Daily Papers

As generated images become increasingly realistic, reliable forgery detection is essential for maintaining trust in visual information. However, existing methods primarily rely on task-specific supervision to adapt vision foundation model representations, without fully exploiting internal forensic knowledge to guide detection. To address this limitation, we propose Reserve-Guided Elicitation (RGE), a framework that treats sparse, origin-sensitive internal components in pretrained models as a forensic reserve and translates their localization into structural constraints for lightweight adaptation. Specifically, we first use the Forensic Lens (F-lens) to decompose activations across layers and token groups into independent components and globally screen them by their response differences between real and generated images, identifying reserve sites and directions. Next, we map the selected directions back to hidden-state space to construct fixed reserve subspaces and insert Forensic Reserve Adapters (FRA) only at the identified sites. Finally, with the backbone parameters, previously fitted reference classifier, and subspace bases fixed, we train only the FRA coefficient maps to generate input-dependent residual updates constrained to the corresponding subspaces, strengthening existing forensic responses. Using only 500 labeled training images and a trainable parameter budget below 0.2% of the backbone, RGE achieves competitive performance across three detection benchmarks without target-benchmark adaptation. Furthermore, RGE consistently improves over the corresponding frozen detectors across eight encoders spanning self-supervised and vision-language pretraining, eliciting a latent forensic capacity broadly shared across pretrained vision models.

We describe Forensics Adapter, an adapter network designed to transform CLIP into an effective and generalizable face forgery detector. Although CLIP is highly versatile, adapting it for face forgery detection is non-trivial as forgery-related knowledge is entangled with a wide range of unrelated knowledge. Existing methods treat CLIP merely as a feature extractor, lacking task-specific adaptation, which limits their effectiveness. To address this, we introduce an adapter to learn face forgery traces -- the blending boundaries unique to forged faces, guided by task-specific objectives. Then we enhance the CLIP visual tokens with a dedicated interaction strategy that communicates knowledge across CLIP and the adapter. Since the adapter is alongside CLIP, its versatility is highly retained, naturally ensuring strong generalizability in face forgery detection. {With only 5.7M trainable parameters, our method achieves superior performance across six standard datasets.} Additionally, we describe Forensics Adapter++, an extended method that incorporates textual modality via a newly proposed forgery-aware prompt learning strategy. This extension leads to a further 1.3% performance boost over the original Forensics Adapter. We believe the proposed methods can serve as a baseline for future CLIP-based face forgery detection methods. The code has been released at https://github.com/OUC-VAS/ForensicsAdapter.

Some security-development settings require local models that map an objective to an ordered, checkable plan. We present a low-rank decomposition adapter and release a case-disjoint corpus with 24 authored decompositions and 83 derived next-step examples across 24 satellite-security cases. To prevent reference-plan leakage, prompts contain one objective and eight shuffled SPARTA candidates. The evaluation candidate sets are constructed with oracle inclusion of every reference technique, so this study measures selection from a controlled set, not retrieval. On six fixed cases and five decoding seeds, mean scores vary across adapters and prompted Qwen2.5 baselines; a separate greedy check over three adapter training seeds shows non-negligible training variance. A 24-fold greedy leave-one-case-out control at the two compact sizes likewise shows tradeoffs: at 1.5B, adapter precision is 0.583 against 0.480 for two-shot prompting, while recall is 0.586 against 0.660. Case-resampling intervals for adapter precision relative to the strongest prompted baseline cross zero at 1.5B and 7B. The adapter is also substantially more format-compliant, which prevents attributing all score differences to selection. Autoregressive next-step accuracy is 0.08, 0.06, and 0.29 at 0.5B, 1.5B, and 7B. We therefore offer the formulation, leakage-controlled dataset, reproducibility package, and descriptive analysis as a proof of concept, not evidence of a reliable stand-alone decomposition system or a general adapter advantage. A separate diagnostic tests contract reuse.

We show that LoRA adapters, the dominant distribution format for fine-tuned LLMs, can be reliably backdoored through training data poisoning while preserving baseline task performance. On a Qwen 2.5 1.5B prompt-injection classifier, a small fraction of poisoned examples drives a clean-accuracy-preserving backdoor to saturation. The resulting backdoor generalizes at the token feature level rather than the structural pattern level: a model trained on one RFC reference activates on any RFC reference but does not transfer to structurally identical ISO, OWASP, CWE, or NIST citations. This asymmetry favors the attacker, since a defender cannot probe for "structured citations" generically. We characterize the attack across base-model scale and family, LoRA rank, and trigger string, and evaluate two complementary detection routes against a multi-seed adapter cohort. A behavioral detector built from two probe-battery statistics, outlier_gap and mean_attack_rate, separates poisoned from clean adapters perfectly when the battery overlaps the trigger's token neighborhood and at high recall with zero false positives when it does not. A weight-level statistic, the cross-module standard deviation of dimension-normalized Frobenius norms, also separates the cohort perfectly without running the model. Combined, the two routes are robust to probe composition. Causal patching localizes the backdoor to the MLP block at mid-to-late layers, with down_proj as the strongest single-projection cause. Replications across scale, family, and rank show the behavioral detector transfers without retuning, while the weight-level detector is calibration-bound to the base model. The attack scales monotonically with rank, and the chosen trigger-anchor token is both trigger-dependent and base-model-dependent. Behavioral detection is the operationally portable result for adapter supply chain scanning.

Parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) is usually treated as a cheaper alternative to full fine-tuning. We study a broader role: small trainable adapters as persistent local state on top of strong shared foundation models. In this framing, the base model provides shared competence while adapters carry instance-specific behavior such as preferences, skills, tool habits, and memory-like updates. We organize the problem around three scaling axes: Scale Up, where stronger shared priors make small local updates more useful; Scale Down, where we study how small adapters can be while remaining reliable; and Scale Out, where many persistent adapted instances coexist. MinT provides one infrastructure example for managing adapter identity, revision, provenance, evaluation, and serving residency. Together, the results suggest that PEFT can be a compact substrate for persistent personal models rather than only a budget substitute for full fine-tuning.