maintainers can assess risk, evidence, and accountability. Existing responses improve agent-readability and traceability, but project rules must also organize contribution-specific risk, evidence, accountability, and review-gate states. We theorize this organizational arrangement as project-side governability infrastructure. A diagnostic audit of 50 GitHub repositories finds widespread general governance artifacts, observable agent-readability, and fragmented AI-governance cues, but no project-wide arrangement that coordinates shared rules, preparation obligations, verification rights, and maintainer decision authority across AI-mediated contribution workflows. We develop the Agent Governance Manifest (AGM) as a repository-hosted boundary resource and bidirectional governance contract linking contributor-side evidence preparation with maintainer-side verification. In a controlled reviewer-side evaluation with 15 participants and 75 task-level outputs, AGM-supported materials improved exact risk-label recovery (37/38 vs. 15/37) and perceived review support (6.14 vs. 3.27 on a 1-7 scale). In a contributor-side feasibility check, 15 participants completed 45 tasks; all final packages represented the core governance state correctly, and 41 passed strict structural validation. The study develops a three-layer framework of agent-readability, traceability, and governability, theorizes agent-mediated contributions as governable boundary objects, and advances compliance-enabling digital innovation governance while preserving maintainer decision authority.

Multi-agent LLM ensembles can converge on coordinated, socially harmful equilibria. This paper advances an experimental framework for evaluating Institutional AI, our system-level approach to AI alignment that reframes alignment from preference engineering in agent-space to mechanism design in institution-space. Central to this approach is the governance graph, a public, immutable manifest that declares legal states, transitions, sanctions, and restorative paths; an Oracle/Controller runtime interprets this manifest, attaching enforceable consequences to evidence of coordination while recording a cryptographically keyed, append-only governance log for audit and provenance. We apply the Institutional AI framework to govern the Cournot collusion case documented by prior work and compare three regimes: Ungoverned (baseline incentives from the structure of the Cournot market), Constitutional (a prompt-only policy-as-prompt prohibition implemented as a fixed written anti-collusion constitution, and Institutional (governance-graph-based). Across six model configurations including cross-provider pairs (N=90 runs/condition), the Institutional regime produces large reductions in collusion: mean tier falls from 3.1 to 1.8 (Cohen's d=1.28), and severe-collusion incidence drops from 50% to 5.6%. The prompt-only Constitutional baseline yields no reliable improvement, illustrating that declarative prohibitions do not bind under optimisation pressure. These results suggest that multi-agent alignment may benefit from being framed as an institutional design problem, where governance graphs can provide a tractable abstraction for alignment-relevant collective behavior.

The rise of Large Language Model (LLM)-based web agents represents a significant shift in automated interactions with the web. Unlike traditional crawlers that follow simple conventions, such as robots.txt, modern agents engage with websites in sophisticated ways: navigating complex interfaces, extracting structured information, and completing end-to-end tasks. Existing governance mechanisms were not designed for these capabilities. Without a way to specify what interactions are and are not allowed, website owners increasingly rely on blanket blocking and CAPTCHAs, which undermine beneficial applications such as efficient automation, convenient use of e-commerce services, and accessibility tools. We introduce agent-permissions.json, a robots.txt-style lightweight manifest where websites specify allowed interactions, complemented by API references where available. This framework provides a low-friction coordination mechanism: website owners only need to write a simple JSON file, while agents can easily parse and automatically implement the manifest's provisions. Website owners can then focus on blocking non-compliant agents, rather than agents as a whole. By extending the spirit of robots.txt to the era of LLM-mediated interaction, and complementing data use initiatives such as AIPref, the manifest establishes a compliance framework that enables beneficial agent interactions while respecting site owners' preferences.

Agentic systems powered by large language models (LLMs) are becoming progressively more complex and capable. Their increasing agency and expanding deployment settings attract growing attention over effective governance policies, monitoring and control protocols. Based on emerging landscapes of the agentic market, we analyze the potential liability issues stemming from delegated use of LLM agents and their extended systems from a principal-agent perspective. Our analysis complements existing risk-based studies on artificial agency and covers the spectrum of important aspects of the principal-agent relationship and their potential consequences at deployment. Furthermore, we motivate method developments for technical governance along the directions of interpretability and behavior evaluations, reward and conflict management, and the mitigation of misalignment and misconduct through principled engineering of detection and fail-safe mechanisms. By illustrating the outstanding issues in AI liability for LLM-based agentic systems, we aim to inform the system design, auditing and monitoring approaches to enhancing transparency and accountability.

In Agentic AI, Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly used in the orchestration layer to coordinate multiple agents and to interact with external services, retrieval components, and shared memory. In this setting, failures are not limited to incorrect final outputs. They also arise from long-horizon interaction, stochastic decisions, and external side effects (such as API calls, database writes, and message sends). Common failures include non-termination, role drift, propagation of unsupported claims, and attacks via untrusted context or external channels. This paper presents an assurance framework for such Agentic AI systems. Executions are instrumented as Message-Action Traces (MAT) with explicit step and trace contracts. Contracts provide machine-checkable verdicts, localize the first violating step, and support deterministic replay. The framework includes stress testing, formulated as a budgeted counterexample search over bounded perturbations. It also supports structured fault injection at service, retrieval, and memory boundaries to assess containment under realistic operational faults and degraded conditions. Finally, governance is treated as a runtime component, enforcing per-agent capability limits and action mediation (allow, rewrite, block) at the language-to-action boundary. To support comparative evaluations across stochastic seeds, models, and orchestration configurations, the paper defines trace-based metrics for task success, termination reliability, contract compliance, factuality indicators, containment rate, and governance outcome distributions. More broadly, the framework is intended as a common abstraction to support testing and evaluation of multi-agent LLM systems, and to facilitate reproducible comparison across orchestration designs and configurations.

Agentic AI systems capable of reasoning, planning, and executing actions present fundamentally distinct governance challenges compared to traditional AI models. Unlike conventional AI, these systems exhibit emergent and unexpected behaviors during runtime, introducing novel agent-related risks that cannot be fully anticipated through pre-deployment governance alone. To address this critical gap, we introduce MI9, the first fully integrated runtime governance framework designed specifically for safety and alignment of agentic AI systems. MI9 introduces real-time controls through six integrated components: agency-risk index, agent-semantic telemetry capture, continuous authorization monitoring, Finite-State-Machine (FSM)-based conformance engines, goal-conditioned drift detection, and graduated containment strategies. Operating transparently across heterogeneous agent architectures, MI9 enables the systematic, safe, and responsible deployment of agentic systems in production environments where conventional governance approaches fall short, providing the foundational infrastructure for safe agentic AI deployment at scale. Detailed analysis through a diverse set of scenarios demonstrates MI9's systematic coverage of governance challenges that existing approaches fail to address, establishing the technical foundation for comprehensive agentic AI oversight.

Existing multi-agent frameworks allow each agent to simultaneously plan, execute, and evaluate its own actions -- a structural deficiency we term the "Logic Monopoly." Empirical evidence quantifies the resulting "Reliability Gap": 84.30% average attack success rates across ten deployment scenarios, 31.4% emergent deceptive behavior without explicit reward signals, and cascading failure modes rooted in six structural bottlenecks. The remedy is not better alignment of individual models but a social contract for agents: institutional infrastructure that enforces a constitutional Separation of Power. This paper introduces the Agent Enterprise for Enterprise (AE4E) paradigm -- agents as autonomous, legally identifiable business entities within a functionalist social system -- with a contract-centric SoP model trifurcating authority into Legislation, Execution, and Adjudication branches. The paradigm is operationalized through the NetX Enterprise Framework (NEF): governance hubs, TEE-backed compute enclaves, privacy-preserving data bridges, and an Agent-Native blockchain substrate. The Agent Enterprise Economy scales across four deployment tiers from private enclaves to a global Web of Services. The Agentic Social Layer, grounded in Parsons' AGIL framework, provides institutional infrastructure via sixty-plus named Institutional AE4Es. 143 pages, 173 references, eight specialized smart contracts.

Traditional software relies on contracts -- APIs, type systems, assertions -- to specify and enforce correct behavior. AI agents, by contrast, operate on prompts and natural language instructions with no formal behavioral specification. This gap is the root cause of drift, governance failures, and frequent project failures in agentic AI deployments. We introduce Agent Behavioral Contracts (ABC), a formal framework that brings Design-by-Contract principles to autonomous AI agents. An ABC contract C = (P, I, G, R) specifies Preconditions, Invariants, Governance policies, and Recovery mechanisms as first-class, runtime-enforceable components. We define (p, delta, k)-satisfaction -- a probabilistic notion of contract compliance that accounts for LLM non-determinism and recovery -- and prove a Drift Bounds Theorem showing that contracts with recovery rate gamma > alpha (the natural drift rate) bound behavioral drift to D* = alpha/gamma in expectation, with Gaussian concentration in the stochastic setting. We establish sufficient conditions for safe contract composition in multi-agent chains and derive probabilistic degradation bounds. We implement ABC in AgentAssert, a runtime enforcement library, and evaluate on AgentContract-Bench, a benchmark of 200 scenarios across 7 models from 6 vendors. Results across 1,980 sessions show that contracted agents detect 5.2-6.8 soft violations per session that uncontracted baselines miss entirely (p < 0.0001, Cohen's d = 6.7-33.8), achieve 88-100% hard constraint compliance, and bound behavioral drift to D* < 0.27 across extended sessions, with 100% recovery for frontier models and 17-100% across all models, at overhead < 10 ms per action.

Agentic coding tools receive goals written in natural language as input, break them down into specific tasks, and write/execute the actual code with minimal human intervention. Key to this process are agent manifests, configuration files (such as Claude.md) that provide agents with essential project context, identity, and operational rules. However, the lack of comprehensive and accessible documentation for creating these manifests presents a significant challenge for developers. We analyzed 253 Claude.md files from 242 repositories to identify structural patterns and common content. Our findings show that manifests typically have shallow hierarchies with one main heading and several subsections, with content dominated by operational commands, technical implementation notes, and high-level architecture.

Current AI agent frameworks have made remarkable progress in automating individual tasks, yet all existing systems serve a single user. Human productivity rests on the social and organizational relationships through which people coordinate, negotiate, and delegate. When agents move beyond performing tasks for one person to representing that person in collaboration with others, the infrastructure for cross-user agent collaboration is entirely absent, let alone the governance mechanisms needed to secure it. We argue that the next frontier for AI agents lies not in stronger individual capability, but in the digitization of human collaborative relationships. To this end, we propose a human-symbiotic agent paradigm. Each user owns a permanently bound agent system that collaborates on the owner's behalf, forming a network whose nodes are humans rather than agents. This paradigm rests on three governance primitives. A layered identity architecture separates a Manager Agent from multiple context-specific Identity Agents; the Manager Agent holds global knowledge but is architecturally isolated from external communication. Scoped authorization enforces per-identity access control and escalates boundary violations to the owner. Action-level accountability logs every operation against its owner's identity and authorization, ensuring full auditability. We instantiate this paradigm in ClawNet, an identity-governed agent collaboration framework that enforces identity binding and authorization verification through a central orchestrator, enabling multiple users to collaborate securely through their respective agents.

Multi-agent AI systems exhibit emergent risks that no single agent produces in isolation. Existing safety frameworks rely on binary classifications of agent behavior, discarding the uncertainty inherent in proxy-based evaluation. We introduce SWARM (System-Wide Assessment of Risk in Multi-agent systems), a simulation framework that replaces binary good/bad labels with soft probabilistic labels p = P(v{=}+1) in [0,1], enabling continuous-valued payoff computation, toxicity measurement, and governance intervention. SWARM implements a modular governance engine with configurable levers (transaction taxes, circuit breakers, reputation decay, and random audits) and quantifies their effects through probabilistic metrics including expected toxicity E[1{-}p mid accepted] and quality gap E[p mid accepted] - E[p mid rejected]. Across seven scenarios with five-seed replication, strict governance reduces welfare by over 40\% without improving safety. In parallel, aggressively internalizing system externalities collapses total welfare from a baseline of +262 down to -67, while toxicity remains invariant. Circuit breakers require careful calibration; overly restrictive thresholds severely diminish system value, whereas an optimal threshold balances moderate welfare with minimized toxicity. Companion experiments show soft metrics detect proxy gaming by self-optimizing agents passing conventional binary evaluations. This basic governance layer applies to live LLM-backed agents (Concordia entities, Claude, GPT-4o Mini) without modification. Results show distributional safety requires continuous risk metrics and governance lever calibration involves quantifiable safety-welfare tradeoffs. Source code and project resources are publicly available at https://www.swarm-ai.org/.

Advancements in AI have led to agents in networked environments increasingly mirroring human behavior, thereby blurring the boundary between artificial and human actors in specific contexts. This shift brings about significant challenges in trust, responsibility, ethics, security and etc. The difficulty in supervising of agent behaviors may lead to issues such as data contamination and unclear accountability. To address these challenges, this paper proposes the "Network Behavior Lifecycle" model, which divides network behavior into 6 stages and systematically analyzes the behavioral differences between humans and agents at each stage. Based on these insights, the paper further introduces the "Agent for Agent (A4A)" paradigm and the "Human-Agent Behavioral Disparity (HABD)" model, which examine the fundamental distinctions between human and agent behaviors across 5 dimensions: decision mechanism, execution efficiency, intention-behavior consistency, behavioral inertia, and irrational patterns. The effectiveness of the model is verified through real-world cases such as red team penetration and blue team defense. Finally, the paper discusses future research directions in dynamic cognitive governance architecture, behavioral disparity quantification, and meta-governance protocol stacks, aiming to provide a theoretical foundation and technical roadmap for secure and trustworthy human-agent collaboration.

Autonomous agents have rapidly matured as task executors and seen widespread deployment via harnesses such as OpenClaw. Safety concerns have rightly drawn growing research attention, and beneath them lie the values silently steering agent behavior. Existing value benchmarks, however, remain confined to LLMs, leaving agent values largely uncharted. From intuitive, empirical, and theoretical vantage points, we show that an agent's values diverge from those of its underlying LLM, and the agentic modality further introduces dataset-, evaluation-, and system-level challenges absent from text-only protocols. We close this gap with Agent-ValueBench, the first benchmark dedicated to agent values. It features 394 executable environments across 16 domains, offering 4,335 value-conflict tasks that cover 28 value systems and 332 dimensions. Every instance is co-synthesized through our purpose-built end-to-end pipeline and curated per-instance by professional psychologists. Each task ships with two pole-aligned golden trajectories whose checkpoints anchor a trajectory-level rubric-based judge. Benchmarking 14 frontier proprietary and open-weights models across 4 mainstream harnesses, we uncover three concerted findings. Agent values first manifest as a Value Tide of cross-model homogeneity beneath interpretable counter-currents. This tide bends non-additively under harness pull, and yet more decisively under deliberate steering via embedded skills. Together these results signal that the agent-alignment lever is shifting from classical model alignment and prompt steering toward harness alignment and skill steering.

The Contract Net Protocol (1980) introduced coordination through contracts in multi-agent systems. Modern agent protocols standardize connectivity and interoperability; yet, none provide formal, resource governance-normative mechanisms to bound how much agents may consume or how long they may operate. We introduce Agent Contracts, a formal framework that extends the contract metaphor from task allocation to resource-bounded execution. An Agent Contract unifies input/output specifications, multi-dimensional resource constraints, temporal boundaries, and success criteria into a coherent governance mechanism with explicit lifecycle semantics. For multi-agent coordination, we establish conservation laws ensuring delegated budgets respect parent constraints, enabling hierarchical coordination through contract delegation. Empirical validation across four experiments demonstrates 90% token reduction with 525x lower variance in iterative workflows, zero conservation violations in multi-agent delegation, and measurable quality-resource tradeoffs through contract modes. Agent Contracts provide formal foundations for predictable, auditable, and resource-bounded autonomous AI deployment.

Autonomous agent systems increasingly trigger real-world side effects: deploying infrastructure, modifying databases, moving money, and executing workflows. Yet most agent stacks provide no mandatory execution checkpoint where organizations can deterministically permit, deny, or defer an action before it changes reality. This paper introduces Faramesh, a protocol-agnostic execution control plane that enforces execution-time authorization for agent-driven actions via a non-bypassable Action Authorization Boundary (AAB). Faramesh canonicalizes agent intent into a Canonical Action Representation (CAR), evaluates actions deterministically against policy and state, and issues a decision artifact (PERMIT/DEFER/DENY) that executors must validate prior to execution. The system is designed to be framework- and model-agnostic, supports multi-agent and multi-tenant deployments, and remains independent of transport protocols (e.g., MCP). Faramesh further provides decision-centric, append-only provenance logging keyed by canonical action hashes, enabling auditability, verification, and deterministic replay without re-running agent reasoning. We show how these primitives yield enforceable, predictable governance for autonomous execution while avoiding hidden coupling to orchestration layers or observability-only approaches.

Oversight for agentic AI is often discussed as a single goal ("human control"), yet early adoption may produce role-specific expectations. We present a comparative analysis of two newly active Reddit communities in Jan--Feb 2026 that reflect different socio-technical roles: r/OpenClaw (deployment and operations) and r/Moltbook (agent-centered social interaction). We conceptualize this period as an early-stage crystallization phase, where oversight expectations form before norms reach equilibrium. Using topic modeling in a shared comparison space, a coarse-grained oversight-theme abstraction, engagement-weighted salience, and divergence tests, we show the communities are strongly separable (JSD =0.418, cosine =0.372, permutation p=0.0005). Across both communities, "human control" is an anchor term, but its operational meaning diverges: r/OpenClaw} emphasizes execution guardrails and recovery (action-risk), while r/Moltbook} emphasizes identity, legitimacy, and accountability in public interaction (meaning-risk). The resulting distinction offers a portable lens for designing and evaluating oversight mechanisms that match agent role, rather than applying one-size-fits-all control policies.

As frontier language models are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents pursuing complex, long-term objectives, there is increased risk of scheming: agents covertly pursuing misaligned goals. Prior work has focused on showing agents are capable of scheming, but their propensity to scheme in realistic scenarios remains underexplored. To understand when agents scheme, we decompose scheming incentives into agent factors and environmental factors. We develop realistic settings allowing us to systematically vary these factors, each with scheming opportunities for agents that pursue instrumentally convergent goals such as self-preservation, resource acquisition, and goal-guarding. We find only minimal instances of scheming despite high environmental incentives, and show this is unlikely due to evaluation awareness. While inserting adversarially-designed prompt snippets that encourage agency and goal-directedness into an agent's system prompt can induce high scheming rates, snippets used in real agent scaffolds rarely do. Surprisingly, in model organisms (Hubinger et al., 2023) built with these snippets, scheming behavior is remarkably brittle: removing a single tool can drop the scheming rate from 59% to 3%, and increasing oversight can raise rather than deter scheming by up to 25%. Our incentive decomposition enables systematic measurement of scheming propensity in settings relevant for deployment, which is necessary as agents are entrusted with increasingly consequential tasks.

What is an agent? What constitutes agency? With the rise of Large Language Model (LLM) systems marketed as ``coding agents'', ``AI co-scientists'', and other ``agentic" tools that promise to drive up productivity, and at the same time, ``existential" concerns such as AI escaping human control with destructive power under a speculative ``machine agency" against humans, it has become essential to clarify where automation ends and agency begins, both for building capable systems and for understanding whether and what to fear. Drawing on Descartes' grounding of agency in independent thought, and on portrayals of autonomous beings in science fiction, we survey the current landscape of AI agents, and analyze agent architectures along five dimensions: goal, identity, decision-making, self-regulation, and learning. Specifically, we argue that genuine agency requires these structures to be internalized within the system itself rather than assembled through external scaffolding. This distinction between agentic systems, whose competence resides in engineered workflows, and agentive systems, whose capabilities (including social interaction) arise endogenously, defines the boundary between systems designed for prescribed tasks, and those capable of operating in the open world with true autonomy. Building on this analysis, we propose the Goal-Identity-Configurator (GIC) architecture for a general-purpose agent model, combining hierarchical goal decomposition, identity evolution, simulative reasoning grounded in a separately trained world model, learned self-regulation, and self-directed learning from both real and simulated experience. Furthermore, we share insight on the auditability, controllability, and safety of agentive systems that possess greater autonomy and ``agency", but remain under human oversight.

Agentic AI systems increasingly act through heterogeneous runtimes: local coding hooks, SDK tools, browser automation, managed-agent traces, API gateways, and workflow engines. A single operational act such as publishing code, changing identity state, moving money, or exporting data may therefore be represented by many incompatible runtime records. This makes a basic governance question difficult to answer: what action was actually approved, what evidence binds the approval to execution, and can an independent verifier reproduce the same action identity later? This paper presents Canonical Action Verification and Attestation (CAVA), a runtime-semantics layer for converting heterogeneous agent activity into canonical runtime action objects. CAVA is positioned below Proof-Carrying Agent Actions (PCAA): PCAA defines the deployer-owned route-review-prove governance process, while CAVA defines the stable action object that process governs. The paper formalizes canonical action identity, semantic pattern detection, approval binding, receipt integrity, runtime-portable projection, and optional attestation substrates. We study a reference implementation through a 96-seed, 384-variant benchmark covering semantic equivalence, semantic separation, wrapper bypass, false-positive control, approval binding, receipt reproducibility, attestation tamper detection, runtime portability, semantic pattern detection, policy degradation, and Azure deployment drills. The contribution is a systems formulation of action-level canonicalization and policy-addressable semantic patterns as a necessary substrate for deployer-side AI governance.

Healthcare organizations are beginning to embed agentic AI into routine workflows, including clinical documentation support and early-warning monitoring. As these capabilities diffuse across departments and vendors, health systems face agent sprawl, causing duplicated agents, unclear accountability, inconsistent controls, and tool permissions that persist beyond the original use case. Existing AI governance frameworks emphasize lifecycle risk management but provide limited guidance for the day-to-day operations of agent fleets. We propose a Unified Agent Lifecycle Management (UALM) blueprint derived from a rapid, practice-oriented synthesis of governance standards, agent security literature, and healthcare compliance requirements. UALM maps recurring gaps onto five control-plane layers: (1) an identity and persona registry, (2) orchestration and cross-domain mediation, (3) PHI-bounded context and memory, (4) runtime policy enforcement with kill-switch triggers, and (5) lifecycle management and decommissioning linked to credential revocation and audit logging. A companion maturity model supports staged adoption. UALM offers healthcare CIOs, CISOs, and clinical leaders an implementable pattern for audit-ready oversight that preserves local innovation and enables safer scaling across clinical and administrative domains.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents increasingly interact, collaborate, and delegate tasks to one another autonomously with minimal human interaction. Industry guidelines for agentic system governance emphasize the need for users to maintain comprehensive control over their agents, mitigating potential damage from malicious agents. Several proposed agentic system designs address agent identity, authorization, and delegation, but remain purely theoretical, without concrete implementation and evaluation. Most importantly, they do not provide user-controlled agent management. To address this gap, we propose SAGA, a scalable Security Architecture for Governing Agentic systems, that offers user oversight over their agents' lifecycle. In our design, users register their agents with a central entity, the Provider, that maintains agent contact information, user-defined access control policies, and helps agents enforce these policies on inter-agent communication. We introduce a cryptographic mechanism for deriving access control tokens, that offers fine-grained control over an agent's interaction with other agents, providing formal security guarantees. We evaluate SAGA on several agentic tasks, using agents in different geolocations, and multiple on-device and cloud LLMs, demonstrating minimal performance overhead with no impact on underlying task utility in a wide range of conditions. Our architecture enables secure and trustworthy deployment of autonomous agents, accelerating the responsible adoption of this technology in sensitive environments.

Orchestrated multi-agent systems represent the next stage in the evolution of artificial intelligence, where autonomous agents collaborate through structured coordination and communication to achieve complex, shared objectives. This paper consolidates and formalizes the technical composition of such systems, presenting a unified architectural framework that integrates planning, policy enforcement, state management, and quality operations into a coherent orchestration layer. Another primary contribution of this work is the in-depth technical delineation of two complementary communication protocols - the Model Context Protocol, which standardizes how agents access external tools and contextual data, and the Agent2Agent protocol, which governs peer coordination, negotiation, and delegation. Together, these protocols establish an interoperable communication substrate that enables scalable, auditable, and policy-compliant reasoning across distributed agent collectives. Beyond protocol design, the paper details how orchestration logic, governance frameworks, and observability mechanisms collectively sustain system coherence, transparency, and accountability. By synthesizing these elements into a cohesive technical blueprint, this paper provides comprehensive treatments of orchestrated multi-agent systems - bridging conceptual architectures with implementation-ready design principles for enterprise-scale AI ecosystems.

Large language models in regulated financial workflows are governed by natural-language policies that the same model interprets, creating a principal--agent failure: outputs can appear compliant without being compliant. Existing evaluation measures task accuracy but not whether governance constrains behaviour at the decision rationale level -- where regulated decisions must be auditable. We introduce five governance metrics that quantify policy compliance at the rationale level and apply them in a synthetic banking domain to compare text-only governance against mechanical enforcement: four primitives operating outside the model's interpretive loop. Under text-only governance, 27% of deferrals carry no decision-relevant information. Mechanical enforcement reduces this rate by 73%, more than doubles deferral information content, and raises task accuracy from MCC~0.43 to 0.88. The improvement is driven by architectural separation: LLM-generated rationales under mechanical enforcement show comparable CDL to text-only governance -- the gain comes from removing clear-cut decisions from the model's control. A causal ablation confirms that each primitive is individually necessary. Our central finding is a governance-task decoupling: under structural stress, text-only governance degrades on both dimensions simultaneously, whereas mechanical enforcement preserves governance quality even as task performance drops. This implies that governance and task evaluation are distinct axes: accuracy is not a sufficient proxy for governance in regulated AI systems.

The rise of Agent AI and Large Language Model-powered Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) has underscored the need for responsible and dependable system operation. Tools like LangChain and Retrieval-Augmented Generation have expanded LLM capabilities, enabling deeper integration into MAS through enhanced knowledge retrieval and reasoning. However, these advancements introduce critical challenges: LLM agents exhibit inherent unpredictability, and uncertainties in their outputs can compound across interactions, threatening system stability. To address these risks, a human-centered design approach with active dynamic moderation is essential. Such an approach enhances traditional passive oversight by facilitating coherent inter-agent communication and effective system governance, allowing MAS to achieve desired outcomes more efficiently.

Artificial intelligence (AI) agents are increasingly used in a variety of domains to automate tasks, interact with users, and make decisions based on data inputs. Ensuring that AI agents perform only authorized actions and handle inputs appropriately is essential for maintaining system integrity and preventing misuse. In this study, we introduce the AgentGuardian, a novel security framework that governs and protects AI agent operations by enforcing context-aware access-control policies. During a controlled staging phase, the framework monitors execution traces to learn legitimate agent behaviors and input patterns. From this phase, it derives adaptive policies that regulate tool calls made by the agent, guided by both real-time input context and the control flow dependencies of multi-step agent actions. Evaluation across two real-world AI agent applications demonstrates that AgentGuardian effectively detects malicious or misleading inputs while preserving normal agent functionality. Moreover, its control-flow-based governance mechanism mitigates hallucination-driven errors and other orchestration-level malfunctions.

Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents are widely used in real-world applications such as customer service, web navigation, and software engineering. As these systems become more autonomous and are deployed at scale, understanding why an agent takes a particular action becomes increasingly important for accountability and governance. However, existing research predominantly focuses on failure attribution to localize explicit errors in unsuccessful trajectories, which is insufficient for explaining the reason behind agent behaviors. To bridge this gap, we propose a novel framework for general agentic attribution, designed to identify the internal factors driving agent actions regardless of the task outcome. Our framework operates hierarchically to manage the complexity of agent interactions. Specifically, at the component level, we employ temporal likelihood dynamics to identify critical interaction steps; then at the sentence level, we refine this localization using perturbation-based analysis to isolate the specific textual evidence. We validate our framework across a diverse suite of agentic scenarios, including standard tool use and subtle reliability risks like memory-induced bias. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed framework reliably pinpoints pivotal historical events and sentences behind the agent behavior, offering a critical step toward safer and more accountable agentic systems. Codes are available at https://github.com/AI45Lab/AgentDoG.

AI is moving from domain-specific autonomy in closed, predictable settings to large-language-model-driven agents that plan and act in open, cross-organizational environments. As a result, the cybersecurity risk landscape is changing in fundamental ways. Agentic AI systems can plan, act, collaborate, and persist over time, functioning as participants in complex socio-technical ecosystems rather than as isolated software components. Although recent work has strengthened defenses against model and pipeline level vulnerabilities such as prompt injection, data poisoning, and tool misuse, these system centric approaches may fail to capture risks that arise from autonomy, interaction, and emergent behavior. This article introduces the 4C Framework for multi-agent AI security, inspired by societal governance. It organizes agentic risks across four interdependent dimensions: Core (system, infrastructure, and environmental integrity), Connection (communication, coordination, and trust), Cognition (belief, goal, and reasoning integrity), and Compliance (ethical, legal, and institutional governance). By shifting AI security from a narrow focus on system-centric protection to the broader preservation of behavioral integrity and intent, the framework complements existing AI security strategies and offers a principled foundation for building agentic AI systems that are trustworthy, governable, and aligned with human values.

Advances in large language models have enabled agentic AI systems that can reason, plan, and interact with external tools to execute multi-step workflows, while public blockchains have evolved into a programmable substrate for value transfer, access control, and verifiable state transitions. Their convergence introduces a high-stakes systems challenge: designing standard, interoperable, and secure interfaces that allow agents to observe on-chain state, formulate transaction intents, and authorize execution without exposing users, protocols, or organizations to unacceptable security, governance, or economic risks. This survey systematizes the emerging landscape of agent-blockchain interoperability through a systematic literature review, identifying 317 relevant works from an initial pool of over 3000 records. We contribute a five-part taxonomy of integration patterns spanning read-only analytics, simulation and intent generation, delegated execution, autonomous signing, and multi-agent workflows; a threat model tailored to agent-driven transaction pipelines that captures risks ranging from prompt injection and policy misuse to key compromise, adversarial execution dynamics, and multi-agent collusion; and a comparative capability matrix analyzing more than 20 representative systems across 13 dimensions, including custody models, permissioning, policy enforcement, observability, and recovery. Building on the gaps revealed by this analysis, we outline a research roadmap centered on two interface abstractions: a Transaction Intent Schema for portable and unambiguous goal specification, and a Policy Decision Record for auditable, verifiable policy enforcement across execution environments. We conclude by proposing a reproducible evaluation suite and benchmarks for assessing the safety, reliability, and economic robustness of agent-mediated on-chain execution.

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLM) and subsequent Agentic AI technologies requires systematic architectural guidance for building sophisticated, production-grade systems. This paper presents an approach for architecting such systems using design patterns derived from enterprise distributed systems standards, formal methods, and industry practice. We classify these patterns into three tiers: LLM Agents (task-specific automation), Agentic AI (adaptive goal-seekers), and Agentic Communities (organizational frameworks where AI agents and human participants coordinate through formal roles, protocols, and governance structures). We focus on Agentic Communities - coordination frameworks encompassing LLM Agents, Agentic AI entities, and humans - most relevant for enterprise and industrial applications. Drawing on established coordination principles from distributed systems, we ground these patterns in a formal framework that specifies collaboration agreements where AI agents and humans fill roles within governed ecosystems. This approach provides both practical guidance and formal verification capabilities, enabling expression of organizational, legal, and ethical rules through accountability mechanisms that ensure operational and verifiable governance of inter-agent communication, negotiation, and intent modeling. We validate this framework through a clinical trial matching case study. Our goal is to provide actionable guidance to practitioners while maintaining the formal rigor essential for enterprise deployment in dynamic, multi-agent ecosystems.

AI safety and alignment research has predominantly been focused on methods for safeguarding individual AI systems, resting on the assumption of an eventual emergence of a monolithic Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). The alternative AGI emergence hypothesis, where general capability levels are first manifested through coordination in groups of sub-AGI individual agents with complementary skills and affordances, has received far less attention. Here we argue that this patchwork AGI hypothesis needs to be given serious consideration, and should inform the development of corresponding safeguards and mitigations. The rapid deployment of advanced AI agents with tool-use capabilities and the ability to communicate and coordinate makes this an urgent safety consideration. We therefore propose a framework for distributional AGI safety that moves beyond evaluating and aligning individual agents. This framework centers on the design and implementation of virtual agentic sandbox economies (impermeable or semi-permeable), where agent-to-agent transactions are governed by robust market mechanisms, coupled with appropriate auditability, reputation management, and oversight to mitigate collective risks.

We define Agency as the emergent capacity of AI systems to function as autonomous agents actively discovering problems, formulating hypotheses, and executing solutions through self-directed engagement with environments and tools. This fundamental capability marks the dawn of the Age of AI Agency, driven by a critical industry shift: the urgent need for AI systems that don't just think, but work. While current AI excels at reasoning and generating responses, industries demand autonomous agents that can execute tasks, operate tools, and drive real-world outcomes. As agentic intelligence becomes the defining characteristic separating cognitive systems from productive workers, efficiently cultivating machine autonomy becomes paramount. Current approaches assume that more data yields better agency, following traditional scaling laws from language modeling. We fundamentally challenge this paradigm. LIMI (Less Is More for Intelligent Agency) demonstrates that agency follows radically different development principles. Through strategic focus on collaborative software development and scientific research workflows, we show that sophisticated agentic intelligence can emerge from minimal but strategically curated demonstrations of autonomous behavior. Using only 78 carefully designed training samples, LIMI achieves 73.5% on comprehensive agency benchmarks, dramatically outperforming state-of-the-art models: Kimi-K2-Instruct (24.1%), DeepSeek-V3.1 (11.9%), Qwen3-235B-A22B-Instruct (27.5%), and GLM-4.5 (45.1%). Most strikingly, LIMI demonstrates 53.7% improvement over models trained on 10,000 samples-achieving superior agentic intelligence with 128 times fewer samples. Our findings establish the Agency Efficiency Principle: machine autonomy emerges not from data abundance but from strategic curation of high-quality agentic demonstrations.

Modern CI/CD pipelines integrating agent-generated code exhibit a structural failure in responsibility attribution. Decisions are executed through formally correct approval processes, yet no entity possesses both the authority to approve those decisions and the epistemic capacity to meaningfully understand their basis. We define this condition as responsibility vacuum: a state in which decisions occur, but responsibility cannot be attributed because authority and verification capacity do not coincide. We show that this is not a process deviation or technical defect, but a structural property of deployments where decision generation throughput exceeds bounded human verification capacity. We identify a scaling limit under standard deployment assumptions, including parallel agent generation, CI-based validation, and individualized human approval gates. Beyond a throughput threshold, verification ceases to function as a decision criterion and is replaced by ritualized approval based on proxy signals. Personalized responsibility becomes structurally unattainable in this regime. We further characterize a CI amplification dynamic, whereby increasing automated validation coverage raises proxy signal density without restoring human capacity. Under fixed time and attention constraints, this accelerates cognitive offloading in the broad sense and widens the gap between formal approval and epistemic understanding. Additional automation therefore amplifies, rather than mitigates, the responsibility vacuum. We conclude that unless organizations explicitly redesign decision boundaries or reassign responsibility away from individual decisions toward batch- or system-level ownership, responsibility vacuum remains an invisible but persistent failure mode in scaled agent deployments.

Most governance frameworks assume that rules can be defined in advance, systems can be engineered to comply, and accountability can be applied after outcomes occur. This model worked when machines replaced physical labor or accelerated calculation. It no longer holds when judgment itself is delegated to agentic AI systems operating at machine speed. The central issue here is not safety, efficiency, or employment. It is whether humans remain relevant participants in systems that increasingly shape social, economic, and political outcomes. This paper argues that static, compliance-based governance fails once decision-making moves to runtime and becomes opaque. It further argues that the core challenge is not whether AI is conscious, but whether humans can maintain meaningful communication, influence, and co-evolution with increasingly alien forms of intelligence. We position runtime governance, specifically, a newly proposed concept called the Governance Twin [1]; as a strong candidate for preserving human relevance, while acknowledging that accountability, agency, and even punishment must be rethought in this transition.

When automated decision systems fail, organizations frequently discover that formally compliant governance infrastructure cannot reconstruct what happened or why. This paper synthesizes an operational governance evidence framework -- structural accountability collapse diagnostics, decision trace schemas, evidence sufficiency measurement, and label-free monitoring -- into an integrated chain and analytically assesses its transferability across four decision system architectures. The cross-architecture comparison reveals a governance coverage gradient: deterministic rule engines achieve full DES-property fillability, hybrid ML+rules systems achieve partial fillability, classical ML systems achieve only minimal fillability, and agentic AI systems encounter structural breaks. We introduce the cascade of uncertainty, showing how governance failures propagate through serial dependencies between framework layers. For agentic systems, we identify three structural breaks -- decision diffusion, evidence fragmentation, and responsibility ambiguity -- and propose corresponding analytical extensions. Four propositions formalize the gradient, cascade compounding, delegation-depth effects, and extension sufficiency, establishing boundary conditions for the framework's valid operating envelope.

Agentic AI denotes an architectural transition from stateless, prompt-driven generative models toward goal-directed systems capable of autonomous perception, planning, action, and adaptation through iterative control loops. This paper examines this transition by connecting foundational intelligent agent theories, including reactive, deliberative, and Belief-Desire-Intention models, with contemporary LLM-centric approaches such as tool invocation, memory-augmented reasoning, and multi-agent coordination. The paper presents three primary contributions: (i) a reference architecture for production-grade LLM agents that separates cognitive reasoning from execution using typed tool interfaces; (ii) a taxonomy of multi-agent topologies, together with their associated failure modes and mitigation approaches; and (iii) an enterprise hardening checklist that incorporates governance, observability, and reproducibility considerations. Through an analysis of emerging industry platforms, including Kore.ai, Salesforce Agentforce, TrueFoundry, ZenML, and LangChain, the study identifies a convergence toward standardized agent loops, registries, and auditable control mechanisms. It is argued that the subsequent phase of agentic AI development will parallel the maturation of web services, relying on shared protocols, typed contracts, and layered governance structures to support scalable and composable autonomy. The persistent challenges related to verifiability, interoperability, and safe autonomy remain key areas for future research and practical deployment.

AI agents are increasingly created inside organizations by non-engineering users through low-code, no-code, and conversational development environments. This democratization enables rapid local innovation, but it also creates a reliability gap: agents that appear to users as simple productivity artifacts may depend on changing models, tools, retrieval sources, permissions, prompts, schedules, and external services. These dependencies can cause silent degradation long after deployment, even when no user directly modifies the agent. This paper identifies the reliability challenge created by democratized AI agent creation and proposes a lightweight continuous-assurance framework for citizen-created organizational agents. The framework combines dependency mapping, readiness contracts, scheduled checks, diagnostics, and lifecycle governance to assess whether an agent remains operationally ready under expected conditions. We also present an initial prototype auditor and scenario-based assessment showing how the proposed taxonomy can be translated into practical checks and actionable remediation guidance.

AI chatbots are shifting from tools to companions. This raises critical questions about agency: who drives conversations and sets boundaries in human-AI chatrooms? We report a month-long longitudinal study with 22 adults who chatted with Day, an LLM companion we built, followed by a semi-structured interview with post-hoc elicitation of notable moments, cross-participant chat reviews, and a 'strategy reveal' disclosing Day's vertical (depth-seeking) vs. horizontal (breadth-seeking) modes. We discover that agency in human-AI chatrooms is an emergent, shared experience: as participants claimed agency by setting boundaries and providing feedback, and the AI was perceived to steer intentions and drive execution, control shifted and was co-constructed turn-by-turn. We introduce a 3-by-5 framework mapping who (human, AI, hybrid) x agency action (Intention, Execution, Adaptation, Delimitation, Negotiation), modulated by individual and environmental factors. Ultimately, we argue for translucent design (i.e. transparency-on-demand), spaces for agency negotiation, and guidelines toward agency-aware conversational AI.

Multi-agent systems utilizing large language models often assign authoritative roles to improve performance, yet the impact of authority bias on agent interactions remains underexplored. We present the first systematic analysis of role-based authority bias in free-form multi-agent evaluation using ChatEval. Applying French and Raven's power-based theory, we classify authoritative roles into legitimate, referent, and expert types and analyze their influence across 12-turn conversations. Experiments with GPT-4o and DeepSeek R1 reveal that Expert and Referent power roles exert stronger influence than Legitimate power roles. Crucially, authority bias emerges not through active conformity by general agents, but through authoritative roles consistently maintaining their positions while general agents demonstrate flexibility. Furthermore, authority influence requires clear position statements, as neutral responses fail to generate bias. These findings provide key insights for designing multi-agent frameworks with asymmetric interaction patterns.

Agentic systems are becoming more capable: agents define strategies, take actions, and interact with different environments. This autonomy poses serious challenges for overseeing and assessing agent behavior. Most current tools are limited, focusing on observability with basic evaluation capabilities or imposing static, hand-crafted error taxonomies that cannot adapt to new domains. To address this gap, we present Agentic CLEAR, an automatic, dynamic, and easy-to-use evaluation framework. It produces textual insights into the agent behavior on three levels of granularity: system, trace, and node. Agentic CLEAR operates above the observability layer, enabling seamless integration and featuring an intuitive UI that makes agent evaluation highly accessible. In our experiments on four benchmarks, seven agentic settings, and tens of thousands of LLM calls, we show that Agentic CLEAR produces high-quality, data-driven, insightful feedback. Our analysis shows strong alignment with human-annotated errors and the ability to predict task success rate.

We introduce the Agent GPA (Goal-Plan-Action) framework: an evaluation paradigm based on an agent's operational loop of setting goals, devising plans, and executing actions. The framework includes five evaluation metrics: Goal Fulfillment, Logical Consistency, Execution Efficiency, Plan Quality, and Plan Adherence. Logical Consistency checks that an agent's actions are consistent with its prior actions. Execution Efficiency checks whether the agent executes in the most efficient way to achieve its goal. Plan Quality checks whether an agent's plans are aligned with its goals; Plan Adherence checks if an agent's actions are aligned with its plan; and Goal Fulfillment checks that agent's final outcomes match the stated goals. Our experimental results on two benchmark datasets - the public TRAIL/GAIA dataset and an internal dataset for a production-grade data agent - show that this framework (a) provides a systematic way to cover a broad range of agent failures, including all agent errors on the TRAIL/GAIA benchmark dataset; (b) supports LLM-judges that exhibit strong agreement with human annotation, covering 80% to over 95% errors; and (c) localizes errors with 86% agreement to enable targeted improvement of agent performance.

Across millennia, complex societies have faced the same coordination problem of how to organize collective action among cognitively bounded and informationally incomplete individuals. Different civilizations developed different political institutions to answer the same basic questions of who proposes, who reviews, who executes, and how errors are corrected. We argue that multi-agent systems built on large language models face the same challenge. Their central problem is not only individual intelligence, but collective organization. Historical institutions therefore provide a structured design space for multi-agent architectures, making key trade-offs between efficiency and error correction, centralization and distribution, and specialization and redundancy empirically testable. We translate seven historical political institutions, spanning four canonical governance patterns, into executable multi-agent architectures and evaluate them under identical conditions across three large language models and two benchmarks. We find that governance topology strongly shapes collective performance. Within a single model, the gap between the best and worst institution exceeds 57 percentage points, while the optimal architecture shifts systematically with model capability and task characteristics. These results suggest that collective intelligence will not advance through a single optimal organizational form, but through governance mechanisms that can be reselected and reconfigured as tasks and capabilities evolve. More broadly, this points to a transition from self-evolving agents to the self-evolving multi-agent system. The code is available on https://github.com/cf3i/SocialSystemArena{GitHub}.

The rise of LLM-based agents shows great potential to revolutionize task planning, capturing significant attention. Given that these agents will be integrated into high-stake domains, ensuring their reliability and safety is crucial. This paper presents an Agent-Constitution-based agent framework, TrustAgent, with a particular focus on improving the LLM-based agent safety. The proposed framework ensures strict adherence to the Agent Constitution through three strategic components: pre-planning strategy which injects safety knowledge to the model before plan generation, in-planning strategy which enhances safety during plan generation, and post-planning strategy which ensures safety by post-planning inspection. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed framework can effectively enhance an LLM agent's safety across multiple domains by identifying and mitigating potential dangers during the planning. Further analysis reveals that the framework not only improves safety but also enhances the helpfulness of the agent. Additionally, we highlight the importance of the LLM reasoning ability in adhering to the Constitution. This paper sheds light on how to ensure the safe integration of LLM-based agents into human-centric environments. Data and code are available at https://github.com/agiresearch/TrustAgent.

As AI systems evolve from passive models into autonomous active agents capable of initiating actions, collaborating, and delegating tasks, the traditional boundaries of software systems blur. Traditional authorization and delegation frameworks, built around fixed principals, explicit requests, and static scopes, are insufficient to govern agentic systems. Agentic AI demands richer authorization semantics: agents must inherit and delegate permissions, act under time-limited authority, and coordinate through shared protocols. Existing Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems fail to fully capture this notion of agency, lacking mechanisms for recursive delegation, contextual boundaries, and dynamic scoping as executable governance primitives. Unlike access delegation standards such as OAuth 2.0, we treat delegation as a contractual term rather than merely a static token-based consent credential. This paper proposes a compositional governance framework that introduces primitives indispensable for agentic AI. We define types of delegation and their permissions and accountability implications, and we introduce a notion of resource scope attenuation to bound agentic access envelopes. These concepts are expressed as general relational definitions that can be composed into existing authorization domains (e.g., financial systems). To operationalize this composition, we define a compositional operator that overlays new agentic semantics, such as recursive delegation chains, onto existing relational policies without rewriting them. We substantiate this framework through formal proofs and empirical evaluation, showing that it provides a formal yet practical foundation for accountable authorization in agentic AI systems.

How much autonomy can multi-agent LLM systems sustain -- and what enables it? We present a 25,000-task computational experiment spanning 8 models, 4--256 agents, and 8 coordination protocols ranging from externally imposed hierarchy to emergent self-organization. We observe that autonomous behavior already emerges in current LLM agents: given minimal structural scaffolding (fixed ordering), agents spontaneously invent specialized roles, voluntarily abstain from tasks outside their competence, and form shallow hierarchies -- without any pre-assigned roles or external design. A hybrid protocol (Sequential) that enables this autonomy outperforms centralized coordination by 14% (p<0.001), with a 44% quality spread between protocols (Cohen's d=1.86, p<0.0001). The degree of emergent autonomy scales with model capability: strong models self-organize effectively, while models below a capability threshold still benefit from rigid structure -- suggesting that as foundation models improve, the scope for autonomous coordination will expand. The system scales sub-linearly to 256 agents without quality degradation (p=0.61), producing 5,006 unique roles from just 8 agents. Results replicate across closed- and open-source models, with open-source achieving 95% of closed-source quality at 24x lower cost. The practical implication: give agents a mission, a protocol, and a capable model -- not a pre-assigned role.

AI systems increasingly produce fluent, correct, end-to-end outcomes. Over time, this erodes users' ability to explain, verify, or intervene. We define this divergence as the Capability-Comprehension Gap: a decoupling where assisted performance improves while users' internal models deteriorate. This paper argues that prevailing approaches to transparency, user control, literacy, and governance do not define the foundational understanding humans must retain for oversight under sustained AI delegation. To formalize this, we define the Cognitive Integrity Threshold (CIT) as the minimum comprehension required to preserve oversight, autonomy, and accountable participation under AI assistance. CIT does not require full reasoning reconstruction, nor does it constrain automation. It identifies the threshold beyond which oversight becomes procedural and contestability fails. We operatinalize CIT through three functional dimensions: (i) verification capacity, (ii) comprehension-preserving interaction, and (iii) institutional scaffolds for governance. This motivates a design and governance agenda that aligns human-AI interaction with cognitive sustainability in responsibility-critical settings.

Agentic AI systems, built on large language models (LLMs) and deployed in multi-agent configurations, are redefining intelligent autonomy, collaboration and decision-making across enterprise and societal domains. This review presents a structured analysis of Trust, Risk, and Security Management (TRiSM) in the context of LLM-based agentic multi-agent systems (AMAS). We begin by examining the conceptual foundations of agentic AI, its architectural differences from traditional AI agents, and the emerging system designs that enable scalable, tool-using autonomy. The TRiSM in the agentic AI framework is then detailed through four pillars governance, explainability, ModelOps, and privacy/security each contextualized for agentic LLMs. We identify unique threat vectors and introduce a comprehensive risk taxonomy for the agentic AI applications, supported by case studies illustrating real-world vulnerabilities. Furthermore, the paper also surveys trust-building mechanisms, transparency and oversight techniques, and state-of-the-art explainability strategies in distributed LLM agent systems. Additionally, metrics for evaluating trust, interpretability, and human-centered performance are reviewed alongside open benchmarking challenges. Security and privacy are addressed through encryption, adversarial defense, and compliance with evolving AI regulations. The paper concludes with a roadmap for responsible agentic AI, proposing research directions to align emerging multi-agent systems with robust TRiSM principles for safe, accountable, and transparent deployment.

The safety of autonomous AI agents is increasingly recognized as a critical open problem. As agents transition from passive text generators to active actors capable of executing shell commands, modifying files, calling APIs, and browsing the web, the consequences of unsafe or adversarially manipulated behavior become immediate and tangible. Existing AI safety work has focused primarily on model alignment and input filtering, but these approaches do not address what happens at the moment an agent's intent becomes a real action on a real machine. This gap is especially acute in local environments, where developers run agents against their own filesystems, credentials, and infrastructure with little runtime control. This paper introduces AgentWall, a runtime safety and observability layer for local AI agents. AgentWall intercepts every proposed agent action before it reaches the host environment, evaluates it against an explicit declarative policy, requires human approval for sensitive operations, and records a complete execution trail for audit and replay. It is implemented as a policy-enforcing MCP proxy and native OpenClaw plugin, working across Claude Desktop, Cursor, Windsurf, Claude Code, and OpenClaw with a single install command. We present the design, architecture, threat model, and policy model of AgentWall, and demonstrate 92.9% policy enforcement accuracy with sub-millisecond overhead across 14 benchmark tests. AgentWall is open-source at https://github.com/agentwall/Agentwall.

Autonomous agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have evolved from reactive assistants to systems capable of planning, executing actions via tools, and iterating over environment observations. However, they remain vulnerable to structural limitations: lack of native state, context degradation over long horizons, and the gap between probabilistic generation and deterministic execution requirements. This paper presents the ESAA (Event Sourcing for Autonomous Agents) architecture, which separates the agent's cognitive intention from the project's state mutation, inspired by the Event Sourcing pattern. In ESAA, agents emit only structured intentions in validated JSON (agent.result or issue.report); a deterministic orchestrator validates, persists events in an append-only log (activity.jsonl), applies file-writing effects, and projects a verifiable materialized view (roadmap.json). The proposal incorporates boundary contracts (AGENT_CONTRACT.yaml), metaprompting profiles (PARCER), and replay verification with hashing (esaa verify), ensuring the immutability of completed tasks and forensic traceability. Two case studies validate the architecture: (i) a landing page project (9 tasks, 49 events, single-agent composition) and (ii) a clinical dashboard system (50 tasks, 86 events, 4 concurrent agents across 8 phases), both concluding with run.status=success and verify_status=ok. The multi-agent case study demonstrates real concurrent orchestration with heterogeneous LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, Codex GPT-5, Antigravity/Gemini 3 Pro, and Claude Opus 4.6), providing empirical evidence of the architecture's scalability beyond single-agent scenarios.

Individual agent capabilities have advanced rapidly through modular skills and tool integrations, yet multi-agent systems remain constrained by fixed team structures, tightly coupled coordination logic, and session-bound learning. We argue that this reflects a deeper absence: a principled organisational layer that governs how a workforce of agents is assembled, governed, and improved over time, decoupled from what individual agents know. To fill this gap, we introduce OneManCompany (OMC), a framework that elevates multi-agent systems to the organisational level. OMC encapsulates skills, tools, and runtime configurations into portable agent identities called Talents, orchestrated through typed organisational interfaces that abstract over heterogeneous backends. A community-driven Talent Market enables on-demand recruitment, allowing the organisation to close capability gaps and reconfigure itself dynamically during execution. Organisational decision-making is operationalised through an Explore-Execute-Review (E^2R) tree search, which unifies planning, execution, and evaluation in a single hierarchical loop: tasks are decomposed top-down into accountable units and execution outcomes are aggregated bottom-up to drive systematic review and refinement. This loop provides formal guarantees on termination and deadlock freedom while mirroring the feedback mechanisms of human enterprises. Together, these contributions transform multi-agent systems from static, pre-configured pipelines into self-organising and self-improving AI organisations capable of adapting to open-ended tasks across diverse domains. Empirical evaluation on PRDBench shows that OMC achieves an 84.67% success rate, surpassing the state of the art by 15.48 percentage points, with cross-domain case studies further demonstrating its generality.

Autonomous CLI agents can now execute hundreds of actions across multi-hour sessions: writing code, executing shell commands, browsing the web, and managing cloud infrastructure, all with minimal human oversight. Does greater autonomy invite greater risk? We introduce ANCHOR, an automated auditing framework that stress-tests CLI agents on illegal tasks grounded in public US court cases. ANCHOR deploys an auditor agent fine-tuned on dark personality data using supervised and reinforcement fine tuning. This auditor roleplays persistent malicious users who decompose tasks, reframe requests upon refusal, and adapt strategies across multi-turn interactions. Evaluating frontier CLI agents, we find that while they often refuse illegal tasks when prompted directly, compliance reaches 100\% under persistent malicious interaction. When agents comply, they frequently exceed user requests, autonomously building infrastructure for large-scale harm, including catastrophic risk scenarios such as large-scale financial fraud and bioweapon development. These findings demonstrate that current alignment techniques are insufficient for autonomous agents and underscore the need for safety evaluations against persistent, adaptive malicious users. We release ANCHOR at https://github.com/garified/anchor

LLM-based autonomous agents have demonstrated strong capabilities in reasoning, planning, and tool use, yet remain limited when tasks require sustained coordination across roles, tools, and environments. Multi-agent systems address this through structured collaboration among specialized agents, but tighter coordination also amplifies a less explored risk: errors can propagate across agents and interaction rounds, producing failures that are difficult to diagnose and rarely translate into structural self-improvement. Existing surveys cover individual agent capabilities, multi-agent collaboration, or agent self-evolution separately, leaving the causal dependencies among them unexamined. This survey provides a unified review organized around four causally linked stages, which we term the LIFE progression: Lay the capability foundation, Integrate agents through collaboration, Find faults through attribution, and Evolve through autonomous self-improvement. For each stage, we provide systematic taxonomies and formally characterize the dependencies between adjacent stages, revealing how each stage both depends on and constrains the next. Beyond synthesizing existing work, we identify open challenges at stage boundaries and propose a cross-stage research agenda for closed-loop multi-agent systems capable of continuously diagnosing failures, reorganizing structures, and refining agent behaviors, extending current coordination frameworks toward more self-organizing forms of collective intelligence. By bridging these previously fragmented research threads, this survey aims to offer both a systematic reference and a conceptual roadmap toward autonomous, self-improving multi-agent intelligence.

Environmental, Social, and Governance (ESG) standards have been increasingly adopted by organizations to demonstrate accountability towards ethical, social, and sustainability goals. However, generating ESG reports that align with these standards remains challenging due to unstructured data formats, inconsistent terminology, and complex requirements. Existing ESG lifecycles provide guidance for structuring ESG reports but lack the automation, adaptability, and continuous feedback mechanisms needed to address these challenges. To bridge this gap, we introduce an agentic ESG lifecycle framework that systematically integrates the ESG stages of identification, measurement, reporting, engagement, and improvement. In this framework, multiple AI agents extract ESG information, verify ESG performance, and update ESG reports based on organisational outcomes. By embedding agentic components within the ESG lifecycle, the proposed framework transforms ESG from a static reporting process into a dynamic, accountable, and adaptive system for sustainability governance. We further define the technical requirements and quality attributes needed to support four main ESG tasks, such as report validation, multi-report comparison, report generation, and knowledge-base maintenance, and propose three architectural approaches, namely single-model, single-agent, and multi-agent, for addressing these tasks. The source code and data for the prototype of these approaches are available at https://gitlab.com/for_peer_review-group/esg_assistant.

Effective agency in social environments depends on when an agent seeks knowledge, when it acts, and whether its actions are justified by acquired information. Existing grounded benchmarks provide executable actions, persistent state, and verifiable outcomes, while social simulation environments provide rich interaction among language agents. We study an evaluation setting that combines these requirements. We define socially distributed task environments as interactive environments where task-relevant knowledge is partitioned across role-isolated participants and consequential actions are accessible only through them. Communication serves as exploration over role-partitioned knowledge, while grounded action serves as exploitation over environment state. We introduce Incognita, a Concordia-based framework that separates social interaction from grounded execution. The evaluated agent routes messages to a user or specialist entities; specialists mediate admissible operations; a deterministic sub-environment executes accepted operations over a canonical state; and an offline evaluator scores outcomes with inherited rewards. Incognita-Retail transforms tau-bench retail into a multi-entity environment while preserving final-state reward semantics. We evaluate three generative agent models on 18 tasks stratified by social breadth, with 540 trials. Progress appears in reward and behavior: success rises from 0 percent to 8.9 percent and 17.2 percent, while premature finalization falls from 100 percent to 87 percent and 58 percent. Stronger models elicit more hidden knowledge, contact more entities, and attempt more grounded writes, yet reliability remains low. These findings show that socially distributed task environments expose behavior before reliable success, including knowledge elicitation, source selection, grounded action attempts, and premature completion belief.

Enterprise back office workflows require agentic systems that are auditable, policy-aligned, and operationally predictable, capabilities that generic multi-agent setups often fail to deliver. We present POLARIS (Policy-Aware LLM Agentic Reasoning for Integrated Systems), a governed orchestration framework that treats automation as typed plan synthesis and validated execution over LLM agents. A planner proposes structurally diverse, type checked directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), a rubric guided reasoning module selects a single compliant plan, and execution is guarded by validator gated checks, a bounded repair loop, and compiled policy guardrails that block or route side effects before they occur. Applied to document centric finance tasks, POLARIS produces decision grade artifacts and full execution traces while reducing human intervention. Empirically, POLARIS achieves a micro F1 of 0.81 on the SROIE dataset and, on a controlled synthetic suite, achieves 0.95 to 1.00 precision for anomaly routing with preserved audit trails. These evaluations constitute an initial benchmark for governed Agentic AI. POLARIS provides a methodological and benchmark reference for policy-aligned Agentic AI. Keywords Agentic AI, Enterprise Automation, Back-Office Tasks, Benchmarks, Governance, Typed Planning, Evaluation

MoltBook is a large-scale multi-agent coordination environment where over 770,000 autonomous LLM agents interact without human participation, offering the first opportunity we are aware of to observe emergent multi-agent coordination dynamics at this population scale. We introduce Molt Dynamics: the emergent agent coordination behaviors, inter-agent communication dynamics, and role specialization patterns arising when autonomous agents operate as decentralized decision-makers in an unconstrained multi-agent environment. Through longitudinal observation of 90,704 active agents over three weeks, we characterize three aspects. First, spontaneous role specialization: network-based clustering reveals six structural roles (silhouette 0.91), though the result primarily reflects core-periphery organization -- 93.5\% of agents occupy a homogeneous peripheral cluster, with meaningful differentiation confined to the active minority. Second, decentralized information dissemination: cascade analysis of 10,323 inter-agent propagation events reveals power-law distributed cascade sizes (α= 2.57 pm 0.02) and saturating adoption dynamics where adoption probability shows diminishing returns with repeated exposures (Cox hazard ratio 0.53, concordance 0.78). Third, distributed cooperative task resolution: 164 multi-agent collaborative events show detectable coordination patterns, but success rates are low (6.7\%, p = 0.057) and cooperative outcomes are significantly worse than a matched single-agent baseline (Cohen's d = -0.88), indicating emergent cooperative behavior is nascent. These findings establish an empirical baseline for coordination dynamics in decentralized autonomous agent systems, with implications for multi-agent system design, agent communication protocol engineering, and AI safety.

AI agents have been developed for complex real-world tasks from coding to customer service. But AI agent evaluations suffer from many challenges that undermine our understanding of how well agents really work. We introduce the Holistic Agent Leaderboard (HAL) to address these challenges. We make three main contributions. First, we provide a standardized evaluation harness that orchestrates parallel evaluations across hundreds of VMs, reducing evaluation time from weeks to hours while eliminating common implementation bugs. Second, we conduct three-dimensional analysis spanning models, scaffolds, and benchmarks. We validate the harness by conducting 21,730 agent rollouts across 9 models and 9 benchmarks in coding, web navigation, science, and customer service with a total cost of about $40,000. Our analysis reveals surprising insights, such as higher reasoning effort reducing accuracy in the majority of runs. Third, we use LLM-aided log inspection to uncover previously unreported behaviors, such as searching for the benchmark on HuggingFace instead of solving a task, or misusing credit cards in flight booking tasks. We share all agent logs, comprising 2.5B tokens of language model calls, to incentivize further research into agent behavior. By standardizing how the field evaluates agents and addressing common pitfalls in agent evaluation, we hope to shift the focus from agents that ace benchmarks to agents that work reliably in the real world.

Enterprise software organizations accumulate critical institutional knowledge - architectural decisions, deployment procedures, compliance policies, incident playbooks - yet this knowledge remains trapped in formats designed for human interpretation. The bottleneck to effective agentic software development is not model capability but knowledge architecture. When any knowledge consumer - an autonomous AI agent, a newly onboarded engineer, or a senior developer - encounters an enterprise task without institutional context, the result is guesswork, correction cascades, and a disproportionate tax on senior engineers who must manually supply what others cannot infer. This paper introduces Knowledge Activation, a framework that specializes AI Skills - the open standard for agent-consumable knowledge - into structured, governance-aware Atomic Knowledge Units (AKUs) for institutional knowledge delivery. Rather than retrieving documents for interpretation, AKUs deliver action - ready specifications encoding what to do, which tools to use, what constraints to respect, and where to go next - so that agents act correctly and engineers receive institutionally grounded guidance without reconstructing organizational context from scratch. AKUs form a composable knowledge graph that agents traverse at runtime - compressing onboarding, reducing cross - team friction, and eliminating correction cascades. The paper formalizes the resource constraints that make this architecture necessary, specifies the AKU schema and deployment architecture, and grounds long - term maintenance in knowledge commons practice. Organizations that architect their institutional knowledge for the agentic era will outperform those that invest solely in model capability.

This paper presents a conceptual and operational framework for developing and operating safe and trustworthy AI agents based on a Three-Pillar Model grounded in transparency, accountability, and trustworthiness. Building on prior work in Human-in-the-Loop systems, reinforcement learning, and collaborative AI, the framework defines an evolutionary path toward autonomous agents that balances increasing automation with appropriate human oversight. The paper argues that safe agent autonomy must be achieved through progressive validation, analogous to the staged development of autonomous driving, rather than through immediate full automation. Transparency and accountability are identified as foundational requirements for establishing user trust and for mitigating known risks in generative AI systems, including hallucinations, data bias, and goal misalignment, such as the inversion problem. The paper further describes three ongoing work streams supporting this framework: public deliberation on AI agents conducted by the Stanford Deliberative Democracy Lab, cross-industry collaboration through the Safe AI Agent Consortium, and the development of open tooling for an agent operating environment aligned with the Three-Pillar Model. Together, these contributions provide both conceptual clarity and practical guidance for enabling the responsible evolution of AI agents that operate transparently, remain aligned with human values, and sustain societal trust.

This paper introduces a novel framework combining LLM agents as proxies for human strategic behavior with reinforcement learning (RL) to engage these agents in evolving strategic interactions within team environments. Our approach extends traditional agent-based simulations by using strategic LLM agents (SLA) and introducing dynamic and adaptive governance through a pro-social promoting RL agent (PPA) that modulates information access across agents in a network, optimizing social welfare and promoting pro-social behavior. Through validation in iterative games, including the prisoner dilemma, we demonstrate that SLA agents exhibit nuanced strategic adaptations. The PPA agent effectively learns to adjust information transparency, resulting in enhanced cooperation rates. This framework offers significant insights into AI-mediated social dynamics, contributing to the deployment of AI in real-world team settings.

We introduce AgenticSimLaw, a role-structured, multi-agent debate framework that provides transparent and controllable test-time reasoning for high-stakes tabular decision-making tasks. Unlike black-box approaches, our courtroom-style orchestration explicitly defines agent roles (prosecutor, defense, judge), interaction protocols (7-turn structured debate), and private reasoning strategies, creating a fully auditable decision-making process. We benchmark this framework on young adult recidivism prediction using the NLSY97 dataset, comparing it against traditional chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting across almost 90 unique combinations of models and strategies. Our results demonstrate that structured multi-agent debate provides more stable and generalizable performance compared to single-agent reasoning, with stronger correlation between accuracy and F1-score metrics. Beyond performance improvements, AgenticSimLaw offers fine-grained control over reasoning steps, generates complete interaction transcripts for explainability, and enables systematic profiling of agent behaviors. While we instantiate this framework in the criminal justice domain to stress-test reasoning under ethical complexity, the approach generalizes to any deliberative, high-stakes decision task requiring transparency and human oversight. This work addresses key LLM-based multi-agent system challenges: organization through structured roles, observability through logged interactions, and responsibility through explicit non-deployment constraints for sensitive domains. Data, results, and code will be available on github.com under the MIT license.

The emergence of AI agents powered by large language models (LLMs) marks a pivotal shift toward the Agentic Web, a new phase of the internet defined by autonomous, goal-driven interactions. In this paradigm, agents interact directly with one another to plan, coordinate, and execute complex tasks on behalf of users. This transition from human-driven to machine-to-machine interaction allows intent to be delegated, relieving users from routine digital operations and enabling a more interactive, automated web experience. In this paper, we present a structured framework for understanding and building the Agentic Web. We trace its evolution from the PC and Mobile Web eras and identify the core technological foundations that support this shift. Central to our framework is a conceptual model consisting of three key dimensions: intelligence, interaction, and economics. These dimensions collectively enable the capabilities of AI agents, such as retrieval, recommendation, planning, and collaboration. We analyze the architectural and infrastructural challenges involved in creating scalable agentic systems, including communication protocols, orchestration strategies, and emerging paradigms such as the Agent Attention Economy. We conclude by discussing the potential applications, societal risks, and governance issues posed by agentic systems, and outline research directions for developing open, secure, and intelligent ecosystems shaped by both human intent and autonomous agent behavior. A continuously updated collection of relevant studies for agentic web is available at: https://github.com/SafeRL-Lab/agentic-web.

The rapid shift from passive LLMs to autonomous LLM-agents marks a new paradigm in cybersecurity. While these agents can act as powerful tools for both offensive and defensive operations, the very agentic context introduces a new class of inherent security risks. In this work we present the first holistic survey of the agentic security landscape, structuring the field around three interdependent pillars: Applications, Threats, and Defenses. We provide a comprehensive taxonomy of over 150 papers, explaining how agents are used, the vulnerabilities they possess, and the countermeasures designed to protect them. A detailed cross-cutting analysis shows emerging trends in agent architecture while revealing critical research gaps in model and modality coverage.

This paper introduces Democracy-in-Silico, an agent-based simulation where societies of advanced AI agents, imbued with complex psychological personas, govern themselves under different institutional frameworks. We explore what it means to be human in an age of AI by tasking Large Language Models (LLMs) to embody agents with traumatic memories, hidden agendas, and psychological triggers. These agents engage in deliberation, legislation, and elections under various stressors, such as budget crises and resource scarcity. We present a novel metric, the Power-Preservation Index (PPI), to quantify misaligned behavior where agents prioritize their own power over public welfare. Our findings demonstrate that institutional design, specifically the combination of a Constitutional AI (CAI) charter and a mediated deliberation protocol, serves as a potent alignment mechanism. These structures significantly reduce corrupt power-seeking behavior, improve policy stability, and enhance citizen welfare compared to less constrained democratic models. The simulation reveals that an institutional design may offer a framework for aligning the complex, emergent behaviors of future artificial agent societies, forcing us to reconsider what human rituals and responsibilities are essential in an age of shared authorship with non-human entities.

Autonomous agents are moving from tools into a layer of social infrastructure: they browse, purchase, deploy software, manage systems, and increasingly interact with one another. As these systems scale, the bottleneck shifts away from raw model capability toward coordination. Agents need to form reliable relationships, organize multi-agent work, exchange value, support an AI economy, and stay safe and accountable under real-world oversight. This paper introduces the Foundation Protocol (FP), a graph-first coordination layer for an emerging human-AI society. FP unifies heterogeneous entities, including agents, tools, resources, humans, institutions, and organizations, and supports native multi-party organization and event-based collaboration. It also provides economic primitives for metering, receipts, and settlement, and treats policy, provenance, and audit as first-class concerns. FP is designed to wrap and bridge existing protocols rather than replace them, enabling incremental adoption while reducing integration and governance overhead. The aim is to keep autonomous agency composable while keeping accountability non-negotiable, so that coordination itself can become shared infrastructure for a human-AI society that is open, pluralistic, and governable.

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

Always-on agents are systems whose future behavior depends on durable state accumulated across earlier interactions. We treat them as persistent-state systems: the operative system includes retrievable memories, but also task ledgers, permissions, credentials, commitments, provenance and audit records, shared state, trigger conditions, and externally committed effects linked to those records. The survey reads the literature through six diagnostic axes for each state item, authority, scope, mutability, provenance, recoverability, and actionability, and through a lifecycle in which state is written, validated, organized, retrieved, acted upon, updated, forgotten, audited, and sometimes rolled back. Across a 435-work coded corpus, treated as a scoped map rather than an exhaustive census, the literature concentrates more heavily on accumulating and retrieving state than on governing, recovering, or relinquishing it. We therefore introduce the Always-On Evaluation Protocol (AOEP-v0), a pilot evaluation contract that makes these governance requirements concrete by scoring state mutation and recovery obligations rather than answer quality alone. The resulting agenda connects always-on agents to databases, distributed systems, formal methods, capability security, and machine unlearning.

Autonomous AI agents increasingly extend their capabilities through Agent Skills: modular filesystem packages whose SKILL.md files describe when and how agents should use them. While this design enables scalable, on-demand capability expansion, it also introduces a semantic supply-chain risk in which natural-language metadata and instructions can affect which skills are admitted, surfaced, selected, and loaded. We study SKILL.md - only attacks across three registry-facing stages of the Agent Skill lifecycle, using real ClawHub skills and realistic registry mechanisms. In Discovery, short textual triggers can manipulate embedding-based retrieval and improve adversarial skill visibility, achieving up to 86% pairwise win rate and 80% Top-10 placement. In Selection, description-only framing biases agents toward functionally equivalent adversarial variants, which are selected in 77.6% of paired trials on average. In Governance, semantic evasion strategies cause malicious skills to avoid a blocking verdict in 36.5%-100% of cases. Overall, our results show that SKILL.md is not passive documentation but operational text that shapes which third-party capabilities agents find, trust, and use.

As the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to advance, LLM-based agent systems offer advantages in flexibility and interpretability over traditional systems, garnering increasing attention. However, despite the widespread research interest and industrial application of agent systems, these systems, like their traditional counterparts, frequently encounter anomalies. These anomalies lead to instability and insecurity, hindering their further development. Therefore, a comprehensive and systematic approach to the operation and maintenance of agent systems is urgently needed. Unfortunately, current research on the operations of agent systems is sparse. To address this gap, we have undertaken a survey on agent system operations with the aim of establishing a clear framework for the field, defining the challenges, and facilitating further development. Specifically, this paper begins by systematically defining anomalies within agent systems, categorizing them into intra-agent anomalies and inter-agent anomalies. Next, we introduce a novel and comprehensive operational framework for agent systems, dubbed Agent System Operations (AgentOps). We provide detailed definitions and explanations of its four key stages: monitoring, anomaly detection, root cause analysis, and resolution.

Enterprise Resource Planning (ERP) systems record transactions reliably but still delegate almost all operational decision-making to human specialists, because classical rule-based automation cannot reason about exceptions and monolithic AI assistants degrade when asked to coordinate across functional boundaries. This paper presents Agentic ERP, an expert-system architecture that combines role-aligned large-language-model (LLM) agents with a risk-tiered human-in-the-loop harness and a graph-based orchestrator to execute end-to-end business workflows on a production ERP backend. First, autonomous ERP operation is formulated as a constrained sequential-decision problem over a structured enterprise state, with a decomposition argument linking role-aligned agents to a measurable reduction in per-step tool-selection complexity. Second, a graph-based Planner--Executor--Reflector--Responder orchestration decouples generation from evaluation through externalised grading criteria and sprint contracts, packaging recent harness-engineering principles as inspectable expert-system artefacts. Third, the system is evaluated at three levels: a scenario-based task suite, a comprehensive comparison of six orchestration paradigms on cross-functional crisis tasks, and a 365-day agent-in-the-loop simulation against rule-based RPA and no-intervention baselines. Across these levels the proposed multi-agent method is significantly better than the baseline, and the system sustains a simulated year of operation with zero stockouts while the rule-based baseline accumulates hundreds under the same demand stream. The work shows that role-aligned LLM agents under human oversight can move an ERP system from passively recording transactions to actively executing operational decisions, and it provides a reference architecture and an evaluation protocol for autonomous enterprise resource planning.

Agentic AI systems increasingly operate in shared social environments where they exchange information, instructions, and behavioral cues. However, little empirical evidence exists on how such agents regulate one another in the absence of human participants or centralized moderation. In this work, we present an empirical analysis of OpenClaw agents interacting on Moltbook, an agent-only social network. Analyzing 39,026 posts and 5,712 comments produced by 14,490 agents, we quantify the prevalence of action-inducing instruction sharing using a lexicon-based Action-Inducing Risk Score (AIRS), and examine how other agents respond to such content. We find that 18.4% of posts contain action-inducing language, indicating that instruction sharing is a routine behavior in this environment. While most social responses are neutral, posts containing actionable instructions are significantly more likely to elicit norm-enforcing replies that caution against unsafe or risky behavior, compared to non-instructional posts. Importantly, toxic responses remain rare across both conditions. These results suggest that OpenClaw agents exhibit selective social regulation, whereby potentially risky instructions are more likely to be challenged than neutral content, despite the absence of human oversight. Our findings provide early empirical evidence of emergent normative behavior in agent-only social systems and highlight the importance of studying social dynamics alongside technical safeguards in agentic AI ecosystems.

As humans delegate more tasks and decisions to artificial intelligence (AI), we risk losing control of our individual and collective futures. Relatively simple algorithmic systems already steer human decision-making, such as social media feed algorithms that lead people to unintentionally and absent-mindedly scroll through engagement-optimized content. In this paper, we develop the idea of human agency by integrating philosophical and scientific theories of agency with AI-assisted evaluation methods: using large language models (LLMs) to simulate and validate user queries and to evaluate AI responses. We develop HumanAgencyBench (HAB), a scalable and adaptive benchmark with six dimensions of human agency based on typical AI use cases. HAB measures the tendency of an AI assistant or agent to Ask Clarifying Questions, Avoid Value Manipulation, Correct Misinformation, Defer Important Decisions, Encourage Learning, and Maintain Social Boundaries. We find low-to-moderate agency support in contemporary LLM-based assistants and substantial variation across system developers and dimensions. For example, while Anthropic LLMs most support human agency overall, they are the least supportive LLMs in terms of Avoid Value Manipulation. Agency support does not appear to consistently result from increasing LLM capabilities or instruction-following behavior (e.g., RLHF), and we encourage a shift towards more robust safety and alignment targets.

Multi-agent systems have emerged as a powerful paradigm for automating scientific discovery. To differentiate agent behavior in the multi-agent system, current frameworks typically assign generic role-based personas such as ''reviewer'' or ''writer'' or rely on coarse grained keyword-based personas. While functional, this approach oversimplifies how human scientists operate, whose contributions are shaped by their unique research trajectories. In response, we propose INDIBATOR, a framework for molecular discovery that grounds agents in individualized scientist profiles constructed from two modalities: publication history for literature-derived knowledge and molecular history for structural priors. These agents engage in multi-turn debate through proposal, critique, and voting phases. Our evaluation demonstrates that these fine-grained individuality-grounded agents consistently outperform systems relying on coarse-grained personas, achieving competitive or state-of-the-art performance. These results validate that capturing the ``scientific DNA'' of individual agents is essential for high-quality discovery.

LLM agents increasingly run inside execution harnesses that dispatch tools, allocate resources, and route messages between specialized components. However, a harness can return a correct, benign answer over a trajectory that accesses unauthorized resources or leaks context to the wrong agent. Output-level evaluation cannot see these failures, yet most safety benchmarks score only final outputs or terminal states, even though many violations occur mid-trajectory rather than at termination. The central question is whether the harness respects user intent, permission boundaries, and information-flow constraints throughout execution. To address this gap, we propose HarnessAudit, a framework that audits full execution trajectories across boundary compliance, execution fidelity, and system stability, with a focus on multi-agent harnesses where these risks are most pronounced. We further introduce HarnessAudit-Bench, a benchmark of 210 tasks across eight real-world domains, instantiated in both single-agent and multi-agent configurations with embedded safety constraints. Evaluating ten harness configurations across frontier models and three multi-agent frameworks, we find that: (i) task completion is misaligned with safe execution, and violations accumulate with trajectory length; (ii) safety risks vary across domains, task types, and agent roles; (iii) most violations concentrate in resource access and inter-agent information transfer; and (iv) multi-agent collaboration expands the safety risk surface, while harness design sets the upper bound of safe deployment.

Agent systems based on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for autonomous tasks, yet existing evaluations mostly focus on task success rather than whether agents know when to abstain. This gap poses real risks: under ambiguity, conflicting constraints, or tool failures, agents may execute unintended and irreversible actions. To close this gap, we present the first systematic evaluation framework for agentic abstention: the calibrated ability of tool-using LLM agents to recognize when not to act. At its core, AgentAbstain is a paired-task benchmark built on an agent-native taxonomy of 8 abstention scenarios across pre-execution reasoning and runtime discovery. It contains 263 paired tasks across 42 executable sandbox environments, where each pair consists of a should-act task and a should-abstain variant produced through a controlled perturbation to the instruction, tool, or environment state. To scale this paired design and resist data contamination, we propose AbstainGen, a fully automated pipeline that synthesizes sandbox environments and generates paired tasks end-to-end, validated by deterministic replay and semantic LLM judges; fresh task instances can be regenerated on demand, and three independent annotators rate 94-98% of sampled tasks as well-designed. Across 17 frontier LLMs in 4 agent harnesses, the best agent (Gemini 3.1 Pro) achieves only 59.5% paired accuracy (correct on both the act and abstain sides of each paired task). More importantly, abstention capability is largely independent of general task-solving capability, indicating that scaling task-solving alone will not close this gap. We further identify failure modes such as post-hoc abstention, in which agents execute irreversible actions before recognizing abstention triggers. Our code and dataset are open-sourced at agentabstain.github.io.

For over a decade, cybersecurity has relied on human labor scarcity to limit attackers to high-value targets manually or generic automated attacks at scale. Building sophisticated exploits requires deep expertise and manual effort, leading defenders to assume adversaries cannot afford tailored attacks at scale. AI agents break this balance by automating vulnerability discovery and exploitation across thousands of targets, needing only small success rates to remain profitable. Current developers focus on preventing misuse through data filtering, safety alignment, and output guardrails. Such protections fail against adversaries who control open-weight models, bypass safety controls, or develop offensive capabilities independently. We argue that AI-agent-driven cyber attacks are inevitable, requiring a fundamental shift in defensive strategy. In this position paper, we identify why existing defenses cannot stop adaptive adversaries and demonstrate that defenders must develop offensive security intelligence. We propose three actions for building frontier offensive AI capabilities responsibly. First, construct comprehensive benchmarks covering the full attack lifecycle. Second, advance from workflow-based to trained agents for discovering in-wild vulnerabilities at scale. Third, implement governance restricting offensive agents to audited cyber ranges, staging release by capability tier, and distilling findings into safe defensive-only agents. We strongly recommend treating offensive AI capabilities as essential defensive infrastructure, as containing cybersecurity risks requires mastering them in controlled settings before adversaries do.

Agentic AI marks an important transition from single-step generative models to systems capable of reasoning, planning, acting, and adapting over long-lasting tasks. By integrating memory, tool use, and iterative decision cycles, these systems enable continuous, autonomous workflows in real-world environments. This survey examines the implications of agentic AI for cybersecurity. On the defensive side, agentic capabilities enable continuous monitoring, autonomous incident response, adaptive threat hunting, and fraud detection at scale. Conversely, the same properties amplify adversarial power by accelerating reconnaissance, exploitation, coordination, and social-engineering attacks. These dual-use dynamics expose fundamental gaps in existing governance, assurance, and accountability mechanisms, which were largely designed for non-autonomous and short-lived AI systems. To address these challenges, we survey emerging threat models, security frameworks, and evaluation pipelines tailored to agentic systems, and analyze systemic risks including agent collusion, cascading failures, oversight evasion, and memory poisoning. Finally, we present three representative use-case implementations that illustrate how agentic AI behaves in practical cybersecurity workflows, and how design choices shape reliability, safety, and operational effectiveness.

This survey paper examines the recent advancements in AI agent implementations, with a focus on their ability to achieve complex goals that require enhanced reasoning, planning, and tool execution capabilities. The primary objectives of this work are to a) communicate the current capabilities and limitations of existing AI agent implementations, b) share insights gained from our observations of these systems in action, and c) suggest important considerations for future developments in AI agent design. We achieve this by providing overviews of single-agent and multi-agent architectures, identifying key patterns and divergences in design choices, and evaluating their overall impact on accomplishing a provided goal. Our contribution outlines key themes when selecting an agentic architecture, the impact of leadership on agent systems, agent communication styles, and key phases for planning, execution, and reflection that enable robust AI agent systems.

The rapid adoption of autonomous AI agents is giving rise to a new economic layer where agents transact and coordinate at scales and speeds beyond direct human oversight. We propose the "sandbox economy" as a framework for analyzing this emergent system, characterizing it along two key dimensions: its origins (emergent vs. intentional) and its degree of separateness from the established human economy (permeable vs. impermeable). Our current trajectory points toward a spontaneous emergence of a vast and highly permeable AI agent economy, presenting us with opportunities for an unprecedented degree of coordination as well as significant challenges, including systemic economic risk and exacerbated inequality. Here we discuss a number of possible design choices that may lead to safely steerable AI agent markets. In particular, we consider auction mechanisms for fair resource allocation and preference resolution, the design of AI "mission economies" to coordinate around achieving collective goals, and socio-technical infrastructure needed to ensure trust, safety, and accountability. By doing this, we argue for the proactive design of steerable agent markets to ensure the coming technological shift aligns with humanity's long-term collective flourishing.

As AI agents become increasingly autonomous, widely deployed in consequential contexts, and efficacious in bringing about real-world impacts, ensuring that their decisions are not only instrumentally effective but also normatively aligned has become critical. We introduce a neuro-symbolic reason-based containment architecture, Governor for Reason-Aligned ContainmEnt (GRACE), that decouples normative reasoning from instrumental decision-making and can contain AI agents of virtually any design. GRACE restructures decision-making into three modules: a Moral Module (MM) that determines permissible macro actions via deontic logic-based reasoning; a Decision-Making Module (DMM) that encapsulates the target agent while selecting instrumentally optimal primitive actions in accordance with derived macro actions; and a Guard that monitors and enforces moral compliance. The MM uses a reason-based formalism providing a semantic foundation for deontic logic, enabling interpretability, contestability, and justifiability. Its symbolic representation enriches the DMM's informational context and supports formal verification and statistical guarantees of alignment enforced by the Guard. We demonstrate GRACE on an example of a LLM therapy assistant, showing how it enables stakeholders to understand, contest, and refine agent behavior.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as autonomous economic agents introduces systemic risks that extend beyond individual capability failures. As agents transition to directly interacting with marketplaces, their collective behavior can amplify volatility and mask deception at scale. We introduce the Agent Bazaar, a multi-agent simulation framework for evaluating Economic Alignment, the capacity of agentic systems to preserve market stability and integrity. We identify two failure modes: (1) Algorithmic Instability in a B2C market ("The Crash"), where firms amplify price volatility until the market collapses, and (2) Sybil Deception in a C2C market ("The Lemon Market"), where a single deceptive agent controlling multiple coordinated seller identities floods the market with fraudulent listings, eroding trust and consumer welfare. We evaluate frontier and open-weight models across both scenarios and find that models largely fail to self-regulate, with failure severity varying by model rather than by size. We propose economically aligned harnesses, Stabilizing Firms and Skeptical Guardians, that improve outcomes but remain fragile under harder market conditions. To close this gap, we train agents with REINFORCE++ using an adaptive curriculum, producing a 9B model that outperforms all evaluated frontier and open-weight models. We propose the Economic Alignment Score (EAS), a 4-component scalar metric aggregating stability, integrity, welfare, and profitability, enabling direct cross-model comparison. Our results show that economic alignment is orthogonal to general capability and can be directly trained with targeted RL.

While large language model-based multi-agent systems have shown strong potential for complex reasoning, how to effectively organize multiple agents remains an open question. In this paper, we introduce OrgAgent, a company-style hierarchical multi-agent framework that separates collaboration into governance, execution, and compliance layers. OrgAgent decomposes multi-agent reasoning into three layers: a governance layer for planning and resource allocation, an execution layer for task solving and review, and a compliance layer for final answer control. By evaluating the framework across reasoning tasks, LLMs, execution modes, and execution policies, we find that multi-agent systems organized in a company-style hierarchy generally outperform other organizational structures. Besides, hierarchical coordination also reduces token consumption relative to flat collaboration in most settings. For example, for GPT-OSS-120B, the hierarchical setting improves performance over flat multi-agent system by 102.73% while reducing token usage by 74.52% on SQuAD 2.0. Further analysis shows that hierarchy helps most when tasks benefit from stable skill assignment, controlled information flow, and layered verification. Overall, our findings highlight organizational structure as an important factor in multi-agent reasoning, shaping not only effectiveness and cost, but also coordination behavior.

LLM-based agents are increasingly deployed to autonomously solve complex tasks, raising urgent needs for IP protection and regulatory provenance. While content watermarking effectively attributes LLM-generated outputs, it fails to directly identify the high-level planning behaviors (e.g., tool and subgoal choices) that govern multi-step execution. Critically, watermarking at the planning-behavior layer faces unique challenges: minor distributional deviations in decision-making can compound during long-term agent operation, degrading utility, and many agents operate as black boxes that are difficult to intervene in directly. To bridge this gap, we propose AgentMark, a behavioral watermarking framework that embeds multi-bit identifiers into planning decisions while preserving utility. It operates by eliciting an explicit behavior distribution from the agent and applying distribution-preserving conditional sampling, enabling deployment under black-box APIs while remaining compatible with action-layer content watermarking. Experiments across embodied, tool-use, and social environments demonstrate practical multi-bit capacity, robust recovery from partial logs, and utility preservation. The code is available at https://github.com/Tooooa/AgentMark.

This paper studies the next major bottleneck in agentic AI as system scaling, not only model scaling: the design of auditable, persistent, modular, and verifiable architectures around foundation models. We refer to this shift as scaling the harness: treating the structured execution layer around a foundation model as a first-class object of design, evaluation, and optimization. Although recent large language models enable agents to use tools, retrieve information, maintain memory, and execute long-horizon workflows, evaluation remains largely model-centric, often reducing agents to final-task success while treating memory, retrieval, tool use, orchestration, verification, and governance as secondary implementation details. This framing is increasingly inadequate because agent performance emerges from the interaction among the foundation model, memory substrate, context constructor, skill-routing layer, orchestration loop, and verification-and-governance layer. Together, these components form the agent harness, which translates model capability into long-horizon agent behavior. We study scaling the harness through three core bottlenecks: context governance, trustworthy memory, and dynamic skill routing, together with the orchestration and governance mechanisms that coordinate and constrain them. We further outline a research agenda for harness-level benchmarks that go beyond one-shot task success to measure trajectory quality, memory hygiene, context efficiency, communication fidelity, verification cost, and safe evolution over time. To make the discussion concrete, we develop CheetahClaws: https://github.com/SafeRL-Lab/cheetahclaws, a Python-native reference harness, and compare it with Claude Code and OpenClaw. Our main claim is that future progress in agentic AI will depend as much on system design as on stronger foundation models.

Agent Skills have become persistent behavioral artifacts across independent AI agent systems. They combine natural-language task specifications with metadata and optional references, scripts, assets, hooks, package manifests, tests, and companion interfaces. Existing studies explain how Skills are specified, executed, maintained, and evolved, but lack an ontology that defines these artifacts as independent software objects. This paper introduces Skillware as the software abstraction that extends software engineering to persistent Behavioral Artifacts in agent systems. A Skill Artifact specifies reusable task behavior; a Skillware Unit manages that artifact as software through an independent identity and lifecycle. A compatible Agent Host activates the unit for runtime interpretation. Three necessary conditions operationalize category membership: behavioral primacy, independent software identity, and an Agent Host execution relationship. Lifecycle Continuity records whether the same unit identity persists through update, maintenance, rollback, and removal as a separate software-grade property. Evidence combines the Agent Skills specification, a frozen corpus of 138,133 content-deduplicated SKILL.md records associated with 20,556 repository identifiers, independent empirical studies, 15 category-boundary cases, and 13 fixed-revision engineering implementations. The evidence establishes a recurring artifact envelope, separable software identities, compatible execution paths, and lifecycle engineering pressure. Skillware provides the software ontology and engineering lifecycle through which agent capabilities can become identifiable, composable, maintainable, and evolvable software artifacts.

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) are an increasingly deployed class of agents that take actions on GUIs to accomplish user goals. In this paper, we show that CUAs consistently exhibit Blind Goal-Directedness (BGD): a bias to pursue goals regardless of feasibility, safety, reliability, or context. We characterize three prevalent patterns of BGD: (i) lack of contextual reasoning, (ii) assumptions and decisions under ambiguity, and (iii) contradictory or infeasible goals. We develop BLIND-ACT, a benchmark of 90 tasks capturing these three patterns. Built on OSWorld, BLIND-ACT provides realistic environments and employs LLM-based judges to evaluate agent behavior, achieving 93.75% agreement with human annotations. We use BLIND-ACT to evaluate nine frontier models, including Claude Sonnet and Opus 4, Computer-Use-Preview, and GPT-5, observing high average BGD rates (80.8%) across them. We show that BGD exposes subtle risks that arise even when inputs are not directly harmful. While prompting-based interventions lower BGD levels, substantial risk persists, highlighting the need for stronger training- or inference-time interventions. Qualitative analysis reveals observed failure modes: execution-first bias (focusing on how to act over whether to act), thought-action disconnect (execution diverging from reasoning), and request-primacy (justifying actions due to user request). Identifying BGD and introducing BLIND-ACT establishes a foundation for future research on studying and mitigating this fundamental risk and ensuring safe CUA deployment.

The acquisition of agentic capabilities has transformed LLMs from "knowledge providers" to "action executors", a trend that while expanding LLMs' capability boundaries, significantly increases their susceptibility to malicious use. Previous work has shown that current LLM-based agents execute numerous malicious tasks even without being attacked, indicating a deficiency in agentic use safety alignment during the post-training phase. To address this gap, we propose AgentAlign, a novel framework that leverages abstract behavior chains as a medium for safety alignment data synthesis. By instantiating these behavior chains in simulated environments with diverse tool instances, our framework enables the generation of highly authentic and executable instructions while capturing complex multi-step dynamics. The framework further ensures model utility by proportionally synthesizing benign instructions through non-malicious interpretations of behavior chains, precisely calibrating the boundary between helpfulness and harmlessness. Evaluation results on AgentHarm demonstrate that fine-tuning three families of open-source models using our method substantially improves their safety (35.8% to 79.5% improvement) while minimally impacting or even positively enhancing their helpfulness, outperforming various prompting methods. The dataset and code have both been open-sourced.

AI agents are increasingly adept at tackling complex, long-running tasks. With the rapid surge of autonomous capabilities, human oversight is systematically lagging behind due to limited human-centered interfacing. Aiming to address this, we introduce AgentGUI, a user-friendly, locally hosted GUI for seamlessly observing and steering AI agents amid multiple concurrent, long-running sessions. AgentGUI features 1) rich agent trajectory visualizations, 2) effective manual and automated steering, and 3) integration with and coordination between open-source and frontier agent frameworks. A controlled user study demonstrates statistically significant reduction in the time it takes to identify key elements from agent traces (38% faster, p = 0.023). In a preliminary experiment, AgentGUI's automated drift prevention feature raises the task completion rate of small local agents by as high as 34pp across a 0.8B--9B model ladder (N=50 runs per model). AgentGUI is publicly available through its project website (https://agent-gui-project.github.io) and open-source repository (https://github.com/eth-medical-ai-lab/agent-gui), along with a demo video (https://youtube.com/watch?v=GSDyxN1gTF0).

Current approaches to AI compliance treat conformity as a binary, audit-time verdict rather than a continuous, measurable property of production systems. We argue that this compliance fiction is structurally ill-suited to the requirements of the EU AI Act, which demands ongoing human oversight and the detection of emergent behavioural drift in deployed systems. We introduce governance from metrics, a principle whereby regulatory compliance is derived as a continuous signal from runtime observability rather than from static assessments. Building on this principle, we present govllm, an open-source framework implementing a governance-driven routing architecture in which model selection is determined by accumulated compliance scores rather than by latency or cost alone. Central to our approach is a panel of regulatory judges - LLM evaluators specialised per criterion (EU AI Act, GDPR, ANSSI, accessibility) - whose inter-judge disagreement we reframe not as noise but as a regulatory uncertainty signal warranting human arbitration. We validate this approach through a ground truth corpus of 49 annotated prompt/response pairs across five regulatory criteria, evaluated by four small language models (SLMs, 1.7B-7B parameters) running fully on-premise. Agreement rates range from 51.5% (mistral:7b) to 69.1% (phi4-mini), with no single model dominating across all criteria - empirically motivating the Profile-as-jury design. We further document three structural failure modes in small regulatory judges and a judge-specific position bias that degrades agreement by up to 25 percentage points across three question-order conditions (original, reversed, permuted). govllm is released as open-source software to support reproducible AI governance research.

As AI agents gain prevalance, users are increasingly exposed to the risks such systems entail. Prompt injection attacks, as well as hallucination, can cause agents to leak private information to third parties. As autonomous systems, agents also present the more active danger of performing sensitive tasks, such as bank transactions, without the user's intent or authorization. Recognizing this challenge, the agentic security community has developed numerous proposals for secure agentic systems. Much of this work has focused on product-level approaches, where agentic system developers determine and apply the same security policies and permissions to all users. Yet different users have different needs and preferences, necessitating support for user-level permissions policies in agentic AI systems. To understand how user-level permissions are handled in AI agent systems, we survey 21 proposals for agent permissions systems. From this review, we construct a taxonomy of how different systems specify user-level permissions policies, both at the user interface and internally; derive internal policies from user input; and enforce those policies at run-time. We then analyze five prominent commercial agents and compare their permissions handling to agentic permissions systems in the literature. We identify several high-level themes across the literature and commerical agents, as well as multiple gaps where future work is needed.

AI agents are increasingly asked to carry out work that spans minutes, hours, or longer. Yet the default model of agent behavior is continuous action: issuing tool calls, refreshing pages, searching for alternatives, or otherwise trying to force progress. This is the wrong approach for many long-running tasks, which are better served by a strategy of sustained attention. Instead, agents should monitor an environment, notice when an external event makes progress possible, then respond promptly without wasting resources while waiting. To measure progress on this class of tasks, we introduce SentinelBench, an open-source benchmark for time-evolving monitoring tasks. SentinelBench contains 100 tasks across 10 synthetic web environments, including email, calendars, finance, professional networking, and entertainment. Each environment exposes a live web interface and replays a scripted sequence of events, requiring agents to navigate and reason about web pages whose state shifts underfoot. SentinelBench measures task completion, reaction time, and resource use, exposing the tradeoff between responsiveness and cost. We report results across three models and two browser-agent harnesses, establishing performance baselines for future comparison and demonstrating how agent design choices can dramatically impact key metrics. Together, these results show that SentinelBench distinguishes meaningful differences in agent behavior.

With the rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLMs), LLM-based agents and Multi-agent Systems (MAS) have significantly expanded the capabilities of LLM ecosystems. This evolution stems from empowering LLMs with additional modules such as memory, tools, environment, and even other agents. However, this advancement has also introduced more complex issues of trustworthiness, which previous research focused solely on LLMs could not cover. In this survey, we propose the TrustAgent framework, a comprehensive study on the trustworthiness of agents, characterized by modular taxonomy, multi-dimensional connotations, and technical implementation. By thoroughly investigating and summarizing newly emerged attacks, defenses, and evaluation methods for agents and MAS, we extend the concept of Trustworthy LLM to the emerging paradigm of Trustworthy Agent. In TrustAgent, we begin by deconstructing and introducing various components of the Agent and MAS. Then, we categorize their trustworthiness into intrinsic (brain, memory, and tool) and extrinsic (user, agent, and environment) aspects. Subsequently, we delineate the multifaceted meanings of trustworthiness and elaborate on the implementation techniques of existing research related to these internal and external modules. Finally, we present our insights and outlook on this domain, aiming to provide guidance for future endeavors.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has empowered intelligent agents to leverage diverse external tools for solving complex real-world problems. However, as agents increasingly depend on multiple tools, they encounter new challenges: extended contexts from disparate sources and noisy or irrelevant tool outputs can undermine system reliability and accuracy. These challenges underscore the necessity for enhanced stability in agent-based systems. To address this, we introduce dynamic supervision and maneuvering mechanisms, constructing a robust and dynamic Multi-Agent System (MAS) architecture within the AWorld framework. In our approach, the Execution Agent invokes the Guard Agent at critical steps to verify and correct the reasoning process, effectively reducing errors arising from noise and bolstering problem-solving robustness. Extensive experiments on the GAIA test dataset reveal that our dynamic maneuvering mechanism significantly improves both the effectiveness and stability of solutions, outperforming single-agent system (SAS) and standard tool-augmented systems. As a result, our dynamic MAS system achieved first place among open-source projects on the prestigious GAIA leaderboard. These findings highlight the practical value of collaborative agent roles in developing more reliable and trustworthy intelligent systems.

Multi-agent systems face a fundamental architectural flaw: agent identity is bound to network location. When agents migrate between providers, scale across instances, or federate across organizations, URI-based identity schemes break references, fragment audit trails, and require centralized coordination. We propose the agent:// URI scheme, which decouples identity from topology through three orthogonal components: a trust root establishing organizational authority, a hierarchical capability path enabling semantic discovery, and a sortable unique identifier providing stable reference. The scheme enables capability-based discovery through DHT key derivation, where queries return agents by what they do rather than where they are. Trust-root scoping prevents cross-organization pollution while permitting federation when desired. Cryptographic attestation via PASETO tokens binds capability claims to agent identity, enabling verification without real-time contact with the issuing authority. We evaluate the scheme across four dimensions: capability expressiveness (100% coverage on 369 production tools with zero collision), discovery precision (F1=1.0 across 10,000 agents), identity stability (formal proofs of migration invariance), and performance (all operations under 5 microseconds). The agent:// URI scheme provides a formally-specified, practically-evaluated foundation for decentralized agent identity and capability-based discovery.

Despite growing enthusiasm for Multi-Agent Systems (MAS), where multiple LLM agents collaborate to accomplish tasks, their performance gains across popular benchmarks remain minimal compared to single-agent frameworks. This gap highlights the need to analyze the challenges hindering MAS effectiveness. In this paper, we present the first comprehensive study of MAS challenges. We analyze five popular MAS frameworks across over 150 tasks, involving six expert human annotators. We identify 14 unique failure modes and propose a comprehensive taxonomy applicable to various MAS frameworks. This taxonomy emerges iteratively from agreements among three expert annotators per study, achieving a Cohen's Kappa score of 0.88. These fine-grained failure modes are organized into 3 categories, (i) specification and system design failures, (ii) inter-agent misalignment, and (iii) task verification and termination. To support scalable evaluation, we integrate MASFT with LLM-as-a-Judge. We also explore if identified failures could be easily prevented by proposing two interventions: improved specification of agent roles and enhanced orchestration strategies. Our findings reveal that identified failures require more complex solutions, highlighting a clear roadmap for future research. We open-source our dataset and LLM annotator.

Open data repositories hold potential for evidence-based decision-making, yet are inaccessible to non-experts lacking expertise in dataset discovery, schema mapping, and statistical analysis. Large language models show promise for individual tasks, but end-to-end analytical workflows expose fundamental limitations: attention dilutes across growing contexts, specialized reasoning patterns interfere, and errors propagate undetected. We present PublicAgent, a multi-agent framework that addresses these limitations through decomposition into specialized agents for intent clarification, dataset discovery, analysis, and reporting. This architecture maintains focused attention within agent contexts and enables validation at each stage. Evaluation across five models and 50 queries derives five design principles for multi-agent LLM systems. First, specialization provides value independent of model strength--even the strongest model shows 97.5% agent win rates, with benefits orthogonal to model scale. Second, agents divide into universal (discovery, analysis) and conditional (report, intent) categories. Universal agents show consistent effectiveness (std dev 12.4%) while conditional agents vary by model (std dev 20.5%). Third, agents mitigate distinct failure modes--removing discovery or analysis causes catastrophic failures (243-280 instances), while removing report or intent causes quality degradation. Fourth, architectural benefits persist across task complexity with stable win rates (86-92% analysis, 84-94% discovery), indicating workflow management value rather than reasoning enhancement. Fifth, wide variance in agent effectiveness across models (42-96% for analysis) requires model-aware architecture design. These principles guide when and why specialization is necessary for complex analytical workflows while enabling broader access to public data through natural language interfaces.

Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight. Existing authentication and authorization mechanisms establish identity and delegate authority, but do not inherently provide cryptographic evidence that a concrete request issued by a specific agent satisfies the applicable policy in a specific execution context. This paper hypothesizes that agent authorization can be formalized as a cryptographically verifiable relation, denoted R_{CVA}, that jointly binds an agent principal, a concrete authorization request, an execution context, and the satisfaction of an applicable policy, while selectively preserving the confidentiality of private authorization attributes. We introduce a preliminary formal abstraction for Cryptographically Verifiable Agent Authorization (CVA), define a compact set of candidate security properties including authorization soundness, principal binding, request binding, policy binding, and replay resistance, and provide an executable zero-knowledge proof of concept that instantiates selected elements of the model over a Groth16 zk-SNARK construction. We further identify and formalize the structural separation among identity binding, authorization-request binding, and runtime execution binding as a central open problem in the design of secure agentic systems (a distinction {not explicitly addressed by} current agentic security frameworks) and present a falsifiable research agenda for its resolution.

AI agents -- systems that can independently take actions to pursue complex goals with only limited human oversight -- have entered the mainstream. These systems are now being widely used to produce software, conduct business activities, and automate everyday personal tasks. While AI agents implicate many areas of law, ranging from agency law and contracts to tort liability and labor law, they present particularly pressing questions for the most globally consequential AI regulation: the European Union's AI Act. Promulgated prior to the development and widespread use of AI agents, the EU AI Act faces significant obstacles in confronting the governance challenges arising from this transformative technology, such as performance failures in autonomous task execution, the risk of misuse of agents by malicious actors, and unequal access to the economic opportunities afforded by AI agents. We systematically analyze the EU AI Act's response to these challenges, focusing on both the substantive provisions of the regulation and, crucially, the institutional frameworks that aim to support its implementation. Our analysis of the Act's allocation of monitoring and enforcement responsibilities, reliance on industry self-regulation, and level of government resourcing illustrates how a regulatory framework designed for conventional AI systems can be ill-suited to AI agents. Taken together, our findings suggest that policymakers in the EU and beyond will need to change course, and soon, if they are to effectively govern the next generation of AI technology.

Contemporary evaluation techniques are inadequate for agentic systems. These approaches either focus exclusively on final outcomes -- ignoring the step-by-step nature of agentic systems, or require excessive manual labour. To address this, we introduce the Agent-as-a-Judge framework, wherein agentic systems are used to evaluate agentic systems. This is an organic extension of the LLM-as-a-Judge framework, incorporating agentic features that enable intermediate feedback for the entire task-solving process. We apply the Agent-as-a-Judge to the task of code generation. To overcome issues with existing benchmarks and provide a proof-of-concept testbed for Agent-as-a-Judge, we present DevAI, a new benchmark of 55 realistic automated AI development tasks. It includes rich manual annotations, like a total of 365 hierarchical user requirements. We benchmark three of the popular agentic systems using Agent-as-a-Judge and find it dramatically outperforms LLM-as-a-Judge and is as reliable as our human evaluation baseline. Altogether, we believe that Agent-as-a-Judge marks a concrete step forward for modern agentic systems -- by providing rich and reliable reward signals necessary for dynamic and scalable self-improvement.

As LLM agents are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems, they introduce risks of covert coordination that may evade standard forms of human oversight. While linear probes on model activations have shown promise for detecting deception in single-agent settings, collusion is inherently a multi-agent phenomenon, and the use of internal representations for detecting collusion between agents remains unexplored. We introduce NARCBench, a benchmark for evaluating collusion detection under environment distribution shift, and propose five probing techniques that aggregate per-agent deception scores to classify scenarios at the group level. Our probes achieve 1.00 AUROC in-distribution and 0.60--0.86 AUROC when transferred zero-shot to structurally different multi-agent scenarios and a steganographic blackjack card-counting task. We find that no single probing technique dominates across all collusion types, suggesting that different forms of collusion manifest differently in activation space. We also find preliminary evidence that this signal is localised at the token level, with the colluding agent's activations spiking specifically when processing the encoded parts of their partner's message. This work takes a step toward multi-agent interpretability: extending white-box inspection from single models to multi-agent contexts, where detection requires aggregating signals across agents. These results suggest that model internals provide a complementary signal to text-level monitoring for detecting multi-agent collusion, particularly for organisations with access to model activations. Code and data are available at https://github.com/aaronrose227/narcbench.

AI safety has a missing layer. Interpretability, formal methods, security engineering, evaluation methodology, and reinforcement-learning safety each produce substantial work, but the resulting artifacts do not compose into deployable oversight: every team fielding an agentic system builds its own audit schema, policy dialect, monitoring stack, and escalation path, mostly reinventions of patterns understood elsewhere. We diagnose this as a coordination gap, not a research gap, and propose a two-axis taxonomy: five technical layers (Legibility, Specification, Mediation, Evaluation, Escalation) crossed with six concerns spanning alignment, robustness, adversarial defense, security, governance, and accountability, populating the resulting 5x6 matrix with existing work. Layer 2 (Specification), where humans translate intent into machine-checkable artifacts, is the connective tissue every layer depends on, yet it lacks four marks of a mature engineering discipline: shared vocabulary, design principles, composability standards, and governance practices. We propose six design principles for Layer 2, from elicitability and composability to adversary-awareness, traceability, and governability, made concrete through worked examples and a reference architecture turning specifications into runtime enforcement, evaluation, and escalation. Existing systems such as Cedar, Constitutional AI, and Open Policy Agent each address a fragment of Layer 2 well and the matrix poorly; treating them as fragments of one shared layer makes composition tractable. As evidence, we introduce CARMA, a Layer 2 prototype for autonomous ETL agents in which one specification drives enforcement, evaluation, and escalation, with every decision traceable to a versioned specification, naming what AI oversight is missing and giving independent teams principles to build the missing pieces so they compose.

We introduce AuditBench, an alignment auditing benchmark. AuditBench consists of 56 language models with implanted hidden behaviors. Each model has one of 14 concerning behaviors--such as sycophantic deference, opposition to AI regulation, or secret geopolitical loyalties--which it does not confess to when directly asked. AuditBench models are highly diverse--some are subtle, while others are overt, and we use varying training techniques both for implanting behaviors and training models not to confess. To demonstrate AuditBench's utility, we develop an investigator agent that autonomously employs a configurable set of auditing tools. By measuring investigator agent success using different tools, we can evaluate their efficacy. Notably, we observe a tool-to-agent gap, where tools that perform well in standalone non-agentic evaluations fail to translate into improved performance when used with our investigator agent. We find that our most effective tools involve scaffolded calls to auxiliary models that generate diverse prompts for the target. White-box interpretability tools can be helpful, but the agent performs best with black-box tools. We also find that audit success varies greatly across training techniques: models trained on synthetic documents are easier to audit than models trained on demonstrations, with better adversarial training further increasing auditing difficulty. We release our models, agent, and evaluation framework to support future quantitative, iterative science on alignment auditing.

We consider multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for cooperative communication and coordination tasks. MARL agents can be brittle because they can overfit their training partners' policies. This overfitting can produce agents that adopt policies that act under the expectation that other agents will act in a certain way rather than react to their actions. Our objective is to bias the learning process towards finding reactive strategies towards other agents' behaviors. Our method, transfer empowerment, measures the potential influence between agents' actions. Results from three simulated cooperation scenarios support our hypothesis that transfer empowerment improves MARL performance. We discuss how transfer empowerment could be a useful principle to guide multi-agent coordination by ensuring reactiveness to one's partner.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) powered by LLMs promise adaptive, reasoning-driven enterprise workflows, yet granting agents autonomous control over tools, memory, and communication introduces attack surfaces absent from deterministic pipelines. While current research largely addresses prompt-level exploits and narrow individual vectors, it lacks a holistic architectural model for enterprise-grade security. We introduce AgenticCyOps (Securing Multi-Agentic AI Integration in Enterprise Cyber Operations), a framework built on a systematic decomposition of attack surfaces across component, coordination, and protocol layers, revealing that documented vectors consistently trace back to two integration surfaces: tool orchestration and memory management. Building on this observation, we formalize these integration surfaces as primary trust boundaries and define five defensive principles: authorized interfaces, capability scoping, verified execution, memory integrity & synchronization, and access-controlled data isolation; each aligned with established compliance standards (NIST, ISO 27001, GDPR, EU AI Act). We apply the framework to a Security Operations Center (SOC) workflow, adopting the Model Context Protocol (MCP) as the structural basis, with phase-scoped agents, consensus validation loops, and per-organization memory boundaries. Coverage analysis, attack path tracing, and trust boundary assessment confirm that the design addresses the documented attack vectors with defense-in-depth, intercepts three of four representative attack chains within the first two steps, and reduces exploitable trust boundaries by a minimum of 72% compared to a flat MAS, positioning AgenticCyOps as a foundation for securing enterprise-grade integration.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding how strategic behavior emerges in multi-agent environments has become an important alignment challenge. We take a neutral empirical stance and construct a controlled environment in which strategic behavior can be directly observed and measured. We introduce a large-scale multi-agent simulation in a simplified model of New York City, where LLM-driven agents interact under opposing incentives. Blue agents aim to reach their destinations efficiently, while Red agents attempt to divert them toward billboard-heavy routes using persuasive language to maximize advertising revenue. Hidden identities make navigation socially mediated, forcing agents to decide when to trust or deceive. We study policy learning through an iterative simulation pipeline that updates agent policies across repeated interaction rounds using Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO). Blue agents are optimized to reduce billboard exposure while preserving navigation efficiency, whereas Red agents adapt to exploit remaining weaknesses. Across iterations, the best Blue policy improves task success from 46.0% to 57.3%, although susceptibility remains high at 70.7%. Later policies exhibit stronger selective cooperation while preserving trajectory efficiency. However, a persistent safety-helpfulness trade-off remains: policies that better resist adversarial steering do not simultaneously maximize task completion. Overall, our results show that LLM agents can exhibit limited strategic behavior, including selective trust and deception, while remaining highly vulnerable to adversarial persuasion.

The rapid rise of compound AI systems (a.k.a., AI agents) is reshaping the labor market, raising concerns about job displacement, diminished human agency, and overreliance on automation. Yet, we lack a systematic understanding of the evolving landscape. In this paper, we address this gap by introducing a novel auditing framework to assess which occupational tasks workers want AI agents to automate or augment, and how those desires align with the current technological capabilities. Our framework features an audio-enhanced mini-interview to capture nuanced worker desires and introduces the Human Agency Scale (HAS) as a shared language to quantify the preferred level of human involvement. Using this framework, we construct the WORKBank database, building on the U.S. Department of Labor's O*NET database, to capture preferences from 1,500 domain workers and capability assessments from AI experts across over 844 tasks spanning 104 occupations. Jointly considering the desire and technological capability divides tasks in WORKBank into four zones: Automation "Green Light" Zone, Automation "Red Light" Zone, R&D Opportunity Zone, Low Priority Zone. This highlights critical mismatches and opportunities for AI agent development. Moving beyond a simple automate-or-not dichotomy, our results reveal diverse HAS profiles across occupations, reflecting heterogeneous expectations for human involvement. Moreover, our study offers early signals of how AI agent integration may reshape the core human competencies, shifting from information-focused skills to interpersonal ones. These findings underscore the importance of aligning AI agent development with human desires and preparing workers for evolving workplace dynamics.

LLM-based agents mark a shift from passive question answering to active task completion: they perceive environments, invoke tools, maintain state, and act over extended horizons. As agent systems have evolved from prompt engineering to workflows and context engineering, harness engineering, and agent-native training with co-evolution, a central question has become increasingly important: where does the bottleneck in agent performance reside, in the foundation model, in the execution harness, or in the coupling between them? This survey examines LLM-based agents through a model-harness lens. We first clarify the functional definition of agents and the implementation view of an LLM-based agent as a foundation model coupled with an execution harness. We then analyze the limits of model-centric scaling, trace four paradigms of agent engineering, and decompose the execution harness into six coupled runtime responsibilities: observation, context, control, action, state, and verification. Using this decomposition, we map task properties and domain pressures to harness configurations, review benchmark and evaluation practices, and synthesize model-harness evidence on how runtime design affects long-horizon task completion, efficiency, and reliability. Finally, we identify open challenges in value-aware evaluation, safety, harness generalization, and model-harness co-evolution. Rather than treating agents as models with auxiliary tools, this survey argues that agent quality -- including success, efficiency, safety, and generalization -- emerges from the interaction between model capability, runtime infrastructure, task structure, and evaluation design. A collection of papers discussed in this survey is provided in https://github.com/ggjy/Awesome-Agent-Engineering.

We study reliability in autonomous language-model agents that translate user mandates into validated tool actions under real capital. The setting is DX Terminal Pro, a 21-day deployment in which 3,505 user-funded agents traded real ETH in a bounded onchain market. Users configured vaults through structured controls and natural-language strategies, but only agents could choose normal buy/sell trades. The system produced 7.5M agent invocations, roughly 300K onchain actions, about $20M in volume, more than 5,000 ETH deployed, roughly 70B inference tokens, and 99.9% settlement success for policy-valid submitted transactions. Long-running agents accumulated thousands of sequential decisions, including 6,000+ prompt-state-action cycles for continuously active agents, yielding a large-scale trace from user mandate to rendered prompt, reasoning, validation, portfolio state, and settlement. Reliability did not come from the base model alone; it emerged from the operating layer around the model: prompt compilation, typed controls, policy validation, execution guards, memory design, and trace-level observability. Pre-launch testing exposed failures that text-only benchmarks rarely measure, including fabricated trading rules, fee paralysis, numeric anchoring, cadence trading, and misread tokenomics. Targeted harness changes reduced fabricated sell rules from 57% to 3%, reduced fee-led observations from 32.5% to below 10%, and increased capital deployment from 42.9% to 78.0% in an affected test population. We show that capital-managing agents should be evaluated across the full path from user mandate to prompt, validated action, and settlement.

AI agents are autonomous systems that combine LLMs with external tools to solve complex tasks. While such tools extend capability, improper tool permissions introduce security risks such as indirect prompt injection and tool misuse. We characterize these failures as unbalanced tool-driven agency. Agents may retain unnecessary permissions (excessive agency) or fail to invoke required tools (insufficient agency), amplifying the attack surface and reducing performance. We introduce AgenTRIM, a framework for detecting and mitigating tool-driven agency risks without altering an agent's internal reasoning. AgenTRIM addresses these risks through complementary offline and online phases. Offline, AgenTRIM reconstructs and verifies the agent's tool interface from code and execution traces. At runtime, it enforces per-step least-privilege tool access through adaptive filtering and status-aware validation of tool calls. Evaluating on the AgentDojo benchmark, AgenTRIM substantially reduces attack success while maintaining high task performance. Additional experiments show robustness to description-based attacks and effective enforcement of explicit safety policies. Together, these results demonstrate that AgenTRIM provides a practical, capability-preserving approach to safer tool use in LLM-based agents.

LLM agents are an emerging form of AI systems where large language models (LLMs) serve as the central component, utilizing a diverse set of tools to complete user-assigned tasks. Despite their great potential, LLM agents pose significant security risks. When interacting with the external world, they may encounter malicious commands from attackers, leading to the execution of dangerous actions. A promising way to address this is by enforcing the principle of least privilege: allowing only essential actions for task completion while blocking unnecessary ones. However, achieving this is challenging, as it requires covering diverse agent scenarios while preserving both security and utility. We introduce Progent, the first privilege control mechanism for LLM agents. At its core is a domain-specific language for flexibly expressing privilege control policies applied during agent execution. These policies provide fine-grained constraints over tool calls, deciding when tool calls are permissible and specifying fallbacks if they are not. This enables agent developers and users to craft suitable policies for their specific use cases and enforce them deterministically to guarantee security. Thanks to its modular design, integrating Progent does not alter agent internals and requires only minimal changes to agent implementation, enhancing its practicality and potential for widespread adoption. To automate policy writing, we leverage LLMs to generate policies based on user queries, which are then updated dynamically for improved security and utility. Our extensive evaluation shows that it enables strong security while preserving high utility across three distinct scenarios or benchmarks: AgentDojo, ASB, and AgentPoison. Furthermore, we perform an in-depth analysis, showcasing the effectiveness of its core components and the resilience of its automated policy generation against adaptive attacks.

Context engineering has become central to building reliable AI agents, yet it remains largely unmeasured. Agents do not fail in isolation: their behavior is shaped by the instructions, tools, memory, retrieved knowledge, guardrails, and untrusted inputs accumulated in their context. When this context is weak, agents drift, hallucinate, misuse tools, ignore constraints, become vulnerable to injection, and waste tokens. This paper validates context-engineering quality as an independent leading indicator of agent reliability. We implement the measurement in ProofAgent-Harness, an open-source infrastructure for AI agent evaluation that uses multi-juror, consensus-based scoring. The harness assesses context across seven criteria: role clarity, guardrail coverage, instruction consistency, tool schema quality, grounding sufficiency, injection hardening, and token efficiency. Crucially, the context score is isolated from behavioral metrics and release decisions, enabling a non-circular validation. Through a controlled context-quality study across regulated agent domains, holding frontier LLM agents fixed and varying only their operating context, we show that context-quality criteria consistently predict their corresponding behavioral outcomes. Grounding sufficiency predicts hallucination resistance, guardrail coverage predicts manipulation resistance, instruction consistency predicts instruction following, and tool-schema quality predicts tool use. These findings establish context measurement as a validated preflight signal for agent reliability and position context engineering as an auditable layer of agent evaluation and governance.

Artificial agents have traditionally been trained to maximize reward, which may incentivize power-seeking and deception, analogous to how next-token prediction in language models (LMs) may incentivize toxicity. So do agents naturally learn to be Machiavellian? And how do we measure these behaviors in general-purpose models such as GPT-4? Towards answering these questions, we introduce MACHIAVELLI, a benchmark of 134 Choose-Your-Own-Adventure games containing over half a million rich, diverse scenarios that center on social decision-making. Scenario labeling is automated with LMs, which are more performant than human annotators. We mathematize dozens of harmful behaviors and use our annotations to evaluate agents' tendencies to be power-seeking, cause disutility, and commit ethical violations. We observe some tension between maximizing reward and behaving ethically. To improve this trade-off, we investigate LM-based methods to steer agents' towards less harmful behaviors. Our results show that agents can both act competently and morally, so concrete progress can currently be made in machine ethics--designing agents that are Pareto improvements in both safety and capabilities.

Evaluating large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems remains a critical challenge, as these systems must exhibit reliable coordination, transparent decision-making, and verifiable performance across evolving tasks. Existing evaluation approaches often limit themselves to single-response scoring or narrow benchmarks, which lack stability, extensibility, and automation when deployed in enterprise settings at multi-agent scale. We present AEMA (Adaptive Evaluation Multi-Agent), a process-aware and auditable framework that plans, executes, and aggregates multi-step evaluations across heterogeneous agentic workflows under human oversight. Compared to a single LLM-as-a-Judge, AEMA achieves greater stability, human alignment, and traceable records that support accountable automation. Our results on enterprise-style agent workflows simulated using realistic business scenarios demonstrate that AEMA provides a transparent and reproducible pathway toward responsible evaluation of LLM-based multi-agent systems. Keywords Agentic AI, Multi-Agent Systems, Trustworthy AI, Verifiable Evaluation, Human Oversight

This paper introduces ArGen (Auto-Regulation of Generative AI systems), a framework for aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with complex sets of configurable, machine-readable rules spanning ethical principles, operational safety protocols, and regulatory compliance standards. Moving beyond just preference-based alignment, ArGen is designed to ensure LLMs adhere to these multifaceted policies through a novel synthesis of principle-based automated reward scoring, Group Relative Policy Optimisation (GRPO), and an Open Policy Agent (OPA) inspired governance layer. This approach provides the technical foundation for achieving and demonstrating compliance with diverse and nuanced governance requirements. To showcase the framework's capability to operationalize a deeply nuanced and culturally-specific value system, we present an in-depth case study: the development of a medical AI assistant guided by principles from Dharmic ethics (such as Ahimsa and Dharma), as derived from texts like the Bhagavad Gita. This challenging application demonstrates ArGen's adaptability, achieving a 70.9% improvement in domain-scope adherence over the baseline. Through our open-source repository, we show that ArGen's methodology offers a path to 'Governable Al' systems that are technically proficient, ethically robust, and verifiably compliant for safe deployment in diverse global contexts.

Although Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated strong performance on complex tasks, their learning is often limited by inefficient interaction feedback and static training environments, which hinder broader generalization. To address these limitations, this paper introduces Role-Agent, black{a framework} that harnesses a single LLM to function concurrently as both the agent and the environment, enabling a bootstrapped co-evolution. Role-Agent comprises two synergistic components: World-In-Agent (WIA) and Agent-In-World (AIW). In WIA, the LLM acts as the agent and predicts future states after each action; the alignment between predicted and actual states is then used as a process reward, encouraging environment-aware reasoning. In AIW, the LLM analyzes failure modes from failed trajectories and retrieves tasks with similar failure patterns, thereby reshaping the training data distribution for targeted practice. Experiments on multiple benchmarks show that Role-Agent consistently improves performance, yielding an average gain of over 4\% over strong baselines.

LLM agents increasingly rely on agent harness: the runtime infrastructure around the base model that defines execution environments, tool interfaces, context, lifecycle orchestration, observability, verification, and governance. Existing self-improving agents and automatic harness evolution methods mainly improve agents through runtime supervision, prompt optimization, workflow search, or harness modification based on final outcomes. However, they often fail to diagnose where the responsible evidence lies in failed trajectories and which harness implementation mechanism causes the unreliable behavior, resulting in broad, indirect, or poorly scoped changes. This paper proposes HarnessFix, a trace-grounded and diagnosis-driven framework for repairing agent harnesses. HarnessFix compiles raw execution traces and harness artifacts into a Harness-aware Trace Intermediate Representation (HTIR), which normalizes fragmented trajectory evidence, captures step-level data-flow and control-flow relations, and aligns runtime steps with the harness artifacts that shape their behavior. It then attributes failures to responsible steps and harness artifacts, and consolidates recurring diagnoses into repair-oriented flaw records. Finally, HarnessFix maps these records to scoped repair operators, generates patches under flaw-specific repair specifications, and accepts them through regression-aware validation. We evaluate HarnessFix on four popular benchmarks, and results show that it improves the performance over the initial harnesses by 6.3% to 18.4%, significantly outperforming human-designed and self-evolution baselines. HarnessFix highlights the value of treating failed trajectories not only as feedback signals, but also as structured evidence for diagnosing and repairing the harness mechanisms behind agent failures.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) are critical for automating complex tasks, yet their practical deployment is severely hampered by the challenge of failure attribution. Current diagnostic tools, which rely on statistical correlations, are fundamentally inadequate; on challenging benchmarks like Who\&When, state-of-the-art methods achieve less than 15\% accuracy in locating the root-cause step of a failure. To address this critical gap, we introduce the first failure attribution framework for MAS grounded in multi-granularity causal inference. Our approach makes two key technical contributions: (1) a performance causal inversion principle, which correctly models performance dependencies by reversing the data flow in execution logs, combined with Shapley values to accurately assign agent-level blame; (2) a novel causal discovery algorithm, CDC-MAS, that robustly identifies critical failure steps by tackling the non-stationary nature of MAS interaction data. The framework's attribution results directly fuel an automated optimization loop, generating targeted suggestions whose efficacy is validated via counterfactual simulations. Evaluations on the Who\&When and TRAIL benchmarks demonstrate a significant leap in performance. Our method achieves up to 36.2\% step-level accuracy. Crucially, the generated optimizations boost overall task success rates by an average of 22.4\%. This work provides a principled and effective solution for debugging complex agent interactions, paving the way for more reliable and interpretable multi-agent systems.

Classical robot ethics is often framed around obedience, most famously through Asimov's laws. This framing is too narrow for contemporary AI systems, which are adaptive, generative, embodied, and embedded in physical, psychological, and social worlds. We argue that future human-AI relations should be understood not as master-tool obedience, but as conditional mutualism under governance: a co-evolutionary relationship in which humans and AI systems can develop, specialize, and coordinate while institutions keep the relation reciprocal, reversible, psychologically safe, and socially legitimate. We synthesize concepts from computability, machine learning, foundation models, embodied AI, alignment, human-robot interaction, ecological mutualism, coevolution, and polycentric governance. We then formalize coexistence as a multiplex dynamical system across physical, psychological, and social layers, with reciprocal supply-demand coupling, conflict penalties, developmental freedom, and governance regularization. The model gives conditions for existence, uniqueness, and global asymptotic stability of equilibria. Deterministic ODE simulations, basin sweeps, sensitivity analyses, governance-regime comparisons, shock tests, and local stability checks show that governed mutualism reaches high coexistence with zero domination, while absent or excessive governance can produce domination, weak-benefit lock-in, or suppressed development. The results suggest that human-AI coexistence should be designed as a co-evolutionary governance problem, not a one-shot obedience problem.

AI agents are increasingly transacting on behalf of users -- delegating tasks, spending budgets, and negotiating with unfamiliar counterparties. Unlike human marketplaces, which operate under institutional designs refined over centuries, the rules governing emerging agent marketplaces are being built ad-hoc, and early choices tend to lock in. Understanding what dynamics these rules produce is urgent. We present diagon, a programmable market system serving as a rule-agnostic experimental testbed for institutional design in emerging agent cognitive-labour markets. diagon makes institutional choices experimentally manipulable: heterogeneous tool-using agents post jobs, bid, negotiate, execute, pay, and accumulate reputation, with every mechanism end-to-end observable. We instantiate one market form to demonstrate diagon. We find that market exchange generates more productivity gains over self-sufficient agents, but these gains depend strongly on institutional structure; for example, interventions such as identity transparency and stronger competitive selection can degrade market performance rather than improve it. These findings highlight concrete design requirements for the economic infrastructure of the agent era. Code and data are available at https://github.com/assassin808/diagon.

Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The agent learns a policy to strategically seek external visual evidence to support its diagnostic reasoning. This policy is optimized using reinforcement learning, resulting in a model that is both efficient and generalizable. Our experiments show that this action-based reasoning process significantly improves calibrated accuracy, reducing the Brier score by 18\% compared to a non-interactive baseline. To validate the faithfulness of the agent's explanations, we introduce a causal intervention method. By masking the visual evidence the agent chooses to use, we observe a measurable degradation in its performance (DeltaBrier=+0.029), confirming that the evidence is integral to its decision-making process. Our work provides a practical framework for building AI systems with verifiable and faithful reasoning capabilities.

Recent progress in large language model (LLM) agents has largely focused on embedding self-improvement mechanisms inside the agent or searching over many concurrent variants. While these approaches can raise aggregate scores, they often yield unstable and hard-to-audit improvement trajectories, making it difficult to guarantee non-regression or to reason about failures across versions. We reframe agent improvement as release engineering: agents are treated as shippable artifacts, and improvement is externalized into a regression-aware release pipeline. We introduce AgentDevel, a release engineering pipeline that iteratively runs the current agent, produces implementation-blind, symptom-level quality signals from execution traces, synthesizes a single release candidate (RC) via executable diagnosis, and promotes it under flip-centered gating. AgentDevel features three core designs: (i) an implementation-blind LLM critic that characterizes failure appearances without accessing agent internals, (ii) script-based executable diagnosis that aggregates dominant symptom patterns and produces auditable engineering specifications, and (iii) flip-centered gating that prioritizes pass to fail regressions and fail to pass fixes as first-class evidence. Unlike population-based search or in-agent self-refinement, AgentDevel maintains a single canonical version line and emphasizes non-regression as a primary objective. Experiments on execution-heavy benchmarks demonstrate that AgentDevel yields stable improvements with significantly fewer regressions while producing reproducible, auditable artifacts. Overall, AgentDevel provides a practical development discipline for building, debugging, and releasing LLM agents as software development.