Daily Papers

The advent of Scientific Machine Learning has heralded a transformative era in scientific discovery, driving progress across diverse domains. Central to this progress is uncovering scientific laws from experimental data through symbolic regression. However, existing approaches are dominated by heuristic algorithms or data-hungry black-box methods, which often demand low-noise settings and lack principled uncertainty quantification. Motivated by interpretable Statistical Artificial Intelligence, we develop a hierarchical Bayesian framework for symbolic regression that represents scientific laws as ensembles of tree-structured symbolic expressions endowed with a regularized tree prior. This coherent probabilistic formulation enables full posterior inference via an efficient Markov chain Monte Carlo algorithm, yielding a balance between predictive accuracy and structural parsimony. To guide symbolic model selection, we develop a marginal posterior-based criterion adhering to the Occam's window principle and further quantify structural fidelity to ground truth through a tailored expression-distance metric. On the theoretical front, we establish near-minimax rate of Bayesian posterior concentration, providing the first rigorous guarantee in context of symbolic regression. Empirical evaluation demonstrates robust performance of our proposed methodology against state-of-the-art competing modules on a simulated example, a suite of canonical Feynman equations, and single-atom catalysis dataset.

Reasoning is a core capability in artificial intelligence systems, for which large language models (LLMs) have recently shown remarkable progress. However, most work focuses exclusively on deductive reasoning, which is problematic since other types of reasoning are also essential in solving real-world problems, and they are less explored. This work focuses on evaluating LLMs' inductive and abductive reasoning capabilities. We introduce a programmable and synthetic dataset, InAbHyD (pronounced in-a-bid), where each reasoning example consists of an incomplete world model and a set of observations. The task for the intelligent agent is to produce hypotheses to explain observations under the incomplete world model to solve each reasoning example. We propose a new metric to evaluate the quality of hypotheses based on Occam's Razor. We evaluate and analyze some state-of-the-art LLMs. Our analysis shows that LLMs can perform inductive and abductive reasoning in simple scenarios, but struggle with complex world models and producing high-quality hypotheses, even with popular reasoning-enhancing techniques such as in-context learning and RLVR.

Capable language models hold what a character believes apart from what is true: told "Anna believes the cup is blue; in reality it is red," they answer blue about Anna and red about the world. Where in the computation does that separation live? We show it rests on two separable mechanisms at two positions. A generic value slot binds the attributed value. A router at the query position selects which frame, the character's belief or reality, a query reads out. Two routes fill the slot: an asserted belief, whose value the text supplies, binds in directly; a derived belief, whose value must be inferred from what the character could see, arrives by a visibility-gated lookback. A subspace trained on either route steers the other, and only the derived route depends on described visibility. The slot itself carries no belief-reality tag: intervening on it moves a reality readout as strongly as a belief one. The separation lives instead in a dissociated pair of routing subspaces, which flip a query between frames without injecting the donor's value. These results hold across three architectures, on stimuli de-confounded against theory-of-mind-benchmark shortcuts; the behavior itself emerges between 3B and 7B across five model families. This paper develops the single belief-reality axis in depth; a companion paper shows the same slot-and-router format is shared across the other non-actual contexts a sentence can open (counterfactual, fictional, temporal).

Existing omni-modal benchmarks attempt to measure modality-specific contributions, but their measurements are confounded: naturally co-occurring modalities carry correlated yet unequal information, making it unclear whether results reflect true modality reliance or information asymmetry. We introduce OMD-Bench, where all modalities are initially congruent - each presenting the same anchor, an object or event independently perceivable through video, audio, and text - which we then systematically corrupt to isolate each modality's contribution. We also evaluate calibrated abstention: whether models appropriately refrain from answering when evidence is conflicting. The benchmark comprises 4,080 instances spanning 27 anchors across eight corruption conditions. Evaluating ten omni-modal models under zero-shot and chain-of-thought prompting, we find that models over-abstain when two modalities are corrupted yet under-abstain severely when all three are, while maintaining high confidence (~60-100%) even under full corruption. Chain-of-thought prompting improves abstention alignment with human judgment but amplifies overconfidence rather than mitigating it. OMD-Bench provides a diagnostic benchmark for diagnosing modality reliance, robustness to cross-modal inconsistency, and uncertainty calibration in omni-modal systems.

Object-centric learning (OCL) seeks to learn representations that only encode an object, isolated from other objects or background cues in a scene. This approach underpins various aims, including out-of-distribution (OOD) generalization, sample-efficient composition, and modeling of structured environments. Most research has focused on developing unsupervised mechanisms that separate objects into discrete slots in the representation space, evaluated using unsupervised object discovery. However, with recent sample-efficient segmentation models, we can separate objects in the pixel space and encode them independently. This achieves remarkable zero-shot performance on OOD object discovery benchmarks, is scalable to foundation models, and can handle a variable number of slots out-of-the-box. Hence, the goal of OCL methods to obtain object-centric representations has been largely achieved. Despite this progress, a key question remains: How does the ability to separate objects within a scene contribute to broader OCL objectives, such as OOD generalization? We address this by investigating the OOD generalization challenge caused by spurious background cues through the lens of OCL. We propose a novel, training-free probe called Object-Centric Classification with Applied Masks (OCCAM), demonstrating that segmentation-based encoding of individual objects significantly outperforms slot-based OCL methods. However, challenges in real-world applications remain. We provide the toolbox for the OCL community to use scalable object-centric representations, and focus on practical applications and fundamental questions, such as understanding object perception in human cognition. Our code is available https://github.com/AlexanderRubinstein/OCCAM{here}.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) frequently "hallucinate" - generate plausible yet factually incorrect statements - posing a critical barrier to their trustworthy deployment. In this work, we propose a new paradigm for diagnosing hallucinations, recasting them from static output errors into dynamic pathologies of a model's computational cognition. Our framework is grounded in a normative principle of computational rationality, allowing us to model a VLM's generation as a dynamic cognitive trajectory. We design a suite of information-theoretic probes that project this trajectory onto an interpretable, low-dimensional Cognitive State Space. Our central discovery is a governing principle we term the geometric-information duality: a cognitive trajectory's geometric abnormality within this space is fundamentally equivalent to its high information-theoretic surprisal. Hallucination detection is counts as a geometric anomaly detection problem. Evaluated across diverse settings - from rigorous binary QA (POPE) and comprehensive reasoning (MME) to unconstrained open-ended captioning (MS-COCO) - our framework achieves state-of-the-art performance. Crucially, it operates with high efficiency under weak supervision and remains highly robust even when calibration data is heavily contaminated. This approach enables a causal attribution of failures, mapping observable errors to distinct pathological states: perceptual instability (measured by Perceptual Entropy), logical-causal failure (measured by Inferential Conflict), and decisional ambiguity (measured by Decision Entropy). Ultimately, this opens a path toward building AI systems whose reasoning is transparent, auditable, and diagnosable by design.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) outputs let us read a model's step-by-step reasoning. Since any long, serial reasoning process must pass through this textual trace, the quality of the CoT is a direct window into what the model is thinking. This visibility could help us spot unsafe or misaligned behavior (monitorability), but only if the CoT is transparent about its internal reasoning (faithfulness). Fully measuring faithfulness is difficult, so researchers often focus on examining the CoT in cases where the model changes its answer after adding a cue to the input. This proxy finds some instances of unfaithfulness but loses information when the model maintains its answer, and does not investigate aspects of reasoning not tied to the cue. We extend these results to a more holistic sense of monitorability by introducing verbosity: whether the CoT lists every factor needed to solve the task. We combine faithfulness and verbosity into a single monitorability score that shows how well the CoT serves as the model's external `working memory', a property that many safety schemes based on CoT monitoring depend on. We evaluate instruction-tuned and reasoning models on BBH, GPQA, and MMLU. Our results show that models can appear faithful yet remain hard to monitor when they leave out key factors, and that monitorability differs sharply across model families. We release our evaluation code using the Inspect library to support reproducible future work.

Spatial reasoning is a fundamental capability for vision-language models (VLMs) deployed in real-world environments. However, visual observations are inherently limited representations of a 3D world: occlusion can render objects invisible, and perspective can make geometric properties misleading. Despite this, existing spatial reasoning benchmarks typically assume that observations are sufficient and reliable, focusing on whether models produce correct answers rather than whether they recognize when a question cannot be answered and what additional observations would be needed. In this work, we challenge this assumption by constructing a controlled evaluation framework, SpatialUncertain, and introducing two types of observation challenges: (1) occlusion, which hides target information, and (2) perspective ambiguity, which produces misleading visual cues. For each configuration, we design spatial questions that are answerable under clean observations but require abstention under the introduced challenges. We further evaluate whether models can identify which additional viewpoints would resolve perspective ambiguity. Our results across a diverse set of frontier open- and closed-source VLMs reveal two consistent failure modes. First, models are prone to overconfident answering, attempting to solve spatial reasoning tasks even when visual evidence is incomplete or misleading, with average accuracy around 30\% under occlusion and below 10\% under perspective ambiguity. Second, even when additional views are available, some models perform near random chance in identifying which would provide reliable evidence. Together, our findings call for moving beyond answer correctness toward evaluating whether models know when to abstain and how to seek reliable evidence.

What is reasoning? This question has driven centuries of philosophical inquiry, from Aristotle's syllogisms to modern computational complexity theory. In the age of large language models achieving superhuman performance on benchmarks like GSM8K (95\% accuracy) and HumanEval (90\% pass@1), we must ask: have these systems learned to reason, or have they learned to pattern-match over reasoning traces? This paper argues for a specific answer: reasoning is iterative operator application in state spaces, converging to fixed points. This definition is not merely philosophical -- it has concrete architectural implications that explain both the failures of current systems and the path to genuine reasoning capabilities. Our investigation begins with a puzzle (OpenXOR), progresses through theory (OpenOperator), and culminates in a working solution (OpenLM) that achieves 76\% accuracy where state-of-the-art LLMs achieve 0\%. This is not about criticizing existing systems, but about understanding what reasoning requires and building architectures that provide it.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have shown remarkable proficiency on general-purpose vision-language benchmarks, reaching or even exceeding human-level performance. However, these evaluations typically rely on standard in-distribution data, leaving the robustness of MLLMs largely unexamined when faced with scenarios that defy common-sense priors. To address this gap, we introduce VIA-Bench, a challenging benchmark designed to probe model performance on visual illusions and anomalies. It includes six core categories: color illusions, motion illusions, gestalt illusions, geometric and spatial illusions, general visual illusions, and visual anomalies. Through careful human-in-the-loop review, we construct over 1K high-quality question-answer pairs that require nuanced visual reasoning. Extensive evaluation of over 20 state-of-the-art MLLMs, including proprietary, open-source, and reasoning-enhanced models, uncovers significant vulnerabilities. Notably, we find that Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning offers negligible robustness, often yielding ``brittle mirages'' where the model's logic collapses under illusory stimuli. Our findings reveal a fundamental divergence between machine and human perception, suggesting that resolving such perceptual bottlenecks is critical for the advancement of artificial general intelligence. The benchmark data and code will be released.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

As reasoning models scale rapidly, the essential role of multimodality in human cognition has come into sharp relief, driving a growing need to probe vision-centric cognitive behaviors. Yet, existing multimodal benchmarks either overemphasize textual reasoning or fall short of systematically capturing vision-centric cognitive behaviors, leaving the cognitive capacity of MLLMs insufficiently assessed. To address this limitation, we introduce MME-CC (Multi-Modal Evaluation benchmark of Cognitive Capacity), a vision-grounded benchmark that organizes 11 representative reasoning tasks into three fundamental categories of visual information: spatial, geometric, and knowledge-based reasoning, and provides fine-grained analyses of MLLMs' cognitive capacity across these dimensions. Based on MME-CC, we conduct extensive experiments over 16 representative MLLMs. Our study reveals that closed-source models currently lead overall (e.g., 42.66 for Gemini-2.5-Pro vs. 30.45 for GLM-4.5V), while spatial and geometric reasoning remain broadly weak (less than or equal to 30%). We further identify common error patterns, including orientation mistakes, fragile cross-view identity persistence, and poor adherence to counterfactual instructions, and observe that Chain-of-Thought typically follows a three-stage process (extract -> reason -> verify) with heavy reliance on visual extraction. We hope this work catalyzes a shift toward treating the cognitive capacity of MLLMs as central to both evaluation and model design.

As chain of thought (CoT) has become central to scaling reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs), it has also emerged as a promising tool for interpretability, suggesting the opportunity to understand model decisions through verbalized reasoning. However, the utility of CoT toward interpretability depends upon its faithfulness---whether the model's stated reasoning reflects the underlying decision process. We provide mechanistic evidence that instruction-tuned models often determine their answer before generating CoT. Training linear probes on residual stream activations at the last token before CoT, we can predict the model's final answer with >0.9 AUC on most tasks. We find that these directions are not only predictive, but also causal: steering activations along the probe direction often flips model answers, with flip rates substantially exceeding norm-matched orthogonal baselines across most model-dataset pairs. When steering induces incorrect answers, we observe two distinct failure modes: confabulation (fabricating false premises) and non-entailment (stating correct premises but drawing unsupported conclusions). While post-hoc reasoning may be instrumentally useful when the model has a correct pre-CoT belief, these failure modes suggest it can result in undesirable behaviors when reasoning from a false belief.

Serial verification gates are a core reliability primitive in LLM harnesses: a candidate answer is returned only if k verifier calls all accept it. Under conditionally independent gates, the recent Odds Law (arXiv:2606.15712) shows that posterior log-odds grow linearly in k, so failure decays exponentially, and states that "a tight theory of partially correlated verifier cascades remains open." This note gives a minimal such theory. Modeling the per-instance false-accept rate on the generator's own errors as a latent variable αsim G (de Finetti), the exact cascade posterior is ell_k = ell_0 - ln m_k, with m_k the k-th moment of G. Then: (i) ell_k is concave in k for every non-degenerate G -- the Odds Law is its tangent at the first gate and an upper bound; (ii) for Beta(a,b) latents, failure decays polynomially, 1-r_k asymp k^{-b}, with correlation parameter ρ_v = 1/(a+b+1); (iii) a blind-spot atom of mass 1-π at α=1 caps the evidence extractable from any number of gates at -ln(1-π) nats, so reliability saturates below 1; (iv) letting the true-accept rate also vary (βsim H) yields a trichotomy -- gates eventually always help, plateau, or actively harm -- decided by the upper-tail exponents of G and H, with closed-form crossover k^dagger. The mechanism is survivorship: errors surviving gates are the high-α ones. The theory is measurable: R repeated verdicts per instance identify the first R moments of G, so two verdicts identify ρ_v; beta-binomial likelihood and NPMLE recover the reliability curve and the ill-posed ceiling. In synthetic tests, independence-based extrapolation underestimates failure by 20x at k=5 and ~3000x at k=10; the correlated fit at R=8 tracks held-out depths. The practical lever is decorrelation -- changing model family, modality, or evidence source -- not adding gates.