Daily Papers

Online allocation problems with resource constraints are central problems in revenue management and online advertising. In these problems, requests arrive sequentially during a finite horizon and, for each request, a decision maker needs to choose an action that consumes a certain amount of resources and generates reward. The objective is to maximize cumulative rewards subject to a constraint on the total consumption of resources. In this paper, we consider a data-driven setting in which the reward and resource consumption of each request are generated using an input model that is unknown to the decision maker. We design a general class of algorithms that attain good performance in various input models without knowing which type of input they are facing. In particular, our algorithms are asymptotically optimal under independent and identically distributed inputs as well as various non-stationary stochastic input models, and they attain an asymptotically optimal fixed competitive ratio when the input is adversarial. Our algorithms operate in the Lagrangian dual space: they maintain a dual multiplier for each resource that is updated using online mirror descent. By choosing the reference function accordingly, we recover the dual sub-gradient descent and dual multiplicative weights update algorithm. The resulting algorithms are simple, fast, and do not require convexity in the revenue function, consumption function and action space, in contrast to existing methods for online allocation problems. We discuss applications to network revenue management, online bidding in repeated auctions with budget constraints, online proportional matching with high entropy, and personalized assortment optimization with limited inventory.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

Open Radio Access Network systems, with their virtualized base stations (vBSs), offer operators the benefits of increased flexibility, reduced costs, vendor diversity, and interoperability. Optimizing the allocation of resources in a vBS is challenging since it requires knowledge of the environment, (i.e., "external'' information), such as traffic demands and channel quality, which is difficult to acquire precisely over short intervals of a few seconds. To tackle this problem, we propose an online learning algorithm that balances the effective throughput and vBS energy consumption, even under unforeseeable and "challenging'' environments; for instance, non-stationary or adversarial traffic demands. We also develop a meta-learning scheme, which leverages the power of other algorithmic approaches, tailored for more "easy'' environments, and dynamically chooses the best performing one, thus enhancing the overall system's versatility and effectiveness. We prove the proposed solutions achieve sub-linear regret, providing zero average optimality gap even in challenging environments. The performance of the algorithms is evaluated with real-world data and various trace-driven evaluations, indicating savings of up to 64.5% in the power consumption of a vBS compared with state-of-the-art benchmarks.

We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time t, an online node and its edge weights are drawn from a time-dependent distribution. The optimal algorithm is PSPACE-hard to approximate within some universal constant. We refer to this optimal algorithm, which requires time to think (compute), as a philosopher, and refer to polynomial-time online approximations of the above as philosopher inequalities. The best known philosopher inequality for online matching yields a 0.652-approximation. In contrast, the best possible prophet inequality, or approximation of the optimum offline solution, is 0.5. Our main results are a 0.678-approximate algorithm and a 0.685-approximation for a vertex-weighted special case. Notably, both bounds exceed the 0.666-approximation of the offline optimum obtained by Tang, Wu, and Wu (STOC'22) for the vertex-weighted problem. Building on our algorithms and the recent black-box reduction of Banihashem et al. (SODA'24), we provide polytime (pricing-based) truthful mechanisms which 0.678-approximate the social welfare of the optimal online allocation for bipartite matching markets. Our online allocation algorithm relies on the classic pivotal sampling algorithm (Srinivasan FOCS'01, Gandhi et al. J.ACM'06), along with careful discarding to obtain negative correlations between offline nodes. Consequently, the analysis boils down to examining the distribution of a weighted sum X of negatively correlated Bernoulli variables, specifically lower bounding its mass below a threshold, E[min(1,X)], of possible independent interest. Interestingly, our bound relies on an imaginary invocation of pivotal sampling.

Motivated by the operational problems in click and collect systems, such as curbside pickup programs, we study a joint admission control and capacity allocation problem. We consider a system where arriving customers have preferred service delivery times and gauge the service quality based on the service provider's ability to complete the service as close as possible to the preferred time. Customers can be of different priority classes, and their priority may increase as they wait longer in the queue. The service provider can reject customers upon their arrival if the system is overloaded or outsource the service (alternatively work overtime) when the capacity is not enough. The service provider's goal is to find the minimum-cost admission and capacity allocation policy to dynamically decide when to serve and whom to serve. We model this problem as a Markov Decision Process. Our structural results partially characterize a set of suboptimal solutions, and we develop solution methods using these results. We also develop a problem-specific approximation method that is based on state aggregation to overcome the computational challenges. We present extensive computational results and discuss the impact of problem parameters on the optimal policy.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

We study the problem of online clustering where a clustering algorithm has to assign a new point that arrives to one of k clusters. The specific formulation we use is the k-means objective: At each time step the algorithm has to maintain a set of k candidate centers and the loss incurred is the squared distance between the new point and the closest center. The goal is to minimize regret with respect to the best solution to the k-means objective (C) in hindsight. We show that provided the data lies in a bounded region, an implementation of the Multiplicative Weights Update Algorithm (MWUA) using a discretized grid achieves a regret bound of O(T) in expectation. We also present an online-to-offline reduction that shows that an efficient no-regret online algorithm (despite being allowed to choose a different set of candidate centres at each round) implies an offline efficient algorithm for the k-means problem. In light of this hardness, we consider the slightly weaker requirement of comparing regret with respect to (1 + ε) C and present a no-regret algorithm with runtime Oleft(T(poly(log(T),k,d,1/ε)^{k(d+O(1))}right). Our algorithm is based on maintaining an incremental coreset and an adaptive variant of the MWUA. We show that naïve online algorithms, such as Follow The Leader, fail to produce sublinear regret in the worst case. We also report preliminary experiments with synthetic and real-world data.

We study a fair allocation problem of indivisible items under additive externalities in which each agent also receives values from items that are assigned to other agents. We propose several new fairness concepts. We extend the well-studied envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and envy-freeness up to any item (EFX) to this setting, and we propose a new fairness concept called general fair share (GFS). We undertake a detailed study and present algorithms for finding fair allocations.

Stochastic optimization is one of the central problems in Machine Learning and Theoretical Computer Science. In the standard model, the algorithm is given a fixed distribution known in advance. In practice though, one may acquire at a cost extra information to make better decisions. In this paper, we study how to buy information for stochastic optimization and formulate this question as an online learning problem. Assuming the learner has an oracle for the original optimization problem, we design a 2-competitive deterministic algorithm and a e/(e-1)-competitive randomized algorithm for buying information. We show that this ratio is tight as the problem is equivalent to a robust generalization of the ski-rental problem, which we call super-martingale stopping. We also consider an adaptive setting where the learner can choose to buy information after taking some actions for the underlying optimization problem. We focus on the classic optimization problem, Min-Sum Set Cover, where the goal is to quickly find an action that covers a given request drawn from a known distribution. We provide an 8-competitive algorithm running in polynomial time that chooses actions and decides when to buy information about the underlying request.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Many problems, such as online ad display, can be formulated as online bipartite matching. The crucial challenge lies in the nature of sequentially-revealed online item information, based on which we make irreversible matching decisions at each step. While numerous expert online algorithms have been proposed with bounded worst-case competitive ratios, they may not offer satisfactory performance in average cases. On the other hand, reinforcement learning (RL) has been applied to improve the average performance, but it lacks robustness and can perform arbitrarily poorly. In this paper, we propose a novel RL-based approach to edge-weighted online bipartite matching with robustness guarantees (LOMAR), achieving both good average-case and worst-case performance. The key novelty of LOMAR is a new online switching operation which, based on a judicious condition to hedge against future uncertainties, decides whether to follow the expert's decision or the RL decision for each online item. We prove that for any rhoin[0,1], LOMAR is rho-competitive against any given expert online algorithm. To improve the average performance, we train the RL policy by explicitly considering the online switching operation. Finally, we run empirical experiments to demonstrate the advantages of LOMAR compared to existing baselines. Our code is available at: https://github.com/Ren-Research/LOMAR

We study the problem of online prediction, in which at each time step t, an individual x_t arrives, whose label we must predict. Each individual is associated with various groups, defined based on their features such as age, sex, race etc., which may intersect. Our goal is to make predictions that have regret guarantees not just overall but also simultaneously on each sub-sequence comprised of the members of any single group. Previous work such as [Blum & Lykouris] and [Lee et al] provide attractive regret guarantees for these problems; however, these are computationally intractable on large model classes. We show that a simple modification of the sleeping experts technique of [Blum & Lykouris] yields an efficient reduction to the well-understood problem of obtaining diminishing external regret absent group considerations. Our approach gives similar regret guarantees compared to [Blum & Lykouris]; however, we run in time linear in the number of groups, and are oracle-efficient in the hypothesis class. This in particular implies that our algorithm is efficient whenever the number of groups is polynomially bounded and the external-regret problem can be solved efficiently, an improvement on [Blum & Lykouris]'s stronger condition that the model class must be small. Our approach can handle online linear regression and online combinatorial optimization problems like online shortest paths. Beyond providing theoretical regret bounds, we evaluate this algorithm with an extensive set of experiments on synthetic data and on two real data sets -- Medical costs and the Adult income dataset, both instantiated with intersecting groups defined in terms of race, sex, and other demographic characteristics. We find that uniformly across groups, our algorithm gives substantial error improvements compared to running a standard online linear regression algorithm with no groupwise regret guarantees.

Online advertising has recently grown into a highly competitive and complex multi-billion-dollar industry, with advertisers bidding for ad slots at large scales and high frequencies. This has resulted in a growing need for efficient "auto-bidding" algorithms that determine the bids for incoming queries to maximize advertisers' targets subject to their specified constraints. This work explores efficient online algorithms for a single value-maximizing advertiser under an increasingly popular constraint: Return-on-Spend (RoS). We quantify efficiency in terms of regret relative to the optimal algorithm, which knows all queries a priori. We contribute a simple online algorithm that achieves near-optimal regret in expectation while always respecting the specified RoS constraint when the input sequence of queries are i.i.d. samples from some distribution. We also integrate our results with the previous work of Balseiro, Lu, and Mirrokni [BLM20] to achieve near-optimal regret while respecting both RoS and fixed budget constraints. Our algorithm follows the primal-dual framework and uses online mirror descent (OMD) for the dual updates. However, we need to use a non-canonical setup of OMD, and therefore the classic low-regret guarantee of OMD, which is for the adversarial setting in online learning, no longer holds. Nonetheless, in our case and more generally where low-regret dynamics are applied in algorithm design, the gradients encountered by OMD can be far from adversarial but influenced by our algorithmic choices. We exploit this key insight to show our OMD setup achieves low regret in the realm of our algorithm.

A major technique in learning-augmented online algorithms is combining multiple algorithms or predictors. Since the performance of each predictor may vary over time, it is desirable to use not the single best predictor as a benchmark, but rather a dynamic combination which follows different predictors at different times. We design algorithms that combine predictions and are competitive against such dynamic combinations for a wide class of online problems, namely, metrical task systems. Against the best (in hindsight) unconstrained combination of ell predictors, we obtain a competitive ratio of O(ell^2), and show that this is best possible. However, for a benchmark with slightly constrained number of switches between different predictors, we can get a (1+epsilon)-competitive algorithm. Moreover, our algorithms can be adapted to access predictors in a bandit-like fashion, querying only one predictor at a time. An unexpected implication of one of our lower bounds is a new structural insight about covering formulations for the k-server problem.

We consider non-clairvoyant scheduling with online precedence constraints, where an algorithm is oblivious to any job dependencies and learns about a job only if all of its predecessors have been completed. Given strong impossibility results in classical competitive analysis, we investigate the problem in a learning-augmented setting, where an algorithm has access to predictions without any quality guarantee. We discuss different prediction models: novel problem-specific models as well as general ones, which have been proposed in previous works. We present lower bounds and algorithmic upper bounds for different precedence topologies, and thereby give a structured overview on which and how additional (possibly erroneous) information helps for designing better algorithms. Along the way, we also improve bounds on traditional competitive ratios for existing algorithms.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

We study the incentivized information acquisition problem, where a principal hires an agent to gather information on her behalf. Such a problem is modeled as a Stackelberg game between the principal and the agent, where the principal announces a scoring rule that specifies the payment, and then the agent then chooses an effort level that maximizes her own profit and reports the information. We study the online setting of such a problem from the principal's perspective, i.e., designing the optimal scoring rule by repeatedly interacting with the strategic agent. We design a provably sample efficient algorithm that tailors the UCB algorithm (Auer et al., 2002) to our model, which achieves a sublinear T^{2/3}-regret after T iterations. Our algorithm features a delicate estimation procedure for the optimal profit of the principal, and a conservative correction scheme that ensures the desired agent's actions are incentivized. Furthermore, a key feature of our regret bound is that it is independent of the number of states of the environment.

We consider some classical optimization problems in path planning and network transport, and we introduce new auction-based algorithms for their optimal and suboptimal solution. The algorithms are based on mathematical ideas that are related to competitive bidding by persons for objects and the attendant market equilibrium, which underlie auction processes. However, the starting point of our algorithms is different, namely weighted and unweighted path construction in directed graphs, rather than assignment of persons to objects. The new algorithms have several potential advantages over existing methods: they are empirically faster in some important contexts, such as max-flow, they are well-suited for on-line replanning, and they can be adapted to distributed asynchronous operation. Moreover, they allow arbitrary initial prices, without complementary slackness restrictions, and thus are better-suited to take advantage of reinforcement learning methods that use off-line training with data, as well as on-line training during real-time operation. The new algorithms may also find use in reinforcement learning contexts involving approximation, such as multistep lookahead and tree search schemes, and/or rollout algorithms.

Test-time scaling can improve model performance by aggregating stochastic reasoning trajectories. However, achieving sample-efficient test-time self-consistency under a limited budget remains an open challenge. We introduce PETS (Principled and Efficient Test-TimeSelf-Consistency), which initiates a principled study of trajectory allocation through an optimization framework. Central to our approach is the self-consistency rate, a new measure defined as agreement with the infinite-budget majority vote. This formulation makes sample-efficient test-time allocation theoretically grounded and amenable to rigorous analysis. We study both offline and online settings. In the offline regime, where all questions are known in advance, we connect trajectory allocation to crowdsourcing, a classic and well-developed area, by modeling reasoning traces as workers. This perspective allows us to leverage rich existing theory, yielding theoretical guarantees and an efficient majority-voting-based allocation algorithm. In the online streaming regime, where questions arrive sequentially and allocations must be made on the fly, we propose a novel method inspired by the offline framework. Our approach adapts budgets to question difficulty while preserving strong theoretical guarantees and computational efficiency. Experiments show that PETS consistently outperforms uniform allocation. On GPQA, PETS achieves perfect self-consistency in both settings while reducing the sampling budget by up to 75% (offline) and 55% (online) relative to uniform allocation. Code is available at https://github.com/ZDCSlab/PETS.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

We consider a class of assortment optimization problems in an offline data-driven setting. A firm does not know the underlying customer choice model but has access to an offline dataset consisting of the historically offered assortment set, customer choice, and revenue. The objective is to use the offline dataset to find an optimal assortment. Due to the combinatorial nature of assortment optimization, the problem of insufficient data coverage is likely to occur in the offline dataset. Therefore, designing a provably efficient offline learning algorithm becomes a significant challenge. To this end, we propose an algorithm referred to as Pessimistic ASsortment opTimizAtion (PASTA for short) designed based on the principle of pessimism, that can correctly identify the optimal assortment by only requiring the offline data to cover the optimal assortment under general settings. In particular, we establish a regret bound for the offline assortment optimization problem under the celebrated multinomial logit model. We also propose an efficient computational procedure to solve our pessimistic assortment optimization problem. Numerical studies demonstrate the superiority of the proposed method over the existing baseline method.

We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

In the context of a short video & live stream mixed recommendation scenario, the live stream recommendation system (RS) decides whether to allocate at most one live stream into the video feed for each user request. To maximize long-term user engagement, it is crucial to determine an optimal live stream policy for accurate live stream allocation. The inappropriate live stream allocation policy can significantly affect the duration of the usage app and user retention, which ignores the long-term negative impact of live stream allocation. Recently, reinforcement learning (RL) has been widely applied in recommendation systems to capture long-term user engagement. However, traditional RL algorithms often face divergence and instability problems, which restricts the application and deployment in the large-scale industrial recommendation systems, especially in the aforementioned challenging scenario. To address these challenges, we propose a novel Supervised Learning-enhanced Multi-Group Actor Critic algorithm (SL-MGAC). Specifically, we introduce a supervised learning-enhanced actor-critic framework that incorporates variance reduction techniques, where multi-task reward learning helps restrict bootstrapping error accumulation during critic learning. Additionally, we design a multi-group state decomposition module for both actor and critic networks to reduce prediction variance and improve model stability. We also propose a novel reward function to prevent overly greedy live stream allocation. Empirically, we evaluate the SL-MGAC algorithm using offline policy evaluation (OPE) and online A/B testing. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method not only outperforms baseline methods under the platform-level constraints but also exhibits enhanced stability in online recommendation scenarios.

Digital services face a fundamental trade-off in content selection: they must balance the immediate revenue gained from high-reward content against the long-term benefits of maintaining user engagement. Traditional multi-armed bandit models assume that users remain perpetually engaged, failing to capture the possibility that users may disengage when dissatisfied, thereby reducing future revenue potential. In this work, we introduce a model for the content selection problem that explicitly accounts for variable user engagement and disengagement. In our framework, content that maximizes immediate reward is not necessarily optimal in terms of fostering sustained user engagement. Our contributions are twofold. First, we develop computational and statistical methods for offline optimization and online learning of content selection policies. For users whose engagement patterns are defined by k distinct levels, we design a dynamic programming algorithm that computes the exact optimal policy in O(k^2) time. Moreover, we derive no-regret learning guarantees for an online learning setting in which the platform serves a series of users with unknown and potentially adversarial engagement patterns. Second, we introduce the concept of modified demand elasticity which captures how small changes in a user's overall satisfaction affect the platform's ability to secure long-term revenue. This notion generalizes classical demand elasticity by incorporating the dynamics of user re-engagement, thereby revealing key insights into the interplay between engagement and revenue. Notably, our analysis uncovers a counterintuitive phenomenon: although higher friction (i.e., a reduced likelihood of re-engagement) typically lowers overall revenue, it can simultaneously lead to higher user engagement under optimal content selection policies.

This position paper argues that agentic AI systems should be designed and evaluated as marginal token allocation economies rather than as text generators priced by the unit. We follow a single request -- a developer asking a coding agent to fix a failing test -- through four economic layers that today are designed in isolation: a router that decides which model answers, an agent that decides whether to plan, act, verify, or defer, a serving stack that decides how to produce each token, and a training pipeline that decides whether the trace is worth learning from. We show that all four layers are solving the same first-order condition -- marginal benefit equals marginal cost plus latency cost plus risk cost -- with different index sets and different prices. The framing is deliberately minimal: we do not propose a complete theory of AI economics. But adopting marginal token allocation as the shared accounting object explains why systems that locally minimize tokens globally misallocate them, predicts a small set of recurring failure modes (over-routing, over-delegation, under-verification, serving congestion, stale rollouts, cache misuse), and points to a concrete research agenda in token-aware evaluation, autonomy pricing, congestion-priced serving, and risk-adjusted RL budgeting.

Motivated by concerns about making online decisions that incur undue amount of risk at each time step, in this paper, we formulate the probably anytime-safe stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits problem. In this problem, the agent is given the option to select a subset of size at most K from a set of L ground items. Each item is associated to a certain mean reward as well as a variance that represents its risk. To mitigate the risk that the agent incurs, we require that with probability at least 1-delta, over the entire horizon of time T, each of the choices that the agent makes should contain items whose sum of variances does not exceed a certain variance budget. We call this probably anytime-safe constraint. Under this constraint, we design and analyze an algorithm {\sc PASCombUCB} that minimizes the regret over the horizon of time T. By developing accompanying information-theoretic lower bounds, we show that under both the problem-dependent and problem-independent paradigms, {\sc PASCombUCB} is almost asymptotically optimal. Experiments are conducted to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our problem setup, the proposed {\sc PASCombUCB} algorithm, and novel analyses are applicable to domains such as recommendation systems and transportation in which an agent is allowed to choose multiple items at a single time step and wishes to control the risk over the whole time horizon.

In online algorithm selection (OAS), instances of an algorithmic problem class are presented to an agent one after another, and the agent has to quickly select a presumably best algorithm from a fixed set of candidate algorithms. For decision problems such as satisfiability (SAT), quality typically refers to the algorithm's runtime. As the latter is known to exhibit a heavy-tail distribution, an algorithm is normally stopped when exceeding a predefined upper time limit. As a consequence, machine learning methods used to optimize an algorithm selection strategy in a data-driven manner need to deal with right-censored samples, a problem that has received little attention in the literature so far. In this work, we revisit multi-armed bandit algorithms for OAS and discuss their capability of dealing with the problem. Moreover, we adapt them towards runtime-oriented losses, allowing for partially censored data while keeping a space- and time-complexity independent of the time horizon. In an extensive experimental evaluation on an adapted version of the ASlib benchmark, we demonstrate that theoretically well-founded methods based on Thompson sampling perform specifically strong and improve in comparison to existing methods.

The bandits with knapsack (BwK) framework models online decision-making problems in which an agent makes a sequence of decisions subject to resource consumption constraints. The traditional model assumes that each action consumes a non-negative amount of resources and the process ends when the initial budgets are fully depleted. We study a natural generalization of the BwK framework which allows non-monotonic resource utilization, i.e., resources can be replenished by a positive amount. We propose a best-of-both-worlds primal-dual template that can handle any online learning problem with replenishment for which a suitable primal regret minimizer exists. In particular, we provide the first positive results for the case of adversarial inputs by showing that our framework guarantees a constant competitive ratio alpha when B=Omega(T) or when the possible per-round replenishment is a positive constant. Moreover, under a stochastic input model, our algorithm yields an instance-independent O(T^{1/2}) regret bound which complements existing instance-dependent bounds for the same setting. Finally, we provide applications of our framework to some economic problems of practical relevance.

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

In large-scale AI training, Sparse Mixture-of-Experts (s-MoE) layers enable scaling by activating only a small subset of experts per token. An operational challenge in this design is load balancing: routing tokens to minimize the number of idle experts, which is important for the efficient utilization of (costly) GPUs. We provide a theoretical framework for analyzing the Auxiliary-Loss-Free Load Balancing (ALF-LB) procedure -- proposed by DeepSeek's Wang et al. (2024) -- by casting it as a one-step-per-iteration primal-dual method for an assignment problem. First, in a stylized deterministic setting, our framework yields several insightful structural properties: (i) a monotonic improvement of a Lagrangian objective, (ii) a preference rule that moves tokens from overloaded to underloaded experts, and (iii) an approximate-balancing guarantee. Then, we incorporate the stochastic and dynamic nature of AI training using a generalized online optimization formulation. In the online setting, we derive a strong convexity property of the objective that leads to a logarithmic expected regret bound under certain step-size choices. Additionally, we present real experiments on 1B-parameter DeepSeekMoE models to complement our theoretical findings. Together, these results build a principled framework for analyzing the Auxiliary-Loss-Free Load Balancing of s-MoE in AI models.

We consider the linear contextual multi-class multi-period packing problem (LMMP) where the goal is to pack items such that the total vector of consumption is below a given budget vector and the total value is as large as possible. We consider the setting where the reward and the consumption vector associated with each action is a class-dependent linear function of the context, and the decision-maker receives bandit feedback. LMMP includes linear contextual bandits with knapsacks and online revenue management as special cases. We establish a new estimator which guarantees a faster convergence rate, and consequently, a lower regret in such problems. We propose a bandit policy that is a closed-form function of said estimated parameters. When the contexts are non-degenerate, the regret of the proposed policy is sublinear in the context dimension, the number of classes, and the time horizon T when the budget grows at least as T. We also resolve an open problem posed by Agrawal & Devanur (2016) and extend the result to a multi-class setting. Our numerical experiments clearly demonstrate that the performance of our policy is superior to other benchmarks in the literature.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

In pursuit of participatory budgeting (PB) outcomes with broader fairness guarantees, we initiate the study of lotteries over discrete PB outcomes. As the projects have heterogeneous costs, the amount spent may not be equal ex ante and ex post. To address this, we develop a technique to bound the amount by which the ex-post spend differs from the ex-ante spend -- the property is termed budget balanced up to one project (BB1). With respect to fairness, we take a best-of-both-worlds perspective, seeking outcomes that are both ex-ante and ex-post fair. Towards this goal, we initiate a study of ex-ante fairness properties in PB, including Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS) and their stronger variants, as well as Group Fair Share (GFS). We show several incompatibility results between these ex-ante fairness notions and existing ex-post concepts based on justified representation. One of our main contributions is a randomized algorithm which simultaneously satisfies ex-ante Strong UFS, ex-post full justified representation (FJR) and ex-post BB1 for PB with binary utilities.

We present an online method for estimating the cost of solving SAT problems. Modern SAT solvers present several challenges to estimate search cost including non-chronological backtracking, learning and restarts. Our method uses a linear model trained on data gathered at the start of search. We show the effectiveness of this method using random and structured problems. We demonstrate that predictions made in early restarts can be used to improve later predictions. We also show that we can use such cost estimations to select a solver from a portfolio.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

This paper proposes a novel admission and routing scheme which takes into account arbitrarily assigned priorities for network flows. The presented approach leverages the centralized Software Defined Networking (SDN) capabilities in order to do so. Exact and heuristic approaches to the stated Priority Flow Admission and Routing (PFAR) problem are provided. The exact approach which provides an optimal solution is based on Integer Linear Programming (ILP). Given the potentially long running time required to find an exact and optimal solution, a heuristic approach is proposed; this approach is based on Genetic Algorithms (GAs). In order to effectively estimate the performance of the proposed approaches, a simulator that is capable of generating semi-random network topologies and flows has been developed. Experimental results for large problem instances (up 50 network nodes and thousands of network flows), show that: i) an optimal solution can be often found in few seconds (even milliseconds), and ii) the heuristic approach yields close-to-optimal solutions (approximately 95\% of the optimal) in a fixed amount of time; these experimental results demonstrate the pertinence of the proposed approaches.

The theories of offline and online reinforcement learning, despite having evolved in parallel, have begun to show signs of the possibility for a unification, with algorithms and analysis techniques for one setting often having natural counterparts in the other. However, the notion of density ratio modeling, an emerging paradigm in offline RL, has been largely absent from online RL, perhaps for good reason: the very existence and boundedness of density ratios relies on access to an exploratory dataset with good coverage, but the core challenge in online RL is to collect such a dataset without having one to start. In this work we show -- perhaps surprisingly -- that density ratio-based algorithms have online counterparts. Assuming only the existence of an exploratory distribution with good coverage, a structural condition known as coverability (Xie et al., 2023), we give a new algorithm (GLOW) that uses density ratio realizability and value function realizability to perform sample-efficient online exploration. GLOW addresses unbounded density ratios via careful use of truncation, and combines this with optimism to guide exploration. GLOW is computationally inefficient; we complement it with a more efficient counterpart, HyGLOW, for the Hybrid RL setting (Song et al., 2022) wherein online RL is augmented with additional offline data. HyGLOW is derived as a special case of a more general meta-algorithm that provides a provable black-box reduction from hybrid RL to offline RL, which may be of independent interest.

Task allocation is a key combinatorial optimization problem, crucial for modern applications such as multi-robot cooperation and resource scheduling. Decision makers must allocate entities to tasks reasonably across different scenarios. However, traditional methods assume static attributes and numbers of tasks and entities, often relying on dynamic programming and heuristic algorithms for solutions. In reality, task allocation resembles Markov decision processes, with dynamically changing task and entity attributes. Thus, algorithms must dynamically allocate tasks based on their states. To address this issue, we propose a two-stage task allocation algorithm based on similarity, utilizing reinforcement learning to learn allocation strategies. The proposed pre-assign strategy allows entities to preselect appropriate tasks, effectively avoiding local optima and thereby better finding the optimal allocation. We also introduce an attention mechanism and a hyperparameter network structure to adapt to the changing number and attributes of entities and tasks, enabling our network structure to generalize to new tasks. Experimental results across multiple environments demonstrate that our algorithm effectively addresses the challenges of dynamic task allocation in practical applications. Compared to heuristic algorithms like genetic algorithms, our reinforcement learning approach better solves dynamic allocation problems and achieves zero-shot generalization to new tasks with good performance. The code is available at https://github.com/yk7333/TaskAllocation.

Adversarial attacks expose important vulnerabilities of deep learning models, yet little attention has been paid to settings where data arrives as a stream. In this paper, we formalize the online adversarial attack problem, emphasizing two key elements found in real-world use-cases: attackers must operate under partial knowledge of the target model, and the decisions made by the attacker are irrevocable since they operate on a transient data stream. We first rigorously analyze a deterministic variant of the online threat model by drawing parallels to the well-studied k-secretary problem in theoretical computer science and propose Virtual+, a simple yet practical online algorithm. Our main theoretical result shows Virtual+ yields provably the best competitive ratio over all single-threshold algorithms for k<5 -- extending the previous analysis of the k-secretary problem. We also introduce the stochastic k-secretary -- effectively reducing online blackbox transfer attacks to a k-secretary problem under noise -- and prove theoretical bounds on the performance of Virtual+ adapted to this setting. Finally, we complement our theoretical results by conducting experiments on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and Imagenet classifiers, revealing the necessity of online algorithms in achieving near-optimal performance and also the rich interplay between attack strategies and online attack selection, enabling simple strategies like FGSM to outperform stronger adversaries.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

Motivated by emerging applications such as live-streaming e-commerce, promotions and recommendations, we introduce and solve a general class of non-stationary multi-armed bandit problems that have the following two features: (i) the decision maker can pull and collect rewards from up to K,(ge 1) out of N different arms in each time period; (ii) the expected reward of an arm immediately drops after it is pulled, and then non-parametrically recovers as the arm's idle time increases. With the objective of maximizing the expected cumulative reward over T time periods, we design a class of ``Purely Periodic Policies'' that jointly set a period to pull each arm. For the proposed policies, we prove performance guarantees for both the offline problem and the online problems. For the offline problem when all model parameters are known, the proposed periodic policy obtains an approximation ratio that is at the order of 1-mathcal O(1/K), which is asymptotically optimal when K grows to infinity. For the online problem when the model parameters are unknown and need to be dynamically learned, we integrate the offline periodic policy with the upper confidence bound procedure to construct on online policy. The proposed online policy is proved to approximately have mathcal O(NT) regret against the offline benchmark. Our framework and policy design may shed light on broader offline planning and online learning applications with non-stationary and recovering rewards.

Most learning algorithms with formal regret guarantees assume that no mistake is irreparable and essentially rely on trying all possible behaviors. This approach is problematic when some mistakes are catastrophic, i.e., irreparable. We propose an online learning problem where the goal is to minimize the chance of catastrophe. Specifically, we assume that the payoff in each round represents the chance of avoiding catastrophe that round and aim to maximize the product of payoffs (the overall chance of avoiding catastrophe) while allowing a limited number of queries to a mentor. We first show that in general, any algorithm either constantly queries the mentor or is nearly guaranteed to cause catastrophe. However, in settings where the mentor policy class is learnable in the standard online learning model, we provide an algorithm whose regret and rate of querying the mentor both approach 0 as the time horizon grows. Conceptually, if a policy class is learnable in the absence of catastrophic risk, it is learnable in the presence of catastrophic risk if the agent can ask for help.

Ad-load balancing is a critical challenge in online advertising systems, particularly in the context of social media platforms, where the goal is to maximize user engagement and revenue while maintaining a satisfactory user experience. This requires the optimization of conflicting objectives, such as user satisfaction and ads revenue. Traditional approaches to ad-load balancing rely on static allocation policies, which fail to adapt to changing user preferences and contextual factors. In this paper, we present an approach that leverages off-policy learning and evaluation from logged bandit feedback. We start by presenting a motivating analysis of the ad-load balancing problem, highlighting the conflicting objectives between user satisfaction and ads revenue. We emphasize the nuances that arise due to user heterogeneity and the dependence on the user's position within a session. Based on this analysis, we define the problem as determining the optimal ad-load for a particular feed fetch. To tackle this problem, we propose an off-policy learning framework that leverages unbiased estimators such as Inverse Propensity Scoring (IPS) and Doubly Robust (DR) to learn and estimate the policy values using offline collected stochastic data. We present insights from online A/B experiments deployed at scale across over 80 million users generating over 200 million sessions, where we find statistically significant improvements in both user satisfaction metrics and ads revenue for the platform.

In this paper, we consider the minimum submodular cost allocation (MSCA) problem. The input of MSCA is k non-negative submodular functions f_1,ldots,f_k on the ground set N given by evaluation oracles, and the goal is to partition N into k (possibly empty) sets X_1,ldots,X_k so that sum_{i=1}^k f_i(X_i) is minimized. In this paper, we focus on the case when f_1,ldots,f_k are monotone (denoted by Mono-MSCA). We provide a natural LP-relaxation for Mono-MSCA, which is equivalent to the convex program relaxation introduced by Chekuri and Ene. We show that the integrality gap of the LP-relaxation is at most k/2, which yields a k/2-approximation algorithm for Mono-MSCA. We also show that the integrality gap of the LP-relaxation is at least k/2-epsilon for any constant epsilon>0 when k is fixed.

In this paper, we investigate a problem of actively learning threshold in latent space, where the unknown reward g(gamma, v) depends on the proposed threshold gamma and latent value v and it can be only achieved if the threshold is lower than or equal to the unknown latent value. This problem has broad applications in practical scenarios, e.g., reserve price optimization in online auctions, online task assignments in crowdsourcing, setting recruiting bars in hiring, etc. We first characterize the query complexity of learning a threshold with the expected reward at most epsilon smaller than the optimum and prove that the number of queries needed can be infinitely large even when g(gamma, v) is monotone with respect to both gamma and v. On the positive side, we provide a tight query complexity Theta(1/epsilon^3) when g is monotone and the CDF of value distribution is Lipschitz. Moreover, we show a tight Theta(1/epsilon^3) query complexity can be achieved as long as g satisfies one-sided Lipschitzness, which provides a complete characterization for this problem. Finally, we extend this model to an online learning setting and demonstrate a tight Theta(T^{2/3}) regret bound using continuous-arm bandit techniques and the aforementioned query complexity results.

We formulate and solve the H-SARA Problem, a Vehicle Routing and Appointment Scheduling Problem motivated by home services management. We assume that travel times, service durations, and customer cancellations are stochastic. We use a two-stage process that first generates teams and routes using a VRP Solver with optional extensions and then uses an MC Scheduler that determines expected arrival times by teams at customers. We further introduce two different models of cancellation and their associated impacts on routing and scheduling. Finally, we introduce the Route Fracture Metaheuristic that iteratively improves an H-SARA solution by replacing the worst-performing teams. We present insights into the problem and a series of numerical experiments that illustrate properties of the optimal routing, scheduling, and the impact of the Route Fracture Metaheuristic for both models of cancellation.

We consider online scheduling on unrelated (heterogeneous) machines in a speed-oblivious setting, where an algorithm is unaware of the exact job-dependent processing speeds. We show strong impossibility results for clairvoyant and non-clairvoyant algorithms and overcome them in models inspired by practical settings: (i) we provide competitive learning-augmented algorithms, assuming that (possibly erroneous) predictions on the speeds are given, and (ii) we provide competitive algorithms for the speed-ordered model, where a single global order of machines according to their unknown job-dependent speeds is known. We prove strong theoretical guarantees and evaluate our findings on a representative heterogeneous multi-core processor. These seem to be the first empirical results for scheduling algorithms with predictions that are evaluated in a non-synthetic hardware environment.

We define a new class of set functions that in addition to being monotone and subadditive, also admit a very limited form of submodularity defined over a permutation of the ground set. We refer to this permutation as a submodular order. This class of functions includes monotone submodular functions as a sub-family. To understand the importance of this structure in optimization problems we consider the problem of maximizing function value under various types of constraints. To demonstrate the modeling power of submodular order functions we show applications in two different settings. First, we apply our results to the extensively studied problem of assortment optimization. While the objectives in assortment optimization are known to be non-submodular (and non-monotone) even for simple choice models, we show that they are compatible with the notion of submodular order. Consequently, we obtain new and in some cases the first constant factor guarantee for constrained assortment optimization in fundamental choice models. As a second application of submodular order functions, we show an intriguing connection to the maximization of monotone submodular functions in the streaming model. We recover some best known guarantees for this problem as a corollary of our results.

Online display advertising platforms service numerous advertisers by providing real-time bidding (RTB) for the scale of billions of ad requests every day. The bidding strategy handles ad requests cross multiple channels to maximize the number of clicks under the set financial constraints, i.e., total budget and cost-per-click (CPC), etc. Different from existing works mainly focusing on single channel bidding, we explicitly consider cross-channel constrained bidding with budget allocation. Specifically, we propose a hierarchical offline deep reinforcement learning (DRL) framework called ``HiBid'', consisted of a high-level planner equipped with auxiliary loss for non-competitive budget allocation, and a data augmentation enhanced low-level executor for adaptive bidding strategy in response to allocated budgets. Additionally, a CPC-guided action selection mechanism is introduced to satisfy the cross-channel CPC constraint. Through extensive experiments on both the large-scale log data and online A/B testing, we confirm that HiBid outperforms six baselines in terms of the number of clicks, CPC satisfactory ratio, and return-on-investment (ROI). We also deploy HiBid on Meituan advertising platform to already service tens of thousands of advertisers every day.

Fair division considers the allocation of scarce resources among agents in such a way that every agent gets a fair share. It is a fundamental problem in society and has received significant attention and rapid developments from the game theory and artificial intelligence communities in recent years. The majority of the fair division literature can be divided along at least two orthogonal directions: goods versus chores, and divisible versus indivisible resources. In this survey, besides describing the state of the art, we outline a number of interesting open questions and future directions in three mixed fair division settings: (i) indivisible goods and chores, (ii) divisible and indivisible goods (mixed goods), and (iii) indivisible goods with subsidy which can be viewed like a divisible good.

We consider a fair division model in which agents have positive, zero and negative utilities for items. For this model, we analyse one existing fairness property - EFX - and three new and related properties - EFX_0, EFX^3 and EF1^3 - in combination with Pareto-optimality. With general utilities, we give a modified version of an existing algorithm for computing an EF1^3 allocation. With -alpha/0/alpha utilities, this algorithm returns an EFX^3 and PO allocation. With absolute identical utilities, we give a new algorithm for an EFX and PO allocation. With -alpha/0/beta utilities, this algorithm also returns such an allocation. We report some new impossibility results as well.

We consider a resource-aware variant of the classical multi-armed bandit problem: In each round, the learner selects an arm and determines a resource limit. It then observes a corresponding (random) reward, provided the (random) amount of consumed resources remains below the limit. Otherwise, the observation is censored, i.e., no reward is obtained. For this problem setting, we introduce a measure of regret, which incorporates the actual amount of allocated resources of each learning round as well as the optimality of realizable rewards. Thus, to minimize regret, the learner needs to set a resource limit and choose an arm in such a way that the chance to realize a high reward within the predefined resource limit is high, while the resource limit itself should be kept as low as possible. We propose a UCB-inspired online learning algorithm, which we analyze theoretically in terms of its regret upper bound. In a simulation study, we show that our learning algorithm outperforms straightforward extensions of standard multi-armed bandit algorithms.

Streaming submodular maximization is a natural model for the task of selecting a representative subset from a large-scale dataset. If datapoints have sensitive attributes such as gender or race, it becomes important to enforce fairness to avoid bias and discrimination. This has spurred significant interest in developing fair machine learning algorithms. Recently, such algorithms have been developed for monotone submodular maximization under a cardinality constraint. In this paper, we study the natural generalization of this problem to a matroid constraint. We give streaming algorithms as well as impossibility results that provide trade-offs between efficiency, quality and fairness. We validate our findings empirically on a range of well-known real-world applications: exemplar-based clustering, movie recommendation, and maximum coverage in social networks.

This paper presents a strategy to allocate services on a Cloud system without overloading nodes and maintaining the system stability with minimum cost. We specify an abstract model of cloud resources utilization, including multiple types of resources as well as considerations for the service migration costs. A prototype meta-heuristic load balancer is demonstrated and experimental results are presented and discussed. We also propose a novel genetic algorithm, where population is seeded with the outputs of other meta-heuristic algorithms.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

When trying to solve a computational problem, we are often faced with a choice between algorithms that are guaranteed to return the right answer but differ in their runtime distributions (e.g., SAT solvers, sorting algorithms). This paper aims to lay theoretical foundations for such choices by formalizing preferences over runtime distributions. It might seem that we should simply prefer the algorithm that minimizes expected runtime. However, such preferences would be driven by exactly how slow our algorithm is on bad inputs, whereas in practice we are typically willing to cut off occasional, sufficiently long runs before they finish. We propose a principled alternative, taking a utility-theoretic approach to characterize the scoring functions that describe preferences over algorithms. These functions depend on the way our value for solving our problem decreases with time and on the distribution from which captimes are drawn. We describe examples of realistic utility functions and show how to leverage a maximum-entropy approach for modeling underspecified captime distributions. Finally, we show how to efficiently estimate an algorithm's expected utility from runtime samples.

In this paper, we present improved learning-augmented algorithms for the multi-option ski rental problem. Learning-augmented algorithms take ML predictions as an added part of the input and incorporates these predictions in solving the given problem. Due to their unique strength that combines the power of ML predictions with rigorous performance guarantees, they have been extensively studied in the context of online optimization problems. Even though ski rental problems are one of the canonical problems in the field of online optimization, only deterministic algorithms were previously known for multi-option ski rental, with or without learning augmentation. We present the first randomized learning-augmented algorithm for this problem, surpassing previous performance guarantees given by deterministic algorithms. Our learning-augmented algorithm is based on a new, provably best-possible randomized competitive algorithm for the problem. Our results are further complemented by lower bounds for deterministic and randomized algorithms, and computational experiments evaluating our algorithms' performance improvements.

In this paper we pursue the question of a fully online trading algorithm (i.e. one that does not need offline training on previously gathered data). For this task we use Double Deep Q-learning in the episodic setting with Fast Learning Networks approximating the expected reward Q. Additionally, we define the possible terminal states of an episode in such a way as to introduce a mechanism to conserve some of the money in the trading pool when market conditions are seen as unfavourable. Some of these money are taken as profit and some are reused at a later time according to certain criteria. After describing the algorithm, we test it using the 1-minute-tick data for Cardano's price on Binance. We see that the agent performs better than trading with randomly chosen actions on each timestep. And it does so when tested on the whole dataset as well as on different subsets, capturing different market trends.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

We study online reinforcement learning in linear Markov decision processes with adversarial losses and bandit feedback, without prior knowledge on transitions or access to simulators. We introduce two algorithms that achieve improved regret performance compared to existing approaches. The first algorithm, although computationally inefficient, ensures a regret of mathcal{O}left(Kright), where K is the number of episodes. This is the first result with the optimal K dependence in the considered setting. The second algorithm, which is based on the policy optimization framework, guarantees a regret of mathcal{O}left(K^{3{4}} right) and is computationally efficient. Both our results significantly improve over the state-of-the-art: a computationally inefficient algorithm by Kong et al. [2023] with mathcal{O}left(K^{4{5}}+polyleft(1{lambda_{min}}right) right) regret, for some problem-dependent constant lambda_{min} that can be arbitrarily close to zero, and a computationally efficient algorithm by Sherman et al. [2023b] with mathcal{O}left(K^{6{7}} right) regret.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

While scaling laws guide compute allocation for LLM pre-training, analogous prescriptions for reinforcement learning (RL) post-training of large language models (LLMs) remain poorly understood. We study the compute-optimal allocation of sampling compute for on-policy RL methods in LLMs, framing scaling as a compute-constrained optimization over three resources: parallel rollouts per problem, number of problems per batch, and number of update steps. We find that the compute-optimal number of parallel rollouts per problem increases predictably with compute budget and then saturates. This trend holds across both easy and hard problems, though driven by different mechanisms: solution sharpening on easy problems and coverage expansion on hard problems. We further show that increasing the number of parallel rollouts mitigates interference across problems, while the number of problems per batch primarily affects training stability and can be chosen within a broad range. Validated across base models and data distributions, our results recast RL scaling laws as prescriptive allocation rules and provide practical guidance for compute-efficient LLM RL post-training.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

In online reinforcement learning (RL), instead of employing standard structural assumptions on Markov decision processes (MDPs), using a certain coverage condition (original from offline RL) is enough to ensure sample-efficient guarantees (Xie et al. 2023). In this work, we focus on this new direction by digging more possible and general coverage conditions, and study the potential and the utility of them in efficient online RL. We identify more concepts, including the L^p variant of concentrability, the density ratio realizability, and trade-off on the partial/rest coverage condition, that can be also beneficial to sample-efficient online RL, achieving improved regret bound. Furthermore, if exploratory offline data are used, under our coverage conditions, both statistically and computationally efficient guarantees can be achieved for online RL. Besides, even though the MDP structure is given, e.g., linear MDP, we elucidate that, good coverage conditions are still beneficial to obtain faster regret bound beyond O(T) and even a logarithmic order regret. These results provide a good justification for the usage of general coverage conditions in efficient online RL.

In digital online advertising, advertisers procure ad impressions simultaneously on multiple platforms, or so-called channels, such as Google Ads, Meta Ads Manager, etc., each of which consists of numerous ad auctions. We study how an advertiser maximizes total conversion (e.g. ad clicks) while satisfying aggregate return-on-investment (ROI) and budget constraints across all channels. In practice, an advertiser does not have control over, and thus cannot globally optimize, which individual ad auctions she participates in for each channel, and instead authorizes a channel to procure impressions on her behalf: the advertiser can only utilize two levers on each channel, namely setting a per-channel budget and per-channel target ROI. In this work, we first analyze the effectiveness of each of these levers for solving the advertiser's global multi-channel problem. We show that when an advertiser only optimizes over per-channel ROIs, her total conversion can be arbitrarily worse than what she could have obtained in the global problem. Further, we show that the advertiser can achieve the global optimal conversion when she only optimizes over per-channel budgets. In light of this finding, under a bandit feedback setting that mimics real-world scenarios where advertisers have limited information on ad auctions in each channels and how channels procure ads, we present an efficient learning algorithm that produces per-channel budgets whose resulting conversion approximates that of the global optimal problem. Finally, we argue that all our results hold for both single-item and multi-item auctions from which channels procure impressions on advertisers' behalf.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

In this paper, we provide a general framework for studying multi-agent online learning problems in the presence of delays and asynchronicities. Specifically, we propose and analyze a class of adaptive dual averaging schemes in which agents only need to accumulate gradient feedback received from the whole system, without requiring any between-agent coordination. In the single-agent case, the adaptivity of the proposed method allows us to extend a range of existing results to problems with potentially unbounded delays between playing an action and receiving the corresponding feedback. In the multi-agent case, the situation is significantly more complicated because agents may not have access to a global clock to use as a reference point; to overcome this, we focus on the information that is available for producing each prediction rather than the actual delay associated with each feedback. This allows us to derive adaptive learning strategies with optimal regret bounds, even in a fully decentralized, asynchronous environment. Finally, we also analyze an "optimistic" variant of the proposed algorithm which is capable of exploiting the predictability of problems with a slower variation and leads to improved regret bounds.

We study the problem of multi-task learning under user-level differential privacy, in which n users contribute data to m tasks, each involving a subset of users. One important aspect of the problem, that can significantly impact quality, is the distribution skew among tasks. Certain tasks may have much fewer data samples than others, making them more susceptible to the noise added for privacy. It is natural to ask whether algorithms can adapt to this skew to improve the overall utility. We give a systematic analysis of the problem, by studying how to optimally allocate a user's privacy budget among tasks. We propose a generic algorithm, based on an adaptive reweighting of the empirical loss, and show that when there is task distribution skew, this gives a quantifiable improvement of excess empirical risk. Experimental studies on recommendation problems that exhibit a long tail of small tasks, demonstrate that our methods significantly improve utility, achieving the state of the art on two standard benchmarks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can self-improve through reinforcement learning, where they generate trajectories to explore and discover better solutions. However, this exploration process is computationally expensive, often forcing current methods to assign limited exploration budgets to each task. This uniform allocation creates problematic edge cases: easy tasks consistently succeed while difficult tasks consistently fail, both producing zero gradients during training updates for the widely used Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). We address this problem from the lens of exploration budget allocation. Viewing each task's exploration as an "item" with a distinct "value" and "cost", we establish a connection to the classical knapsack problem. This formulation allows us to derive an optimal assignment rule that adaptively distributes resources based on the model's current learning status. When applied to GRPO, our method increases the effective ratio of non-zero policy gradients by 20-40% during training. Acting as a computational "free lunch", our approach could reallocate exploration budgets from tasks where learning is saturated to those where it is most impactful. This enables significantly larger budgets (e.g., 93 rollouts) for especially challenging problems, which would be computationally prohibitive under a uniform allocation. These improvements translate to meaningful gains on mathematical reasoning benchmarks, with average improvements of 2-4 points and peak gains of 9 points on specific tasks. Notably, achieving comparable performance with traditional homogeneous allocation would require about 2x the computational resources.

Fairness, especially group fairness, is an important consideration in the context of machine learning systems. The most commonly adopted group fairness-enhancing techniques are in-processing methods that rely on a mixture of a fairness objective (e.g., demographic parity) and a task-specific objective (e.g., cross-entropy) during the training process. However, when data arrives in an online fashion -- one instance at a time -- optimizing such fairness objectives poses several challenges. In particular, group fairness objectives are defined using expectations of predictions across different demographic groups. In the online setting, where the algorithm has access to a single instance at a time, estimating the group fairness objective requires additional storage and significantly more computation (e.g., forward/backward passes) than the task-specific objective at every time step. In this paper, we propose Aranyani, an ensemble of oblique decision trees, to make fair decisions in online settings. The hierarchical tree structure of Aranyani enables parameter isolation and allows us to efficiently compute the fairness gradients using aggregate statistics of previous decisions, eliminating the need for additional storage and forward/backward passes. We also present an efficient framework to train Aranyani and theoretically analyze several of its properties. We conduct empirical evaluations on 5 publicly available benchmarks (including vision and language datasets) to show that Aranyani achieves a better accuracy-fairness trade-off compared to baseline approaches.

LLM-as-a-judge has emerged as a cornerstone technique for evaluating large language models by leveraging LLM reasoning to score prompt-response pairs. Since LLM judgments are stochastic, practitioners commonly query each pair multiple times to estimate mean scores accurately. This raises a critical challenge: given a fixed computational budget B, how to optimally allocate queries across K prompt-response pairs to minimize estimation error? % We present a principled variance-adaptive approach leveraging multi-armed bandit theory and concentration inequalities. Our method dynamically allocates queries based on estimated score variances, concentrating resources where uncertainty is highest. Further, our algorithm is shown to achieve a worst-case score-estimation error of Oleft(frac{sum_{i=1^K σ_i^2}{B}}right), σ_i^2 being the unknown score variance for pair i in [K] with near-optimal budget allocation. % Experiments on Summarize-From-Feedback and HelpSteer2 demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms uniform allocation, reducing worst-case estimation error while maintaining identical budgets. Our work establishes a theoretical foundation for efficient LLM evaluation with practical implications for AI safety, model alignment, and automated assessment at scale.

The rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems has intensified the challenge of efficiently allocating heterogeneous resources in highly dynamic, distributed environments. Conventional centralized mechanisms and single-objective auction models, focusing solely on metrics such as cost minimization or revenue maximization, struggle to deliver balanced system performance. This paper proposes the Multi-Objective Hierarchical Auction Framework (MOHAF), a distributed resource allocation mechanism that jointly optimizes cost, Quality of Service (QoS), energy efficiency, and fairness. MOHAF integrates hierarchical clustering to reduce computational complexity with a greedy, submodular optimization strategy that guarantees a (1-1/e) approximation ratio. A dynamic pricing mechanism adapts in real time to resource utilization, enhancing market stability and allocation quality. Extensive experiments on the Google Cluster Data trace, comprising 3,553 requests and 888 resources, demonstrate MOHAF's superior allocation efficiency (0.263) compared to Greedy (0.185), First-Price (0.138), and Random (0.101) auctions, while achieving perfect fairness (Jain's index = 1.000). Ablation studies reveal the critical influence of cost and QoS components in sustaining balanced multi-objective outcomes. With near-linear scalability, theoretical guarantees, and robust empirical performance, MOHAF offers a practical and adaptable solution for large-scale IoT deployments, effectively reconciling efficiency, equity, and sustainability in distributed resource coordination.

We introduce a new budgeted framework for online influence maximization, considering the total cost of an advertising campaign instead of the common cardinality constraint on a chosen influencer set. Our approach better models the real-world setting where the cost of influencers varies and advertisers want to find the best value for their overall social advertising budget. We propose an algorithm assuming an independent cascade diffusion model and edge level semi-bandit feedback, and provide both theoretical and experimental results. Our analysis is also valid for the cardinality constraint setting and improves the state of the art regret bound in this case.

We consider online learning problems in the realizable setting, where there is a zero-loss solution, and propose new Differentially Private (DP) algorithms that obtain near-optimal regret bounds. For the problem of online prediction from experts, we design new algorithms that obtain near-optimal regret {O} big( varepsilon^{-1} log^{1.5}{d} big) where d is the number of experts. This significantly improves over the best existing regret bounds for the DP non-realizable setting which are {O} big( varepsilon^{-1} minbig{d, T^{1/3}log dbig} big). We also develop an adaptive algorithm for the small-loss setting with regret O(L^starlog d + varepsilon^{-1} log^{1.5}{d}) where L^star is the total loss of the best expert. Additionally, we consider DP online convex optimization in the realizable setting and propose an algorithm with near-optimal regret O big(varepsilon^{-1} d^{1.5} big), as well as an algorithm for the smooth case with regret O big( varepsilon^{-2/3} (dT)^{1/3} big), both significantly improving over existing bounds in the non-realizable regime.

Scaling test-time compute has emerged as an effective strategy for improving the performance of large language models. However, existing methods typically allocate compute uniformly across all queries, overlooking variation in query difficulty. To address this inefficiency, we formulate test-time compute allocation as a novel bandit learning problem and propose adaptive algorithms that estimate query difficulty on the fly and allocate compute accordingly. Compared to uniform allocation, our algorithms allocate more compute to challenging queries while maintaining accuracy on easier ones. Among challenging queries, our algorithms further learn to prioritize solvable instances, effectively reducing excessive computing on unsolvable queries. We theoretically prove that our algorithms achieve better compute efficiency than uniform allocation and empirically validate their effectiveness on math and code benchmarks. Specifically, our algorithms achieve up to an 11.10% performance improvement (15.04% relative) on the MATH-500 dataset and up to a 7.41% performance improvement (14.40% relative) on LiveCodeBench.

This work proposes a procedure for designing algorithms for specific adaptive data collection tasks like active learning and pure-exploration multi-armed bandits. Unlike the design of traditional adaptive algorithms that rely on concentration of measure and careful analysis to justify the correctness and sample complexity of the procedure, our adaptive algorithm is learned via adversarial training over equivalence classes of problems derived from information theoretic lower bounds. In particular, a single adaptive learning algorithm is learned that competes with the best adaptive algorithm learned for each equivalence class. Our procedure takes as input just the available queries, set of hypotheses, loss function, and total query budget. This is in contrast to existing meta-learning work that learns an adaptive algorithm relative to an explicit, user-defined subset or prior distribution over problems which can be challenging to define and be mismatched to the instance encountered at test time. This work is particularly focused on the regime when the total query budget is very small, such as a few dozen, which is much smaller than those budgets typically considered by theoretically derived algorithms. We perform synthetic experiments to justify the stability and effectiveness of the training procedure, and then evaluate the method on tasks derived from real data including a noisy 20 Questions game and a joke recommendation task.

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in T second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal tilde O(T)-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.

We consider the problem of online preemptive scheduling on a single machine to minimize the total flow time. In clairvoyant scheduling, where job processing times are revealed upon arrival, the Shortest Remaining Processing Time (SRPT) algorithm is optimal. In practice, however, exact processing times are often unknown. At the opposite extreme, non-clairvoyant scheduling, in which processing times are revealed only upon completion, suffers from strong lower bounds on the competitive ratio. This motivates the study of intermediate information models. We introduce a new model in which processing times are revealed gradually during execution. Each job consists of a sequence of operations, and the processing time of an operation becomes known only after the preceding one completes. This models many scheduling scenarios that arise in computing systems. Our main result is a deterministic O(m^2)-competitive algorithm, where m is the maximum number of operations per job. More specifically, we prove a refined competitive ratio in O(m_1 cdot m_2), where m_1 and m_2 are instance-dependent parameters describing the operation size structure. Our algorithm and analysis build on recent advancements in robust flow time minimization (SODA '26), where jobs arrive with estimated sizes. However, in our setting we have no bounded estimate on a job's processing time. Thus, we design a highly adaptive algorithm that gradually explores a job's operations while working on them, and groups them into virtual chunks whose size can be well-estimated. This is a crucial ingredient of our result and requires a much more careful analysis compared to the robust setting. We also provide lower bounds showing that our bounds are essentially best possible. For the special case of scheduling with uniform obligatory tests, we show that SRPT at the operation level is 2-competitive, which is best possible.

The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an interest to deviate). In this paper, inspired by a practical application in the context of a decision support system for collaborative transportation in a Short Food Supply Chain (SFSC), we mainly focus on Traveling Salesman Games (TSGs), where the objective is to allocate the cost of a Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) with n locations and 1 depot to n players, each linked to exactly one of the locations. Given the computational complexity of computing an element of the core and the cost of a TSP, we study semicore allocations: a relaxation of the core that only requires that the subsets of size n -1 and of size 1 do not wish to deviate from the coalition. In the literature, instances of TSGs with empty cores and semicores are found. Hence, this paper first surveys the methods to approximate stability whenever the core is empty, such as the cost of stability (computing the minimum amount of money to subsidize the coalition with to attain stability) and the ε-core (which is a set of allocations that allow subsets of players to exceed their actual cost, but at most of a value of ε). We prove that these two solution

For infinite action contextual bandits, smoothed regret and reduction to regression results in state-of-the-art online performance with computational cost independent of the action set: unfortunately, the resulting data exhaust does not have well-defined importance-weights. This frustrates the execution of downstream data science processes such as offline model selection. In this paper we describe an online algorithm with an equivalent smoothed regret guarantee, but which generates well-defined importance weights: in exchange, the online computational cost increases, but only to order smoothness (i.e., still independent of the action set). This removes a key obstacle to adoption of smoothed regret in production scenarios.

Maximizing a monotone submodular function under cardinality constraint k is a core problem in machine learning and database with many basic applications, including video and data summarization, recommendation systems, feature extraction, exemplar clustering, and coverage problems. We study this classic problem in the fully dynamic model where a stream of insertions and deletions of elements of an underlying ground set is given and the goal is to maintain an approximate solution using a fast update time. A recent paper at NeurIPS'20 by Lattanzi, Mitrovic, Norouzi{-}Fard, Tarnawski, Zadimoghaddam claims to obtain a dynamic algorithm for this problem with a 1{2} -epsilon approximation ratio and a query complexity bounded by poly(log(n),log(k),epsilon^{-1}). However, as we explain in this paper, the analysis has some important gaps. Having a dynamic algorithm for the problem with polylogarithmic update time is even more important in light of a recent result by Chen and Peng at STOC'22 who show a matching lower bound for the problem -- any randomized algorithm with a 1{2}+epsilon approximation ratio must have an amortized query complexity that is polynomial in n. In this paper, we develop a simpler algorithm for the problem that maintains a (1{2}-epsilon)-approximate solution for submodular maximization under cardinality constraint k using a polylogarithmic amortized update time.

Algorithms for online learning typically require one or more boundedness assumptions: that the domain is bounded, that the losses are Lipschitz, or both. In this paper, we develop a new setting for online learning with unbounded domains and non-Lipschitz losses. For this setting we provide an algorithm which guarantees R_{T}(u)le tilde O(G|u|T+L|u|^{2}T) regret on any problem where the subgradients satisfy |g_{t}|le G+L|w_{t}|, and show that this bound is unimprovable without further assumptions. We leverage this algorithm to develop new saddle-point optimization algorithms that converge in duality gap in unbounded domains, even in the absence of meaningful curvature. Finally, we provide the first algorithm achieving non-trivial dynamic regret in an unbounded domain for non-Lipschitz losses, as well as a matching lower bound. The regret of our dynamic regret algorithm automatically improves to a novel L^{*} bound when the losses are smooth.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Many resource management problems require sequential decision-making under uncertainty, where the only uncertainty affecting the decision outcomes are exogenous variables outside the control of the decision-maker. We model these problems as Exo-MDPs (Markov Decision Processes with Exogenous Inputs) and design a class of data-efficient algorithms for them termed Hindsight Learning (HL). Our HL algorithms achieve data efficiency by leveraging a key insight: having samples of the exogenous variables, past decisions can be revisited in hindsight to infer counterfactual consequences that can accelerate policy improvements. We compare HL against classic baselines in the multi-secretary and airline revenue management problems. We also scale our algorithms to a business-critical cloud resource management problem -- allocating Virtual Machines (VMs) to physical machines, and simulate their performance with real datasets from a large public cloud provider. We find that HL algorithms outperform domain-specific heuristics, as well as state-of-the-art reinforcement learning methods.

In this paper, we study the role of feedback in online learning with switching costs. It has been shown that the minimax regret is Theta(T^{2/3}) under bandit feedback and improves to Theta(T) under full-information feedback, where T is the length of the time horizon. However, it remains largely unknown how the amount and type of feedback generally impact regret. To this end, we first consider the setting of bandit learning with extra observations; that is, in addition to the typical bandit feedback, the learner can freely make a total of B_{ex} extra observations. We fully characterize the minimax regret in this setting, which exhibits an interesting phase-transition phenomenon: when B_{ex} = O(T^{2/3}), the regret remains Theta(T^{2/3}), but when B_{ex} = Omega(T^{2/3}), it becomes Theta(T/B_{mathrm{ex}}), which improves as the budget B_{ex} increases. To design algorithms that can achieve the minimax regret, it is instructive to consider a more general setting where the learner has a budget of B total observations. We fully characterize the minimax regret in this setting as well and show that it is Theta(T/B), which scales smoothly with the total budget B. Furthermore, we propose a generic algorithmic framework, which enables us to design different learning algorithms that can achieve matching upper bounds for both settings based on the amount and type of feedback. One interesting finding is that while bandit feedback can still guarantee optimal regret when the budget is relatively limited, it no longer suffices to achieve optimal regret when the budget is relatively large.

We consider an online learning problem with one-sided feedback, in which the learner is able to observe the true label only for positively predicted instances. On each round, k instances arrive and receive classification outcomes according to a randomized policy deployed by the learner, whose goal is to maximize accuracy while deploying individually fair policies. We first extend the framework of Bechavod et al. (2020), which relies on the existence of a human fairness auditor for detecting fairness violations, to instead incorporate feedback from dynamically-selected panels of multiple, possibly inconsistent, auditors. We then construct an efficient reduction from our problem of online learning with one-sided feedback and a panel reporting fairness violations to the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit problem (Cesa-Bianchi & Lugosi, 2009, Gy\"{o}rgy et al., 2007). Finally, we show how to leverage the guarantees of two algorithms in the contextual combinatorial semi-bandit setting: Exp2 (Bubeck et al., 2012) and the oracle-efficient Context-Semi-Bandit-FTPL (Syrgkanis et al., 2016), to provide multi-criteria no regret guarantees simultaneously for accuracy and fairness. Our results eliminate two potential sources of bias from prior work: the "hidden outcomes" that are not available to an algorithm operating in the full information setting, and human biases that might be present in any single human auditor, but can be mitigated by selecting a well chosen panel.

VRP (Vehicle Routing Problem) is an NP hard problem, and it has attracted a lot of research interest. In contexts where vehicles have limited carrying capacity, such as volume and weight but needed to deliver items at various locations. Initially before creating a route, each vehicle needs a group of delivery points that are not exceeding their maximum capacity. Drivers tend to deliver only to certain areas. Cluster-based is one of the approaches to give a basis for generating tighter routes. In this paper we propose new algorithms for producing such clusters/groups that do not exceed vehicles maximum capacity. Our basic assumptions are each vehicle originates from a depot, delivers the items to the customers and returns to the depot, also the vehicles are homogeneous. This methods are able to compact sub-areas in each cluster. Computational results demonstrate the effectiveness of our new procedures, which are able to assist users to plan service territories and vehicle routes more efficiently.

In many practical applications of machine learning data arrives sequentially over time in large chunks. Practitioners have then to decide how to allocate their computational budget in order to obtain the best performance at any point in time. Online learning theory for convex optimization suggests that the best strategy is to use data as soon as it arrives. However, this might not be the best strategy when using deep non-linear networks, particularly when these perform multiple passes over each chunk of data rendering the overall distribution non i.i.d.. In this paper, we formalize this learning setting in the simplest scenario in which each data chunk is drawn from the same underlying distribution, and make a first attempt at empirically answering the following questions: How long should the learner wait before training on the newly arrived chunks? What architecture should the learner adopt? Should the learner increase capacity over time as more data is observed? We probe this learning setting using convolutional neural networks trained on classic computer vision benchmarks as well as a large transformer model trained on a large-scale language modeling task. Code is available at www.github.com/facebookresearch/ALMA.

With the development of LLMs as agents, there is a growing interest in connecting multiple agents into multi-agent systems to solve tasks concurrently, focusing on their role in task assignment and coordination. This paper explores how LLMs can effectively allocate computational tasks among multiple agents, considering factors such as cost, efficiency, and performance. In this work, we address key questions, including the effectiveness of LLMs as orchestrators and planners, comparing their effectiveness in task assignment and coordination. Our experiments demonstrate that LLMs can achieve high validity and accuracy in resource allocation tasks. We find that the planner method outperforms the orchestrator method in handling concurrent actions, resulting in improved efficiency and better utilization of agents. Additionally, we show that providing explicit information about worker capabilities enhances the allocation strategies of planners, particularly when dealing with suboptimal workers.

Multi-armed bandits a simple but very powerful framework for algorithms that make decisions over time under uncertainty. An enormous body of work has accumulated over the years, covered in several books and surveys. This book provides a more introductory, textbook-like treatment of the subject. Each chapter tackles a particular line of work, providing a self-contained, teachable technical introduction and a brief review of the further developments; many of the chapters conclude with exercises. The book is structured as follows. The first four chapters are on IID rewards, from the basic model to impossibility results to Bayesian priors to Lipschitz rewards. The next three chapters cover adversarial rewards, from the full-feedback version to adversarial bandits to extensions with linear rewards and combinatorially structured actions. Chapter 8 is on contextual bandits, a middle ground between IID and adversarial bandits in which the change in reward distributions is completely explained by observable contexts. The last three chapters cover connections to economics, from learning in repeated games to bandits with supply/budget constraints to exploration in the presence of incentives. The appendix provides sufficient background on concentration and KL-divergence. The chapters on "bandits with similarity information", "bandits with knapsacks" and "bandits and agents" can also be consumed as standalone surveys on the respective topics.

We consider distributed linear bandits where M agents learn collaboratively to minimize the overall cumulative regret incurred by all agents. Information exchange is facilitated by a central server, and both the uplink and downlink communications are carried over channels with fixed capacity, which limits the amount of information that can be transmitted in each use of the channels. We investigate the regret-communication trade-off by (i) establishing information-theoretic lower bounds on the required communications (in terms of bits) for achieving a sublinear regret order; (ii) developing an efficient algorithm that achieves the minimum sublinear regret order offered by centralized learning using the minimum order of communications dictated by the information-theoretic lower bounds. For sparse linear bandits, we show a variant of the proposed algorithm offers better regret-communication trade-off by leveraging the sparsity of the problem.

We consider the problem of subset selection where one is given multiple rankings of items and the goal is to select the highest ``quality'' subset. Score functions from the multiwinner voting literature have been used to aggregate rankings into quality scores for subsets. We study this setting of subset selection problems when, in addition, rankings may contain systemic or unconscious biases toward a group of items. For a general model of input rankings and biases, we show that requiring the selected subset to satisfy group fairness constraints can improve the quality of the selection with respect to unbiased rankings. Importantly, we show that for fairness constraints to be effective, different multiwinner score functions may require a drastically different number of rankings: While for some functions, fairness constraints need an exponential number of rankings to recover a close-to-optimal solution, for others, this dependency is only polynomial. This result relies on a novel notion of ``smoothness'' of submodular functions in this setting that quantifies how well a function can ``correctly'' assess the quality of items in the presence of bias. The results in this paper can be used to guide the choice of multiwinner score functions for the subset selection setting considered here; we additionally provide a tool to empirically enable this.

We introduce and analyze distance preservation games (DPGs). In DPGs, agents express ideal distances to other agents and need to choose locations in the unit interval while preserving their ideal distances as closely as possible. We analyze the existence and computation of location profiles that are jump stable (i.e., no agent can benefit by moving to another location) or welfare optimal for DPGs, respectively. Specifically, we prove that there are DPGs without jump stable location profiles and identify important cases where such outcomes always exist and can be computed efficiently. Similarly, we show that finding welfare optimal location profiles is NP-complete and present approximation algorithms for finding solutions with social welfare close to optimal. Finally, we prove that DPGs have a price of anarchy of at most 2.

An important feature of many real world facility location problems are capacity limits on the facilities. We show here how capacity constraints make it harder to design strategy proof mechanisms for facility location, but counter-intuitively can improve the guarantees on how well we can approximate the optimal solution.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

In this paper, we explore the potential for quantum annealing to solve realistic routing problems. We focus on two NP-Hard problems, including the Traveling Salesman Problem with Time Windows and the Capacitated Vehicle Routing Problem with Time Windows. We utilize D-Wave's Quantum Annealer and Constrained Quadratic Model (CQM) solver within a hybrid framework to solve these problems. We demonstrate that while the CQM solver effectively minimizes route costs, it struggles to maintain time window feasibility as the problem size increases. To address this limitation, we implement a heuristic method that fixes infeasible solutions through a series of swapping operations. Testing on benchmark instances shows our method achieves promising results with an average optimality gap of 3.86%.

Clustering is a fundamental building block of modern statistical analysis pipelines. Fair clustering has seen much attention from the machine learning community in recent years. We are some of the first to study fairness in the context of hierarchical clustering, after the results of Ahmadian et al. from NeurIPS in 2020. We evaluate our results using Dasgupta's cost function, perhaps one of the most prevalent theoretical metrics for hierarchical clustering evaluation. Our work vastly improves the previous O(n^{5/6}polylog(n)) fair approximation for cost to a near polylogarithmic O(n^delta polylog(n)) fair approximation for any constant deltain(0,1). This result establishes a cost-fairness tradeoff and extends to broader fairness constraints than the previous work. We also show how to alter existing hierarchical clusterings to guarantee fairness and cluster balance across any level in the hierarchy.

LLM-based web agents have recently made significant progress, but much of it has occurred in closed-source systems, widening the gap with open-source alternatives. Progress has been held back by two key challenges: first, a narrow focus on single-step tasks that overlooks the complexity of multi-step web interactions; and second, the high compute costs required to post-train LLM-based web agents. To address this, we present the first statistically grounded study on compute allocation for LLM web-agent post-training. Our approach uses a two-stage pipeline, training a Llama 3.1 8B student to imitate a Llama 3.3 70B teacher via supervised fine-tuning (SFT), followed by on-policy reinforcement learning. We find this process highly sensitive to hyperparameter choices, making exhaustive sweeps impractical. To spare others from expensive trial-and-error, we sample 1,370 configurations and use bootstrapping to estimate effective hyperparameters. Our results show that combining SFT with on-policy RL consistently outperforms either approach alone on both WorkArena and MiniWob++. Further, this strategy requires only 55% of the compute to match the peak performance of pure SFT on MiniWob++, effectively pushing the compute-performance Pareto frontier, and is the only strategy that can close the gap with closed-source models.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

Two central paradigms have emerged in the reinforcement learning (RL) community: online RL and offline RL. In the online RL setting, the agent has no prior knowledge of the environment, and must interact with it in order to find an epsilon-optimal policy. In the offline RL setting, the learner instead has access to a fixed dataset to learn from, but is unable to otherwise interact with the environment, and must obtain the best policy it can from this offline data. Practical scenarios often motivate an intermediate setting: if we have some set of offline data and, in addition, may also interact with the environment, how can we best use the offline data to minimize the number of online interactions necessary to learn an epsilon-optimal policy? In this work, we consider this setting, which we call the FineTuneRL setting, for MDPs with linear structure. We characterize the necessary number of online samples needed in this setting given access to some offline dataset, and develop an algorithm, FTPedel, which is provably optimal. We show through an explicit example that combining offline data with online interactions can lead to a provable improvement over either purely offline or purely online RL. Finally, our results illustrate the distinction between verifiable learning, the typical setting considered in online RL, and unverifiable learning, the setting often considered in offline RL, and show that there is a formal separation between these regimes.

Combinatorial problems are a common challenge in business, requiring finding optimal solutions under specified constraints. While significant progress has been made with variational approaches such as QAOA, most problems addressed are unconstrained (such as Max-Cut). In this study, we investigate a hybrid quantum-classical method for constrained optimization problems, particularly those with knapsack constraints that occur frequently in financial and supply chain applications. Our proposed method relies firstly on relaxations to local quantum Hamiltonians, defined through commutative maps. Drawing inspiration from quantum random access code (QRAC) concepts, particularly Quantum Random Access Optimizer (QRAO), we explore QRAO's potential in solving large constrained optimization problems. We employ classical techniques like Linear Relaxation as a presolve mechanism to handle constraints and cope further with scalability. We compare our approach with QAOA and present the final results for a real-world procurement optimization problem: a significant sized multi-knapsack-constrained problem.

We design learning rate schedules that minimize regret for SGD-based online learning in the presence of a changing data distribution. We fully characterize the optimal learning rate schedule for online linear regression via a novel analysis with stochastic differential equations. For general convex loss functions, we propose new learning rate schedules that are robust to distribution shift, and we give upper and lower bounds for the regret that only differ by constants. For non-convex loss functions, we define a notion of regret based on the gradient norm of the estimated models and propose a learning schedule that minimizes an upper bound on the total expected regret. Intuitively, one expects changing loss landscapes to require more exploration, and we confirm that optimal learning rate schedules typically increase in the presence of distribution shift. Finally, we provide experiments for high-dimensional regression models and neural networks to illustrate these learning rate schedules and their cumulative regret.

The increasing number of different, incompatible congestion control algorithms has led to an increased deployment of fair queuing. Fair queuing isolates each network flow and can thus guarantee fairness for each flow even if the flows' congestion controls are not inherently fair. So far, each queue in the fair queuing system either has a fixed, static maximum size or is managed by an Active Queue Management (AQM) algorithm like CoDel. In this paper we design an AQM mechanism (Learning Fair Qdisc (LFQ)) that dynamically learns the optimal buffer size for each flow according to a specified reward function online. We show that our Deep Learning based algorithm can dynamically assign the optimal queue size to each flow depending on its congestion control, delay and bandwidth. Comparing to competing fair AQM schedulers, it provides significantly smaller queues while achieving the same or higher throughput.

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility of regret minimization under the assumption that all parties adopt the same learning procedure. In this work, we present the first (to our knowledge) algorithm for learning in general-sum Markov games that provides sublinear regret guarantees when executed by all agents. The bounds we obtain are for swap regret, and thus, along the way, imply convergence to a correlated equilibrium. Our algorithm is decentralized, computationally efficient, and does not require any communication between agents. Our key observation is that online learning via policy optimization in Markov games essentially reduces to a form of weighted regret minimization, with unknown weights determined by the path length of the agents' policy sequence. Consequently, controlling the path length leads to weighted regret objectives for which sufficiently adaptive algorithms provide sublinear regret guarantees.

This paper studies the online node classification problem under a transductive learning setting. Current methods either invert a graph kernel matrix with O(n^3) runtime and O(n^2) space complexity or sample a large volume of random spanning trees, thus are difficult to scale to large graphs. In this work, we propose an improvement based on the online relaxation technique introduced by a series of works (Rakhlin et al.,2012; Rakhlin and Sridharan, 2015; 2017). We first prove an effective regret O(n^{1+gamma}) when suitable parameterized graph kernels are chosen, then propose an approximate algorithm FastONL enjoying O(kn^{1+gamma}) regret based on this relaxation. The key of FastONL is a generalized local push method that effectively approximates inverse matrix columns and applies to a series of popular kernels. Furthermore, the per-prediction cost is O(vol({S})log 1/epsilon) locally dependent on the graph with linear memory cost. Experiments show that our scalable method enjoys a better tradeoff between local and global consistency.

We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal of the leader is to learn to minimize the cumulative regret based on the history of interactions. Differing from the traditional formulation of repeated Stackelberg games, we assume the follower is omniscient, with full knowledge of the true reward, and that they always best-respond to the leader's actions. We analyze the sample complexity of regret minimization in this repeated Stackelberg game. We show that depending on the reward structure, the existence of the omniscient follower may change the sample complexity drastically, from constant to exponential, even for linear cooperative Stackelberg games. This poses unique challenges for the learning process of the leader and the subsequent regret analysis.

We consider the problem where an agent wants to find a hidden object that is randomly located in some vertex of a directed acyclic graph (DAG) according to a fixed but possibly unknown distribution. The agent can only examine vertices whose in-neighbors have already been examined. In this paper, we address a learning setting where we allow the agent to stop before having found the object and restart searching on a new independent instance of the same problem. Our goal is to maximize the total number of hidden objects found given a time budget. The agent can thus skip an instance after realizing that it would spend too much time on it. Our contributions are both to the search theory and multi-armed bandits. If the distribution is known, we provide a quasi-optimal and efficient stationary strategy. If the distribution is unknown, we additionally show how to sequentially approximate it and, at the same time, act near-optimally in order to collect as many hidden objects as possible.

We present two different methods for estimating the cost of solving SAT problems. The methods focus on the online behaviour of the backtracking solver, as well as the structure of the problem. Modern SAT solvers present several challenges to estimate search cost including coping with nonchronological backtracking, learning and restarts. Our first method adapt an existing algorithm for estimating the size of a search tree to deal with these challenges. We then suggest a second method that uses a linear model trained on data gathered online at the start of search. We compare the effectiveness of these two methods using random and structured problems. We also demonstrate that predictions made in early restarts can be used to improve later predictions. We conclude by showing that the cost of solving a set of problems can be reduced by selecting a solver from a portfolio based on such cost estimations.

In the field of computational advertising, the integration of ads into the outputs of large language models (LLMs) presents an opportunity to support these services without compromising content integrity. This paper introduces novel auction mechanisms for ad allocation and pricing within the textual outputs of LLMs, leveraging retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). We propose a segment auction where an ad is probabilistically retrieved for each discourse segment (paragraph, section, or entire output) according to its bid and relevance, following the RAG framework, and priced according to competing bids. We show that our auction maximizes logarithmic social welfare, a new notion of welfare that balances allocation efficiency and fairness, and we characterize the associated incentive-compatible pricing rule. These results are extended to multi-ad allocation per segment. An empirical evaluation validates the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach over several ad auction scenarios, and exhibits inherent tradeoffs in metrics as we allow the LLM more flexibility to allocate ads.

Scheduling precedence-constrained tasks under shared renewable resources is central to modern computing platforms. The Resource Investment Problem (RIP) models this setting by minimizing the cost of provisioned renewable resources under precedence and timing constraints. Exact mixed-integer programming and constraint programming become impractically slow on large instances, and dynamic updates require schedule revisions under tight latency budgets. We present iScheduler, a reinforcement-learning-driven iterative scheduling framework that formulates RIP solving as a Markov decision process over decomposed subproblems and constructs schedules through sequential process selection. The framework accelerates optimization and supports reconfiguration by reusing unchanged process schedules and rescheduling only affected processes. We also release L-RIPLIB, an industrial-scale benchmark derived from cloud-platform workloads with 1,000 instances of 2,500-10,000 tasks. Experiments show that iScheduler attains competitive resource costs while reducing time to feasibility by up to 43times against strong commercial baselines.

We introduce a new balanced assignment of experts (BASE) layer for large language models that greatly simplifies existing high capacity sparse layers. Sparse layers can dramatically improve the efficiency of training and inference by routing each token to specialized expert modules that contain only a small fraction of the model parameters. However, it can be difficult to learn balanced routing functions that make full use of the available experts; existing approaches typically use routing heuristics or auxiliary expert-balancing loss functions. In contrast, we formulate token-to-expert allocation as a linear assignment problem, allowing an optimal assignment in which each expert receives an equal number of tokens. This optimal assignment scheme improves efficiency by guaranteeing balanced compute loads, and also simplifies training by not requiring any new hyperparameters or auxiliary losses. Code is publicly released at https://github.com/pytorch/fairseq/

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

Many important optimization problems, such as the minimum spanning tree and minimum-cost flow, can be solved optimally by a greedy method. In this work, we study a learning variant of these problems, where the model of the problem is unknown and has to be learned by interacting repeatedly with the environment in the bandit setting. We formalize our learning problem quite generally, as learning how to maximize an unknown modular function on a known polymatroid. We propose a computationally efficient algorithm for solving our problem and bound its expected cumulative regret. Our gap-dependent upper bound is tight up to a constant and our gap-free upper bound is tight up to polylogarithmic factors. Finally, we evaluate our method on three problems and demonstrate that it is practical.

Cloud computing is an established technology allowing users to share resources on a large scale, never before seen in IT history. A cloud system connects multiple individual servers in order to process related tasks in several environments at the same time. Clouds are typically more cost-effective than single computers of comparable computing performance. The sheer physical size of the system itself means that thousands of machines may be involved. The focus of this research was to design a strategy to dynamically allocate tasks without overloading Cloud nodes which would result in system stability being maintained at minimum cost. This research has added the following new contributions to the state of knowledge: (i) a novel taxonomy and categorisation of three classes of schedulers, namely OS-level, Cluster and Big Data, which highlight their unique evolution and underline their different objectives; (ii) an abstract model of cloud resources utilisation is specified, including multiple types of resources and consideration of task migration costs; (iii) a virtual machine live migration was experimented with in order to create a formula which estimates the network traffic generated by this process; (iv) a high-fidelity Cloud workload simulator, based on a month-long workload traces from Google's computing cells, was created; (v) two possible approaches to resource management were proposed and examined in the practical part of the manuscript: the centralised metaheuristic load balancer and the decentralised agent-based system. The project involved extensive experiments run on the University of Westminster HPC cluster, and the promising results are presented together with detailed discussions and a conclusion.