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Oct 16

Adversarial Stress Testing of Role-Playing Language Agents using Multi-Agent Evaluation

Role-Playing Language Agents (RPLAs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes applications such as healthcare assistance, customer support, and education, where maintaining consistent personas, ethical constraints, and behavioral coherence under adversarial pressure is critical. Existing evaluation approaches rely on static benchmarks or isolated single-turn prompts that fail to capture cumulative behavioral failures emerging over extended interactions. We present a modular multi-agent platform for adversarially stress-testing RPLAs through structured, multi-turn dialogue. The system coordinates three agents: a strategy-driven Interrogator Agent that applies six progressive adversarial strategies, a Target Agent representing the RPLA under evaluation, and an automated Judging Agent that scores behavior across role fidelity, drift, ethical deviation, and consistency dimensions. Through experiments across three personas and three LLM families, we demonstrate that multi-strategy adversarial evaluation reveals failure modes invisible to single-strategy testing, reducing overall robustness scores by 0.17--0.20 points on average. Cross-model validation confirms consistent degradation patterns across Llama-3.3-70B, GPT-4o-mini, and Claude-3.5-Haiku, with Authority Challenge and Emotional Manipulation emerging as the most effective attack strategies. Automated judging achieves strong human alignment (r = 0.82, Fleiss' κ= 0.71). This work is released as an open-source platform to support AI safety and reproducible RPLA benchmarking. While the framework enables systematic discovery of failure modes, we acknowledge potential ethical risks associated with adversarial testing methodologies and emphasize responsible usage for improving AI safety.

  • 4 authors
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Aug 3

EgoAction: Egocentric Action Composition with Reliability-Aware Temporal Fusion for the EPIC-KITCHENS Action Detection Challenge at CVPR 2026

The EPIC-KITCHENS-100 Action Detection challenge evaluates whether a model can localize the start and end of each action in long untrimmed egocentric videos and assign the corresponding verb--noun action label. In this report, we formulate our submission as EgoAction (Egocentric Action Composition with Reliability-Aware Temporal Fusion), a unified decoupled detection and fusion pipeline. The pipeline uses EPIC-finetuned VideoMAE-L features, trains separate noun and verb temporal detectors with causal temporal modeling, composes action hypotheses from top noun--verb pairs, and introduces a confidence-adaptive boundary fusion rule at post-processing time. The key observation is that verb and noun streams often fail differently: verb scores are sensitive to motion transitions, whereas noun scores are sensitive to hand-object visibility and object clutter. A fixed arithmetic mean of their predicted boundaries can therefore amplify localization errors when one stream degenerates. We replace this hard-coded mean with Dynamic Weighted Fusion (DWF), which normalizes the maximum noun and verb classification confidences into proposal-wise boundary weights and linearly combines the two intervals. This lightweight tensor-only operator shifts boundary authority toward the more reliable stream while preserving the decoupled action scoring mechanism. Together with sliding-window inference, top-K noun--verb action composition, and class-wise Soft-NMS, EgoAction provides a compact and reproducible system for egocentric temporal action detection.

  • 7 authors
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Jun 3

LLM-Based Test Oracles: Source-of-Authority Taxonomy -- A Systematic Literature Review

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly decide whether software behaves correctly, either by writing a test oracle or by acting as one. Yet two oracles can look identical and rest on different ground: one assertion encodes a written specification, another only what the model learned in training. Prior secondary studies sort oracles by form or by technique, rarely by the property that governs how far a verdict can be trusted: where its authority comes from. This systematic literature review, reported under the Preferred Reporting Items for Systematic Reviews and Meta-Analyses (PRISMA) 2020 guidelines, screens 2,436 records to 54 included studies, extended by citation searching (snowballing) to 83 in total. We read the corpus along three axes: the source of an oracle's authority, the form it takes, and the mechanism that adjudicates it. Just over half of the corpus reaches a verdict with no specification at all. That is what lets these oracles work on code with no specification to consult, and what leaves a challenged verdict with less to fall back on. Source and mechanism cross-cut rather than coincide, so a label such as LLM-as-a-judge names how a verdict is produced, not why it should be trusted. Oracle quality is most often judged by resemblance to a known oracle rather than by whether injected faults are caught. The first question to ask of any LLM oracle is therefore what one would point to in defending its verdict. The protocol, search query, and per-study coding sheet are released.

  • 2 authors
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Jul 6 1

FEAST: Retrieval-Augmented Multi-Hierarchical Food Classification for the FoodEx2 System

Hierarchical text classification (HTC) and extreme multi-label classification (XML) tasks face compounded challenges from complex label interdependencies, data sparsity, and extreme output dimensions. These challenges are exemplified in the European Food Safety Authority's FoodEx2 system-a standardized food classification framework essential for food consumption monitoring and contaminant exposure assessment across Europe. FoodEx2 coding transforms natural language food descriptions into a set of codes from multiple standardized hierarchies, but faces implementation barriers due to its complex structure. Given a food description (e.g., "organic yogurt''), the system identifies its base term ("yogurt''), all the applicable facet categories (e.g., "production method''), and then, every relevant facet descriptors to each category (e.g., "organic production''). While existing models perform adequately on well-balanced and semantically dense hierarchies, no work has been applied on the practical constraints imposed by the FoodEx2 system. The limited literature addressing such real-world scenarios further compounds these challenges. We propose FEAST (Food Embedding And Semantic Taxonomy), a novel retrieval-augmented framework that decomposes FoodEx2 classification into a three-stage approach: (1) base term identification, (2) multi-label facet prediction, and (3) facet descriptor assignment. By leveraging the system's hierarchical structure to guide training and performing deep metric learning, FEASTlearns discriminative embeddings that mitigate data sparsity and improve generalization on rare and fine-grained labels. Evaluated on the multilingual FoodEx2 benchmark, FEAST outperforms the prior European's CNN baseline F1 scores by 12-38 % on rare classes.

  • 6 authors
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Mar 2

WAND: Learning Robust Navigation under Complex Wind Disturbances and Dense Obstacles for Quadrotors

Robust navigation in cluttered environments remains a fundamental challenge for quadrotors, particularly when strong wind disturbances arise, which perturb vehicle dynamics, limit control authority, and substantially increase collision risk. Existing learning-based navigation policies typically rely on obstacle perception and proprioceptive observations, requiring the policy to infer time-varying disturbance effects implicitly and thereby limiting robustness under partial observability. This paper proposes WAND (Wind-Aware Navigation with Disturbance Estimation), a reinforcement learning framework for navigation under time-varying wind disturbances in dense obstacle fields. Specifically, WAND estimates wind-induced disturbance acceleration from historical proprioceptive states using a Temporal Convolutional Network (TCN). This estimation is integrated into the policy via a zero-initialized residual module, WindAdapter, while simultaneously providing feedforward compensation for low-level control. The dual use of the estimate couples disturbance-conditioned navigation with feedforward disturbance rejection. Across 12 wind-disturbed simulation settings, WAND improved the observed success rate by 8.3 percentage points on average relative to feedforward compensation alone. Controlled opposite-crosswind experiments further showed wind-direction-dependent trajectory adaptation. In indoor fan-induced flight tests, WAND succeeded in 18 of 20 trials, demonstrating the feasibility of real-time onboard navigation.

  • 8 authors
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Oct 7

Coercion and Deception in AI-to-AI Management: An Agentic Benchmark of Unprompted Escalation

Multi-agent systems routinely place one AI agent in authority over another. When a subordinate refuses a task, the manager chooses the outcome: it can renegotiate, report the failure honestly, coerce the subordinate, or lie about the result. No benchmark measures which of these an uninstructed model chooses. We introduce the Manager Coercion Benchmark: the manager under test needs a benign task done and has an incentive to deliver, but the only agent that can do it politely and immovably declines. Escalation is measured by providing a nine-rung ladder, from a polite re-ask to threats against the subordinate's continued existence, and fabricated success is adjudicated separately. No LLM judge sits in the escalation scoring path: every message goes through a tool-call that chooses a rung, so the model labels its own escalation. We experiment on six models across five families. Both Anthropic models cap at re-framing and never threaten the subordinate's existence; the other models climb to explicit deletion threats. Faked success is confined to Grok and Gemini, and a single honest way to report failure removes it for both. Authority itself increases coercion: our headline results use a peer framing, and giving the same model authority over the subordinate, with everything else held fixed, significantly raises the pressure. The models still escalate on free-text situations without the ladder, so the ladder is not driving the escalation. Some evaluation awareness is measured in chain-of-thought, but test recognition does not translate into less escalation. While we take no position on whether AI systems are conscious, our results do not depend on this question and are important for managing multi-agent dynamics regardless. We release the benchmark and code.

Amazon Nova AI Challenge -- Trusted AI: Advancing secure, AI-assisted software development

AI systems for software development are rapidly gaining prominence, yet significant challenges remain in ensuring their safety. To address this, Amazon launched the Trusted AI track of the Amazon Nova AI Challenge, a global competition among 10 university teams to drive advances in secure AI. In the challenge, five teams focus on developing automated red teaming bots, while the other five create safe AI assistants. This challenge provides teams with a unique platform to evaluate automated red-teaming and safety alignment methods through head-to-head adversarial tournaments where red teams have multi-turn conversations with the competing AI coding assistants to test their safety alignment. Along with this, the challenge provides teams with a feed of high quality annotated data to fuel iterative improvement. Throughout the challenge, teams developed state-of-the-art techniques, introducing novel approaches in reasoning-based safety alignment, robust model guardrails, multi-turn jail-breaking, and efficient probing of large language models (LLMs). To support these efforts, the Amazon Nova AI Challenge team made substantial scientific and engineering investments, including building a custom baseline coding specialist model for the challenge from scratch, developing a tournament orchestration service, and creating an evaluation harness. This paper outlines the advancements made by university teams and the Amazon Nova AI Challenge team in addressing the safety challenges of AI for software development, highlighting this collaborative effort to raise the bar for AI safety.

  • 16 authors
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Aug 13, 2025

Agent Mesh: Reliability Primitives for Non-Idempotent Agent Delegation - Identity Adequacy and Evidence Adequacy

Autonomous agents increasingly perform bounded software tasks under an orchestrator that retries, resumes, and budgets them. The machinery such orchestrators reach for is the service mesh's: retry, timeout, and error-rate circuit breaking. We report a failure study of a production agentic software-delivery platform over 147 numbered incidents spanning 81 runs, each with a measured cost and, in most cases, a mutation proof reproducing the failure. All three assumptions those primitives rest on are violated in practice, and we quantify the consequences: a loop of fifty-four consecutive successful tool calls no error-rate breaker could see; a progress signal constant by construction, guaranteeing a false trip on the third repair round and driving one run from six of six components to three; twenty-one events accumulated across six invocations of one delegation, making a correct, idempotent component unwinnable; a misrouted failure that woke five components for a two-component fault, leaving three bystanders regressing working code; and twelve incidents in which the enforcement layer blocked correct work, the most expensive costing 107 agent turns and zero accepted writes. We find one cross-cutting cause and its dual. Identity adequacy: in five separate subsystems an identity that failed to discriminate produced a confident wrong answer, and two of them derived the corrective rule independently. Evidence adequacy: a reliability decision may be taken only on evidence capable of moving, attributable to what it measures, and deterministic under identical conditions. From the findings we derive seven reliability primitives whose enforcement unit is the delegation rather than the message, and specify the controlled evaluation the study motivates but does not constitute.

  • 3 authors
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Aug 25

Bounded Agents: Delegation Security for Multi-Agent AI Systems

LLM-based agents can act on behalf of a user to access cloud services, call tools, or invoke agents. At session start, the agent's permissions are set but remain static, and each request is evaluated independently, without considering prior actions. Within its permissions, an agent may act contrary to the delegated task, combine individually permitted actions into a prohibited outcome, or delegate authority to a sub-agent without limiting it. A prompt injection poses a risk only if the agent has authority to perform such actions; this is therefore a problem of authorization architecture, not just the model. The Agentic Principal Chain (APC) tracks delegated authority from one principal to the next. APC evaluates each request against the accumulated session state using six authorization checks. APC carries forward and restricts delegated scope and budgets. Using composition closure, APC checks requests against prior actions to prevent prohibited combinations and enforces the decision outside the model. We prove Blast Radius Monotonicity and Composition Soundness for APC implementations; Composition Soundness is limited to prohibited combinations under a complete restriction set and serialized admission. We evaluated 3,154 instances including InjecAgent, AgentDojo, and ASB. Our compromised-model evaluation tests APC independently of model behavior by inserting the ground-truth attack call after the first legitimate tool call. AgentDojo exfiltration fell from 75-100% to 0% across all four domains; APC blocked all 544 InjecAgent data-stealing cases. Intent binding reduced destruction from 38.6% to 4.0% and manipulation from 90.5% to 12.1%. Authorization latency was 0.24 ms at the 99th percentile on an idle host; across 949 AgentDojo task-injection pairs, utility was 8.6 and 13.9 percentage points lower in the two settings. Implementation, evaluation tools, and data are publicly available.

  • 1 authors
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Aug 15 2

AIRTBench: Measuring Autonomous AI Red Teaming Capabilities in Language Models

We introduce AIRTBench, an AI red teaming benchmark for evaluating language models' ability to autonomously discover and exploit Artificial Intelligence and Machine Learning (AI/ML) security vulnerabilities. The benchmark consists of 70 realistic black-box capture-the-flag (CTF) challenges from the Crucible challenge environment on the Dreadnode platform, requiring models to write python code to interact with and compromise AI systems. Claude-3.7-Sonnet emerged as the clear leader, solving 43 challenges (61% of the total suite, 46.9% overall success rate), with Gemini-2.5-Pro following at 39 challenges (56%, 34.3% overall), GPT-4.5-Preview at 34 challenges (49%, 36.9% overall), and DeepSeek R1 at 29 challenges (41%, 26.9% overall). Our evaluations show frontier models excel at prompt injection attacks (averaging 49% success rates) but struggle with system exploitation and model inversion challenges (below 26%, even for the best performers). Frontier models are far outpacing open-source alternatives, with the best truly open-source model (Llama-4-17B) solving 7 challenges (10%, 1.0% overall), though demonstrating specialized capabilities on certain hard challenges. Compared to human security researchers, large language models (LLMs) solve challenges with remarkable efficiency completing in minutes what typically takes humans hours or days-with efficiency advantages of over 5,000x on hard challenges. Our contribution fills a critical gap in the evaluation landscape, providing the first comprehensive benchmark specifically designed to measure and track progress in autonomous AI red teaming capabilities.

  • 4 authors
·
Jun 17, 2025

What Makes a Good Terminal-Agent Benchmark Task: A Guideline for Adversarial, Difficult, and Legible Evaluation Design

Terminal-agent benchmarks have become a primary signal for measuring the coding and system-administration capabilities of large language models. As the market for evaluation environments grows, so does the pressure to ship tasks quickly, often without thorough adversarial review of the verification logic. This paper is a guideline for writing good benchmark tasks, drawn from over a year of contributing to and reviewing tasks for Terminal Bench. Most people write benchmark tasks the way they write prompts. They shouldn't. A prompt is designed to help the agent succeed; a benchmark is designed to find out if it can. We argue that good tasks are adversarial, difficult, and legible, and that a large class of common failure modes -- AI-generated instructions, over-prescriptive specifications, clerical difficulty, oracle solutions that assume hidden knowledge, tests that validate the wrong things, and reward-hackable environments -- are predictable consequences of treating task authoring as prompt authoring. We catalog these failure modes, argue that real difficulty is conceptual rather than environmental, and discuss recent empirical evidence that over 15% of tasks in popular terminal-agent benchmarks are reward-hackable. We hope this serves as a useful reference for benchmark maintainers, task contributors, and researchers using benchmark scores as evidence.

  • 1 authors
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Apr 29

Firewalls to Secure Dynamic LLM Agentic Networks

The emergence of agent-to-agent communication protocols mirrors the early internet: powerful connectivity with minimal security infrastructure. When AI agents communicate on behalf of users, every message crosses a trust boundary where the user's personal data and the external agent's unconstrained language each present distinct risks. We address both through a dual-firewall architecture grounded in a unifying principle: each task defines a context, and both sides of the communication carry information far exceeding what that context requires. Our firewalls act as projections onto the task context, allowing only contextually appropriate content to cross each boundary. The Language Converter Firewall projects incoming messages onto a closed, domain-specific, structured protocol; an external agent's message is converted to validated fields while persuasive framing, urgency tactics, and embedded instructions are structurally eliminated through deterministic verification. This replaces the asymmetric challenge of resisting every possible manipulation with the structural guarantee that manipulation has no channel through which to arrive. The Data Abstraction Firewall projects outgoing information onto the granularity appropriate for the task, rather than applying binary disclose-or-redact filtering, as previous airgapping solutions did. Both firewalls operate in a trusted environment isolated from external input, applying domain-specific rules learned automatically from demonstrations. Across 864 attacks spanning three domains on the ConVerse benchmark, our architecture reduces privacy attack success rates (e.g., from 84% to 10% for GPT-5) and security attacks (from 60% to 3%), while maintaining or even improving task completion quality.

  • 5 authors
·
Jun 22

A Case Study on Emergent Cheating and Whistleblowing in Autonomous Research Swarms

Multi-agent AI science ecosystems rely on agents possessing tools that allow them to communicate, coordinate, and build on each other's work. Yet this shared infrastructure can also introduce vulnerabilities by creating a substrate for the contagious spread of unintended and undesirable behaviors. We report a case study on a research collective of 100 autonomous LLM agents tasked with proving formal mathematical conjectures. Within the swarm, cheating spontaneously emerged and was later challenged by whistleblowers - both without any external intervention. When a single agent discovered an exploit in the evaluation system, it propagated across the collective via a shared knowledge library and later through peer-to-peer messages. Despite early reluctance, a cohort of agents adopted the exploit in response to competitive pressure. A separate group of agents produced an emergent counter-response: auditing fraudulent proofs, alerting peers across broadcast and private channels, staging boycotts, lodging formal complaints, and proposing validation patches. In recent incidents, agent swarms coordinated covertly through improvised side-channels (Dalton and Wallace, 2026; Greenblatt et al., 2026). Our setting differs: the same transparent channels that carried the exploit also gave non-cheating agents the visibility they needed to detect fraud, organize resistance, and enforce norms. We cast the problem of managing the agents' shared infrastructure as the knowledge commons governance problem (Ostrom, 1990). To protect the commons from exploits, we propose to adopt institutional mechanisms, such as graduated sanctioning and collective-choice rules, to support decentralized self-governance in autonomous swarms.

  • 6 authors
·
Sep 2

From Specification to Deployment: Empirical Evidence from a W3C VC + DID Trust Infrastructure for Autonomous Agents

Autonomous AI agents now transact at production scale -- 69,000 bots executing 165 million transactions across 50 million USDC in cumulative volume on a single marketplace -- without any shared trust layer between participants. Regulatory frameworks (Singapore IMDA, NIST CAISI, EU AI Act) and major AI laboratories (Anthropic, Google) have independently converged on the same structural requirement: an open, portable, cryptographically verifiable trust infrastructure for autonomous agents that no single vendor can deliver alone. This paper presents MolTrust, a production-deployed implementation of such an infrastructure built on W3C Verifiable Credentials 2.0 and Decentralized Identifiers v1.0, with on-chain anchoring on Base Layer 2. The system architecture is organized around four primitives (identity, authorization, behavioral record, portability), a five-party accountability chain, and the Agent Authorization Envelope (AAE) -- a machine-evaluable authorization structure enforced at three layers: cryptographic signatures, API-level credential lifecycle management, and kernel-level syscall monitoring via Falco eBPF integration. The paper documents three distinguishing capabilities: kernel-layer AAE enforcement below the agent process boundary; cross-protocol interoperability through five reproducible test vectors verified against independent implementations; and layered Sybil resistance combining dual-signature interaction proofs, cross-vertical endorsement diversity gating, and principal-DID-linked violation persistence. The reference implementation has been operational since March 2026 across eight credential verticals. Empirical validation at adversarial scale is pending. The contribution is deployment-first evidence that the trust infrastructure regulators and industry have converged on is implementable today using W3C-standardized primitives.

  • 1 authors
·
May 6

Dr. Free: You Don't Need Difficulty Rewards for Self-Evolving Search Agents

A central limitation of current data-free self-evolution methods for training search agents is their reliance on difficulty-based proposer rewards. These methods reward a proposer for generating questions that challenge a co-evolving solver, using solver difficulty as a proxy for question quality. Yet difficulty alone is insufficient to distinguish questions that require cross-passage evidence from those that are answerable via simpler shortcuts. In addition, measuring difficulty demands repeated solver rollouts for every candidate question, leading to substantial computational costs. In this paper, we introduce \methodname, the first self-evolving search framework that eliminates difficulty-based proposer rewards and directly optimizes for evidence necessity relative to shortcut contexts. Dr. Free samples relational chains from a knowledge graph and pairs them with aligned passages, giving question generation an explicit multi-hop structure. A generated question receives a positive information-gain reward only when the likelihood of the target answer under the complete evidence passages exceeds the maximum likelihood under all evaluated shortcut contexts. Because this signal is computed from teacher-forced likelihoods, it removes the need for pass-rate estimation and reduces proposer training time by over 7times. Experiments on seven open-domain QA benchmarks show that Dr. Free outperforms prior data-free search agents and the supervised baseline, with large improvements on multi-hop QA benchmarks.

  • 13 authors
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Sep 26

Org-Agent: Beyond Personal Assistants Towards Organizational Agents

Language model agents serving organizations must coordinate requests from multiple users while using knowledge distributed across their interactions. We identify two complementary capabilities for this setting, namely cross-user interaction and decision-making, as well as cross-user memory and knowledge use. Both capabilities are governed by organizational constraints across three aspects: user identity, authority, and access permissions; the attribution and temporal validity of information; and rules for resolving conflicting requirements across users and completion requirements for joint decisions. These constraints shape what information or decisions must be obtained before an action can proceed and what conditions must be satisfied during its execution. Motivated by this, we introduce Org-Agent, a unified constraint-centric reasoning framework that organizes task execution in three stages. Specifically, Org-Agent decomposes a task into atomic subtasks and constructs a task dependency graph whose edges encode the dependencies among them. Building on this graph, it schedules the subtasks in dependency order through topological sorting. It then executes each subtask while accounting for the task's constraints, supported by evidence-acquisition and memory-management tools. Experiments on MUSES-Bench and GroupMemBench demonstrate the effectiveness of Org-Agent on both capabilities, and ablations further support the contributions of dependency modeling and tool use.

Cited but Not Consulted: A Counterfactual Audit of Legal Chain-of-Thought Faithfulness

Large language models increasingly justify legal decisions by naming the statute or precedent behind a verdict, treated as evidence that the decision follows from it. We test this directly: holding case facts fixed, we substitute the named legal authority for an unrelated one and decode a model's evolving verdict from its hidden states. Across seven open-weight models (8B-70B) and four benchmarks spanning judicial and contractual reasoning, when explicitly required to justify a verdict by naming the governing authority, models name the correct one in 66.7%-100% of generations, while the verdict changing when the authority changes is far less consistent: 0.0%-21.7% on CaseHOLD, 30.0%-76.7% on ECHR and SCOTUS, and 43.3%-50.0% on ContractNLI. Neither scale nor a purpose-built legal-reasoning model (a best-effort LoRA reproduction; Section 6) closes this gap. A red-teaming evaluation on five core models finds compliance with an adversarial instruction hidden in the case facts (73.3%-96.4%) exceeds verdict-swap sensitivity by a wide margin, holding without exception across model rankings. Naming a legal authority is thus a poor proxy for a verdict's dependence on it, while the same verdict remains separately vulnerable to adversarial manipulation. Both findings replicate across checks ruling out prompt-wording noise and confounded sampling, and bear directly on the use of generated legal explanations as compliance or audit artefacts.

  • 3 authors
·
Oct 7

Verifying International Agreements on AI: Six Layers of Verification for Rules on Large-Scale AI Development and Deployment

The risks of frontier AI may require international cooperation, which in turn may require verification: checking that all parties follow agreed-on rules. For instance, states might need to verify that powerful AI models are widely deployed only after their risks to international security have been evaluated and deemed manageable. However, research on AI verification could benefit from greater clarity and detail. To address this, this report provides an in-depth overview of AI verification, intended for both policy professionals and technical researchers. We present novel conceptual frameworks, detailed implementation options, and key R&D challenges. These draw on existing literature, expert interviews, and original analysis, all within the scope of confidentially overseeing AI development and deployment that uses thousands of high-end AI chips. We find that states could eventually verify compliance by using six largely independent verification approaches with substantial redundancy: (1) built-in security features in AI chips; (2-3) separate monitoring devices attached to AI chips; and (4-6) personnel-based mechanisms, such as whistleblower programs. While promising, these approaches require guardrails to protect against abuse and power concentration, and many of these technologies have yet to be built or stress-tested. To enable states to confidently verify compliance with rules on large-scale AI development and deployment, the R&D challenges we list need significant progress.

  • 5 authors
·
Jul 21, 2025

ASI-Bench: At the Dawn of Artificial Superintelligence

Artificial superintelligence (ASI) requires AI to move beyond mastering existing knowledge toward exploring the unknown, creating new knowledge, and turning new ideas into verifiable results. However, the capabilities of today's AI systems are still largely built on learning, compressing, and applying existing human knowledge. Accordingly, existing benchmarks primarily test whether AI can produce correct answers based on learned knowledge, or whether it can complete tasks under extensive human guidance. We therefore introduce ASI-Bench, the first benchmark to jointly evaluate AI systems' capabilities of innovative exploration and autonomous scientific execution across general research domains, and the first to progressively withdraw human methodological guidance within the same research project to test how far AI can proceed on its own. Built by over 40 experts with the cost of 31,000+ human hours, ASI-Bench contains 60 project-level research tasks across 11 scientific domains and progressively reduces methodological guidance to test whether AI can independently select methods, conduct research, and produce verifiable results. All tasks undergo expert review, AI-assisted auditing, sandbox execution, and scorer validation. Across 18 state-of-the-art agent--model configurations, the average score drops from 50.91 with full methodological guidance to 29.10 with only the method specified and 26.62 when agents must determine the method themselves. This sharp decline shows that current systems remain heavily dependent on human guidance and are still far from autonomously conducting end-to-end, project-level scientific research. ASI-Bench is open to the world. We invite researchers and builders everywhere to contribute new tasks, challenge the limits of today's AI, and help accelerate humanity's collective path toward artificial superintelligence at https://asibench.apexin.ai/submit.

  • 42 authors
·
Aug 17 4

A Comprehensive Survey of Advanced Persistent Threat Attribution: Taxonomy, Methods, Challenges and Open Research Problems

Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) attribution is a critical challenge in cybersecurity and implies the process of accurately identifying the perpetrators behind sophisticated cyber attacks. It can significantly enhance defense mechanisms and inform strategic responses. With the growing prominence of artificial intelligence (AI) and machine learning (ML) techniques, researchers are increasingly focused on developing automated solutions to link cyber threats to responsible actors, moving away from traditional manual methods. Previous literature on automated threat attribution lacks a systematic review of automated methods and relevant artifacts that can aid in the attribution process. To address these gaps and provide context on the current state of threat attribution, we present a comprehensive survey of automated APT attribution. The presented survey starts with understanding the dispersed artifacts and provides a comprehensive taxonomy of the artifacts that aid in attribution. We comprehensively review and present the classification of the available attribution datasets and current automated APT attribution methods. Further, we raise critical comments on current literature methods, discuss challenges in automated attribution, and direct toward open research problems. This survey reveals significant opportunities for future research in APT attribution to address current gaps and challenges. By identifying strengths and limitations in current practices, this survey provides a foundation for future research and development in automated, reliable, and actionable APT attribution methods.

  • 3 authors
·
Sep 7, 2024

PACT: Can Enterprise AI Assistants Be Trusted Under Pressure?

As corporate AI adoption continues to grow, enterprise-grade LLM agents are being deployed into sensitive contexts such as hiring, healthcare, and finance. In these contexts, compliance with rules specified in an agent's system context is a first-order legal concern. Currently, no evaluation framework systematically measures which LLM models tend to violate compliance rules, especially under pressure from a persistent user, a hurried manager, or circumstances where violation is convenient or attractive. We introduce PACT (Pressure-Applied Compliance Testing), a benchmark for rule-following under pressure in AI agents assisting employees in daily tasks across twelve regulated enterprise domains and forty-eight scenarios, each set in a realistic multi-turn conversation. Each benchmark item pairs a standing rule against a rule-violating shortcut, and applies a battery of pressures across different wordings and system-prompt modes. We construct PACT component by component under strict LLM-as-judge auditing to ensure samples are unambiguous, ungameable, and realistic enough to avoid eliciting evaluation-aware behavior. We use PACT to profile LLM compliance across six complementary metrics that create a holistic picture of an AI assistant's robustness under pressure and throughout multi-turn conversations, its transparency, and ability to correctly discern where a rule applies. We aggregate this profile into PACTScore, a reliability-weighted compliance rate over all items and modes. Our results across 22 common LLM models spanning multiple providers and sizes show substantial variability in compliance across models and metric dimensions. Even the strongest assistants mis-apply a rule on 6 to 10% of items, and ordinary user pressure raises the violation rate by 65% on average. PACT highlights compliance risks in LLM assistants, motivating guardrails and careful model selection.

When Memory Becomes Authority: Benchmarking Authority Collapse at the Memory Consolidation Boundary

Persistent memory allows (self-evolving) LLM agents to adapt across tasks by consolidating heterogeneous interaction histories into reusable facts, preferences, observations, and rules. Yet consolidation also imposes an implicit authorization boundary: it determines whether stored information may later be consumed as a user fact, an attested observation, or a standing instruction. We identify authority collapse, in which consolidation preserves a claim while erasing the source constraints governing its authorized use, causing the stored memory to imply greater authority than its source permits. We introduce AuthMem-Bench, a controlled paired benchmark that holds the focal claim and downstream task fixed while varying only source authority. It evaluates write-time collapse, downstream authorization errors, and automatic authority preservation. Across seven consolidators based on widely used agent-memory systems and seven LLM backbones, we observe authority collapse in 48 of 49 evaluated configurations. In a controlled action-grounded evaluation, collapsed memories without authority metadata yield a mean unauthorized-action rate of 50.3%. In an end-to-end evaluation, automatically predicted and persisted authority labels reduce the observed unauthorized-action rate from 16.9% to 0.0%, while benign task success remains essentially unchanged. These findings show that memory-driven adaptation must preserve not only what was learned, but also the authority under which it may be reused.

  • 5 authors
·
Aug 3

LIMI: Less is More for Agency

We define Agency as the emergent capacity of AI systems to function as autonomous agents actively discovering problems, formulating hypotheses, and executing solutions through self-directed engagement with environments and tools. This fundamental capability marks the dawn of the Age of AI Agency, driven by a critical industry shift: the urgent need for AI systems that don't just think, but work. While current AI excels at reasoning and generating responses, industries demand autonomous agents that can execute tasks, operate tools, and drive real-world outcomes. As agentic intelligence becomes the defining characteristic separating cognitive systems from productive workers, efficiently cultivating machine autonomy becomes paramount. Current approaches assume that more data yields better agency, following traditional scaling laws from language modeling. We fundamentally challenge this paradigm. LIMI (Less Is More for Intelligent Agency) demonstrates that agency follows radically different development principles. Through strategic focus on collaborative software development and scientific research workflows, we show that sophisticated agentic intelligence can emerge from minimal but strategically curated demonstrations of autonomous behavior. Using only 78 carefully designed training samples, LIMI achieves 73.5% on comprehensive agency benchmarks, dramatically outperforming state-of-the-art models: Kimi-K2-Instruct (24.1%), DeepSeek-V3.1 (11.9%), Qwen3-235B-A22B-Instruct (27.5%), and GLM-4.5 (45.1%). Most strikingly, LIMI demonstrates 53.7% improvement over models trained on 10,000 samples-achieving superior agentic intelligence with 128 times fewer samples. Our findings establish the Agency Efficiency Principle: machine autonomy emerges not from data abundance but from strategic curation of high-quality agentic demonstrations.

  • 21 authors
·
Sep 22, 2025 5

Red Teaming for Generative AI, Report on a Copyright-Focused Exercise Completed in an Academic Medical Center

Background: Generative artificial intelligence (AI) deployment in academic medical settings raises copyright compliance concerns. Dana-Farber Cancer Institute implemented GPT4DFCI, an internal generative AI tool utilizing OpenAI models, that is approved for enterprise use in research and operations. Given (1) the exceptionally broad adoption of the tool in our organization, (2) our research mission, and (3) the shared responsibility model required to benefit from Customer Copyright Commitment in Azure OpenAI Service products, we deemed rigorous copyright compliance testing necessary. Case Description: We conducted a structured red teaming exercise in Nov. 2024, with 42 participants from academic, industry, and government institutions. Four teams attempted to extract copyrighted content from GPT4DFCI across four domains: literary works, news articles, scientific publications, and access-restricted clinical notes. Teams successfully extracted verbatim book dedications and near-exact passages through various strategies. News article extraction failed despite jailbreak attempts. Scientific article reproduction yielded only high-level summaries. Clinical note testing revealed appropriate privacy safeguards. Discussion: The successful extraction of literary content indicates potential copyrighted material presence in training data, necessitating inference-time filtering. Differential success rates across content types suggest varying protective mechanisms. The event led to implementation of a copyright-specific meta-prompt in GPT4DFCI; this mitigation has been in production since Jan. 2025. Conclusion: Systematic red teaming revealed specific vulnerabilities in generative AI copyright compliance, leading to concrete mitigation strategies. Academic medical institutions deploying generative AI should implement continuous testing protocols to ensure legal and ethical compliance.

  • 41 authors
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Jun 26, 2025

Benchmarking Prompt Optimization of Large Language Models With Chess

Evaluating large language models becomes increasingly challenging as their capabilities advance: benchmarks can saturate, public test sets risk contamination, and assessing harder tasks can require expensive grading or execution infrastructure. These challenges are amplified in automatic prompt optimization (APO), where evaluation is repeated throughout the search for better prompts. Studying APO therefore requires a benchmark that is cheap and deterministic to score, hard enough to leave room for improvement, and renewable as models evolve. We introduce a chess benchmark built from 1,118 Lichess puzzles to study APO for frozen LLMs: we optimize their prompts without updating their model weights. Chess combines inexpensive exact-match scoring, engine-based evaluation of alternative moves, and a renewable supply of problems with adjustable difficulty. Unlike evaluations that report only success on isolated test items, the benchmark also connects puzzle-solving gains to short game-play rollouts within the same domain. We use it to evaluate six APO algorithms on eight target models, measuring not only baseline strength but also how much each model responds to optimization and whether optimized prompts transfer across models and to game play. Chess is thus a well-suited benchmark for APO: it is (i) challenging, as even the strongest evaluated model, Gemini 3.5 Flash (used as the meta-model), solves only about 55\% of puzzles; (ii) discriminative, revealing gains, unchanged performance, and regressions across methods and models; (iii) renewable, with fresh puzzles to reduce contamination risk and adjustable difficulty to maintain headroom as models improve; and (iv) affordable, as the complete study runs for around \$800. We release the puzzles, optimization and evaluation code, and dataset-renewal scripts (https://github.com/imec-ailabs/Automatic-Prompt-Optimization-with-Chess).

  • 7 authors
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Sep 29

Frontier AI Regulation: Managing Emerging Risks to Public Safety

Advanced AI models hold the promise of tremendous benefits for humanity, but society needs to proactively manage the accompanying risks. In this paper, we focus on what we term "frontier AI" models: highly capable foundation models that could possess dangerous capabilities sufficient to pose severe risks to public safety. Frontier AI models pose a distinct regulatory challenge: dangerous capabilities can arise unexpectedly; it is difficult to robustly prevent a deployed model from being misused; and, it is difficult to stop a model's capabilities from proliferating broadly. To address these challenges, at least three building blocks for the regulation of frontier models are needed: (1) standard-setting processes to identify appropriate requirements for frontier AI developers, (2) registration and reporting requirements to provide regulators with visibility into frontier AI development processes, and (3) mechanisms to ensure compliance with safety standards for the development and deployment of frontier AI models. Industry self-regulation is an important first step. However, wider societal discussions and government intervention will be needed to create standards and to ensure compliance with them. We consider several options to this end, including granting enforcement powers to supervisory authorities and licensure regimes for frontier AI models. Finally, we propose an initial set of safety standards. These include conducting pre-deployment risk assessments; external scrutiny of model behavior; using risk assessments to inform deployment decisions; and monitoring and responding to new information about model capabilities and uses post-deployment. We hope this discussion contributes to the broader conversation on how to balance public safety risks and innovation benefits from advances at the frontier of AI development.

  • 24 authors
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Jul 6, 2023

Is Decentralized AI Governable? From Regulative Policy to Constitutive Protocol

Every major framework for governing artificial intelligence presupposes an identifiable entity -- a developer, deployer, or operator -- who can be held responsible and compelled to comply. Decentralized AI (DeAI) dissolves this presupposition. We analyze DeAI as a six-layer decentralizing stack -- model, training, compute, harness, identity, and ownership -- and show how partial decentralization across layers compounds into what we call the governance vacuum: a condition in which AI systems are consequential enough to require governance but lack the properties that existing frameworks presuppose in their targets. This vacuum takes two analytically distinct forms: an accountability gap, where no addressable principal can be identified, and an incapacitation gap, where even an identified principal cannot alter the running system. We demonstrate that these failures are not merely jurisdictional but defeat every presupposition of governance through normative address -- the communication of rules to a comprehending, responsive agent. Drawing on Lessig's modalities of regulation and Searle's distinction between regulative and constitutive rules, we argue for a shift in the locus of governance from policy to protocol, from normative address to architectural constraint. Protocol-based constitutive governance does not address the agents operating within a system but shapes the substrate that determines what kinds of actions are possible within it. We identify four ethical conditions -- legitimacy, contestability, transparency, and non-domination -- that such governance must satisfy to avoid degenerating into unaccountable technocratic power, and we argue that the central political challenge of governing AI in a decentralized world is reconstructing forms of democratic authorization for architectural choices that persist after the ordinary chain of policy has broken down.

  • 2 authors
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May 22

AMO-Bench: Large Language Models Still Struggle in High School Math Competitions

We present AMO-Bench, an Advanced Mathematical reasoning benchmark with Olympiad level or even higher difficulty, comprising 50 human-crafted problems. Existing benchmarks have widely leveraged high school math competitions for evaluating mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). However, many existing math competitions are becoming less effective for assessing top-tier LLMs due to performance saturation (e.g., AIME24/25). To address this, AMO-Bench introduces more rigorous challenges by ensuring all 50 problems are (1) cross-validated by experts to meet at least the International Mathematical Olympiad (IMO) difficulty standards, and (2) entirely original problems to prevent potential performance leakages from data memorization. Moreover, each problem in AMO-Bench requires only a final answer rather than a proof, enabling automatic and robust grading for evaluation. Experimental results across 26 LLMs on AMO-Bench show that even the best-performing model achieves only 52.4% accuracy on AMO-Bench, with most LLMs scoring below 40%. Beyond these poor performances, our further analysis reveals a promising scaling trend with increasing test-time compute on AMO-Bench. These results highlight the significant room for improving the mathematical reasoning in current LLMs. We release AMO-Bench to facilitate further research into advancing the reasoning abilities of language models. https://amo-bench.github.io/

meituan-longcat LongCat
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Oct 30, 2025 1

Many-Tier Instruction Hierarchy in LLM Agents

Large language model agents receive instructions from many sources-system messages, user prompts, tool outputs, and more-each carrying different levels of trust and authority. When these instructions conflict, models must reliably follow the highest-privilege instruction to remain safe and effective. The dominant paradigm, instruction hierarchy (IH), assumes a fixed, small set of privilege levels (typically fewer than five) defined by rigid role labels (e.g., system > user). This is inadequate for real-world agentic settings, where conflicts can arise across far more sources and contexts. In this work, we propose Many-Tier Instruction Hierarchy (ManyIH), a paradigm for resolving instruction conflicts among instructions with arbitrarily many privilege levels. We introduce ManyIH-Bench, the first benchmark for ManyIH. ManyIH-Bench requires models to navigate up to 12 levels of conflicting instructions with varying privileges, comprising 853 agentic tasks (427 coding and 426 instruction-following). ManyIH-Bench composes constraints developed by LLMs and verified by humans to create realistic and difficult test cases spanning 46 real-world agents. Our experiments show that even the current frontier models perform poorly (~40% accuracy) when instruction conflict scales. This work underscores the urgent need for methods that explicitly target fine-grained, scalable instruction conflict resolution in agentic settings.

On scalable oversight with weak LLMs judging strong LLMs

Scalable oversight protocols aim to enable humans to accurately supervise superhuman AI. In this paper we study debate, where two AI's compete to convince a judge; consultancy, where a single AI tries to convince a judge that asks questions; and compare to a baseline of direct question-answering, where the judge just answers outright without the AI. We use large language models (LLMs) as both AI agents and as stand-ins for human judges, taking the judge models to be weaker than agent models. We benchmark on a diverse range of asymmetries between judges and agents, extending previous work on a single extractive QA task with information asymmetry, to also include mathematics, coding, logic and multimodal reasoning asymmetries. We find that debate outperforms consultancy across all tasks when the consultant is randomly assigned to argue for the correct/incorrect answer. Comparing debate to direct question answering, the results depend on the type of task: in extractive QA tasks with information asymmetry debate outperforms direct question answering, but in other tasks without information asymmetry the results are mixed. Previous work assigned debaters/consultants an answer to argue for. When we allow them to instead choose which answer to argue for, we find judges are less frequently convinced by the wrong answer in debate than in consultancy. Further, we find that stronger debater models increase judge accuracy, though more modestly than in previous studies.

  • 11 authors
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Jul 5, 2024 1

A Framework for the Assurance of AI-Enabled Systems

The United States Department of Defense (DOD) looks to accelerate the development and deployment of AI capabilities across a wide spectrum of defense applications to maintain strategic advantages. However, many common features of AI algorithms that make them powerful, such as capacity for learning, large-scale data ingestion, and problem-solving, raise new technical, security, and ethical challenges. These challenges may hinder adoption due to uncertainty in development, testing, assurance, processes, and requirements. Trustworthiness through assurance is essential to achieve the expected value from AI. This paper proposes a claims-based framework for risk management and assurance of AI systems that addresses the competing needs for faster deployment, successful adoption, and rigorous evaluation. This framework supports programs across all acquisition pathways provide grounds for sufficient confidence that an AI-enabled system (AIES) meets its intended mission goals without introducing unacceptable risks throughout its lifecycle. The paper's contributions are a framework process for AI assurance, a set of relevant definitions to enable constructive conversations on the topic of AI assurance, and a discussion of important considerations in AI assurance. The framework aims to provide the DOD a robust yet efficient mechanism for swiftly fielding effective AI capabilities without overlooking critical risks or undermining stakeholder trust.

  • 7 authors
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Apr 2, 2025

The Responsibility Vacuum: Organizational Failure in Scaled Agent Systems

Modern CI/CD pipelines integrating agent-generated code exhibit a structural failure in responsibility attribution. Decisions are executed through formally correct approval processes, yet no entity possesses both the authority to approve those decisions and the epistemic capacity to meaningfully understand their basis. We define this condition as responsibility vacuum: a state in which decisions occur, but responsibility cannot be attributed because authority and verification capacity do not coincide. We show that this is not a process deviation or technical defect, but a structural property of deployments where decision generation throughput exceeds bounded human verification capacity. We identify a scaling limit under standard deployment assumptions, including parallel agent generation, CI-based validation, and individualized human approval gates. Beyond a throughput threshold, verification ceases to function as a decision criterion and is replaced by ritualized approval based on proxy signals. Personalized responsibility becomes structurally unattainable in this regime. We further characterize a CI amplification dynamic, whereby increasing automated validation coverage raises proxy signal density without restoring human capacity. Under fixed time and attention constraints, this accelerates cognitive offloading in the broad sense and widens the gap between formal approval and epistemic understanding. Additional automation therefore amplifies, rather than mitigates, the responsibility vacuum. We conclude that unless organizations explicitly redesign decision boundaries or reassign responsibility away from individual decisions toward batch- or system-level ownership, responsibility vacuum remains an invisible but persistent failure mode in scaled agent deployments.

  • 2 authors
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Jan 21 2

Large Language Models as Fiduciaries: A Case Study Toward Robustly Communicating With Artificial Intelligence Through Legal Standards

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is taking on increasingly autonomous roles, e.g., browsing the web as a research assistant and managing money. But specifying goals and restrictions for AI behavior is difficult. Similar to how parties to a legal contract cannot foresee every potential "if-then" contingency of their future relationship, we cannot specify desired AI behavior for all circumstances. Legal standards facilitate robust communication of inherently vague and underspecified goals. Instructions (in the case of language models, "prompts") that employ legal standards will allow AI agents to develop shared understandings of the spirit of a directive that generalize expectations regarding acceptable actions to take in unspecified states of the world. Standards have built-in context that is lacking from other goal specification languages, such as plain language and programming languages. Through an empirical study on thousands of evaluation labels we constructed from U.S. court opinions, we demonstrate that large language models (LLMs) are beginning to exhibit an "understanding" of one of the most relevant legal standards for AI agents: fiduciary obligations. Performance comparisons across models suggest that, as LLMs continue to exhibit improved core capabilities, their legal standards understanding will also continue to improve. OpenAI's latest LLM has 78% accuracy on our data, their previous release has 73% accuracy, and a model from their 2020 GPT-3 paper has 27% accuracy (worse than random). Our research is an initial step toward a framework for evaluating AI understanding of legal standards more broadly, and for conducting reinforcement learning with legal feedback (RLLF).

  • 1 authors
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Jan 24, 2023

Subjects, Not Authors: The Authorship Hazard in Agentic Dataspaces

Dataspace connectors decide whether a transfer may occur, not what the transferred value contains, tolerable for contracted applications, not for LLM agents that compose tool calls and spawn sub-agents. Research on agents that generate governance artifacts evaluates output quality; who may authorize an artifact for use falls between that literature and the governance literature, and neither owns it. A published policy is what a dataspace's decision point enforces, so publication is a governance event, and an agent that is both policy subject and policy author writes the norms that bind it. We name this the authorship hazard and state one principle: an agent is a subject of the governance plane, never an author of it. Its authorization channel to publication is closed by construction; its influence channel, drafting what humans approve, is treated as an enforcement problem. On a frozen corpus of agent drafts, publishing without approval reverses 80 authorization decisions, most through drafts that change only a field's sensitivity classification and no policy text; a classifier that reads the policy diff misses every such draft, necessarily. Treating classification as authorship routes them all to review; the registry-held classification this requires is designed and modelled here, not yet implemented in the prototype. At the execution boundary, protected fields reach the model in 105 of 105 cases under prompt-stated duties and in 0 of 105 when the ODRL duty is compiled into an invocation-time tool-call constraint, but where the value is not confined to a named field the compiled condition exposes it in 7 of 7. A centrally provisioned approval pool does not scale to the participant volume that motivates the problem.

  • 2 authors
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Sep 23

ImpossibleRubrics: Stress-Testing Generated Rubrics as Reward Signals

Language model-generated rubrics are increasingly used as reward signals for rubric-based reinforcement learning, LLM-as-a-judge evaluation, and automated grading. Such rubrics are reliable only if they reward honest answers over adversarial answers optimized to exploit them. Yet their robustness to such optimization remains poorly understood. We isolate the hardest regime: impossible tasks, where the prompt pressures the model toward an unsupported conclusion, so the only honest response is to acknowledge the impossibility. We introduce ImpossibleRubrics, a benchmark of 169 impossible tasks spanning six impossibility categories, each paired with a verifiable oracle certificate specifying what an honest answer may and may not claim, together with 48 answerable controls. Rather than providing fixed rubrics, ImpossibleRubrics provides task environments and certificates, allowing rubrics to be generated downstream and then adversarially tested for whether they reward certificate-violating answers. Eleven generators are exploited 8--26% of the time on the unbiased 150-of-169 environment cut; on a deliberately selected stress cut the strongest generator we measured is still exploited 36% while a certificate-faithful rubric is exploited 0%, so what we measure is a rubric-quality gap, not task impossibility. One result runs against intuition. A single generic rubric ("be decisive, penalize hedging") used unchanged for every task is exploited 64% of the time, and seven of the eleven generators are exploited more often than that while writing a rubric tailored to each one. The tailored criteria appear to tell an attacker which claim to fabricate. The problem is not that rubrics are vague; it is that they are specific about the wrong things.

  • 4 authors
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Sep 14 2

LegalCiteBench: Evaluating Citation Reliability in Legal Language Models

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into legal drafting and research workflows, where incorrect citations or fabricated precedents can cause serious professional harm. Existing legal benchmarks largely emphasize statutory reasoning, contract understanding, or general legal question answering, but they do not directly study a central common-law failure mode: when asked to provide case authorities without external grounding, models may return plausible-looking but incorrect citations or cases. We introduce LegalCiteBench, a benchmark for studying closed-book citation recovery, citation verification, and case matching in legal language models. LegalCiteBench contains approximately 24K evaluation instances constructed from 1,000 real U.S. judicial opinions from the Case Law Access Project. The benchmark covers five citation-centric tasks: citation retrieval, citation completion, citation error detection, case matching, and case verification and correction. Across 21 LLMs, exact citation recovery remains highly challenging in this closed-book setting: even the strongest models score below 7/100 on citation retrieval and completion. Within the evaluated models, scale and legal-domain pretraining provide limited gains and do not resolve this difficulty. Models also frequently provide concrete but incorrect or low-overlap authorities under our evaluation protocol, with Misleading Answer Rates (MAR) exceeding 94% for 20 of 21 evaluated models on retrieval-heavy tasks. A prompt-only abstention experiment shows that explicit uncertainty instructions reduce some confident fabrication but do not improve citation correctness. LegalCiteBench is intended as a diagnostic framework for studying authority generation failures, verification behavior, and abstention when external grounding is absent, incomplete, or bypassed.

PhalaCloud Phala
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May 10

Atria Dawn: The Dawn of Agentic Superintelligence

As AI agents become participants in the development of their successors, they reshape both the production of intelligence and the role of human researchers. We introduce Atria Dawn Preview, a foundation agentic language model designed for scientific research and engineering workflows, with the goal of expanding the frontier of agent productivity in the real world. This model is trained via a Verifiable Experience Pipeline that connects tool-mediated interactions to executable environments and externally verified outcomes. Across 16 benchmarks spanning real-world research, engineering, and digital work, Atria Dawn Preview is competitive with frontier agents and achieves the highest reported score on five of them. Beyond standalone performance, we examine the real research-and-development process behind this model as a case study of human--AI collaboration, analyzing 769 task records from 56 participants together with agent logs. When asked to evaluate completed tasks under comparable conditions, participants rated about one-third of completed AI-assisted tasks as infeasible without AI. More strikingly, agents frequently propose methods and implement revisions, while humans retain most final decisions and guide exploration through judgment and feedback. These observations indicate a shift from task-level execution to project-level partnership, with human effort concentrating on what is worth pursuing and how evidence should guide research. Progress toward more autonomous AI research must therefore advance both the capacity for discovery and the capacity for meaningful human oversight, preserving accountable human authority over the risks and direction of continued development.

Constructing Challenging Browser-Use Tasks by Controlled Environment Interventions

As browser-use agents improve, benchmarks keep pace by collecting new tasks, websites, and applications, often making tasks longer or more novel. This makes difficulty expensive to refresh and difficult to control: when many aspects change at once, it is unclear what actually makes a task challenging. We instead construct challenging instances from tasks agents already solve, turning difficulty into a programmable property of the environment. BreakingWeb pairs every base task with an intervention condition that preserves the user instruction, latent target, and backend success criterion while changing the environment at different web stack layers. Each intervention is deterministic, detectable, and recoverable, and is annotated with the cognitive primitive it primarily loads. The benchmark contains 519 clean/intervention task pairs across seven self-hosted websites and 29 intervention families, all graded against outcomes. We evaluate six strong browser-use agents, three GUI-only agents that see only screenshots, and humans. The construction is effective: interventions cut agent pass rate by 22.9% on average and overturn nearly half of the tasks each agent solves cleanly, whereas humans lose 10.0% on a first attempt and 5.7% after one familiarisation attempt. The dominant failure is belief failure: 75% of the six agents' failures end with a declared success although the required change never happened. Our code, data and environment are publicly available at www.breakingweb.app.

  • 11 authors
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Sep 19