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Nov 16

CHASE: Adversarial Red-Blue Teaming for Improving LLM Safety using Reinforcement Learning

Despite advances in safety alignment, prompt-rewriting attacks such as persona modulation, fictional framing and persuasion-based reformulation, can bypass safety filters even on frontier models. Existing defenses either rely on non-scalable human curation or white-box optimisation that overfits to specific model internals, leaving aligned models brittle against the very class of adaptive black-box adversaries they will face in deployment. To address this gap, we introduce CHASE (Co-evolutionary Hardening through Adversarial Safety-Escalation), a closed-loop red-blue teaming framework in which a black-box attacker and a safety-aligned defender co-evolve. The attacker is trained via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) under a multiplicative reward that jointly enforces bypass effectiveness and intent fidelity, while the defender is hardened on the harvested adversarial rewrites through a two-stage GRPO + rejection-sampled SFT pipeline balanced with benign data. Evaluated on BeaverTails and JailbreakBench against five held-out attack families (PAIR, TAP, AutoDAN, PAP, Translation), CHASE cuts mean StrongREJECT score by 43.2\% with 0\% false-refusal on benign prompts. Beyond the headline result, CHASE shows that template-free RL exploration recovers latent attack primitives that transfer across mechanistically distinct attack families, suggesting a path toward LLM safety hardening that generalises beyond the narrow distributions achieved thus far in adversarial training.

  • 6 authors
·
Jun 3

Open-Weight LLM Fine-Tuning Defenses are Susceptible to Simple Attacks

Recent defenses for safeguarding open-weight large language models (LLMs) are intended to prevent adversarial usage. Underlying these defenses is an assumption that new harmful behavior is learned through fine-tuning rather than elicited by jailbreaking the model. Yet, pretrained LLMs already encode substantial harmful knowledge across many domains, which raises an important question: can an adversary jailbreak safeguarded models, to achieve harmful usage without fine-tuning at all? In this paper, we show that open-weight safeguards are susceptible to simpler strategies that, despite being well known, have not been systematically evaluated against these safeguards. Specifically, we evaluate two low-cost attacks--abliteration and prefilling--that do not rely on gradient-based optimization. Across three harmfulness evaluation benchmarks (BeaverTails, HarmBench, and AdvBench), these attacks increase attack success rates against safeguarded open-weight models from below 10\% to a range of 16%-96%. To mitigate this vulnerability, we introduce abliteration-resistant tuning (ART), which incorporates an abliteration-based objective into training. ART can be layered onto existing defenses and reduces the success rates of abliteration, prefilling, and their combination by 10%-20%. These findings indicate that the attack surface for open-weight models is broader than previously characterized, and that evaluations of safeguarding defenses should incorporate a more diverse set of attack strategies beyond adversarial fine-tuning.

  • 3 authors
·
Oct 5

Reward Models Can Improve Themselves: Reward-Guided Adversarial Failure Mode Discovery for Robust Reward Modeling

Reward modeling (RM), which captures human preferences to align large language models (LLMs), is increasingly employed in tasks such as model finetuning, response filtering, and ranking. However, due to the inherent complexity of human preferences and the limited coverage of available datasets, reward models often fail under distributional shifts or adversarial perturbations. Existing approaches for identifying such failure modes typically rely on prior knowledge about preference distributions or failure attributes, limiting their practicality in real-world settings where such information is unavailable. In this work, we propose a tractable, preference-distribution agnostic method for discovering reward model failure modes via reward guided controlled decoding. Building on this, we introduce REFORM, a self-improving reward modeling framework that enhances robustness by using the reward model itself to guide the generation of falsely scored responses. These adversarial examples are then used to augment the training data and patch the reward model's misaligned behavior. We evaluate REFORM on two widely used preference datasets Anthropic Helpful Harmless (HH) and PKU Beavertails and demonstrate that it significantly improves robustness without sacrificing reward quality. Notably, REFORM preserves performance both in direct evaluation and in downstream policy training, and further improves alignment quality by removing spurious correlations.

  • 2 authors
·
Apr 7

Safety-Flag: A Unified Benchmark for the Reliability and Calibration of LLM Content Moderators

Large language models are increasingly used for content moderation, but most evaluations still report aggregate accuracy on individual benchmarks. We introduce Safety-Flag, which places seven widely used safety benchmarks (BeaverTails, XSTest, Ethics, WildGuard, Aegis, ToxiChat, and ToxiGen) into a single balanced flag / do-not-flag protocol. We release item-level decisions and confidence scores for six general-purpose LLMs and four dedicated guards, together with three reference models, evaluated on the same items. Safety-Flag measures three dimensions of moderator reliability: error direction, probability calibration, and confidence-based error ranking for human review. They often disagree. Aggregate accuracy does not reveal error direction: one model flags 85% of benign content, whereas another misses 54% of harmful content. All six general-purpose models are overconfident; fitting one temperature per model reduces calibration error by 2.8--6.0times without changing predicted labels or confidence ordering. Confidence-based abstention lowers selective risk for every model, although the gains depend on how well confidence ranks errors. Dedicated guards produce fewer false alarms and are better calibrated, but several have higher miss rates outside their documented coverage. We release the benchmark, fixed item lists, evaluation code, per-item model outputs, and leaderboard at: https://github.com/yibo-hu-lab/safety-flag-benchmark.

  • 1 authors
·
Aug 5

Safe RLHF-V: Safe Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback in Multimodal Large Language Models

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are critical for developing general-purpose AI assistants, yet they face growing safety risks. How can we ensure that MLLMs are safely aligned to prevent undesired behaviors such as discrimination, misinformation, or violations of ethical standards? In a further step, we need to explore how to fine-tune MLLMs to enhance reasoning performance while ensuring they satisfy safety constraints. Fundamentally, this can be formulated as a min-max optimization problem. In this study, we propose Safe RLHF-V, the first multimodal safety alignment framework that jointly optimizes helpfulness and safety using separate multimodal reward and cost models within a Lagrangian-based constrained optimization framework. Given that there is a lack of preference datasets that separate helpfulness and safety in multimodal scenarios, we introduce BeaverTails-V, the first open-source dataset with dual preference annotations for helpfulness and safety, along with multi-level safety labels (minor, moderate, severe). Additionally, we design a Multi-level Guardrail System to proactively defend against unsafe queries and adversarial attacks. By applying the Beaver-Guard-V moderation for 5 rounds of filtering and re-generation on the precursor model, the overall safety of the upstream model is significantly improved by an average of 40.9%. Experimental results demonstrate that fine-tuning different MLLMs with Safe RLHF can effectively enhance model helpfulness while ensuring improved safety. Specifically, Safe RLHF-V improves model safety by 34.2% and helpfulness by 34.3%. All of datasets, models, and code can be found at https://github.com/SafeRLHF-V to support the safety development of MLLMs and reduce potential societal risks.

  • 15 authors
·
Mar 22, 2025

ActivationReasoning: Logical Reasoning in Latent Activation Spaces

Large language models (LLMs) excel at generating fluent text, but their internal reasoning remains opaque and difficult to control. Sparse autoencoders (SAEs) make hidden activations more interpretable by exposing latent features that often align with human concepts. Yet, these features are fragile and passive, offering no mechanism for systematic reasoning or model control. To address this, we introduce ActivationReasoning (AR), a framework that embeds explicit logical reasoning into the latent space of LLMs. It proceeds in three stages: (1) Finding latent representations, first latent concept representations are identified (e.g., via SAEs) and organized into a dictionary; (2) Activating propositions, at inference time AR detects activating concepts and maps them to logical propositions; and (3)Logical reasoning, applying logical rules over these propositions to infer higher-order structures, compose new concepts, and steer model behavior. We evaluate AR on multi-hop reasoning (PrOntoQA), abstraction and robustness to indirect concept cues (Rail2Country), reasoning over natural and diverse language (ProverQA), and context-sensitive safety (BeaverTails). Across all tasks, AR scales robustly with reasoning complexity, generalizes to abstract and context-sensitive tasks, and transfers across model backbones. These results demonstrate that grounding logical structure in latent activations not only improves transparency but also enables structured reasoning, reliable control, and alignment with desired behaviors, providing a path toward more reliable and auditable AI.

  • 9 authors
·
Oct 20, 2025