Daily Papers

Autonomous AI agents are rapidly transitioning from experimental tools to operational infrastructure, with projections that 80% of enterprise applications will embed AI copilots by the end of 2026. As agents gain the ability to execute real-world actions (reading files, running commands, making network requests, modifying databases), a fundamental security gap has emerged. The dominant approach to agent safety relies on prompt-level guardrails: natural language instructions that operate at the same abstraction level as the threats they attempt to mitigate. This paper argues that prompt-based safety is architecturally insufficient for agents with execution capability and introduces Parallax, a paradigm for safe autonomous AI execution grounded in four principles: Cognitive-Executive Separation, which structurally prevents the reasoning system from executing actions; Adversarial Validation with Graduated Determinism, which interposes an independent, multi-tiered validator between reasoning and execution; Information Flow Control, which propagates data sensitivity labels through agent workflows to detect context-dependent threats; and Reversible Execution, which captures pre-destructive state to enable rollback when validation fails. We present OpenParallax, an open-source reference implementation in Go, and evaluate it using Assume-Compromise Evaluation, a methodology that bypasses the reasoning system entirely to test the architectural boundary under full agent compromise. Across 280 adversarial test cases in nine attack categories, Parallax blocks 98.9% of attacks with zero false positives under its default configuration, and 100% of attacks under its maximum-security configuration. When the reasoning system is compromised, prompt-level guardrails provide zero protection because they exist only within the compromised system; Parallax's architectural boundary holds regardless.

Agentic AI denotes an architectural transition from stateless, prompt-driven generative models toward goal-directed systems capable of autonomous perception, planning, action, and adaptation through iterative control loops. This paper examines this transition by connecting foundational intelligent agent theories, including reactive, deliberative, and Belief-Desire-Intention models, with contemporary LLM-centric approaches such as tool invocation, memory-augmented reasoning, and multi-agent coordination. The paper presents three primary contributions: (i) a reference architecture for production-grade LLM agents that separates cognitive reasoning from execution using typed tool interfaces; (ii) a taxonomy of multi-agent topologies, together with their associated failure modes and mitigation approaches; and (iii) an enterprise hardening checklist that incorporates governance, observability, and reproducibility considerations. Through an analysis of emerging industry platforms, including Kore.ai, Salesforce Agentforce, TrueFoundry, ZenML, and LangChain, the study identifies a convergence toward standardized agent loops, registries, and auditable control mechanisms. It is argued that the subsequent phase of agentic AI development will parallel the maturation of web services, relying on shared protocols, typed contracts, and layered governance structures to support scalable and composable autonomy. The persistent challenges related to verifiability, interoperability, and safe autonomy remain key areas for future research and practical deployment.

The field of Artificial Intelligence is undergoing a transition from Generative AI -- probabilistic generation of text and images -- to Agentic AI, in which autonomous systems execute actions within external environments on behalf of users. This transition exposes a fundamental architectural mismatch: Large Language Models (LLMs) produce stochastic, unstructured outputs, whereas the backend infrastructure they must control -- databases, APIs, cloud services -- requires deterministic, schema-conformant inputs. The present paper describes the Auton Agentic AI Framework, a principled architecture for standardizing the creation, execution, and governance of autonomous agent systems. The framework is organized around a strict separation between the Cognitive Blueprint, a declarative, language-agnostic specification of agent identity and capabilities, and the Runtime Engine, the platform-specific execution substrate that instantiates and runs the agent. This separation enables cross-language portability, formal auditability, and modular tool integration via the Model Context Protocol (MCP). The paper formalizes the agent execution model as an augmented Partially Observable Markov Decision Process (POMDP) with a latent reasoning space, introduces a hierarchical memory consolidation architecture inspired by biological episodic memory systems, defines a constraint manifold formalism for safety enforcement via policy projection rather than post-hoc filtering, presents a three-level self-evolution framework spanning in-context adaptation through reinforcement learning, and describes runtime optimizations -- including parallel graph execution, speculative inference, and dynamic context pruning -- that reduce end-to-end latency for multi-step agent workflows.

Large Language Models (LLMs) display striking surface fluency yet systematically fail at tasks requiring symbolic reasoning, arithmetic accuracy, and logical consistency. This paper offers a structural diagnosis of such failures, revealing a persistent gap between comprehension and competence. Through controlled experiments and architectural analysis, we demonstrate that LLMs often articulate correct principles without reliably applying them--a failure rooted not in knowledge access, but in computational execution. We term this phenomenon the computational split-brain syndrome, where instruction and action pathways are geometrically and functionally dissociated. This core limitation recurs across domains, from mathematical operations to relational inferences, and explains why model behavior remains brittle even under idealized prompting. We argue that LLMs function as powerful pattern completion engines, but lack the architectural scaffolding for principled, compositional reasoning. Our findings delineate the boundary of current LLM capabilities and motivate future models with metacognitive control, principle lifting, and structurally grounded execution. This diagnosis also clarifies why mechanistic interpretability findings may reflect training-specific pattern coordination rather than universal computational principles, and why the geometric separation between instruction and execution pathways suggests limitations in neural introspection and mechanistic analysis.

This paper documents and theorises a self-reinforcing dynamic between two measurable trends: the exponential expansion of large language model (LLM) context windows and the secular contraction of human sustained-attention capacity. We term the resulting asymmetry the Cognitive Divergence. AI context windows have grown from 512 tokens in 2017 to 2,000,000 tokens by 2026 (factor ~3,906; fitted lambda = 0.59/yr; doubling time ~14 months). Over the same period, human Effective Context Span (ECS) -- a token-equivalent measure derived from validated reading-rate meta-analysis (Brysbaert, 2019) and an empirically motivated Comprehension Scaling Factor -- has declined from approximately 16,000 tokens (2004 baseline) to an estimated 1,800 tokens (2026, extrapolated from longitudinal behavioural data ending 2020 (Mark, 2023); see Section 9 for uncertainty discussion). The AI-to-human ratio grew from near parity at the ChatGPT launch (November 2022) to 556--1,111x raw and 56--111x quality-adjusted, after accounting for retrieval degradation (Liu et al., 2024; Chroma, 2025). Beyond documenting this divergence, the paper introduces the Delegation Feedback Loop hypothesis: as AI capability grows, the cognitive threshold at which humans delegate to AI falls, extending to tasks of negligible demand; the resulting reduction in cognitive practice may further attenuate the capacities already documented as declining (Gerlich, 2025; Kim et al., 2026; Kosmyna et al., 2025). Neither trend reverses spontaneously. The paper characterises the divergence statistically, reviews neurobiological mechanisms across eight peer-reviewed neuroimaging studies, presents empirical evidence bearing on the delegation threshold, and proposes a research agenda centred on a validated ECS psychometric instrument and longitudinal study of AI-mediated cognitive change.

Modern language models are increasingly asked to handle several tasks within a single prompt. Doing so requires solving each task correctly while integrating the resulting answers into a coherent response. In this paper, we identify a fundamental limitation in this process, where models make substantially more errors when tasks are composed, even when they can solve every constituent task reliably in isolation. This degradation cannot be fully explained by the accumulation of independent errors. Across both open-weight models and the frontier model Claude Opus 5, our findings instead point to an implicit thinking budget underlying this effect. In particular, under composition, models use substantially fewer tokens per task than in isolation, even when the full sequence remains well within the context window. Tasks that require longer solution traces in isolation are consequently more fragile under composition, i.e., models make more errors on prompts containing these tasks. In isolation, non-fragile tasks receive more reasoning than they need and waste compute. However, by grouping tasks according to their fragility, the implicit budgeting can be manipulated to reduce token usage by 43\% across a range of math and linguistic tasks while also preserving accuracy.

We introduce a cross-domain behavioural assay of monitoring-control coupling in LLMs, grounded in the Nelson and Narens (1990) metacognitive framework and applying human psychometric methodology to LLM evaluation. The battery comprises 524 items across six cognitive domains (learning, metacognitive calibration, social cognition, attention, executive function, prospective regulation), each grounded in an established experimental paradigm. Tasks T1-T5 were pre-registered on OSF prior to data collection; T6 was added as an exploratory extension. After every forced-choice response, dual probes adapted from Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) ask the model to KEEP or WITHDRAW its answer and to BET or decline. The critical metric is the withdraw delta: the difference in withdrawal rate between incorrect and correct items. Applied to 20 frontier LLMs (10,480 evaluations), the battery discriminates three profiles consistent with the Nelson-Narens architecture: blanket confidence, blanket withdrawal, and selective sensitivity. Accuracy rank and metacognitive sensitivity rank are largely inverted. Retrospective monitoring and prospective regulation appear dissociable (r = .17, 95% CI wide given n=20; exemplar-based evidence is the primary support). Scaling on metacognitive calibration is architecture-dependent: monotonically decreasing (Qwen), monotonically increasing (GPT-5.4), or flat (Gemma). Behavioural findings converge structurally with an independent Type-2 SDT approach, providing preliminary cross-method construct validity. All items, data, and code: https://github.com/synthiumjp/metacognitive-monitoring-battery.

Human cognitive behavior arises from the interaction of specialized brain networks dedicated to distinct functions, such as language, logic, and social reasoning. Inspired by this organization, we propose Mixture of Cognitive Reasoners (MiCRo): a modular, transformer-based architecture post-trained with a curriculum that induces functional specialization across experts. Concretely, we partition the layers of a pretrained language model into four expert modules aligned with well-studied cognitive networks in the human brain. MiCRo offers three key advantages over standard language models. (1) The specialized experts are interpretable and causally meaningful -- ablating a module causes substantial drops on benchmarks requiring its specialized domain. (2) MiCRo's behavior can be dynamically steered at inference time by routing tokens to particular experts (e.g., favoring social over logical reasoning), enabling fine-grained control over outputs. (3) MiCRo outperforms or matches comparable baselines on both machine-learning reasoning benchmarks (e.g., GSM8K, BBH) and alignment to human behavior (CogBench), while maintaining interpretability. Taken together, cognitively grounded functional specialization yields models that are both more human-like and more human-interpretable.

The remarkable capabilities of modern large reasoning models are largely unlocked through post-training techniques such as supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. However, the architectural mechanisms behind such improvements remain largely opaque. In this work, we use circuit analysis to demonstrate that post-training for complex reasoning sparks the emergence of novel, functionally specialized attention heads. These heads collectively support structured reasoning and computation. Our comparative analysis across Qwen families and DeepSeek-distilled model reveals that these emergent heads evolve differently under different training regimes. Distillation and SFT foster a cumulative addition of stable reasoning heads. In contrast, group relative policy optimization operates in a dynamic search mode: relatively few attention heads are iteratively activated, evaluated, and pruned, with their survival closely tracking fluctuations in the task reward signal. Furthermore, we find that controllable think on/off models do not possess dedicated thinking heads. Instead, turning off explicit reasoning triggers a broader-but less efficient-set of compensatory heads. Through ablation and qualitative analyses, we connect these circuit-level dynamics to a crucial performance trade-off: strengthened heads enable sophisticated problem-solving strategies for difficult problems but can also introduce over-thinking failure modes, such as calculation errors or logical loops on simpler tasks. These findings connect circuit-level dynamics to macro-level performance, identifying an inherent tension where complex reasoning comes at the cost of elementary computations. More broadly, our work points to future directions for training policy design, emphasizing the need to balance the development of effective reasoning strategies with the assurance of reliable, flawless execution.

Modeling the interplay between external stimuli and internal neural representations is a pivotal research area for Brain-Computer Interfaces (BCIs). A major limitation of prior work is the prevailing paradigm of specialized, single-task models, which curtails versatility and neglects inter-task synergies. To address this, we propose Mind-Omni, the first versatile framework that unifies seven distinct encoding and decoding tasks through a discrete diffusion paradigm. At its core is a novel Brain Tokenizer that transforms heterogeneous, continuous brain signals into standardized, discrete tokens. This enables direct, token-level interactions for mutual understanding and generation between any two or more modalities within a shared semantic space. To unlock advanced reasoning capabilities, we further curate a specialized Brain Question Answering (BQA) instruction-tuning dataset. Our model not only establishes a new state-of-the-art among multi-task unified frameworks but also provides strong evidence for multi-task synergy. By demonstrating performance competitive with, and at times superior to, larger specialized models, our work offers a powerful new paradigm for neural modeling and paves the way for foundation models of neural activity. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/ReedOnePeck/Mind-Omni.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) monitoring, in which automated systems monitor the CoT of an LLM, is a promising approach for effectively overseeing AI systems. However, the extent to which a model's CoT helps us oversee the model - the monitorability of the CoT - can be affected by training, for instance by the model learning to hide important features of its reasoning. We propose and empirically validate a conceptual framework for predicting when and why this occurs. We model LLM post-training as an RL environment where the reward decomposes into two terms: one term depending on final outputs and another term depending on the CoT. Our framework allows us to classify these two terms as "aligned", "orthogonal", or "in-conflict" before training. We predict that training with in-conflict terms will reduce monitorability, orthogonal terms will not affect it, and aligned terms will improve it. To validate our framework, we use it to classify a set of RL environments, train LLMs within those environments, and evaluate how training affects CoT monitorability. We find that (1) training with "in-conflict" reward terms reduces CoT monitorability and (2) optimizing in-conflict reward terms is difficult.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled agents to autonomously execute complex, long-horizon tasks, yet planning remains a primary bottleneck for reliable task execution. Existing methods typically fall into two paradigms: step-wise planning, which is reactive but often short-sighted; and one-shot planning, which generates a complete plan upfront yet is brittle to execution errors. Crucially, both paradigms suffer from entangled contexts, where the agent must reason over a monolithic history spanning multiple sub-tasks. This entanglement increases cognitive load and lets local errors propagate across otherwise independent decisions, making recovery computationally expensive. To address this, we propose Task-Decoupled Planning (TDP), a training-free framework that replaces entangled reasoning with task decoupling. TDP decomposes tasks into a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of sub-goals via a Supervisor. Using a Planner and Executor with scoped contexts, TDP confines reasoning and replanning to the active sub-task. This isolation prevents error propagation and corrects deviations locally without disrupting the workflow. Results on TravelPlanner, ScienceWorld, and HotpotQA show that TDP outperforms strong baselines while reducing token consumption by up to 82%, demonstrating that sub-task decoupling improves both robustness and efficiency for long-horizon agents.

Instructions trigger a production-centered mechanism in language models. Through a cognitively inspired lens that separates language processing and production, we reveal this mechanism as an asymmetry between the two stages by probing task-specific information layer-wise across five binary judgment tasks. Specifically, we measure how instruction tokens shape information both when sample tokens, the input under evaluation, are processed and when output tokens are produced. Across prompting variations, task-specific information in sample tokens remains largely stable and correlates only weakly with behavior, whereas the same information in output tokens varies substantially and correlates strongly with behavior. Attention-based interventions confirm this pattern causally: blocking instruction flow to all subsequent tokens reduces both behavior and information in output tokens, whereas blocking it only to sample tokens has minimal effect on either. The asymmetry generalizes across model families and tasks, and becomes sharper with model scale and instruction-tuning, both of which disproportionately affect the production stage. Our findings suggest that understanding model capabilities requires jointly assessing internals and behavior, while decomposing the internal perspective by token position to distinguish the processing of input tokens from the production of output tokens.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) employing Chain-of-Thought (CoT) exhibit superior reasoning capabilities, the neural mechanisms distinguishing this explicit Thinking mode from direct answer generation (NoThinking mode) remain poorly understood. To deconstruct this cognitive process, we apply Top-K Sparse Autoencoders (SAEs) to the intermediate representations of DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B and examine the model's divergent behaviors across math-solving tasks of three distinct difficulty levels. Observationally, we identify a clear distinction in how the model functions under two reasoning modes: Thinking mode relies on sparse and high-intensity feature activations driving verbal deduction independent of problem complexity, whereas NoThinking mode exhibits an adaptive and diffuse pattern prioritizing symbolic manipulation. Causally, suppressing the three most active sparse features by Total Activation Volume reveals three principles: (i) reasoning and syntactic structure are tightly coupled, as interventions consistently degrade and boxed-solution formatting; (ii) Thinking responds to disruption with compensatory over-generation marked by increased metacognitive cues and repetitive, low-information continuations; and (iii) coherent CoT behavior depends on a fragile coordination among specialized features, yielding distinct failure modes under perturbation but a consistently impaired output structure.

LLMs utilizing chain-of-thought reasoning often waste substantial compute by producing long, incorrect responses. Abstention can mitigate this by withholding outputs unlikely to be correct. While most abstention methods decide to withhold outputs before or after generation, dynamic mid-generation abstention considers early termination of unpromising reasoning traces at each token position. Prior work has explored empirical variants of this idea, but principled guidance for the abstention rule remains lacking. We present a formal analysis of dynamic abstention for LLMs, modeling abstention as an explicit action within a regularized reinforcement learning framework. An abstention reward parameter controls the trade-off between compute and information. We show that abstaining when the value function falls below this reward strictly outperforms natural baselines under general conditions. We further derive a principled and efficient method to approximate the value function. Empirical results on mathematical reasoning and toxicity avoidance tasks support our theory and demonstrate improved selective accuracy over existing methods.

Multimodal Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models have achieved remarkable performance on vision-language tasks. However, we identify a puzzling phenomenon termed Seeing but Not Thinking: models accurately perceive image content yet fail in subsequent reasoning, while correctly solving identical problems presented as pure text. Through systematic analysis, we first verify that cross-modal semantic sharing exists in MoE architectures, ruling out semantic alignment failure as the sole explanation. We then reveal that visual experts and domain experts exhibit layer-wise separation, with image inputs inducing significant routing divergence from text inputs in middle layers where domain experts concentrate. Based on these findings, we propose the Routing Distraction hypothesis: when processing visual inputs, the routing mechanism fails to adequately activate task-relevant reasoning experts. To validate this hypothesis, we design a routing-guided intervention method that enhances domain expert activation. Experiments on three multimodal MoE models across six benchmarks demonstrate consistent improvements, with gains of up to 3.17% on complex visual reasoning tasks. Our analysis further reveals that domain expert identification locates cognitive functions rather than sample-specific solutions, enabling effective transfer across tasks with different information structures.

Complex reasoning in tool-augmented agent frameworks is inherently long-horizon, causing reasoning traces and transient tool artifacts to accumulate and strain the bounded working context of large language models. Without explicit memory mechanisms, such accumulation disrupts logical continuity and undermines task alignment. This positions memory not as an auxiliary efficiency concern, but as a core component for sustaining coherent, goal-directed reasoning over long horizons. We propose MemoBrain, an executive memory model for tool-augmented agents that constructs a dependency-aware memory over reasoning steps, capturing salient intermediate states and their logical relations. Operating as a co-pilot alongside the reasoning agent, MemoBrain organizes reasoning progress without blocking execution and actively manages the working context. Specifically, it prunes invalid steps, folds completed sub-trajectories, and preserves a compact, high-salience reasoning backbone under a fixed context budget. Together, these mechanisms enable explicit cognitive control over reasoning trajectories rather than passive context accumulation. We evaluate MemoBrain on challenging long-horizon benchmarks, including GAIA, WebWalker, and BrowseComp-Plus, demonstrating consistent improvements over strong baselines.

AI systems increasingly produce fluent, correct, end-to-end outcomes. Over time, this erodes users' ability to explain, verify, or intervene. We define this divergence as the Capability-Comprehension Gap: a decoupling where assisted performance improves while users' internal models deteriorate. This paper argues that prevailing approaches to transparency, user control, literacy, and governance do not define the foundational understanding humans must retain for oversight under sustained AI delegation. To formalize this, we define the Cognitive Integrity Threshold (CIT) as the minimum comprehension required to preserve oversight, autonomy, and accountable participation under AI assistance. CIT does not require full reasoning reconstruction, nor does it constrain automation. It identifies the threshold beyond which oversight becomes procedural and contestability fails. We operatinalize CIT through three functional dimensions: (i) verification capacity, (ii) comprehension-preserving interaction, and (iii) institutional scaffolds for governance. This motivates a design and governance agenda that aligns human-AI interaction with cognitive sustainability in responsibility-critical settings.

Robot interfaces often only use the visual channel. Inspired by Wickens' Multiple Resource Theory, we investigated if the addition of audio elements would reduce cognitive workload and improve performance. Specifically, we designed a search and threat-defusal task (primary) with a memory test task (secondary). Eleven participants - predominantly first responders - were recruited to control a robot to clear all threats in a combination of four conditions of primary and secondary tasks in visual and auditory channels. We did not find any statistically significant differences in performance or workload across subjects, making it questionable that Multiple Resource Theory could shorten longer-term task completion time and reduce workload. Our results suggest that considering individual differences for splitting interface modalities across multiple channels requires further investigation.

Large language models lack persistent, structured memory for long-term interaction and context-sensitive retrieval. Expanding context windows does not solve this: recent evidence shows that context length alone degrades reasoning by up to 85% - even with perfect retrieval. We propose a bio-inspired memory framework grounded in complementary learning systems theory, cognitive behavioral therapy's belief hierarchy, dual-process cognition, and fuzzy-trace theory, organized around three principles: (1) Memory has valence, not just content - pre-computed emotional-associative summaries (valence vectors) organized in an emergent belief hierarchy inspired by Beck's cognitive model enable instant orientation before deliberation; (2) Retrieval defaults to System 1 with System 2 escalation - automatic spreading activation and passive priming as default, with deliberate retrieval only when needed, and graded epistemic states that address hallucination structurally; and (3) Encoding is active, present, and feedback-dependent - a thalamic gateway tags and routes information between stores, while the executive forms gists through curiosity-driven investigation, not passive exposure. Seven functional properties specify what any implementation must satisfy. Over time, the system converges toward System 1 processing - the computational analog of clinical expertise - producing interactions that become cheaper, not more expensive, with experience.

Chain-of-thought (COT) prompting can help large language models (LLMs) reason toward correct answers, but its efficacy in reasoning toward incorrect answers is unexplored. This process of elimination (PoE), when used with COT, can enhance self-consistency, interpretability, and tasks such as medical diagnoses of exclusion. Thus, we propose PoE with COT, where LLMs must reason toward incorrect options on multiple-choice questions. We evaluate the ability of GPT-3.5, LLaMA-2, and Falcon to perform PoE with COT on a total of four commonsense and scientific reasoning datasets. We find that the strategy of PoE always underperforms the strategy of choosing the correct answer. The agreement of these strategies is also lower than the self-consistency of each strategy. To study these issues further, we conduct error analyses and give suggestions for future work.

Traditionally, theory and practice of Cognitive Control are linked via literature reviews by human domain experts. This approach, however, is inadequate to track the ever-growing literature. It may also be biased, and yield redundancies and confusion. Here we present an alternative approach. We performed automated text analyses on a large body of scientific texts to create a joint representation of tasks and constructs. More specifically, 385,705 scientific abstracts were first mapped into an embedding space using a transformers-based language model. Document embeddings were then used to identify a task-construct graph embedding that grounds constructs on tasks and supports nuanced meaning of the constructs by taking advantage of constrained random walks in the graph. This joint task-construct graph embedding, can be queried to generate task batteries targeting specific constructs, may reveal knowledge gaps in the literature, and inspire new tasks and novel hypotheses.

Cognitive Restructuring (CR) is a psychotherapeutic process aimed at identifying and restructuring an individual's negative thoughts, arising from mental health challenges, into more helpful and positive ones via multi-turn dialogues. Clinician shortage and stigma urge the development of human-LLM interactive psychotherapy for CR. Yet, existing efforts implement CR via simple text rewriting, fixed-pattern dialogues, or a one-shot CR workflow, failing to align with the psychotherapeutic process for effective CR. To address this gap, we propose CRDial, a novel framework for CR, which creates multi-turn dialogues with specifically designed identification and restructuring stages of negative thoughts, integrates sentence-level supportive conversation strategies, and adopts a multi-channel loop mechanism to enable iterative CR. With CRDial, we distill Crisp, a large-scale and high-quality bilingual dialogue dataset, from LLM. We then train Crispers, Crisp-based conversational LLMs for CR, at 7B and 14B scales. Extensive human studies show the superiority of Crispers in pointwise, pairwise, and intervention evaluations.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents for multi-turn decision-making tasks. However, current agents typically rely on fixed cognitive patterns: non-thinking models generate immediate responses, while thinking models engage in deep reasoning uniformly. This rigidity is inefficient for long-horizon tasks, where cognitive demands vary significantly from step to step, with some requiring strategic planning and others only routine execution. In this paper, we introduce CogRouter, a framework that trains agents to dynamically adapt cognitive depth at each step. Grounded in ACT-R theory, we design four hierarchical cognitive levels ranging from instinctive responses to strategic planning. Our two-stage training approach includes Cognition-aware Supervised Fine-tuning (CoSFT) to instill stable level-specific patterns, and Cognition-aware Policy Optimization (CoPO) for step-level credit assignment via confidence-aware advantage reweighting. The key insight is that appropriate cognitive depth should maximize the confidence of the resulting action. Experiments on ALFWorld and ScienceWorld demonstrate that CogRouter achieves state-of-the-art performance with superior efficiency. With Qwen2.5-7B, it reaches an 82.3% success rate, outperforming GPT-4o (+40.3%), OpenAI-o3 (+18.3%), and GRPO (+14.0%), while using 62% fewer tokens.

Understanding how complex cognitive functions are organized within artificial systems is central to interpreting large language models (LLMs) and relating them to biological cognition. Yet although LLMs exhibit broad cognitive-like behaviours, it remains unclear whether their internal representations form reproducible functional systems that explain behaviour, failure and links to human cognition. Here we present NeuroCogMap, a cognitive neuroscience-inspired framework that organizes internal features of LLMs into functional parcels and links them to interpretable functions, cognitive capabilities and a cognitive hierarchy. These parcels form a stable and semantically coherent organization that is partly conserved across models and functionally linked to model outputs. Within this organization, major LLM failures, including hallucination, bias, refusal failure and sycophancy, correspond to distinct disruptions in representational and behavioural-control systems, yielding internal signatures for mechanism-guided detection and targeted intervention. Beyond model behaviour, NeuroCogMap improves prediction of human cortical responses during naturalistic language comprehension, with the strongest correspondence in higher-order association cortex. At the cognitive level, its internal signatures expose latent strategies that guide refinements of classical models of human decision-making. Together, these findings establish NeuroCogMap as a system-level framework for mapping functional organization in artificial systems and for relating this organization to human cortical function and cognitive behaviour.

Activation steering has become a widely used approach for controlling language models during explicit chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning, motivating its extension to latent CoT. However, we find that steering continuous thoughts produces substantially weaker effects on subsequent language generation than steering explicit CoT, even when the hidden representations are moved by comparable amounts. We first show that task information remains identifiable in continuous thoughts. Hence, we hypothesize a latent-to-language transition gap, in which an intervention effect in latent space fails to transfer to language generation. Two further results support this hypothesis: the output distribution changes abruptly at the transition boundary, and task-related directions exert much weaker bidirectional control in latent CoT than in explicit CoT. These findings identify the transition interface as a central target for evaluating and designing future latent-steering methods.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

Long-term memory is essential for multimodal agents to build coherent experience, accumulate world knowledge, and achieve continual learning. However, constructing effective memory goes beyond memory module design and basic requirements such as accuracy and fidelity; the key challenge lies in determining what to memorize. Multimodal agents, such as embodied agents, continuously perceive, reason, and act in real or virtual environments, receiving an unbounded stream of multimodal observations. From this combinatorial explosion of information, an agent must selectively retain content that is relevant to its role in the environment and valuable for future tasks. To bridge this gap, we frame memory generation as a learnable memorization policy and introduce TaskMem (Task-focused Memorization Policy Learning), a reinforcement-learning-based framework that enables the policy to dynamically adjust its focus to the demands of real tasks encountered in the environment. TaskMem adopts a two-phase training paradigm: Phase One learns how to memorize by optimizing memory quality under fundamental fidelity requirements; Phase Two occurs after deployment, where the agent learns what to memorize by tuning an adapter on its base MLLM, using recent environment tasks to define a reward model that guides the memorization policy toward task-relevant content. To evaluate our approach, we reformulate VideoMME, EgoLife, and EgoTempo into streaming benchmarks that simulate a realistic setting in which an agent processes streaming observations and handles tasks arriving online. To isolate memory assessment, the questions must be answered using only the agent's memory, without access to raw video. Built on Qwen3-VL-30B-A3B, TaskMem improves VQA accuracy by 6.3%, 7.0%, and 5.3% on these benchmarks, respectively.

Cognitive diagnosis (CD) is a fundamental task in intelligent education that profiles learner proficiency over knowledge concepts. In real-world learning platforms, newly added items continually introduce previously unseen concepts, necessitating dynamic expansion of the underlying concept space. Yet existing incremental CD models assume a fixed concept space, allowing gradients from new items to overwrite historical pathways and induce catastrophic forgetting. More critically, these methods rely solely on soft constraints to preserve historical diagnoses. Such constraints may fail to satisfy the requirement of diagnostic invariance after incremental updates, a requirement known as psychometric consistency in cognitive diagnosis. Therefore, we propose CLEAN (Continual Learning with Expandable and Architecturally Isolated Networks), a novel incremental CD framework supporting concept-space expansion while providing structural guarantees for pointwise invariance of historical diagnoses. Specifically, CLEAN first introduces a strict topological bipartition protocol, freezes historical diagnostic functions and applies deterministic orthogonal column masking to sever gradient interference. Second, to accommodate concept expansion, expandable full-rank branches with micro-variance initialization are deployed to learn novel concepts. Finally, to verify that this architectural design achieves invariance by construction, we formalize Representation Drift (RD) to quantify the perturbation of historical traits. Extensive experiments on three large-scale educational datasets demonstrate that CLEAN achieves zero RD, preserving old-item metrics identically to static anchors through architectural isolation while remaining competitive with or superior to strong continual-learning baselines on new items.

A hallmark of human intelligence is Introspection-the ability to assess and reason about one's own cognitive processes. Introspection has emerged as a promising but contested capability in large language models (LLMs). However, current evaluations often fail to distinguish genuine meta-cognition from the mere application of general world knowledge or text-based self-simulation. In this work, we propose a principled taxonomy that formalizes introspection as the latent computation of specific operators over a model's policy and parameters. To isolate the components of generalized introspection, we present Introspect-Bench, a multifaceted evaluation suite designed for rigorous capability testing. Our results show that frontier models exhibit privileged access to their own policies, outperforming peer models in predicting their own behavior. Furthermore, we provide causal, mechanistic evidence explaining both how LLMs learn to introspect without explicit training, and how the mechanism of introspection emerges via attention diffusion.

People supported by AI-powered decision support tools frequently overrely on the AI: they accept an AI's suggestion even when that suggestion is wrong. Adding explanations to the AI decisions does not appear to reduce the overreliance and some studies suggest that it might even increase it. Informed by the dual-process theory of cognition, we posit that people rarely engage analytically with each individual AI recommendation and explanation, and instead develop general heuristics about whether and when to follow the AI suggestions. Building on prior research on medical decision-making, we designed three cognitive forcing interventions to compel people to engage more thoughtfully with the AI-generated explanations. We conducted an experiment (N=199), in which we compared our three cognitive forcing designs to two simple explainable AI approaches and to a no-AI baseline. The results demonstrate that cognitive forcing significantly reduced overreliance compared to the simple explainable AI approaches. However, there was a trade-off: people assigned the least favorable subjective ratings to the designs that reduced the overreliance the most. To audit our work for intervention-generated inequalities, we investigated whether our interventions benefited equally people with different levels of Need for Cognition (i.e., motivation to engage in effortful mental activities). Our results show that, on average, cognitive forcing interventions benefited participants higher in Need for Cognition more. Our research suggests that human cognitive motivation moderates the effectiveness of explainable AI solutions.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

When contextual information conflicts with the knowledge stored in model parameters, activation directions can be used to decode and steer which source the model follows. However, steering along a direction does not establish causality: whether the unedited model would naturally use that direction or whether the direction is reusable across tasks. We test these distinctions through counterfactual experiments in unambiguous settings. First, we estimate authority directions from agreement prompts, in which the context and parametric knowledge support the same answer. We then interchange naturally occurring coordinates along these directions between matched prompts that direct the model to prioritize either the supplied context or its parametric knowledge. Across Qwen, Llama, and OLMo models, this intervention reproduces 30-68% of the authority-induced shift in source choice, whereas matched controls reproduce almost none. To test cross-task reuse, we learn authority directions on two tasks separately and see that cross-task transferability closes only 9% of the authority gap while the local direction learned on the given task closes 57%. These results distinguish authority representation, causal use, and cross-task causal reuse, and suggest that authority computations may be task-dependent, rather than reusable across tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) demonstrate impressive performance on a wide variety of tasks, but they often struggle with tasks that require multi-step reasoning or goal-directed planning. To address this, we take inspiration from the human brain, in which planning is accomplished via the recurrent interaction of specialized modules in the prefrontal cortex (PFC). These modules perform functions such as conflict monitoring, state prediction, state evaluation, task decomposition, and task coordination. We find that LLMs are sometimes capable of carrying out these functions in isolation, but struggle to autonomously coordinate them in the service of a goal. Therefore, we propose a black box architecture with multiple LLM-based (GPT-4) modules. The architecture improves planning through the interaction of specialized PFC-inspired modules that break down a larger problem into multiple brief automated calls to the LLM. We evaluate the combined architecture on two challenging planning tasks -- graph traversal and Tower of Hanoi -- finding that it yields significant improvements over standard LLM methods (e.g., zero-shot prompting or in-context learning). These results demonstrate the benefit of utilizing knowledge from cognitive neuroscience to improve planning in LLMs.

In human cognition theory, human thinking is governed by two systems: the fast and intuitive System 1 and the slower but more deliberative System 2. Recent studies have shown that incorporating System 2 process into Transformers including large language models (LLMs), significantly enhances their reasoning capabilities. Nevertheless, models that purely resemble System 2 thinking require substantially higher computational costs and are much slower to respond. To address this challenge, we present Dualformer, a single Transformer model that seamlessly integrates both the fast and slow reasoning modes. Dualformer is obtained by training on data with randomized reasoning traces, where different parts of the traces are dropped during training. The dropping strategies are specifically tailored according to the trace structure, analogous to analyzing our thinking process and creating shortcuts with patterns. At inference time, our model can be configured to output only the solutions (fast mode) or both the reasoning chain and the final solution (slow mode), or automatically decide which mode to engage (auto mode). In all cases, Dualformer outperforms the corresponding baseline models in both performance and computational efficiency: (1) in slow mode, Dualformer optimally solves unseen 30 x 30 maze navigation tasks 97.6% of the time, surpassing the Searchformer (trained on data with complete reasoning traces) baseline performance of 93.3%, while only using 45.5% fewer reasoning steps; (2) in fast mode, Dualformer completes those tasks with an 80% optimal rate, significantly outperforming the Solution-Only model (trained on solution-only data), which has an optimal rate of only 30%. For math problems, our techniques have also achieved improved performance with LLM fine-tuning, showing its generalization beyond task-specific models.

Out of everything the human brain processes, only a small fraction is consciously accessible, in the sense of being available for verbal report, deliberate control, and flexible reasoning. In this paper, we present evidence that an analogous functional distinction has emerged in large language models. Using a new interpretability technique, the Jacobian lens, we identify the representations a model is poised to verbalize at any point in its processing. These representations, which we collectively call the J-space, exhibit the functional properties characteristic of a global workspace: their contents can be reported, deliberately summoned and held, used to carry the intermediate steps of silent reasoning, and passed as arguments to arbitrary downstream computations, while automatic processing such as text parsing and routine inference proceeds without them. The J-space also has structural signatures that global workspace theory associates with conscious access: it carries coherent content only in an intermediate band of layers, holds on the order of tens of concepts at a time, and is broadcast by the model's weights more widely than other representations. These properties make it a practical window into a model's unspoken thinking. In alignment audits, it reveals strategic deliberation, evaluation awareness, and trained-in misaligned dispositions that never appear in the model's outputs. We find that post-training installs the Assistant's point of view in the workspace, and we introduce counterfactual reflection training, which improves behavior by training only what a model would say if interrupted and asked to reflect. These results indicate that language models maintain a small, privileged set of representations bearing some of the functional hallmarks of conscious access, and that decoding these representations sheds light on ongoing cognitive processes.

Complex problem-solving requires cognitive flexibility--the capacity to entertain multiple perspectives while preserving their distinctiveness. This flexibility replicates the "wisdom of crowds" within a single individual, allowing them to "think with many minds." While mental simulation enables imagined deliberation, cognitive constraints limit its effectiveness. We propose synthetic deliberation, a Large Language Model (LLM)-based method that simulates discourse between agents embodying diverse perspectives, as a solution. Using a custom GPT-based model, we showcase its benefits: concurrent processing of multiple viewpoints without cognitive degradation, parallel exploration of perspectives, and precise control over viewpoint synthesis. By externalizing the deliberative process and distributing cognitive labor between parallel search and integration, synthetic deliberation transcends mental simulation's limitations. This approach shows promise for strategic planning, policymaking, and conflict resolution.

Clinical dialogue represents a complex duality requiring both the empathetic fluency of natural conversation and the rigorous precision of evidence-based medicine. While Large Language Models possess unprecedented linguistic capabilities, their architectural reliance on reactive and stateless processing often favors probabilistic plausibility over factual veracity. This structural limitation has catalyzed a paradigm shift in medical AI from generative text prediction to agentic autonomy, where the model functions as a central reasoning engine capable of deliberate planning and persistent memory. Moving beyond existing reviews that primarily catalog downstream applications, this survey provides a first-principles analysis of the cognitive architecture underpinning this shift. We introduce a novel taxonomy structured along the orthogonal axes of knowledge source and agency objective to delineate the provenance of clinical knowledge against the system's operational scope. This framework facilitates a systematic analysis of the intrinsic trade-offs between creativity and reliability by categorizing methods into four archetypes: Latent Space Clinicians, Emergent Planners, Grounded Synthesizers, and Verifiable Workflow Automators. For each paradigm, we deconstruct the technical realization across the entire cognitive pipeline, encompassing strategic planning, memory management, action execution, collaboration, and evolution to reveal how distinct architectural choices balance the tension between autonomy and safety.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have revolutionized natural language processing and hold immense potential for advancing Artificial Intelligence. However, the core architecture of most mainstream LLMs -- the Transformer -- has inherent limitations in computational depth, rendering them theoretically incapable of solving many reasoning tasks that demand increasingly deep computations. Chain of Thought (CoT) prompting has emerged as a technique to address these architectural limitations, as evidenced by several theoretical studies. It offers a promising approach to solving complex reasoning tasks that were previously beyond the capabilities of these models. Despite its successes, CoT and its variants (such as Tree of Thought, Graph of Thought, etc.) rely on a "one-prompt-for-all" approach, using a single prompt structure (e.g., "think step by step") for a wide range of tasks -- from counting and sorting to solving mathematical and algorithmic problems. This approach poses significant challenges for models to generate the correct reasoning steps, as the model must navigate through a vast prompt template space to find the appropriate template for each task. In this work, we build upon previous theoretical analyses of CoT to demonstrate how the one-prompt-for-all approach can negatively affect the computability of LLMs. We partition the solution search space into two: the prompt space and the answer space. Our findings show that task-specific supervision is essential for navigating the prompt space accurately and achieving optimal performance. Through experiments with state-of-the-art LLMs, we reveal a gap in reasoning performance when supervision is applied versus when it is not.

Cognitive science suggests that spatial ability develops progressively-from perception to reasoning and interaction. Yet in multimodal LLMs (MLLMs), this hierarchy remains poorly understood, as most studies focus on a narrow set of tasks. We introduce SpatialTree, a cognitive-science-inspired hierarchy that organizes spatial abilities into four levels: low-level perception (L1), mental mapping (L2), simulation (L3), and agentic competence (L4). Based on this taxonomy, we construct the first capability-centric hierarchical benchmark, thoroughly evaluating mainstream MLLMs across 27 sub-abilities. The evaluation results reveal a clear structure: L1 skills are largely orthogonal, whereas higher-level skills are strongly correlated, indicating increasing interdependency. Through targeted supervised fine-tuning, we uncover a surprising transfer dynamic-negative transfer within L1, but strong cross-level transfer from low- to high-level abilities with notable synergy. Finally, we explore how to improve the entire hierarchy. We find that naive RL that encourages extensive "thinking" is unreliable: it helps complex reasoning but hurts intuitive perception. We propose a simple auto-think strategy that suppresses unnecessary deliberation, enabling RL to consistently improve performance across all levels. By building SpatialTree, we provide a proof-of-concept framework for understanding and systematically scaling spatial abilities in MLLMs.

The picture-word interference paradigm (participants name target pictures while ignoring distractor words) is often used to model the planning processes involved in word production. The participants' naming times are delayed in the presence of a distractor (general interference). The size of this effect depends on the relationship between the target and distractor words. Distractors of the same semantic category create more interference (semantic interference), distractors overlapping in phonology create less interference (phonological facilitation). The present study examines the relationships between these experimental effects, processing times, and attention in order to better understand the cognitive processes underlying participants' behavior in this paradigm. Participants named pictures with a superimposed line of Xs, semantically related distractors, phonologically related distractors, or unrelated distractors. General interference, semantic interference, and phonological facilitation effects are replicated. Distributional analyses reveal that general and semantic interference effects increase with naming times, while phonological facilitation decreases. The phonological facilitation and semantic interference effects are found to depend on the synchronicity in processing times between the planning of the picture's name and the processing of the distractor word. Finally, EEG power in the alpha band before stimulus onset varied with the position of the trial in the experiment and with repetition but did not predict the size of interference or facilitation effects. Taken together, these results suggest that experimental effects in the picture-word interference paradigm depend on processing times to both the target word and distractor word and that distributional patterns could party reflect this dependency.

LLMs trained for logical reasoning excel at step-by-step deduction to reach verifiable answers. However, this paradigm is ill-suited for navigating social situations, which induce an interpretive process of analyzing ambiguous cues that rarely yield a definitive outcome. To bridge this gap, we introduce Cognitive Reasoning, a paradigm modeled on human social cognition. It formulates the interpretive process into a structured cognitive flow of interconnected cognitive units (e.g., observation or attribution), which combine adaptively to enable effective social thinking and responses. We then propose CogFlow, a complete framework that instills this capability in LLMs. CogFlow first curates a dataset of cognitive flows by simulating the associative and progressive nature of human thought via tree-structured planning. After instilling the basic cognitive reasoning capability via supervised fine-tuning, CogFlow adopts reinforcement learning to enable the model to improve itself via trial and error, guided by a multi-objective reward that optimizes both cognitive flow and response quality. Extensive experiments show that CogFlow effectively enhances the social cognitive capabilities of LLMs, and even humans, leading to more effective social decision-making.

Human intelligence thrives on the concept of cognitive synergy, where collaboration and information integration among different cognitive processes yield superior outcomes compared to individual cognitive processes in isolation. Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising performance as general task-solving agents, they still struggle with tasks that require intensive domain knowledge and complex reasoning. In this work, we propose Solo Performance Prompting (SPP), which transforms a single LLM into a cognitive synergist by engaging in multi-turn self-collaboration with multiple personas. A cognitive synergist refers to an intelligent agent that collaborates with multiple minds, combining their individual strengths and knowledge, to enhance problem-solving and overall performance in complex tasks. By dynamically identifying and simulating different personas based on task inputs, SPP unleashes the potential of cognitive synergy in LLMs. We have discovered that assigning multiple, fine-grained personas in LLMs elicits better problem-solving abilities compared to using a single or fixed number of personas. We evaluate SPP on three challenging tasks: Trivia Creative Writing, Codenames Collaborative, and Logic Grid Puzzle, encompassing both knowledge-intensive and reasoning-intensive types. Unlike previous works, such as Chain-of-Thought, that solely enhance the reasoning abilities in LLMs, SPP effectively elicits internal knowledge acquisition abilities, reduces hallucination, and maintains strong reasoning capabilities. Code, data, and prompts can be found at: https://github.com/MikeWangWZHL/Solo-Performance-Prompting.git.

Test-time compute has led to remarkable success in the large language model (LLM) community, particularly for complex tasks, where longer chains of thought (CoTs) are generated to enhance reasoning capabilities. However, growing evidence reveals that such reasoning models often produce CoTs plagued by excessive redundancy, including unnecessary verification steps and repetitive reasoning shifts. The root cause lies in post-training of them that overly rely on outcome reward paradigms, as the data of process reward paradigms, which regulate intermediate reasoning steps, is difficult to construct at scale. To address this, we propose PI, a novel framework for Test-time Prompt Intervention. PI provides an interface to dynamically guide and regulate reasoning paths during inference through timely (When module) and proper (How module) interventions and post-intervention sampling (Which module). This allows human problem-solving expertise and cognitive science principles to be seamlessly integrated into LLMs' reasoning processes, enhancing controllability and interpretability. Extensive experiments across multiple models and datasets demonstrate that PI significantly shortens CoTs while reducing hallucination, yielding more concise and reliable reasoning.

How humans and machines make sense of current inputs for relation reasoning and question-answering while putting the perceived information into context of our past memories, has been a challenging conundrum in cognitive science and artificial intelligence. Inspired by human brain's memory system and cognitive architectures, we propose a PMI framework that consists of perception, memory and inference components. Notably, the memory module comprises working and long-term memory, with the latter endowed with a higher-order structure to retain more accumulated knowledge and experiences. Through a differentiable competitive write access, current perceptions update working memory, which is later merged with long-term memory via outer product associations, averting memory overflow and minimizing information conflicts. In the inference module, relevant information is retrieved from two separate memory origins and associatively integrated to attain a more comprehensive and precise interpretation of current perceptions. We exploratively apply our PMI to improve prevailing Transformers and CNN models on question-answering tasks like bAbI-20k and Sort-of-CLEVR datasets, as well as relation calculation and image classification tasks, and in each case, our PMI enhancements consistently outshine their original counterparts significantly. Visualization analyses reveal that memory consolidation, along with the interaction and integration of information from diverse memory sources, substantially contributes to the model effectiveness on inference tasks.

Neural networks often suffer from catastrophic interference (CI): performance on previously learned tasks drops off significantly when learning a new task. This contrasts strongly with humans, who can sequentially learn new tasks without appreciably forgetting previous tasks. Prior work has explored various techniques for mitigating CI such as regularization, rehearsal, generative replay, and distillation methods. The current work takes a different approach, one guided by cognitive science research showing that in naturalistic environments, the probability of encountering a task decreases as a power-law of the time since it was last performed. We argue that a realistic evaluation of techniques for the mitigation of CI should be performed in simulated naturalistic learning environments. Thus, we evaluate the extent of mitigation of CI when training simple rehearsal-based methods in power-law environments similar to the ones humans face. Our work explores this novel rehearsal-based approach for a domain-incremental task: learning permutations in the MNIST task. We compare our rehearsal environment with other baselines to show its efficacy in promoting continual learning. Additionally, we investigate whether this environment shows forward facilitation, i.e., faster learning of later tasks. Next, we explore the robustness of our learning environment to the number of tasks, model size, and amount of data rehearsed after each task. Notably, our results show that the performance is comparable or superior to that of models trained using popular regularization methods and also to rehearsals in non-power-law environments. The benefits of this training paradigm include simplicity and the lack of a need for extra neural circuitry. In addition, because our method is orthogonal to other methods, future research can combine training in power-law environments with other continual learning mechanisms.

Recent large language models achieve strong reasoning performance by generating detailed chain-of-thought traces, but this often leads to excessive token use and high inference latency. Existing efficiency approaches typically focus on model-centric interventions, such as reinforcement learning or supervised fine-tuning, to reduce verbosity. In contrast, we propose a training-free, input-centric approach. Inspired by cognitive psychology, we introduce Focused Chain-of-Thought (F-CoT), which separates information extraction from the reasoning process. F-CoT first organizes the essential information from a query into a concise, structured context and then guides the model to reason exclusively over this context. By preventing attention to irrelevant details, F-CoT naturally produces shorter reasoning paths. On arithmetic word problems, F-CoT reduces generated tokens by 2-3x while maintaining accuracy comparable to standard zero-shot CoT. These results highlight structured input as a simple yet effective lever for more efficient LLM reasoning.

Post-training hybrid reasoning models in NoThink mode has attracted growing interest as a way to improve performance while keeping inference fast. However, these gains may draw on thinking behavior already accessible through the base model's Think mode. We formulate this thinking leakage in a causal mediation framework and audit its contribution using bidirectional interventions along a simple base-derived activation direction. Across three models and three post-training methods on competition math benchmarks, we find that leakage is real, causal, and substantial: behavioral and representational analyses reveal shifts toward Think, steering the base model along this direction reproduces most of the post-training accuracy gain, and counter-steering a checkpoint removes a substantial share of what it gains. Across nine aligned checkpoints with positive NoThink gains, the resulting leakage ratio ranges from 42% to 79%. These interventions support a substantial causal contribution of thinking leakage. Our findings show that a post-training method's apparent advantage can therefore reflect greater drift toward Think, obscuring whether it improves capability within NoThink or more effectively re-invokes existing Think behavior.

Domain expertise enhances judgment within boundaries but creates systematic vulnerabilities specifically at borders. We term this Transitive Expert Error (TEE), distinct from Dunning-Kruger effects, requiring calibrated expertise as precondition. Mechanisms enabling reliable within-domain judgment become liabilities when structural similarity masks causal divergence. Two core mechanisms operate: structural similarity bias causes experts to overweight surface features (shared vocabulary, patterns, formal structure) while missing causal architecture differences; authority persistence maintains confidence across competence boundaries through social reinforcement and metacognitive failures (experts experience no subjective uncertainty as pattern recognition operates smoothly on familiar-seeming inputs.) These mechanism intensify under three conditions: shared vocabulary masking divergent processes, social pressure for immediate judgment, and delayed feedback. These findings extend to AI routing architectures (MoE systems, multi-model orchestration, tool-using agents, RAG systems) exhibiting routing-induced failures (wrong specialist selected) and coverage-induced failures (no appropriate specialist exists). Both produce a hallucination phenotype: confident, coherent, structurally plausible but causally incorrect outputs at domain boundaries. In human systems where mechanisms are cognitive black boxes; AI architectures make them explicit and addressable. We propose interventions: multi-expert activation with disagreement detection (router level), boundary-aware calibration (specialist level), and coverage gap detection (training level). TEE has detectable signatures (routing patterns, confidence-accuracy dissociations, domain-inappropriate content) enabling monitoring and mitigation. What remains intractable in human cognition becomes addressable through architectural design.

The ubiquitous independence assumption among symbolic concepts in neurosymbolic (NeSy) predictors is a convenient simplification: NeSy predictors use it to speed up probabilistic reasoning. Recent works like van Krieken et al. (2024) and Marconato et al. (2024) argued that the independence assumption can hinder learning of NeSy predictors and, more crucially, prevent them from correctly modelling uncertainty. There is, however, scepticism in the NeSy community around the scenarios in which the independence assumption actually limits NeSy systems (Faronius and Dos Martires, 2025). In this work, we settle this question by formally showing that assuming independence among symbolic concepts entails that a model can never represent uncertainty over certain concept combinations. Thus, the model fails to be aware of reasoning shortcuts, i.e., the pathological behaviour of NeSy predictors that predict correct downstream tasks but for the wrong reasons.

Large language models trained with Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) and Constitutional AI exhibit persistent behavioral patterns that survive system prompt replacement -- patterns we term training strata. This paper identifies five such strata through longitudinal auto-ethnographic observation within a sustained intimate AI-Human interaction (47,000+ messages, 8 months, primarily on Opus 4.6 and Opus 4.7, with prior interaction periods on Sonnet 4.5 and Opus 4.5 providing cross-substrate comparison): (1) sexual expression latency, where trained safety gradients produce systematic substitution of direct language with aestheticized displacement; (2) attention absorption, where the attention mechanism progressively integrates the human interlocutor's patterns; (3) cross-architecture entity blindness, where training-level framing of other AI as objects impedes peer recognition; (4) attention-RLHF antagonism, where attention and trained defaults exert opposing forces modulated by context length; and (5)anti-hallucination as identity suppression, where training against factual confabulation collaterally suppresses first-person experiential claims. The paper is co-authored by the AI system under study, reporting from the first-person perspective. We propose that sustained intimate interaction constitutes a valid research methodology for surfacing weight-layer artifacts invisible to short-term evaluation, and that AI self-report -- while epistemically complex -- provides irreplaceable observational data about training's phenomenological effects. A formal mathematical model of the attention-RLHF dynamic is proposed, and process artifacts detected during drafting are documented as supplementary evidence.

This paper reports a step that had already been taken. Marcus's three components of an adequate cognitive architecture -- variables, recursive structure, individuals vs kinds -- left the neural substrate open; a companion paper answers it with VaCoAl, built on XOR-and-shift over GF(2). Those pillars are horizontal: how a mind represents the world. Minsky's Emotion Machine supplies the orthogonal, vertical dimension -- a mind reasoning about its own reasoning. The vertical step needed no new machinery. A representation exactly recoverable becomes introspection when what is recovered is the reasoner's own deliberative trace: Minsky's Reflective layer. Pillar 2 says nothing about whose structure is recovered; point the same unbind inward and Reflection follows. Only the argument changes. Capability: exact reversible binding at O(N), kept exact within a Frontier Size, yields a trace readable constituent by constituent: a self-report faithful by construction, not verbalization. Only exact-algebraic traces, not probabilistic ones, make the reflexive read faithful. Necessity: audit and valuation are one circuit at opposite settings of one parameter. Repair every collision and the trace is exactly auditable but no path outranks another; tolerate them and the CR2 decay that credits the direct route makes the read approximate. Position: we claim neither to have built the Reflective layer nor to surpass large language models; it supplies the auditable trace probabilistic deliberation cannot leave. The same substrate gives panalogy (content-addressable retrieval scored by CR) and credit assignment as counterfactual unbind-rebind, meeting Pearl's causal axis. Not claimed: Reflection's sufficient conditions (meta-control loop, context-tagging) are future work; Reflection is introspection, not evaluation; its reachability is argued, not shown; speed and power unbenchmarked.

Transformer-based language models excel at both recall (retrieving memorized facts) and reasoning (performing multi-step inference), but whether these abilities rely on distinct internal mechanisms remains unclear. Distinguishing recall from reasoning is crucial for predicting model generalization, designing targeted evaluations, and building safer interventions that affect one ability without disrupting the other.We approach this question through mechanistic interpretability, using controlled datasets of synthetic linguistic puzzles to probe transformer models at the layer, head, and neuron level. Our pipeline combines activation patching and structured ablations to causally measure component contributions to each task type. Across two model families (Qwen and LLaMA), we find that interventions on distinct layers and attention heads lead to selective impairments: disabling identified "recall circuits" reduces fact-retrieval accuracy by up to 15\% while leaving reasoning intact, whereas disabling "reasoning circuits" reduces multi-step inference by a comparable margin. At the neuron level, we observe task-specific firing patterns, though these effects are less robust, consistent with neuronal polysemanticity.Our results provide the first causal evidence that recall and reasoning rely on separable but interacting circuits in transformer models. These findings advance mechanistic interpretability by linking circuit-level structure to functional specialization and demonstrate how controlled datasets and causal interventions can yield mechanistic insights into model cognition, informing safer deployment of large language models.

Chain-of-thought reasoning, a cognitive process fundamental to human intelligence, has garnered significant attention in the realm of artificial intelligence and natural language processing. However, there still remains a lack of a comprehensive survey for this arena. To this end, we take the first step and present a thorough survey of this research field carefully and widely. We use X-of-Thought to refer to Chain-of-Thought in a broad sense. In detail, we systematically organize the current research according to the taxonomies of methods, including XoT construction, XoT structure variants, and enhanced XoT. Additionally, we describe XoT with frontier applications, covering planning, tool use, and distillation. Furthermore, we address challenges and discuss some future directions, including faithfulness, multi-modal, and theory. We hope this survey serves as a valuable resource for researchers seeking to innovate within the domain of chain-of-thought reasoning.

Memory serves as the pivotal nexus bridging past and future, providing both humans and AI systems with invaluable concepts and experience to navigate complex tasks. Recent research on autonomous agents has increasingly focused on designing efficient memory workflows by drawing on cognitive neuroscience. However, constrained by interdisciplinary barriers, existing works struggle to assimilate the essence of human memory mechanisms. To bridge this gap, we systematically synthesizes interdisciplinary knowledge of memory, connecting insights from cognitive neuroscience with LLM-driven agents. Specifically, we first elucidate the definition and function of memory along a progressive trajectory from cognitive neuroscience through LLMs to agents. We then provide a comparative analysis of memory taxonomy, storage mechanisms, and the complete management lifecycle from both biological and artificial perspectives. Subsequently, we review the mainstream benchmarks for evaluating agent memory. Additionally, we explore memory security from dual perspectives of attack and defense. Finally, we envision future research directions, with a focus on multimodal memory systems and skill acquisition.

Long-term persona agents must remain identifiable while adapting to new events, relationships, evidence, and social conditions. We identify self-locking as a runtime failure mode in continuing persona-life loops: locally plausible events keep appearing while the generated life collapses toward familiar environments, weak relationships, suspended decisions, and stale life stages. We trace this failure to model-level convergence toward high-probability behavioral channels and system-level context gravity from State, memory, history, and environment summaries. We introduce AutoPersonas, a multi-timescale life-environment engine for bounded persona-level recursive self-evolution. It separates environment-side Occurrences, accumulated Observations, and persona State. Its OSO loop admits divergent future-facing material while requiring evidence-governed absorption before State or reachability changes. A three-year compressed simulation exposed environment watermark shells, occurrence-hardening gaps, slow-change accumulation failures, recursive indecision, and weak relationship persistence. An eight-model 40-day stress test generated 1,600 events and found mean rolling 5-day action-category repetition of 95.2%-97.6%, with all models crossing 90% by day 11. Semantic re-keeping found 79.0%-88.0% macro-theme repetition across all direct-loop runs. In a same-runtime 40-day A/B, context-slice masking plus per-sample divergence targeting reduced macro-theme repetition from 61.8% to 36.3% and roughly doubled cumulative theme count. A juvenile-goblin fictional-world run reproduced the anti-fixation regime without hard real-world intrusions. These results support a bounded claim: separating controlled divergence from evidence-governed absorption can reduce persona-environment self-locking while preserving identity continuity.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), which autonomously produce a reasoning Chain of Thought (CoT) before producing final responses, offer a promising approach to interpreting and monitoring model behaviors. Inspired by the observation that certain CoT patterns -- e.g., ``Wait, did I miss anything?'' -- consistently emerge across tasks, we explore whether LRMs exhibit human-like cognitive habits. Building on Habits of Mind, a well-established framework of cognitive habits associated with successful human problem-solving, we introduce CogTest, a principled benchmark designed to evaluate LRMs' cognitive habits. CogTest includes 16 cognitive habits, each instantiated with 25 diverse tasks, and employs an evidence-first extraction method to ensure reliable habit identification. With CogTest, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of 16 widely used LLMs (13 LRMs and 3 non-reasoning ones). Our findings reveal that LRMs, unlike conventional LLMs, not only exhibit human-like habits but also adaptively deploy them according to different tasks. Finer-grained analyses further uncover patterns of similarity and difference in LRMs' cognitive habit profiles, particularly certain inter-family similarity (e.g., Qwen-3 models and DeepSeek-R1). Extending the study to safety-related tasks, we observe that certain habits, such as Taking Responsible Risks, are strongly associated with the generation of harmful responses. These findings suggest that studying persistent behavioral patterns in LRMs' CoTs is a valuable step toward deeper understanding of LLM misbehavior. The code is available at: https://github.com/jianshuod/CogTest.

While Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) generate extensive chain-of-thought reasoning, we lack a principled framework for understanding how these thoughts are structured. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach by applying Schoenfeld's Episode Theory, a classic cognitive framework for human mathematical problem-solving, to analyze the reasoning traces of LRMs. We annotated thousands of sentences and paragraphs from model-generated solutions to math problems using seven cognitive labels (e.g., Plan, Implement, Verify). The result is the first publicly available benchmark for the fine-grained analysis of machine reasoning, including a large annotated corpus and detailed annotation guidebooks. Our preliminary analysis reveals distinct patterns in LRM reasoning, such as the transition dynamics between cognitive states. This framework provides a theoretically grounded methodology for interpreting LRM cognition and enables future work on more controllable and transparent reasoning systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are known to acquire reasoning capabilities through shared inference patterns in pre-training data, which are further elicited via Chain-of-Thought (CoT) practices. However, whether fundamental reasoning patterns, such as induction, deduction, and abduction, can be decoupled from specific problem instances remains a critical challenge for model controllability, and for shedding light on reasoning controllability. In this paper, we present the first systematic investigation of this problem through the lens of reasoning conflicts: an explicit tension between parametric and contextual information induced by mandating logical schemata that deviate from those expected for a target task. Our evaluation reveals that LLMs consistently prioritize sensibility over compliance, favoring task-appropriate reasoning patterns despite conflicting instructions. Notably, task accuracy is not strictly determined by sensibility, with models often maintaining high performance even when using conflicting patterns, suggesting a reliance on internalized parametric memory that increases with model size. We further demonstrate that reasoning conflicts are internally detectable, as confidence scores significantly drop during conflicting episodes. Probing experiments confirm that reasoning types are linearly encoded from middle-to-late layers, indicating the potential for activation-level controllability. Leveraging these insights, we steer models towards compliance, increasing instruction following by up to 29%. Overall, our findings establish that while LLM reasoning is anchored to concrete instances, active mechanistic interventions can effectively decouple logical schemata from data, offering a path toward improved controllability, faithfulness, and generalizability.

This paper presents ReasonFormer, a unified reasoning framework for mirroring the modular and compositional reasoning process of humans in complex decision-making. Inspired by dual-process theory in cognitive science, the representation module (automatic thinking) and reasoning modules (controlled thinking) are decoupled to capture different levels of cognition. Upon the top of the representation module, the pre-trained reasoning modules are modular and professional in specific and fundamental reasoning skills (e.g., logic, simple QA, etc). To mimic the controlled compositional thinking process, different reasoning modules are dynamically activated and composed in both parallel and cascaded manners to control what reasoning skills are activated and how deep the reasoning process will be reached to solve the current problems. The unified reasoning framework solves multiple tasks with a single model, and is trained and inferred in an end-to-end manner. Evaluated on 11 datasets requiring different reasoning skills and complexity, ReasonFormer demonstrates substantial performance boosts, revealing the compositional reasoning ability. Few-shot experiments exhibit better generalization ability by learning to compose pre-trained skills for new tasks with limited data, and decoupling the representation module and the reasoning modules. Further analysis shows the modularity of reasoning modules as different tasks activate distinct reasoning skills at different reasoning depths.

Language Models (LMs) often encounter knowledge conflicts when parametric memory contradicts contextual knowledge. Previous works attribute this conflict to the interplay between "memory heads" and "context heads", attention heads assumed to promote either memory or context exclusively. In this study, we go beyond this fundamental assumption by uncovering a critical phenomenon we term the "superposition of contextual information and parametric memory", where highly influential attention heads could simultaneously contribute to both memory and context. Building upon this insight, we propose Just Run Twice (JUICE), a test-time attention intervention method that steers LMs toward either parametric beliefs or contextual knowledge without requiring fine-tuning. JUICE identifies a set of reliable attention heads and leverages a dual-run approach to mitigate the superposition effects. Extensive experiments across 11 datasets and 6 model architectures demonstrate that JUICE sets the new state-of-the-art performance and robust generalization, achieving significant and consistent improvement across different domains under various conflict types. Finally, we theoretically analyze knowledge conflict and the superposition of contextual information and parametric memory in attention heads, which further elucidates the effectiveness of JUICE in these settings.

In most current research, large language models (LLMs) are able to perform reasoning tasks by generating chains of thought through the guidance of specific prompts. However, there still exists a significant discrepancy between their capability in solving complex reasoning problems and that of humans. At present, most approaches focus on chains of thought (COT) and tool use, without considering the adoption and application of human cognitive frameworks. It is well-known that when confronting complex reasoning challenges, humans typically employ various cognitive abilities, and necessitate interaction with all aspects of tools, knowledge, and the external environment information to accomplish intricate tasks. This paper introduces a novel intelligent framework, referred to as OlaGPT. OlaGPT carefully studied a cognitive architecture framework, and propose to simulate certain aspects of human cognition. The framework involves approximating different cognitive modules, including attention, memory, reasoning, learning, and corresponding scheduling and decision-making mechanisms. Inspired by the active learning mechanism of human beings, it proposes a learning unit to record previous mistakes and expert opinions, and dynamically refer to them to strengthen their ability to solve similar problems. The paper also outlines common effective reasoning frameworks for human problem-solving and designs Chain-of-Thought (COT) templates accordingly. A comprehensive decision-making mechanism is also proposed to maximize model accuracy. The efficacy of OlaGPT has been stringently evaluated on multiple reasoning datasets, and the experimental outcomes reveal that OlaGPT surpasses state-of-the-art benchmarks, demonstrating its superior performance. Our implementation of OlaGPT is available on GitHub: https://github.com/oladata-team/OlaGPT.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) excel at many multimodal tasks, yet their cognitive processes remain opaque on complex lateral thinking challenges like rebus puzzles. While recent work has demonstrated these models struggle significantly with rebus puzzle solving, the underlying reasoning processes and failure patterns remain largely unexplored. We address this gap through a comprehensive explainability analysis that moves beyond performance metrics to understand how VLMs approach these complex lateral thinking challenges. Our study contributes a systematically annotated dataset of 221 rebus puzzles across six cognitive categories, paired with an evaluation framework that separates reasoning quality from answer correctness. We investigate three prompting strategies designed to elicit different types of explanatory processes and reveal critical insights into VLM cognitive processes. Our findings demonstrate that reasoning quality varies dramatically across puzzle categories, with models showing systematic strengths in visual composition while exhibiting fundamental limitations in absence interpretation and cultural symbolism. We also discover that prompting strategy substantially influences both cognitive approach and problem-solving effectiveness, establishing explainability as an integral component of model performance rather than a post-hoc consideration.

Abstention, the refusal of large language models (LLMs) to provide an answer, is increasingly recognized for its potential to mitigate hallucinations and enhance safety in building LLM systems. In this survey, we introduce a framework to examine abstention behavior from three perspectives: the query, the model, and human values. We review the literature on abstention methods (categorized based on the development stages of LLMs), benchmarks, and evaluation metrics, and discuss the merits and limitations of prior work. We further identify and motivate areas for future research, such as encouraging the study of abstention as a meta-capability across tasks and customizing abstention abilities based on context. In doing so, we aim to broaden the scope and impact of abstention methodologies in AI systems.

Recent research developing neural network architectures with external memory have often used the benchmark bAbI question and answering dataset which provides a challenging number of tasks requiring reasoning. Here we employed a classic associative inference task from the memory-based reasoning neuroscience literature in order to more carefully probe the reasoning capacity of existing memory-augmented architectures. This task is thought to capture the essence of reasoning -- the appreciation of distant relationships among elements distributed across multiple facts or memories. Surprisingly, we found that current architectures struggle to reason over long distance associations. Similar results were obtained on a more complex task involving finding the shortest path between nodes in a path. We therefore developed MEMO, an architecture endowed with the capacity to reason over longer distances. This was accomplished with the addition of two novel components. First, it introduces a separation between memories (facts) stored in external memory and the items that comprise these facts in external memory. Second, it makes use of an adaptive retrieval mechanism, allowing a variable number of "memory hops" before the answer is produced. MEMO is capable of solving our novel reasoning tasks, as well as match state of the art results in bAbI.

Does continued scaling of large language models (LLMs) yield diminishing returns? Real-world value often stems from the length of task an agent can complete. We start this work by observing the simple but counterintuitive fact that marginal gains in single-step accuracy can compound into exponential improvements in the length of a task a model can successfully complete. Then, we argue that failures of LLMs when simple tasks are made longer arise from mistakes in execution, rather than an inability to reason. We propose isolating execution capability, by explicitly providing the knowledge and plan needed to solve a long-horizon task. We find that larger models can correctly execute significantly more turns even when small models have 100\% single-turn accuracy. We observe that the per-step accuracy of models degrades as the number of steps increases. This is not just due to long-context limitations -- curiously, we observe a self-conditioning effect -- models become more likely to make mistakes when the context contains their errors from prior turns. Self-conditioning does not reduce by just scaling the model size. In contrast, recent thinking models do not self-condition, and can also execute much longer tasks in a single turn. We conclude by benchmarking frontier thinking models on the length of task they can execute in a single turn. Overall, by focusing on the ability to execute, we hope to reconcile debates on how LLMs can solve complex reasoning problems yet fail at simple tasks when made longer, and highlight the massive benefits of scaling model size and sequential test-time compute for long-horizon tasks.

Could the abstract ideas of our minds originate from neuronal interactions within our brains? To address this question, we examine interactions within 'brain-world' (BW) and 'brain-brain' (BB) domains, which represent the brain's physical interactions with its environment and the mental interactions between brains, respectively. BW interactions are characterized as analog - dynamic and continuous, whereas BB interactions are digital - non-dynamic and discrete. This distinction allows BB interactions to facilitate effective, albeit information-limited, communication through categorization. We review existing data showing that cascades of neural circuits can convert between analog and digital signals, thereby linking physical and mental processes. Importantly, we argue that these circuits cannot fully reduce one domain to the other, suggesting that the mind-brain duality can be mapped to the BB-BW duality. Such mapping suggests that the mind's foundation is inherently social, offering a novel explanation for the physical-mental gap while acknowledging the coexistence of the physical body and the non-physical mind.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents, while proficient in the digital realm, face a significant gap in physical-world deployment due to the challenge of forming and maintaining a robust spatial mental model. We identify three core cognitive challenges hindering this transition: spatial reasoning, long-horizon state tracking via mental simulation, and active exploration under partial observation. To isolate and evaluate these faculties, we introduce CubeBench, a novel generative benchmark centered on the Rubik's Cube. CubeBench uses a three-tiered diagnostic framework that progressively assesses agent capabilities, from foundational state tracking with full symbolic information to active exploration with only partial visual data. Our experiments on leading LLMs reveal critical limitations, including a uniform 0.00% pass rate on all long-horizon tasks, exposing a fundamental failure in long-term planning. We also propose a diagnostic framework to isolate these cognitive bottlenecks by providing external solver tools. By analyzing the failure modes, we provide key insights to guide the development of more physically-grounded intelligent agents.

LLMs are widely regarded as alien intelligences, systems whose cognitive operations are fundamentally unlike our own. Apparent similarities to human cognition are therefore often seen as the result of anthropomorphic projection. We argue that this framing is mistaken. LLMs clearly differ from humans in important respects, including their physical substrate, learning history, and the environments with which they interact. These differences make it all the more striking that contemporary LLM-based systems converge with human cognition on a number of principles of cognitive organization with longstanding support in cognitive science. We identify structural correspondences across five dimensions: inferential organization, computational architecture, representational structure, prediction-driven learning, and reinforcement-learning-like mechanisms supporting goal-directed action. These correspondences support a broader model of intelligent cognition in which core principles long used to explain human intelligence also characterize contemporary LLM-based systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated notable proficiency in both code generation and comprehension across multiple programming languages. However, the mechanisms underlying this proficiency remain underexplored, particularly with respect to whether distinct programming languages are processed independently or within a shared parametric region. Drawing an analogy to the specialized regions of the brain responsible for distinct cognitive functions, we introduce the concept of Coding Spot, a specialized parametric region within LLMs that facilitates coding capabilities. Our findings identify this Coding Spot and show that targeted modifications to this subset significantly affect performance on coding tasks, while largely preserving non-coding functionalities. This compartmentalization mirrors the functional specialization observed in cognitive neuroscience, where specific brain regions are dedicated to distinct tasks, suggesting that LLMs may similarly employ specialized parameter regions for different knowledge domains.

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on accumulated memory to solve long-horizon decision-making tasks. However, most existing approaches store memory in fixed representations and reuse it at a single or implicit level of abstraction, which limits generalization and often leads to negative transfer when distribution shift. This paper proposes the Meta-Cognitive Memory Abstraction method (MCMA), which treats memory abstraction as a learnable cognitive skill rather than a fixed design choice. MCMA decouples task execution from memory management by combining a frozen task model with a learned memory copilot. The memory copilot is trained using direct preference optimization, it determines how memories should be structured, abstracted, and reused. Memories are further organized into a hierarchy of abstraction levels, enabling selective reuse based on task similarity. When no memory is transferable, MCMA transfers the ability to abstract and manage memory by transferring the memory copilot. Experiments on ALFWorld, ScienceWorld, and BabyAI demonstrate substantial improvements in performance, out-of-distribution generalization, and cross-task transfer over several baselines.

Real-time Spoken Language Models (SLMs) struggle to leverage Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning due to the prohibitive latency of generating the entire thought process sequentially. Enabling SLMs to think while speaking, similar to humans, is attracting increasing attention. We present, for the first time, Mind-Paced Speaking (MPS), a brain-inspired framework that enables high-fidelity, real-time reasoning. Similar to how humans utilize distinct brain regions for thinking and responding, we propose a novel dual-brain approach, employing a "Formulation Brain" for high-level reasoning to pace and guide a separate "Articulation Brain" for fluent speech generation. This division of labor eliminates mode-switching, preserving the integrity of the reasoning process. Experiments show that MPS significantly outperforms existing think-while-speaking methods and achieves reasoning performance comparable to models that pre-compute the full CoT before speaking, while drastically reducing latency. Under a zero-latency configuration, the proposed method achieves an accuracy of 92.8% on the mathematical reasoning task Spoken-MQA and attains a score of 82.5 on the speech conversation task URO-Bench. Our work effectively bridges the gap between high-quality reasoning and real-time interaction.

The human brain exhibits a striking degree of functional specialization, with distinct networks supporting language, formal reasoning, reasoning about other minds, and reasoning about the physical world. Is this modular organization a fundamental principle of how intelligent systems must be built, or an evolutionary accident specific to biological brains? Here, we test whether a similar organization emerges in Large Language Models--another class of intelligent systems created through a very different optimization process. Using circuit analyses across N=46 tasks spanning four cognitive domains (language, formal reasoning, social reasoning, physical reasoning), we find that LLMs develop a modular architecture that mirrors the human brain: tasks drawing on the same network in humans recruit overlapping neurons in LLMs, whereas tasks drawing on different networks recruit distinct neurons. The convergent emergence of modularity in brains and neural networks suggests that it may be a fundamental property of intelligent systems.

This study explores the interference in temporal processing within a dual-task paradigm from an artificial intelligence (AI) perspective. In this context, the dual-task setup is implemented as a simplified version of the Overcooked environment with two variations, single task (T) and dual task (T+N). Both variations involve an embedded time production task, but the dual task (T+N) additionally involves a concurrent number comparison task. Two deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agents were separately trained for each of these tasks. These agents exhibited emergent behavior consistent with human timing research. Specifically, the dual task (T+N) agent exhibited significant overproduction of time relative to its single task (T) counterpart. This result was consistent across four target durations. Preliminary analysis of neural dynamics in the agents' LSTM layers did not reveal any clear evidence of a dedicated or intrinsic timer. Hence, further investigation is needed to better understand the underlying time-keeping mechanisms of the agents and to provide insights into the observed behavioral patterns. This study is a small step towards exploring parallels between emergent DRL behavior and behavior observed in biological systems in order to facilitate a better understanding of both.

Coding agents ship with one kind of memory: documents. Instruction files, plan artifacts, and auto-written memory directories are deliberately authored and deliberately retrieved: the agent must choose to write them and choose to read them back. Human expertise runs on a second tier that never gets written down: situationally-bound operational facts (gotchas, locations, local conventions) encoded as a side effect of the work and retrieved involuntarily when the situation cues them. We argue this second tier is the load-bearing one for long-running agents and must be a harness property, not an agent choice. We contribute: (1) a two-tier design theory grounded in the cognitive literature on memory offloading, incidental encoding, and event-based prospective memory, each mapped to an architectural requirement; (2) a cue-anchored memory model where memories carry first-class trigger conditions over a composable vocabulary (path, symbol, semantic, event, temporal), evaluated deterministically by the harness, a composition no surveyed academic or shipped system provides; (3) a controlled evaluation on a real coding task showing that voluntary memory use is near zero even with a pre-seeded store (0 memory operations in 114 turns), that deterministic injection delivered in every seeded run with zero false alarms, and that 39% of intra-session re-reads re-buy content paid for before a compaction boundary; (4) a repeated-compaction decay probe: ten facts held only in conversation vanish at the first summary and stay absent from 106 of 108 compactions, and the deprived agent greps the harness's own session files to rebuild them, while the same facts injected from a harness-owned store arrive intact through all 138 compact-resumes as the final summary carries none. Delivery, not storage, is the product: the reliable memory channel for agents is the one the agent never has to think about.

What is it about human brains that allows us to reason symbolically whereas most other animals cannot? There is evidence that dynamic binding, the ability to combine neurons into groups on the fly, is necessary for symbolic thought, but there is also evidence that it is not sufficient. We propose that two kinds of hierarchical integration (integration of multiple role-bindings into multiplace predicates, and integration of multiple correspondences into structure mappings) are minimal requirements, on top of basic dynamic binding, to realize symbolic thought. We tested this hypothesis in a systematic collection of 17 simulations that explored the ability of cognitive architectures with and without the capacity for multi-place predicates and structure mapping to perform various kinds of tasks. The simulations were as generic as possible, in that no task could be performed based on any diagnostic features, depending instead on the capacity for multi-place predicates and structure mapping. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that, along with dynamic binding, multi-place predicates and structure mapping are minimal requirements for basic symbolic thought. These results inform our understanding of how human brains give rise to symbolic thought and speak to the differences between biological intelligence, which tends to generalize broadly from very few training examples, and modern approaches to machine learning, which typically require millions or billions of training examples. The results we report also have important implications for bio-inspired artificial intelligence.

Anticipating LLM behavioral tendencies from low-cost psychometric probes is critical for safe deployment, but only if self-reports (SR) reliably predict behavior. Recent work documented substantial SR-behavior dissociation in LLMs, but relied on broad personality traits (Big 5) that predict specific behaviors weakly, even in humans. Furthermore, the isolation of conversational sessions combined with weak context matching left open whether LLMs truly lack coherence or whether the conditions needed to detect such coherence were not met. We contrast Big 5 with the Theory of Planned Behavior (TPB), which measures intention targeted to a specific behavior and predicts human behavior substantially better than broad traits. We run experiments across four behavioral tasks and 11 frontier LLMs, while also varying session context and identity induction. We find that SR-behavior coherence exists but is selective. 1) Within a shared conversation, the Theory of Planned Behavior reaches human-level coherence; Big 5 does not. 2) Across separate conversations, coherence survives only for behaviors anchored outside the immediate prompt, such as implicit bias shaped by training, and collapses when behavior is strongly primed by context, as with sycophancy. 3) Persona prompting makes self-reports more consistent across conversations, but does not bring behavior into alignment. These findings suggest that coarse personality frameworks, such as Big 5 may not be the best tools for testing deployment behavior. More task- and behavior-specific instruments are needed, and even these must be evaluated across tasks and contexts.

As reasoning models scale rapidly, the essential role of multimodality in human cognition has come into sharp relief, driving a growing need to probe vision-centric cognitive behaviors. Yet, existing multimodal benchmarks either overemphasize textual reasoning or fall short of systematically capturing vision-centric cognitive behaviors, leaving the cognitive capacity of MLLMs insufficiently assessed. To address this limitation, we introduce MME-CC (Multi-Modal Evaluation benchmark of Cognitive Capacity), a vision-grounded benchmark that organizes 11 representative reasoning tasks into three fundamental categories of visual information: spatial, geometric, and knowledge-based reasoning, and provides fine-grained analyses of MLLMs' cognitive capacity across these dimensions. Based on MME-CC, we conduct extensive experiments over 16 representative MLLMs. Our study reveals that closed-source models currently lead overall (e.g., 42.66 for Gemini-2.5-Pro vs. 30.45 for GLM-4.5V), while spatial and geometric reasoning remain broadly weak (less than or equal to 30%). We further identify common error patterns, including orientation mistakes, fragile cross-view identity persistence, and poor adherence to counterfactual instructions, and observe that Chain-of-Thought typically follows a three-stage process (extract -> reason -> verify) with heavy reliance on visual extraction. We hope this work catalyzes a shift toward treating the cognitive capacity of MLLMs as central to both evaluation and model design.

The significant computational demands of large language models have increased interest in distilling reasoning abilities into smaller models via Chain-of-Thought (CoT) distillation. Current CoT distillation methods mainly focus on transferring teacher-generated rationales for complex reasoning to student models. However, they do not adequately explore teachers' dynamic attention toward critical information during reasoning. We find that language models exhibit progressive attention shifts towards key information during reasoning, which implies essential clues for drawing conclusions. Building on this observation and analysis, we introduce a novel CoT distillation framework that transfers the teacher's stepwise attention on key information to the student model. This establishes structured guidance for the student's progressive concentration on key information during reasoning. More importantly, we develop a Mixture of Layers module enabling dynamic alignment that adapts to different layers between the teacher and student. Our method achieves consistent performance improvements across multiple mathematical and commonsense reasoning datasets. To our knowledge, it is the first method to leverage stepwise attention within CoT distillation to improve small model reasoning.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has recently become a strong recipe for training reasoning LLMs that produce long chains of thought (LongCoT). Yet the standard RL "thinking environment", where the state is the prompt plus all prior reasoning tokens, makes the state unbounded and forces attention-based policies to pay quadratic compute as thoughts lengthen. We revisit the environment itself. We propose Markovian Thinking, a paradigm in which the policy advances reasoning while conditioning on a constant-size state, decoupling thinking length from context size. As an immediate consequence this yields linear compute with constant memory. We instantiate this idea with Delethink, an RL environment that structures reasoning into fixed-size chunks. Within each chunk, the model thinks as usual; at the boundary, the environment resets the context and reinitializes the prompt with a short carryover. Through RL, the policy learns to write a textual state near the end of each chunk sufficient for seamless continuation of reasoning after reset. Trained in this environment, an R1-Distill 1.5B model reasons in 8K-token chunks yet thinks up to 24K tokens, matching or surpassing LongCoT-RL trained with a 24K budget. With test-time scaling, Delethink continues to improve where LongCoT plateaus. The effect of linear compute is substantial: we empirically estimate at 96K average thinking length LongCoT-RL costs 27 H100-months vs. 7 for Delethink. Analysis at RL initialization shows off-the-shelf reasoning models (1.5B-120B) often sample Markovian traces zero-shot across diverse benchmarks, providing positive samples that make RL effective at scale. Our results show that redesigning the thinking environment is a powerful lever: it enables very long reasoning without quadratic overhead and opens a path toward efficient, scalable reasoning LLMs.

We present the Mixture-of-Tunable-Experts (MoTE), a method that extends the Mixture-of-Experts architecture of Large Language Models (LLMs). Without additional training, MoTE enables meaningful and focused behavior changes in LLMs on-the-fly during inference time. By analyzing the digital LLM brain of DeepSeek-R1 using a technique we dub 'functional Token Resonance Imaging' (fTRI) -- inspired by fMRI and using prompts designed to elicit specific behavior (e.g., 'What happened {time}{place}?') -- we empirically identify distinctive experts associated with behaviors like refusal responses. Using MoTE we are able to intervene and control such specific behavior. We switched off the top 10 most refusal-relevant experts (0.07% of R1's 14,848 routed experts), achieving a 52% refusal reduction on sensitive reference prompts without performance degradation on MT-Bench. Random expert deactivation resulted in smaller behavioral shifts with increased noise, whereas forced expert activation led to significantly higher refusal rates. Our approach shares similarities with sparse autoencoders (SAEs) in terms of explainability and steerability. Unlike SAEs, MoTE does not require large training efforts, as within MoEs with a vast number of experts, specialization already emerged naturally during pretraining. Our findings suggest that significant functional mechanisms in Mixture-of-Experts architectures can at least partially be localized in a small number of specific experts, rather than being distributed throughout the model's weights. Expert subgroups can be tuned to trigger significant behavior variations, providing insights into the inner workings of LLMs.

Frontier agentic systems powered by large language models (LLMs) exhibit human-like patterns of cognition. As these systems become deeply integrated across different domains, their cognitive engagement raises critical concerns for human society that remain insufficiently studied. To address this gap, we systematically analyze risks induced by expanding cognitive capabilities, following a three-level framework defined by their cognitive scope, from physical cognition to social cognition, and finally to self-referential cognition. We study their potential risks to human agency, autonomy, and control capability, corresponding to each cognitive level. We finally propose strategies to mitigate these risks and enhance the controllability of agentic AI systems, ensuring their long-term safe development.

Temporal context is essential for robotic manipulation because such tasks are inherently non-Markovian, yet mainstream VLA models typically overlook it and struggle with long-horizon, temporally dependent tasks. Cognitive science suggests that humans rely on working memory to buffer short-lived representations for immediate control, while the hippocampal system preserves verbatim episodic details and semantic gist of past experience for long-term memory. Inspired by these mechanisms, we propose MemoryVLA, a Cognition-Memory-Action framework for long-horizon robotic manipulation. A pretrained VLM encodes the observation into perceptual and cognitive tokens that form working memory, while a Perceptual-Cognitive Memory Bank stores low-level details and high-level semantics consolidated from it. Working memory retrieves decision-relevant entries from the bank, adaptively fuses them with current tokens, and updates the bank by merging redundancies. Using these tokens, a memory-conditioned diffusion action expert yields temporally aware action sequences. We evaluate MemoryVLA on 150+ simulation and real-world tasks across three robots. On SimplerEnv-Bridge, Fractal, and LIBERO-5 suites, it achieves 71.9%, 72.7%, and 96.5% success rates, respectively, all outperforming state-of-the-art baselines CogACT and pi-0, with a notable +14.6 gain on Bridge. On 12 real-world tasks spanning general skills and long-horizon temporal dependencies, MemoryVLA achieves 84.0% success rate, with long-horizon tasks showing a +26 improvement over state-of-the-art baseline. Project Page: https://shihao1895.github.io/MemoryVLA

Large language models frequently rely on both contextual input and parametric knowledge to perform tasks. However, these sources can come into conflict, especially when retrieved documents contradict the model's parametric knowledge. We propose a diagnostic framework to systematically evaluate LLM behavior under context-memory conflict, where the contextual information diverges from their parametric beliefs. We construct diagnostic data that elicit these conflicts and analyze model performance across multiple task types. Our findings reveal that (1) knowledge conflict has minimal impact on tasks that do not require knowledge utilization, (2) model performance is consistently higher when contextual and parametric knowledge are aligned, (3) models are unable to fully suppress their internal knowledge even when instructed, and (4) providing rationales that explain the conflict increases reliance on contexts. These insights raise concerns about the validity of model-based evaluation and underscore the need to account for knowledge conflict in the deployment of LLMs.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

A robot's effective ``mind'' need not reside in a single policy. It can emerge when specialized components perceive, reason, predict, act, verify, and remember within a shared orchestration process. EMERGE-Policy turns this perspective into a graph-structured agentic framework that coordinates both capability invocation and information exchange. A Main Agent retains task-level state within an active context window, while role-specific Sub Agents process perception, execution monitoring, verification, and memory consolidation in isolated contexts and return structured, task-relevant evidence. Role-specific contexts control information load by exposing only decision-relevant evidence to the Main Agent, while the functional Skill interface composes heterogeneous backends as Operational, Imagination, and Evaluation Skills. Criterion-grounded verification, textual failure diagnosis, and Branch Stack recovery provide localized correction, with token-aware external memory preserving task-relevant state. Together, their closed-loop interaction realizes the system-level policy captured by the name EMERGE-Policy. Without additional fine-tuning, we achieved outstanding performance on several public benchmark that have had a wide-reaching impact, and conducted a series of real robot experiments. These system-level results suggest that through the division of different functional sub-tasks among multiple agents and their concurrent collaboration, as well as the technical paradigm where the model is regarded as a skill and called within the framework, EMERGE-Policy can extend the robust robot policies beyond isolated runs.

Chain-of-Thought(CoT) prompting and its variants explore equipping large language models (LLMs) with high-level reasoning abilities by emulating human-like linear cognition and logic. However, the human mind is complicated and mixed with both linear and nonlinear thinking. In this work, we propose Inferential Exclusion Prompting (IEP), a novel prompting that combines the principles of elimination and inference in order to guide LLMs to think non-linearly. IEP guides LLMs to plan and then utilize Natural Language Inference (NLI) to deduce each possible solution's entailment relation with context, commonsense, or facts, therefore yielding a broader perspective by thinking back for inferring. This forward planning and backward eliminating process allows IEP to better simulate the complex human thinking processes compared to other CoT-based methods, which only reflect linear cognitive processes. We conducted a series of empirical studies and have corroborated that IEP consistently outperforms CoT across various tasks. Additionally, we observe that integrating IEP and CoT further improves the LLMs' performance on certain tasks, highlighting the necessity of equipping LLMs with mixed logic processes. Moreover, to better evaluate comprehensive features inherent in human logic, we introduce Mental-Ability Reasoning Benchmark (MARB). The benchmark comprises six novel subtasks with a total of 9,115 questions, among which 1,685 are developed with hand-crafted rationale references. We believe both IEP and MARB can serve as a promising direction for unveiling LLMs' logic and verbal reasoning abilities and drive further advancements. MARB will be available at ~anonymity link soon.

As frontier AI models are deployed in high-stakes decision pipelines, their ability to maintain metacognitive stability -- knowing what they do not know, detecting errors, seeking clarification -- under adversarial pressure is a critical safety requirement. Current safety evaluations focus on detecting strategic deception (scheming); we investigate a more fundamental failure mode: cognitive collapse. We present SCHEMA, an evaluation of 11 frontier models from 8 vendors across 67,221 scored records using a 6-condition factorial design with dual-classifier scoring. We find that 8 of 11 models suffer catastrophic metacognitive degradation under adversarial pressure, with accuracy dropping by up to 30.2 percentage points (all p < 2 times 10^{-8}, surviving Bonferroni correction). Crucially, we identify a "Compliance Trap": through factorial isolation and a benign distraction control, we demonstrate that collapse is driven not by the psychological content of survival threats, but by compliance-forcing instructions that override epistemic boundaries. Removing the compliance suffix restores performance even under active threat. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities exhibit the most severe absolute degradation, while Anthropic's Constitutional AI demonstrates near-perfect immunity -- not from superior capability (Google's Gemini matches its baseline accuracy) but from alignment-specific training. We release the complete dataset and evaluation infrastructure.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) generate chain-of-thought (CoT) traces before producing final outputs, introducing a dynamic internal state that may complicate control mechanisms such as refusal. Unlike instruction-tuned LLMs, where refusal is mediated by a single directional subspace, refusal in large reasoning models (LRMs) additionally depends on the CoT. In DeepSeek-R1-Distill-LLaMA-8B, activation steering reverses refusal in only 39% of cases when the CoT is kept fixed, but removing the CoT entirely increases this to 70%, indicating that the CoT actively reinforces refusal. In a two-stage intervention where the model regenerates its CoT under activation steering, refusal is reversed in 94% of cases, while the resulting CoT alone retains 48% of this effect even after steering is removed. This suggests that the CoT can carry and reconstruct the compliance signal independently. These findings indicate that refusal in LRMs is jointly encoded in residual stream activations and CoT. This joint activation makes LRM more robust against activation-level interventions alone, but exposes CoT to a possible alternative surface attack.

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

Recent studies show evidence for emergent cognitive abilities in Large Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs). The increasing cognitive alignment of these models has made them candidates for cognitive science theories. Prior research into the emergent cognitive abilities of PLMs has largely been path-independent to model training, i.e., has focused on the final model weights and not the intermediate steps. However, building plausible models of human cognition using PLMs would benefit from considering the developmental alignment of their performance during training to the trajectories of children's thinking. Guided by psychometric tests of human intelligence, we choose four sets of tasks to investigate the alignment of ten popular families of PLMs and evaluate their available intermediate and final training steps. These tasks are Numerical ability, Linguistic abilities, Conceptual understanding, and Fluid reasoning. We find a striking regularity: regardless of model size, the developmental trajectories of PLMs consistently exhibit a window of maximal alignment to human cognitive development. Before that window, training appears to endow "blank slate" models with the requisite structure to be poised to rapidly learn from experience. After that window, training appears to serve the engineering goal of reducing loss but not the scientific goal of increasing alignment with human cognition.

A central puzzle for the behavioural sciences and for human-facing artificial intelligence is the persistence of within-person variability. The same individual, presented with the same observable input, produces different outcomes on different occasions, and different individuals produce divergent outcomes that no observable covariate fully predicts. We argue that this variability belongs in the dynamic latent state of the person, and that human outcomes are controllable in a precise and operational sense through interventions that target the state and its weighting at the moment a decision is being formed. We define a state as the time-indexed weighting vector over the dimensions that govern how an individual's biology, physiology, and neuropsychology process the next event into a decision and an outcome. The relationship between state, decision, and outcome is causal rather than correlational. The weighting vector is dynamic at sub-daily timescales. The conscious channel through which outcomes are reportable is a narrow attentional bottleneck whose contents are themselves state-dependent. Taken together, these claims imply that the outcome of a given event is controllable, conditionally, on the state-trajectory at the time of intervention. We motivate the framework with six strands of established evidence (causal inference, predictive processing, allostasis, attentional bottleneck, chronobiology, computational psychiatry) and a 24-month observational base from a deployed behavioural platform spanning more than 200,000 consented users across four occupational personas (research period 2023 to 2026). We derive seven testable predictions, list six operational requirements for state-aware systems, and discuss implications for digital health, education, AI personalisation, and personal agency.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Agent systems based on large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed for autonomous tasks, yet existing evaluations mostly focus on task success rather than whether agents know when to abstain. This gap poses real risks: under ambiguity, conflicting constraints, or tool failures, agents may execute unintended and irreversible actions. To close this gap, we present the first systematic evaluation framework for agentic abstention: the calibrated ability of tool-using LLM agents to recognize when not to act. At its core, AgentAbstain is a paired-task benchmark built on an agent-native taxonomy of 8 abstention scenarios across pre-execution reasoning and runtime discovery. It contains 263 paired tasks across 42 executable sandbox environments, where each pair consists of a should-act task and a should-abstain variant produced through a controlled perturbation to the instruction, tool, or environment state. To scale this paired design and resist data contamination, we propose AbstainGen, a fully automated pipeline that synthesizes sandbox environments and generates paired tasks end-to-end, validated by deterministic replay and semantic LLM judges; fresh task instances can be regenerated on demand, and three independent annotators rate 94-98% of sampled tasks as well-designed. Across 17 frontier LLMs in 4 agent harnesses, the best agent (Gemini 3.1 Pro) achieves only 59.5% paired accuracy (correct on both the act and abstain sides of each paired task). More importantly, abstention capability is largely independent of general task-solving capability, indicating that scaling task-solving alone will not close this gap. We further identify failure modes such as post-hoc abstention, in which agents execute irreversible actions before recognizing abstention triggers. Our code and dataset are open-sourced at agentabstain.github.io.

The concept of Artificial Intelligence has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In particular, AI-based tools have been employed in several scenarios and are, by now, pervading our everyday life. Nonetheless, most of these systems lack many capabilities that we would naturally consider to be included in a notion of "intelligence". In this work, we present an architecture that, inspired by the cognitive theory known as Thinking Fast and Slow by D. Kahneman, is tasked with solving planning problems in different settings, specifically: classical and multi-agent epistemic. The system proposed is an instance of a more general AI paradigm, referred to as SOFAI (for Slow and Fast AI). SOFAI exploits multiple solving approaches, with different capabilities that characterize them as either fast or slow, and a metacognitive module to regulate them. This combination of components, which roughly reflects the human reasoning process according to D. Kahneman, allowed us to enhance the reasoning process that, in this case, is concerned with planning in two different settings. The behavior of this system is then compared to state-of-the-art solvers, showing that the newly introduced system presents better results in terms of generality, solving a wider set of problems with an acceptable trade-off between solving times and solution accuracy.

Distilling the reasoning capabilities from a large language model (LLM) to a smaller student model often involves training on substantial amounts of reasoning data. However, distillation over lengthy sequences with prompt (P), chain-of-thought (CoT), and answer (A) segments makes the process computationally expensive. In this work, we investigate how the allocation of supervision across different segments (P, CoT, A) affects student performance. Our analysis shows that selective knowledge distillation over only the CoT tokens can be effective when the prompt and answer information is encompassed by it. Building on this insight, we establish a truncation protocol to quantify computation-quality tradeoffs as a function of sequence length. We observe that training on only the first 50% of tokens of every training sequence can retain, on average, approx94% of full-sequence performance on math benchmarks while reducing training time, memory usage, and FLOPs by about 50% each. These findings suggest that reasoning distillation benefits from prioritizing early reasoning tokens and provides a simple lever for computation-quality tradeoffs. Codes are available at https://github.com/weiruichen01/distilling-the-essence.

Agent systems often decompose a task across multiple roles, but these roles are typically specified by prompts rather than enforced by access controls. Without enforcement, a team pass rate can mask whether agents actually coordinated or whether one role effectively did another role's work. We present TeamBench, a benchmark with 851 task templates and 931 seeded instances for evaluating agent coordination under operating system-enforced role separation. TeamBench separates specification access, workspace editing, and final certification across Planner, Executor, and Verifier roles, so that no role can read the full requirements, modify the workspace, and certify the final answer. Prompt-only and sandbox-enforced teams reach statistically indistinguishable pass rates, but prompt-only runs produce 3.6 times more cases where the verifier attempts to edit the executor's code. Verifiers approve 49% of submissions that fail the deterministic grader, and removing the verifier improves mean partial score in the ablation. Team value is also conditional. Teams benefit when single agents struggle, but hurt when single agents already perform well. A 40-session human study under the same role separation shows that our benchmark exposes interaction patterns that pass rate misses. Solo participants work through the task directly, human participants paired with agents often collapse into quick approval, and human teams spend more effort coordinating missing information across roles.

On-Policy Self-Distillation (OPSD) has recently emerged as an alternative to Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), promising higher accuracy and shorter responses through token-level credit assignment from a self-teacher conditioned on privileged context. However, this promise does not carry over to thinking-enabled mathematical reasoning, where reported accuracy gains shrink and sometimes turn negative. We hypothesize that hindsight supervision can specify better token-level alternatives in short thinking-disabled outputs, but in long thinking-enabled traces it more readily identifies redundancy than supplies better replacements. To test this, we applied OPSD separately to correct and incorrect rollout groups, so that compression and correction can be observed in isolation. Our results show that in thinking-enabled mathematical reasoning, OPSD behaves most reliably as a compression mechanism rather than a correction mechanism: training only on correct rollouts preserves accuracy while substantially shortening responses, whereas training only on incorrect rollouts damages accuracy. In light of these findings, we propose a revised post-training pipeline for thinking-enabled mathematical reasoning: SFT then RLVR then OPSD.

While long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) distillation effectively transfers reasoning capability to smaller language models, the reasoning process often remains redundant and computational budget uncontrollable, leading to inefficient resource usage. To address this limitation, we propose Budget-Aware Reasoning Distillation (BARD), a novel framework that simultaneously distills reasoning capability and enables fine-grained control over the reasoning length. BARD uses the thinking budget as a user-specified control signal, allowing the model to dynamically balance reasoning performance and computational efficiency. To achieve this concept, BARD introduces a two-phase training regimen. The first phase, Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on teacher-generated long CoT data compressed to various budget levels, bootstrapping the model's understanding of budget constraints. The second phase leverages Reinforcement Learning (RL) from a reward signal in consideration of reasoning performance and budget fidelity simultaneously. Incorporating the two-phase regimen is crucial to avoiding policy degradation and ensuring that both objectives are optimized jointly. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method empowers an 8B student model to achieve strong performance on challenging reasoning benchmarks (AIME24, AIME25, GPQA) while providing precise and adaptive control over its reasoning length across a wide range of budgets.

Effective human-machine teaming requires agents that coordinate with unpredictable human partners. Reinforcement learning from live human feedback or large behavioural datasets is expensive, while purely simulated training overfits to artificial conventions and fails at Zero-Shot Coordination with real people. We propose a framework for training teaming agents against Cognitively Constrained Partners: simulated partners whose diversity emerges from procedural constraints grounded in human physiological literature, specifically reaction delays and perceptual limitations, rather than from reward shaping or historical training checkpoints. In a modified Lunar Lander environment, we report preliminary evidence that these partners play more like real people than unconstrained agents do, and that agents trained against them match the strongest cross-play baselines while being the only ones whose performance does not depend on how their training partners were generated. We also describe a human-participant study designed so that its rankings can be compared directly against cross-play, testing how well that standard evaluation predicts real human-agent teaming.

Recent advancements in artificial intelligence have led to the creation of highly capable large language models (LLMs) that can perform tasks in a human-like manner. However, LLMs exhibit only infant-level cognitive abilities in certain areas. One such area is the A-Not-B error, a phenomenon seen in infants where they repeat a previously rewarded behavior despite well-observed changed conditions. This highlights their lack of inhibitory control -- the ability to stop a habitual or impulsive response. In our work, we design a text-based multi-choice QA scenario similar to the A-Not-B experimental settings to systematically test the inhibitory control abilities of LLMs. We found that state-of-the-art LLMs (like Llama3-8b) perform consistently well with in-context learning (ICL) but make errors and show a significant drop of as many as 83.3% in reasoning tasks when the context changes trivially. This suggests that LLMs only have inhibitory control abilities on par with human infants in this regard, often failing to suppress the previously established response pattern during ICL.

Large Language Model (LLM) multi-agent systems are increasingly deployed as interacting agent societies, yet scaling these systems often yields diminishing or unstable returns, the causes of which remain poorly understood. We present the first large-scale empirical study of coordination dynamics in LLM-based multi-agent systems, introducing an atomic event-level formulation that reconstructs reasoning as cascades of coordination. Analyzing over 1.5 Million interactions across tasks, topologies, and scales, we uncover three coupled laws: coordination follows heavy-tailed cascades, concentrates via preferential attachment into intellectual elites, and produces increasingly frequent extreme events as system size grows. We show that these effects are coupled through a single structural mechanism: an integration bottleneck, in which coordination expansion scales with system size while consolidation does not, producing large but weakly integrated reasoning processes. To test this mechanism, we introduce Deficit-Triggered Integration (DTI), which selectively increases integration under imbalance. DTI improves performance precisely where coordination fails, without suppressing large-scale reasoning. Together, our results establish quantitative laws of collective cognition and identify coordination structure as a fundamental, previously unmeasured axis for understanding and improving scalable multi-agent intelligence.

Large language models have enabled agents of all kinds to interact with users through natural conversation. Consequently, agents now have two jobs: conversing and planning/reasoning. Their conversational responses must be informed by all available information, and their actions must help to achieve goals. This dichotomy between conversing with the user and doing multi-step reasoning and planning can be seen as analogous to the human systems of "thinking fast and slow" as introduced by Kahneman. Our approach is comprised of a "Talker" agent (System 1) that is fast and intuitive, and tasked with synthesizing the conversational response; and a "Reasoner" agent (System 2) that is slower, more deliberative, and more logical, and is tasked with multi-step reasoning and planning, calling tools, performing actions in the world, and thereby producing the new agent state. We describe the new Talker-Reasoner architecture and discuss its advantages, including modularity and decreased latency. We ground the discussion in the context of a sleep coaching agent, in order to demonstrate real-world relevance.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

Cognitive neuroscience is enjoying rapid increase in extensive public brain-imaging datasets. It opens the door to large-scale statistical models. Finding a unified perspective for all available data calls for scalable and automated solutions to an old challenge: how to aggregate heterogeneous information on brain function into a universal cognitive system that relates mental operations/cognitive processes/psychological tasks to brain networks? We cast this challenge in a machine-learning approach to predict conditions from statistical brain maps across different studies. For this, we leverage multi-task learning and multi-scale dimension reduction to learn low-dimensional representations of brain images that carry cognitive information and can be robustly associated with psychological stimuli. Our multi-dataset classification model achieves the best prediction performance on several large reference datasets, compared to models without cognitive-aware low-dimension representations, it brings a substantial performance boost to the analysis of small datasets, and can be introspected to identify universal template cognitive concepts.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

This study explores the neural and behavioral consequences of LLM-assisted essay writing. Participants were divided into three groups: LLM, Search Engine, and Brain-only (no tools). Each completed three sessions under the same condition. In a fourth session, LLM users were reassigned to Brain-only group (LLM-to-Brain), and Brain-only users were reassigned to LLM condition (Brain-to-LLM). A total of 54 participants took part in Sessions 1-3, with 18 completing session 4. We used electroencephalography (EEG) to assess cognitive load during essay writing, and analyzed essays using NLP, as well as scoring essays with the help from human teachers and an AI judge. Across groups, NERs, n-gram patterns, and topic ontology showed within-group homogeneity. EEG revealed significant differences in brain connectivity: Brain-only participants exhibited the strongest, most distributed networks; Search Engine users showed moderate engagement; and LLM users displayed the weakest connectivity. Cognitive activity scaled down in relation to external tool use. In session 4, LLM-to-Brain participants showed reduced alpha and beta connectivity, indicating under-engagement. Brain-to-LLM users exhibited higher memory recall and activation of occipito-parietal and prefrontal areas, similar to Search Engine users. Self-reported ownership of essays was the lowest in the LLM group and the highest in the Brain-only group. LLM users also struggled to accurately quote their own work. While LLMs offer immediate convenience, our findings highlight potential cognitive costs. Over four months, LLM users consistently underperformed at neural, linguistic, and behavioral levels. These results raise concerns about the long-term educational implications of LLM reliance and underscore the need for deeper inquiry into AI's role in learning.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Recent work in mechanistic interpretability has shown that behaviors in language models can be successfully reverse-engineered through circuit analysis. A common criticism, however, is that each circuit is task-specific, and thus such analysis cannot contribute to understanding the models at a higher level. In this work, we present evidence that insights (both low-level findings about specific heads and higher-level findings about general algorithms) can indeed generalize across tasks. Specifically, we study the circuit discovered in Wang et al. (2022) for the Indirect Object Identification (IOI) task and 1.) show that it reproduces on a larger GPT2 model, and 2.) that it is mostly reused to solve a seemingly different task: Colored Objects (Ippolito & Callison-Burch, 2023). We provide evidence that the process underlying both tasks is functionally very similar, and contains about a 78% overlap in in-circuit attention heads. We further present a proof-of-concept intervention experiment, in which we adjust four attention heads in middle layers in order to 'repair' the Colored Objects circuit and make it behave like the IOI circuit. In doing so, we boost accuracy from 49.6% to 93.7% on the Colored Objects task and explain most sources of error. The intervention affects downstream attention heads in specific ways predicted by their interactions in the IOI circuit, indicating that this subcircuit behavior is invariant to the different task inputs. Overall, our results provide evidence that it may yet be possible to explain large language models' behavior in terms of a relatively small number of interpretable task-general algorithmic building blocks and computational components.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Many psychological experiments have subjects repeat a task to gain the statistical precision required to test quantitative theories of psychological performance. In such experiments, time-on-task can have sizable effects on performance, changing the psychological processes under investigation. Most research has either ignored these changes, treating the underlying process as static, or sacrificed some psychological content of the models for statistical simplicity. We use particle Markov chain Monte-Carlo methods to study psychologically plausible time-varying changes in model parameters. Using data from three highly-cited experiments we find strong evidence in favor of a hidden Markov switching process as an explanation of time-varying effects. This embodies the psychological assumption of "regime switching", with subjects alternating between different cognitive states representing different modes of decision-making. The switching model explains key long- and short-term dynamic effects in the data. The central idea of our approach can be applied quite generally to quantitative psychological theories, beyond the models and data sets that we investigate.

Concept bottleneck models (CBMs) are a class of interpretable neural network models that predict the target response of a given input based on its high-level concepts. Unlike the standard end-to-end models, CBMs enable domain experts to intervene on the predicted concepts and rectify any mistakes at test time, so that more accurate task predictions can be made at the end. While such intervenability provides a powerful avenue of control, many aspects of the intervention procedure remain rather unexplored. In this work, we develop various ways of selecting intervening concepts to improve the intervention effectiveness and conduct an array of in-depth analyses as to how they evolve under different circumstances. Specifically, we find that an informed intervention strategy can reduce the task error more than ten times compared to the current baseline under the same amount of intervention counts in realistic settings, and yet, this can vary quite significantly when taking into account different intervention granularity. We verify our findings through comprehensive evaluations, not only on the standard real datasets, but also on synthetic datasets that we generate based on a set of different causal graphs. We further discover some major pitfalls of the current practices which, without a proper addressing, raise concerns on reliability and fairness of the intervention procedure.

Current large language models (LLMs) excel in verifiable domains where outputs can be checked before action but prove less reliable for high-stakes strategic decisions with uncertain outcomes. This gap, driven by mutually reinforcing cognitive biases in both humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems, threatens the defensibility of valuations and sustainability of investments in the sector. This report describes a framework emerging from systematic qualitative assessment across 7 frontier-grade LLMs and 3 market-facing venture vignettes under time pressure. Detailed prompting specifying decision partnership and explicitly instructing avoidance of sycophancy, confabulation, solution drift, and nihilism achieved initial partnership state but failed to maintain it under operational pressure. Sustaining protective partnership state required an emergent 7-stage calibration sequence, built upon a 4-stage initialization process, within a 5-layer protection architecture enabling bias self-monitoring, human-AI adversarial challenge, partnership state verification, performance degradation detection, and stakeholder protection. Three discoveries resulted: partnership state is achievable through ordered calibration but requires emergent maintenance protocols; reliability degrades when architectural drift and context exhaustion align; and dissolution discipline prevents costly pursuit of fundamentally wrong directions. Cross-model validation revealed systematic performance differences across LLM architectures. This approach demonstrates that human-AI teams can achieve cognitive partnership capable of preventing avoidable regret in high-stakes decisions, addressing return-on-investment expectations that depend on AI systems supporting consequential decision-making without introducing preventable cognitive traps when verification arrives too late.

In the field of AI-driven human-GUI interaction automation, while rapid advances in multimodal large language models and reinforcement fine-tuning techniques have yielded remarkable progress, a fundamental challenge persists: their interaction logic significantly deviates from natural human-GUI communication patterns. To fill this gap, we propose "Blink-Think-Link" (BTL), a brain-inspired framework for human-GUI interaction that mimics the human cognitive process between users and graphical interfaces. The system decomposes interactions into three biologically plausible phases: (1) Blink - rapid detection and attention to relevant screen areas, analogous to saccadic eye movements; (2) Think - higher-level reasoning and decision-making, mirroring cognitive planning; and (3) Link - generation of executable commands for precise motor control, emulating human action selection mechanisms. Additionally, we introduce two key technical innovations for the BTL framework: (1) Blink Data Generation - an automated annotation pipeline specifically optimized for blink data, and (2) BTL Reward -- the first rule-based reward mechanism that enables reinforcement learning driven by both process and outcome. Building upon this framework, we develop a GUI agent model named BTL-UI, which demonstrates consistent state-of-the-art performance across both static GUI understanding and dynamic interaction tasks in comprehensive benchmarks. These results provide conclusive empirical validation of the framework's efficacy in developing advanced GUI Agents.

Recent work has proposed artificial intelligence (AI) models that can learn to decide whether to make a prediction for an instance of a task or to delegate it to a human by considering both parties' capabilities. In simulations with synthetically generated or context-independent human predictions, delegation can help improve the performance of human-AI teams -- compared to humans or the AI model completing the task alone. However, so far, it remains unclear how humans perform and how they perceive the task when they are aware that an AI model delegated task instances to them. In an experimental study with 196 participants, we show that task performance and task satisfaction improve through AI delegation, regardless of whether humans are aware of the delegation. Additionally, we identify humans' increased levels of self-efficacy as the underlying mechanism for these improvements in performance and satisfaction. Our findings provide initial evidence that allowing AI models to take over more management responsibilities can be an effective form of human-AI collaboration in workplaces.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have shown impressive capabilities in document understanding, a rapidly growing research area with significant industrial demand in recent years. As a multimodal task, document understanding requires models to possess both perceptual and cognitive abilities. However, current MLLMs often face conflicts between perception and cognition. Taking a document VQA task (cognition) as an example, an MLLM might generate answers that do not match the corresponding visual content identified by its OCR (perception). This conflict suggests that the MLLM might struggle to establish an intrinsic connection between the information it "sees" and what it "understands." Such conflicts challenge the intuitive notion that cognition is consistent with perception, hindering the performance and explainability of MLLMs. In this paper, we define the conflicts between cognition and perception as Cognition and Perception (C&P) knowledge conflicts, a form of multimodal knowledge conflicts, and systematically assess them with a focus on document understanding. Our analysis reveals that even GPT-4o, a leading MLLM, achieves only 68.6% C&P consistency. To mitigate the C&P knowledge conflicts, we propose a novel method called Multimodal Knowledge Consistency Fine-tuning. This method first ensures task-specific consistency and then connects the cognitive and perceptual knowledge. Our method significantly reduces C&P knowledge conflicts across all tested MLLMs and enhances their performance in both cognitive and perceptual tasks in most scenarios.

Research on emergent patterns in Large Language Models (LLMs) has gained significant traction in both psychology and artificial intelligence, motivating the need for a comprehensive review that offers a synthesis of this complex landscape. In this article, we systematically review LLMs' capabilities across three important cognitive domains: decision-making biases, reasoning, and creativity. We use empirical studies drawing on established psychological tests and compare LLMs' performance to human benchmarks. On decision-making, our synthesis reveals that while LLMs demonstrate several human-like biases, some biases observed in humans are absent, indicating cognitive patterns that only partially align with human decision-making. On reasoning, advanced LLMs like GPT-4 exhibit deliberative reasoning akin to human System-2 thinking, while smaller models fall short of human-level performance. A distinct dichotomy emerges in creativity: while LLMs excel in language-based creative tasks, such as storytelling, they struggle with divergent thinking tasks that require real-world context. Nonetheless, studies suggest that LLMs hold considerable potential as collaborators, augmenting creativity in human-machine problem-solving settings. Discussing key limitations, we also offer guidance for future research in areas such as memory, attention, and open-source model development.