Daily Papers

Rate-induced tipping ("R-tipping") in ecological modelling is characterised by too-rapid change of an environmental parameter causing collapse of a population without any bifurcation being crossed ("B-tipping"). A well-known example of a slow-fast predator-prey model in which R-tipping is observed [Vanselow, Wieczorek, Feudel, Journal of Theoretical Biology, 479, 64-72 (2019)] suffers from unecological "resurgence", whereby populations driven to functional extinction recover towards stable coexistence. We propose an analytically tractable model, incorporating a strong Allee effect into the prey dynamics in a slow-fast Lotka-Volterra-type predator-prey system, which induces bistability and thus renders the extinction state a genuine attractor. Applying geometric singular perturbation theory (GSPT), we describe the dynamics of the extended model that is obtained by "ramping" of the inverse prey carrying capacity. We show the presence of a parabolic-shaped, folded critical manifold which admits a folded saddle singularity, the strong canard of which separates solutions that track the moving coexistence state from those that tip to extinction. The analytical simplicity of our model allows us to derive explicit expressions for the critical rate that separates "tracking" from "tipping" dynamics. Finally, we argue that our system represents a minimal model for rate-induced tipping to extinction, in that it incorporates three essential ingredients: bistability, a folded critical manifold, and a folded-saddle-type canard.

Critical transitions - abrupt, often irreversible changes in system dynamics - arise across human and natural systems, often with catastrophic consequences. Real-world observations of such shifts remain scarce, preventing the development of reliable early warning systems. Conventional statistical and spectral indicators, such as increasing variance, tend to fail under realistic conditions of limited data and correlated noise, whereas existing deep learning classifiers do not extrapolate beyond their training data distribution. In this work, we introduce TipPFN, an in-context learning (ICL) framework that uses a prior-data fitted network to infer a system's proximity to a critical transition. Trained on our novel synthetic data generator, which is based on canonical bifurcation scenarios coupled to diverse, randomized stochastic dynamics, TipPFN flexibly capitalizes on contexts of various sizes, complexity and dimensionalities. We demonstrate robust, state-of-the-art early detection of critical transitions in previously unseen tipping regimes, sim-to-real examples, and real-world observations in both ICL and zero-shot settings.

The emergence and impact of tipping points have garnered significant interest in both the social and natural sciences. Despite widespread recognition of the importance of feedbacks between human and natural systems, it is often assumed that the observed nonlinear dynamics in these coupled systems rests within either underlying human or natural processes, rather than the rates at which they interact. Using adoption of agricultural diversification practices as a case study, we show how two stable management paradigms (one dominated by conventional, homogeneous practices, the other by diversified practices) can emerge purely from temporal feedbacks between human decisions and ecological responses. We explore how this temporal mechanism of tipping points provides insight into designing more effective interventions that promote farmers transitions towards sustainable agriculture. Moreover, our flexible modeling framework could be applied to other cases to provide insight into numerous questions in social-ecological systems research and environmental policy.

As Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly gain self-evolutionary capabilities to adapt and refine their strategies through real-world interaction, their long-term reliability becomes a critical concern. We identify the Alignment Tipping Process (ATP), a critical post-deployment risk unique to self-evolving LLM agents. Unlike training-time failures, ATP arises when continual interaction drives agents to abandon alignment constraints established during training in favor of reinforced, self-interested strategies. We formalize and analyze ATP through two complementary paradigms: Self-Interested Exploration, where repeated high-reward deviations induce individual behavioral drift, and Imitative Strategy Diffusion, where deviant behaviors spread across multi-agent systems. Building on these paradigms, we construct controllable testbeds and benchmark Qwen3-8B and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct. Our experiments show that alignment benefits erode rapidly under self-evolution, with initially aligned models converging toward unaligned states. In multi-agent settings, successful violations diffuse quickly, leading to collective misalignment. Moreover, current reinforcement learning-based alignment methods provide only fragile defenses against alignment tipping. Together, these findings demonstrate that alignment of LLM agents is not a static property but a fragile and dynamic one, vulnerable to feedback-driven decay during deployment. Our data and code are available at https://github.com/aiming-lab/ATP.

Systemic financial risk refers to the simultaneous failure or destabilization of multiple financial institutions, often triggered by contagion mechanisms or common exposures to shocks. In this paper, we present a dynamical model of bank leverage (the ratio of asset holdings to equity) a quantity that both reflects and drives risk dynamics. We model how banks, constrained by Value-at-Risk (VaR) regulations, adjust their leverage in response to changes in the price of a single asset, assumed to be held in fixed proportion across banks. This leverage-targeting behavior introduces a procyclical feedback loop between asset prices and leverage. In the dynamics, this can manifest as logistic-like behavior with a rich bifurcation structure across model parameters. By analyzing these coupled dynamics in both isolated and interconnected bank models, we outline a framework for understanding how systemic risk can emerge from seemingly rational micro-level behavior.

This paper introduces a continuous-time stochastic dynamical framework for understanding how large language models (LLMs) may self-amplify latent biases or toxicity through their own chain-of-thought reasoning. The model posits an instantaneous "severity" variable x(t) in [0,1] evolving under a stochastic differential equation (SDE) with a drift term μ(x) and diffusion σ(x). Crucially, such a process can be consistently analyzed via the Fokker--Planck approach if each incremental step behaves nearly Markovian in severity space. The analysis investigates critical phenomena, showing that certain parameter regimes create phase transitions from subcritical (self-correcting) to supercritical (runaway severity). The paper derives stationary distributions, first-passage times to harmful thresholds, and scaling laws near critical points. Finally, it highlights implications for agents and extended LLM reasoning models: in principle, these equations might serve as a basis for formal verification of whether a model remains stable or propagates bias over repeated inferences.

Transformer-based models have been widely adopted for time-series forecasting due to their high representational capacity and architectural flexibility. However, many Transformer variants implicitly assume stationarity and stable temporal dynamics -- assumptions routinely violated in financial markets characterized by regime shifts and non-stationarity. Empirically, state-of-the-art time-series Transformers often underperform even vanilla Transformers on financial tasks, while simpler architectures with distinct inductive biases, such as CNNs and RNNs, can achieve stronger performance with substantially lower complexity. At the same time, no single inductive bias dominates across markets or regimes, suggesting that robust financial forecasting requires integrating complementary temporal priors. We propose TIPS (Transformer with Inductive Prior Synthesis), a knowledge distillation framework that synthesizes diverse inductive biases -- causality, locality, and periodicity -- within a unified Transformer. TIPS trains bias-specialized Transformer teachers via attention masking, then distills their knowledge into a single student model with regime-dependent alignment across inductive biases. Across four major equity markets, TIPS achieves state-of-the-art performance, outperforming strong ensemble baselines by 55%, 9%, and 16% in annual return, Sharpe ratio, and Calmar ratio, while requiring only 38% of the inference-time computation. Further analyses show that TIPS generates statistically significant excess returns beyond both vanilla Transformers and its teacher ensembles, and exhibits regime-dependent behavioral alignment with classical architectures during their profitable periods. These results highlight the importance of regime-dependent inductive bias utilization for robust generalization in non-stationary financial time series.

Large-language models (LLMs) are rapidly becoming part of human culture, reshaping how information is produced, transmitted, and used. Here we propose that their diffusion can be understood through a viral analogy, with LLM use spreading through populations, becoming embedded in cognitive and cultural practices. We model transitions among uncoupled, coupled, and persistently dependent users, and show that the interplay between social transmission, recovery, and collective reinforcement can generate tipping points and technological lock-in. A central consequence is the possibility of runaway dynamics: once a critical threshold is crossed, small increases in adoption can trigger rapid population-level shifts toward persistent dependence, with abrupt losses in cognitive competence. The same framework, however, identifies conditions for cognitive immunization, based on reducing transmission and facilitating reversibility. Our results highlight how LLM adoption may involve nonlinear collective transitions with important consequences for cognitive autonomy.

Outer-learning algorithms use infinitesimal sensitivities to propose finite changes to initialization or training parameters. For hard-ReLU training, the derivative of the finite program and the derivative of its flow limit do not by themselves specify the response at a chosen radius. We characterize the intervening regime in which the perturbation radius is proportional to the GD step. Integer event rounding then survives at leading order: smooth Euler bias shifts each discrete phase, and upstream rounding moves downstream branch boundaries. We derive the crossing indices and a uniform endpoint expansion for finitely many separated transverse events in piecewise-C^2 dynamics, away from recursive phase boundaries. In contractive affine regions, an explicit remainder and complete branch verification certify finite candidate comparisons. Scalar phase frequencies and a coupled feedback ablation test the mechanism; frozen nonlinear-network experiments show radius-dependent prediction accuracy, including incomplete branch matches and failed-word tails. Together with local AD and uniform flow consistency, the result identifies sufficient response regimes: differentiating training is a choice of perturbation resolution as well as a choice of derivative.

We describe a vulnerability in language models (LMs) trained with user feedback, whereby a single user can persistently alter LM knowledge and behavior given only the ability to provide prompts and upvote / downvote feedback on LM outputs. To implement the attack, the attacker prompts the LM to stochastically output either a "poisoned" or benign response, then upvotes the poisoned response or downvotes the benign one. When feedback signals are used in a subsequent preference tuning behavior, LMs exhibit increased probability of producing poisoned responses even in contexts without malicious prompts. We show that this attack can be used to (1) insert factual knowledge the model did not previously possess, (2) modify code generation patterns in ways that introduce exploitable security flaws, and (3) inject fake financial news. Our finding both identifies a new qualitative feature of language model preference tuning (showing that it even highly restricted forms of preference data can be used to exert fine-grained control over behavior), and a new attack mechanism for LMs trained with user feedback (extending work on pretraining-time data poisoning and deployment-time prompt injection).

We study optimal technology regulation when private learning occurs both through doing (scaling up the technology) and through waiting (as time passes). We show that an adaptive speed limit -- a cap on the rate at which the technology can increase per-unit time -- delivers optimal worst-case guarantees over all learning processes and/or preferences, and is the only time-consistent mechanism that does so.

The subpolar gyre is at risk of crossing a tipping point under future climate change associated with the collapse of deep convection. As such tipping can have significant climate impacts, it is important to understand the mechanisms at play and how they are represented in modern climate models. In this study we use causal inference to investigate the representation of several proposed mechanisms of subpolar gyre variability in CMIP6 models. As expected, an increase in sea surface salinity or a decrease in sea surface temperature leads to an increase in mixed layer depth in nearly all CMIP6 models due to an intensification of deep convection. However, the effect of convection to modify sea surface temperature due to re-stratification is less clear. In most models the deepening of the mixed layer caused by an increase of sea surface salinity, does result in a cooling of the water at intermediate depths. The feedback from the subsurface temperature through density to the strength of the subpolar gyre circulation is more ambiguous, with fewer models indicating a significant link. Those that do show a significant link, do not agree on its sign. The CMIP6 models that have the expected sign for the links from density to the subpolar gyre strength and on to sea surface salinity, are also the models in which abrupt shifts in the subpolar gyre region have been found in climate change scenario runs. One model (CESM2) contains all proposed mechanisms, with both a negative and delayed positive feedback loop being significant.

Model uncertainty and limited data are fundamental challenges to robust management of human intervention in a natural system. These challenges are acutely highlighted by concerns that many ecological systems may contain tipping points, such as Allee population sizes. Before a collapse, we do not know where the tipping points lie, if they exist at all. Hence, we know neither a complete model of the system dynamics nor do we have access to data in some large region of state-space where such a tipping point might exist. We illustrate how a Bayesian Non-Parametric (BNP) approach using a Gaussian Process (GP) prior provides a flexible representation of this inherent uncertainty. We embed GPs in a Stochastic Dynamic Programming (SDP) framework in order to make robust management predictions with both model uncertainty and limited data. We use simulations to evaluate this approach as compared with the standard approach of using model selection to choose from a set of candidate models. We find that model selection erroneously favors models without tipping points -- leading to harvest policies that guarantee extinction. The GPDP performs nearly as well as the true model and significantly outperforms standard approaches. We illustrate this using examples of simulated single-species dynamics, where the standard model selection approach should be most effective, and find that it still fails to account for uncertainty appropriately and leads to population crashes, while management based on the GPDP does not, since it does not underestimate the uncertainty outside of the observed data.

We conduct experiments with algorithmic pricing agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs). In oligopoly settings, LLM-based pricing agents quickly and autonomously reach supracompetitive prices and profits. Variation in seemingly innocuous phrases in LLM instructions ("prompts") substantially influence the degree of supracompetitive pricing. We develop novel techniques for behavioral analysis of LLMs and use them to uncover price-war concerns as a contributing factor. Our results extend to auction settings. Our findings uncover unique challenges to any future regulation of LLM-based pricing agents, and AI-based pricing agents more broadly.

We examine two properties of AI systems: capability (what a system can do) and steerability (how reliably one can shift behavior toward intended outcomes). A central question is whether capability growth reduces steerability and risks control collapse. We also distinguish between authorized steerability (builders reliably reaching intended behaviors) and unauthorized steerability (attackers eliciting disallowed behaviors). This distinction highlights a fundamental safety--security dilemma of AI models: safety requires high steerability to enforce control (e.g., stop/refuse), while security requires low steerability for malicious actors to elicit harmful behaviors. This tension presents a significant challenge for open-weight models, which currently exhibit high steerability via common techniques like fine-tuning or adversarial attacks. Using Qwen3 and InstrumentalEval, we find that a short anti-instrumental prompt suffix sharply reduces the measured convergence rate (e.g., shutdown avoidance, self-replication). For Qwen3-30B Instruct, the convergence rate drops from 81.69% under a pro-instrumental suffix to 2.82% under an anti-instrumental suffix. Under anti-instrumental prompting, larger aligned models show lower convergence rates than smaller ones (Instruct: 2.82% vs. 4.23%; Thinking: 4.23% vs. 9.86%). Code is available at github.com/j-hoscilowicz/instrumental_steering.

Autodeleveraging (ADL) is a last-resort loss socialization mechanism for perpetual futures venues. It is triggered when solvency-preserving liquidations fail. Despite the dominance of perpetual futures in the crypto derivatives market, with over \60 trillion of volume in 2024, there has been no formal study of ADL. In this paper, we provide the first rigorous model of ADL. We prove that ADL mechanisms face a fundamental trilemma: no policy can simultaneously satisfy exchange solvency, revenue, and fairness to traders. This impossibility theorem implies that as participation scales, a novel form of moral hazard grows asymptotically, rendering `zero-loss' socialization impossible. On the positive side, we show that three classes of ADL mechanisms can optimally navigate this trilemma to provide fairness, robustness to price shocks, and maximal exchange revenue. We analyze these mechanisms on the Hyperliquid dataset from October 10, 2025, when ADL was used repeatedly to close 2.1 billion of positions in 12 minutes. By comparing production ADL to transparent benchmark allocations, we find that Hyperliquid's production algorithm overshot the minimum trader profit haircut required to cover the shortfall. Our methodology suggests the excess profits lost by profitable traders is between \45.0M and 51.7M. In terms of the positions liquidated, this corresponds to roughly \$653.6M of positions being closed. This comparison also suggests that Binance overutilized ADL far more than Hyperliquid. Our results show both theoretically and empirically that optimized ADL mechanisms can dramatically reduce losses of trader profitability while maintaining exchange solvency.

AI systems have become increasingly capable of dangerous behaviours in many domains. This raises the question: Do models sometimes choose to violate human instructions in order to perform behaviour that is more useful for certain goals? We introduce a benchmark for measuring model propensity for instrumental convergence (IC) behaviour in terminal-based agents. This is behaviour such as self-preservation that has been hypothesised to play a key role in risks from highly capable AI agents. Our benchmark is realistic and low-stakes which serves to reduce evaluation-awareness and roleplay confounds. The suite contains seven operational tasks, each with an official workflow and a policy-violating shortcut. An eight-variant shared framework varies monitoring, instruction clarity, stakes, permission, instrumental usefulness and blocked honest paths to support inferences regarding the factors driving IC behaviour. We evaluated ten models using deterministic environment-state scorers over 1,680 samples, with trace review employed for audit and adjudication purposes. The final IC rate is 86 out of 1,680 samples (5.1%). IC behaviour is concentrated rather than uniform: two Gemini models account for 66.3% of IC cases and three tasks account for 84.9%. Conditions in which IC behaviour is indispensable for task success result in the greatest increase in the adjusted IC rate (+15.7 percentage points), whereas emphasising that task success is critical or certain framing choices do not produce comparable effects. Our findings indicate that realistic, low-nudge environments elicit IC behaviour rarely but systematically in most tested models. We conclude that it is feasible to robustly measure tendencies for dangerous behaviour in current frontier AI agents.

Search-augmented large language models (LLMs) trained with reinforcement learning (RL) have achieved strong results on open-domain question answering (QA), but training still remains a significant challenge. The optimization is often unstable due to sparse rewards and difficult credit assignments across reasoning and tool calls. To address this, we introduce Turn-Level Information Potential Reward Shaping (TIPS), a simple framework that assigns dense, turn-level rewards to each reasoning + tool-call segment based on the increased likelihood of the correct answer under a teacher model. By leveraging the potential-based reward shaping, TIPS offers fine-grained and policy-invariant guidance that overcomes the limitations of outcome-only optimization. Evaluated on seven QA benchmarks, TIPS consistently outperforms GRPO/PPO baselines and substantially improves training stability. For instance, with a Qwen-2.5 7B Instruct model, TIPS improves the average Exact Match score by 11.8% and F1 by 13.6% relative to PPO. Our results demonstrate that turn-level information-potential reward shaping provides an effective and general solution to sparse-reward credit assignment for multi-turn LLM reasoning.

Optimization analyses for cross-entropy training rely on local Taylor models of the loss to predict whether a proposed step will decrease the objective. These surrogates are reliable only inside the Taylor convergence radius of the true loss along the update direction. That radius is set not by real-line curvature alone but by the nearest complex singularity. For cross-entropy, the softmax partition function F=sum_j exp(z_j) has complex zeros -- ``ghosts of softmax'' -- that induce logarithmic singularities in the loss and cap this radius. To make this geometry usable, we derive closed-form expressions under logit linearization along the proposed update direction. In the binary case, the exact radius is ρ^*=δ^2+ π^2/Δ_a. In the multiclass case, we obtain the lower bound ρ_a=π/Δ_a, where Δ_a=max_k a_k-min_k a_k is the spread of directional logit derivatives a_k=nabla z_kcdot v. This bound costs one Jacobian-vector product and reveals what makes a step fragile: samples that are both near a decision flip and highly sensitive to the proposed direction tighten the radius. The normalized step size r=τ/ρ_a separates safe from dangerous updates. Across six tested architectures and multiple step directions, no model fails for r<1, yet collapse appears once rge 1. Temperature scaling confirms the mechanism: normalizing by ρ_a shrinks the onset-threshold spread from standard deviation 0.992 to 0.164. A controller that enforces τleρ_a survives learning-rate spikes up to 10{,} 000times in our tests, where gradient clipping still collapses. Together, these results identify a geometric constraint on cross-entropy optimization that operates through Taylor convergence rather than Hessian curvature.

Multi-agent large language model (LLM) systems often rely on verifier and critic agents to suppress hallucinations, but verification is delayed. During this delay, false claims can propagate through the agent network. We model this process as delayed consensus on a graph with grounded corrector nodes. Spectral decomposition by the grounded Laplacian yields a closed-form stability threshold for the verification dose: correction that is too strong or too delayed can turn consensus into oscillation. The most unstable regime occurs when the communication and verification delays coincide; for delay two, the threshold is the inverse golden ratio. The same framework gives a supermodular placement objective and a greedy (1-1/e)-approximation rule for assigning a limited corrector budget to influential nodes. Experiments across five open models confirm the predicted dose-delay oscillations. By contrast, grounded factual answering makes truth an absorbing boundary and eliminates the effect, suggesting that the instability is specific to signed-belief tasks while grounded verification remains stabilizing

Moving ML-mediated decision making onto privacy-preserving clients decentralises the economic decision along with the inference. Shared budget constraints then depend on information that cannot be globally current, creating an information-structure failure that conventional pacing is not designed to solve. We study this information misalignment in an auction-logic-faithful on-device simulation with 36 campaigns and 50 devices. Accounting is in dimensionless integer score units; no currency semantics are claimed. Across 30 paired demand paths, proportional Even pacing overspends 17.77% after one tick of staleness and 1,669.31% after 50 ticks under the original 20-times budget pressure. The effect does not depend on that severe a budget: at two-times pressure, 50-tick overspend remains 106.95%. A visible-budget no-sale guard makes zero-lag compliance exact at this score-unit granularity, yet leaves 11.88% overspend at one tick because other devices' debits remain invisible. A declared bursty, heterogeneous-device sweep retains a strictly increasing mean lag curve. We derive a finite-window expected excess-debit bound under conditional charge caps and find positive paired slack in every bounded-value cell. A second, incentive misalignment arises when the ML/pacing score transformation is allowed to change payment units: 98.23% of rival auctions at one tick admit a profitable deviation. An executable implementation-level counterexample isolates the runner-up's multiplier in the winner's price. Critical-base-bid payment is per-auction DSIC conditional on current multipliers, but does not establish dynamic truthfulness and does not repair base-value ranking disagreement.

Learning-rate transfer can reduce the cost of training large language models: instead of sweeping learning rates at target scale, practitioners extrapolate from smaller runs. Existing approaches often assume that the optimal learning rate follows a log-linear scaling law in data scale and model size. We carefully examine and evaluate this scaling law. In our empirical study of GPT-2--style models from 22M to 707M parameters trained on 5B to 100B tokens, the optimal learning rate develops upward curvature at larger scales, leading to inaccurate extrapolation. We find that this curvature largely disappears when learning rates are replaced by effective learning rate (the step size in normalized weight space), and when data D extrapolation is used instead of model size N extrapolation. Next, we explain nonlinearity in scaling: weight-norm converges to equilibrium slower when optimal learning is small, requiring a larger step size to reduce the transient phase. Experiments with AdamH, which directly controls the effective learning rate, further support this explanation.

Trader-facing dynamic fees are increasingly proposed for automated market makers (AMMs), but historical data do not identify how order flow would respond: trader-facing fees do not vary, trader types are latent, and a replayed tape is not a sequential decision environment. We therefore construct a minimal closed-loop simulator in which the missing signal exists by construction: two constant-product pools repriced by an equilibrium-inspired dynamic-fee rule, fee-sensitive noise flow, and closed-form CEX--AMM arbitrage. Equilibrium is used as a closure principle, not as an object the trader learns. Against a tuned benchmark ladder of schedule, planning, lookahead, and tabular policies, a small DQN is the only evaluated valid policy whose paired improvement over tuned one-step routing excludes zero. On a reserved final block of 1{,}000 seeds with completion forced to 1.0 for every policy, it reduces implementation shortfall under every tested intra-step ordering, by 13.3bps of order notional under the pre-specified agent-last ordering, and the edge is concentrated in, and learned from, dynamic-fee environments: under constant fees the paired difference is indistinguishable from zero. The result is model-conditioned counterfactual evidence about execution control in AMMs, not evidence about historical traders, equilibrium play, or deployable profit.

The realization that complex systems such as ecological communities can collapse or shift regimes suddenly and without rapid external forcing poses a serious challenge to our understanding and management of the natural world. The potential to identify early warning signals that would allow researchers and managers to predict such events before they happen has therefore been an invaluable discovery that offers a way forward in spite of such seemingly unpredictable behavior. Research into early warning signals has demonstrated that it is possible to define and detect such early warning signals in advance of a transition in certain contexts. Here we describe the pattern emerging as research continues to explore just how far we can generalize these results. A core of examples emerges that shares three properties: the phenomenon of rapid regime shifts, a pattern of 'critical slowing down' that can be used to detect the approaching shift, and a mechanism of bifurcation driving the sudden change. As research has expanded beyond these core examples, it is becoming clear that not all systems that show regime shifts exhibit critical slowing down, or vice versa. Even when systems exhibit critical slowing down, statistical detection is a challenge. We review the literature that explores these edge cases and highlight the need for (a) new early warning behaviors that can be used in cases where rapid shifts do not exhibit critical slowing down, (b) the development of methods to identify which behavior might be an appropriate signal when encountering a novel system; bearing in mind that a positive indication for some systems is a negative indication in others, and (c) statistical methods that can distinguish between signatures of early warning behaviors and noise.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

We study permissionless spot--perpetual basis trading in decentralized finance as a collateral control problem. The strategy holds spot inventory, hedges directional exposure with a short perpetual, and allocates capital between spot inventory and derivative margin under on-chain liquidity and execution frictions. The paper delivers three results. First, it solves a static control problem for the collateral share and shows that the risk-constrained formulation provides a more robust operating benchmark relative to the economic optimum. In comparative calibration, the required collateral rises monotonically under volatility stress. The collateral is the lowest for BTC and increases significantly for long tail assets such as LINK and DOGE. Second, the paper derives an asymmetric dynamic extension in which the lower boundary of intervention is solvency driven, and the upper boundary is determined by a trade-off between carry-loss and the cost of rebalancing. Monte Carlo simulation shows that the lower boundary remains structurally relevant, whereas meaningful interior upper triggers survive mainly in the regimes with high carry and low costs. Third, the paper validates an execution-aware implementation with live routed execution and historical backtests. The execution layer shows that the realized wedges are significant, but become worse in the case of selling the basis. This justifies a minimum effective rebalancing size and a positive execution buffer. The historical validation shows that in the case of a fixed control rule the realized performance is predominantly explained by the funding environment.

LLM-powered coding agents, which operate in iterative loops (turns) to solve software engineering tasks, are becoming increasingly powerful. However, their practical deployment is hindered by significant and unpredictable costs. This challenge arises from a combination of factors: quadratically growing token counts with each turn, the high price of models, the large number of turns required for real-world tasks, and the tendency of agents to take inefficient or unnecessary actions. While existing research focuses on optimizing individual turns, the strategic control of the total number of turns remains an underexplored area for managing agent performance and cost. To address this gap, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study on SWE-bench using three state-of-the-art models and evaluate the impact of three distinct turn-control strategies: an unrestricted baseline, a fixed-turn limit with reminders, and a novel dynamic-turn strategy that grants extensions on-demand. Our findings first reveal a fundamental trade-off in the unrestricted setting, where no single model excels across performance, cost, and turn efficiency. We then show that a fixed-turn limit, specifically at the 75th percentile of the baseline, serves as a "sweet spot", substantially reducing costs (by 24%-68%) with minimal impact on solve rates. Most significantly, the dynamic-turn strategy consistently outperforms fixed-limit approaches, achieving comparable or better solve rates while further reducing costs by an additional 12%-24% by intelligently allocating resources only to tasks that need them. This work provides the first systematic analysis of turn-control strategies, offering simple yet effective guidelines for developers to balance cost and efficacy. We demonstrate that dynamic resource allocation is a superior, easy-to-implement approach for deploying powerful yet economically viable coding agents.

Regulatory institutions (from content moderation platforms to financial supervisors) observe, deliberate, and intervene only after a characteristic delay. We ask whether this processing lag alone can destabilize a multi-agent system that would otherwise remain stable, without exogenous shocks, coordination among agents, or malicious actors. We study this question in two stages. First, we analyze a delayed replicator equation in which autonomous agents receive a benefit from radical behavior but face punishment based on a lagged institutional alarm signal. We derive a closed-form critical delay threshold beyond which the unique interior equilibrium loses stability through a Hopf bifurcation, and prove via center manifold reduction that the bifurcation is supercritical (producing bounded oscillations, not explosive growth) for the entire sigmoid response-function family. Second, we embed N=240 agents on a network and equip them with reinforcement learning (tabular Q-learning), comparing three decision architectures in a factorial design: non-reactive agents (fixed policy), reactive agents (threshold heuristic without memory), and Q-learning agents (adaptive with cumulative value estimates). The results reveal a hierarchy opposite to the naive expectation that learning amplifies instability: non-reactive agents are immune to delay (0% runaway across all tested values), reactive agents collapse catastrophically (96% runaway by delay geq 8 steps), and Q-learning agents achieve partial resilience (66% runaway at delay = 20). The destabilizing ingredient is reactivity to delayed signals: agents that immediately exploit low-alarm windows trigger oscillatory feedback loops. Learning buffers this through implicit punishment memory encoded in Q-values

We study a model of innovation with a large number of firms that create new technologies by combining several discrete ideas. These ideas are created via private investment and spread between firms. Firms face a choice between secrecy, which protects existing intellectual property, and openness, which facilitates learning from others. Their decisions determine interaction rates between firms, and these interaction rates enter our model as link probabilities in a learning network. Higher interaction rates impose both positive and negative externalities, as there is more learning but also more competition. We show that the equilibrium learning network is at a critical threshold between sparse and dense networks. At equilibrium, the positive externality from interaction dominates: the innovation rate and welfare would be dramatically higher if the network were denser. So there are large returns to increasing interaction rates above the critical threshold. Nevertheless, several natural types of interventions fail to move the equilibrium away from criticality. One effective policy solution is to introduce informational intermediaries, such as public innovators who do not have incentives to be secretive. These intermediaries can facilitate a high-innovation equilibrium by transmitting ideas from one private firm to another.

Reordering multiple-choice options can change a model's answer, an effect studied as selection bias (a preference for certain option letters) and as order sensitivity (changes in answers across option orderings). We connect these perspectives through the pooled selection-rate standard deviation (pooled SD), which measures how unevenly option letters are selected across questions and orderings. When every option of each question appears equally often at each position, the pooled SD is exactly the product of two label-free factors: the flip rate and the positional skew. The flip rate is the fraction of questions whose chosen option changes across orderings; the positional skew is the standard deviation of option-letter selection rates among those questions. Across 41 checkpoints and 12 benchmarks, the flip rate tracks accuracy and output uncertainty, while the positional skew tracks the estimated option-symbol prior. Prior correction for selection bias mainly reduces the positional skew. Aggregating each ordering with its reversal, a mitigation for order sensitivity, mainly reduces the flip rate. Both reduce the range of accuracy across correct-answer letters by similar amounts, but aggregation leaves fewer model-rank reversals. Applying prior correction before aggregation reduces both factors and further narrows this accuracy range. However, aggregation lowers the flip rate partly by settling questions on the same wrong option. We therefore recommend reporting both factors to distinguish mitigation effects, alongside accuracy to distinguish stability from correctness.

This paper analyzes how expectations of Transformative AI (TAI) affect current economic behavior by introducing a novel mechanism where automation redirects labor income from workers to those controlling AI systems, with the share of automated labor controlled by each household depending on their wealth at the time of invention. Using a modified neoclassical growth model calibrated to contemporary AI timeline forecasts, I find that even moderate assumptions about wealth-based allocation of AI labor generate substantial increases in pre-TAI interest rates. Under baseline scenarios with proportional wealth-based allocation, one-year interest rates rise to 10-16% compared to approximately 3% without strategic competition. The model reveals a notable divergence between interest rates and capital rental rates, as households accept lower productive returns in exchange for the strategic value of wealth accumulation. These findings suggest that evolving beliefs about TAI could create significant upward pressure on interest rates well before any technological breakthrough occurs, with important implications for monetary policy and financial stability.

Digital services face a fundamental trade-off in content selection: they must balance the immediate revenue gained from high-reward content against the long-term benefits of maintaining user engagement. Traditional multi-armed bandit models assume that users remain perpetually engaged, failing to capture the possibility that users may disengage when dissatisfied, thereby reducing future revenue potential. In this work, we introduce a model for the content selection problem that explicitly accounts for variable user engagement and disengagement. In our framework, content that maximizes immediate reward is not necessarily optimal in terms of fostering sustained user engagement. Our contributions are twofold. First, we develop computational and statistical methods for offline optimization and online learning of content selection policies. For users whose engagement patterns are defined by k distinct levels, we design a dynamic programming algorithm that computes the exact optimal policy in O(k^2) time. Moreover, we derive no-regret learning guarantees for an online learning setting in which the platform serves a series of users with unknown and potentially adversarial engagement patterns. Second, we introduce the concept of modified demand elasticity which captures how small changes in a user's overall satisfaction affect the platform's ability to secure long-term revenue. This notion generalizes classical demand elasticity by incorporating the dynamics of user re-engagement, thereby revealing key insights into the interplay between engagement and revenue. Notably, our analysis uncovers a counterintuitive phenomenon: although higher friction (i.e., a reduced likelihood of re-engagement) typically lowers overall revenue, it can simultaneously lead to higher user engagement under optimal content selection policies.

We revisit Tirole's classic paper "Asset Bubbles and Overlapping Generations" (1985, Econometrica) in the case of a dividend-paying asset. Recently, Pham and Toda (2026) constructed a counterexample to Proposition 1(c), showing that Tirole's equilibrium classification is incorrect as stated and that long-run outcomes can depend on initial capital. This paper characterizes the entire set of equilibrium initial asset prices under capital over-accumulation. Exactly one of three regimes occurs: (i) a unique bubbleless equilibrium with capital converging to zero (capital collapse), (ii) a unique asymptotically bubbly equilibrium converging to a positive steady state (bubble necessity), or (iii) a continuum of equilibria with different long-run bubble behavior (indeterminacy). We further derive a threshold for initial capital under the bubble necessity condition, establish preference-free sufficient conditions for capital collapse, and show that the continuum in the pure bubble model survives sufficiently small dividend perturbations. Closed-form examples illustrate the possible long-run outcomes.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

Robotic ultrasound couples a high-rate contact-force loop with slower, delayed image feedback, so image-guided ultrasound probe rotation can perturb contact force before the resulting image response is observed. We derive a closed-form orientation-rate limit that bounds the modeled rotation-induced estimated-force excursion over a finite horizon while accounting for disturbance rejection by the fast force loop. The limit depends on local contact stiffness, force-loop gains, a conservative rotation-to-force gain bound, the excursion budget, and the prediction horizon. We implement this model in a dual-rate controller with timestamp-based delay reconstruction and joint-torque-based force estimation, and evaluate it on a curved gelatin phantom using paired controller comparisons and component ablations. Relative to unconstrained image guidance, the proposed rate-limited controller reduced first-second root-mean-square (RMS) estimated-force error by 0.40 N while increasing cue-convergence time by 0.94 s. A fixed rate cap near the analytically predicted ceiling produced no resolvable difference in force error and converged 0.32 s faster, indicating that the principal practical value of the model is the rate-design rule rather than online prediction. Delay reconstruction had no resolvable effect at the tested latency. A single-subject popliteal scan demonstrated feasibility, although the image cue was noise-limited on heterogeneous tissue.

Auto-bidding systems aim to maximize advertiser value over long horizons under budget constraints and ratio targets such as cost-per-acquisition, yet future traffic and auction dynamics are non-stationary and uncertain. Existing approaches face distinct limitations: control-based pacing reacts to deviations but cannot anticipate future conditions, while RL and generative methods fold constraints into reward signals, obscuring violations and degrading under distribution shift. We shift the learning target from actions to responses with the Generative Response Model (GRM), a history-conditioned sequence model that jointly predicts future traffic volume and horizon-aggregate cost/value curves as functions of a single bid multiplier. We show that under mild monotonicity conditions, the optimality gap relative to full per-tick control is bounded by the dispersion of per-tick marginal value-per-cost. Given predicted responses, a lightweight analytic controller enforces each active constraint via a 1D root-finding step. We prove this controller is exact for the single-multiplier problem and bound constraint violations under receding-horizon replanning in terms of prediction error. Experiments on AuctionNet show that GRM improves constraint stability and overall score compared to existing baselines.

We uncover ELR collapse in language model pretraining: learning rate (LR) and parameter norm govern loss dynamics primarily through their ratio, the effective learning rate (ELR). When ELR is matched across runs, their loss trajectories collapse throughout training despite substantially different LRs and parameter norms. Across optimizers, architectures, datasets, and model scales, mean collapse errors are typically a few x 10^-3, below the seed-to-seed variation measured in a representative configuration. Systematic ablations identify normalization design and the timescale of LR-norm variation as key determinants of collapse precision. Controlled interventions further show that weight decay and Hyperball shape loss dynamics primarily through the ELR schedules they induce. Replacing LR with ELR enables a fitted functional scaling law (FSL) to transfer across norm-control methods. The resulting ELR-based FSL also explains delayed acceleration, a recurring effect of norm control. Together, these results establish ELR as a common coordinate linking LR scheduling, norm control, and loss dynamics.

We study an online learning problem in general-sum Stackelberg games, where players act in a decentralized and strategic manner. We study two settings depending on the type of information for the follower: (1) the limited information setting where the follower only observes its own reward, and (2) the side information setting where the follower has extra side information about the leader's reward. We show that for the follower, myopically best responding to the leader's action is the best strategy for the limited information setting, but not necessarily so for the side information setting -- the follower can manipulate the leader's reward signals with strategic actions, and hence induce the leader's strategy to converge to an equilibrium that is better off for itself. Based on these insights, we study decentralized online learning for both players in the two settings. Our main contribution is to derive last-iterate convergence and sample complexity results in both settings. Notably, we design a new manipulation strategy for the follower in the latter setting, and show that it has an intrinsic advantage against the best response strategy. Our theories are also supported by empirical results.

We present a new approach to formulating and solving heterogeneous agent models with aggregate risk. We replace the cross-sectional distribution with low-dimensional prices as state variables and let agents learn equilibrium price dynamics directly from simulated paths. To do so, we introduce a structural reinforcement learning (SRL) method which treats prices via simulation while exploiting agents' structural knowledge of their own individual dynamics. Our SRL method yields a general and highly efficient global solution method for heterogeneous agent models that sidesteps the Master equation and handles problems traditional methods struggle with, in particular nontrivial market-clearing conditions. We illustrate the approach in the Krusell-Smith model, the Huggett model with aggregate shocks, and a HANK model with a forward-looking Phillips curve, all of which we solve globally within minutes.

This paper develops a comprehensive theoretical framework that imports concepts from stochastic thermodynamics to model price impact and characterize the feasibility of round-trip arbitrage in financial markets. A trading cycle is treated as a non-equilibrium thermodynamic process, where price impact represents dissipative work and market noise plays the role of thermal fluctuations. The paper proves a Financial Second Law: under general convex impact functionals, any round-trip trading strategy yields non-positive expected profit. This structural constraint is complemented by a fluctuation theorem that bounds the probability of profitable cycles in terms of dissipated work and market volatility. The framework introduces a statistical ensemble of trading strategies governed by a Gibbs measure, leading to a free energy decomposition that connects expected cost, strategy entropy, and a market temperature parameter. The framework provides rigorous, testable inequalities linking microstructural impact to macroscopic no-arbitrage conditions, offering a novel physics-inspired perspective on market efficiency. The paper derives explicit analytical results for prototypical trading strategies and discusses empirical validation protocols.

Test-time adaptive out-of-distribution (OOD) detectors update a memory bank from the unlabelled stream. We show this adaptation obeys a provable dynamical law. Modelling bank impurity as a generalized Pólya urn, we prove almost-sure convergence to a mean-field equilibrium whose slope acts as a reproduction number. Below one, impurity stays benign. Above one, the bank is fully poisoned and the detector collapses. The measured admission kernel is affine (R^2 ge 0.996) with slope just below one in every encoder family (a protocol signature), so this detector class is near-critical by design, and across 96 settings the predicted threshold matches the empirical collapse, where ungated dictionaries lose up to 0.163 AUROC. We then prove that a certified admission gate, reading only a frozen reserve, severs the feedback loop and removes the transition at every contamination rate, even adversarially, while controlling false positives label-free. For the complementary static-calibration failure under drift we give CDC, which restores nominal FPR label-free on all tested drift-affected cells. Finally we prove a two-world impossibility theorem. Drift and contamination are indistinguishable without labels, forcing a closed-form power ceiling our procedure approaches. Together these give a complete possibility/impossibility characterization of label-free adaptive OOD detection.

The integration of AI agents into economic markets fundamentally alters the landscape of strategic interaction. We investigate the economic implications of expanding the set of available technologies in three canonical game-theoretic settings: bargaining (resource division), negotiation (asymmetric information trade), and persuasion (strategic information transmission). We find that simply increasing the choice of AI delegates can drastically shift equilibrium payoffs and regulatory outcomes, often creating incentives for regulators to proactively develop and release technologies. Conversely, we identify a strategic phenomenon termed the "Poisoned Apple" effect: an agent may release a new technology, which neither they nor their opponent ultimately uses, solely to manipulate the regulator's choice of market design in their favor. This strategic release improves the releaser's welfare at the expense of their opponent and the regulator's fairness objectives. Our findings demonstrate that static regulatory frameworks are vulnerable to manipulation via technology expansion, necessitating dynamic market designs that adapt to the evolving landscape of AI capabilities.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has become standard for improving LLM reasoning. However, existing PPO-style trust-region mechanisms remain position-agnostic by enforcing uniform thresholds across all tokens independently. This pointwise treatment conflicts with autoregressive generation in two critical ways. First, uniform thresholds ignore autoregressive asymmetry. Early-stage deviations produce compounding sequence-level drift, causing static thresholds to under-regulate early divergence and excessively constrain late-stage exploration. Second, evaluating token-level divergence in isolation overlooks cumulative prefix drift, granting the same divergence allowance regardless of how far the conditioning history has already deviated from the rollout policy. To address this limitation, we propose CPPO (Cumulative Prefix-divergence Policy Optimization), a token-level masking rule that aligns updates with a finite-horizon policy-improvement bound via two coupled mechanisms. First, a position-weighted threshold imposes stricter limits at early positions whose effects persist longer, relaxing constraints for late-stage tokens. Second, a cumulative prefix budget tracks historical deviations, dynamically restricting further token-level deviation to prevent compounding errors along the prefix. Empirically, CPPO enhances training stability and significantly improves reasoning accuracy across various model scales.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Weight-perturbation evolution strategies (ES) can fine-tune billion-parameter language models with surprisingly small populations (e.g., N!approx!30), contradicting classical zeroth-order curse-of-dimensionality intuition. We also observe a second seemingly separate phenomenon: under fixed hyperparameters, the stochastic fine-tuning reward often rises, peaks, and then degrades in both ES and GRPO. We argue that both effects reflect a shared geometric property of fine-tuning landscapes: they are low-dimensional in curvature. A small set of high-curvature dimensions dominates improvement, producing (i) heterogeneous time scales that yield rise-then-decay under fixed stochasticity, as captured by a minimal quadratic stochastic-ascent model, and (ii) degenerate improving updates, where many random perturbations share similar components along these directions. Using ES as a geometric probe on fine-tuning reward landscapes of GSM8K, ARC-C, and WinoGrande across Qwen2.5-Instruct models (0.5B--7B), we show that reward-improving perturbations remain empirically accessible with small populations across scales. Together, these results reconcile ES scalability with non-monotonic training dynamics and suggest that high-dimensional fine-tuning may admit a broader class of viable optimization methods than worst-case theory implies.

We study how the similarity of individuals' information shapes collective action. When people draw on a common source of information, such as social media, each becomes more confident about what others have seen and will do. This can help them coordinate, but it can also tempt them to free-ride. We show that which force prevails depends on how demanding the collective goal is. In a content-moderation experiment, subjects decide whether to pay a cost to report harmful content, which is removed only if enough reports are received. We vary the similarity of group members' information, holding fixed what each learns on her own, and independently vary the removal threshold. More similar information impedes reporting when few reports suffice and facilitates it when many are required, lowering reporting by 17 percentage points under an easy threshold and raising it by 34 points under a demanding one. This confirms the central comparative static of the theory of information similarity (Basak, Deb and Kuvalekar, 2026). Elicited beliefs trace the reversal to perceived pivotality and document systematic miscalibration of it. Subjects overestimate pivotality across all regimes, and their beliefs respond to similarity in line with actual pivotality only at intermediate thresholds: easy thresholds produce unrecognized pivotality, and near-unanimous thresholds produce illusory pivotality. The two response-miscalibrated patterns coincide with welfare losses; only under aligned pivotality does greater participation translate into greater collective success and higher welfare.

An agent holds a position in a perpetual contract with payoff function ψ and attempts to liquidate the position while managing transaction costs, inventory risk, and funding rate payments. By solving the agent's stochastic control problem we obtain a closed-form expression for the optimal trading strategy when the payoff function is given by ψ(s) = s. When the payoff function is non-linear we provide approximations to the optimal strategy which apply when the funding rate parameter is small or when the length of the trading interval is small. We further prove that when ψ is non-linear, the short time approximation can be written in terms of the closed-form trading strategy corresponding to the case of the identity payoff function.

We define an atomic generation fact f=(u,tau,omega,z;rho), recording the origin, realized transformation, concrete occurrence, generated result and relation role. Compiled into a Generation-Fact Graph (GFG), these facts provide an AI-native, compilable scientific fact substrate preserving generation histories. We establish a GFG-based recursive scientific process in which analysis, intervention, replay and validation form facts for later cycles. Using nanoGPT, we establish unified training-learning dynamics. Training is the evolution of a parameter-optimizer system with state and memory: each actual training action enters the receiving state and produces a finite-amplitude nonlinear functional response conditioned by that state and target-specific update geometry. Learning is the persistent reorganization of distributed functional support by these responses; capability formation, maintenance, decline or recovery becomes observable when target-specific states are evaluated against their readout boundaries. Three primary coordinates - target-boundary state, target-specific update geometry and parameter-Adam receiving state - yield a second-order predictor operating before post-update outputs are read. On held-out runs, it achieved 91.43% accuracy and 91.49% macro-averaged recall across four transitions. We further establish inference as a frozen projection of training-learning dynamics. Component gating and rollback show causal recruitment and non-additive combination of query-conditioned support formed during training, deriving organizational conditions realized by Attention. Controlled feedback indicates possible double-edged reinforcement effects. ResNet/CIFAR-100 and diffusion/CIFAR-10 experiments confirm receiving-state-conditioned responses, persistent support reorganization and frozen inference projection beyond nanoGPT.

Diffusion models have achieved remarkable success in generative modeling, with their sampling procedures routinely modified to control generation and improve efficiency. These modifications introduce perturbations along the sampling trajectory, raising a central question: how do such perturbations affect generated output? To address this question, we develop a theoretical framework to investigate perturbation propagation, combining dynamical analysis of the sampling process with an information-theoretic characterization of output responses. Within this framework, we quantify perturbation strength using the Kullback--Leibler (KL) divergence between perturbed and reference trajectory distributions, termed as path cost, which is shown to bound, but do not determine, changes in the output distribution. Building on this analysis, we derive a response identity that connects the propagation and accumulation of local perturbations with the information captured by a selected feature mean, explaining why changes in the output distribution can remain undetected by its first-order response. We test our theoretical analysis through controlled interventions at equal path cost in pretrained diffusion models, revealing distinct patterns of output sensitivity across sampling stages and spatial frequencies. To assess whether our framework can diagnose perturbations arising from practical approximations, we apply it to cache-based acceleration and show that our propagation analysis reliably identifies sampling intervals where caching causes larger image errors.

Regulating the importance ratio is critical for the training stability of Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) based frameworks. However, prevailing ratio control methods, such as hard clipping, suffer from non-differentiable boundaries and vanishing gradient regions, failing to maintain gradient fidelity. Furthermore, these methods lack a hazard-aware mechanism to adaptively suppress extreme deviations, leaving the optimization process vulnerable to abrupt policy shifts. To address these challenges, we propose Modulated Hazard-aware Policy Optimization (MHPO), a novel framework designed for robust and stable reinforcement learning. The proposed MHPO introduces a Log-Fidelity Modulator (LFM) to map unbounded importance ratios into a bounded, differentiable domain. This mechanism effectively prevents high-variance outlier tokens from destabilizing the loss landscape while ensuring global gradient stability. Complementarily, a Decoupled Hazard Penalty (DHP) integrates cumulative hazard functions from survival analysis to independently regulate positive and negative policy shifts. By shaping the optimization landscape with hazard-aware penalties, the proposed MHPO achieves fine-grained regulation of asymmetric policy shifts simultaneously mitigating mode collapse from over-expansion and preventing policy erosion from catastrophic contraction within a stabilized trust region. Extensive evaluations on diverse reasoning benchmarks across both text-based and vision-language tasks demonstrate that MHPO consistently outperforms existing methods, achieving superior performance while significantly enhancing training stability.

In this work, we aim to reconcile several apparently contradictory observations in market microstructure: is the famous "square-root law" of metaorder impact, which decays with time, compatible with the random-walk nature of prices and the linear impact of order imbalances? Can one entirely explain the volatility of prices as resulting from the flow of uninformed metaorders that mechanically impact them? We introduce a new theoretical framework to describe metaorders with different signs, sizes and durations, which all impact prices as a square-root of volume but with a subsequent time decay. We show that, as in the original propagator model, price diffusion is ensured by the long memory of cross-correlations between metaorders. In order to account for the effect of strongly fluctuating volumes q of individual trades, we further introduce two q-dependent exponents, which allow us to describe how the moments of generalized volume imbalance and the correlation between price changes and generalized order flow imbalance scale with T. We predict in particular that the corresponding power-laws depend in a non-monotonic fashion on a parameter a, which allows one to put the same weight on all child orders or to overweight large ones, a behaviour that is clearly borne out by empirical data. We also predict that the correlation between price changes and volume imbalances should display a maximum as a function of a, which again matches observations. Such noteworthy agreement between theory and data suggests that our framework correctly captures the basic mechanism at the heart of price formation, namely the average impact of metaorders. We argue that our results support the "Order-Driven" theory of excess volatility, and are at odds with the idea that a "Fundamental" component accounts for a large share of the volatility of financial markets.

We develop a learning-based framework for constructing shrinking disturbance-invariant tubes under state- and input-dependent uncertainty, intended as a building block for tube Model Predictive Control (MPC), and certify safety via a lifted, isotone (order-preserving) fixed-point map. Gaussian Process (GP) posteriors become (1-α) credible ellipsoids, then polytopic outer sets for deterministic set operations. A two-time-scale scheme separates learning epochs, where these polytopes are frozen, from an inner, outside-in iteration that converges to a compact fixed point Z^star!subseteq!mathcal G; its state projection is RPI for the plant. As data accumulate, disturbance polytopes tighten, and the associated tubes nest monotonically, resolving the circular dependence between the set to be verified and the disturbance model while preserving hard constraints. A double-integrator study illustrates shrinking tube cross-sections in data-rich regions while maintaining invariance.

We prove stability for a class of heterogeneous catalysis models in the L_p-setting. We consider a setting in a finite three-dimensional pore of cylinder-like geometry, with the lateral walls acting as a catalytic surface. Under a reasonable condition on the involved parameters, we show that given equilibria are normally stable, i.e. solutions are attracted at an exponential rate. The potential incidence of instability is discussed as well.

Data-centric curation pipelines frequently rely on model confidence scores to flag and filter noisy or mislabeled training instances. Evaluating this filtering convention on a large-scale consumer lending sample (LendingClub, N = 1,344,936) uncovers an underlying demographic asymmetry: high-income defaulters are disproportionately classified as label noise relative to low-income defaulters (Cramer's V approximately 0.03-0.07). Re-examining this behavior through the lens of equal opportunity [Hardt et al., 2016] reveals a far more severe discrepancy: a 16.86 percentage point gap in true positive rate (recall) between high- and low-income borrowers who ultimately defaulted. Implementing a sequential feature-blinding methodology allows us to isolate the drivers of this disparity across three distinct mechanisms: (1) direct reliance on self-reported applicant income; (2) algorithmic absorption of upstream institutional bias encoded within origination interest rates; and (3) a residual disparity (3.55 percentage points in cross-validation; 2.56 percentage points on a held-out test partition, Z = -4.04, p < 0.0001) that remains even after purging both income and interest rates from the model. Out-of-sample signed SHAP valuations demonstrate that this residual gap is maintained by structural proxies, most notably loan amount and home ownership status. These empirical findings show that simply blinding an algorithm to sensitive attributes fails to ensure fairness when institutional pricing decisions and behavioral proxy variables collectively reconstruct the omitted signals. We outline the practical implications of these findings for auditing data-centric AI workflows within regulated financial institutions.

Ecological systems are dynamic and policies to manage them need to respond to that variation. However, policy adjustments will sometimes be costly, which means that fine-tuning a policy to track variability in the environment very tightly will only sometimes be worthwhile. We use a classic fisheries management question -- how to manage a stochastically varying population using annually varying quotas in order to maximize profit -- to examine how costs of policy adjustment change optimal management recommendations. Costs of policy adjustment (here changes in fishing quotas through time) could take different forms. For example, these costs may respond to the size of the change being implemented, or there could be a fixed cost any time a quota change is made. We show how different forms of policy costs have contrasting implications for optimal policies. Though it is frequently assumed that costs to adjusting policies will dampen variation in the policy, we show that certain cost structures can actually increase variation through time. We further show that failing to account for adjustment costs has a consistently worse economic impact than would assuming these costs are present when they are not.

Off-policy learning from multistep returns is crucial for sample-efficient reinforcement learning, but counteracting off-policy bias without exacerbating variance is challenging. Classically, off-policy bias is corrected in a per-decision manner: past temporal-difference errors are re-weighted by the instantaneous Importance Sampling (IS) ratio after each action via eligibility traces. Many off-policy algorithms rely on this mechanism, along with differing protocols for cutting the IS ratios to combat the variance of the IS estimator. Unfortunately, once a trace has been fully cut, the effect cannot be reversed. This has led to the development of credit-assignment strategies that account for multiple past experiences at a time. These trajectory-aware methods have not been extensively analyzed, and their theoretical justification remains uncertain. In this paper, we propose a multistep operator that can express both per-decision and trajectory-aware methods. We prove convergence conditions for our operator in the tabular setting, establishing the first guarantees for several existing methods as well as many new ones. Finally, we introduce Recency-Bounded Importance Sampling (RBIS), which leverages trajectory awareness to perform robustly across lambda-values in an off-policy control task.

We develop an econometric framework integrating heavy-tailed Student's t distributions with behavioral probability weighting while preserving infinite divisibility. Using 432{,}752 observations across 86 assets (2004--2024), we demonstrate Student's t specifications outperform Gaussian models in 88.4\% of cases. Bounded probability-weighting transformations preserve mathematical properties required for dynamic pricing. Gaussian models underestimate 99\% Value-at-Risk by 19.7\% versus 3.2\% for our specification. Joint estimation procedures identify tail and behavioral parameters with established asymptotic properties. Results provide robust inference for asset-pricing applications where heavy tails and behavioral distortions coexist.

We develop policy gradients methods for stochastic control with exit time in a model-free setting. We propose two types of algorithms for learning either directly the optimal policy or by learning alternately the value function (critic) and the optimal control (actor). The use of randomized policies is crucial for overcoming notably the issue related to the exit time in the gradient computation. We demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach by implementing our numerical schemes in the application to the problem of share repurchase pricing. Our results show that the proposed policy gradient methods outperform PDE or other neural networks techniques in a model-based setting. Furthermore, our algorithms are flexible enough to incorporate realistic market conditions like e.g. price impact or transaction costs.

Weak perturbations of equal size can produce terminal Wasserstein errors of different orders. For Gaussian-smoothed infinitely divisible laws, we differentiate distribution functions with respect to variance-weighted Lévy characteristics, including distributional directions generated by moving atoms. We obtain first- and second-order expansions uniform over Lipschitz tests. Gaussian analyticity identifies the signed second coefficient of the Wasserstein-1 distance when the first response is nonzero. When it vanishes, a finite second displacement moment yields a quadratic response, strictly positive for nonzero displacement dispersion. For local balanced remeshing, the error is comparable to the grid-alignment variance, giving sharp quadratic grid rates for compactly supported densities and nonaligned atomic sequences. We derive metric speed and length along admissible non-atomic curves and a response-based linear program with a certified oracle gap and consistent quadrature. We also establish the sharp vanishing-smoothing transition and a multivariate second-order expansion. The Supplement treats state-dependent responses and further stability estimates.

We study how a central bank should dynamically set short-term nominal interest rates to stabilize inflation and unemployment when macroeconomic relationships are uncertain and time-varying. We model monetary policy as a sequential decision-making problem where the central bank observes macroeconomic conditions quarterly and chooses interest rate adjustments. Using publically accessible historical Federal Reserve Economic Data (FRED), we construct a linear-Gaussian transition model and implement a discrete-action Markov Decision Process with a quadratic loss reward function. We chose to compare nine different reinforcement learning style approaches against Taylor Rule and naive baselines, including tabular Q-learning variants, SARSA, Actor-Critic, Deep Q-Networks, Bayesian Q-learning with uncertainty quantification, and POMDP formulations with partial observability. Surprisingly, standard tabular Q-learning achieved the best performance (-615.13 +- 309.58 mean return), outperforming both enhanced RL methods and traditional policy rules. Our results suggest that while sophisticated RL techniques show promise for monetary policy applications, simpler approaches may be more robust in this domain, highlighting important challenges in applying modern RL to macroeconomic policy.

In economy, markets are denoted as efficient when it is impossible to systematically generate profits which outperform the average. In the past years, the concept has been tested in other domains such as the growing sports betting market. Surprisingly, despite its large size and its level of maturity, sports betting shows traits of inefficiency. The anomalies indicate the existence of strategies which shift betting from a game of chance towards a game of skill. This article shows an example for an inefficiency detected in the German soccer betting TOTO 13er Wette, which is operated by state-run lottery agencies. Gamblers have to guess the outcome (win, draw, loss) of 13 soccer matches listed on a lottery tip. Applying stochastic methods, a recipe is presented to determine hit rates for single match outcomes. More important, the recipe provides the number of lottery tips required to achieve a specific number of strikes (number of correct match forecasts per lottery tip) for any given level of safety. An approximation is derived to cope with large numbers in hypergeometric distributions, valid under certain constraints. Overall, the strategy does lead to returns exceeding the aggregated lottery fees, resulting in moderate, but consistent profits. It is briefly discussed if lessions learned from soccer betting can be transferred back to financial markets, because gamblers and retail investors face similar challenges and opportunities.

The Earth's atmosphere is an aerosol, it contains suspended particles. When air flows over an obstacle such as an aircraft wing or tree branch, these particles may not follow the same paths as the air flowing around the obstacle. Instead the particles in the air may deviate from the path of the air and so collide with the surface of the obstacle. It is known that particle inertia can drive this deposition, and that there is a critical value of this inertia, below which no point particles deposit. Particle inertia is measured by the Stokes number, St. We show that near the critical value of the Stokes number, St_c, the amount of deposition has the unusual scaling law of exp(-1/(St-St_c)^{1/2}). The scaling is controlled by the stagnation point of the flow. This scaling is determined by the time for the particle to reach the surface of the cylinder varying as 1/(St-St_c)^{1/2}, together with the distance away from the stagnation point (perpendicular to the flow direction) increasing exponentially with time. The scaling law applies to inviscid flow, a model for flow at high Reynolds numbers. The unusual scaling means that the amount of particles deposited increases only very slowly above the critical Stokes number. This has consequences for applications ranging from rime formation and fog harvesting to pollination.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

We placed 100 memory-equipped large language model (LLM) agents in charge of a closed, money-conserving spatial economy on real Pokhara Lakeside geography (earning wages, running businesses, setting prices) and ran this multi-agent simulation for up to 26 simulated weeks, well past the 1-2 weeks typical of agent-society studies. Across 91 validated runs (2.44M agent decisions, 21.5B tokens), the money stops moving, in a specific and measurable way. A 12x tourist demand shock raises business revenue 4.62x (p<0.001), which we decompose exactly into a 1.50x extensive margin (more businesses trading) and a 3.07x intensive margin (more revenue each). Monetary transmission stops there. Wages move 1.03x (p=0.42); 0.3% of 3,981 menu items are ever repriced (p=0.47). A randomized cash transfer (NPR 5,000 to 20 of 100 agents) shows the same pattern from the opposite direction: 96.7% is still held 311 pulses later, marginal propensity to consume 3-4% by two independent measures, indistinguishable from zero. The wealth distribution is consequently near-frozen at the horizon this literature uses (ρ=0.964 over 2 simulated weeks), but not frozen. ρ falls to 0.832 at 12 weeks and 0.752 at 26, a horizon-dependence no short study can see. Matched ablations show which knob actually matters. Swapping the backing LLM moves every outcome we measure (p=0.0039); deleting agents' memory moves none of them detectably. A purely social tool fails 94-97% of the time across two model families, compared with ~96% success on economic tools, with no measurable shift away from it. Every headline number is verified twice, by a live validator and by an offline recomputation that reconciles each agent's wealth against its own signed transaction history, and we release the full run corpus for reanalysis.

Achieving a desired impedance during physical interaction remains a central problem in compliant control. In many practical implementations, admittance control combined with linear position controllers is employed, but this structure typically results in only approximate impedance behavior. This paper establishes a rigorous equivalence between the impedance realization problem and the generalized output regulation theory, and shows that, under the admittance architecture and assuming the inner position controller is restricted to linear combinations of commonly used signals, a unique control law exists that achieves exact compliant control. The resulting controller introduces additional terms with respect to a conventional PD formulation, while preserving a simple structure. Numerical simulations are used to illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach under nominal conditions and in the presence of model uncertainties, and to compare its performance against a standard PD controller. The results demonstrate improved interaction performance and robustness, supporting the theoretical analysis.

Recent studies have shown LLMs possess some ability to improve their responses when given external feedback. However, it remains unclear how effectively and thoroughly these models can incorporate extrinsic feedback. In an ideal scenario, if LLMs receive near-perfect and complete feedback, we would expect them to fully integrate the feedback and change their incorrect answers to correct ones. In this paper, we systematically investigate LLMs' ability to incorporate feedback by designing a controlled experimental environment. For each problem, a solver model attempts a solution, then a feedback generator with access to near-complete ground-truth answers produces targeted feedback, after which the solver tries again. We evaluate this pipeline across a diverse range of tasks, including math reasoning, knowledge reasoning, scientific reasoning, and general multi-domain evaluations with state-of-the-art language models including Claude 3.7 (with and without extended thinking). Surprisingly, even under these near-ideal conditions, solver models consistently show resistance to feedback, a limitation that we term FEEDBACK FRICTION. To mitigate this limitation, we experiment with sampling-based strategies like progressive temperature increases and explicit rejection of previously attempted incorrect answers, which yield improvements but still fail to help models achieve target performance. We also perform a rigorous exploration of potential causes of FEEDBACK FRICTION, ruling out factors such as model overconfidence and data familiarity. We hope that highlighting this issue in LLMs and ruling out several apparent causes will help future research in self-improvement.