Daily Papers

LLM-as-a-judge panels aggregate votes from multiple models, with the expectation that diverse models yield more reliable evaluations. We develop a framework to measure the true informational value of such panels and quantify how far their reliability falls short of the independent-voting ideal. Testing a panel of 9 frontier LLMs from 7 model families on three natural language inference datasets (each with 100 human annotations per item), we find that the 9 judges effectively provide only about 2 independent votes' worth of information. Roughly three-quarters of the panel's nominal independence is lost because the models make the same mistakes on the same items. The consequences are stark: the panel's actual accuracy falls 8-22 percentage points short of what independent voting would achieve, and the best single judge matches or outperforms the full panel across all conditions. Neither adding more judges nor using smarter aggregation algorithms helps -- established methods close at most 11% of this gap, even with access to the correct answers. We quantify these findings using the Kish effective sample size (n_eff) and a Condorcet null model, and show the deficit is robust across prompt variants, temperatures, chain-of-thought reasoning, and a pairwise preference task (RewardBench). The bottleneck is correlated judges, not the aggregation algorithm, implying that scaling up panels cannot substitute for genuinely independent evaluation.

Condorcet domains are subsets of permutations that ensure pairwise majority voting yields acyclic outcomes, and they form an active area of research at the intersection of social choice theory and combinatorics. In this paper, we extend the theory of Condorcet domains to the broader setting of arbitrary finite Coxeter groups. The core contribution of our approach is the introduction of Condorcet root posets, defined on the chosen root systems. Notably, we establish a natural bijection between closed Condorcet domains and Condorcet root posets, which facilitates the study of Condorcet domains. Using this correspondence, we extend the median graph representation of closed Condorcet domains to arbitrary finite Coxeter groups, demonstrating that these domains can be characterized by the skeletons of their associated Condorcet root posets. These results are novel even in type A. Furthermore, these posets give a unified language that efficiently captures a wide range of desirable properties of Condorcet domains, such as being maximal, connected, peak-pit, and of tiling type. Using this framework, we strengthen and generalize several classical results: we establish that a maximal Condorcet domain is connected if and only if it is peak-pit; we prove that the tiling-type property is equivalent to the combination of being maximal and connected, and having maximal width; and we show that strictly positive voting profiles on connected Condorcet domains yield outcomes with only simple ties.

We study the non-stationary dueling bandits problem with K arms, where the time horizon T consists of M stationary segments, each of which is associated with its own preference matrix. The learner repeatedly selects a pair of arms and observes a binary preference between them as feedback. To minimize the accumulated regret, the learner needs to pick the Condorcet winner of each stationary segment as often as possible, despite preference matrices and segment lengths being unknown. We propose the Beat, the, Winner, Reset algorithm and prove a bound on its expected binary weak regret in the stationary case, which tightens the bound of current state-of-art algorithms. We also show a regret bound for the non-stationary case, without requiring knowledge of M or T. We further propose and analyze two meta-algorithms, DETECT for weak regret and Monitored, Dueling, Bandits for strong regret, both based on a detection-window approach that can incorporate any dueling bandit algorithm as a black-box algorithm. Finally, we prove a worst-case lower bound for expected weak regret in the non-stationary case.

As intelligent agents become more generally-capable, i.e. able to master a wide variety of tasks, the complexity and cost of properly evaluating them rises significantly. Tasks that assess specific capabilities of the agents can be correlated and stochastic, requiring many samples for accurate comparisons, leading to added costs. In this paper, we propose a formal definition and a conceptual framework for active evaluation of agents across multiple tasks, which assesses the performance of ranking algorithms as a function of number of evaluation data samples. Rather than curating, filtering, or compressing existing data sets as a preprocessing step, we propose an online framing: on every iteration, the ranking algorithm chooses the task and agents to sample scores from. Then, evaluation algorithms report a ranking of agents on each iteration and their performance is assessed with respect to the ground truth ranking over time. Several baselines are compared under different experimental contexts, with synthetic generated data and simulated online access to real evaluation data from Atari game-playing agents. We find that the classical Elo rating system -- while it suffers from well-known failure modes, in theory -- is a consistently reliable choice for efficient reduction of ranking error in practice. A recently-proposed method, Soft Condorcet Optimization, shows comparable performance to Elo on synthetic data and significantly outperforms Elo on real Atari agent evaluation. When task variation from the ground truth is high, selecting tasks based on proportional representation leads to higher rate of ranking error reduction.

Automatic LLM benchmarks, such as AlpacaEval 2.0, Arena-Hard-Auto, and MT-Bench, have become popular for evaluating language models due to their cost-effectiveness and scalability compared to human evaluation. Achieving high win rates on these benchmarks can significantly boost the promotional impact of newly released language models. This promotional benefit may motivate tricks, such as manipulating model output length or style to game win rates, even though several mechanisms have been developed to control length and disentangle style to reduce gameability. Nonetheless, we show that even a "null model" that always outputs a constant response (irrelevant to input instructions) can cheat automatic benchmarks and achieve top-ranked win rates: an 86.5% LC win rate on AlpacaEval 2.0; an 83.0 score on Arena-Hard-Auto; and a 9.55 score on MT-Bench. Moreover, the crafted cheating outputs are transferable because we assume that the instructions of these benchmarks (e.g., 805 samples of AlpacaEval 2.0) are private and cannot be accessed. While our experiments are primarily proof-of-concept, an adversary could use LLMs to generate more imperceptible cheating responses, unethically benefiting from high win rates and promotional impact. Our findings call for the development of anti-cheating mechanisms for reliable automatic benchmarks. The code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/Cheating-LLM-Benchmarks.

Claims that language models homogenise are usually measured against human judgements collected for the study, which makes the human side an artifact of the design: a crowdworker given the model's instruction is running the model's prompt. We measure convergence against a human reference nobody built for the purpose -- 2,523 reader mark sets across 120 web documents, produced by people highlighting for their own reasons on a platform where the overlay of others' marks is off by default. Agreement is the overlap between two size-matched sentence sets minus the overlap expected when each is resampled within its own depth-and-length bands. The null's calibration is demonstrated, not asserted: every pair involving a random baseline lands within 0.006 of zero. On the median document each party names 14 sentences of 70; two readers share 4.1 and two models 8.7. Across 18 model arms spanning 11 vendors, 3 countries and both weight regimes, the median of 153 model pairs is +0.093 against a human yardstick of +0.040, and 99 sit entirely above the human interval. Two frontier models from rival labs reach +0.203, twice what GPT-4o agrees with itself on a second call. The effect is not determinism, prompt wording, procedure, vendor or routing, and it is graded: the smallest models agree at the human level. No model agrees with readers detectably more than a reader does, and at equal depth and length no surface feature separates their choices. The multiples are procedure-dependent and the ordering is not: models are cut to their sharpest set while a reader's is a random draw from what they marked, and blunting the models alike halves the gap without closing it. Tested out of sample on four models released after this analysis, against predictions fixed beforehand, none clears the human interval. A population simulated from several models is not several populations.

LLM inference often generates a batch of candidates for a prompt and selects one via strategies like majority voting or Best-of- N (BoN). For difficult tasks, this single-shot selection often underperforms. Consequently, evaluations commonly report Pass@k: the agent may submit up to k responses, and only the best of them is used when computing regret. Motivated by this, we study inference scaling in the more general Pass@k inference setting, and prove that neither majority voting nor BoN exhibits the desirable scaling with k and the sampling budget N. Combining the advantages of majority voting and BoN, we propose a new inference strategy called Best-of-Majority (BoM), with a pivotal step that restricts the candidates to the responses with high frequency in the N samples before selecting the top-k rewards. We prove that when the sampling budget is N=tildeOmega(C^*), the regret of BoM is O(epsilon_{opt}+epsilon_{mathrm{RM}^2C^*/k}), where C^* is the coverage coefficient, epsilon_{RM} is the estimation error of the reward model, and epsilon_{opt} is the estimation error of reward at the optimal response. We further establish a matching lower bound, certifying that our algorithm is minimax optimal. Beyond optimality, BoM has a key advantage: unlike majority voting and BoN, its performance does not degrade when increasing N. Experimental results of inference on math problems show BoM outperforming both majority voting and BoN.

Modern large language models (LLMs) have exhibited cooperative synergy on complex task-solving, and collective decision-making (CDM) is a pivotal component in LLM-based multi-agent collaboration frameworks. Our survey on 52 recent such systems uncovers a severe lack of diversity, with a heavy reliance on dictatorial and plurality voting for CDM. Through the lens of social choice theory, we scrutinize widely-adopted CDM methods and identify their limitations. To enrich current landscape of LLM-based CDM, we present GEDI, an electoral CDM module that incorporates various ordinal preferential voting mechanisms. Our empirical case study across three benchmarks shows that the integration of certain CDM methods can markedly improve the reasoning capabilities and robustness of some leading LLMs, all without requiring intricate system designs. Additionally, we find that some CDM mechanisms generate positive synergies even with as few as three agents. The voting-based methods also demonstrate robustness against single points of failure, as well as diversity in terms of hit-rate@k and subject-wise impacts.

Building on developments in machine learning and prior work in the science of judicial prediction, we construct a model designed to predict the behavior of the Supreme Court of the United States in a generalized, out-of-sample context. To do so, we develop a time evolving random forest classifier which leverages some unique feature engineering to predict more than 240,000 justice votes and 28,000 cases outcomes over nearly two centuries (1816-2015). Using only data available prior to decision, our model outperforms null (baseline) models at both the justice and case level under both parametric and non-parametric tests. Over nearly two centuries, we achieve 70.2% accuracy at the case outcome level and 71.9% at the justice vote level. More recently, over the past century, we outperform an in-sample optimized null model by nearly 5%. Our performance is consistent with, and improves on the general level of prediction demonstrated by prior work; however, our model is distinctive because it can be applied out-of-sample to the entire past and future of the Court, not a single term. Our results represent an important advance for the science of quantitative legal prediction and portend a range of other potential applications.

We propose a general two-stage algorithm that enjoys a provable scaling law for the test-time compute of large language models (LLMs). Given an input problem, the proposed algorithm first generates N candidate solutions, and then chooses the best one via a multiple-round knockout tournament where each pair of candidates are compared for K times and only the winners move on to the next round. In a minimalistic implementation, both stages can be executed with a black-box LLM alone and nothing else (e.g., no external verifier or reward model), and a total of N times (K + 1) highly parallelizable LLM calls are needed for solving an input problem. Assuming that a generated candidate solution is correct with probability p_{gen} > 0 and a comparison between a pair of correct and incorrect solutions identifies the right winner with probability p_{comp} > 0.5 (i.e., better than a random guess), we prove theoretically that the failure probability of the proposed algorithm decays to zero exponentially with respect to N and K: $P(final output is incorrect) le (1 - p_{gen})^N + lceil log_2 N rceil e^{-2 K (p_{comp} - 0.5)^2}.$ Our empirical results with the challenging MMLU-Pro benchmark validate the technical assumptions, as well as the efficacy of the proposed algorithm and the gains from scaling up its test-time compute.

The mathematical study of voting, social choice theory, has traditionally only been applicable to choices among a few predetermined alternatives, but not to open-ended decisions such as collectively selecting a textual statement. We introduce generative social choice, a design methodology for open-ended democratic processes that combines the rigor of social choice theory with the capability of large language models to generate text and extrapolate preferences. Our framework divides the design of AI-augmented democratic processes into two components: first, proving that the process satisfies representation guarantees when given access to oracle queries; second, empirically validating that these queries can be approximately implemented using a large language model. We apply this framework to the problem of summarizing free-form opinions into a proportionally representative slate of opinion statements; specifically, we develop a democratic process with representation guarantees and use this process to portray the opinions of participants in a survey about abortion policy. In a trial with 100 representative US residents, we find that 84 out of 100 participants feel "excellently" or "exceptionally" represented by the slate of five statements we extracted.

Text-to-image models now generate graphic design at production scale, yet their supervision still comes primarily from photo-style preference datasets with a single overall verdict per comparison. Designers evaluate designs along several distinct axes (e.g., typography, layout, color harmony) that a single preference label collapses. We release TASTE (Typography, Aesthetics, Spatial, Tone, Etc.), a multi-dimensional preference dataset in which two disjoint cohorts of five professional designers each ranked outputs from four current text-to-image models across nine criteria along with per-image hallucination flags. We pair the dataset with two contributions. First, a criterion-agnostic signal-validation framework based on Kendall's τ, majority-vote probability, and Condorcet cycles against exact iid-uniform nulls; the analysis reveals significant but moderate designer agreement, with every TASTE criterion rejecting the random-rater null. Second, we benchmark preference models on TASTE and find that off-the-shelf VLM judges and dedicated T2I scorers fail to reach majority agreement with the designer panel, while a small MLP head trained directly on TASTE substantially narrows the gap to the single-rater ceiling, setting a baseline for future TASTE-trained preference models.