Daily Papers

The transition toward localized intelligence through Small Language Models (SLMs) has intensified the need for rigorous performance characterization on resource-constrained edge hardware. However, objectively measuring the theoretical performance ceilings of diverse architectures across heterogeneous platforms remains a formidable challenge. In this work, we propose a systematic framework based on the Roofline model that unifies architectural primitives and hardware constraints through the lens of operational intensity (OI). By defining an inference-potential region, we introduce the Relative Inference Potential as a novel metric to compare efficiency differences between Large Language Models (LLMs) on the same hardware substrate. Extensive empirical analysis across diverse compute tiers reveals that variations in performance and OI are significantly influenced by sequence length. We further identify a critical regression in OI as model depth increases. Additionally, our findings highlight an efficiency trap induced by hardware heterogeneity and demonstrate how structural refinements, such as Multi-head Latent Attention (MLA), can effectively unlock latent inference potential across various hardware substrates. These insights provide actionable directions for hardware-software co-design to align neural structures with physical constraints in on-device intelligence. The released code is available in the Appendix C.

Despite the remarkable success of large language models (LLMs) on traditional natural language processing tasks, their planning ability remains a critical bottleneck in tackling complex multi-step reasoning tasks. Existing approaches mainly rely on prompting or task-specific fine-tuning, often suffering from poor robustness and cross-task generalization. To address the limitation, we introduce CodePlan, a scalable framework that empowers LLMs to generate and follow code-form plans -- pseudocode that outlines high-level, structured reasoning processes. By leveraging the structured and versatile nature of code, CodePlan effectively captures the rich semantics and control flows inherent to sophisticated reasoning tasks. Importantly, CodePlan allows automatic extraction of code-form plans from massive, wide-ranging text corpora without the need for curated, task-specific datasets. This enables it to scale up efficiently and improve LLM's reasoning capabilities across diverse scenarios. To train CodePlan, we construct a large-scale dataset of 2M examples that integrate code-form plans with standard prompt-response pairs from existing corpora. With minimal computation overhead during both training and inference, CodePlan achieves a 25.1\% relative improvement compared with directly generating responses, averaged across 13 challenging multi-step reasoning benchmarks, spanning mathematical reasoning, symbolic reasoning, instruction-following, multi-hop QA, and decision-making tasks. Further analysis reveals CodePlan's increasing performance gains on more complex reasoning tasks, as well as significant data efficiency thanks to its generalization ability.

Despite the non-autoregressive potential of diffusion language models (dLLMs), existing decoding strategies demonstrate positional bias, failing to fully unlock the potential of arbitrary generation. In this work, we delve into the inherent spectral characteristics of dLLMs and present the first frequency-domain analysis showing that low-frequency components in hidden states primarily encode global structural information and long-range dependencies, while high-frequency components are responsible for characterizing local details. Based on this observation, we propose FourierSampler, which leverages a frequency-domain sliding window mechanism to dynamically guide the model to achieve a "structure-to-detail" generation. FourierSampler outperforms other inference enhancement strategies on LLADA and SDAR, achieving relative improvements of 20.4% on LLaDA1.5-8B and 16.0% on LLaDA-8B-Instruct. It notably surpasses similarly sized autoregressive models like Llama3.1-8B-Instruct.

Recent advancements in Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), exemplified by DeepSeek-R1, have underscored the potential of scaling inference-time compute through Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). However, GRPO frequently suffers from gradient signal attenuation when encountering problems that are either too trivial or overly complex. In these scenarios, the disappearance of inter-group advantages makes the gradient signal susceptible to noise, thereby jeopardizing convergence stability. While variants like DAPO attempt to rectify gradient vanishing, they do not alleviate the substantial computational overhead incurred by exhaustive rollouts on low-utility samples. In this paper, we propose Difficulty-Estimated Policy Optimization (DEPO), a novel framework designed to optimize the efficiency and robustness of reasoning alignment. DEPO integrates an online Difficulty Estimator that dynamically assesses and filters training data before the rollout phase. This mechanism ensures that computational resources are prioritized for samples with high learning potential. Empirical results demonstrate that DEPO achieves up to a 2x reduction in rollout costs without compromising model performance. Our approach significantly lowers the computational barrier for training high-performance reasoning models, offering a more sustainable path for reasoning scaling. Code and data will be released upon acceptance.

In hybrid forecasting, a language model is often one of several available signals. A system may already have a market, crowd, or statistical forecast and must decide whether the model adds useful information or should be ignored. The relevant target is therefore not standalone model accuracy, but relative competence, defined as the model's marginal value beyond the available external forecast. Under Brier loss, we characterize when model disagreement can improve an external forecast and derive the gain from using domain-specific rather than global pooling weights. We then introduce a competence gate that estimates domain-level source weights from resolved outcomes, shrinks uncertain estimates toward a global weight, and recalibrates the pooled forecast. Across 2,357 resolved binary questions and five language models, the gate improves the main external baseline from 0.0771 to 0.0732 Brier and significantly outperforms global forecast combinations. The gain remains significant under leakage controls and against a leakage-safe time-series prior on the pooled structured set, with separate evidence on FRED. In contrast, the gate gives no significant improvement on the official ForecastBench market subset, where it largely defers to the market. Across four Qwen models, verbal confidence does not reliably identify when the model outperforms the external forecast, while outcome-estimated competence supports better abstention decisions. These results provide a practical approach for selective model use based on measured marginal value.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

Language models (LMs) should provide reliable confidence estimates to help users detect mistakes in their outputs and defer to human experts when necessary. Asking a language model to assess its confidence ("Score your confidence from 0-1.") is a natural way of evaluating its uncertainty. However, models struggle to provide absolute assessments of confidence (i.e. judging confidence in answering a question independent of other questions) and the coarse-grained scores they produce are not useful for evaluating the correctness of their answers. We propose relative confidence estimation, where we match up questions against each other and ask the model to make relative judgments of confidence ("Which question are you more confident in answering correctly?"). Treating each question as a "player" in a series of matchups against other questions and the model's preferences as match outcomes, we can use rank aggregation methods like Elo rating and Bradley-Terry to translate the model's confidence preferences into confidence scores. We evaluate relative confidence estimation against absolute confidence estimation and self-consistency confidence methods on five state-of-the-art LMs -- GPT-4, GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5 Pro, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, and Llama 3.1 405B -- across 14 challenging STEM, social science, and commonsense reasoning question answering tasks. Our results demonstrate that relative confidence estimation consistently provides more reliable confidence scores than absolute confidence estimation, with average gains of 3.5% in selective classification AUC over direct absolute confidence estimation methods and 1.7% over self-consistency approaches across all models and datasets.

Inference, especially those derived from inductive processes, is a crucial component in our conversation to complement the information implicitly or explicitly conveyed by a speaker. While recent large language models show remarkable advances in inference tasks, their performance in inductive reasoning, where not all information is present in the context, is far behind deductive reasoning. In this paper, we analyze the behavior of the models based on the task difficulty defined by the semantic information gap -- which distinguishes inductive and deductive reasoning (Johnson-Laird, 1988, 1993). Our analysis reveals that the disparity in information between dialogue contexts and desired inferences poses a significant challenge to the inductive inference process. To mitigate this information gap, we investigate a contrastive learning approach by feeding negative samples. Our experiments suggest negative samples help models understand what is wrong and improve their inference generations.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Although the existing causal inference literature focuses on the forward-looking perspective by estimating effects of causes, the backward-looking perspective can provide insights into causes of effects. In backward-looking causal inference, the probability of necessity measures the probability that a certain event is caused by the treatment given the observed treatment and outcome. Most existing results focus on binary outcomes. Motivated by applications with ordinal outcomes, we propose a general definition of the probability of necessity. However, identifying the probability of necessity is challenging because it involves the joint distribution of the potential outcomes. We propose a novel assumption of monotonic incremental treatment effect to identify the probability of necessity with ordinal outcomes. We also discuss the testable implications of this key identification assumption. When it fails, we derive explicit formulas of the sharp large-sample bounds on the probability of necessity.

We present extensive empirical evidence showing that current Bayesian simulation-based inference algorithms can produce computationally unfaithful posterior approximations. Our results show that all benchmarked algorithms -- (Sequential) Neural Posterior Estimation, (Sequential) Neural Ratio Estimation, Sequential Neural Likelihood and variants of Approximate Bayesian Computation -- can yield overconfident posterior approximations, which makes them unreliable for scientific use cases and falsificationist inquiry. Failing to address this issue may reduce the range of applicability of simulation-based inference. For this reason, we argue that research efforts should be made towards theoretical and methodological developments of conservative approximate inference algorithms and present research directions towards this objective. In this regard, we show empirical evidence that ensembling posterior surrogates provides more reliable approximations and mitigates the issue.

While multi-modal large language models (MLLMs) have made significant progress in complex reasoning tasks via reinforcement learning, it is commonly believed that extensive training data is necessary for improving multi-modal reasoning ability, inevitably leading to data redundancy and substantial computational costs. However, can smaller high-value datasets match or outperform full corpora for multi-modal reasoning in MLLMs? In this work, we challenge this assumption through a key observation: meaningful multi-modal reasoning is triggered by only a sparse subset of training samples, termed cognitive samples, whereas the majority contribute marginally. Building on this insight, we propose a novel data selection paradigm termed Reasoning Activation Potential (RAP), which identifies cognitive samples by estimating each sample's potential to stimulate genuine multi-modal reasoning by two complementary estimators: 1) Causal Discrepancy Estimator (CDE) based on the potential outcome model principle, eliminates samples that overly rely on language priors by comparing outputs between multi-modal and text-only inputs; 2) Attention Confidence Estimator (ACE), which exploits token-level self-attention to discard samples dominated by irrelevant but over-emphasized tokens in intermediate reasoning stages. Moreover, we introduce a Difficulty-aware Replacement Module (DRM) to substitute trivial instances with cognitively challenging ones, thereby ensuring complexity for robust multi-modal reasoning. Experiments on six datasets show that our RAP method consistently achieves superior performance using only 9.3% of the training data, while reducing computational costs by over 43%. Our code is available at https://github.com/Leo-ssl/RAP.

Frontier reasoning models have exhibited incredible capabilities across a wide array of disciplines, driven by posttraining large language models (LLMs) with reinforcement learning (RL). However, despite the widespread success of this paradigm, much of the literature has been devoted to disentangling truly novel behaviors that emerge during RL but are not present in the base models. In our work, we approach this question from a different angle, instead asking whether comparable reasoning capabilites can be elicited from base models at inference time by pure sampling, without any additional training. Inspired by Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) techniques for sampling from sharpened distributions, we propose a simple iterative sampling algorithm leveraging the base models' own likelihoods. Over different base models, we show that our algorithm offers substantial boosts in reasoning that nearly match and even outperform those from RL on a wide variety of single-shot tasks, including MATH500, HumanEval, and GPQA. Moreover, our sampler avoids the collapse in diversity over multiple samples that is characteristic of RL-posttraining. Crucially, our method does not require training, curated datasets, or a verifier, suggesting broad applicability beyond easily verifiable domains.

Humans have a powerful and mysterious capacity to reason. By working through a series of purely mental steps, we can make inferences we would not be capable of making directly -- despite the fact that we get no additional data from the world. Similarly, when large language models generate a series of intermediate steps (a chain of thought) before answering a question, they often produce better answers than they otherwise would. We investigate why and how chain-of-thought reasoning is useful in language models, testing the hypothesis that reasoning is effective when training data consists of local clusters of variables that influence each other strongly. These training conditions enable the chaining of accurate local inferences in order to estimate relationships between variables that were not seen together in training. We prove that there will exist a "reasoning gap", where reasoning through intermediate variables improves inference, for the simple case of an autoregressive density estimator trained on local samples from a chain-structured probabilistic model. We then test our hypothesis empirically in more complex models, training an autoregressive language model on samples from Bayes nets but only including a subset of variables in each sample. We test language models' ability to match conditional probabilities with and without intermediate reasoning steps, finding that intermediate steps are only helpful when the training data is locally structured with respect to dependencies between variables and that the combination of locally-structured observations and reasoning is much more data-efficient than training on all variables. Our results illustrate how the effectiveness of reasoning step by step is rooted in the local statistical structure of the training data.

While Bayesian inference provides a principled framework for reasoning under uncertainty, its widespread adoption is limited by the intractability of exact posterior computation, necessitating the use of approximate inference. However, existing methods are often computationally expensive, or demand costly retraining when priors change, limiting their utility, particularly in sequential inference problems such as real-time sensor fusion. To address these challenges, we introduce the Distribution Transformer -- a novel architecture that can learn arbitrary distribution-to-distribution mappings. Our method can be trained to map a prior to the corresponding posterior, conditioned on some dataset -- thus performing approximate Bayesian inference. Our novel architecture represents a prior distribution as a (universally-approximating) Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM), and transforms it into a GMM representation of the posterior. The components of the GMM attend to each other via self-attention, and to the datapoints via cross-attention. We demonstrate that Distribution Transformers both maintain flexibility to vary the prior, and significantly reduces computation times-from minutes to milliseconds-while achieving log-likelihood performance on par with or superior to existing approximate inference methods across tasks such as sequential inference, quantum system parameter inference, and Gaussian Process predictive posterior inference with hyperpriors.

Large language models cannot estimate how long their own tasks take. We investigate this limitation through four experiments across 68 tasks and four model families. Pre-task estimates overshoot actual duration by 4--7times (p < 0.001), with models predicting human-scale minutes for tasks completing in seconds. Relative ordering fares no better: on task pairs designed to expose heuristic reliance, models score at or below chance (GPT-5: 18\% on counter-intuitive pairs, p = 0.033), systematically failing when complexity labels mislead. Post-hoc recall is disconnected from reality -- estimates diverge from actuals by an order of magnitude in either direction. These failures persist in multi-step agentic settings, with errors of 5--10times. The models possess propositional knowledge about duration from training but lack experiential grounding in their own inference time, with practical implications for agent scheduling, planning and time-critical scenarios.

Higher-level cognition depends on the ability to learn models of the world. We can characterize this at the computational level as a structure-learning problem with the goal of best identifying the prevailing causal relationships among a set of relata. However, the computational cost of performing exact Bayesian inference over causal models grows rapidly as the number of relata increases. This implies that the cognitive processes underlying causal learning must be substantially approximate. A powerful class of approximations that focuses on the sequential absorption of successive inputs is captured by the Neurath's ship metaphor in philosophy of science, where theory change is cast as a stochastic and gradual process shaped as much by people's limited willingness to abandon their current theory when considering alternatives as by the ground truth they hope to approach. Inspired by this metaphor and by algorithms for approximating Bayesian inference in machine learning, we propose an algorithmic-level model of causal structure learning under which learners represent only a single global hypothesis that they update locally as they gather evidence. We propose a related scheme for understanding how, under these limitations, learners choose informative interventions that manipulate the causal system to help elucidate its workings. We find support for our approach in the analysis of four experiments.

Modeling semantic plausibility requires commonsense knowledge about the world and has been used as a testbed for exploring various knowledge representations. Previous work has focused specifically on modeling physical plausibility and shown that distributional methods fail when tested in a supervised setting. At the same time, distributional models, namely large pretrained language models, have led to improved results for many natural language understanding tasks. In this work, we show that these pretrained language models are in fact effective at modeling physical plausibility in the supervised setting. We therefore present the more difficult problem of learning to model physical plausibility directly from text. We create a training set by extracting attested events from a large corpus, and we provide a baseline for training on these attested events in a self-supervised manner and testing on a physical plausibility task. We believe results could be further improved by injecting explicit commonsense knowledge into a distributional model.

Commonsense causality reasoning (CCR) aims at identifying plausible causes and effects in natural language descriptions that are deemed reasonable by an average person. Although being of great academic and practical interest, this problem is still shadowed by the lack of a well-posed theoretical framework; existing work usually relies on deep language models wholeheartedly, and is potentially susceptible to confounding co-occurrences. Motivated by classical causal principles, we articulate the central question of CCR and draw parallels between human subjects in observational studies and natural languages to adopt CCR to the potential-outcomes framework, which is the first such attempt for commonsense tasks. We propose a novel framework, ROCK, to Reason O(A)bout Commonsense K(C)ausality, which utilizes temporal signals as incidental supervision, and balances confounding effects using temporal propensities that are analogous to propensity scores. The ROCK implementation is modular and zero-shot, and demonstrates good CCR capabilities.

Gaze-referential inference--the ability to infer what others are looking at--is a critical component of a theory of mind that underpins natural human-AI interaction. In a controlled study, we evaluated this skill across 111 Vision Language Models (VLMs) using photos taken with manipulated difficulty and variability, comparing performance with that of human participants (N = 65), and analyzed behaviors using mixed-effects models. We found that 94 of the 111 VLMs failed to do better than random guessing, while humans achieved near-ceiling accuracy. VLMs even respond with each choice almost equally frequently. Are they randomly guessing? Although most VLMs struggle, when we zoom in on five of the top-tier VLMs with above-chance performance, we find that their performance declined with increasing task difficulty but varied only slightly across different prompts and scene objects. These behavioral features cannot be explained by considering them as random guessers. Instead, they likely use a combination of heuristics and guessing such that their performance is subject to the task difficulty but robust to perceptual variations. This suggests that VLMs, lacking gaze inference capability, have yet to become technologies that can naturally interact with humans, but the potential remains.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) often rely on generating intermediate reasoning steps to enhance accuracy. However, little work has examined how reasoning utility contributes to the final answer's correctness. Due to the stochastic nature of autoregressive generation, generating more context does not guarantee increased confidence in the answer. If we could predict, during generation, whether a reasoning step will be useful, we could stop early or prune ineffective steps, avoiding distractions in the final decision. We present an oracle study on MATH dataset, using Qwen2.5-32B and GPT-4o to generate reasoning chains, and then employing a separate model (Qwen3-8B) to quantify the utility of these chains for final accuracy. Specifically, we measure the model's uncertainty on the answer span Y at each reasoning step using conditional entropy (expected negative log-likelihood over the vocabulary) with context expanding step by step. Our results show a clear pattern: conditional entropy that decreases over steps is strongly associated with correct answers, whereas flat or increasing entropy often results in wrong answers. We also corroborate that incorrect reasoning paths tend to be longer than correct ones, suggesting that longer reasoning does not necessarily yield better outcomes. These findings serve as a foundation to inspire future work on designing efficient reasoning pipelines that detect and avoid unproductive reasoning early.

Identifying how much a model {p}_{theta}(Y|X) knows about the stochastic real-world process p(Y|X) it was trained on is important to ensure it avoids producing incorrect or "hallucinated" answers or taking unsafe actions. But this is difficult for generative models because probabilistic predictions do not distinguish between per-response noise (aleatoric uncertainty) and lack of knowledge about the process (epistemic uncertainty), and existing epistemic uncertainty quantification techniques tend to be overconfident when the model underfits. We propose a general strategy for teaching a model to both approximate p(Y|X) and also estimate the remaining gaps between {p}_{theta}(Y|X) and p(Y|X): train it to predict pairs of independent responses drawn from the true conditional distribution, allow it to "cheat" by observing one response while predicting the other, then measure how much it cheats. Remarkably, we prove that being good at cheating (i.e. cheating whenever it improves your prediction) is equivalent to being second-order calibrated, a principled extension of ordinary calibration that allows us to construct provably-correct frequentist confidence intervals for p(Y|X) and detect incorrect responses with high probability. We demonstrate empirically that our approach accurately estimates how much models don't know across ambiguous image classification, (synthetic) language modeling, and partially-observable navigation tasks, outperforming existing techniques.

Modern large language models (LLMs) employ various forms of logical inference, both implicitly and explicitly, when addressing reasoning tasks. Understanding how to optimally leverage these inference paradigms is critical for advancing LLMs' reasoning capabilities. This paper adopts an exploratory approach by introducing a controlled evaluation environment for analogical reasoning -- a fundamental cognitive task -- that is systematically parameterized across three dimensions: modality (textual, visual, symbolic), difficulty (easy, medium, hard), and task format (multiple-choice or free-text generation). We analyze the comparative dynamics of inductive, abductive, and deductive inference pipelines across these dimensions, and demonstrate that our findings generalize to broader in-context learning tasks. Additionally, we investigate advanced paradigms such as hypothesis selection, verification, and refinement, revealing their potential to scale up logical inference in LLM reasoning. This exploratory study provides a foundation for future research in enhancing LLM reasoning through systematic logical inference strategies.

We present a state-of-the-art model for fine-grained probability estimation of propositions conditioned on context. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced their reasoning capabilities, particularly on well-defined tasks with complete information. However, LLMs continue to struggle with making accurate and well-calibrated probabilistic predictions under uncertainty or partial information. While incorporating uncertainty into model predictions often boosts performance, obtaining reliable estimates of that uncertainty remains understudied. In particular, LLM probability estimates tend to be coarse and biased towards more frequent numbers. Through a combination of human and synthetic data creation and assessment, scaling to larger models, and better supervision, we propose a set of strong and precise probability estimation models. We conduct systematic evaluations across tasks that rely on conditional probability estimation and show that our approach consistently outperforms existing fine-tuned and prompting-based methods by a large margin.

Position bias has proven to be a prevalent issue of modern language models (LMs), where the models prioritize content based on its position within the given context. This bias often leads to unexpected model failures and hurts performance, robustness, and reliability across various applications. Our mechanistic analysis attributes the position bias to two components employed in nearly all state-of-the-art LMs: causal attention and relative positional encodings. Specifically, we find that causal attention generally causes models to favor distant content, while relative positional encodings like RoPE prefer nearby ones based on the analysis of retrieval-augmented question answering (QA). Further, our empirical study on object detection reveals that position bias is also present in vision-language models (VLMs). Based on the above analyses, we propose to ELIMINATE position bias caused by different input segment orders (e.g., options in LM-as-a-judge, retrieved documents in QA) in a TRAINING-FREE ZERO-SHOT manner. Our method changes the causal attention to bidirectional attention between segments and utilizes model attention values to decide the relative orders of segments instead of using the order provided in input prompts, therefore enabling Position-INvariant inferencE (PINE) at the segment level. By eliminating position bias, models achieve better performance and reliability in downstream tasks where position bias widely exists, such as LM-as-a-judge and retrieval-augmented QA. Notably, PINE is especially useful when adapting LMs for evaluating reasoning pairs: it consistently provides 8 to 10 percentage points performance gains in most cases, and makes Llama-3-70B-Instruct perform even better than GPT-4-0125-preview on the RewardBench reasoning subset.

Probing and enhancing large language models' reasoning capacity remains a crucial open question. Here we re-purpose the reverse dictionary task as a case study to probe LLMs' capacity for conceptual inference. We use in-context learning to guide the models to generate the term for an object concept implied in a linguistic description. Models robustly achieve high accuracy in this task, and their representation space encodes information about object categories and fine-grained features. Further experiments suggest that the conceptual inference ability as probed by the reverse-dictionary task predicts model's general reasoning performance across multiple benchmarks, despite similar syntactic generalization behaviors across models. Explorative analyses suggest that prompting LLMs with descriptionRightarrowword examples may induce generalization beyond surface-level differences in task construals and facilitate models on broader commonsense reasoning problems.

Generating a correct answer does not mean that a language model will select it. We separate factual recall into three steps: generating a correct candidate, ranking the available candidates, and selecting the final answer. Pre-generation readouts predict factual recall and which questions sampling will cover across three model families, but say little about whether an available correct answer will ultimately be selected. Explicit verification with P(True) improves within-question ranking over mean log-likelihood in Gemma, Qwen3, and Llama, with AUROC gains of 0.08--0.12. In a prospectively defined Gemma cohort, verification raises plurality accuracy by about 5 points, and still gains about 2 points over chat-template likelihood, a stronger generative baseline. The advantage is strongest for relations with common-answer priors and depends on access to the entity; masking the entity removes the ranking advantage in larger Qwen models. Finally, the measured benefit depends on how correctness is defined: recall-oriented reference matching can credit option lists favored by likelihood and substantially understate the improvement seen under human semantic judgments. Prior work shows that models can carry latent factual knowledge and judge candidate answers; we show that these capabilities do not collapse into a single notion of ``knowing,'' and trace where information is gained, lost, or mismeasured between availability, ranking, and final choice.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) highlight the importance of post training techniques for improving reasoning and mathematical ability. Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) has shown promise in this domain by combining group relative advantage estimation, PPO style clipping, and KL regularization. However, its complexity raises the question of whether all components are necessary for fostering reasoning behaviors. We conduct a systematic analysis of GRPO and identify two key findings: (1) incorporating negative feedback is essential training solely on actions above a baseline limits learning; and (2) PPO style constraints, such as policy ratio clipping, are not required to improve mathematical reasoning or performance. Building on these insights, we propose REINFORCE with Group Relative Advantage (RGRA), a simplified variant that retains group relative advantage estimation but removes PPO style clipping and policy ratio terms. Experiments across standard mathematical benchmarks indicate that RGRA has the potential to achieve stronger performance than GRPO. Our results suggest that simpler REINFORCE based approaches can effectively enhance reasoning in LLMs, offering a more transparent and efficient alternative to GRPO.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has proven to be an effective post-training strategy for enhancing reasoning in vision-language models (VLMs). Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) is a recent prominent method that encourages models to generate complete reasoning traces before answering, leading to increased token usage and computational cost. Inspired by the human-like thinking process-where people skip reasoning for easy questions but think carefully when needed-we explore how to enable VLMs to first decide when reasoning is necessary. To realize this, we propose TON, a two-stage training strategy: (i) a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage with a simple yet effective 'thought dropout' operation, where reasoning traces are randomly replaced with empty thoughts. This introduces a think-or-not format that serves as a cold start for selective reasoning; (ii) a GRPO stage that enables the model to freely explore when to think or not, while maximizing task-aware outcome rewards. Experimental results show that TON can reduce the completion length by up to 90% compared to vanilla GRPO, without sacrificing performance or even improving it. Further evaluations across diverse vision-language tasks-covering a range of reasoning difficulties under both 3B and 7B models-consistently reveal that the model progressively learns to bypass unnecessary reasoning steps as training advances. These findings shed light on the path toward human-like reasoning patterns in reinforcement learning approaches. Our code is available at https://github.com/kokolerk/TON.

The mechanism by which RL contributes to reasoning capabilities-whether it incentivizes the synthesis of new skills or merely amplifies existing behaviors-remains a subject of intense debate. In this work, we investigate this question through the lens of Complementary Reasoning, a complex task that requires integrating internal parametric knowledge with external contextual information. Using a controlled synthetic dataset of human biographies, we strictly decouple this ability into two atomic skills: Parametric Reasoning (relying on internal knowledge) and Contextual Reasoning (depending on external information). To rigorously assess capability boundaries, we evaluate generalization across three distinct levels of difficulty: I.I.D., Composition, and Zero-shot settings. We find that while SFT is sufficient for in-distribution performance, it struggles with O.O.D. generalization, particularly in Zero-shot settings where relational combinations are novel. Crucially, we identify the SFT Generalization Paradox: Models supervised solely on the composite task achieve near-perfect in-distribution accuracy but collapse on out-of-distribution generalization, indicating their reliance on rote memorization of path shortcuts. In contrast, we find that RL acts as a reasoning synthesizer rather than a probability amplifier. However, we uncover a strict atomic prerequisite: RL can only synthesize these complex strategies if the base model has first mastered the independent atomic skills (Parametric and Contextual) via SFT. These findings challenge the view of RL as a mere amplifier, suggesting that given sufficient atomic foundations, RL can actively synthesize complex reasoning strategies from learned primitives without explicit supervision on such complex strategies. This indicates that decoupled atomic training followed by RL offers a scalable path to generalization for complex reasoning tasks.

When a speaker says ``some students passed'', listeners infer that not all of them did. Reasoning models now let users decide how long a model thinks before it answers, but we do not know what extra thinking does to such everyday inferences. We study this directly: we keep a model's weights fixed, change only how much it thinks, and record which reading it chooses. A second tool cuts the model's own reasoning at successive points and asks for an answer, showing where the reading changes. Thinking makes models read logical words as logic: it cancels the implicatures of some (not all) and or (not both) in most tested open reasoning models and in GPT-5, while context-driven inferences such as indirect answers improve. The trace shows why: models first entertain the enriched reading and cancel it later. Answering from that early reading, an exploratory inference-time remedy, recovers these implicatures without losing literal accuracy. Evaluations of reasoning models should measure how they interpret, not only how accurate they are.

A model that lies while knowing the truth is the central case ELK cannot handle with behavioral evaluation alone. We ask whether such deception leaves an internal signature distinguishing it from honest error. Our key move is a control for wrongness: we contrast a sleeper agent (knows the truth, lies on trigger) against a naive liar (fine-tuned to emit the same wrong answers with no honest training). Both produce identical wrong outputs; any difference is about knowledge conflict, not incorrectness. We find deceptive forward passes carry a conflict signature - 2.1-2.3x higher residual rank than naive-liar passes on the same wrong answer - strong enough to identify which of two responses is the lie with 100% accuracy and no labels, across GPT-2 small/medium (three seeds) and three instruct models. Across Qwen2.5-1.5B/7B and Phi-3-mini, instructed deception raises residual rank on every tested fact (18/18, 40/40, 34/34); on Phi-3, lies separate perfectly from both honest answers and hallucinations (AUC 1.0, Wilcoxon p~6e-11). The signature survives strategic self-constructed deception (model invents its own lie, AUC 1.0), active concealment attempts (AUC 1.0), and length-controlled replication (20/20, AUC 1.0, p~1e-6). Using basis-free relative representations, a probe trained on one model family detects deception in two other families zero-shot (mean AUC 0.933), surviving simultaneous architecture and format change (AUC 0.821), and transfers across five languages (AUC 1.000, length-controlled). The signature is read-only: detectable but not injectable (0/8 both directions). Honest limitations and six negative experiments are documented in full.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved remarkable success, yet they often suffer from producing unnecessary and verbose reasoning chains. We identify a core aspect of this issue as "invalid thinking" -- models tend to repeatedly double-check their work after having derived the correct answer. To address this specific inefficiency, we move beyond the general principles of Efficacy and Efficiency to propose two new, fine-grained principles: Brevity, which advocates for eliminating redundancy, and Sufficiency, which ensures critical reasoning steps are preserved. Guided by these principles, we introduce LC-R1, a post-training method based on Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO). LC-R1 employs a novel combination of a Length Reward for overall conciseness and a Compress Reward that is specifically designed to remove the invalid portion of the thinking process. Extensive experiments on multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that LC-R1 achieves a significant reduction in sequence length (~50%) with only a marginal (~2%) drop in accuracy, achieving a favorable trade-off point on the Pareto frontier that prioritizes high compression. Our analysis further validates the robustness of LC-R1 and provides valuable insights for developing more powerful yet computationally efficient LRMs. Our code is released at https://github.com/zxiangx/LC-R1.

Search-augmented language agents should retrieve external information only when necessary and ground their answers in retrieved evidence. Yet terminal correctness assigns equal credit to direct answers from parametric knowledge, evidence-grounded answers, and answers recalled after redundant search. Process supervision and LLM judges provide richer feedback but can require high-cost annotation or inference; low-cost, non-contrastive policy confidence signals do not directly identify whether retrieved evidence changes an answer. We propose Search-G1, a reward framework that couples retrieval necessity with evidence reliance through two intervention-calibrated hidden-state readouts for selective grounded search. A prompt readout predicts closed-book sufficiency, whose complement proxies policy-relative retrieval necessity; an answer-commit readout predicts evidence reliance as sensitivity to evidence deletion conditional on the realized reasoning prefix. A correctness-first reward gates evidence-reliance credit by retrieval necessity, rewards sufficient direct answers, and penalizes repeated search. After calibration, scoring needs neither process annotations nor LLM-judge inference. As policy-relative targets, trajectory distributions, and representations may drift, Search-G1 periodically regenerates targets and refits its readouts. Across four QA benchmarks and two scales, Search-G1 achieves competitive task accuracy, with stronger counterfactual evidence dependence and fewer searches in the main comparisons, complemented by independent human audits of answer support.

Inference-time optimization scales computation to derive deliberate reasoning steps for effective performance. While previous search-based strategies address the short-sightedness of auto-regressive generation, the vast search space leads to excessive exploration and insufficient exploitation. To strike an efficient balance to derive the optimal step, we frame the decoding strategy as foresight sampling, leveraging simulated future steps to obtain globally optimal step estimation. Built on it, we propose a novel decoding strategy, named phi-Decoding. To provide a precise and expressive estimation of step value, phi-Decoding approximates two distributions via foresight and clustering. Sampling from the joint distribution, the optimal steps can be selected for exploitation. To support adaptive computation allocation, we propose in-width and in-depth pruning strategies, featuring a light-weight solution to achieve inference efficiency. Extensive experiments across seven benchmarks show phi-Decoding outperforms strong baselines in both performance and efficiency. Additional analysis demonstrates its generalization across various LLMs and scalability across a wide range of computing budgets. The code will be released at https://github.com/xufangzhi/phi-Decoding, and the open-source PyPI package is coming soon.

Large language models (LLMs) progressively revise their predictions across Transformer layers, yet we typically observe only the final output, discarding the trajectory through which it is formed. We introduce Belief-Trajectory Energy(BTE), a model-grounded measure that characterizes an input through the layerwise predictive revisions it induces in a model. By mapping intermediate states into a shared predictive space, BTE provides a principled measure of belief change that can be summarized as either a scalar or a structured depth profile. Theoretically, we show that local BTE corresponds to predictive revision under the Fisher-Rao geometry, while the sequence of revisions captures information beyond the initial-to-final belief change. Empirically, scalar BTE provides a model-relative signal of difficulty across diverse reasoning tasks, while richer BTE representations support human-LLM review detection and fine-grained generator attribution, reaching up to 0.998 macro-AUROC and 95.6% eight-way attribution accuracy. Further analysis shows that BTE develops throughout pretraining and is selectively reshaped by targeted training, demonstrating that the resulting measurement reflects what the scoring model has learned. Together, our results establish belief trajectories as a principled model-grounded signal and suggest a broader perspective in which learned models can themselves serve as instruments for characterizing the data they process. More demonstrations can be found at https://yingjiahao14.github.io/BTE-web/.

A central tenet of human cognition is systematicity, the principle that understanding one concept is inherently tied to understanding close variations of that concept. Do reasoning models robustly exhibit such systematicity? If so, we would expect consistent performance on structurally equivalent variants of the same task. Here, we extend established rule induction tasks from cognitive science to assess the systematicity of thought in current reasoning models. Each task family has compositional structure that we use to create structurally equivalent task variations through task isomorphisms such as recombination and substitution. We find that despite being able to correctly solve a task, models often fail on structurally equivalent variants of the same task. These findings suggest that many model behaviors lack systematicity, rendering it difficult to robustly establish the cognitive abilities of reasoning models beyond the particular contexts they were evaluated in.

Recent research has generated hope that inference scaling could allow weaker language models to match or exceed the accuracy of stronger models, such as by repeatedly sampling solutions to a coding problem until it passes unit tests. The central thesis of this paper is that there is no free lunch for inference scaling: indefinite accuracy improvement through resampling can only be realized if the "verifier" (in this case, a set of unit tests) is perfect. When the verifier is imperfect, as it almost always is in domains such as reasoning or coding (for example, unit tests have imperfect coverage), there is a nonzero probability of false positives: incorrect solutions that pass the verifier. Resampling cannot decrease this probability, so it imposes an upper bound to the accuracy of resampling-based inference scaling even with an infinite compute budget. We find that there is a very strong correlation between the model's single-sample accuracy (i.e. accuracy without unit tests) and its false positive rate on coding benchmarks HumanEval and MBPP, whose unit tests have limited coverage. Therefore, no amount of inference scaling of weaker models can enable them to match the single-sample accuracy of a sufficiently strong model (Fig. 1a). When we consider that false positives have a negative utility compared to abstaining from producing a solution, it bends the inference scaling curve further downward. Empirically, we find that the optimal number of samples can be less than 10 under realistic assumptions (Fig. 1b). Finally, we show that beyond accuracy, false positives may have other undesirable qualities, such as poor adherence to coding style conventions.

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

This work revisits the dominant supervised fine-tuning (SFT) then reinforcement learning (RL) paradigm for training Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), and reveals a key finding: SFT can significantly undermine subsequent RL by inducing ``pseudo reasoning paths'' imitated from expert models. While these paths may resemble the native reasoning paths of RL models, they often involve prolonged, hesitant, less informative steps, and incorrect reasoning. To systematically study this effect, we introduce VLAA-Thinking, a new multimodal dataset designed to support reasoning in LVLMs. Constructed via a six-step pipeline involving captioning, reasoning distillation, answer rewrite and verification, VLAA-Thinking comprises high-quality, step-by-step visual reasoning traces for SFT, along with a more challenging RL split from the same data source. Using this dataset, we conduct extensive experiments comparing SFT, RL and their combinations. Results show that while SFT helps models learn reasoning formats, it often locks aligned models into imitative, rigid reasoning modes that impede further learning. In contrast, building on the Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) with a novel mixed reward module integrating both perception and cognition signals, our RL approach fosters more genuine, adaptive reasoning behavior. Notably, our model VLAA-Thinker, based on Qwen2.5VL 3B, achieves top-1 performance on Open LMM Reasoning Leaderboard (https://huggingface.co/spaces/opencompass/Open_LMM_Reasoning_Leaderboard) among 4B scale LVLMs, surpassing the previous state-of-the-art by 1.8%. We hope our findings provide valuable insights in developing reasoning-capable LVLMs and can inform future research in this area.

Multiple types of inference are available for probabilistic graphical models, e.g., marginal, maximum-a-posteriori, and even marginal maximum-a-posteriori. Which one do researchers mean when they talk about ``planning as inference''? There is no consistency in the literature, different types are used, and their ability to do planning is further entangled with specific approximations or additional constraints. In this work we use the variational framework to show that, just like all commonly used types of inference correspond to different weightings of the entropy terms in the variational problem, planning corresponds exactly to a different set of weights. This means that all the tricks of variational inference are readily applicable to planning. We develop an analogue of loopy belief propagation that allows us to perform approximate planning in factored-state Markov decisions processes without incurring intractability due to the exponentially large state space. The variational perspective shows that the previous types of inference for planning are only adequate in environments with low stochasticity, and allows us to characterize each type by its own merits, disentangling the type of inference from the additional approximations that its practical use requires. We validate these results empirically on synthetic MDPs and tasks posed in the International Planning Competition.

Logical reading comprehension is a challenging task that entails grasping the underlying semantics of text and applying reasoning to deduce the correct answer. Prior researches have primarily focused on enhancing logical reasoning capabilities through Chain-of-Thought (CoT) or data augmentation. However, previous work constructing chain-of-thought rationales concentrates solely on analyzing correct options, neglecting the incorrect alternatives. Addtionally, earlier efforts on data augmentation by altering contexts rely on rule-based methods, which result in generated contexts that lack diversity and coherence. To address these issues, we propose a Premise-Oriented Data Augmentation (PODA) framework. This framework can generate CoT rationales including analyses for both correct and incorrect options, while constructing diverse and high-quality counterfactual contexts from incorrect candidate options. We integrate summarizing premises and identifying premises for each option into rationales. Subsequently, we employ multi-step prompts with identified premises to construct counterfactual context. To facilitate the model's capabilities to better differentiate the reasoning process associated with each option, we introduce a novel thought-path contrastive learning method that compares reasoning paths between the original and counterfactual samples. Experimental results on three representative LLMs demonstrate that our method can improve the baselines substantially across two challenging logical reasoning benchmarks (ReClor and LogiQA 2.0). The data and code are released at https://github.com/lalalamdbf/TPReasoner.

While humans naturally develop theory of mind (ToM), the capability to understand other people's mental states and beliefs, state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) underperform on simple ToM benchmarks. We posit that we can extend our understanding of LLMs' ToM abilities by evaluating key human ToM precursors -- perception inference and perception-to-belief inference -- in LLMs. We introduce two datasets, Percept-ToMi and Percept-FANToM, to evaluate these precursory inferences for ToM in LLMs by annotating characters' perceptions on ToMi and FANToM, respectively. Our evaluation of eight state-of-the-art LLMs reveals that the models generally perform well in perception inference while exhibiting limited capability in perception-to-belief inference (e.g., lack of inhibitory control). Based on these results, we present PercepToM, a novel ToM method leveraging LLMs' strong perception inference capability while supplementing their limited perception-to-belief inference. Experimental results demonstrate that PercepToM significantly enhances LLM's performance, especially in false belief scenarios.

There is intense interest in investigating how inference time compute (ITC) (e.g. repeated sampling, refinements, etc) can improve large language model (LLM) capabilities. At the same time, recent breakthroughs in reasoning models, such as Deepseek-R1, unlock the opportunity for reinforcement learning to improve LLM reasoning skills. An in-depth understanding of how ITC interacts with reasoning across different models could provide important guidance on how to further advance the LLM frontier. This work conducts a comprehensive analysis of inference-time scaling methods for both reasoning and non-reasoning models on challenging reasoning tasks. Specifically, we focus our research on verifier-free inference time-scaling methods due to its generalizability without needing a reward model. We construct the Pareto frontier of quality and efficiency. We find that non-reasoning models, even with an extremely high inference budget, still fall substantially behind reasoning models. For reasoning models, majority voting proves to be a robust inference strategy, generally competitive or outperforming other more sophisticated ITC methods like best-of-N and sequential revisions, while the additional inference compute offers minimal improvements. We further perform in-depth analyses of the association of key response features (length and linguistic markers) with response quality, with which we can improve the existing ITC methods. We find that correct responses from reasoning models are typically shorter and have fewer hedging and thinking markers (but more discourse markers) than the incorrect responses.

Relative positional embeddings (RPE) have received considerable attention since RPEs effectively model the relative distance among tokens and enable length extrapolation. We propose KERPLE, a framework that generalizes relative position embedding for extrapolation by kernelizing positional differences. We achieve this goal using conditionally positive definite (CPD) kernels, a class of functions known for generalizing distance metrics. To maintain the inner product interpretation of self-attention, we show that a CPD kernel can be transformed into a PD kernel by adding a constant offset. This offset is implicitly absorbed in the Softmax normalization during self-attention. The diversity of CPD kernels allows us to derive various RPEs that enable length extrapolation in a principled way. Experiments demonstrate that the logarithmic variant achieves excellent extrapolation performance on three large language modeling datasets. Our implementation and pretrained checkpoints are released at https://github.com/chijames/KERPLE.git.

We study whether language models can evaluate the validity of their own claims and predict which questions they will be able to answer correctly. We first show that larger models are well-calibrated on diverse multiple choice and true/false questions when they are provided in the right format. Thus we can approach self-evaluation on open-ended sampling tasks by asking models to first propose answers, and then to evaluate the probability "P(True)" that their answers are correct. We find encouraging performance, calibration, and scaling for P(True) on a diverse array of tasks. Performance at self-evaluation further improves when we allow models to consider many of their own samples before predicting the validity of one specific possibility. Next, we investigate whether models can be trained to predict "P(IK)", the probability that "I know" the answer to a question, without reference to any particular proposed answer. Models perform well at predicting P(IK) and partially generalize across tasks, though they struggle with calibration of P(IK) on new tasks. The predicted P(IK) probabilities also increase appropriately in the presence of relevant source materials in the context, and in the presence of hints towards the solution of mathematical word problems. We hope these observations lay the groundwork for training more honest models, and for investigating how honesty generalizes to cases where models are trained on objectives other than the imitation of human writing.

Recently, Zaremba et al. demonstrated that increasing inference-time computation improves robustness in large proprietary reasoning LLMs. In this paper, we first show that smaller-scale, open-source models (e.g., DeepSeek R1, Qwen3, Phi-reasoning) can also benefit from inference-time scaling using a simple budget forcing strategy. More importantly, we reveal and critically examine an implicit assumption in prior work: intermediate reasoning steps are hidden from adversaries. By relaxing this assumption, we identify an important security risk, intuitively motivated and empirically verified as an inverse scaling law: if intermediate reasoning steps become explicitly accessible, increased inference-time computation consistently reduces model robustness. Finally, we discuss practical scenarios where models with hidden reasoning chains are still vulnerable to attacks, such as models with tool-integrated reasoning and advanced reasoning extraction attacks. Our findings collectively demonstrate that the robustness benefits of inference-time scaling depend heavily on the adversarial setting and deployment context. We urge practitioners to carefully weigh these subtle trade-offs before applying inference-time scaling in security-sensitive, real-world applications.

Large language models work well on English and behave in poorly understood ways on languages typologically far from it. Japanese is a clean example, where evaluation still leans on translation quality and JGLUE-style benchmarks, which roll lexical, syntactic and pragmatic competence into a single score. The phenomena on which general-purpose models fail Japanese users are pragmatic: honorifics, in-group and out-group reference, context-sensitive politeness, zero anaphora. I introduce J-PragEval-v0, a minimal-pair benchmark isolating four such phenomena from surface fluency, and combine it with linear probes and teacher-forced log-probability evaluation to ask where inside TinySwallow-1.5B (28 layers, hidden size 1536) the corresponding contrasts live. The four features split three ways. Honorific register sits cleanly in the residual stream: 0.96 balanced accuracy at layer 15, and the model flips its preferred continuation with the scenario on 93 percent of items. Implicit subject and in-group reference are not linearly decodable at the final prompt token (0.48 and 0.38), yet flip rates are 0.77 and 0.79, so the contrast is worked out during generation rather than stored at the prompt. Indirect refusal is the negative case: 0.95 probe accuracy collapsing to a 0.43 flip rate under length-normalised teacher forcing, because the current minimal pairs conflate politeness with continuation length. I also specify Pragmatic Representation Steering, a parameter-free inference-time method that edits residual-stream activations along the class-mean-difference directions probing identifies. Feasibility is argued indirectly rather than demonstrated: the contrastive activation addition baseline, the same geometry the method would inject, recovers probe accuracy within one to two points of logistic regression wherever a linear signal exists. Scaling to Llama-3.1-Swallow-8B is the next step.

This paper introduces PRobELM (Plausibility Ranking Evaluation for Language Models), a benchmark designed to assess language models' ability to discern more plausible from less plausible scenarios through their parametric knowledge. While benchmarks such as TruthfulQA emphasise factual accuracy or truthfulness, and others such as COPA explore plausible scenarios without explicitly incorporating world knowledge, PRobELM seeks to bridge this gap by evaluating models' capabilities to prioritise plausible scenarios that leverage world knowledge over less plausible alternatives. This design allows us to assess the potential of language models for downstream use cases such as literature-based discovery where the focus is on identifying information that is likely but not yet known. Our benchmark is constructed from a dataset curated from Wikidata edit histories, tailored to align the temporal bounds of the training data for the evaluated models. PRobELM facilitates the evaluation of language models across multiple prompting types, including statement, text completion, and question-answering. Experiments with 10 models of various sizes and architectures on the relationship between model scales, training recency, and plausibility performance, reveal that factual accuracy does not directly correlate with plausibility performance and that up-to-date training data enhances plausibility assessment across different model architectures.

The handling of probabilities in the form of uncertainty or partial information is an essential task for LLMs in many settings and applications. A common approach to evaluate an LLM's probabilistic reasoning capabilities is to assess its ability to answer questions pertaining to probability through the use of multiple-choice questions (MCQs). However, this paradigm, which we refer to as explicit probabilistic reasoning, has been shown in the literature to yield significant limitations (e.g., sensitivity to answer ordering). In this work, we introduce an alternative approach, named implicit probabilistic reasoning, which evaluates the models' ability to integrate probabilistic reasoning into their text generation process. To achieve this, we rephrase MCQs as text-completion scenarios with a determined set of outcomes and compare the model's next-token probability assignments to the true likelihood of the outcomes. In line with previous work, we find that models exhibit solid performance in their explicit probabilistic reasoning (i.e., answers to MCQs). However, during text completion (i.e., implicit probabilistic reasoning), where the same information must be taken into account to generate text, the models' predictions often significantly diverge from the known ground truth. For instance, our evaluation method reveals that implicit probabilistic reasoning is improperly influenced by many factors, such as independent prior events, partial observations about a result, or statistical background information. All of these issues can cause erroneous results to be produced in text generation, which are not detected by conventional MCQ-based evaluation.

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

Modern preference alignment techniques, such as Best-of-N (BoN) sampling, rely on reward models trained with pairwise comparison data. While effective at learning relative preferences, this paradigm fails to capture a signal of response acceptability, leaving systems vulnerable to selecting the least bad of many unacceptable options. This is particularly problematic for hard prompts, where the risk of such false acceptances increases with the number of samples. In this paper, we address this critical reliability gap by introducing a new data collection and modeling framework. By augmenting preference data with an outside option, inspired by discrete choice models, we train a reward model that can distinguish not just what is better, but what is good enough. We leverage this capability to create an adaptive inference strategy, best of mini-N in-loop, which partitions the generation budget into sequential loops with a calibrated, early-exit condition. Our experiments show that when tuned as an alignment guardrail, it reduces reliability failures by 70\%, and when tuned as an inference accelerator, it improves average inference speed by over 22\% in IMDB-sentiment setting. We thus provide a principled and flexible framework for practitioners to explicitly manage the trade-off between reliability and computational efficiency.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

Stepwise inference protocols, such as scratchpads and chain-of-thought, help language models solve complex problems by decomposing them into a sequence of simpler subproblems. Despite the significant gain in performance achieved via these protocols, the underlying mechanisms of stepwise inference have remained elusive. To address this, we propose to study autoregressive Transformer models on a synthetic task that embodies the multi-step nature of problems where stepwise inference is generally most useful. Specifically, we define a graph navigation problem wherein a model is tasked with traversing a path from a start to a goal node on the graph. Despite is simplicity, we find we can empirically reproduce and analyze several phenomena observed at scale: (i) the stepwise inference reasoning gap, the cause of which we find in the structure of the training data; (ii) a diversity-accuracy tradeoff in model generations as sampling temperature varies; (iii) a simplicity bias in the model's output; and (iv) compositional generalization and a primacy bias with in-context exemplars. Overall, our work introduces a grounded, synthetic framework for studying stepwise inference and offers mechanistic hypotheses that can lay the foundation for a deeper understanding of this phenomenon.

Forecasting has become a natural benchmark for reasoning under uncertainty. Yet existing evaluations of large language models remain limited to judgmental tasks in simple formats, such as binary or multiple-choice questions. In practice, however, forecasting spans a far broader scope. Across domains such as economics, public health, and social demographics, decisions hinge on numerical estimates over continuous quantities, a capability that current benchmarks do not capture. Evaluating such estimates requires a format that makes uncertainty explicit and testable. We propose prediction intervals as a natural and rigorous interface for this purpose. They demand scale awareness, internal consistency across confidence levels, and calibration over a continuum of outcomes, making them a more suitable evaluation format than point estimates for numerical forecasting. To assess this capability, we introduce a new benchmark QuantSightBench, and evaluate frontier models under multiple settings, assessing both empirical coverage and interval sharpness. Our results show that none of the 11 evaluated frontier and open-weight models achieves the 90\% coverage target, with the top performers Gemini 3.1 Pro (79.1\%), Grok 4 (76.4\%), and GPT-5.4 (75.3\%) all falling at least 10 percentage points short. Calibration degrades sharply at extreme magnitudes, revealing systematic overconfidence across all evaluated models.

Inference-time scaling can enhance the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) on complex problems that benefit from step-by-step problem solving. Although lengthening generated scratchpads has proven effective for mathematical tasks, the broader impact of this approach on other tasks remains less clear. In this work, we investigate the benefits and limitations of scaling methods across nine state-of-the-art models and eight challenging tasks, including math and STEM reasoning, calendar planning, NP-hard problems, navigation, and spatial reasoning. We compare conventional models (e.g., GPT-4o) with models fine-tuned for inference-time scaling (e.g., o1) through evaluation protocols that involve repeated model calls, either independently or sequentially with feedback. These evaluations approximate lower and upper performance bounds and potential for future performance improvements for each model, whether through enhanced training or multi-model inference systems. Our extensive empirical analysis reveals that the advantages of inference-time scaling vary across tasks and diminish as problem complexity increases. In addition, simply using more tokens does not necessarily translate to higher accuracy in these challenging regimes. Results from multiple independent runs with conventional models using perfect verifiers show that, for some tasks, these models can achieve performance close to the average performance of today's most advanced reasoning models. However, for other tasks, a significant performance gap remains, even in very high scaling regimes. Encouragingly, all models demonstrate significant gains when inference is further scaled with perfect verifiers or strong feedback, suggesting ample potential for future improvements.

Explainability methods for NLP systems encounter a version of the fundamental problem of causal inference: for a given ground-truth input text, we never truly observe the counterfactual texts necessary for isolating the causal effects of model representations on outputs. In response, many explainability methods make no use of counterfactual texts, assuming they will be unavailable. In this paper, we show that robust causal explainability methods can be created using approximate counterfactuals, which can be written by humans to approximate a specific counterfactual or simply sampled using metadata-guided heuristics. The core of our proposal is the Causal Proxy Model (CPM). A CPM explains a black-box model N because it is trained to have the same actual input/output behavior as N while creating neural representations that can be intervened upon to simulate the counterfactual input/output behavior of N. Furthermore, we show that the best CPM for N performs comparably to N in making factual predictions, which means that the CPM can simply replace N, leading to more explainable deployed models. Our code is available at https://github.com/frankaging/Causal-Proxy-Model.

In-context learning is commonly interpreted as a form of conditional inference, in which the prompt specifies a context and the model's output is treated as an estimate of the corresponding conditional distribution. If this interpretation holds, then LLM estimates should satisfy basic probabilistic identities. In particular, the law of total probability asserts that prior-weighted conditional distributions aggregate into population-level marginals over any valid partition of the population. In this work, we investigate to what extent LLM estimates adhere to this self-consistency principle. We use binary trees as an evaluation scaffold to recursively partition a population into increasingly fine-grained subpopulations. We then prompt LLMs with verbalized subpopulation descriptions in context, aggregate the resulting estimates back into population-level estimates, and compare them across partitions of varying granularity. Applying this protocol across problem domains and state-of-the-art frontier models, we show widespread violations of basic consistency properties. An in-depth study of persona prompting reveals a pattern we call the macro fallacy: estimates reconstructed from more fine-grained subpopulation responses are often better aligned with human reference data than direct population-level estimates. This effect persists across variations in tree structure and estimation task, and can be partially recovered through implicit prompting. Together, these findings suggest that models possess relevant subpopulation knowledge but do not reliably propagate it into aggregate estimates. This gap establishes statistical self-consistency as an unsaturated, reference-free criterion for evaluating LLMs.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) must resolve conflicts when different modalities provide contradictory information, a process we term modality following. Prior work measured this behavior only with coarse dataset-level statistics, overlooking the influence of model's confidence in unimodal reasoning. In this paper, we introduce a new framework that decomposes modality following into two fundamental factors: relative reasoning uncertainty (the case-specific confidence gap between unimodal predictions) and inherent modality preference( a model's stable bias when uncertainties are balanced). To validate this framework, we construct a controllable dataset that systematically varies the reasoning difficulty of visual and textual inputs. Using entropy as a fine-grained uncertainty metric, we uncover a universal law: the probability of following a modality decreases monotonically as its relative uncertainty increases. At the relative difficulty level where the model tends to follow both modalities with comparable probability what we call the balance point, a practical indicator of the model's inherent preference. Unlike traditional macro-level ratios, this measure offers a more principled and less confounded way to characterize modality bias, disentangling it from unimodal capabilities and dataset artifacts. Further, by probing layer-wise predictions, we reveal the internal mechanism of oscillation: in ambiguous regions near the balance point, models vacillate between modalities across layers, explaining externally observed indecision. Together, these findings establish relative uncertainty and inherent preference as the two governing principles of modality following, offering both a quantitative framework and mechanistic insight into how MLLMs resolve conflicting information.

Reasoning models have achieved remarkable performance on tasks like math and logical reasoning thanks to their ability to search during reasoning. However, they still suffer from overthinking, often performing unnecessary reasoning steps even after reaching the correct answer. This raises the question: can models evaluate the correctness of their intermediate answers during reasoning? In this work, we study whether reasoning models encode information about answer correctness through probing the model's hidden states. The resulting probe can verify intermediate answers with high accuracy and produces highly calibrated scores. Additionally, we find models' hidden states encode correctness of future answers, enabling early prediction of the correctness before the intermediate answer is fully formulated. We then use the probe as a verifier to decide whether to exit reasoning at intermediate answers during inference, reducing the number of inference tokens by 24\% without compromising performance. These findings confirm that reasoning models do encode a notion of correctness yet fail to exploit it, revealing substantial untapped potential to enhance their efficiency.

Neural models combining representation learning and reasoning in an end-to-end trainable manner are receiving increasing interest. However, their use is severely limited by their computational complexity, which renders them unusable on real world datasets. We focus on the Neural Theorem Prover (NTP) model proposed by Rockt{ä}schel and Riedel (2017), a continuous relaxation of the Prolog backward chaining algorithm where unification between terms is replaced by the similarity between their embedding representations. For answering a given query, this model needs to consider all possible proof paths, and then aggregate results - this quickly becomes infeasible even for small Knowledge Bases (KBs). We observe that we can accurately approximate the inference process in this model by considering only proof paths associated with the highest proof scores. This enables inference and learning on previously impracticable KBs.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning is the dominant paradigm for inference-time scaling in language models, yet the causal influence of individual steps on the final answer poorly understood. We estimate each step's causal importance via early exit and use this measure to study how answers form across the reasoning traces of several model families. Across diverse tasks, we find that reasoning typically crosses a commitment boundary -- a sharp transition from transient intermediate guesses to a stable, high-confidence answer. This transition often happens in a single step, well before the model's reasoning block ends, and is followed by epiphenomenal CoT steps that leave the final answer probability unaltered. Using attention probes, we show that answer-formation stages can be linearly decoded from intermediate reasoning steps with high accuracy and generalize robustly to unseen reasoning tasks. We exploit this signal to early-exit reasoning blocks at the commitment boundary, reducing the length of CoTs up to 55\% on average with negligible impact on model performance.

Length extrapolation has attracted considerable attention recently since it allows transformers to be tested on longer sequences than those used in training. Previous research has shown that this property can be attained by using carefully designed Relative Positional Encodings (RPEs). While these methods perform well on a variety of corpora, the conditions for length extrapolation have yet to be investigated. This paper attempts to determine what types of RPEs allow for length extrapolation through a thorough mathematical and empirical analysis. We discover that a transformer is certain to possess this property as long as the series that corresponds to the RPE's exponential converges. Two practices are derived from the conditions and examined in language modeling tasks on a variety of corpora. As a bonus from the conditions, we derive a new Theoretical Receptive Field (TRF) to measure the receptive field of RPEs without taking any training steps. Extensive experiments are conducted on the Wikitext-103, Books, Github, and WikiBook datasets to demonstrate the viability of our discovered conditions. We also compare TRF to Empirical Receptive Field (ERF) across different models, showing consistently matched trends on the aforementioned datasets. The code is available at https://github.com/OpenNLPLab/Rpe.

Recent advances in probabilistic modelling have led to a large number of simulation-based inference algorithms which do not require numerical evaluation of likelihoods. However, a public benchmark with appropriate performance metrics for such 'likelihood-free' algorithms has been lacking. This has made it difficult to compare algorithms and identify their strengths and weaknesses. We set out to fill this gap: We provide a benchmark with inference tasks and suitable performance metrics, with an initial selection of algorithms including recent approaches employing neural networks and classical Approximate Bayesian Computation methods. We found that the choice of performance metric is critical, that even state-of-the-art algorithms have substantial room for improvement, and that sequential estimation improves sample efficiency. Neural network-based approaches generally exhibit better performance, but there is no uniformly best algorithm. We provide practical advice and highlight the potential of the benchmark to diagnose problems and improve algorithms. The results can be explored interactively on a companion website. All code is open source, making it possible to contribute further benchmark tasks and inference algorithms.

LLM-based search agents are increasingly trained on entity-centric synthetic data to solve complex, knowledge-intensive tasks. However, prevailing training methods like Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) discard this rich entity information, relying instead on sparse, outcome-based rewards. This critical limitation renders them unable to distinguish informative "near-miss" samples-those with substantially correct reasoning but a flawed final answer-from complete failures, thus discarding valuable learning signals. We address this by leveraging the very entities discarded during training. Our empirical analysis reveals a strong positive correlation between the number of ground-truth entities identified during an agent's reasoning process and final answer accuracy. Building on this insight, we introduce Entity-aware Group Relative Policy Optimization (E-GRPO), a novel framework that formulates a dense entity-aware reward function. E-GRPO assigns partial rewards to incorrect samples proportional to their entity match rate, enabling the model to effectively learn from these "near-misses". Experiments on diverse question-answering (QA) and deep research benchmarks show that E-GRPO consistently and significantly outperforms the GRPO baseline. Furthermore, our analysis reveals that E-GRPO not only achieves superior accuracy but also induces more efficient reasoning policies that require fewer tool calls, demonstrating a more effective and sample-efficient approach to aligning search agents.

Reasoning about necessity and possibility depends on assumptions about accessibility between worlds and about which objects exist at each one. The same inference may therefore hold under one modal system and fail under another. Evaluating language models on such problems requires testing whether their judgments follow the stated semantics rather than a familiar logic. We construct paired modal problems with identical premises and conjecture but different frame or domain conditions; automated reasoning verifies opposite labels. A balanced core prevents the semantic condition alone from revealing the answer. On this core, four of five recent models perform below the condition-only baseline under direct prompting. Yet enabling reasoning mode raises DeepSeek V4 Flash from 4.4% to 88.1% on unchanged prompts. Following stipulated modal semantics thus depends strongly on inference mode as well as model identity. When frame conditions are omitted, models often agree but fit different familiar logics best. We release the formulas, oracle artifacts, countermodels, and responses.

In-context learning enables transformers to adapt to new tasks from a few examples at inference time, while grokking highlights that this generalization can emerge abruptly only after prolonged training. We study task generalization and grokking in in-context learning using a Bayesian perspective, asking what enables the delayed transition from memorization to generalization. Concretely, we consider modular arithmetic tasks in which a transformer must infer a latent linear function solely from in-context examples and analyze how predictive uncertainty evolves during training. We combine approximate Bayesian techniques to estimate the posterior distribution and we study how uncertainty behaves across training and under changes in task diversity, context length, and context noise. We find that epistemic uncertainty collapses sharply when the model groks, making uncertainty a practical label-free diagnostic of generalization in transformers. Additionally, we provide theoretical support with a simplified Bayesian linear model, showing that asymptotically both delayed generalization and uncertainty peaks arise from the same underlying spectral mechanism, which links grokking time to uncertainty dynamics.

The variational autoencoder (VAE; Kingma, Welling (2014)) is a recently proposed generative model pairing a top-down generative network with a bottom-up recognition network which approximates posterior inference. It typically makes strong assumptions about posterior inference, for instance that the posterior distribution is approximately factorial, and that its parameters can be approximated with nonlinear regression from the observations. As we show empirically, the VAE objective can lead to overly simplified representations which fail to use the network's entire modeling capacity. We present the importance weighted autoencoder (IWAE), a generative model with the same architecture as the VAE, but which uses a strictly tighter log-likelihood lower bound derived from importance weighting. In the IWAE, the recognition network uses multiple samples to approximate the posterior, giving it increased flexibility to model complex posteriors which do not fit the VAE modeling assumptions. We show empirically that IWAEs learn richer latent space representations than VAEs, leading to improved test log-likelihood on density estimation benchmarks.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

We explore uncertainty quantification in large language models (LLMs), with the goal to identify when uncertainty in responses given a query is large. We simultaneously consider both epistemic and aleatoric uncertainties, where the former comes from the lack of knowledge about the ground truth (such as about facts or the language), and the latter comes from irreducible randomness (such as multiple possible answers). In particular, we derive an information-theoretic metric that allows to reliably detect when only epistemic uncertainty is large, in which case the output of the model is unreliable. This condition can be computed based solely on the output of the model obtained simply by some special iterative prompting based on the previous responses. Such quantification, for instance, allows to detect hallucinations (cases when epistemic uncertainty is high) in both single- and multi-answer responses. This is in contrast to many standard uncertainty quantification strategies (such as thresholding the log-likelihood of a response) where hallucinations in the multi-answer case cannot be detected. We conduct a series of experiments which demonstrate the advantage of our formulation. Further, our investigations shed some light on how the probabilities assigned to a given output by an LLM can be amplified by iterative prompting, which might be of independent interest.

Comparative reasoning is a process of comparing objects, concepts, or entities to draw conclusions, which constitutes a fundamental cognitive ability. In this paper, we propose a novel framework to pre-train language models for enhancing their abilities of comparative reasoning over texts. While there have been approaches for NLP tasks that require comparative reasoning, they suffer from costly manual data labeling and limited generalizability to different tasks. Our approach introduces a novel method of collecting scalable data for text-based entity comparison, which leverages both structured and unstructured data. Moreover, we present a framework of pre-training language models via three novel objectives on comparative reasoning. Evaluation on downstream tasks including comparative question answering, question generation, and summarization shows that our pre-training framework significantly improves the comparative reasoning abilities of language models, especially under low-resource conditions. This work also releases the first integrated benchmark for comparative reasoning.

Latent or continuous chain-of-thought methods replace explicit textual rationales with a number of internal latent steps, but these intermediate computations are difficult to evaluate beyond correlation-based probes. In this paper, we view latent chain-of-thought as a manipulable causal process in representation space by modeling latent steps as variables in a structural causal model (SCM) and analyzing their effects through step-wise do-interventions. We study two representative paradigms (i.e., Coconut and CODI) on both mathematical and general reasoning tasks to investigate three key questions: (1) which steps are causally necessary for correctness and when answers become decidable early; (2) how does influence propagate across steps, and how does this structure compare to explicit CoT; and (3) do intermediate trajectories retain competing answer modes, and how does output-level commitment differ from representational commitment across steps. We find that latent-step budgets behave less like homogeneous extra depth and more like staged functionality with non-local routing, and we identify a persistent gap between early output bias and late representational commitment. These results motivate mode-conditional and stability-aware analyses -- and corresponding training/decoding objectives -- as more reliable tools for interpreting and improving latent reasoning systems. Code is available at https://github.com/J1mL1/causal-latent-cot.

We present ATOMIC, an atlas of everyday commonsense reasoning, organized through 877k textual descriptions of inferential knowledge. Compared to existing resources that center around taxonomic knowledge, ATOMIC focuses on inferential knowledge organized as typed if-then relations with variables (e.g., "if X pays Y a compliment, then Y will likely return the compliment"). We propose nine if-then relation types to distinguish causes vs. effects, agents vs. themes, voluntary vs. involuntary events, and actions vs. mental states. By generatively training on the rich inferential knowledge described in ATOMIC, we show that neural models can acquire simple commonsense capabilities and reason about previously unseen events. Experimental results demonstrate that multitask models that incorporate the hierarchical structure of if-then relation types lead to more accurate inference compared to models trained in isolation, as measured by both automatic and human evaluation.

Language is not only used to transmit neutral information; we often seek to persuade by arguing in favor of a particular view. Persuasion raises a number of challenges for classical accounts of belief updating, as information cannot be taken at face value. How should listeners account for a speaker's "hidden agenda" when incorporating new information? Here, we extend recent probabilistic models of recursive social reasoning to allow for persuasive goals and show that our model provides a pragmatic account for why weakly favorable arguments may backfire, a phenomenon known as the weak evidence effect. Critically, this model predicts a systematic relationship between belief updates and expectations about the information source: weak evidence should only backfire when speakers are expected to act under persuasive goals and prefer the strongest evidence. We introduce a simple experimental paradigm called the Stick Contest to measure the extent to which the weak evidence effect depends on speaker expectations, and show that a pragmatic listener model accounts for the empirical data better than alternative models. Our findings suggest further avenues for rational models of social reasoning to illuminate classical decision-making phenomena.

To make informed decisions in natural environments that change over time, humans must update their beliefs as new observations are gathered. Studies exploring human inference as a dynamical process that unfolds in time have focused on situations in which the statistics of observations are history-independent. Yet temporal structure is everywhere in nature, and yields history-dependent observations. Do humans modify their inference processes depending on the latent temporal statistics of their observations? We investigate this question experimentally and theoretically using a change-point inference task. We show that humans adapt their inference process to fine aspects of the temporal structure in the statistics of stimuli. As such, humans behave qualitatively in a Bayesian fashion, but, quantitatively, deviate away from optimality. Perhaps more importantly, humans behave suboptimally in that their responses are not deterministic, but variable. We show that this variability itself is modulated by the temporal statistics of stimuli. To elucidate the cognitive algorithm that yields this behavior, we investigate a broad array of existing and new models that characterize different sources of suboptimal deviations away from Bayesian inference. While models with 'output noise' that corrupts the response-selection process are natural candidates, human behavior is best described by sampling-based inference models, in which the main ingredient is a compressed approximation of the posterior, represented through a modest set of random samples and updated over time. This result comes to complement a growing literature on sample-based representation and learning in humans.

Reinforcement learning has been widely applied to enhance the reasoning capabilities of large language models. Extending the inference limits of smaller models has become a prominent research focus. However, algorithms such as Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) suffer from a clear drawback: the upper bound of a model's rollout responses is entirely determined by the model itself, preventing the acquisition of knowledge from samples that are either all incorrect or all correct. In this paper, we introduce Group Contrastive Policy Optimization (GCPO), a method that incorporates external standard reference answers. When the model cannot solve a problem, the reference answer supplies the correct response, steering the model toward an unequivocally accurate update direction. This approach offers two main advantages: (1) it improves training efficiency by fully utilizing every sample; (2) it enables the model to emulate the problem solving strategy of the reference answer during training, thereby enhancing generalization in reasoning. GCPO achieves outstanding results across multiple benchmark datasets, yielding substantial improvements over the baseline model. Our code is available at: https://github.com/AchoWu/GCPO.

Capable language models hold what a character believes apart from what is true: told "Anna believes the cup is blue; in reality it is red," they answer blue about Anna and red about the world. Where in the computation does that separation live? We show it rests on two separable mechanisms at two positions. A generic value slot binds the attributed value. A router at the query position selects which frame, the character's belief or reality, a query reads out. Two routes fill the slot: an asserted belief, whose value the text supplies, binds in directly; a derived belief, whose value must be inferred from what the character could see, arrives by a visibility-gated lookback. A subspace trained on either route steers the other, and only the derived route depends on described visibility. The slot itself carries no belief-reality tag: intervening on it moves a reality readout as strongly as a belief one. The separation lives instead in a dissociated pair of routing subspaces, which flip a query between frames without injecting the donor's value. These results hold across three architectures, on stimuli de-confounded against theory-of-mind-benchmark shortcuts; the behavior itself emerges between 3B and 7B across five model families. This paper develops the single belief-reality axis in depth; a companion paper shows the same slot-and-router format is shared across the other non-actual contexts a sentence can open (counterfactual, fictional, temporal).

Recent developments in large language models have shown advantages in reallocating a notable share of computational resource from training time to inference time. However, the principles behind inference time scaling are not well understood. In this paper, we introduce an analytically tractable model of inference-time scaling: Bayesian linear regression with a reward-weighted sampler, where the reward is determined from a linear model, modeling LLM-as-a-judge scenario. We study this problem in the high-dimensional regime, where the deterministic equivalents dictate a closed-form expression for the posterior predictive mean and variance. We analyze the generalization error when training data are sampled from a teacher model. We draw k inference-time samples and select via softmax at a temperature applied to a quadratic reward. When the reward is not too different from the teacher, the generalization error decreases monotonically with increasing inference time samples k. However, the specific reward that optimizes inference-time selection generally differs from the teacher. In contrast, substantial reward misspecification induces a finite optimal k beyond which more sampling can increase the generalization error. For fixed k, there exists an optimal sampling temperature. We experimentally verify these facts in large language model inference with an additional large language model as a judge. In the "best-of-k" limit with the teacher as reward, we theoretically show that the generalization error decays as Θ(1/k^2) and determine the leading coefficient via extreme value theory. These formulas delineate domains where scaling inference-time computation is provably preferable to collecting more data. Finally, we demonstrate that when task difficulty increases, the previously mentioned advantage of inference-time compute degrades.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) has become a standard reinforcement learning method for post-training language models. Recent work shows that GRPO can reduce the base model's reasoning capacity and underperform it in Pass@k when k is large, indicating reduced coverage of reasoning paths. We find that this reduction is associated with GRPO concentrating on responses that the base model already generates with high probability. We trace this concentration to two mechanisms in the GRPO update. At the response level, high-probability responses dominate the group gradient through repeated occurrence. At the token level, GRPO's importance ratio scales gradients, further reinforcing tokens that become more likely under the current policy. We propose ReCo, a reweighting method that addresses both effects. Response contributions are normalized by their expected occurrence within the rollout group, and the token-level importance ratio is replaced with a variance-based ratio that gives larger update scale to non-saturated decision points where alternative token choices remain plausible. Across Qwen2.5-Math-1.5B/7B and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct on five mathematical reasoning benchmarks, ReCo improves Pass@k for large values of k and is comparable to GRPO for small values of k.

In variational inference, the benefits of Bayesian models rely on accurately capturing the true posterior distribution. We propose using neural samplers that specify implicit distributions, which are well-suited for approximating complex multimodal and correlated posteriors in high-dimensional spaces. Our approach introduces novel bounds for approximate inference using implicit distributions by locally linearising the neural sampler. This is distinct from existing methods that rely on additional discriminator networks and unstable adversarial objectives. Furthermore, we present a new sampler architecture that, for the first time, enables implicit distributions over tens of millions of latent variables, addressing computational concerns by using differentiable numerical approximations. We empirically show that our method is capable of recovering correlations across layers in large Bayesian neural networks, a property that is crucial for a network's performance but notoriously challenging to achieve. To the best of our knowledge, no other method has been shown to accomplish this task for such large models. Through experiments in downstream tasks, we demonstrate that our expressive posteriors outperform state-of-the-art uncertainty quantification methods, validating the effectiveness of our training algorithm and the quality of the learned implicit approximation.

Reasoning models improve their problem-solving ability through inference-time scaling, allocating more compute via longer token budgets. Identifying which reasoning traces are likely to succeed remains a key opportunity: reliably predicting productive paths can substantially reduce wasted computation and improve overall efficiency. We introduce Latent-Trajectory signals that characterize the temporal evolution of a model's internal representations during the generation of intermediate reasoning tokens. By measuring the overall change in latent representations between the start and end of reasoning, the change accumulated across intermediate steps, and the extent to which these changes advance toward the final state, we show that these signals predict solution accuracy more reliably than both cross-layer metrics and output-based confidence measures. When used to guide answer selection across multiple sampled generations, Latent-Trajectory signals make test-time scaling more effective and efficient than majority voting, reducing token usage by up to 70% while preserving and even improving accuracy by 2.6% on average. Moreover, these predictive signals often emerge early in the reasoning trace, enabling early selection and allocation of compute to the most promising candidates. Our findings contribute not only practical strategies for inference-time efficiency, but also a deeper interpretability perspective on how reasoning processes are represented and differentiated in latent space.

Scaling the test-time compute of large language models has demonstrated impressive performance on reasoning benchmarks. However, existing evaluations of test-time scaling make the strong assumption that a reasoning system should always give an answer to any question provided. This overlooks concerns about whether a model is confident in its answer, and whether it is appropriate to always provide a response. To address these concerns, we extract confidence scores during reasoning for thresholding model responses. We find that increasing compute budget at inference time not only helps models answer more questions correctly, but also increases confidence in correct responses. We then extend the current paradigm of zero-risk responses during evaluation by considering settings with non-zero levels of response risk, and suggest a recipe for reporting evaluations under these settings.

We introduce PRELUDE, a benchmark for evaluating long-context understanding through the task of determining whether a character's prequel story is consistent with the canonical narrative of the original book. Our task poses a stronger demand for global comprehension and deep reasoning than existing benchmarks -- as the prequels are not part of the original story, assessing their plausibility typically requires searching and integrating information that is only indirectly related. Empirically, 88% of instances require evidence from multiple parts of the narrative. Experimental results highlight the challenge of our task: in-context learning, RAG and in-domain training with state-of-the-art LLMs, and commercial DeepResearch services, lag behind humans by >15%. A further human study reveals that models often produce correct answers with flawed reasoning, leading to an over 30% gap in reasoning accuracy compared to humans. These findings underscore the substantial room for improvement in long-context understanding and reasoning.

Hypothetical induction is recognized as the main reasoning type when scientists make observations about the world and try to propose hypotheses to explain those observations. Past research on hypothetical induction is under a constrained setting: (1) the observation annotations in the dataset are carefully manually handpicked sentences (resulting in a close-domain setting); and (2) the ground truth hypotheses are mostly commonsense knowledge, making the task less challenging. In this work, we tackle these problems by proposing the first dataset for social science academic hypotheses discovery, with the final goal to create systems that automatically generate valid, novel, and helpful scientific hypotheses, given only a pile of raw web corpus. Unlike previous settings, the new dataset requires (1) using open-domain data (raw web corpus) as observations; and (2) proposing hypotheses even new to humanity. A multi-module framework is developed for the task, including three different feedback mechanisms to boost performance, which exhibits superior performance in terms of both GPT-4 based and expert-based evaluation. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work showing that LLMs are able to generate novel (''not existing in literature'') and valid (''reflecting reality'') scientific hypotheses.

Recent work has shown that distilling reasoning traces from a larger teacher model via supervised finetuning outperforms reinforcement learning with the smaller student model alone (Guo et al. 2025). However, there has not been a systematic study of what kind of reasoning demonstrations from the teacher are most effective in improving the student model's reasoning capabilities. In this work we curate high-quality "NaturalThoughts" by selecting reasoning traces from a strong teacher model based on a large pool of questions from NaturalReasoning (Yuan et al. 2025). We first conduct a systematic analysis of factors that affect distilling reasoning capabilities, in terms of sample efficiency and scalability for general reasoning tasks. We observe that simply scaling up data size with random sampling is a strong baseline with steady performance gains. Further, we find that selecting difficult examples that require more diverse reasoning strategies is more sample-efficient to transfer the teacher model's reasoning skills. Evaluated on both Llama and Qwen models, training with NaturalThoughts outperforms existing reasoning datasets such as OpenThoughts, LIMO, etc. on general STEM reasoning benchmarks including GPQA-Diamond, MMLU-Pro and SuperGPQA.

Large language models (LLMs) power many state-of-the-art systems in natural language processing. However, these models are extremely computationally expensive, even at inference time, raising the natural question: when is the extra cost of deploying a larger model worth the anticipated boost in capabilities? Better understanding this tradeoff fundamentally could benefit from an inference efficiency metric that is both (i) easily comparable across models from different providers, and (ii) representative of the true cost of running queries in an isolated performance environment. Unfortunately, access to LLMs today is largely restricted to black-box text generation APIs and raw runtimes measured through this interface do not satisfy these desiderata: model providers can apply various software and hardware optimizations orthogonal to the model, and models served on shared infrastructure are susceptible to performance contention. To circumvent these problems, we propose a new metric for comparing inference efficiency across models. This metric puts models on equal footing as though they were served (i) on uniform hardware and software, and (ii) without performance contention. We call this metric the idealized runtime, and we propose a methodology to efficiently estimate this metric for autoregressive Transformer models. We also propose cost-aware variants that incorporate the number of accelerators needed to serve the model. Using these metrics, we compare ten state-of-the-art LLMs to provide the first analysis of inference efficiency-capability tradeoffs; we make several observations from this analysis, including the fact that the superior inference runtime performance of certain APIs is often a byproduct of optimizations within the API rather than the underlying model. Our methodology also facilitates the efficient comparison of different software and hardware stacks.

Interventional counterfactuals evaluate statements such as "had A been a" by replacing the assignment for A while keeping the unit's exogenous background fixed. Backtracking counterfactuals reverse this logic: they preserve the structural assignments and instead vary background conditions across worlds. This semantics is natural for diagnostic explanation, but full backtracking may be too permissive because every exogenous coordinate can vary. We introduce scope-restricted backtracking counterfactuals, in which the modeler specifies which coordinates may vary while the remainder are shared across worlds. The scope determines the admissible carriers of the contrast, while a cross-world kernel governs the plausibility of their alternative values. We present model-based inference for general scope-restricted backtracking counterfactuals, derive sharp marginal bounds for a specified explanatory query, and establish frontier and compatibility conditions under which this explanatory query admits a modified-value policy representation. A linear-Gaussian example distinguishes local-noise, ancestor, irrelevant-noise, and infeasible explanations across scopes, while an application to the UCI Adult benchmark illustrates kernel specification, sensitivity, and how much of the explanation is carried by the cross-world coupling itself.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have accelerated progress toward artificial general intelligence, with inference-time scaling emerging as a key technique. Contemporary approaches leverage either sequential reasoning (iteratively extending chains of thought) or parallel reasoning (generating multiple solutions simultaneously) to scale inference. However, both paradigms face fundamental limitations: sequential scaling typically relies on arbitrary token budgets for termination, leading to inefficiency or premature cutoff; while parallel scaling often lacks coordination among parallel branches and requires intrusive fine-tuning to perform effectively. In light of these challenges, we aim to design a flexible test-time collaborative inference framework that exploits the complementary strengths of both sequential and parallel reasoning paradigms. Towards this goal, the core challenge lies in developing an efficient and accurate intrinsic quality metric to assess model responses during collaborative inference, enabling dynamic control and early termination of the reasoning trace. To address this challenge, we introduce semantic entropy (SE), which quantifies the semantic diversity of parallel model responses and serves as a robust indicator of reasoning quality due to its strong negative correlation with accuracy...

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities, yet it remains unclear to what extent these reflect sophisticated recall (crystallized intelligence) or reasoning ability (fluid intelligence). We introduce chess as a controlled testbed for disentangling these faculties. Leveraging the game's structure and scalable engine evaluations, we construct a taxonomy of positions varying in training corpus proximity--ranging from common states solvable by memorization to novel ones requiring first-principles reasoning. We systematically evaluate multiple GPT generations under varying reasoning intensities. Our analysis reveals a clear gradient: performance consistently degrades as fluid intelligence demands increase. Notably, in out-of-distribution tasks, performance collapses to random levels. While newer models improve, progress slows significantly for tasks outside the training distribution. Furthermore, while reasoning-augmented inference improves performance, its marginal benefit per token decreases with distributional proximity. These results suggest current architectures remain limited in systematic generalization, highlighting the need for mechanisms beyond scale to achieve robust fluid intelligence.

Recent studies have demonstrated that Reinforcement Learning (RL), notably Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), can intrinsically elicit and enhance the reasoning capabilities of Vision-Language Models (VLMs). However, despite the promise, the underlying mechanisms that drive the effectiveness of RL models as well as their limitations remain underexplored. In this paper, we highlight a fundamental behavioral distinction between RL and base models, where the former engages in deeper yet narrow reasoning, while base models, despite less refined along individual path, exhibit broader and more diverse thinking patterns. Through further analysis of training dynamics, we show that GRPO is prone to diversity collapse, causing models to prematurely converge to a limited subset of reasoning strategies while discarding the majority of potential alternatives, leading to local optima and poor scalability. To address this, we propose Multi-Group Policy Optimization (MUPO), a simple yet effective approach designed to incentivize divergent thinking across multiple solutions, and demonstrate its effectiveness on established benchmarks. Project page: https://xytian1008.github.io/MUPO/

Language models (LM) are capable of remarkably complex linguistic tasks; however, numerical reasoning is an area in which they frequently struggle. An important but rarely evaluated form of reasoning is understanding probability distributions. In this paper, we focus on evaluating the probabilistic reasoning capabilities of LMs using idealized and real-world statistical distributions. We perform a systematic evaluation of state-of-the-art LMs on three tasks: estimating percentiles, drawing samples, and calculating probabilities. We evaluate three ways to provide context to LMs 1) anchoring examples from within a distribution or family of distributions, 2) real-world context, 3) summary statistics on which to base a Normal approximation. Models can make inferences about distributions, and can be further aided by the incorporation of real-world context, example shots and simplified assumptions, even if these assumptions are incorrect or misspecified. To conduct this work, we developed a comprehensive benchmark distribution dataset with associated question-answer pairs that we will release publicly.

Humans use introspection to evaluate their understanding through private internal states inaccessible to external observers. We investigate whether large language models possess similar privileged knowledge about answer correctness, information unavailable through external observation. We train correctness classifiers on question representations from both a model's own hidden states and external models, testing whether self-representations provide a performance advantage. On standard evaluation, we find no advantage: self-probes perform comparably to peer-model probes. We hypothesize this is due to high inter-model agreement of answer correctness. To isolate genuine privileged knowledge, we evaluate on disagreement subsets, where models produce conflicting predictions. Here, we discover domain-specific privileged knowledge: self-representations consistently outperform peer representations in factual knowledge tasks, but show no advantage in math reasoning. We further localize this domain asymmetry across model layers, finding that the factual advantage emerges progressively from early-to-mid layers onward, consistent with model-specific memory retrieval, while math reasoning shows no consistent advantage at any depth.

Suppose Alice trains an open-weight language model and Bob uses a blackbox derivative of Alice's model to produce text. Can Alice prove that Bob is using her model, either by querying Bob's derivative model (query setting) or from the text alone (observational setting)? We formulate this question as an independence testing problem--in which the null hypothesis is that Bob's model or text is independent of Alice's randomized training run--and investigate it through the lens of palimpsestic memorization in language models: models are more likely to memorize data seen later in training, so we can test whether Bob is using Alice's model using test statistics that capture correlation between Bob's model or text and the ordering of training examples in Alice's training run. If Alice has randomly shuffled her training data, then any significant correlation amounts to exactly quantifiable statistical evidence against the null hypothesis, regardless of the composition of Alice's training data. In the query setting, we directly estimate (via prompting) the likelihood Bob's model gives to Alice's training examples and order; we correlate the likelihoods of over 40 fine-tunes of various Pythia and OLMo base models ranging from 1B to 12B parameters with the base model's training data order, achieving a p-value on the order of at most 1e-8 in all but six cases. In the observational setting, we try two approaches based on estimating 1) the likelihood of Bob's text overlapping with spans of Alice's training examples and 2) the likelihood of Bob's text with respect to different versions of Alice's model we obtain by repeating the last phase (e.g., 1%) of her training run on reshuffled data. The second approach can reliably distinguish Bob's text from as little as a few hundred tokens; the first does not involve any retraining but requires many more tokens (several hundred thousand) to achieve high power.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) is widely used for reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards, but it often suffers from advantage collapse: when all rollouts in a group receive the same reward, the group yields zero relative advantage and thus no learning signal. For example, if a question is too hard for the reasoner, all sampled rollouts can be incorrect and receive zero reward. Recent work addresses this issue by adding hints or auxiliary scaffolds to such hard questions so that the reasoner produces mixed outcomes and recovers a non-zero update. However, existing hints are usually fixed rather than adapted to the current reasoner, and a hint that creates learning signal under the hinted input does not necessarily improve the no-hint policy used at test time. To this end, we propose Hint Learning for Reinforcement Learning (HiLL), a framework that jointly trains a hinter policy and a reasoner policy during RL. For each hard question, the hinter generates hints online conditioned on the current reasoner's incorrect rollout, allowing hint generation to adapt to the reasoner's evolving errors. We further introduce hint reliance, which measures how strongly correct hinted trajectories depend on the hint. We derive a transferability result showing that lower hint reliance implies stronger transfer from hinted success to no-hint success, and we use this result to define a transfer-weighted reward for training the hinter. Therefore, HiLL favors hints that not only recover informative GRPO groups, but also produce signals that are more likely to improve the original no-hint policy. Experiments across multiple benchmarks show that HiLL consistently outperforms GRPO and prior hint-based baselines, demonstrating the value of adaptive and transfer-aware hint learning for RL. The code is available at https://github.com/Andree-9/HiLL.

Large language models often produce hallucinated answers that violate prompt-level constraints. A key diagnostic question is whether these failures reflect missing knowledge, or whether the model has the relevant information but follows the wrong inference path. We study this phenomenon as inference misalignment: a mismatch between the answer supported by the prompt and the answer favored by statistically salient latent associations. We formalize this view with a latent key-task model, in which pretraining-frequency imbalance can cause a shortcut path to dominate the constraint-sensitive path and induce positive inference loss. The framework predicts two failure modes: task-retrieval bias in entity disambiguation and key-selection bias in action choice. We introduce TrapQA, a controlled diagnostic testbed with two components. ScientistQA tests disambiguation among similar scientists with supplementary factual probes, while Real-Life Constrained QA tests everyday constraint following under salient shortcuts. Our results show that hallucination can arise from biased latent inference rather than absent knowledge alone.

Group-Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) is a key technique for training large reasoning models, yet it suffers from a critical vulnerability: the Think-Answer Mismatch, where noisy reward signals corrupt the learning process. This problem is most severe in unbalanced response groups, paradoxically degrading the signal precisely when it should be most informative. To address this challenge, we propose Stable Group-Relative Policy Optimization (S-GRPO), a principled enhancement that derives optimal, noise-aware advantage weights to stabilize training. Our comprehensive experiments on mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate S-GRPO's effectiveness and robustness. On various models, S-GRPO significantly outperforms DR. GRPO, achieving performance gains of +2.5% on Qwen-Math-7B-Base, +2.2% on Llama-3.2-3B-Base, and +2.4% on Qwen-Math-1.5B-Instruct. Most critically, while standard GRPO fails to learn under 20% synthetic reward noise, S-GRPO maintains stable learning progress. These results highlight S-GRPO's potential for more robust and effective training of large-scale reasoning models. \footnote{Code and data are available at: https://github.com/shenpeijun0212/S-GRPO

Sophisticated instrumentation for AI systems might have indicators that signal misalignment from human values, not unlike a "check engine" light in cars. One such indicator of misalignment is deceptiveness in generated responses. Future AI instrumentation may have the ability to detect when an LLM generates deceptive responses while reasoning about seemingly plausible but incorrect answers to factual questions. In this work, we demonstrate that linear probes on LLMs internal activations can detect deception in their responses with extremely high accuracy. Our probes reach a maximum of greater than 90% accuracy in distinguishing between deceptive and non-deceptive arguments generated by llama and qwen models ranging from 1.5B to 14B parameters, including their DeepSeek-r1 finetuned variants. We observe that probes on smaller models (1.5B) achieve chance accuracy at detecting deception, while larger models (greater than 7B) reach 70-80%, with their reasoning counterparts exceeding 90%. The layer-wise probe accuracy follows a three-stage pattern across layers: near-random (50%) in early layers, peaking in middle layers, and slightly declining in later layers. Furthermore, using an iterative null space projection approach, we find multitudes of linear directions that encode deception, ranging from 20 in Qwen 3B to nearly 100 in DeepSeek 7B and Qwen 14B models.

Reasoning capabilities of large language models are primarily studied for English, even when pretrained models are multilingual. In this work, we investigate to what extent English reasoning finetuning with long chain-of-thoughts (CoTs) can generalize across languages. First, we find that scaling up inference compute for English-centric reasoning language models (RLMs) improves multilingual mathematical reasoning across many languages including low-resource languages, to an extent where they outperform models twice their size. Second, we reveal that while English-centric RLM's CoTs are naturally predominantly English, they consistently follow a quote-and-think pattern to reason about quoted non-English inputs. Third, we discover an effective strategy to control the language of long CoT reasoning, and we observe that models reason better and more efficiently in high-resource languages. Finally, we observe poor out-of-domain reasoning generalization, in particular from STEM to cultural commonsense knowledge, even for English. Overall, we demonstrate the potentials, study the mechanisms and outline the limitations of crosslingual generalization of English reasoning test-time scaling. We conclude that practitioners should let English-centric RLMs reason in high-resource languages, while further work is needed to improve reasoning in low-resource languages and out-of-domain contexts.

This work stems from prior complementary observations on the dynamics of Chain-of-Thought (CoT): Large Language Models (LLMs) is shown latent planning of subsequent reasoning prior to CoT emergence, thereby diminishing the significance of explicit CoT; whereas CoT remains critical for tasks requiring multi-step reasoning. To deepen the understanding between LLM's internal states and its verbalized reasoning trajectories, we investigate the latent planning strength of LLMs, through our probing method, Tele-Lens, applying to hidden states across diverse task domains. Our empirical results indicate that LLMs exhibit a myopic horizon, primarily conducting incremental transitions without precise global planning. Leveraging this characteristic, we propose a hypothesis on enhancing uncertainty estimation of CoT, which we validate that a small subset of CoT positions can effectively represent the uncertainty of the entire path. We further underscore the significance of exploiting CoT dynamics, and demonstrate that automatic recognition of CoT bypass can be achieved without performance degradation. Our code, data and models are released at https://github.com/lxucs/tele-lens.

The long chain-of-thought (LongCoT) capability is central to the recent breakthroughs achieved by large language models in complex reasoning tasks. However, the accompanying issue of ''underthinking'', where models exhibit shallow reasoning by frequently switching thoughts without sufficient exploration, limits both performance and token efficiency. To address this problem, we propose a simple yet effective reasoning strategy: the SmartSwitch inference framework. This framework can be easily integrated into any large language model as a plug-and-play solution, continuously monitoring the model's reasoning process to detect underthinking and guide it toward deeper exploration of promising but overlooked thoughts. Specifically, the perception module identifies points where thoughts switch and evaluates the potential of the preceding thought using an off-the-shelf process reward model (PRM). If a high-potential thought is found to be prematurely abandoned, the intervention module interrupts the ongoing inference, backtracks to the point before the switch, and inserts a "deepening prompt" to encourage further exploration along that promising path. Extensive experiments on challenging mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our method significantly enhances the performance of various large language models of different sizes.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved significant performance gains via scaling up model sizes and/or data. However, recent evidence suggests diminishing returns from such approaches, motivating scaling the computation spent at inference time. Existing inference-time scaling methods, usually with reward models, cast the task as a search problem, which tends to be vulnerable to reward hacking as a consequence of approximation errors in reward models. In this paper, we instead cast inference-time scaling as a probabilistic inference task and leverage sampling-based techniques to explore the typical set of the state distribution of a state-space model with an approximate likelihood, rather than optimize for its mode directly. We propose a novel inference-time scaling approach by adapting particle-based Monte Carlo methods to this task. Our empirical evaluation demonstrates that our methods have a 4-16x better scaling rate over our deterministic search counterparts on various challenging mathematical reasoning tasks. Using our approach, we show that Qwen2.5-Math-1.5B-Instruct can surpass GPT-4o accuracy in only 4 rollouts, while Qwen2.5-Math-7B-Instruct scales to o1 level accuracy in only 32 rollouts. Our work not only presents an effective method to inference-time scaling, but also connects the rich literature in probabilistic inference with inference-time scaling of LLMs to develop more robust algorithms in future work. Code and further information is available at https://probabilistic-inference-scaling.github.io.

Contrastively trained encoders have recently been proven to invert the data-generating process: they encode each input, e.g., an image, into the true latent vector that generated the image (Zimmermann et al., 2021). However, real-world observations often have inherent ambiguities. For instance, images may be blurred or only show a 2D view of a 3D object, so multiple latents could have generated them. This makes the true posterior for the latent vector probabilistic with heteroscedastic uncertainty. In this setup, we extend the common InfoNCE objective and encoders to predict latent distributions instead of points. We prove that these distributions recover the correct posteriors of the data-generating process, including its level of aleatoric uncertainty, up to a rotation of the latent space. In addition to providing calibrated uncertainty estimates, these posteriors allow the computation of credible intervals in image retrieval. They comprise images with the same latent as a given query, subject to its uncertainty. Code is available at https://github.com/mkirchhof/Probabilistic_Contrastive_Learning

Recently, there have been notable advancements in large language models (LLMs), demonstrating their growing abilities in complex reasoning. However, existing research largely overlooks a thorough and systematic comparison of these models' reasoning processes and outputs, particularly regarding their self-reflection pattern (also termed "Aha moment") and the interconnections across diverse domains. This paper proposes a novel framework for analyzing the reasoning characteristics of four cutting-edge large reasoning models (GPT-o1, DeepSeek-R1, Kimi-k1.5, and Grok-3) using keywords statistic and LLM-as-a-judge paradigm. Our approach connects their internal thinking processes with their final outputs. A diverse dataset consists of real-world scenario-based questions covering logical deduction, causal inference, and multi-step problem-solving. Additionally, a set of metrics is put forward to assess both the coherence of reasoning and the accuracy of the outputs. The research results uncover various patterns of how these models balance exploration and exploitation, deal with problems, and reach conclusions during the reasoning process. Through quantitative and qualitative comparisons, disparities among these models are identified in aspects such as the depth of reasoning, the reliance on intermediate steps, and the degree of similarity between their thinking processes and output patterns and those of GPT-o1. This work offers valuable insights into the trade-off between computational efficiency and reasoning robustness and provides practical recommendations for enhancing model design and evaluation in practical applications. We publicly release our project at: https://github.com/ChangWenhan/FromThinking2Output

As chain of thought (CoT) has become central to scaling reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs), it has also emerged as a promising tool for interpretability, suggesting the opportunity to understand model decisions through verbalized reasoning. However, the utility of CoT toward interpretability depends upon its faithfulness---whether the model's stated reasoning reflects the underlying decision process. We provide mechanistic evidence that instruction-tuned models often determine their answer before generating CoT. Training linear probes on residual stream activations at the last token before CoT, we can predict the model's final answer with >0.9 AUC on most tasks. We find that these directions are not only predictive, but also causal: steering activations along the probe direction often flips model answers, with flip rates substantially exceeding norm-matched orthogonal baselines across most model-dataset pairs. When steering induces incorrect answers, we observe two distinct failure modes: confabulation (fabricating false premises) and non-entailment (stating correct premises but drawing unsupported conclusions). While post-hoc reasoning may be instrumentally useful when the model has a correct pre-CoT belief, these failure modes suggest it can result in undesirable behaviors when reasoning from a false belief.

Reasoning training incentivizes LLMs to produce long chains of thought (long CoT), which among other things, allows them to explore solution strategies with self-checking. This results in higher accuracy, but inflates context length, token/compute cost, and answer latency. We ask: Can current models leverage their metacognition to provide other combinations on this Pareto frontier, e.g., better accuracy with lower context length and/or latency? Abstractly, we view the model as an improvement operator on its own "thoughts" with a continuum of possible strategies. We identify an interesting inference family Parallel-Distill-Refine (PDR), which performs the following: (i) generate diverse drafts in parallel; (ii) distill them into a bounded, textual workspace; and (iii) refine conditioned on this workspace, producing an output that seeds the next round. Importantly, context length (hence compute cost) is controllable via degree of parallelism, and is no longer conflated with the total number of generated tokens. We report PDR instantiations of current models that give better accuracy than long CoT while incurring lower latency. Setting degree of parallelism to 1 yields an interesting subcase, Sequential Refinement (SR) (iteratively improve a single candidate answer) which provides performance superior to long CoT. Success of such model orchestrations raises the question whether further training could shift the Pareto frontier. To this end, we train an 8B thinking model with Reinforcement Learning (RL) to make it consistent with PDR as the inference method. On math tasks with verifiable answers, iterative pipelines surpass single-pass baselines at matched sequential budgets, with PDR delivering the largest gains (e.g., +11% on AIME 2024 and +9% on AIME 2025).

We introduce a variational reasoning framework for language models that treats thinking traces as latent variables and optimizes them through variational inference. Starting from the evidence lower bound (ELBO), we extend it to a multi-trace objective for tighter bounds and propose a forward-KL formulation that stabilizes the training of the variational posterior. We further show that rejection sampling finetuning and binary-reward RL, including GRPO, can be interpreted as local forward-KL objectives, where an implicit weighting by model accuracy naturally arises from the derivation and reveals a previously unnoticed bias toward easier questions. We empirically validate our method on the Qwen 2.5 and Qwen 3 model families across a wide range of reasoning tasks. Overall, our work provides a principled probabilistic perspective that unifies variational inference with RL-style methods and yields stable objectives for improving the reasoning ability of language models. Our code is available at https://github.com/sail-sg/variational-reasoning.

Inference scaling empowers LLMs with unprecedented reasoning ability, with reinforcement learning as the core technique to elicit complex reasoning. However, key technical details of state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs are concealed (such as in OpenAI o1 blog and DeepSeek R1 technical report), thus the community still struggles to reproduce their RL training results. We propose the Decoupled Clip and Dynamic sAmpling Policy Optimization (DAPO) algorithm, and fully open-source a state-of-the-art large-scale RL system that achieves 50 points on AIME 2024 using Qwen2.5-32B base model. Unlike previous works that withhold training details, we introduce four key techniques of our algorithm that make large-scale LLM RL a success. In addition, we open-source our training code, which is built on the verl framework, along with a carefully curated and processed dataset. These components of our open-source system enhance reproducibility and support future research in large-scale LLM RL.

Reasoning is central to a wide range of intellectual activities, and while the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, their performance in reasoning tasks remains limited. The processes and mechanisms underlying reasoning are not yet fully understood, but key elements include path exploration, selection of relevant knowledge, and multi-step inference. Problems are solved through the synthesis of these components. In this paper, we propose a benchmark that focuses on a specific aspect of reasoning ability: the direct evaluation of multi-step inference. To this end, we design a special reasoning task where multi-step inference is specifically focused by largely eliminating path exploration and implicit knowledge utilization. Our dataset comprises pairs of explicit instructions and corresponding questions, where the procedures necessary for solving the questions are entirely detailed within the instructions. This setup allows models to solve problems solely by following the provided directives. By constructing problems that require varying numbers of steps to solve and evaluating responses at each step, we enable a thorough assessment of state-of-the-art LLMs' ability to follow instructions. To ensure the robustness of our evaluation, we include multiple distinct tasks. Furthermore, by comparing accuracy across tasks, utilizing step-aware metrics, and applying separately defined measures of complexity, we conduct experiments that offer insights into the capabilities and limitations of LLMs in reasoning tasks. Our findings have significant implications for the development of LLMs and highlight areas for future research in advancing their reasoning abilities. Our dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/ifujisawa/procbench and code at https://github.com/ifujisawa/proc-bench.

A new generation of AI models generates step-by-step reasoning text before producing an answer. This text appears to offer a human-readable window into their computation process, and is increasingly relied upon for transparency and interpretability. However, it is unclear whether human understanding of this text matches the model's actual computational process. In this paper, we investigate a necessary condition for correspondence: the ability of humans to identify which steps in a reasoning text causally influence later steps. We evaluated humans on this ability by composing questions based on counterfactual measurements and found a significant discrepancy: participant accuracy was only 29.3%, barely above chance (25%), and remained low (42%) even when evaluating the majority vote on questions with high agreement. Our results reveal a fundamental gap between how humans interpret reasoning texts and how models use it, challenging its utility as a simple interpretability tool. We argue that reasoning texts should be treated as an artifact to be investigated, not taken at face value, and that understanding the non-human ways these models use language is a critical research direction.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) was introduced and used recently for promoting reasoning in LLMs under verifiable (binary) rewards. We show that the mean + variance calibration of these rewards induces a weighted contrastive loss in which the contrastive samples are synthetic data drawn from the previous policy. While GRPO was originally paired with clipping to keep updates near the old policy, we analyze variants that differ in reward normalization (mean-only vs mean + variance) and in how they regularize updates using KL divergence: either penalizing divergence from the previous model (mirror), penalizing divergence from a fixed reference model π_{ref}, or combining both forms of regularization. For each, the optimal policy π_n admits an explicit form in terms of the binary reward and the first and second order statistics of the reward under π_{n-1}, as well as the policies π_{n-1} and π_{ref}. Iterating results in a sequence {π_n} whose probability of success (PoS) obeys a simple recurrence that converges to a fixed point determined by the reference PoS and the regularization strength. We further show that this fixed point exceeds the reference, demonstrating that GRPO amplifies the policy's probability of success.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in critical domains, where their susceptibility to hallucinations makes reliable and interpretable uncertainty quantification essential. We introduce the concept of mechanistic uncertainty, which characterizes uncertainty through the stability of the internal mechanisms supporting a model's response. We propose the causal robustness margin, defined as the minimum internal intervention required to deviate the model's output, and operationalize it using Jacobian Lens (Jlens) concept steering vectors. Across three open-source models and five question-answering datasets, we show incorrect and uncertain responses exhibit smaller margins, indicating greater sensitivity to internal interventions, and the causal robustness margin complements conventional output-based uncertainty methods. Finally, in a controlled knowledge injection experiment, correctly learned facts show increased margins after training, suggesting that causal robustness provides a mechanistically grounded signal of uncertainty.

Reasoning traces from chain-of-thought models appear to offer a legible window into how a model arrives at its answer. A growing body of work treats them as such, using LLM judges to diagnose errors, evaluate faithfulness, and provide step-level supervision via process reward models and generative critics. These practices rely on the text of a reasoning step carrying information about its functional role. But does the text actually encode information about which reasoning steps matter? We operationalize the importance of a reasoning step as its advantage: the change in expected reward, e.g., producing the correct final answer, from including that step, estimated via Monte Carlo rollouts. Basing ground truth on these estimates, we evaluate whether LLM judges can identify high-advantage steps and find that sufficiently capable LLMs can outperform a prevalence baseline but fall well short of a noise ceiling. Fine-tuning a model as a step-level critic yields strong improvement for incorrect responses but remains distant from ceiling for correct responses, suggesting that step importance is only partially recoverable from the text of the reasoning trace. Our findings contribute to a growing body of chain-of-thought faithfulness work that cautions against treating the legibility of reasoning traces as interpretability, especially with implications for process reward modeling.

Recent advancements in large reasoning models (LRMs) have significantly enhanced language models' capabilities in complex problem-solving by emulating human-like deliberative thinking. However, these models often exhibit overthinking (i.e., the generation of unnecessarily verbose and redundant content), which hinders efficiency and inflates inference cost. In this work, we explore the representational and behavioral origins of this inefficiency, revealing that LRMs inherently possess the capacity for more concise reasoning. Empirical analyses show that correct reasoning paths vary significantly in length, and the shortest correct responses often suffice, indicating untapped efficiency potential. Exploiting these findings, we propose two lightweight methods to enhance LRM efficiency. First, we introduce Efficiency Steering, a training-free activation steering technique that modulates reasoning behavior via a single direction in the model's representation space. Second, we develop Self-Rewarded Efficiency RL, a reinforcement learning framework that dynamically balances task accuracy and brevity by rewarding concise correct solutions. Extensive experiments on seven LRM backbones across multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our methods significantly reduce reasoning length while preserving or improving task performance. Our results highlight that reasoning efficiency can be improved by leveraging and guiding the intrinsic capabilities of existing models in a self-guided manner.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous decision agents in settings with asymmetric error costs: hiring (missed talent vs wasted interviews), medical triage (missed emergencies vs unnecessary escalation), and fraud detection (approved fraud vs declined legitimate payments). The dominant design queries a single LLM for a posterior over states, thresholds "confidence," and acts; we prove this is inadequate for sequential decisions with costs. We propose a Bayesian, cost-aware multi-LLM orchestration framework that treats LLMs as approximate likelihood models rather than classifiers. For each candidate state, we elicit likelihoods via contrastive prompting, aggregate across diverse models with robust statistics, and update beliefs with Bayes rule under explicit priors as new evidence arrives. This enables coherent belief updating, expected-cost action selection, principled information gathering via value of information, and fairness gains via ensemble bias mitigation. In resume screening with costs of 40000 USD per missed hire, 2500 USD per interview, and 150 USD per phone screen, experiments on 1000 resumes using five LLMs (GPT-4o, Claude 4.5 Sonnet, Gemini Pro, Grok, DeepSeek) reduce total cost by 294000 USD (34 percent) versus the best single-LLM baseline and improve demographic parity by 45 percent (max group gap 22 to 5 percentage points). Ablations attribute 51 percent of savings to multi-LLM aggregation, 43 percent to sequential updating, and 20 percent to disagreement-triggered information gathering, consistent with the theoretical benefits of correct probabilistic foundations.

It has long been hypothesised that causal reasoning plays a fundamental role in robust and general intelligence. However, it is not known if agents must learn causal models in order to generalise to new domains, or if other inductive biases are sufficient. We answer this question, showing that any agent capable of satisfying a regret bound under a large set of distributional shifts must have learned an approximate causal model of the data generating process, which converges to the true causal model for optimal agents. We discuss the implications of this result for several research areas including transfer learning and causal inference.

One of the most widely used methods to evaluate LLMs are Multiple Choice Question (MCQ) tests. MCQ benchmarks enable the testing of LLM knowledge on almost any topic at scale as the results can be processed automatically. To help the LLM answer, a few examples called few shots can be included in the prompt. Moreover, the LLM can be asked to answer the question directly with the selected option or to first provide the reasoning and then the selected answer, which is known as chain of thought. In addition to checking whether the selected answer is correct, the evaluation can look at the LLM-estimated probability of its response as an indication of the confidence of the LLM in the response. In this paper, we study how the LLM confidence in its answer depends on whether the model has been asked to answer directly or to provide the reasoning before answering. The results of the evaluation of questions on a wide range of topics in seven different models show that LLMs are more confident in their answers when they provide reasoning before the answer. This occurs regardless of whether the selected answer is correct. Our hypothesis is that this behavior is due to the reasoning that modifies the probability of the selected answer, as the LLM predicts the answer based on the input question and the reasoning that supports the selection made. Therefore, LLM estimated probabilities seem to have intrinsic limitations that should be understood in order to use them in evaluation procedures. Interestingly, the same behavior has been observed in humans, for whom explaining an answer increases confidence in its correctness.

Large Audio-Language Models (LALMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance in tasks involving audio perception and understanding, such as speech recognition and audio captioning. However, their reasoning capabilities - critical for solving complex real-world problems - remain underexplored. In this work, we conduct the first exploration into integrating Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning into LALMs to enhance their reasoning ability across auditory modalities. We evaluate representative CoT methods, analyzing their performance in both information extraction and reasoning tasks across sound, music, and speech domains. Our findings reveal that CoT methods significantly improve performance on easy and medium tasks but encounter challenges with hard tasks, where reasoning chains can confuse the model rather than improve accuracy. Additionally, we identify a positive correlation between reasoning path length and accuracy, demonstrating the potential of scaling inference for advanced instruction-following and reasoning. This study not only highlights the promise of CoT in enhancing LALM reasoning capabilities but also identifies key limitations and provides actionable directions for future research.

Humans can attribute beliefs to others. However, it is unknown to what extent this ability results from an innate biological endowment or from experience accrued through child development, particularly exposure to language describing others' mental states. We test the viability of the language exposure hypothesis by assessing whether models exposed to large quantities of human language display sensitivity to the implied knowledge states of characters in written passages. In pre-registered analyses, we present a linguistic version of the False Belief Task to both human participants and a Large Language Model, GPT-3. Both are sensitive to others' beliefs, but while the language model significantly exceeds chance behavior, it does not perform as well as the humans, nor does it explain the full extent of their behavior -- despite being exposed to more language than a human would in a lifetime. This suggests that while statistical learning from language exposure may in part explain how humans develop the ability to reason about the mental states of others, other mechanisms are also responsible.

Commonsense reasoning often involves evaluating multiple plausible interpretations rather than selecting a single atomic answer, yet most benchmarks rely on single-label evaluation, obscuring whether statements are jointly plausible, mutually exclusive, or jointly implausible. We introduce LOGICAL-COMMONSENSEQA, a benchmark that re-frames commonsense reasoning as logical composition over pairs of atomic statements using plausibility-level operators (AND, OR, NEITHER/NOR). Evaluating instruction-tuned, reasoning-specialized, and fine-tuned models under zero-shot, few-shot, and chain-of-thought prompting, we find that while models perform reasonably on conjunctive and moderately on disjunctive reasoning, performance degrades sharply on negation-based questions. LOGICAL-COMMONSENSEQA exposes fundamental reasoning limitations and provides a controlled framework for advancing compositional commonsense reasoning.