Daily Papers

Object tracking is one of the most important and fundamental disciplines of Computer Vision. Many Computer Vision applications require specific object tracking capabilities, including autonomous and smart vehicles, video surveillance, medical treatments, and many others. The OpenCV as one of the most popular libraries for Computer Vision includes several hundred Computer Vision algorithms. Object tracking tasks in the library can be roughly clustered in single and multiple object trackers. The library is widely used for real-time applications, but there are a lot of unanswered questions such as when to use a specific tracker, how to evaluate its performance, and for what kind of objects will the tracker yield the best results? In this paper, we evaluate 7 trackers implemented in OpenCV against the MOT20 dataset. The results are shown based on Multiple Object Tracking Accuracy (MOTA) and Multiple Object Tracking Precision (MOTP) metrics.

Practical uncertainty quantification (UQ) for large language models must decide, from a single generation, whether a specific answer should be trusted. Existing methods either sample multiple generations, read only output-token probabilities, or reduce the model's internal computation to a single hidden state. We introduce ActMap, a white-box representation that compresses the generation-time hidden-state trajectory (every layer, every generated token) into a fixed 12times32times128 tensor of temporal-statistic channels that preserves structure across transformer depth and pooled hidden coordinates. The map is captured during the generation pass with no measurable overhead, has a fixed shape across model depths and hidden sizes, and occupies 96 KiB: a compact artifact that can be retained for audit-relevant generations and probed directly, with occlusion analysis localizing the classifier's signal to mid-depth regions of the map. A lightweight classifier, instantiated as a compact Vision Transformer, reads an estimated correctness probability from each map in a fraction of a millisecond; capacity-matched MLPs perform comparably, indicating the representation itself carries the result. Trained and evaluated in-domain on short-answer QA, direct-answer math, and summarization factuality with three instruction-tuned 7-8B models, ActMap consistently outperforms sampling, token-probability, attention, and embedding baselines, and matches ACT-ViT, a detector trained on dense activation tensors 67times larger, at essentially the same mean AUROC with lower calibration error on ten of twelve pairs. The resulting score supports abstention, routing, and selective verification from a single generation, making it a practical primitive for scalable oversight of deployed models.

Post-training quantization is often treated as a semantically neutral optimization for edge deployment of Large Language Models. When a full-precision source checkpoint is evaluated and quantization is applied downstream without equivalent re-evaluation, this workflow creates a structural validation--deployment gap: because quantization is a many-to-one mapping over parameter space, source-precision certification does not guarantee behavioral equivalence in the deployed configuration. We formalize this gap through Quantization Behavioral Equivalence Classes (QBECs) and prove that QBEC membership does not imply behavioral equivalence, providing a theoretical basis for quantization-triggered backdoor attacks. Building on a three-stage adversarial fine-tuning framework, we embed latent malicious payloads into models that satisfy the source-precision checks used in our evaluation, yet activate targeted adversarial behavior upon INT8 or 4-bit compression. We evaluate this threat in two operationally motivated scenarios, tactical machine translation and political content analysis, extending prior work from decoder-only causal LMs to multilingual encoder-decoder sequence-to-sequence models. Results show that backdoored translation models move from zero measured friend--foe corruption at repaired FP16 to up to 85.02% inversion after quantization, and that a paired stance classifier measures an ideological shift of up to ΔBias=0.33 upon compression. A cross-quantizer transferability analysis further shows that attack persistence varies across quantization schemes and model architectures, rather than being determined by nominal bit-width alone. These findings demonstrate that source-precision auditing alone does not rule out quantization-triggered behavior and that the final deployed configuration must be included in behavioral certification for trustworthy edge AI.

Vulnerability detection in C programs is a critical challenge in software security. Although large language models (LLMs) achieve strong detection performance, their multi-billion-parameter scale makes them impractical for integration into development workflows requiring low latency and continuous analysis. We introduce VULNSCOUT-C, a compact transformer architecture with 693M total parameters (353M active during inference), derived from the Qwen model family and optimized for C code vulnerability detection. Alongside the model, we present VULNSCOUT, a new 33,565-sample curated dataset generated through a controlled multi-agent pipeline with formal verification, designed to fill coverage gaps in existing benchmarks across underrepresented CWE categories. Evaluated on a standardized C vulnerability detection benchmark, VULNSCOUT-C outperforms all evaluated baselines, including state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs and commercial static analysis tools, while offering a fraction of their inference cost. These results demonstrate that task-specialized compact architectures can match or even outperform the detection capability of models orders of magnitude larger, making continuous, low-latency vulnerability analysis practical within real-world development workflows.

Recent decisions by leading AI labs to either open-source their models or to restrict access to their models has sparked debate about whether, and how, increasingly capable AI models should be shared. Open-sourcing in AI typically refers to making model architecture and weights freely and publicly accessible for anyone to modify, study, build on, and use. This offers advantages such as enabling external oversight, accelerating progress, and decentralizing control over AI development and use. However, it also presents a growing potential for misuse and unintended consequences. This paper offers an examination of the risks and benefits of open-sourcing highly capable foundation models. While open-sourcing has historically provided substantial net benefits for most software and AI development processes, we argue that for some highly capable foundation models likely to be developed in the near future, open-sourcing may pose sufficiently extreme risks to outweigh the benefits. In such a case, highly capable foundation models should not be open-sourced, at least not initially. Alternative strategies, including non-open-source model sharing options, are explored. The paper concludes with recommendations for developers, standard-setting bodies, and governments for establishing safe and responsible model sharing practices and preserving open-source benefits where safe.