Daily Papers

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

We revisit the noisy binary search model of Karp and Kleinberg, in which we have n coins with unknown probabilities p_i that we can flip. The coins are sorted by increasing p_i, and we would like to find where the probability crosses (to within varepsilon) of a target value tau. This generalized the fixed-noise model of Burnashev and Zigangirov , in which p_i = 1{2} pm varepsilon, to a setting where coins near the target may be indistinguishable from it. Karp and Kleinberg showed that Theta(1{varepsilon^2} log n) samples are necessary and sufficient for this task. We produce a practical algorithm by solving two theoretical challenges: high-probability behavior and sharp constants. We give an algorithm that succeeds with probability 1-delta from \[ 1{C_{\tau, \varepsilon}} \cdot \left(\lg n + O(\log^{2/3} n \log^{1/3} 1{\delta} + \log 1{\delta})\right) \] samples, where C_{tau, varepsilon} is the optimal such constant achievable. For delta > n^{-o(1)} this is within 1 + o(1) of optimal, and for delta ll 1 it is the first bound within constant factors of optimal.