Daily Papers

Computer-use agents (CUAs) promise to automate complex tasks across operating systems (OS) and the web, but remain vulnerable to indirect prompt injection. Current evaluations of this threat either lack support realistic but controlled environments or ignore hybrid web-OS attack scenarios involving both interfaces. To address this, we propose RedTeamCUA, an adversarial testing framework featuring a novel hybrid sandbox that integrates a VM-based OS environment with Docker-based web platforms. Our sandbox supports key features tailored for red teaming, such as flexible adversarial scenario configuration, and a setting that decouples adversarial evaluation from navigational limitations of CUAs by initializing tests directly at the point of an adversarial injection. Using RedTeamCUA, we develop RTC-Bench, a comprehensive benchmark with 864 examples that investigate realistic, hybrid web-OS attack scenarios and fundamental security vulnerabilities. Benchmarking current frontier CUAs identifies significant vulnerabilities: Claude 3.7 Sonnet | CUA demonstrates an ASR of 42.9%, while Operator, the most secure CUA evaluated, still exhibits an ASR of 7.6%. Notably, CUAs often attempt to execute adversarial tasks with an Attempt Rate as high as 92.5%, although failing to complete them due to capability limitations. Nevertheless, we observe concerning ASRs of up to 50% in realistic end-to-end settings, with the recently released frontier Claude 4 Opus | CUA showing an alarming ASR of 48%, demonstrating that indirect prompt injection presents tangible risks for even advanced CUAs despite their capabilities and safeguards. Overall, RedTeamCUA provides an essential framework for advancing realistic, controlled, and systematic analysis of CUA vulnerabilities, highlighting the urgent need for robust defenses to indirect prompt injection prior to real-world deployment.

Native computer use offers a general interface for agents to operate almost any software available to people, but requires long-horizon state tracking, large-scale interactive experience, and learning from sparse yet verifiable outcomes. We introduce Qwen-CUA, a native computer-use agent with a 397B-A17B Qwen mixture-of-experts backbone. It observes only screenshots and acts through keyboard and mouse events, without DOM trees, accessibility metadata, or task-specific APIs. Its scaffold maintains up to 20 active screenshots and folds older visual history in fixed-size blocks to retain recent evidence while preserving reusable prompt prefixes. For training, we build a cloud rollout fleet with access to nearly 100,000 vCPUs and tens of thousands of concurrent environments, construct approximately 40,000 verifiable tasks, and collect personalized long-horizon workflows across everyday and professional software. We optimize complete trajectories with verifiable rewards and trajectory slicing, while iterative training runs refresh supervised data and recalibrate reinforcement-learning tasks. Across eight benchmarks, Qwen-CUA outperforms Qwen3.7 and remains competitive with leading proprietary systems, reaching 86.2 on OSWorld-Verified and 18.5/48.4 binary/partial completion on OSWorld 2.0. Scaling the same recipe to a model with over one trillion parameters yields Qwen-CUA-Max, improving these scores to 87.6 and 21.2/53.3. Qwen-CUA also reduces RedTeamCUA attack success from 36.6 to 16.4 relative to Qwen3.7. Efficiency analyses, a browser deployment, and Bash-augmented experiments further characterize practical behavior. These results establish native computer use as a broadly capable agent foundation and highlight scalable verifiable interaction and hybrid tool use as key directions.