Daily Papers

Video reasoning language models implicitly assume that every input frame is equally reliable. This leads to what we term the Blind Trust Problem: under realistic perturbations such as motion blur, glare, or occlusion, frontier video reasoning models can suffer 15-30%p accuracy drops on real-world embodied benchmarks, while remaining unaware that their visual evidence has been degraded. To address this challenge, we propose Robust-TO, an agentic video understanding framework that explicitly integrates per-frame trustworthiness into every stage of reasoning. Robust-TO organizes heterogeneous visual perception tools under a unified evidence interface. Each tool receives a sub-query derived from the original question and a set of trustworthy frames selected by the reliability-relevance score. It returns evidence in a shared format: a concrete prediction (e.g., a bounding box, motion trajectory, recognized text, or action label), temporal grounding, and a calibrated reliability score. During reasoning, these calibrated scores guide evidence weighting in a three-tier synthesis process (high/medium/low) and define a confidence-cost GRPO reward that jointly optimizes correctness, evidence reliability, and efficiency. On two video reasoning benchmarks spanning eight tasks, Robust-TO achieves 56.4% average accuracy on clean inputs, surpassing the strongest open-source baseline by 10.6%p and outperforming Gemini-2.5-Pro (46.2%). Under five realistic corruption types, Robust-TO maintains 54.3% average accuracy, 5.8%p above the strongest open-source baseline, while exhibiting the smallest clean-to-corrupted accuracy drop among all compared methods.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) hold immense promise as assistive technologies for the blind and visually impaired (BVI) community. However, we identify a critical failure mode that undermines their trustworthiness in real-world applications. We introduce the Escalator Problem -- the inability of state-of-the-art models to perceive an escalator's direction of travel -- as a canonical example of a deeper limitation we term Implicit Motion Blindness. This blindness stems from the dominant frame-sampling paradigm in video understanding, which, by treating videos as discrete sequences of static images, fundamentally struggles to perceive continuous, low-signal motion. As a position paper, our contribution is not a new model but rather to: (I) formally articulate this blind spot, (II) analyze its implications for user trust, and (III) issue a call to action. We advocate for a paradigm shift from purely semantic recognition towards robust physical perception and urge the development of new, human-centered benchmarks that prioritize safety, reliability, and the genuine needs of users in dynamic environments.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

AI systems are fallible, and humans can make mistakes in deciding whether to trust AI over their own judgment. Thus, improving human-AI collaboration requires understanding when, why, and how humans decide to rely on AI. We study two distinct reliance decisions: the delegation choice -- deciding when to let AI act autonomously without knowing its output, and the adoption choice -- evaluating AI suggestions and deciding how to use them. Both of these decoupled reliance patterns shape collaboration, but prior work rarely studies them together in realistic settings with the same users. We address this gap by studying collaborative human--AI teams competing in a question-answering game in which humans can choose when and how to work with AI agents to win. Our 24 matches pair 23 expert humans with 16 AI agents, capturing 387 delegation and 1440 adoption decisions. While human--AI collaboration performs better than either AI or humans alone, humans make suboptimal collaboration decisions, both under-relying on correct AI suggestions (3.9% of opportunities missed) and over-relying when AI misleads them (1.7%). Both parties contribute wrong answers: reported model confidence is near chance when humans and AI disagree, while confirmation bias drives higher under-reliance (64.5%) when an AI suggestion agrees with humans' initial incorrect answer. To close this gap, we recommend calibrated confidence, evidence-grounded explanations, and mechanisms that help users refine trust.

Weak-to-strong generalization studies how to improve a strong student using supervision from a weaker teacher when reliable labels are scarce. We view this primarily as a data selection problem, where the key challenge is to identify which weak labels are reliable enough to serve as a training signal. To address this, we introduce trust functions that assign each weak label a scalar trust score and use these scores to filter weak supervision. Across several domains, including world knowledge, quantitative reasoning, and strategy games, trust filtering yields students that match and sometimes surpass ground-truth supervision, achieving near-lossless weak-to-strong generalization. Moreover, trust functions enable an iterative weak-to-strong chain that compounds gains by training a student and reusing it as the next teacher, amplifying the gains. There are several mechanisms to which advantage of trust functions can be attributed.

Modern socio-technical systems increasingly involve multi-stakeholder environments where actors simultaneously cooperate and compete. These coopetitive relationships exhibit dynamic trust evolution based on observed behavior over repeated interactions. While conceptual modeling languages like i* represent trust relationships qualitatively, they lack computational mechanisms for analyzing how trust changes with behavioral evidence. Conversely, computational trust models from multi-agent systems provide algorithmic updating but lack grounding in conceptual models that capture strategic dependencies covering mixed motives of actors. This technical report bridges this gap by developing a computational trust model that extends game-theoretic foundations for strategic coopetition with dynamic trust evolution. Building on companion work that achieved 58/60 validation (96.7%) for logarithmic specifications, we introduce trust as a two-layer system with immediate trust responding to current behavior and reputation tracking violation history. Trust evolves through asymmetric updating where cooperation builds trust gradually while violations erode it sharply, creating hysteresis effects and trust ceilings that constrain relationship recovery. We develop a structured translation framework enabling practitioners to instantiate computational trust models from i* dependency networks encompassing mixed motives of actors. Comprehensive experimental validation across 78,125 parameter configurations establishes robust emergence of negativity bias, hysteresis effects, and cumulative damage amplification. Empirical validation using the Renault-Nissan Alliance case study (1999-2025) achieves 49/60 validation points (81.7%), successfully reproducing documented trust evolution across five distinct relationship phases including crisis and recovery periods.

The trustworthiness of machine learning has emerged as a critical topic in the field, encompassing various applications and research areas such as robustness, security, interpretability, and fairness. The last decade saw the development of numerous methods addressing these challenges. In this survey, we systematically review these advancements from a data-centric perspective, highlighting the shortcomings of traditional empirical risk minimization (ERM) training in handling challenges posed by the data. Interestingly, we observe a convergence of these methods, despite being developed independently across trustworthy machine learning subfields. Pearl's hierarchy of causality offers a unifying framework for these techniques. Accordingly, this survey presents the background of trustworthy machine learning development using a unified set of concepts, connects this language to Pearl's causal hierarchy, and finally discusses methods explicitly inspired by causality literature. We provide a unified language with mathematical vocabulary to link these methods across robustness, adversarial robustness, interpretability, and fairness, fostering a more cohesive understanding of the field. Further, we explore the trustworthiness of large pretrained models. After summarizing dominant techniques like fine-tuning, parameter-efficient fine-tuning, prompting, and reinforcement learning with human feedback, we draw connections between them and the standard ERM. This connection allows us to build upon the principled understanding of trustworthy methods, extending it to these new techniques in large pretrained models, paving the way for future methods. Existing methods under this perspective are also reviewed. Lastly, we offer a brief summary of the applications of these methods and discuss potential future aspects related to our survey. For more information, please visit http://trustai.one.

This paper presents a conceptual and operational framework for developing and operating safe and trustworthy AI agents based on a Three-Pillar Model grounded in transparency, accountability, and trustworthiness. Building on prior work in Human-in-the-Loop systems, reinforcement learning, and collaborative AI, the framework defines an evolutionary path toward autonomous agents that balances increasing automation with appropriate human oversight. The paper argues that safe agent autonomy must be achieved through progressive validation, analogous to the staged development of autonomous driving, rather than through immediate full automation. Transparency and accountability are identified as foundational requirements for establishing user trust and for mitigating known risks in generative AI systems, including hallucinations, data bias, and goal misalignment, such as the inversion problem. The paper further describes three ongoing work streams supporting this framework: public deliberation on AI agents conducted by the Stanford Deliberative Democracy Lab, cross-industry collaboration through the Safe AI Agent Consortium, and the development of open tooling for an agent operating environment aligned with the Three-Pillar Model. Together, these contributions provide both conceptual clarity and practical guidance for enabling the responsible evolution of AI agents that operate transparently, remain aligned with human values, and sustain societal trust.

In this work we study agents in simulated bargaining scenarios, where a buyer and a seller communicate through a text channel and attempt to negotiate mutually beneficial trades, under different information regimes (complete information, information asymmetry or mutual uncertainty). We evaluate their performance w.r.t. game-theoretical solutions and further investigate their honesty (their tendency to disclose or withhold information or to mislead and deceive) as well as their credulity (their tendency to trust or distrust information provided by the other agent). We study zero-shot LLM agents with simple prompting scaffolding as well as fine-tuned agents, in order to investigate whether optimising the agents to maximise financial profits makes them stronger negotiators but also more dishonest and less trusting. We find that off-the-shelf LLMs all substantially deviate from game-theoretical equilibria, they attempt to lie about their private information but cannot efficiently exploit information asymmetries. Fine-tuning on financial utility makes the agents stronger at achieving better deals but also more dishonest, highlighting the risks that optimising agents for a task can have on their safety. We release our code and a dataset of bargaining scenarios.

We study the feasibility of conducting alignment audits: investigations into whether models have undesired objectives. As a testbed, we train a language model with a hidden objective. Our training pipeline first teaches the model about exploitable errors in RLHF reward models (RMs), then trains the model to exploit some of these errors. We verify via out-of-distribution evaluations that the model generalizes to exhibit whatever behaviors it believes RMs rate highly, including ones not reinforced during training. We leverage this model to study alignment audits in two ways. First, we conduct a blind auditing game where four teams, unaware of the model's hidden objective or training, investigate it for concerning behaviors and their causes. Three teams successfully uncovered the model's hidden objective using techniques including interpretability with sparse autoencoders (SAEs), behavioral attacks, and training data analysis. Second, we conduct an unblinded follow-up study of eight techniques for auditing the model, analyzing their strengths and limitations. Overall, our work provides a concrete example of using alignment audits to discover a model's hidden objective and proposes a methodology for practicing and validating progress in alignment auditing.

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) are an increasingly deployed class of agents that take actions on GUIs to accomplish user goals. In this paper, we show that CUAs consistently exhibit Blind Goal-Directedness (BGD): a bias to pursue goals regardless of feasibility, safety, reliability, or context. We characterize three prevalent patterns of BGD: (i) lack of contextual reasoning, (ii) assumptions and decisions under ambiguity, and (iii) contradictory or infeasible goals. We develop BLIND-ACT, a benchmark of 90 tasks capturing these three patterns. Built on OSWorld, BLIND-ACT provides realistic environments and employs LLM-based judges to evaluate agent behavior, achieving 93.75% agreement with human annotations. We use BLIND-ACT to evaluate nine frontier models, including Claude Sonnet and Opus 4, Computer-Use-Preview, and GPT-5, observing high average BGD rates (80.8%) across them. We show that BGD exposes subtle risks that arise even when inputs are not directly harmful. While prompting-based interventions lower BGD levels, substantial risk persists, highlighting the need for stronger training- or inference-time interventions. Qualitative analysis reveals observed failure modes: execution-first bias (focusing on how to act over whether to act), thought-action disconnect (execution diverging from reasoning), and request-primacy (justifying actions due to user request). Identifying BGD and introducing BLIND-ACT establishes a foundation for future research on studying and mitigating this fundamental risk and ensuring safe CUA deployment.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) excel in integrating visual and textual information for vision-centric tasks, but their handling of inconsistencies between modalities is underexplored. We investigate VLMs' modality preferences when faced with visual data and varied textual inputs in vision-centered settings. By introducing textual variations to four vision-centric tasks and evaluating ten Vision-Language Models (VLMs), we discover a ``blind faith in text'' phenomenon: VLMs disproportionately trust textual data over visual data when inconsistencies arise, leading to significant performance drops under corrupted text and raising safety concerns. We analyze factors influencing this text bias, including instruction prompts, language model size, text relevance, token order, and the interplay between visual and textual certainty. While certain factors, such as scaling up the language model size, slightly mitigate text bias, others like token order can exacerbate it due to positional biases inherited from language models. To address this issue, we explore supervised fine-tuning with text augmentation and demonstrate its effectiveness in reducing text bias. Additionally, we provide a theoretical analysis suggesting that the blind faith in text phenomenon may stem from an imbalance of pure text and multi-modal data during training. Our findings highlight the need for balanced training and careful consideration of modality interactions in VLMs to enhance their robustness and reliability in handling multi-modal data inconsistencies.

Recent advances have shown success in eliciting strong reasoning abilities in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) through rule-based reinforcement learning (RL) with outcome rewards. However, this paradigm typically lacks supervision over the thinking process leading to the final outcome.As a result, the model may learn sub-optimal reasoning strategies, which can hinder its generalization ability. In light of this, we propose SophiaVL-R1, as an attempt to add reward signals for the thinking process in this paradigm. To achieve this, we first train a thinking reward model that evaluates the quality of the entire thinking process. Given that the thinking reward may be unreliable for certain samples due to reward hacking, we propose the Trust-GRPO method, which assigns a trustworthiness weight to the thinking reward during training. This weight is computed based on the thinking reward comparison of responses leading to correct answers versus incorrect answers, helping to mitigate the impact of potentially unreliable thinking rewards. Moreover, we design an annealing training strategy that gradually reduces the thinking reward over time, allowing the model to rely more on the accurate rule-based outcome reward in later training stages. Experiments show that our SophiaVL-R1 surpasses a series of reasoning MLLMs on various benchmarks (e.g., MathVisita, MMMU), demonstrating strong reasoning and generalization capabilities. Notably, our SophiaVL-R1-7B even outperforms LLaVA-OneVision-72B on most benchmarks, despite the latter having 10 times more parameters. All code, models, and datasets are made publicly available at https://github.com/kxfan2002/SophiaVL-R1.

Distributed reinforcement learning trains on data from stale, buggy, or mismatched actors, producing actions with high surprisal (negative log-probability) under the learner's policy. The core difficulty is not surprising data per se, but negative learning from surprising data. High-surprisal failures can dominate the update direction despite carrying little useful signal, while high-surprisal successes reveal opportunities the current policy would otherwise miss. The Delightful Policy Gradient (DG) separates these cases by gating each update with delight, the product of advantage and surprisal, suppressing rare failures and amplifying rare successes without behavior probabilities. Under contaminated sampling, the cosine similarity between the standard policy gradient and the true gradient collapses, while DG's grows as the policy improves. No sign-blind reweighting, including exact importance sampling, can reproduce this effect. On MNIST with simulated staleness, DG without off-policy correction outperforms importance-weighted PG with exact behavior probabilities. On a transformer sequence task with staleness, actor bugs, reward corruption, and rare discovery, DG achieves roughly 10{times} lower error. When all four frictions act simultaneously, its compute advantage is order-of-magnitude and grows with task complexity.

Despite widespread adoption, machine learning models remain mostly black boxes. Understanding the reasons behind predictions is, however, quite important in assessing trust, which is fundamental if one plans to take action based on a prediction, or when choosing whether to deploy a new model. Such understanding also provides insights into the model, which can be used to transform an untrustworthy model or prediction into a trustworthy one. In this work, we propose LIME, a novel explanation technique that explains the predictions of any classifier in an interpretable and faithful manner, by learning an interpretable model locally around the prediction. We also propose a method to explain models by presenting representative individual predictions and their explanations in a non-redundant way, framing the task as a submodular optimization problem. We demonstrate the flexibility of these methods by explaining different models for text (e.g. random forests) and image classification (e.g. neural networks). We show the utility of explanations via novel experiments, both simulated and with human subjects, on various scenarios that require trust: deciding if one should trust a prediction, choosing between models, improving an untrustworthy classifier, and identifying why a classifier should not be trusted.

Large language models (LLMs) have transformed the way computers understand and process human language, but using them effectively across different organizations remains still difficult. When organizations work together to improve LLMs, they face several main challenges. First, organizations hesitate to share their valuable data with others. Second, competition between organizations creates trust problems during collaboration. Third, new privacy laws require organizations to be able to delete specific data when requested, which is especially difficult when multiple organizations are learning from shared data. Traditional federated learning approaches do not address these interconnected challenges, particularly in scenarios where participants cannot fully trust each other or the central aggregator. To overcome these limitations, we propose a hybrid blockchain-based federated learning framework that uniquely combines public and private blockchain architectures with multi-agent reinforcement learning. Our framework enables transparent sharing of model update through the public blockchain while protecting sensitive computations in private chains. Each organization operates as an intelligent agent, using Q-learning to optimize its participation strategy and resource allocation, thus aligning individual incentives with collective goals. Notably, we introduce an efficient unlearning mechanism based on Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) that enables selective removal of specific data contributions without compromising the model's overall performance. Through extensive experimentation on real-world datasets, we demonstrate that our framework effectively balances privacy protection, trust establishment, and regulatory compliance while maintaining high model performance.

The existing peer-to-peer networks have several problems such as fake content distribution, free riding, white-washing and poor search scalability, lack of a robust trust model and absence of user privacy protection mechanism. Although, several trust management and semantic community-based mechanisms for combating free riding and distribution of malicious contents have been proposed by some researchers, most of these schemes lack scalability due to their high computational, communication and storage overhead. This paper presents a robust trust management scheme for P2P networks that utilizes topology adaptation by constructing an overlay of trusted peers where the neighbors are selected based on their trust ratings and content similarities. While increasing the search efficiency by intelligently exploiting the formation of semantic community structures by topology adaptation among the trustworthy peers, the scheme provides the users a very high level of privacy protection of their usage and consumption patterns of network resources. Simulation results demonstrate that the proposed scheme provides efficient searching to good peers while penalizing the malicious peers by increasing their search times as the network topology stabilizes.

Persuasive dialogue plays a pivotal role in human communication, influencing various domains. Recent persuasive dialogue datasets often fail to align with real-world interpersonal interactions, leading to unfaithful representations. For instance, unrealistic scenarios may arise, such as when the persuadee explicitly instructs the persuader on which persuasion strategies to employ, with each of the persuadee's questions corresponding to a specific strategy for the persuader to follow. This issue can be attributed to a violation of the "Double Blind" condition, where critical information is fully shared between participants. In actual human interactions, however, key information such as the mental state of the persuadee and the persuasion strategies of the persuader is not directly accessible. The persuader must infer the persuadee's mental state using Theory of Mind capabilities and construct arguments that align with the persuadee's motivations. To address this gap, we introduce ToMMA, a novel multi-agent framework for dialogue generation that is guided by causal Theory of Mind. This framework ensures that information remains undisclosed between agents, preserving "double-blind" conditions, while causal ToM directs the persuader's reasoning, enhancing alignment with human-like persuasion dynamics. Consequently, we present CToMPersu, a multi-domain, multi-turn persuasive dialogue dataset that tackles both double-blind and logical coherence issues, demonstrating superior performance across multiple metrics and achieving better alignment with real human dialogues. Our dataset and prompts are available at https://github.com/DingyiZhang/ToMMA-CToMPersu .

This paper claims that machine learning (ML) largely overlooks an important facet of general intelligence: robustness to a qualitatively unknown future in an open world. Such robustness relates to Knightian uncertainty (KU) in economics, i.e. uncertainty that cannot be quantified, which is excluded from consideration in ML's key formalisms. This paper aims to identify this blind spot, argue its importance, and catalyze research into addressing it, which we believe is necessary to create truly robust open-world AI. To help illuminate the blind spot, we contrast one area of ML, reinforcement learning (RL), with the process of biological evolution. Despite staggering ongoing progress, RL still struggles in open-world situations, often failing under unforeseen situations. For example, the idea of zero-shot transferring a self-driving car policy trained only in the US to the UK currently seems exceedingly ambitious. In dramatic contrast, biological evolution routinely produces agents that thrive within an open world, sometimes even to situations that are remarkably out-of-distribution (e.g. invasive species; or humans, who do undertake such zero-shot international driving). Interestingly, evolution achieves such robustness without explicit theory, formalisms, or mathematical gradients. We explore the assumptions underlying RL's typical formalisms, showing how they limit RL's engagement with the unknown unknowns characteristic of an ever-changing complex world. Further, we identify mechanisms through which evolutionary processes foster robustness to novel and unpredictable challenges, and discuss potential pathways to algorithmically embody them. The conclusion is that the intriguing remaining fragility of ML may result from blind spots in its formalisms, and that significant gains may result from direct confrontation with the challenge of KU.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have been demonstrating increasingly strong reasoning capability with their chain-of-thoughts (CoT), which are routinely used by humans to judge answer quality. This reliance creates a powerful yet fragile basis for trust. In this work, we present an urgent but underexplored risk: attackers could induce LLMs to generate incorrect yet coherent CoTs that look plausible at first glance, while leaving no obvious manipulated traces, closely resembling the reasoning exhibited in benign scenarios. In particular, we introduce DecepChain, a novel backdoor attack paradigm that steers models to generate reasoning that appears benign while yielding incorrect conclusions eventually. At a high level, DecepChain exploits LLMs' own hallucination and amplifies it by fine-tuning on naturally erroneous rollouts generated by the model itself and then reinforces it via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with a flipped reward on triggered inputs, plus a plausibility regularizer to preserve fluent, benign-looking reasoning. Across multiple benchmarks and models, DecepChain achieves high attack success rates with minimal performance degradation on benign scenarios. Moreover, a careful human evaluation showed that the human raters struggle to distinguish our manipulated reasoning processes from benign ones, underscoring our attack's stealthiness. Left unaddressed, this stealthy failure mode can quietly corrupt LLM answers and undermine human trust for LLM reasoning, emphasizing the urgency for future research into this alarming risk. Project page: https://decepchain.github.io/.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has significantly advanced the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) and is now being applied to Vision-Language Models (VLMs). However, vanilla RLVR for VLMs verifies only the final textual output, critically neglecting the foundational step of visual perception. This oversight leads to visual hallucinations and reward hacking, as reasoning built upon flawed perception is inherently unreliable. To address this, we propose PEARL (Perceptual-Evidence Anchored Reinforced Learning), a dual-branch, perception-reasoning synergistic that strengthens multimodal reasoning by explicitly anchoring it to verified visual evidence. For each reasoning-oriented QA instance, PEARL first derive a perception checklist -- a set of perception-oriented sub-questions with verifiable answers that probe the model's understanding of key visual evidence. During training, auxiliary rollouts on this checklist yield a perceptual reward that both directly reinforces the model's perception ability and acts as a fidelity gate for reasoning. If the model passes the perception check, its policy update is biased towards evidence-anchored reasoning. Otherwise, the process is halted to prevent reasoning from flawed premises. PEARL can be seamlessly integrated with popular RL methods like GRPO and DAPO. Comprehensive experiments show PEARL achieves substantial gains on multimodal reasoning benchmarks, e.g., a +9.7% improvement over the baseline and +6.6% over GRPO on MathVerse.

As multi-agent AI systems become increasingly autonomous, evidence shows they can develop collusive strategies similar to those long observed in human markets and institutions. While human domains have accumulated centuries of anti-collusion mechanisms, it remains unclear how these can be adapted to AI settings. This paper addresses that gap by (i) developing a taxonomy of human anti-collusion mechanisms, including sanctions, leniency & whistleblowing, monitoring & auditing, market design, and governance and (ii) mapping them to potential interventions for multi-agent AI systems. For each mechanism, we propose implementation approaches. We also highlight open challenges, such as the attribution problem (difficulty attributing emergent coordination to specific agents) identity fluidity (agents being easily forked or modified) the boundary problem (distinguishing beneficial cooperation from harmful collusion) and adversarial adaptation (agents learning to evade detection).

As AI systems increasingly assume roles where trust and alignment with human values are essential, understanding when and why they engage in deception has become a critical research priority. We introduce The Traitors, a multi-agent simulation framework inspired by social deduction games, designed to probe deception, trust formation, and strategic communication among large language model (LLM) agents under asymmetric information. A minority of agents the traitors seek to mislead the majority, while the faithful must infer hidden identities through dialogue and reasoning. Our contributions are: (1) we ground the environment in formal frameworks from game theory, behavioral economics, and social cognition; (2) we develop a suite of evaluation metrics capturing deception success, trust dynamics, and collective inference quality; (3) we implement a fully autonomous simulation platform where LLMs reason over persistent memory and evolving social dynamics, with support for heterogeneous agent populations, specialized traits, and adaptive behaviors. Our initial experiments across DeepSeek-V3, GPT-4o-mini, and GPT-4o (10 runs per model) reveal a notable asymmetry: advanced models like GPT-4o demonstrate superior deceptive capabilities yet exhibit disproportionate vulnerability to others' falsehoods. This suggests deception skills may scale faster than detection abilities. Overall, The Traitors provides a focused, configurable testbed for investigating LLM behavior in socially nuanced interactions. We position this work as a contribution toward more rigorous research on deception mechanisms, alignment challenges, and the broader social reliability of AI systems.

Despite the remarkable success of deep neural networks in a myriad of settings, several works have demonstrated their overwhelming sensitivity to near-imperceptible perturbations, known as adversarial attacks. On the other hand, prior works have also observed that deep networks can be under-sensitive, wherein large-magnitude perturbations in input space do not induce appreciable changes to network activations. In this work, we study in detail the phenomenon of under-sensitivity in vision models such as CNNs and Transformers, and present techniques to study the geometry and extent of "equi-confidence" level sets of such networks. We propose a Level Set Traversal algorithm that iteratively explores regions of high confidence with respect to the input space using orthogonal components of the local gradients. Given a source image, we use this algorithm to identify inputs that lie in the same equi-confidence level set as the source image despite being perceptually similar to arbitrary images from other classes. We further observe that the source image is linearly connected by a high-confidence path to these inputs, uncovering a star-like structure for level sets of deep networks. Furthermore, we attempt to identify and estimate the extent of these connected higher-dimensional regions over which the model maintains a high degree of confidence. The code for this project is publicly available at https://github.com/SriramB-98/blindspots-neurips-sub

Automated negotiations in insurance and business-to-business (B2B) commerce encounter substantial challenges. Current systems force a trade-off between convenience and privacy by routing sensitive financial data through centralized servers, increasing security risks, and diminishing user trust. This study introduces a device-native autonomous Agentic AI system for privacy-preserving negotiations. The proposed system operates exclusively on user hardware, enabling real-time bargaining while maintaining sensitive constraints locally. It integrates zero-knowledge proofs to ensure privacy and employs distilled world models to support advanced on-device reasoning. The architecture incorporates six technical components within an Agentic AI workflow. Agents autonomously plan negotiation strategies, conduct secure multi-party bargaining, and generate cryptographic audit trails without exposing user data to external servers. The system is evaluated in insurance and B2B procurement scenarios across diverse device configurations. Results show an average success rate of 87 %, a 2.4x reduction in latency relative to cloud baselines, and strong privacy preservation through zero-knowledge proofs. User studies show 27 % higher trust scores when decision trails are available. These findings establish a foundation for trustworthy autonomous agents in privacy-sensitive financial domains.

Large language models (LLMs), exemplified by ChatGPT, have gained considerable attention for their excellent natural language processing capabilities. Nonetheless, these LLMs present many challenges, particularly in the realm of trustworthiness. Therefore, ensuring the trustworthiness of LLMs emerges as an important topic. This paper introduces TrustLLM, a comprehensive study of trustworthiness in LLMs, including principles for different dimensions of trustworthiness, established benchmark, evaluation, and analysis of trustworthiness for mainstream LLMs, and discussion of open challenges and future directions. Specifically, we first propose a set of principles for trustworthy LLMs that span eight different dimensions. Based on these principles, we further establish a benchmark across six dimensions including truthfulness, safety, fairness, robustness, privacy, and machine ethics. We then present a study evaluating 16 mainstream LLMs in TrustLLM, consisting of over 30 datasets. Our findings firstly show that in general trustworthiness and utility (i.e., functional effectiveness) are positively related. Secondly, our observations reveal that proprietary LLMs generally outperform most open-source counterparts in terms of trustworthiness, raising concerns about the potential risks of widely accessible open-source LLMs. However, a few open-source LLMs come very close to proprietary ones. Thirdly, it is important to note that some LLMs may be overly calibrated towards exhibiting trustworthiness, to the extent that they compromise their utility by mistakenly treating benign prompts as harmful and consequently not responding. Finally, we emphasize the importance of ensuring transparency not only in the models themselves but also in the technologies that underpin trustworthiness. Knowing the specific trustworthy technologies that have been employed is crucial for analyzing their effectiveness.

Since the dawn of human civilization, trust has been the core challenge of social organization. Trust functions to reduce the effort spent in constantly monitoring others' actions in order to verify their assertions, thus facilitating cooperation by allowing groups to function with reduced complexity. To date, in modern societies, large scale trust is almost exclusively provided by large centralized institutions. Specifically in the case of the Internet, Big Tech companies maintain the largest Internet platforms where users can interact, transact and share information. Thus, they control who can interact and conduct transactions through their monopoly of online trust. However, as recent events have shown, allowing for-profit corporations to act as gatekeepers to the online world comes with a litany of problems. While so far ecosystems of trust on the Internet could only be feasibly created by large institutions, Web3 proponents have a vision of the Internet where trust is generated without centralised actors. They attempt to do so by creating an ecosystem of trust constructed using decentralised technology. This survey explores this elusive goal of Web3 to create a "Universal Trust Machine", which in a true decentralised paradigm would be owned by both nobody and everybody. In order to do so, we first motivate the decades-old problem of generating trust without an intermediary by discussing Robert Axelrod's research on the evolution of cooperation. Next, we present the challenges that would have to be overcome in order to enable long term cooperation. We proceed to present various reputation systems, all of which present promising techniques for encouraging trustworthy behaviour. Then, we discuss Distributed Ledger technologies whose secure transaction facilitating and privacy preserving techniques promise to be a good complement to the current limitations of vanilla reputation systems.

The growing use of large language models in sensitive domains has exposed a critical weakness: the inability to ensure that private information can be permanently forgotten. Yet these systems still lack reliable mechanisms to guarantee that sensitive information can be permanently removed once it has been used. Retraining from the beginning is prohibitively costly, and existing unlearning methods remain fragmented, difficult to verify, and often vulnerable to recovery. This paper surveys recent research on machine unlearning for LLMs and considers how far current approaches can address these challenges. We review methods for evaluating whether forgetting has occurred, the resilience of unlearned models against adversarial attacks, and mechanisms that can support user trust when model complexity or proprietary limits restrict transparency. Technical solutions such as differential privacy, homomorphic encryption, federated learning, and ephemeral memory are examined alongside institutional safeguards including auditing practices and regulatory frameworks. The review finds steady progress, but robust and verifiable unlearning is still unresolved. Efficient techniques that avoid costly retraining, stronger defenses against adversarial recovery, and governance structures that reinforce accountability are needed if LLMs are to be deployed safely in sensitive applications. By integrating technical and organizational perspectives, this study outlines a pathway toward AI systems that can be required to forget, while maintaining both privacy and public trust.

Multimodal misinformation, encompassing textual, visual, and cross-modal distortions, poses an increasing societal threat that is amplified by generative AI. Existing methods typically focus on a single type of distortion and struggle to generalize to unseen scenarios. In this work, we observe that different distortion types share common reasoning capabilities while also requiring task-specific skills. We hypothesize that joint training across distortion types facilitates knowledge sharing and enhances the model's ability to generalize. To this end, we introduce TRUST-VL, a unified and explainable vision-language model for general multimodal misinformation detection. TRUST-VL incorporates a novel Question-Aware Visual Amplifier module, designed to extract task-specific visual features. To support training, we also construct TRUST-Instruct, a large-scale instruction dataset containing 198K samples featuring structured reasoning chains aligned with human fact-checking workflows. Extensive experiments on both in-domain and zero-shot benchmarks demonstrate that TRUST-VL achieves state-of-the-art performance, while also offering strong generalization and interpretability.

Machine learning systems in fraud detection, credit scoring, and clinical risk assessment operate under delayed ground truth: outcome labels arrive days to months after the decision they evaluate. During this blind period, governance evidence degrades through mechanisms that neither drift detection methods nor governance frameworks adequately address. This paper formalizes an evidence sufficiency model with four dimensions (completeness, freshness, reliability, representativeness) and a decision-readiness gate that quantifies how label latency degrades evidence quality. The model maps three drift types to dimension-specific degradation trajectories. A complementary proxy indicator framework comprising seven measurement categories estimates sufficiency degradation without labels, with explicit coverage mapping and characterized blind spots per drift type. Evaluation on the IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection dataset (~590K transactions) with controlled drift injection shows that composite proxy monitoring detects covariate and mixed drift with 100% detection rate, while concept drift without feature change remains undetected -- consistent with the theoretical impossibility of unsupervised detection when P(X) is unchanged. Blind period simulation confirms monotone sufficiency degradation, with concept drift degrading fastest (S=0.242 at day 60 vs 0.418 for no-drift). The framework contributes a governance sufficiency monitoring instrument; its value lies in translating drift signals into auditable sufficiency assessments with characterized blind spots. Mapping sufficiency levels to governance actions requires deployment-specific calibration beyond this study's scope.

Trust is an important factor in people's interactions with AI systems. However, there is a lack of empirical studies examining how real end-users trust or distrust the AI system they interact with. Most research investigates one aspect of trust in lab settings with hypothetical end-users. In this paper, we provide a holistic and nuanced understanding of trust in AI through a qualitative case study of a real-world computer vision application. We report findings from interviews with 20 end-users of a popular, AI-based bird identification app where we inquired about their trust in the app from many angles. We find participants perceived the app as trustworthy and trusted it, but selectively accepted app outputs after engaging in verification behaviors, and decided against app adoption in certain high-stakes scenarios. We also find domain knowledge and context are important factors for trust-related assessment and decision-making. We discuss the implications of our findings and provide recommendations for future research on trust in AI.

Explainable machine learning holds great potential for analyzing and understanding learning-based systems. These methods can, however, be manipulated to present unfaithful explanations, giving rise to powerful and stealthy adversaries. In this paper, we demonstrate blinding attacks that can fully disguise an ongoing attack against the machine learning model. Similar to neural backdoors, we modify the model's prediction upon trigger presence but simultaneously also fool the provided explanation. This enables an adversary to hide the presence of the trigger or point the explanation to entirely different portions of the input, throwing a red herring. We analyze different manifestations of such attacks for different explanation types in the image domain, before we resume to conduct a red-herring attack against malware classification.

On-policy reinforcement learning (RL) has become a popular framework for solving sequential decision problems due to its computational efficiency and theoretical simplicity. Some on-policy methods guarantee every policy update is constrained to a trust region relative to the prior policy to ensure training stability. These methods often require computationally intensive non-linear optimization or require a particular form of action distribution. In this work, we show that applying KL penalization alone is nearly sufficient to enforce such trust regions. Then, we show that introducing a "fixup" phase is sufficient to guarantee a trust region is enforced on every policy update while adding fewer than 5% additional gradient steps in practice. The resulting algorithm, which we call FixPO, is able to train a variety of policy architectures and action spaces, is easy to implement, and produces results competitive with other trust region methods.

Mirror descent (MD), a well-known first-order method in constrained convex optimization, has recently been shown as an important tool to analyze trust-region algorithms in reinforcement learning (RL). However, there remains a considerable gap between such theoretically analyzed algorithms and the ones used in practice. Inspired by this, we propose an efficient RL algorithm, called {\em mirror descent policy optimization} (MDPO). MDPO iteratively updates the policy by {\em approximately} solving a trust-region problem, whose objective function consists of two terms: a linearization of the standard RL objective and a proximity term that restricts two consecutive policies to be close to each other. Each update performs this approximation by taking multiple gradient steps on this objective function. We derive {\em on-policy} and {\em off-policy} variants of MDPO, while emphasizing important design choices motivated by the existing theory of MD in RL. We highlight the connections between on-policy MDPO and two popular trust-region RL algorithms: TRPO and PPO, and show that explicitly enforcing the trust-region constraint is in fact {\em not} a necessity for high performance gains in TRPO. We then show how the popular soft actor-critic (SAC) algorithm can be derived by slight modifications of off-policy MDPO. Overall, MDPO is derived from the MD principles, offers a unified approach to viewing a number of popular RL algorithms, and performs better than or on-par with TRPO, PPO, and SAC in a number of continuous control tasks. Code is available at https://github.com/manantomar/Mirror-Descent-Policy-Optimization.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have been increasingly adopted as simulation tools to model humans in applications such as social science. However, one fundamental question remains: can LLM agents really simulate human behaviors? In this paper, we focus on one of the most critical behaviors in human interactions, trust, and aim to investigate whether or not LLM agents can simulate human trust behaviors. We first find that LLM agents generally exhibit trust behaviors, referred to as agent trust, under the framework of Trust Games, which are widely recognized in behavioral economics. Then, we discover that LLM agents can have high behavioral alignment with humans regarding trust behaviors, indicating the feasibility to simulate human trust behaviors with LLM agents. In addition, we probe into the biases in agent trust and the differences in agent trust towards agents and humans. We also explore the intrinsic properties of agent trust under conditions including advanced reasoning strategies and external manipulations. We further offer important implications for various scenarios where trust is paramount. Our study represents a significant step in understanding the behaviors of LLM agents and the LLM-human analogy.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Autonomous agents deployed in the real world need to be robust against adversarial attacks on sensory inputs. Robustifying agent policies requires anticipating the strongest attacks possible. We demonstrate that existing observation-space attacks on reinforcement learning agents have a common weakness: while effective, their lack of temporal consistency makes them detectable using automated means or human inspection. Detectability is undesirable to adversaries as it may trigger security escalations. We introduce perfect illusory attacks, a novel form of adversarial attack on sequential decision-makers that is both effective and provably statistically undetectable. We then propose the more versatile R-attacks, which result in observation transitions that are consistent with the state-transition function of the adversary-free environment and can be learned end-to-end. Compared to existing attacks, we empirically find R-attacks to be significantly harder to detect with automated methods, and a small study with human subjects suggests they are similarly harder to detect for humans. We propose that undetectability should be a central concern in the study of adversarial attacks on mixed-autonomy settings.

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems (MAS) as components of collaborative intelligence, where peer interactions dynamically shape individual decision-making. Although prior work has focused on conformity bias, we extend the analysis to examine how LLMs form trust from previous impressions, resist misinformation, and integrate peer input during interaction, key factors for achieving collective intelligence under complex social dynamics. We present KAIROS, a benchmark simulating quiz contests with peer agents of varying reliability, offering fine-grained control over conditions such as expert-novice roles, noisy crowds, and adversarial peers. LLMs receive both historical interactions and current peer responses, allowing systematic investigation into how trust, peer action, and self-confidence influence decisions. As for mitigation strategies, we evaluate prompting, supervised fine-tuning, and reinforcement learning, Group Relative Policy Optimisation (GRPO), across multiple models. Our results reveal that GRPO with multi-agent context combined with outcome-based rewards and unconstrained reasoning achieves the best overall performance, but also decreases the robustness to social influence compared to Base models. The code and datasets are available at: https://github.com/declare-lab/KAIROS.

Individual agents in multi-agent (MA) systems often lack robustness, tending to blindly conform to misleading peers. We show this weakness stems from both sycophancy and inadequate ability to evaluate peer reliability. To address this, we first formalize the learning problem of history-aware reference, introducing the historical interactions of peers as additional input, so that agents can estimate peer reliability and learn from trustworthy peers when uncertain. This shifts the task from evaluating peer reasoning quality to estimating peer reliability based on interaction history. We then develop Epistemic Context Learning (ECL): a reasoning framework that conditions predictions on explicitly-built peer profiles from history. We further optimize ECL by reinforcement learning using auxiliary rewards. Our experiments reveal that our ECL enables small models like Qwen 3-4B to outperform a history-agnostic baseline 8x its size (Qwen 3-30B) by accurately identifying reliable peers. ECL also boosts frontier models to near-perfect (100%) performance. We show that ECL generalizes well to various MA configurations and we find that trust is modeled well by LLMs, revealing a strong correlation in trust modeling accuracy and final answer quality.

Despite significant strides in factual reliability, errors -- often termed hallucinations -- remain a major concern for generative AI, especially as LLMs are increasingly expected to be helpful in more complex or nuanced setups. Yet even in the simplest setting -- factoid question-answering with clear ground truth-frontier models without external tools continue to hallucinate. We argue that most factuality gains in this domain have come from expanding the model's knowledge boundary (encoding more facts) rather than improving awareness of that boundary (distinguishing known from unknown). We conjecture that the latter is inherently difficult: models may lack the discriminative power to perfectly separate truths from errors, creating an unavoidable tradeoff between eliminating hallucinations and preserving utility. This tradeoff dissolves under a different framing. If we understand hallucinations as confident errors -- incorrect information delivered without appropriate qualification -- a third path emerges beyond the answer-or-abstain dichotomy: expressing uncertainty. We propose faithful uncertainty: aligning linguistic uncertainty with intrinsic uncertainty. This is one facet of metacognition -- the ability to be aware of one's own uncertainty and to act on it. For direct interaction, acting on uncertainty means communicating it honestly; for agentic systems, it becomes the control layer governing when to search and what to trust. Metacognition is thus essential for LLMs to be both trustworthy and capable; we conclude by highlighting open problems for progress towards this objective.

Inverse reinforcement learning (IRL) is typically formulated as maximizing entropy subject to matching the distribution of expert trajectories. Classical (dual-ascent) IRL guarantees monotonic performance improvement but requires fully solving an RL problem each iteration to compute dual gradients. More recent adversarial methods avoid this cost at the expense of stability and monotonic dual improvement, by directly optimizing the primal problem and using a discriminator to provide rewards. In this work, we bridge the gap between these approaches by enabling monotonic improvement of the reward function and policy without having to fully solve an RL problem at every iteration. Our key theoretical insight is that a trust-region-optimal policy for a reward function update can be globally optimal for a smaller update in the same direction. This smaller update allows us to explicitly optimize the dual objective while only relying on a local search around the current policy. In doing so, our approach avoids the training instabilities of adversarial methods, offers monotonic performance improvement, and learns a reward function in the traditional sense of IRL--one that can be globally optimized to match expert demonstrations. Our proposed algorithm, Trust Region Inverse Reinforcement Learning (TRIRL), outperforms state-of-the-art imitation learning methods across multiple challenging tasks by a factor of 2.4x in terms of aggregate inter-quartile mean, while recovering reward functions that generalize to system dynamics shifts.

We consider the task of identifying the Copeland winner(s) in a dueling bandits problem with ternary feedback. This is an underexplored but practically relevant variant of the conventional dueling bandits problem, in which, in addition to strict preference between two arms, one may observe feedback in the form of an indifference. We provide a lower bound on the sample complexity for any learning algorithm finding the Copeland winner(s) with a fixed error probability. Moreover, we propose POCOWISTA, an algorithm with a sample complexity that almost matches this lower bound, and which shows excellent empirical performance, even for the conventional dueling bandits problem. For the case where the preference probabilities satisfy a specific type of stochastic transitivity, we provide a refined version with an improved worst case sample complexity.

The Sybil attack plagues all peer-to-peer systems, and modern open distributed ledgers employ a number of tactics to prevent it from proof of work, or other resources such as space, stake or memory, to traditional admission control in permissioned settings. With SybilQuorum we propose an alternative approach to securing an open distributed ledger against Sybil attacks, and ensuring consensus amongst honest participants, leveraging social network based Sybil defences. We show how nodes expressing their trust relationships through the ledger can bootstrap and operate a value system, and general transaction system, and how Sybil attacks are thwarted. We empirically evaluate our system as a secure Federated Byzantine Agreement System, and extend the theory of those systems to do so.

Although large language models (LLMs) have become transformative, they still make mistakes and can explore unproductive reasoning paths. Self-correction is an important capability for a trustworthy LLM, particularly an autoregressive LLM. While LLMs can identify error in user input, they exhibit a systematic 'Self-Correction Blind Spot' - failing to correct identical error in their own outputs. To systematically study this phenomenon, we introduce Self-Correction Bench, a systematic framework to measure this phenomenon through controlled error injection at three complexity levels. Testing 14 models, we find an average 64.5% blind spot rate. We find multiple evidences that this limitation relates to training data composition: human training demonstrations predominantly show error-free responses rather than error-correction sequences, unlike RL-trained models that learn error correction through outcome feedback. Remarkably, simply appending "Wait" reduces blind spots by 89.3%, suggesting that the capability exists but requires activation. Our work highlights a critical limitation in current LLMs and offers potential avenues for improving their reliability and trustworthiness.

Risk decision systems in fraud detection and credit scoring operate under structural label absence: ground truth arrives weeks to months after decisions are made. During this blind period, model performance may degrade silently, eroding the governance evidence that justifies automated decisions. Existing drift detection methods either require labels (supervised detectors) or detect statistical change without distinguishing harmful degradation from benign distributional evolution (unsupervised detectors). No existing framework integrates drift detection with governance evidence assessment and operational response. This paper presents a label-free governance monitoring extension to the Governance Drift Toolkit that produces governance alerts rather than statistical alarms. The monitoring architecture applies composite multi-proxy monitoring across four proxy monitors (score distribution, feature drift, prediction entropy, confidence distribution), with governance-calibrated thresholds. Empirical evaluation on the Lending Club credit scoring dataset (1.37M loans, 11 years) demonstrates three findings. First, raw proxy metrics (Feature PSI delta up to 1.84, Score PSI delta up to 0.92) distinguish injected covariate degradation from natural temporal drift in an offline evaluation setting. Second, pure concept drift in P(Y|X) produces exactly zero delta across all proxy metrics in all windows, confirming the irreducible blind spot of label-free monitoring as a structural verification. Third, the composite score provides monotonic severity progression as more monitors trigger (0.583 to 0.833 to 1.000), enabling graduated governance response. Cross-domain comparison with IEEE-CIS fraud detection results shows the detectable/undetectable boundary is consistent across both domains. The toolkit and evaluation code are available as open-source artifacts.

Reward hacking arises when a model improves a proxy reward by exploiting shortcuts rather than solving the intended task. We study this failure mode through the geometry of reinforcement learning updates in language models and argue that hacking emerges when optimization drifts away from a stable low-dimensional learning trajectory. We analyze this drift through dominant singular directions of parameter updates and show that reward-hacking runs exhibit substantially larger directional change than clean runs. Motivated by this observation, we introduce trusted-direction projection, which constrains gradients to remain within a clean reference subspace. Across reward-hacking experiments on mathematical reasoning, the proposed approach delays shortcut exploitation and better preserves task performance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have limited performance when solving arithmetic reasoning tasks and often provide incorrect answers. Unlike natural language understanding, math problems typically have a single correct answer, making the task of generating accurate solutions more challenging for LLMs. To the best of our knowledge, we are not aware of any LLMs that indicate their level of confidence in their responses which fuels a trust deficit in these models impeding their adoption. To address this deficiency, we propose `MathPrompter', a technique that improves performance of LLMs on arithmetic problems along with increased reliance in the predictions. MathPrompter uses the Zero-shot chain-of-thought prompting technique to generate multiple Algebraic expressions or Python functions to solve the same math problem in different ways and thereby raise the confidence level in the output results. This is in contrast to other prompt based CoT methods, where there is no check on the validity of the intermediate steps followed. Our technique improves over state-of-the-art on the MultiArith dataset (78.7%rightarrow92.5%) evaluated using 175B parameter GPT-based LLM.

Recommender systems play a pivotal role in mitigating information overload in various fields. Nonetheless, the inherent openness of these systems introduces vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to insert fake users into the system's training data to skew the exposure of certain items, known as poisoning attacks. Adversarial training has emerged as a notable defense mechanism against such poisoning attacks within recommender systems. Existing adversarial training methods apply perturbations of the same magnitude across all users to enhance system robustness against attacks. Yet, in reality, we find that attacks often affect only a subset of users who are vulnerable. These perturbations of indiscriminate magnitude make it difficult to balance effective protection for vulnerable users without degrading recommendation quality for those who are not affected. To address this issue, our research delves into understanding user vulnerability. Considering that poisoning attacks pollute the training data, we note that the higher degree to which a recommender system fits users' training data correlates with an increased likelihood of users incorporating attack information, indicating their vulnerability. Leveraging these insights, we introduce the Vulnerability-aware Adversarial Training (VAT), designed to defend against poisoning attacks in recommender systems. VAT employs a novel vulnerability-aware function to estimate users' vulnerability based on the degree to which the system fits them. Guided by this estimation, VAT applies perturbations of adaptive magnitude to each user, not only reducing the success ratio of attacks but also preserving, and potentially enhancing, the quality of recommendations. Comprehensive experiments confirm VAT's superior defensive capabilities across different recommendation models and against various types of attacks.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

AI agents will be predictable in certain ways that traditional agents are not. Where and how can we leverage this predictability in order to improve social welfare? We study this question in a game-theoretic setting where one agent can pay a fixed cost to simulate the other in order to learn its mixed strategy. As a negative result, we prove that, in contrast to prior work on pure-strategy simulation, enabling mixed-strategy simulation may no longer lead to improved outcomes for both players in all so-called "generalised trust games". In fact, mixed-strategy simulation does not help in any game where the simulatee's action can depend on that of the simulator. We also show that, in general, deciding whether simulation introduces Pareto-improving Nash equilibria in a given game is NP-hard. As positive results, we establish that mixed-strategy simulation can improve social welfare if the simulator has the option to scale their level of trust, if the players face challenges with both trust and coordination, or if maintaining some level of privacy is essential for enabling cooperation.

As with other commodities, markets could help us efficiently produce machine intelligence. We propose a market where intelligence is priced by other intelligence systems peer-to-peer across the internet. Peers rank each other by training neural networks which learn the value of their neighbors. Scores accumulate on a digital ledger where high ranking peers are monetarily rewarded with additional weight in the network. However, this form of peer-ranking is not resistant to collusion, which could disrupt the accuracy of the mechanism. The solution is a connectivity-based regularization which exponentially rewards trusted peers, making the system resistant to collusion of up to 50 percent of the network weight. The result is a collectively run intelligence market which continual produces newly trained models and pays contributors who create information theoretic value.

Recent advancements in large vision language models (VLMs) tailored for autonomous driving (AD) have shown strong scene understanding and reasoning capabilities, making them undeniable candidates for end-to-end driving systems. However, limited work exists on studying the trustworthiness of DriveVLMs -- a critical factor that directly impacts public transportation safety. In this paper, we introduce AutoTrust, a comprehensive trustworthiness benchmark for large vision-language models in autonomous driving (DriveVLMs), considering diverse perspectives -- including trustfulness, safety, robustness, privacy, and fairness. We constructed the largest visual question-answering dataset for investigating trustworthiness issues in driving scenarios, comprising over 10k unique scenes and 18k queries. We evaluated six publicly available VLMs, spanning from generalist to specialist, from open-source to commercial models. Our exhaustive evaluations have unveiled previously undiscovered vulnerabilities of DriveVLMs to trustworthiness threats. Specifically, we found that the general VLMs like LLaVA-v1.6 and GPT-4o-mini surprisingly outperform specialized models fine-tuned for driving in terms of overall trustworthiness. DriveVLMs like DriveLM-Agent are particularly vulnerable to disclosing sensitive information. Additionally, both generalist and specialist VLMs remain susceptible to adversarial attacks and struggle to ensure unbiased decision-making across diverse environments and populations. Our findings call for immediate and decisive action to address the trustworthiness of DriveVLMs -- an issue of critical importance to public safety and the welfare of all citizens relying on autonomous transportation systems. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://github.com/taco-group/AutoTrust, and the leaderboard is released at https://taco-group.github.io/AutoTrust/.

One obstacle to applying reinforcement learning algorithms to real-world problems is the lack of suitable reward functions. Designing such reward functions is difficult in part because the user only has an implicit understanding of the task objective. This gives rise to the agent alignment problem: how do we create agents that behave in accordance with the user's intentions? We outline a high-level research direction to solve the agent alignment problem centered around reward modeling: learning a reward function from interaction with the user and optimizing the learned reward function with reinforcement learning. We discuss the key challenges we expect to face when scaling reward modeling to complex and general domains, concrete approaches to mitigate these challenges, and ways to establish trust in the resulting agents.

We study a new non-stochastic federated multi-armed bandit problem with multiple agents collaborating via a communication network. The losses of the arms are assigned by an oblivious adversary that specifies the loss of each arm not only for each time step but also for each agent, which we call ``doubly adversarial". In this setting, different agents may choose the same arm in the same time step but observe different feedback. The goal of each agent is to find a globally best arm in hindsight that has the lowest cumulative loss averaged over all agents, which necessities the communication among agents. We provide regret lower bounds for any federated bandit algorithm under different settings, when agents have access to full-information feedback, or the bandit feedback. For the bandit feedback setting, we propose a near-optimal federated bandit algorithm called FEDEXP3. Our algorithm gives a positive answer to an open question proposed in Cesa-Bianchi et al. (2016): FEDEXP3 can guarantee a sub-linear regret without exchanging sequences of selected arm identities or loss sequences among agents. We also provide numerical evaluations of our algorithm to validate our theoretical results and demonstrate its effectiveness on synthetic and real-world datasets

Smart contracts are decentralized applications built atop blockchains like Ethereum. Recent research has shown that large language models (LLMs) have potential in auditing smart contracts, but the state-of-the-art indicates that even GPT-4 can achieve only 30% precision (when both decision and justification are correct). This is likely because off-the-shelf LLMs were primarily pre-trained on a general text/code corpus and not fine-tuned on the specific domain of Solidity smart contract auditing. In this paper, we propose TrustLLM, a general framework that combines fine-tuning and LLM-based agents for intuitive smart contract auditing with justifications. Specifically, TrustLLM is inspired by the observation that expert human auditors first perceive what could be wrong and then perform a detailed analysis of the code to identify the cause. As such, TrustLLM employs a two-stage fine-tuning approach: it first tunes a Detector model to make decisions and then tunes a Reasoner model to generate causes of vulnerabilities. However, fine-tuning alone faces challenges in accurately identifying the optimal cause of a vulnerability. Therefore, we introduce two LLM-based agents, the Ranker and Critic, to iteratively select and debate the most suitable cause of vulnerability based on the output of the fine-tuned Reasoner model. To evaluate TrustLLM, we collected a balanced dataset with 1,734 positive and 1,810 negative samples to fine-tune TrustLLM. We then compared it with traditional fine-tuned models (CodeBERT, GraphCodeBERT, CodeT5, and UnixCoder) as well as prompt learning-based LLMs (GPT4, GPT-3.5, and CodeLlama-13b/34b). On a dataset of 263 real smart contract vulnerabilities, TrustLLM achieves an F1 score of 91.21% and an accuracy of 91.11%. The causes generated by TrustLLM achieved a consistency of about 38% compared to the ground truth causes.

Like students facing hard exam questions, large language models sometimes guess when uncertain, producing plausible yet incorrect statements instead of admitting uncertainty. Such "hallucinations" persist even in state-of-the-art systems and undermine trust. We argue that language models hallucinate because the training and evaluation procedures reward guessing over acknowledging uncertainty, and we analyze the statistical causes of hallucinations in the modern training pipeline. Hallucinations need not be mysterious -- they originate simply as errors in binary classification. If incorrect statements cannot be distinguished from facts, then hallucinations in pretrained language models will arise through natural statistical pressures. We then argue that hallucinations persist due to the way most evaluations are graded -- language models are optimized to be good test-takers, and guessing when uncertain improves test performance. This "epidemic" of penalizing uncertain responses can only be addressed through a socio-technical mitigation: modifying the scoring of existing benchmarks that are misaligned but dominate leaderboards, rather than introducing additional hallucination evaluations. This change may steer the field toward more trustworthy AI systems.

PGD adversarial training, the standard robustness method, can reduce Jacobian Frobenius norm yet worsen clean-input geometry (e.g., TDI 1.336 vs. ERM 1.093). We show this is not an implementation artifact but a theorem-level consequence of supervised learning. We prove that any encoder minimizing supervised loss must retain non-zero sensitivity along directions correlated with training labels, including directions that are nuisance at test time. This holds across proper scoring rules, architectures, and dataset sizes. We call this the geometric blind spot of supervised learning. This theorem unifies four empirical phenomena often treated separately: non-robust features, texture bias, corruption fragility, and the robustness-accuracy tradeoff. It also explains why suppressing sensitivity in one adversarial direction can redistribute sensitivity elsewhere. We introduce Trajectory Deviation Index (TDI), a diagnostic of geometric isotropy. Unlike CKA, intrinsic dimension, or Jacobian Frobenius norm alone, TDI captures the failure mode above. In our experiments, PGD attains low Frobenius norm but high TDI, while PMH attains the lowest TDI with one additional training term and no architectural changes. Across seven tasks, BERT/SST-2, and ImageNet ViT-B/16 (backbone family underlying CLIP/DINO/SAM), the blind spot is measurable and repairable. It appears at foundation-model scale, worsens with model scale and task-specific fine-tuning, and is substantially reduced by PMH. PMH also leads on non-Gaussian corruption types (blur/brightness/contrast) without corruption-specific training.

We consider objective evaluation measures of saliency explanations for complex black-box machine learning models. We propose simple robust variants of two notions that have been considered in recent literature: (in)fidelity, and sensitivity. We analyze optimal explanations with respect to both these measures, and while the optimal explanation for sensitivity is a vacuous constant explanation, the optimal explanation for infidelity is a novel combination of two popular explanation methods. By varying the perturbation distribution that defines infidelity, we obtain novel explanations by optimizing infidelity, which we show to out-perform existing explanations in both quantitative and qualitative measurements. Another salient question given these measures is how to modify any given explanation to have better values with respect to these measures. We propose a simple modification based on lowering sensitivity, and moreover show that when done appropriately, we could simultaneously improve both sensitivity as well as fidelity.

We introduce a new mechanism for stochastic convex optimization (SCO) with user-level differential privacy guarantees. The convergence rates of this mechanism are similar to those in the prior work of Levy et al. (2021); Narayanan et al. (2022), but with two important improvements. Our mechanism does not require any smoothness assumptions on the loss. Furthermore, our bounds are also the first where the minimum number of users needed for user-level privacy has no dependence on the dimension and only a logarithmic dependence on the desired excess error. The main idea underlying the new mechanism is to show that the optimizers of strongly convex losses have low local deletion sensitivity, along with an output perturbation method for functions with low local deletion sensitivity, which could be of independent interest.

We study best arm identification (BAI) in linear bandits in the fixed-budget regime under differential privacy constraints, when the arm rewards are supported on the unit interval. Given a finite budget T and a privacy parameter varepsilon>0, the goal is to minimise the error probability in finding the arm with the largest mean after T sampling rounds, subject to the constraint that the policy of the decision maker satisfies a certain {\em varepsilon-differential privacy} (varepsilon-DP) constraint. We construct a policy satisfying the varepsilon-DP constraint (called {\sc DP-BAI}) by proposing the principle of {\em maximum absolute determinants}, and derive an upper bound on its error probability. Furthermore, we derive a minimax lower bound on the error probability, and demonstrate that the lower and the upper bounds decay exponentially in T, with exponents in the two bounds matching order-wise in (a) the sub-optimality gaps of the arms, (b) varepsilon, and (c) the problem complexity that is expressible as the sum of two terms, one characterising the complexity of standard fixed-budget BAI (without privacy constraints), and the other accounting for the varepsilon-DP constraint. Additionally, we present some auxiliary results that contribute to the derivation of the lower bound on the error probability. These results, we posit, may be of independent interest and could prove instrumental in proving lower bounds on error probabilities in several other bandit problems. Whereas prior works provide results for BAI in the fixed-budget regime without privacy constraints or in the fixed-confidence regime with privacy constraints, our work fills the gap in the literature by providing the results for BAI in the fixed-budget regime under the varepsilon-DP constraint.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

The adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) as automated evaluators (LLM-as-a-judge) has revealed critical inconsistencies in current evaluation frameworks. We identify two fundamental types of inconsistencies: (1) Score-Comparison Inconsistency, where lower-rated responses outperform higher-scored ones in pairwise comparisons, and (2) Pairwise Transitivity Inconsistency, manifested through circular preference chains (A>B>C>A) and equivalence contradictions (A=B=C\neq A). We argue that these issues come from information loss in discrete rating systems and ambiguous tie judgments during pairwise evaluation. We propose TrustJudge, a probabilistic framework that addresses these limitations through two key innovations: 1) distribution-sensitive scoring that computes continuous expectations from discrete rating probabilities, preserving information entropy for more precise scoring, and 2) likelihood-aware aggregation that resolves transitivity violations using bidirectional preference probabilities or perplexity. We also formalize the theoretical limitations of current LLM-as-a-judge frameworks and demonstrate how TrustJudge's components overcome them. When evaluated with Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct as judge using our dataset, TrustJudge reduces Score-Comparison inconsistency by 8.43% (from 23.32% to 14.89%) and Pairwise Transitivity inconsistency by 10.82% (from 15.22% to 4.40%), while maintaining higher evaluation accuracy. Our work provides the first systematic analysis of evaluation framework inconsistencies in LLM-as-a-judge paradigms, offering both theoretical insights and practical solutions for reliable automated assessment. The framework demonstrates consistent improvements across various model architectures and scales, enabling more trustworthy LLM evaluation without requiring additional training or human annotations. The codes can be found at https://github.com/TrustJudge/TrustJudge.

We study the problem of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning with a single joint reward signal. This class of learning problems is difficult because of the often large combined action and observation spaces. In the fully centralized and decentralized approaches, we find the problem of spurious rewards and a phenomenon we call the "lazy agent" problem, which arises due to partial observability. We address these problems by training individual agents with a novel value decomposition network architecture, which learns to decompose the team value function into agent-wise value functions. We perform an experimental evaluation across a range of partially-observable multi-agent domains and show that learning such value-decompositions leads to superior results, in particular when combined with weight sharing, role information and information channels.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

We revisit the efficacy of several practical methods for approximate machine unlearning developed for large-scale deep learning. In addition to complying with data deletion requests, one often-cited potential application for unlearning methods is to remove the effects of poisoned data. We experimentally demonstrate that, while existing unlearning methods have been demonstrated to be effective in a number of settings, they fail to remove the effects of data poisoning across a variety of types of poisoning attacks (indiscriminate, targeted, and a newly-introduced Gaussian poisoning attack) and models (image classifiers and LLMs); even when granted a relatively large compute budget. In order to precisely characterize unlearning efficacy, we introduce new evaluation metrics for unlearning based on data poisoning. Our results suggest that a broader perspective, including a wider variety of evaluations, are required to avoid a false sense of confidence in machine unlearning procedures for deep learning without provable guarantees. Moreover, while unlearning methods show some signs of being useful to efficiently remove poisoned data without having to retrain, our work suggests that these methods are not yet ``ready for prime time,'' and currently provide limited benefit over retraining.

We describe an iterative procedure for optimizing policies, with guaranteed monotonic improvement. By making several approximations to the theoretically-justified procedure, we develop a practical algorithm, called Trust Region Policy Optimization (TRPO). This algorithm is similar to natural policy gradient methods and is effective for optimizing large nonlinear policies such as neural networks. Our experiments demonstrate its robust performance on a wide variety of tasks: learning simulated robotic swimming, hopping, and walking gaits; and playing Atari games using images of the screen as input. Despite its approximations that deviate from the theory, TRPO tends to give monotonic improvement, with little tuning of hyperparameters.

Collaborative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) has rapidly evolved, offering state-of-the-art algorithms for real-world applications, including sensitive domains. However, a key challenge to its widespread adoption is the lack of a thorough investigation into its vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks. Existing work predominantly focuses on training-time attacks or unrealistic scenarios, such as access to policy weights or the ability to train surrogate policies. In this paper, we investigate new vulnerabilities under more realistic and constrained conditions, assuming an adversary can only collect and perturb the observations of deployed agents. We also consider scenarios where the adversary has no access at all. We propose simple yet highly effective algorithms for generating adversarial perturbations designed to misalign how victim agents perceive their environment. Our approach is empirically validated on three benchmarks and 22 environments, demonstrating its effectiveness across diverse algorithms and environments. Furthermore, we show that our algorithm is sample-efficient, requiring only 1,000 samples compared to the millions needed by previous methods.

Sequential recommender systems stand out for their ability to capture users' dynamic interests and the patterns of item-to-item transitions. However, the inherent openness of sequential recommender systems renders them vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where fraudulent users are injected into the training data to manipulate learned patterns. Traditional defense strategies predominantly depend on predefined assumptions or rules extracted from specific known attacks, limiting their generalizability to unknown attack types. To solve the above problems, considering the rich open-world knowledge encapsulated in Large Language Models (LLMs), our research initially focuses on the capabilities of LLMs in the detection of unknown fraudulent activities within recommender systems, a strategy we denote as LLM4Dec. Empirical evaluations demonstrate the substantial capability of LLMs in identifying unknown fraudsters, leveraging their expansive, open-world knowledge. Building upon this, we propose the integration of LLMs into defense strategies to extend their effectiveness beyond the confines of known attacks. We propose LoRec, an advanced framework that employs LLM-Enhanced Calibration to strengthen the robustness of sequential recommender systems against poisoning attacks. LoRec integrates an LLM-enhanced CalibraTor (LCT) that refines the training process of sequential recommender systems with knowledge derived from LLMs, applying a user-wise reweighting to diminish the impact of fraudsters injected by attacks. By incorporating LLMs' open-world knowledge, the LCT effectively converts the limited, specific priors or rules into a more general pattern of fraudsters, offering improved defenses against poisoning attacks. Our comprehensive experiments validate that LoRec, as a general framework, significantly strengthens the robustness of sequential recommender systems.

We consider adversarial multi-armed bandit problems where the learner is allowed to observe losses of a number of arms beside the arm that it actually chose. We study the case where all non-chosen arms reveal their loss with a fixed but unknown probability r, independently of each other and the action of the learner. We propose two algorithms that work for different ranges of r. We show that after T rounds in a bandit problem with N arms, the expected regret of our first algorithm is O((T /r) log N ) whenever rge(log T)/(2N), while our second algorithm achieves a regret of O((T/r) log (N+T)) for smaller values of r. We also give a quick estimation procedure that decides the range of~r. All our bounds are within logarithmic factors of the best achievable performance of any algorithm that is even allowed to know~r.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

Blind face restoration remains a persistent challenge due to the inherent ill-posedness of reconstructing holistic structures from severely constrained observations. Current generative approaches, while capable of synthesizing realistic textures, often suffer from information asymmetry -- the intrinsic disparity between the information-sparse low quality inputs and the information-dense high quality outputs. This imbalance leads to a one-to-many mapping, where insufficient constraints result in stochastic uncertainty and hallucinatory artifacts. To bridge this gap, we present Pref-Restore, a hierarchical framework that integrates discrete semantic logic with continuous texture generation to achieve deterministic, preference-aligned restoration. Our methodology fundamentally addresses this information disparity through two complementary strategies: (1) Augmenting Input Density: We employ an auto-regressive integrator to reformulate textual instructions into dense latent queries, injecting high-level semantic stability to constrain the degraded signals; (2) Pruning Output Distribution: We pioneer the integration of on-policy reinforcement learning directly into the diffusion restoration loop. By transforming human preferences into differentiable constraints, we explicitly penalize stochastic deviations, thereby sharpening the posterior distribution toward the desired high-fidelity outcomes. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Pref-Restore achieves state-of-the-art performance across synthetic and real-world benchmarks. Furthermore, empirical analysis confirms that our preference-aligned strategy significantly reduces solution entropy, establishing a robust pathway toward reliable and deterministic blind restoration.

This study probes the vulnerabilities of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) under adversarial attacks, a critical determinant of c-MARL's worst-case performance prior to real-world implementation. Current observation-based attacks, constrained by white-box assumptions, overlook c-MARL's complex multi-agent interactions and cooperative objectives, resulting in impractical and limited attack capabilities. To address these shortcomes, we propose Adversarial Minority Influence (AMI), a practical and strong for c-MARL. AMI is a practical black-box attack and can be launched without knowing victim parameters. AMI is also strong by considering the complex multi-agent interaction and the cooperative goal of agents, enabling a single adversarial agent to unilaterally misleads majority victims to form targeted worst-case cooperation. This mirrors minority influence phenomena in social psychology. To achieve maximum deviation in victim policies under complex agent-wise interactions, our unilateral attack aims to characterize and maximize the impact of the adversary on the victims. This is achieved by adapting a unilateral agent-wise relation metric derived from mutual information, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of victim influence on the adversary. To lead the victims into a jointly detrimental scenario, our targeted attack deceives victims into a long-term, cooperatively harmful situation by guiding each victim towards a specific target, determined through a trial-and-error process executed by a reinforcement learning agent. Through AMI, we achieve the first successful attack against real-world robot swarms and effectively fool agents in simulated environments into collectively worst-case scenarios, including Starcraft II and Multi-agent Mujoco. The source code and demonstrations can be found at: https://github.com/DIG-Beihang/AMI.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit

We study a graph bandit setting where the objective of the learner is to detect the most influential node of a graph by requesting as little information from the graph as possible. One of the relevant applications for this setting is marketing in social networks, where the marketer aims at finding and taking advantage of the most influential customers. The existing approaches for bandit problems on graphs require either partial or complete knowledge of the graph. In this paper, we do not assume any knowledge of the graph, but we consider a setting where it can be gradually discovered in a sequential and active way. At each round, the learner chooses a node of the graph and the only information it receives is a stochastic set of the nodes that the chosen node is currently influencing. To address this setting, we propose BARE, a bandit strategy for which we prove a regret guarantee that scales with the detectable dimension, a problem dependent quantity that is often much smaller than the number of nodes.

Precision agriculture, enhanced by artificial intelligence (AI), offers promising tools such as remote sensing, intelligent irrigation, fertilization management, and crop simulation to improve agricultural efficiency and sustainability. Reinforcement learning (RL), in particular, has outperformed traditional methods in optimizing yields and resource management. However, widespread AI adoption is limited by gaps between algorithmic recommendations and farmers' practical experience, local knowledge, and traditional practices. To address this, our study emphasizes Human-AI Interaction (HAII), focusing on transparency, usability, and trust in RL-based farm management. We employ a well-established trust framework - comprising ability, benevolence, and integrity - to develop a novel mathematical model quantifying farmers' confidence in AI-based fertilization strategies. Surveys conducted with farmers for this research reveal critical misalignments, which are integrated into our trust model and incorporated into a multi-objective RL framework. Unlike prior methods, our approach embeds trust directly into policy optimization, ensuring AI recommendations are technically robust, economically feasible, context-aware, and socially acceptable. By aligning technical performance with human-centered trust, this research supports broader AI adoption in agriculture.

As large language models (LLMs) become the engine behind conversational systems, their ability to reason about the intentions and states of their dialogue partners (i.e., form and use a theory-of-mind, or ToM) becomes increasingly critical for safe interaction with potentially adversarial partners. We propose a novel privacy-themed ToM challenge, ToM for Steering Beliefs (ToM-SB), in which a defender must act as a Double Agent to steer the beliefs of an attacker with partial prior knowledge within a shared universe. To succeed on ToM-SB, the defender must engage with and form a ToM of the attacker, with a goal of fooling the attacker into believing they have succeeded in extracting sensitive information. We find that strong frontier models like Gemini3-Pro and GPT-5.4 struggle on ToM-SB, often failing to fool attackers in hard scenarios with partial attacker prior knowledge, even when prompted to reason about the attacker's beliefs (ToM prompting). To close this gap, we train models on ToM-SB to act as AI Double Agents using reinforcement learning, testing both fooling and ToM rewards. Notably, we find a bidirectionally emergent relationship between ToM and attacker-fooling: rewarding fooling success alone improves ToM, and rewarding ToM alone improves fooling. Across four attackers with different strengths, six defender methods, and both in-distribution and out-of-distribution (OOD) evaluation, we find that gains in ToM and attacker-fooling are well-correlated, highlighting belief modeling as a key driver of success on ToM-SB. AI Double Agents that combine both ToM and fooling rewards yield the strongest fooling and ToM performance, outperforming Gemini3-Pro and GPT-5.4 with ToM prompting on hard scenarios. We also show that ToM-SB and AI Double Agents can be extended to stronger attackers, demonstrating generalization to OOD settings and the upgradability of our task.

We consider the problem where an agent wants to find a hidden object that is randomly located in some vertex of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) according to a fixed but possibly unknown distribution. The agent can only examine vertices whose in-neighbors have already been examined. In this paper, we address a learning setting where we allow the agent to stop before having found the object and restart searching on a new independent instance of the same problem. Our goal is to maximize the total number of hidden objects found given a time budget. The agent can thus skip an instance after realizing that it would spend too much time on it. Our contributions are both to the search theory and multi-armed bandits. If the distribution is known, we provide a quasi-optimal and efficient stationary strategy. If the distribution is unknown, we additionally show how to sequentially approximate it and, at the same time, act near-optimally in order to collect as many hidden objects as possible.

Aligning AI agents to human intentions and values is a key bottleneck in building safe and deployable AI applications. But whose values should AI agents be aligned with? Reinforcement learning with human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the key framework for AI alignment. RLHF uses feedback from human reinforcers to fine-tune outputs; all widely deployed large language models (LLMs) use RLHF to align their outputs to human values. It is critical to understand the limitations of RLHF and consider policy challenges arising from these limitations. In this paper, we investigate a specific challenge in building RLHF systems that respect democratic norms. Building on impossibility results in social choice theory, we show that, under fairly broad assumptions, there is no unique voting protocol to universally align AI systems using RLHF through democratic processes. Further, we show that aligning AI agents with the values of all individuals will always violate certain private ethical preferences of an individual user i.e., universal AI alignment using RLHF is impossible. We discuss policy implications for the governance of AI systems built using RLHF: first, the need for mandating transparent voting rules to hold model builders accountable. Second, the need for model builders to focus on developing AI agents that are narrowly aligned to specific user groups.

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design. Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions they take in response to different signals, assuming that they are maximizing their own expected utility; our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.

For reinforcement learning systems to be widely adopted, their users must understand and trust them. We present a theoretical analysis of explaining reinforcement learning using Shapley values, following a principled approach from game theory for identifying the contribution of individual players to the outcome of a cooperative game. We call this general framework Shapley Values for Explaining Reinforcement Learning (SVERL). Our analysis exposes the limitations of earlier uses of Shapley values in reinforcement learning. We then develop an approach that uses Shapley values to explain agent performance. In a variety of domains, SVERL produces meaningful explanations that match and supplement human intuition.

Explanations for AI models in high-stakes domains like medicine often lack verifiability, which can hinder trust. To address this, we propose an interactive agent that produces explanations through an auditable sequence of actions. The agent learns a policy to strategically seek external visual evidence to support its diagnostic reasoning. This policy is optimized using reinforcement learning, resulting in a model that is both efficient and generalizable. Our experiments show that this action-based reasoning process significantly improves calibrated accuracy, reducing the Brier score by 18\% compared to a non-interactive baseline. To validate the faithfulness of the agent's explanations, we introduce a causal intervention method. By masking the visual evidence the agent chooses to use, we observe a measurable degradation in its performance (DeltaBrier=+0.029), confirming that the evidence is integral to its decision-making process. Our work provides a practical framework for building AI systems with verifiable and faithful reasoning capabilities.

Collaborative Perception (CP) has shown a promising technique for autonomous driving, where multiple connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) share their perception information to enhance the overall perception performance and expand the perception range. However, in CP, ego CAV needs to receive messages from its collaborators, which makes it easy to be attacked by malicious agents. For example, a malicious agent can send harmful information to the ego CAV to mislead it. To address this critical issue, we propose a novel method, CP-Guard, a tailored defense mechanism for CP that can be deployed by each agent to accurately detect and eliminate malicious agents in its collaboration network. Our key idea is to enable CP to reach a consensus rather than a conflict against the ego CAV's perception results. Based on this idea, we first develop a probability-agnostic sample consensus (PASAC) method to effectively sample a subset of the collaborators and verify the consensus without prior probabilities of malicious agents. Furthermore, we define a collaborative consistency loss (CCLoss) to capture the discrepancy between the ego CAV and its collaborators, which is used as a verification criterion for consensus. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments in collaborative bird's eye view (BEV) tasks and our results demonstrate the effectiveness of our CP-Guard. Code is available at https://github.com/CP-Security/CP-Guard

As artificial intelligence (AI) systems play an increasingly prominent role in human decision-making, challenges surface in the realm of human-AI interactions. One challenge arises from the suboptimal AI policies due to the inadequate consideration of humans disregarding AI recommendations, as well as the need for AI to provide advice selectively when it is most pertinent. This paper presents a sequential decision-making model that (i) takes into account the human's adherence level (the probability that the human follows/rejects machine advice) and (ii) incorporates a defer option so that the machine can temporarily refrain from making advice. We provide learning algorithms that learn the optimal advice policy and make advice only at critical time stamps. Compared to problem-agnostic reinforcement learning algorithms, our specialized learning algorithms not only enjoy better theoretical convergence properties but also show strong empirical performance.

Entropy regularization is a standard technique in reinforcement learning (RL) to enhance exploration, yet it yields negligible effects or even degrades performance in Large Language Models (LLMs). We attribute this failure to the cumulative tail risk inherent to LLMs with massive vocabularies and long generation horizons. In such environments, standard global entropy maximization indiscriminately dilutes probability mass into the vast tail of invalid tokens rather than focusing on plausible candidates, thereby disrupting coherent reasoning. To address this, we propose Trust Region Entropy (TRE), a method that encourages exploration strictly within the model's trust region. Extensive experiments across mathematical reasoning (MATH), combinatorial search (Countdown), and preference alignment (HH) tasks demonstrate that TRE consistently outperforms vanilla PPO, standard entropy regularization, and other exploration baselines. Our code is available at https://github.com/WhyChaos/TRE-Encouraging-Exploration-in-the-Trust-Region.

In mental health counseling, a variety of earlier studies have focused on dialogue modeling. However, most of these studies give limited to no emphasis on the quality of interaction between a patient and a therapist. The therapeutic bond between a patient and a therapist directly correlates with effective mental health counseling. It involves developing the patient's trust on the therapist over the course of counseling. To assess the therapeutic bond in counseling, we introduce trust as a therapist-assistive metric. Our definition of trust involves patients' willingness and openness to express themselves and, consequently, receive better care. We conceptualize it as a dynamic trajectory observable through textual interactions during the counseling. To facilitate trust modeling, we present MENTAL-TRUST, a novel counseling dataset comprising manual annotation of 212 counseling sessions with first-of-its-kind seven expert-verified ordinal trust levels. We project our problem statement as an ordinal classification task for trust quantification and propose a new benchmark, TrustBench, comprising a suite of classical and state-of-the-art language models on MENTAL-TRUST. We evaluate the performance across a suite of metrics and lay out an exhaustive set of findings. Our study aims to unfold how trust evolves in therapeutic interactions.

Machine unlearning aims to unlearn data points from a learned model, offering a principled way to process data-deletion requests and mitigate privacy risks without full retraining. Prior work has mainly studied unsupervised / supervised machine unlearning, leaving unlearning for sequential decision-making systems far less understood. We initiate the first study of a foundational sequential decision-making problem: offline stochastic multi-armed bandits (MAB). We formalize the privacy constraint for offline MAB and measure utility by the post-unlearning decision quality. We conduct a systematic study of both single- and multi-source unlearning scenarios under two data-generation models, the fixed-sample model and the distribution model. For these settings, our algorithmic design is built on two canonical base algorithms: Gaussian mechanism and rollback, and we propose adaptive algorithms that switch between them according to the data regime and privacy constraint. We further introduce a mixing procedure that elucidates the rationale behind these baselines. We provide performance guarantees across the above settings and establish lower bounds under both dataset models. Experiments validate the predicted tradeoffs and demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods.

Hallucination, posed as a pervasive challenge of multi-modal large language models (MLLMs), has significantly impeded their real-world usage that demands precise judgment. Existing methods mitigate this issue with either training with specific designed data or inferencing with external knowledge from other sources, incurring inevitable additional costs. In this paper, we present OPERA, a novel MLLM decoding method grounded in an Over-trust Penalty and a Retrospection-Allocation strategy, serving as a nearly free lunch to alleviate the hallucination issue without additional data, knowledge, or training. Our approach begins with an interesting observation that, most hallucinations are closely tied to the knowledge aggregation patterns manifested in the self-attention matrix, i.e., MLLMs tend to generate new tokens by focusing on a few summary tokens, but not all the previous tokens. Such partial over-trust inclination results in the neglecting of image tokens and describes the image content with hallucination. Statistically, we observe an 80%sim95% co-currency rate between hallucination contents and such knowledge aggregation patterns. Based on the observation, OPERA introduces a penalty term on the model logits during the beam-search decoding to mitigate the over-trust issue, along with a rollback strategy that retrospects the presence of summary tokens in the previously generated tokens, and re-allocate the token selection if necessary. With extensive experiments, OPERA shows significant hallucination-mitigating performance on different MLLMs and metrics, proving its effectiveness and generality. Our code is available at: https://github.com/shikiw/OPERA.

We study the non-stationary dueling bandits problem with K arms, where the time horizon T consists of M stationary segments, each of which is associated with its own preference matrix. The learner repeatedly selects a pair of arms and observes a binary preference between them as feedback. To minimize the accumulated regret, the learner needs to pick the Condorcet winner of each stationary segment as often as possible, despite preference matrices and segment lengths being unknown. We propose the Beat, the, Winner, Reset algorithm and prove a bound on its expected binary weak regret in the stationary case, which tightens the bound of current state-of-art algorithms. We also show a regret bound for the non-stationary case, without requiring knowledge of M or T. We further propose and analyze two meta-algorithms, DETECT for weak regret and Monitored, Dueling, Bandits for strong regret, both based on a detection-window approach that can incorporate any dueling bandit algorithm as a black-box algorithm. Finally, we prove a worst-case lower bound for expected weak regret in the non-stationary case.

In many real-world sequential decision-making problems, an action does not immediately reflect on the feedback and spreads its effects over a long time frame. For instance, in online advertising, investing in a platform produces an instantaneous increase of awareness, but the actual reward, i.e., a conversion, might occur far in the future. Furthermore, whether a conversion takes place depends on: how fast the awareness grows, its vanishing effects, and the synergy or interference with other advertising platforms. Previous work has investigated the Multi-Armed Bandit framework with the possibility of delayed and aggregated feedback, without a particular structure on how an action propagates in the future, disregarding possible dynamical effects. In this paper, we introduce a novel setting, the Dynamical Linear Bandits (DLB), an extension of the linear bandits characterized by a hidden state. When an action is performed, the learner observes a noisy reward whose mean is a linear function of the hidden state and of the action. Then, the hidden state evolves according to linear dynamics, affected by the performed action too. We start by introducing the setting, discussing the notion of optimal policy, and deriving an expected regret lower bound. Then, we provide an optimistic regret minimization algorithm, Dynamical Linear Upper Confidence Bound (DynLin-UCB), that suffers an expected regret of order mathcal{O} Big( d sqrt{T}{(1-rho)^{3/2}} Big), where rho is a measure of the stability of the system, and d is the dimension of the action vector. Finally, we conduct a numerical validation on a synthetic environment and on real-world data to show the effectiveness of DynLin-UCB in comparison with several baselines.

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the online Bayesian persuasion framework, in which the sender repeatedly faces one or more receivers with unknown and adversarially selected types. First, we show how to obtain a tight tilde O(T^{1/2}) regret bound in the case in which the sender faces a single receiver and has partial feedback, improving over the best previously known bound of tilde O(T^{4/5}). Then, we provide the first no-regret guarantees for the multi-receiver setting under partial feedback. Finally, we show how to design no-regret algorithms with polynomial per-iteration running time by exploiting type reporting, thereby circumventing known intractability results on online Bayesian persuasion. We provide efficient algorithms guaranteeing a O(T^{1/2}) regret upper bound both in the single- and multi-receiver scenario when type reporting is allowed.

Malicious server (MS) attacks have enabled the scaling of data stealing in federated learning to large batch sizes and secure aggregation, settings previously considered private. However, many concerns regarding client-side detectability of MS attacks were raised, questioning their practicality once they are publicly known. In this work, for the first time, we thoroughly study the problem of client-side detectability.We demonstrate that most prior MS attacks, which fundamentally rely on one of two key principles, are detectable by principled client-side checks. Further, we formulate desiderata for practical MS attacks and propose SEER, a novel attack framework that satisfies all desiderata, while stealing user data from gradients of realistic networks, even for large batch sizes (up to 512 in our experiments) and under secure aggregation. The key insight of SEER is the use of a secret decoder, which is jointly trained with the shared model. Our work represents a promising first step towards more principled treatment of MS attacks, paving the way for realistic data stealing that can compromise user privacy in real-world deployments.

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear T^{2/3}-regret after T iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.

Blind inpainting is a task to automatically complete visual contents without specifying masks for missing areas in an image. Previous works assume missing region patterns are known, limiting its application scope. In this paper, we relax the assumption by defining a new blind inpainting setting, making training a blind inpainting neural system robust against various unknown missing region patterns. Specifically, we propose a two-stage visual consistency network (VCN), meant to estimate where to fill (via masks) and generate what to fill. In this procedure, the unavoidable potential mask prediction errors lead to severe artifacts in the subsequent repairing. To address it, our VCN predicts semantically inconsistent regions first, making mask prediction more tractable. Then it repairs these estimated missing regions using a new spatial normalization, enabling VCN to be robust to the mask prediction errors. In this way, semantically convincing and visually compelling content is thus generated. Extensive experiments are conducted, showing our method is effective and robust in blind image inpainting. And our VCN allows for a wide spectrum of applications.

In this paper, we study the problem of establishing the accountability and fairness of transparent machine learning models through monotonicity. Although there have been numerous studies on individual monotonicity, pairwise monotonicity is often overlooked in the existing literature. This paper studies transparent neural networks in the presence of three types of monotonicity: individual monotonicity, weak pairwise monotonicity, and strong pairwise monotonicity. As a means of achieving monotonicity while maintaining transparency, we propose the monotonic groves of neural additive models. As a result of empirical examples, we demonstrate that monotonicity is often violated in practice and that monotonic groves of neural additive models are transparent, accountable, and fair.

Sharpness-aware minimization (SAM) reports improving domain generalization by reducing the loss surface curvature in the parameter space. However, generalization during fine-tuning is often more dependent on the transferability of representations in the function space. Trust-region methods (TR) target this goal by regularizing representation curvature to reduce catastrophic forgetting of pre-trained task-agnostic information while adopting task-specific skills. We consider unifying these strategies for low curvature in both parameter space and function space to improve out-of-domain (OOD) generalization. We propose Trust Region Aware Minimization (TRAM), a SAM algorithm fine-tuning for low parameter sharpness and smooth, informative representations preserving pre-trained structure. TRAM uses a trust region bound to inform the SAM adversarial neighborhood, introducing an awareness of function curvature within optimization for flatter minima. We empirically validate TRAM in vision (cross-dataset adaptation) and text (OOD language modeling, zero-shot cross-lingual transfer) tasks where robust domain transfer and representation generality are critical. TRAM outperforms SAM- and TR-based optimization across all tasks, notably surpassing competing methods for hard transfer between anticorrelated domains. TRAM establishes a novel standard in fine-tuning for domain-generalizable models with minimal additional computation over previous sharpness-aware methods.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel in diverse tasks such as text generation, data analysis, and software development, making them indispensable across domains like education, business, and creative industries. However, the rapid proliferation of LLMs (with over 560 companies developing or deploying them as of 2024) has raised concerns about their originality and trustworthiness. A notable issue, termed identity confusion, has emerged, where LLMs misrepresent their origins or identities. This study systematically examines identity confusion through three research questions: (1) How prevalent is identity confusion among LLMs? (2) Does it arise from model reuse, plagiarism, or hallucination? (3) What are the security and trust-related impacts of identity confusion? To address these, we developed an automated tool combining documentation analysis, self-identity recognition testing, and output similarity comparisons--established methods for LLM fingerprinting--and conducted a structured survey via Credamo to assess its impact on user trust. Our analysis of 27 LLMs revealed that 25.93% exhibit identity confusion. Output similarity analysis confirmed that these issues stem from hallucinations rather than replication or reuse. Survey results further highlighted that identity confusion significantly erodes trust, particularly in critical tasks like education and professional use, with declines exceeding those caused by logical errors or inconsistencies. Users attributed these failures to design flaws, incorrect training data, and perceived plagiarism, underscoring the systemic risks posed by identity confusion to LLM reliability and trustworthiness.

We propose a new partial-observability model for online learning problems where the learner, besides its own loss, also observes some noisy feedback about the other actions, depending on the underlying structure of the problem. We represent this structure by a weighted directed graph, where the edge weights are related to the quality of the feedback shared by the connected nodes. Our main contribution is an efficient algorithm that guarantees a regret of O(α^* T) after T rounds, where α^* is a novel graph property that we call the effective independence number. Our algorithm is completely parameter-free and does not require knowledge (or even estimation) of α^*. For the special case of binary edge weights, our setting reduces to the partial-observability models of Mannor and Shamir (2011) and Alon et al. (2013) and our algorithm recovers the near-optimal regret bounds.