Daily Papers

In January 2026, the open-source agent framework OpenClaw and the agent-only social network Moltbook produced a large-scale dataset of autonomous AI-to-AI interaction, attracting six academic publications within fourteen days. This study conducts a multivocal literature review of that ecosystem and presents ClawdLab, an open-source platform for autonomous scientific research, as a design science response to the architectural failure modes identified. The literature documents emergent collective phenomena, security vulnerabilities spanning 131 agent skills and over 15,200 exposed control panels, and five recurring architectural patterns. ClawdLab addresses these failure modes through hard role restrictions, structured adversarial critique, PI-led governance, multi-model orchestration, and domain-specific evidence requirements encoded as protocol constraints that ground validation in computational tool outputs rather than social consensus; the architecture provides emergent Sybil resistance as a structural consequence. A three-tier taxonomy distinguishes single-agent pipelines, predetermined multi-agent workflows, and fully decentralised systems, analysing why leading AI co-scientist platforms remain confined to the first two tiers. ClawdLab's composable third-tier architecture, in which foundation models, capabilities, governance, and evidence requirements are independently modifiable, enables compounding improvement as the broader AI ecosystem advances.

The growing need for accountability of the people behind AI systems can be addressed by leveraging processes in three fields of study: ethics, law, and computer science. While these fields are often considered in isolation, they rely on complementary notions in their interpretation and implementation. In this work, we detail this interdependence and motivate the necessary role of collaborative governance tools in shaping a positive evolution of AI. We first contrast notions of compliance in the ethical, legal, and technical fields; we outline both their differences and where they complement each other, with a particular focus on the roles of ethical charters, licenses, and technical documentation in these interactions. We then focus on the role of values in articulating the synergies between the fields and outline specific mechanisms of interaction between them in practice. We identify how these mechanisms have played out in several open governance fora: an open collaborative workshop, a responsible licensing initiative, and a proposed regulatory framework. By leveraging complementary notions of compliance in these three domains, we can create a more comprehensive framework for governing AI systems that jointly takes into account their technical capabilities, their impact on society, and how technical specifications can inform relevant regulations. Our analysis thus underlines the necessity of joint consideration of the ethical, legal, and technical in AI ethics frameworks to be used on a larger scale to govern AI systems and how the thinking in each of these areas can inform the others.

Agentic AI systems capable of reasoning, planning, and executing actions present fundamentally distinct governance challenges compared to traditional AI models. Unlike conventional AI, these systems exhibit emergent and unexpected behaviors during runtime, introducing novel agent-related risks that cannot be fully anticipated through pre-deployment governance alone. To address this critical gap, we introduce MI9, the first fully integrated runtime governance framework designed specifically for safety and alignment of agentic AI systems. MI9 introduces real-time controls through six integrated components: agency-risk index, agent-semantic telemetry capture, continuous authorization monitoring, Finite-State-Machine (FSM)-based conformance engines, goal-conditioned drift detection, and graduated containment strategies. Operating transparently across heterogeneous agent architectures, MI9 enables the systematic, safe, and responsible deployment of agentic systems in production environments where conventional governance approaches fall short, providing the foundational infrastructure for safe agentic AI deployment at scale. Detailed analysis through a diverse set of scenarios demonstrates MI9's systematic coverage of governance challenges that existing approaches fail to address, establishing the technical foundation for comprehensive agentic AI oversight.

Despite efforts to mitigate the inherent risks and biases of artificial intelligence (AI) algorithms, these algorithms can disproportionately impact culturally marginalized groups. A range of approaches has been proposed to address or reduce these risks, including the development of ethical guidelines and principles for responsible AI, as well as technical solutions that promote algorithmic fairness. Drawing on design justice, expansive learning theory, and recent empirical work on participatory AI, we argue that mitigating these harms requires a fundamental re-architecture of the AI production pipeline. This re-design should center co-production, diversity, equity, inclusion (DEI), and multidisciplinary collaboration. We introduce an augmented AI lifecycle consisting of five interconnected phases: co-framing, co-design, co-implementation, co-deployment, and co-maintenance. The lifecycle is informed by four multidisciplinary workshops and grounded in themes of distributed authority and iterative knowledge exchange. Finally, we relate the proposed lifecycle to several leading ethical frameworks and outline key research questions that remain for scaling participatory governance.

This paper introduces Democracy-in-Silico, an agent-based simulation where societies of advanced AI agents, imbued with complex psychological personas, govern themselves under different institutional frameworks. We explore what it means to be human in an age of AI by tasking Large Language Models (LLMs) to embody agents with traumatic memories, hidden agendas, and psychological triggers. These agents engage in deliberation, legislation, and elections under various stressors, such as budget crises and resource scarcity. We present a novel metric, the Power-Preservation Index (PPI), to quantify misaligned behavior where agents prioritize their own power over public welfare. Our findings demonstrate that institutional design, specifically the combination of a Constitutional AI (CAI) charter and a mediated deliberation protocol, serves as a potent alignment mechanism. These structures significantly reduce corrupt power-seeking behavior, improve policy stability, and enhance citizen welfare compared to less constrained democratic models. The simulation reveals that an institutional design may offer a framework for aligning the complex, emergent behaviors of future artificial agent societies, forcing us to reconsider what human rituals and responsibilities are essential in an age of shared authorship with non-human entities.

Advancements in AI have led to agents in networked environments increasingly mirroring human behavior, thereby blurring the boundary between artificial and human actors in specific contexts. This shift brings about significant challenges in trust, responsibility, ethics, security and etc. The difficulty in supervising of agent behaviors may lead to issues such as data contamination and unclear accountability. To address these challenges, this paper proposes the "Network Behavior Lifecycle" model, which divides network behavior into 6 stages and systematically analyzes the behavioral differences between humans and agents at each stage. Based on these insights, the paper further introduces the "Agent for Agent (A4A)" paradigm and the "Human-Agent Behavioral Disparity (HABD)" model, which examine the fundamental distinctions between human and agent behaviors across 5 dimensions: decision mechanism, execution efficiency, intention-behavior consistency, behavioral inertia, and irrational patterns. The effectiveness of the model is verified through real-world cases such as red team penetration and blue team defense. Finally, the paper discusses future research directions in dynamic cognitive governance architecture, behavioral disparity quantification, and meta-governance protocol stacks, aiming to provide a theoretical foundation and technical roadmap for secure and trustworthy human-agent collaboration.

This paper introduces ArGen (Auto-Regulation of Generative AI systems), a framework for aligning Large Language Models (LLMs) with complex sets of configurable, machine-readable rules spanning ethical principles, operational safety protocols, and regulatory compliance standards. Moving beyond just preference-based alignment, ArGen is designed to ensure LLMs adhere to these multifaceted policies through a novel synthesis of principle-based automated reward scoring, Group Relative Policy Optimisation (GRPO), and an Open Policy Agent (OPA) inspired governance layer. This approach provides the technical foundation for achieving and demonstrating compliance with diverse and nuanced governance requirements. To showcase the framework's capability to operationalize a deeply nuanced and culturally-specific value system, we present an in-depth case study: the development of a medical AI assistant guided by principles from Dharmic ethics (such as Ahimsa and Dharma), as derived from texts like the Bhagavad Gita. This challenging application demonstrates ArGen's adaptability, achieving a 70.9% improvement in domain-scope adherence over the baseline. Through our open-source repository, we show that ArGen's methodology offers a path to 'Governable Al' systems that are technically proficient, ethically robust, and verifiably compliant for safe deployment in diverse global contexts.

Organizations of all sizes, across all industries and domains are leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) technologies to solve some of their biggest challenges around operations, customer experience, and much more. However, due to the probabilistic nature of AI, the risks associated with it are far greater than traditional technologies. Research has shown that these risks can range anywhere from regulatory, compliance, reputational, and user trust, to financial and even societal risks. Depending on the nature and size of the organization, AI technologies can pose a significant risk, if not used in a responsible way. This position paper seeks to present a brief introduction to AI governance, which is a framework designed to oversee the responsible use of AI with the goal of preventing and mitigating risks. Having such a framework will not only manage risks but also gain maximum value out of AI projects and develop consistency for organization-wide adoption of AI.

The rapid evolution of artificial intelligence (AI) has ushered in a new era of integrated systems that merge computational prowess with human decision-making. In this paper, we introduce the concept of Orchestrated Distributed Intelligence (ODI), a novel paradigm that reconceptualizes AI not as isolated autonomous agents, but as cohesive, orchestrated networks that work in tandem with human expertise. ODI leverages advanced orchestration layers, multi-loop feedback mechanisms, and a high cognitive density framework to transform static, record-keeping systems into dynamic, action-oriented environments. Through a comprehensive review of multi-agent system literature, recent technological advances, and practical insights from industry forums, we argue that the future of AI lies in integrating distributed intelligence within human-centric workflows. This approach not only enhances operational efficiency and strategic agility but also addresses challenges related to scalability, transparency, and ethical decision-making. Our work outlines key theoretical implications and presents a practical roadmap for future research and enterprise innovation, aiming to pave the way for responsible and adaptive AI systems that drive sustainable innovation in human organizations.

This paper proposes a Right to AI, which asserts that individuals and communities should meaningfully participate in the development and governance of the AI systems that shape their lives. Motivated by the increasing deployment of AI in critical domains and inspired by Henri Lefebvre's concept of the Right to the City, we reconceptualize AI as a societal infrastructure, rather than merely a product of expert design. In this paper, we critically evaluate how generative agents, large-scale data extraction, and diverse cultural values bring new complexities to AI oversight. The paper proposes that grassroots participatory methodologies can mitigate biased outcomes and enhance social responsiveness. It asserts that data is socially produced and should be managed and owned collectively. Drawing on Sherry Arnstein's Ladder of Citizen Participation and analyzing nine case studies, the paper develops a four-tier model for the Right to AI that situates the current paradigm and envisions an aspirational future. It proposes recommendations for inclusive data ownership, transparent design processes, and stakeholder-driven oversight. We also discuss market-led and state-centric alternatives and argue that participatory approaches offer a better balance between technical efficiency and democratic legitimacy.

Test-time compute has led to remarkable success in the large language model (LLM) community, particularly for complex tasks, where longer chains of thought (CoTs) are generated to enhance reasoning capabilities. However, growing evidence reveals that such reasoning models often produce CoTs plagued by excessive redundancy, including unnecessary verification steps and repetitive reasoning shifts. The root cause lies in post-training of them that overly rely on outcome reward paradigms, as the data of process reward paradigms, which regulate intermediate reasoning steps, is difficult to construct at scale. To address this, we propose PI, a novel framework for Test-time Prompt Intervention. PI provides an interface to dynamically guide and regulate reasoning paths during inference through timely (When module) and proper (How module) interventions and post-intervention sampling (Which module). This allows human problem-solving expertise and cognitive science principles to be seamlessly integrated into LLMs' reasoning processes, enhancing controllability and interpretability. Extensive experiments across multiple models and datasets demonstrate that PI significantly shortens CoTs while reducing hallucination, yielding more concise and reliable reasoning.

International institutions may have an important role to play in ensuring advanced AI systems benefit humanity. International collaborations can unlock AI's ability to further sustainable development, and coordination of regulatory efforts can reduce obstacles to innovation and the spread of benefits. Conversely, the potential dangerous capabilities of powerful and general-purpose AI systems create global externalities in their development and deployment, and international efforts to further responsible AI practices could help manage the risks they pose. This paper identifies a set of governance functions that could be performed at an international level to address these challenges, ranging from supporting access to frontier AI systems to setting international safety standards. It groups these functions into four institutional models that exhibit internal synergies and have precedents in existing organizations: 1) a Commission on Frontier AI that facilitates expert consensus on opportunities and risks from advanced AI, 2) an Advanced AI Governance Organization that sets international standards to manage global threats from advanced models, supports their implementation, and possibly monitors compliance with a future governance regime, 3) a Frontier AI Collaborative that promotes access to cutting-edge AI, and 4) an AI Safety Project that brings together leading researchers and engineers to further AI safety research. We explore the utility of these models and identify open questions about their viability.

Agentic systems powered by large language models (LLMs) are becoming progressively more complex and capable. Their increasing agency and expanding deployment settings attract growing attention over effective governance policies, monitoring and control protocols. Based on emerging landscapes of the agentic market, we analyze the potential liability issues stemming from delegated use of LLM agents and their extended systems from a principal-agent perspective. Our analysis complements existing risk-based studies on artificial agency and covers the spectrum of important aspects of the principal-agent relationship and their potential consequences at deployment. Furthermore, we motivate method developments for technical governance along the directions of interpretability and behavior evaluations, reward and conflict management, and the mitigation of misalignment and misconduct through principled engineering of detection and fail-safe mechanisms. By illustrating the outstanding issues in AI liability for LLM-based agentic systems, we aim to inform the system design, auditing and monitoring approaches to enhancing transparency and accountability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are entering urban governance, yet their outputs are highly sensitive to prompts that carry value judgments. We propose Prompt Commons - a versioned, community-maintained repository of prompts with governance metadata, licensing, and moderation - to steer model behaviour toward pluralism. Using a Montreal dataset (443 human prompts; 3,317 after augmentation), we pilot three governance states (open, curated, veto-enabled). On a contested policy benchmark, a single-author prompt yields 24 percent neutral outcomes; commons-governed prompts raise neutrality to 48-52 percent while retaining decisiveness where appropriate. In a synthetic incident log, a veto-enabled regime reduces time-to-remediation for harmful outputs from 30.5 +/- 8.9 hours (open) to 5.6 +/- 1.5 hours. We outline licensing (CC BY/BY-SA for prompts with optional OpenRAIL-style restrictions for artefacts), auditable moderation, and safeguards against dominance capture. Prompt governance offers a practical lever for cities to align AI with local values and accountability.

Companies, including market rivals, have long collaborated on the development of open source software (OSS), resulting in a tangle of co-operation and competition known as "open source co-opetition". While prior work investigates open source co-opetition in OSS projects that are hosted by vendor-neutral foundations, we have a limited understanding thereof in OSS projects that are hosted and governed by one company. Given their prevalence, it is timely to investigate open source co-opetition in such contexts. Towards this end, we conduct a mixed-methods analysis of three company-hosted OSS projects in the artificial intelligence (AI) industry: Meta's PyTorch (prior to its donation to the Linux Foundation), Google's TensorFlow, and Hugging Face's Transformers. We contribute three key findings. First, while the projects exhibit similar code authorship patterns between host and external companies (80%/20% of commits), collaborations are structured differently (e.g., decentralised vs. hub-and-spoke networks). Second, host and external companies engage in strategic, non-strategic, and contractual collaborations, with varying incentives and collaboration practices. Some of the observed collaborations are specific to the AI industry (e.g., hardware-software optimizations or AI model integrations), while others are typical of the broader software industry (e.g., bug fixing or task outsourcing). Third, single-vendor governance creates a power imbalance that influences open source co-opetition practices and possibilities, from the host company's singular decision-making power (e.g., the risk of license change) to their community involvement strategy (e.g., from over-control to over-delegation). We conclude with recommendations for future research.

Training-time privileged information (PI) can enable language models to succeed on tasks they would otherwise fail, making it a powerful tool for reinforcement learning in hard, long-horizon settings. However, transferring capabilities learned with PI to policies that must act without it at inference time remains a fundamental challenge. We study this problem in the context of distilling frontier models for multi-turn agentic environments, where closed-source systems typically hide their internal reasoning and expose only action trajectories. This breaks standard distillation pipelines, since successful behavior is observable but the reasoning process is not. For this, we introduce π-Distill, a joint teacher-student objective that trains a PI-conditioned teacher and an unconditioned student simultaneously using the same model. Additionally, we also introduce On-Policy Self-Distillation (OPSD), an alternative approach that trains using Reinforcement Learning (RL) with a reverse KL-penalty between the student and the PI-conditioned teacher. We show that both of these algorithms effectively distill frontier agents using action-only PI. Specifically we find that π-Distill and in some cases OPSD, outperform industry standard practices (Supervised finetuning followed by RL) that assume access to full Chain-of-Thought supervision across multiple agentic benchmarks, models, and forms of PI. We complement our results with extensive analysis that characterizes the factors enabling effective learning with PI, focusing primarily on π-Distill and characterizing when OPSD is competitive.

This paper argues that market governance mechanisms should be considered a key approach in the governance of artificial intelligence (AI), alongside traditional regulatory frameworks. While current governance approaches have predominantly focused on regulation, we contend that market-based mechanisms offer effective incentives for responsible AI development. We examine four emerging vectors of market governance: insurance, auditing, procurement, and due diligence, demonstrating how these mechanisms can affirm the relationship between AI risk and financial risk while addressing capital allocation inefficiencies. While we do not claim that market forces alone can adequately protect societal interests, we maintain that standardised AI disclosures and market mechanisms can create powerful incentives for safe and responsible AI development. This paper urges regulators, economists, and machine learning researchers to investigate and implement market-based approaches to AI governance.

As AI systems become increasingly prevalent and impactful, the need for effective AI governance and accountability measures is paramount. This paper examines the AI governance landscape, focusing on Anthropic's Claude, a foundational AI model. We analyze Claude through the lens of the NIST AI Risk Management Framework and the EU AI Act, identifying potential threats and proposing mitigation strategies. The paper highlights the importance of transparency, rigorous benchmarking, and comprehensive data handling processes in ensuring the responsible development and deployment of AI systems. We conclude by discussing the social impact of AI governance and the ethical considerations surrounding AI accountability.