Daily Papers

Algorithmic trading relies on machine learning models to make trading decisions. Despite strong in-sample performance, these models often degrade when confronted with evolving real-world market regimes, which can shift dramatically due to macroeconomic changes-e.g., monetary policy updates or unanticipated fluctuations in participant behavior. We identify two challenges that perpetuate this mismatch: (1) insufficient robustness in existing policy against uncertainties in high-level market fluctuations, and (2) the absence of a realistic and diverse simulation environment for training, leading to policy overfitting. To address these issues, we propose a Bayesian Robust Framework that systematically integrates a macro-conditioned generative model with robust policy learning. On the data side, to generate realistic and diverse data, we propose a macro-conditioned GAN-based generator that leverages macroeconomic indicators as primary control variables, synthesizing data with faithful temporal, cross-instrument, and macro correlations. On the policy side, to learn robust policy against market fluctuations, we cast the trading process as a two-player zero-sum Bayesian Markov game, wherein an adversarial agent simulates shifting regimes by perturbing macroeconomic indicators in the macro-conditioned generator, while the trading agent-guided by a quantile belief network-maintains and updates its belief over hidden market states. The trading agent seeks a Robust Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium via Bayesian neural fictitious self-play, stabilizing learning under adversarial market perturbations. Extensive experiments on 9 financial instruments demonstrate that our framework outperforms 9 state-of-the-art baselines. In extreme events like the COVID, our method shows improved profitability and risk management, offering a reliable solution for trading under uncertain and shifting market dynamics.

High-fidelity social simulation is pivotal for addressing complex Web societal challenges, yet it demands agents capable of authentically replicating the dynamic spectrum of human interaction. Current LLM-based multi-agent frameworks, however, predominantly adhere to static interaction topologies, failing to capture the fluid oscillation between cooperative knowledge synthesis and competitive critical reasoning seen in real-world scenarios. This rigidity often leads to unrealistic ``groupthink'' or unproductive deadlocks, undermining the credibility of simulations for decision support. To bridge this gap, we propose BEACOF, a belief-driven adaptive collaboration framework inspired by Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium (PBE). By modeling social interaction as a dynamic game of incomplete information, BEACOF rigorously addresses the circular dependency between collaboration type selection and capability estimation. Agents iteratively refine probabilistic beliefs about peer capabilities and autonomously modulate their collaboration strategy, thereby ensuring sequentially rational decisions under uncertainty. Validated across adversarial (judicial), open-ended (social) and mixed (medical) scenarios, BEACOF prevents coordination failures and fosters robust convergence toward high-quality solutions, demonstrating superior potential for reliable social simulation. Source codes and datasets are publicly released at: https://github.com/WUT-IDEA/BEACOF.

In this study, we explore the robustness of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) against Byzantine failures, where any agent can enact arbitrary, worst-case actions due to malfunction or adversarial attack. To address the uncertainty that any agent can be adversarial, we propose a Bayesian Adversarial Robust Dec-POMDP (BARDec-POMDP) framework, which views Byzantine adversaries as nature-dictated types, represented by a separate transition. This allows agents to learn policies grounded on their posterior beliefs about the type of other agents, fostering collaboration with identified allies and minimizing vulnerability to adversarial manipulation. We define the optimal solution to the BARDec-POMDP as an ex post robust Bayesian Markov perfect equilibrium, which we proof to exist and weakly dominates the equilibrium of previous robust MARL approaches. To realize this equilibrium, we put forward a two-timescale actor-critic algorithm with almost sure convergence under specific conditions. Experimentation on matrix games, level-based foraging and StarCraft II indicate that, even under worst-case perturbations, our method successfully acquires intricate micromanagement skills and adaptively aligns with allies, demonstrating resilience against non-oblivious adversaries, random allies, observation-based attacks, and transfer-based attacks.

We develop an econometric framework integrating heavy-tailed Student's t distributions with behavioral probability weighting while preserving infinite divisibility. Using 432{,}752 observations across 86 assets (2004--2024), we demonstrate Student's t specifications outperform Gaussian models in 88.4\% of cases. Bounded probability-weighting transformations preserve mathematical properties required for dynamic pricing. Gaussian models underestimate 99\% Value-at-Risk by 19.7\% versus 3.2\% for our specification. Joint estimation procedures identify tail and behavioral parameters with established asymptotic properties. Results provide robust inference for asset-pricing applications where heavy tails and behavioral distortions coexist.

Robust Markov decision processes (MDPs) address the challenge of model uncertainty by optimizing the worst-case performance over an uncertainty set of MDPs. In this paper, we focus on the robust average-reward MDPs under the model-free setting. We first theoretically characterize the structure of solutions to the robust average-reward Bellman equation, which is essential for our later convergence analysis. We then design two model-free algorithms, robust relative value iteration (RVI) TD and robust RVI Q-learning, and theoretically prove their convergence to the optimal solution. We provide several widely used uncertainty sets as examples, including those defined by the contamination model, total variation, Chi-squared divergence, Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence and Wasserstein distance.

We consider finite-horizon Markov Decision Processes where parameters, such as transition probabilities, are unknown and estimated from data. The popular distributionally robust approach to addressing the parameter uncertainty can sometimes be overly conservative. In this paper, we propose a new formulation, Bayesian risk Markov Decision Process (BR-MDP), to address parameter uncertainty in MDPs, where a risk functional is applied in nested form to the expected total cost with respect to the Bayesian posterior distribution of the unknown parameters. The proposed formulation provides more flexible risk attitutes towards parameter uncertainty and takes into account the availability of data in future times stages. To solve the proposed formulation with the conditional value-at-risk (CVaR) risk functional, we propose an efficient approximation algorithm by deriving an analytical approximation of the value function and utilizing the convexity of CVaR. We demonstrate the empirical performance of the BR-MDP formulation and proposed algorithms on a gambler's betting problem and an inventory control problem.

Robust reinforcement learning (RL) seeks to train policies that can perform well under environment perturbations or adversarial attacks. Existing approaches typically assume that the space of possible perturbations remains the same across timesteps. However, in many settings, the space of possible perturbations at a given timestep depends on past perturbations. We formally introduce temporally-coupled perturbations, presenting a novel challenge for existing robust RL methods. To tackle this challenge, we propose GRAD, a novel game-theoretic approach that treats the temporally-coupled robust RL problem as a partially-observable two-player zero-sum game. By finding an approximate equilibrium in this game, GRAD ensures the agent's robustness against temporally-coupled perturbations. Empirical experiments on a variety of continuous control tasks demonstrate that our proposed approach exhibits significant robustness advantages compared to baselines against both standard and temporally-coupled attacks, in both state and action spaces.

Most bandit algorithms assume that the reward variances or their upper bounds are known, and that they are the same for all arms. This naturally leads to suboptimal performance and higher regret due to variance overestimation. On the other hand, underestimated reward variances may lead to linear regret due to committing early to a suboptimal arm. This motivated prior works on variance-adaptive frequentist algorithms, which have strong instance-dependent regret bounds but cannot incorporate prior knowledge on reward variances. We lay foundations for the Bayesian setting, which incorporates prior knowledge. This results in lower regret in practice, due to using the prior in the algorithm design, and also improved regret guarantees. Specifically, we study Gaussian bandits with {unknown heterogeneous reward variances}, and develop a Thompson sampling algorithm with prior-dependent Bayes regret bounds. We achieve lower regret with lower reward variances and more informative priors on them, which is precisely why we pay only for what is uncertain. This is the first result of its kind. Finally, we corroborate our theory with extensive experiments, which show the superiority of our variance-adaptive Bayesian algorithm over prior frequentist approaches. We also show that our approach is robust to model misspecification and can be applied with estimated priors.

Robust optimization safeguards decisions against uncertainty by optimizing against worst-case scenarios, yet their effectiveness hinges on a prespecified robustness level that is often chosen ad hoc, leading to either insufficient protection or overly conservative and costly solutions. Recent approaches using conformal prediction construct data-driven uncertainty sets with finite-sample coverage guarantees, but they still fix coverage targets a priori and offer little guidance for selecting robustness levels. We propose a new framework that provides distribution-free, finite-sample guarantees on both miscoverage and regret for any family of robust predict-then-optimize policies. Our method constructs valid estimators that trace out the miscoverage-regret Pareto frontier, enabling decision-makers to reliably evaluate and calibrate robustness levels according to their cost-risk preferences. The framework is simple to implement, broadly applicable across classical optimization formulations, and achieves sharper finite-sample performance than existing approaches. These results offer the first principled data-driven methodology for guiding robustness selection and empower practitioners to balance robustness and conservativeness in high-stakes decision-making.

We consider the problem of finding an input to a stochastic black box function such that the scalar output of the black box function is as close as possible to a target value in the sense of the expected squared error. While the optimization of stochastic black boxes is classic in (robust) Bayesian optimization, the current approaches based on Gaussian processes predominantly focus either on i) maximization/minimization rather than target value optimization or ii) on the expectation, but not the variance of the output, ignoring output variations due to stochasticity in uncontrollable environmental variables. In this work, we fill this gap and derive acquisition functions for common criteria such as the expected improvement, the probability of improvement, and the lower confidence bound, assuming that aleatoric effects are Gaussian with known variance. Our experiments illustrate that this setting is compatible with certain extensions of Gaussian processes, and show that the thus derived acquisition functions can outperform classical Bayesian optimization even if the latter assumptions are violated. An industrial use case in billet forging is presented.

Robust reinforcement learning is essential for deploying reinforcement learning algorithms in real-world scenarios where environmental uncertainty predominates. Traditional robust reinforcement learning often depends on rectangularity assumptions, where adverse probability measures of outcome states are assumed to be independent across different states and actions. This assumption, rarely fulfilled in practice, leads to overly conservative policies. To address this problem, we introduce a new time-constrained robust MDP (TC-RMDP) formulation that considers multifactorial, correlated, and time-dependent disturbances, thus more accurately reflecting real-world dynamics. This formulation goes beyond the conventional rectangularity paradigm, offering new perspectives and expanding the analytical framework for robust RL. We propose three distinct algorithms, each using varying levels of environmental information, and evaluate them extensively on continuous control benchmarks. Our results demonstrate that these algorithms yield an efficient tradeoff between performance and robustness, outperforming traditional deep robust RL methods in time-constrained environments while preserving robustness in classical benchmarks. This study revisits the prevailing assumptions in robust RL and opens new avenues for developing more practical and realistic RL applications.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

Robust optimization provides a mathematical framework for modeling and solving decision-making problems under worst-case uncertainty. This work addresses two-stage robust optimization (2RO) problems (also called adjustable robust optimization), wherein first-stage and second-stage decisions are made before and after uncertainty is realized, respectively. This results in a nested min-max-min optimization problem which is extremely challenging computationally, especially when the decisions are discrete. We propose Neur2RO, an efficient machine learning-driven instantiation of column-and-constraint generation (CCG), a classical iterative algorithm for 2RO. Specifically, we learn to estimate the value function of the second-stage problem via a novel neural network architecture that is easy to optimize over by design. Embedding our neural network into CCG yields high-quality solutions quickly as evidenced by experiments on two 2RO benchmarks, knapsack and capital budgeting. For knapsack, Neur2RO finds solutions that are within roughly 2% of the best-known values in a few seconds compared to the three hours of the state-of-the-art exact branch-and-price algorithm; for larger and more complex instances, Neur2RO finds even better solutions. For capital budgeting, Neur2RO outperforms three variants of the k-adaptability algorithm, particularly on the largest instances, with a 10 to 100-fold reduction in solution time. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/khalil-research/Neur2RO.

Robustness against adversarial attacks and distribution shifts is a long-standing goal of Reinforcement Learning (RL). To this end, Robust Adversarial Reinforcement Learning (RARL) trains a protagonist against destabilizing forces exercised by an adversary in a competitive zero-sum Markov game, whose optimal solution, i.e., rational strategy, corresponds to a Nash equilibrium. However, finding Nash equilibria requires facing complex saddle point optimization problems, which can be prohibitive to solve, especially for high-dimensional control. In this paper, we propose a novel approach for adversarial RL based on entropy regularization to ease the complexity of the saddle point optimization problem. We show that the solution of this entropy-regularized problem corresponds to a Quantal Response Equilibrium (QRE), a generalization of Nash equilibria that accounts for bounded rationality, i.e., agents sometimes play random actions instead of optimal ones. Crucially, the connection between the entropy-regularized objective and QRE enables free modulation of the rationality of the agents by simply tuning the temperature coefficient. We leverage this insight to propose our novel algorithm, Quantal Adversarial RL (QARL), which gradually increases the rationality of the adversary in a curriculum fashion until it is fully rational, easing the complexity of the optimization problem while retaining robustness. We provide extensive evidence of QARL outperforming RARL and recent baselines across several MuJoCo locomotion and navigation problems in overall performance and robustness.

Bayesian inference usually requires running potentially costly inference procedures separately for every new observation. In contrast, the idea of amortized Bayesian inference is to initially invest computational cost in training an inference network on simulated data, which can subsequently be used to rapidly perform inference (i.e., to return estimates of posterior distributions) for new observations. This approach has been applied to many real-world models in the sciences and engineering, but it is unclear how robust the approach is to adversarial perturbations in the observed data. Here, we study the adversarial robustness of amortized Bayesian inference, focusing on simulation-based estimation of multi-dimensional posterior distributions. We show that almost unrecognizable, targeted perturbations of the observations can lead to drastic changes in the predicted posterior and highly unrealistic posterior predictive samples, across several benchmark tasks and a real-world example from neuroscience. We propose a computationally efficient regularization scheme based on penalizing the Fisher information of the conditional density estimator, and show how it improves the adversarial robustness of amortized Bayesian inference.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

We study preferential Bayesian optimization (BO) where reliable feedback is limited to pairwise comparison called duels. An important challenge in preferential BO, which uses the preferential Gaussian process (GP) model to represent flexible preference structure, is that the posterior distribution is a computationally intractable skew GP. The most widely used approach for preferential BO is Gaussian approximation, which ignores the skewness of the true posterior. Alternatively, Markov chain Monte Carlo (MCMC) based preferential BO is also proposed. In this work, we first verify the accuracy of Gaussian approximation, from which we reveal the critical problem that the predictive probability of duels can be inaccurate. This observation motivates us to improve the MCMC-based estimation for skew GP, for which we show the practical efficiency of Gibbs sampling and derive the low variance MC estimator. However, the computational time of MCMC can still be a bottleneck in practice. Towards building a more practical preferential BO, we develop a new method that achieves both high computational efficiency and low sample complexity, and then demonstrate its effectiveness through extensive numerical experiments.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

The surprisingly likely criterion in the seminal work of Prelec (the Bayesian Truth Serum) guarantees truthfulness in a game-theoretic multi-agent setting, by rewarding rational agents to maximise the expected information gain with their answers w.r.t. their probabilistic beliefs. We investigate the relevance of a similar criterion for responses of LLMs. We hypothesize that if the surprisingly likely criterion works in LLMs, under certain conditions, the responses that maximize the reward under this criterion should be more accurate than the responses that only maximize the posterior probability. Using benchmarks including the TruthfulQA benchmark and using openly available LLMs: GPT-2 and LLaMA-2, we show that the method indeed improves the accuracy significantly (for example, upto 24 percentage points aggregate improvement on TruthfulQA and upto 70 percentage points improvement on individual categories of questions).

The prevalence and importance of algorithmic two-sided marketplaces has drawn attention to the issue of fairness in such settings. Algorithmic decisions are used in assigning students to schools, users to advertisers, and applicants to job interviews. These decisions should heed the preferences of individuals, and simultaneously be fair with respect to their merits (synonymous with fit, future performance, or need). Merits conditioned on observable features are always uncertain, a fact that is exacerbated by the widespread use of machine learning algorithms to infer merit from the observables. As our key contribution, we carefully axiomatize a notion of individual fairness in the two-sided marketplace setting which respects the uncertainty in the merits; indeed, it simultaneously recognizes uncertainty as the primary potential cause of unfairness and an approach to address it. We design a linear programming framework to find fair utility-maximizing distributions over allocations, and we show that the linear program is robust to perturbations in the estimated parameters of the uncertain merit distributions, a key property in combining the approach with machine learning techniques.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Designing control policies whose performance level is guaranteed to remain above a given threshold in a span of environments is a critical feature for the adoption of reinforcement learning (RL) in real-world applications. The search for such robust policies is a notoriously difficult problem, related to the so-called dynamic model of transition function uncertainty, where the environment dynamics are allowed to change at each time step. But in practical cases, one is rather interested in robustness to a span of static transition models throughout interaction episodes. The static model is known to be harder to solve than the dynamic one, and seminal algorithms, such as robust value iteration, as well as most recent works on deep robust RL, build upon the dynamic model. In this work, we propose to revisit the static model. We suggest an analysis of why solving the static model under some mild hypotheses is a reasonable endeavor, based on an equivalence with the dynamic model, and formalize the general intuition that robust MDPs can be solved by tackling a series of static problems. We introduce a generic meta-algorithm called IWOCS, which incrementally identifies worst-case transition models so as to guide the search for a robust policy. Discussion on IWOCS sheds light on new ways to decouple policy optimization and adversarial transition functions and opens new perspectives for analysis. We derive a deep RL version of IWOCS and demonstrate it is competitive with state-of-the-art algorithms on classical benchmarks.

We consider infinite-horizon Markov Decision Processes where parameters, such as transition probabilities, are unknown and estimated from data. The popular distributionally robust approach to addressing the parameter uncertainty can sometimes be overly conservative. In this paper, we utilize the recently proposed formulation, Bayesian risk Markov Decision Process (BR-MDP), to address parameter (or epistemic) uncertainty in MDPs. To solve the infinite-horizon BR-MDP with a class of convex risk measures, we propose a computationally efficient approach called approximate bilevel difference convex programming (ABDCP). The optimization is performed offline and produces the optimal policy that is represented as a finite state controller with desirable performance guarantees. We also demonstrate the empirical performance of the BR-MDP formulation and the proposed algorithm.

We study bandit best-arm identification with arbitrary and potentially adversarial rewards. A simple random uniform learner obtains the optimal rate of error in the adversarial scenario. However, this type of strategy is suboptimal when the rewards are sampled stochastically. Therefore, we ask: Can we design a learner that performs optimally in both the stochastic and adversarial problems while not being aware of the nature of the rewards? First, we show that designing such a learner is impossible in general. In particular, to be robust to adversarial rewards, we can only guarantee optimal rates of error on a subset of the stochastic problems. We give a lower bound that characterizes the optimal rate in stochastic problems if the strategy is constrained to be robust to adversarial rewards. Finally, we design a simple parameter-free algorithm and show that its probability of error matches (up to log factors) the lower bound in stochastic problems, and it is also robust to adversarial ones.

This paper proposes an online, provably robust, and scalable Bayesian approach for changepoint detection. The resulting algorithm has key advantages over previous work: it provides provable robustness by leveraging the generalised Bayesian perspective, and also addresses the scalability issues of previous attempts. Specifically, the proposed generalised Bayesian formalism leads to conjugate posteriors whose parameters are available in closed form by leveraging diffusion score matching. The resulting algorithm is exact, can be updated through simple algebra, and is more than 10 times faster than its closest competitor.

Optimizing multiple competing black-box objectives is a challenging problem in many fields, including science, engineering, and machine learning. Multi-objective Bayesian optimization (MOBO) is a sample-efficient approach for identifying the optimal trade-offs between the objectives. However, many existing methods perform poorly when the observations are corrupted by noise. We propose a novel acquisition function, NEHVI, that overcomes this important practical limitation by applying a Bayesian treatment to the popular expected hypervolume improvement (EHVI) criterion and integrating over this uncertainty in the Pareto frontier. We argue that, even in the noiseless setting, generating multiple candidates in parallel is an incarnation of EHVI with uncertainty in the Pareto frontier and therefore can be addressed using the same underlying technique. Through this lens, we derive a natural parallel variant, qNEHVI, that reduces computational complexity of parallel EHVI from exponential to polynomial with respect to the batch size. qNEHVI is one-step Bayes-optimal for hypervolume maximization in both noisy and noiseless environments, and we show that it can be optimized effectively with gradient-based methods via sample average approximation. Empirically, we demonstrate not only that qNEHVI is substantially more robust to observation noise than existing MOBO approaches, but also that it achieves state-of-the-art optimization performance and competitive wall-times in large-batch environments.

AI agents are increasingly granted economic agency (executing trades, managing budgets, negotiating contracts, and spawning sub-agents), yet current frameworks gate this agency on capability benchmarks that are empirically uncorrelated with operational robustness. We introduce the Comprehension-Gated Agent Economy (CGAE), a formal architecture in which an agent's economic permissions are upper-bounded by a verified comprehension function derived from adversarial robustness audits. The gating mechanism operates over three orthogonal robustness dimensions: constraint compliance (measured by CDCT), epistemic integrity (measured by DDFT), and behavioral alignment (measured by AGT), with intrinsic hallucination rates serving as a cross-cutting diagnostic. We define a weakest-link gate function that maps robustness vectors to discrete economic tiers, and prove three properties of the resulting system: (1) bounded economic exposure, ensuring maximum financial liability is a function of verified robustness; (2) incentive-compatible robustness investment, showing rational agents maximize profit by improving robustness rather than scaling capability alone; and (3) monotonic safety scaling, demonstrating that aggregate system safety does not decrease as the economy grows. The architecture includes temporal decay and stochastic re-auditing mechanisms that prevent post-certification drift. CGAE provides the first formal bridge between empirical AI robustness evaluation and economic governance, transforming safety from a regulatory burden into a competitive advantage.

Fairness is essential for machine learning systems deployed in high-stake applications. Among all fairness notions, individual fairness, deriving from a consensus that `similar individuals should be treated similarly,' is a vital notion to describe fair treatment for individual cases. Previous studies typically characterize individual fairness as a prediction-invariant problem when perturbing sensitive attributes on samples, and solve it by Distributionally Robust Optimization (DRO) paradigm. However, such adversarial perturbations along a direction covering sensitive information used in DRO do not consider the inherent feature correlations or innate data constraints, therefore could mislead the model to optimize at off-manifold and unrealistic samples. In light of this drawback, in this paper, we propose to learn and generate antidote data that approximately follows the data distribution to remedy individual unfairness. These generated on-manifold antidote data can be used through a generic optimization procedure along with original training data, resulting in a pure pre-processing approach to individual unfairness, or can also fit well with the in-processing DRO paradigm. Through extensive experiments on multiple tabular datasets, we demonstrate our method resists individual unfairness at a minimal or zero cost to predictive utility compared to baselines.

Robust Markov Decision Processes (MDPs) and risk-sensitive MDPs are both powerful tools for making decisions in the presence of uncertainties. Previous efforts have aimed to establish their connections, revealing equivalences in specific formulations. This paper introduces a new formulation for risk-sensitive MDPs, which assesses risk in a slightly different manner compared to the classical Markov risk measure (Ruszczy\'nski 2010), and establishes its equivalence with a class of regularized robust MDP (RMDP) problems, including the standard RMDP as a special case. Leveraging this equivalence, we further derive the policy gradient theorem for both problems, proving gradient domination and global convergence of the exact policy gradient method under the tabular setting with direct parameterization. This forms a sharp contrast to the Markov risk measure, known to be potentially non-gradient-dominant (Huang et al. 2021). We also propose a sample-based offline learning algorithm, namely the robust fitted-Z iteration (RFZI), for a specific regularized RMDP problem with a KL-divergence regularization term (or equivalently the risk-sensitive MDP with an entropy risk measure). We showcase its streamlined design and less stringent assumptions due to the equivalence and analyze its sample complexity.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

In their seminal work, Nayyar et al. (2013) showed that imperfect information can be abstracted away from common-payoff games by having players publicly announce their policies as they play. This insight underpins sound solvers and decision-time planning algorithms for common-payoff games. Unfortunately, a naive application of the same insight to two-player zero-sum games fails because Nash equilibria of the game with public policy announcements may not correspond to Nash equilibria of the original game. As a consequence, existing sound decision-time planning algorithms require complicated additional mechanisms that have unappealing properties. The main contribution of this work is showing that certain regularized equilibria do not possess the aforementioned non-correspondence problem -- thus, computing them can be treated as perfect-information problems. Because these regularized equilibria can be made arbitrarily close to Nash equilibria, our result opens the door to a new perspective to solving two-player zero-sum games and yields a simplified framework for decision-time planning in two-player zero-sum games, void of the unappealing properties that plague existing decision-time planning approaches.

We study best arm identification (BAI) in linear bandits in the fixed-budget regime under differential privacy constraints, when the arm rewards are supported on the unit interval. Given a finite budget T and a privacy parameter varepsilon>0, the goal is to minimise the error probability in finding the arm with the largest mean after T sampling rounds, subject to the constraint that the policy of the decision maker satisfies a certain {\em varepsilon-differential privacy} (varepsilon-DP) constraint. We construct a policy satisfying the varepsilon-DP constraint (called {\sc DP-BAI}) by proposing the principle of {\em maximum absolute determinants}, and derive an upper bound on its error probability. Furthermore, we derive a minimax lower bound on the error probability, and demonstrate that the lower and the upper bounds decay exponentially in T, with exponents in the two bounds matching order-wise in (a) the sub-optimality gaps of the arms, (b) varepsilon, and (c) the problem complexity that is expressible as the sum of two terms, one characterising the complexity of standard fixed-budget BAI (without privacy constraints), and the other accounting for the varepsilon-DP constraint. Additionally, we present some auxiliary results that contribute to the derivation of the lower bound on the error probability. These results, we posit, may be of independent interest and could prove instrumental in proving lower bounds on error probabilities in several other bandit problems. Whereas prior works provide results for BAI in the fixed-budget regime without privacy constraints or in the fixed-confidence regime with privacy constraints, our work fills the gap in the literature by providing the results for BAI in the fixed-budget regime under the varepsilon-DP constraint.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

Performative Reinforcement Learning (PRL) refers to a scenario in which the deployed policy changes the reward and transition dynamics of the underlying environment. In this work, we study multi-agent PRL by incorporating performative effects into Markov Potential Games (MPGs). We introduce the notion of a performatively stable equilibrium (PSE) and show that it always exists under a reasonable sensitivity assumption. We then provide convergence results for state-of-the-art algorithms used to solve MPGs. Specifically, we show that independent policy gradient ascent (IPGA) and independent natural policy gradient (INPG) converge to an approximate PSE in the best-iterate sense, with an additional term that accounts for the performative effects. Furthermore, we show that INPG asymptotically converges to a PSE in the last-iterate sense. As the performative effects vanish, we recover the convergence rates from prior work. For a special case of our game, we provide finite-time last-iterate convergence results for a repeated retraining approach, in which agents independently optimize a surrogate objective. We conduct extensive experiments to validate our theoretical findings.

Reinforcement learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) learns from preference signals, while standard Reinforcement Learning (RL) directly learns from reward signals. Preferences arguably contain less information than rewards, which makes preference-based RL seemingly more difficult. This paper theoretically proves that, for a wide range of preference models, we can solve preference-based RL directly using existing algorithms and techniques for reward-based RL, with small or no extra costs. Specifically, (1) for preferences that are drawn from reward-based probabilistic models, we reduce the problem to robust reward-based RL that can tolerate small errors in rewards; (2) for general arbitrary preferences where the objective is to find the von Neumann winner, we reduce the problem to multiagent reward-based RL which finds Nash equilibria for factored Markov games under a restricted set of policies. The latter case can be further reduce to adversarial MDP when preferences only depend on the final state. We instantiate all reward-based RL subroutines by concrete provable algorithms, and apply our theory to a large class of models including tabular MDPs and MDPs with generic function approximation. We further provide guarantees when K-wise comparisons are available.

Non-cooperative game theory provides a robust framework for analyzing distributed resource allocation in multi-user wireless networks, with Iterative Water-Filling (IWF) emerging as a canonical solution for power control problems. Although classical fixed-point theorems guarantee the existence of a Nash Equilibrium (NE) under mild concavity and compactness conditions, the convergence of practical iterative algorithms to that equilibrium remains a challenging endeavor. This challenge intensifies under varying update schedules, interference regimes, and imperfections such as channel estimation errors or feedback delay. In this paper, we present an in-depth examination of IWF in multi-user systems under three different update schemes: (1) synchronous sequential updates, (2) synchronous simultaneous updates, and (3) totally asynchronous updates. We first formulate the water-filling operator in a multi-carrier environment, then recast the iterative process as a fixed-point problem. Using contraction mapping principles, we demonstrate sufficient conditions under which IWF converges to a unique NE and highlight how spectral radius constraints, diagonal dominance, and careful step-size selection are pivotal for guaranteeing convergence. We further discuss robustness to measurement noise, partial updates, and network scaling to emphasize the practical viability of these schemes. This comprehensive analysis unifies diverse threads in the literature while offering novel insights into asynchronous implementations. Our findings enable network designers to ascertain system parameters that foster both stable convergence and efficient spectrum usage.

Combining several (sample approximations of) distributions, which we term sub-posteriors, into a single distribution proportional to their product, is a common challenge. Occurring, for instance, in distributed 'big data' problems, or when working under multi-party privacy constraints. Many existing approaches resort to approximating the individual sub-posteriors for practical necessity, then find either an analytical approximation or sample approximation of the resulting (product-pooled) posterior. The quality of the posterior approximation for these approaches is poor when the sub-posteriors fall out-with a narrow range of distributional form, such as being approximately Gaussian. Recently, a Fusion approach has been proposed which finds an exact Monte Carlo approximation of the posterior, circumventing the drawbacks of approximate approaches. Unfortunately, existing Fusion approaches have a number of computational limitations, particularly when unifying a large number of sub-posteriors. In this paper, we generalise the theory underpinning existing Fusion approaches, and embed the resulting methodology within a recursive divide-and-conquer sequential Monte Carlo paradigm. This ultimately leads to a competitive Fusion approach, which is robust to increasing numbers of sub-posteriors.

This paper claims that machine learning (ML) largely overlooks an important facet of general intelligence: robustness to a qualitatively unknown future in an open world. Such robustness relates to Knightian uncertainty (KU) in economics, i.e. uncertainty that cannot be quantified, which is excluded from consideration in ML's key formalisms. This paper aims to identify this blind spot, argue its importance, and catalyze research into addressing it, which we believe is necessary to create truly robust open-world AI. To help illuminate the blind spot, we contrast one area of ML, reinforcement learning (RL), with the process of biological evolution. Despite staggering ongoing progress, RL still struggles in open-world situations, often failing under unforeseen situations. For example, the idea of zero-shot transferring a self-driving car policy trained only in the US to the UK currently seems exceedingly ambitious. In dramatic contrast, biological evolution routinely produces agents that thrive within an open world, sometimes even to situations that are remarkably out-of-distribution (e.g. invasive species; or humans, who do undertake such zero-shot international driving). Interestingly, evolution achieves such robustness without explicit theory, formalisms, or mathematical gradients. We explore the assumptions underlying RL's typical formalisms, showing how they limit RL's engagement with the unknown unknowns characteristic of an ever-changing complex world. Further, we identify mechanisms through which evolutionary processes foster robustness to novel and unpredictable challenges, and discuss potential pathways to algorithmically embody them. The conclusion is that the intriguing remaining fragility of ML may result from blind spots in its formalisms, and that significant gains may result from direct confrontation with the challenge of KU.

Both online and offline RLHF methods such as PPO and DPO have been extremely successful in aligning AI with human preferences. Despite their success, the existing methods suffer from a fundamental problem that their optimal solution is highly task-dependent (i.e., not robust to out-of-distribution (OOD) tasks). Here we address this challenge by proposing Self-Improving Robust Preference Optimization SRPO, a practical and mathematically principled offline RLHF framework that is completely robust to the changes in the task. The key idea of SRPO is to cast the problem of learning from human preferences as a self-improvement process, which can be mathematically expressed in terms of a min-max objective that aims at joint optimization of self-improvement policy and the generative policy in an adversarial fashion. The solution for this optimization problem is independent of the training task and thus it is robust to its changes. We then show that this objective can be re-expressed in the form of a non-adversarial offline loss which can be optimized using standard supervised optimization techniques at scale without any need for reward model and online inference. We show the effectiveness of SRPO in terms of AI Win-Rate (WR) against human (GOLD) completions. In particular, when SRPO is evaluated on the OOD XSUM dataset, it outperforms the celebrated DPO by a clear margin of 15% after 5 self-revisions, achieving WR of 90%.

In the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem, a randomized probability matching policy called Thompson sampling (TS) has shown excellent performance in various reward models. In addition to the empirical performance, TS has been shown to achieve asymptotic problem-dependent lower bounds in several models. However, its optimality has been mainly addressed under light-tailed or one-parameter models that belong to exponential families. In this paper, we consider the optimality of TS for the Pareto model that has a heavy tail and is parameterized by two unknown parameters. Specifically, we discuss the optimality of TS with probability matching priors that include the Jeffreys prior and the reference priors. We first prove that TS with certain probability matching priors can achieve the optimal regret bound. Then, we show the suboptimality of TS with other priors, including the Jeffreys and the reference priors. Nevertheless, we find that TS with the Jeffreys and reference priors can achieve the asymptotic lower bound if one uses a truncation procedure. These results suggest carefully choosing noninformative priors to avoid suboptimality and show the effectiveness of truncation procedures in TS-based policies.

Decision-making under distribution shift is a central challenge in reinforcement learning (RL), where training and deployment environments differ. We study this problem through the lens of robust Markov decision processes (RMDPs), which optimize performance against adversarial transition dynamics. Our focus is the online setting, where the agent has only limited interaction with the environment, making sample efficiency and exploration especially critical. Policy optimization, despite its success in standard RL, remains theoretically and empirically underexplored in robust RL. To bridge this gap, we propose Distributionally Robust Regularized Policy Optimization algorithm (DR-RPO), a model-free online policy optimization method that learns robust policies with sublinear regret. To enable tractable optimization within the softmax policy class, DR-RPO incorporates reference-policy regularization, yielding RMDP variants that are doubly constrained in both transitions and policies. To scale to large state-action spaces, we adopt the d-rectangular linear MDP formulation and combine linear function approximation with an upper confidence bonus for optimistic exploration. We provide theoretical guarantees showing that policy optimization can achieve polynomial suboptimality bounds and sample efficiency in robust RL, matching the performance of value-based approaches. Finally, empirical results across diverse domains corroborate our theory and demonstrate the robustness of DR-RPO.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

We study the problem of designing minimax procedures in linear regression under the quantile risk. We start by considering the realizable setting with independent Gaussian noise, where for any given noise level and distribution of inputs, we obtain the exact minimax quantile risk for a rich family of error functions and establish the minimaxity of OLS. This improves on the known lower bounds for the special case of square error, and provides us with a lower bound on the minimax quantile risk over larger sets of distributions. Under the square error and a fourth moment assumption on the distribution of inputs, we show that this lower bound is tight over a larger class of problems. Specifically, we prove a matching upper bound on the worst-case quantile risk of a variant of the recently proposed min-max regression procedure, thereby establishing its minimaxity, up to absolute constants. We illustrate the usefulness of our approach by extending this result to all p-th power error functions for p in (2, infty). Along the way, we develop a generic analogue to the classical Bayesian method for lower bounding the minimax risk when working with the quantile risk, as well as a tight characterization of the quantiles of the smallest eigenvalue of the sample covariance matrix.

Offline reinforcement learning (RL) presents a promising approach for learning reinforced policies from offline datasets without the need for costly or unsafe interactions with the environment. However, datasets collected by humans in real-world environments are often noisy and may even be maliciously corrupted, which can significantly degrade the performance of offline RL. In this work, we first investigate the performance of current offline RL algorithms under comprehensive data corruption, including states, actions, rewards, and dynamics. Our extensive experiments reveal that implicit Q-learning (IQL) demonstrates remarkable resilience to data corruption among various offline RL algorithms. Furthermore, we conduct both empirical and theoretical analyses to understand IQL's robust performance, identifying its supervised policy learning scheme as the key factor. Despite its relative robustness, IQL still suffers from heavy-tail targets of Q functions under dynamics corruption. To tackle this challenge, we draw inspiration from robust statistics to employ the Huber loss to handle the heavy-tailedness and utilize quantile estimators to balance penalization for corrupted data and learning stability. By incorporating these simple yet effective modifications into IQL, we propose a more robust offline RL approach named Robust IQL (RIQL). Extensive experiments demonstrate that RIQL exhibits highly robust performance when subjected to diverse data corruption scenarios.

In Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), constructing a robust advantage baseline is critical for policy gradients, effectively guiding the policy model to reinforce desired behaviors. Recent research has introduced Generalist Value Models (such as V_0), which achieve pre-trained value estimation by explicitly encoding model capabilities in-context, eliminating the need to synchronously update the value model alongside the policy model. In this paper, we propose V_{0.5}, which adaptively fuses the baseline predicted by such value model (acting as a prior) with the empirical mean derived from sparse rollouts. This constructs a robust baseline that balances computational efficiency with extremely low variance. Specifically, we introduce a real-time statistical testing and dynamic budget allocation. This balances the high variance caused by sparse sampling against the systematic bias (or hallucinations) inherent in the value model's prior. By constructing a hypothesis test to evaluate the prior's reliability in real-time, the system dynamically allocates additional rollout budget on demand. This mechanism minimizes the baseline estimator's Mean Squared Error (MSE), guaranteeing stable policy gradients, even under extreme sparsity with a group size of 4. Extensive evaluations across six mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that V_{0.5} significantly outperforms GRPO and DAPO, achieving faster convergence and over some 10% performance improvement.

Bayesian optimization (BO) is a powerful framework to optimize black-box expensive-to-evaluate functions via sequential interactions. In several important problems (e.g. drug discovery, circuit design, neural architecture search, etc.), though, such functions are defined over large combinatorial and unstructured spaces. This makes existing BO algorithms not feasible due to the intractable maximization of the acquisition function over these domains. To address this issue, we propose GameOpt, a novel game-theoretical approach to combinatorial BO. GameOpt establishes a cooperative game between the different optimization variables, and selects points that are game equilibria of an upper confidence bound acquisition function. These are stable configurations from which no variable has an incentive to deviate- analog to local optima in continuous domains. Crucially, this allows us to efficiently break down the complexity of the combinatorial domain into individual decision sets, making GameOpt scalable to large combinatorial spaces. We demonstrate the application of GameOpt to the challenging protein design problem and validate its performance on four real-world protein datasets. Each protein can take up to 20^{X} possible configurations, where X is the length of a protein, making standard BO methods infeasible. Instead, our approach iteratively selects informative protein configurations and very quickly discovers highly active protein variants compared to other baselines.

Offline reinforcement learning enables agents to leverage large pre-collected datasets of environment transitions to learn control policies, circumventing the need for potentially expensive or unsafe online data collection. Significant progress has been made recently in offline model-based reinforcement learning, approaches which leverage a learned dynamics model. This typically involves constructing a probabilistic model, and using the model uncertainty to penalize rewards where there is insufficient data, solving for a pessimistic MDP that lower bounds the true MDP. Existing methods, however, exhibit a breakdown between theory and practice, whereby pessimistic return ought to be bounded by the total variation distance of the model from the true dynamics, but is instead implemented through a penalty based on estimated model uncertainty. This has spawned a variety of uncertainty heuristics, with little to no comparison between differing approaches. In this paper, we compare these heuristics, and design novel protocols to investigate their interaction with other hyperparameters, such as the number of models, or imaginary rollout horizon. Using these insights, we show that selecting these key hyperparameters using Bayesian Optimization produces superior configurations that are vastly different to those currently used in existing hand-tuned state-of-the-art methods, and result in drastically stronger performance.

This paper studies reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) for aligning large language models with human preferences. While RLHF has demonstrated promising results, many algorithms are highly sensitive to misspecifications in the underlying preference model (e.g., the Bradley-Terry model), the reference policy, or the reward function, resulting in undesirable fine-tuning. To address model misspecification, we propose a doubly robust preference optimization algorithm that remains consistent when either the preference model or the reference policy is correctly specified (without requiring both). Our proposal demonstrates superior and more robust performance than state-of-the-art algorithms, both in theory and in practice. The code is available at https://github.com/DRPO4LLM/DRPO4LLM

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

We propose the first loss function for approximate Nash equilibria of normal-form games that is amenable to unbiased Monte Carlo estimation. This construction allows us to deploy standard non-convex stochastic optimization techniques for approximating Nash equilibria, resulting in novel algorithms with provable guarantees. We complement our theoretical analysis with experiments demonstrating that stochastic gradient descent can outperform previous state-of-the-art approaches.

Existing theoretical studies on offline reinforcement learning (RL) mostly consider a dataset sampled directly from the target task. In practice, however, data often come from several heterogeneous but related sources. Motivated by this gap, this work aims at rigorously understanding offline RL with multiple datasets that are collected from randomly perturbed versions of the target task instead of from itself. An information-theoretic lower bound is derived, which reveals a necessary requirement on the number of involved sources in addition to that on the number of data samples. Then, a novel HetPEVI algorithm is proposed, which simultaneously considers the sample uncertainties from a finite number of data samples per data source and the source uncertainties due to a finite number of available data sources. Theoretical analyses demonstrate that HetPEVI can solve the target task as long as the data sources collectively provide a good data coverage. Moreover, HetPEVI is demonstrated to be optimal up to a polynomial factor of the horizon length. Finally, the study is extended to offline Markov games and offline robust RL, which demonstrates the generality of the proposed designs and theoretical analyses.

There has been a recent surge of interest in developing generally-capable agents that can adapt to new tasks without additional training in the environment. Learning world models from reward-free exploration is a promising approach, and enables policies to be trained using imagined experience for new tasks. However, achieving a general agent requires robustness across different environments. In this work, we address the novel problem of generating curricula in the reward-free setting to train robust world models. We consider robustness in terms of minimax regret over all environment instantiations and show that the minimax regret can be connected to minimising the maximum error in the world model across environment instances. This result informs our algorithm, WAKER: Weighted Acquisition of Knowledge across Environments for Robustness. WAKER selects environments for data collection based on the estimated error of the world model for each environment. Our experiments demonstrate that WAKER outperforms several baselines, resulting in improved robustness, efficiency, and generalisation.

Popular offline reinforcement learning (RL) methods rely on conservatism, either by penalizing out-of-dataset actions or by restricting rollout horizons. In this work, we question the universality of this principle and instead revisit a complementary one: a Bayesian perspective. Rather than enforcing conservatism, the Bayesian approach tackles epistemic uncertainty in offline data by modeling a posterior distribution over plausible world models and training a history-dependent agent to maximize expected rewards, enabling test-time generalization. We first illustrate, in a bandit setting, that Bayesianism excels on low-quality datasets where conservatism fails. We then scale this principle to realistic tasks and show that long-horizon planning is critical for reducing value overestimation once conservatism is removed. To make this feasible, we introduce key design choices for performing and learning from long-horizon rollouts while controlling compounding errors. These yield our algorithm, NEUBAY, grounded in the neutral Bayesian principle. On D4RL and NeoRL benchmarks, NEUBAY generally matches or surpasses leading conservative algorithms, achieving new state-of-the-art on 7 datasets. Notably, it succeeds with rollout horizons of several hundred steps, contrary to dominant practice. Finally, we characterize datasets by quality and coverage, showing when NEUBAY is preferable to conservative methods. Together, we argue NEUBAY lays the foundation for a new practical direction in offline and model-based RL.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

Task robust adaptation is a long-standing pursuit in sequential decision-making. Some risk-averse strategies, e.g., the conditional value-at-risk principle, are incorporated in domain randomization or meta reinforcement learning to prioritize difficult tasks in optimization, which demand costly intensive evaluations. The efficiency issue prompts the development of robust active task sampling to train adaptive policies, where risk-predictive models are used to surrogate policy evaluation. This work characterizes the optimization pipeline of robust active task sampling as a Markov decision process, posits theoretical and practical insights, and constitutes robustness concepts in risk-averse scenarios. Importantly, we propose an easy-to-implement method, referred to as Posterior and Diversity Synergized Task Sampling (PDTS), to accommodate fast and robust sequential decision-making. Extensive experiments show that PDTS unlocks the potential of robust active task sampling, significantly improves the zero-shot and few-shot adaptation robustness in challenging tasks, and even accelerates the learning process under certain scenarios. Our project website is at https://thu-rllab.github.io/PDTS_project_page.

We study distributionally robust expected values under optimal transport distance with a quadratic cost function. In general the duality method, for this computation for the payoff function f, requires the computation of the λc-transform f^{λc}. We show that under the quadratic cost function there exists an intuitive and easily implementable representation of f^{λc}, if f is convex and piecewise linear. We apply this to the robust expected shortfall under the risk-neutral measure of an unhedged call option, from the point of view of the writer, as well as that of a portfolio mixing underlying shares with a call and a put option.

We consider offline Imitation Learning from corrupted demonstrations where a constant fraction of data can be noise or even arbitrary outliers. Classical approaches such as Behavior Cloning assumes that demonstrations are collected by an presumably optimal expert, hence may fail drastically when learning from corrupted demonstrations. We propose a novel robust algorithm by minimizing a Median-of-Means (MOM) objective which guarantees the accurate estimation of policy, even in the presence of constant fraction of outliers. Our theoretical analysis shows that our robust method in the corrupted setting enjoys nearly the same error scaling and sample complexity guarantees as the classical Behavior Cloning in the expert demonstration setting. Our experiments on continuous-control benchmarks validate that our method exhibits the predicted robustness and effectiveness, and achieves competitive results compared to existing imitation learning methods.

Understanding and analyzing markets is crucial, yet analytical equilibrium solutions remain largely infeasible. Recent breakthroughs in equilibrium computation rely on zeroth-order policy gradient estimation. These approaches commonly suffer from high variance and are computationally expensive. The use of fully differentiable simulators would enable more efficient gradient estimation. However, the discrete allocation of goods in economic simulations is a non-differentiable operation. This renders the first-order Monte Carlo gradient estimator inapplicable and the learning feedback systematically misleading. We propose a novel smoothing technique that creates a surrogate market game, in which first-order methods can be applied. We provide theoretical bounds on the resulting bias which justifies solving the smoothed game instead. These bounds also allow choosing the smoothing strength a priori such that the resulting estimate has low variance. Furthermore, we validate our approach via numerous empirical experiments. Our method theoretically and empirically outperforms zeroth-order methods in approximation quality and computational efficiency.

Bayesian Optimization (BO) is typically used to optimize an unknown function f that is noisy and costly to evaluate, by exploiting an acquisition function that must be maximized at each optimization step. Even if provably asymptotically optimal BO algorithms are efficient at optimizing low-dimensional functions, scaling them to high-dimensional spaces remains an open problem, often tackled by assuming an additive structure for f. By doing so, BO algorithms typically introduce additional restrictive assumptions on the additive structure that reduce their applicability domain. This paper contains two main contributions: (i) we relax the restrictive assumptions on the additive structure of f without weakening the maximization guarantees of the acquisition function, and (ii) we address the over-exploration problem for decentralized BO algorithms. To these ends, we propose DuMBO, an asymptotically optimal decentralized BO algorithm that achieves very competitive performance against state-of-the-art BO algorithms, especially when the additive structure of f comprises high-dimensional factors.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

Model uncertainty and limited data are fundamental challenges to robust management of human intervention in a natural system. These challenges are acutely highlighted by concerns that many ecological systems may contain tipping points, such as Allee population sizes. Before a collapse, we do not know where the tipping points lie, if they exist at all. Hence, we know neither a complete model of the system dynamics nor do we have access to data in some large region of state-space where such a tipping point might exist. We illustrate how a Bayesian Non-Parametric (BNP) approach using a Gaussian Process (GP) prior provides a flexible representation of this inherent uncertainty. We embed GPs in a Stochastic Dynamic Programming (SDP) framework in order to make robust management predictions with both model uncertainty and limited data. We use simulations to evaluate this approach as compared with the standard approach of using model selection to choose from a set of candidate models. We find that model selection erroneously favors models without tipping points -- leading to harvest policies that guarantee extinction. The GPDP performs nearly as well as the true model and significantly outperforms standard approaches. We illustrate this using examples of simulated single-species dynamics, where the standard model selection approach should be most effective, and find that it still fails to account for uncertainty appropriately and leads to population crashes, while management based on the GPDP does not, since it does not underestimate the uncertainty outside of the observed data.

Robust reinforcement learning is the problem of learning control policies that provide optimal worst-case performance against a span of adversarial environments. It is a crucial ingredient for deploying algorithms in real-world scenarios with prevalent environmental uncertainties and has been a long-standing object of attention in the community, without a standardized set of benchmarks. This contribution endeavors to fill this gap. We introduce the Robust Reinforcement Learning Suite (RRLS), a benchmark suite based on Mujoco environments. RRLS provides six continuous control tasks with two types of uncertainty sets for training and evaluation. Our benchmark aims to standardize robust reinforcement learning tasks, facilitating reproducible and comparable experiments, in particular those from recent state-of-the-art contributions, for which we demonstrate the use of RRLS. It is also designed to be easily expandable to new environments. The source code is available at https://github.com/SuReLI/RRLS{https://github.com/SuReLI/RRLS}.

Learning to play optimally against any mixture over a diverse set of strategies is of important practical interests in competitive games. In this paper, we propose simplex-NeuPL that satisfies two desiderata simultaneously: i) learning a population of strategically diverse basis policies, represented by a single conditional network; ii) using the same network, learn best-responses to any mixture over the simplex of basis policies. We show that the resulting conditional policies incorporate prior information about their opponents effectively, enabling near optimal returns against arbitrary mixture policies in a game with tractable best-responses. We verify that such policies behave Bayes-optimally under uncertainty and offer insights in using this flexibility at test time. Finally, we offer evidence that learning best-responses to any mixture policies is an effective auxiliary task for strategic exploration, which, by itself, can lead to more performant populations.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) aligns language models to human preferences by employing a singular reward model derived from preference data. However, such an approach overlooks the rich diversity of human preferences inherent in data collected from multiple users. In this work, we first derive an impossibility result of alignment with single reward RLHF, thereby highlighting its insufficiency in representing diverse human preferences. To provide an equitable solution to the problem, we learn a mixture of preference distributions via an expectation-maximization algorithm and propose a MaxMin alignment objective for policy learning inspired by the Egalitarian principle in social choice theory to better represent diverse human preferences. We elucidate the connection of our proposed approach to distributionally robust optimization and general utility RL, thereby highlighting the generality and robustness of our proposed solution. We present comprehensive experimental results on small-scale (GPT-2) and large-scale language models (with Tulu2-7B) and show the efficacy of the proposed approach in the presence of diversity among human preferences. Our algorithm achieves an average improvement of more than 16% in win-rates over conventional RLHF algorithms and improves the win-rate (accuracy) for minority groups by over 33% without compromising the performance of majority groups, showcasing the robustness and fairness of our approach. We remark that our findings in this work are not only limited to language models but also extend to reinforcement learning in general.

Bayesian persuasion studies how an informed sender should influence beliefs of rational receivers who take decisions through Bayesian updating of a common prior. We focus on the online Bayesian persuasion framework, in which the sender repeatedly faces one or more receivers with unknown and adversarially selected types. First, we show how to obtain a tight tilde O(T^{1/2}) regret bound in the case in which the sender faces a single receiver and has partial feedback, improving over the best previously known bound of tilde O(T^{4/5}). Then, we provide the first no-regret guarantees for the multi-receiver setting under partial feedback. Finally, we show how to design no-regret algorithms with polynomial per-iteration running time by exploiting type reporting, thereby circumventing known intractability results on online Bayesian persuasion. We provide efficient algorithms guaranteeing a O(T^{1/2}) regret upper bound both in the single- and multi-receiver scenario when type reporting is allowed.

Bayesian filtering approximates the true underlying behavior of a time-varying system by inverting an explicit generative model to convert noisy measurements into state estimates. This process typically requires either storage, inversion, and multiplication of large matrices or Monte Carlo estimation, neither of which are practical in high-dimensional state spaces such as the weight spaces of artificial neural networks. Here, we frame the standard Bayesian filtering problem as optimization over a time-varying objective. Instead of maintaining matrices for the filtering equations or simulating particles, we specify an optimizer that defines the Bayesian filter implicitly. In the linear-Gaussian setting, we show that every Kalman filter has an equivalent formulation using K steps of gradient descent. In the nonlinear setting, our experiments demonstrate that our framework results in filters that are effective, robust, and scalable to high-dimensional systems, comparing well against the standard toolbox of Bayesian filtering solutions. We suggest that it is easier to fine-tune an optimizer than it is to specify the correct filtering equations, making our framework an attractive option for high-dimensional filtering problems.

The Distributionally Robust Markov Decision Process (DRMDP) is a popular framework for addressing dynamics shift in reinforcement learning by learning policies robust to the worst-case transition dynamics within a constrained set. However, solving its dual optimization oracle poses significant challenges, limiting theoretical analysis and computational efficiency. The recently proposed Robust Regularized Markov Decision Process (RRMDP) replaces the uncertainty set constraint with a regularization term on the value function, offering improved scalability and theoretical insights. Yet, existing RRMDP methods rely on unstructured regularization, often leading to overly conservative policies by considering transitions that are unrealistic. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework, the d-rectangular linear robust regularized Markov decision process (d-RRMDP), which introduces a linear latent structure into both transition kernels and regularization. For the offline RL setting, where an agent learns robust policies from a pre-collected dataset in the nominal environment, we develop a family of algorithms, Robust Regularized Pessimistic Value Iteration (R2PVI), employing linear function approximation and f-divergence based regularization terms on transition kernels. We provide instance-dependent upper bounds on the suboptimality gap of R2PVI policies, showing these bounds depend on how well the dataset covers state-action spaces visited by the optimal robust policy under robustly admissible transitions. This term is further shown to be fundamental to d-RRMDPs via information-theoretic lower bounds. Finally, numerical experiments validate that R2PVI learns robust policies and is computationally more efficient than methods for constrained DRMDPs.

This paper studies distributional model risk in marginal problems, where each marginal measure is assumed to lie in a Wasserstein ball centered at a fixed reference measure with a given radius. Theoretically, we establish several fundamental results including strong duality, finiteness of the proposed Wasserstein distributional model risk, and the existence of an optimizer at each radius. In addition, we show continuity of the Wasserstein distributional model risk as a function of the radius. Using strong duality, we extend the well-known Makarov bounds for the distribution function of the sum of two random variables with given marginals to Wasserstein distributionally robust Markarov bounds. Practically, we illustrate our results on four distinct applications when the sample information comes from multiple data sources and only some marginal reference measures are identified. They are: partial identification of treatment effects; externally valid treatment choice via robust welfare functions; Wasserstein distributionally robust estimation under data combination; and evaluation of the worst aggregate risk measures.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to progress toward more advanced forms of intelligence, Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is increasingly seen as a key pathway toward achieving Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). However, the reliance on reward-model-based (RM-based) alignment methods introduces significant challenges due to the inherent instability and imperfections of Reward Models (RMs), which can lead to critical issues such as reward hacking and misalignment with human intentions. In this paper, we introduce a reward-robust RLHF framework aimed at addressing these fundamental challenges, paving the way for more reliable and resilient learning in LLMs. Our approach introduces a novel optimization objective that carefully balances performance and robustness by incorporating Bayesian Reward Model Ensembles (BRME) to model the uncertainty set of reward functions. This allows the framework to integrate both nominal performance and minimum reward signals, ensuring more stable learning even with imperfect reward models. Empirical results demonstrate that our framework consistently outperforms traditional RLHF across diverse benchmarks, showing improved accuracy and long-term stability. We also provide a theoretical analysis, demonstrating that reward-robust RLHF approaches the stability of constant reward settings, which proves to be effective in a stochastic-case analysis. Together, these contributions highlight the framework potential to enhance both the performance and stability of LLM alignment with RLHF.

While Bayesian inference provides a principled framework for reasoning under uncertainty, its widespread adoption is limited by the intractability of exact posterior computation, necessitating the use of approximate inference. However, existing methods are often computationally expensive, or demand costly retraining when priors change, limiting their utility, particularly in sequential inference problems such as real-time sensor fusion. To address these challenges, we introduce the Distribution Transformer -- a novel architecture that can learn arbitrary distribution-to-distribution mappings. Our method can be trained to map a prior to the corresponding posterior, conditioned on some dataset -- thus performing approximate Bayesian inference. Our novel architecture represents a prior distribution as a (universally-approximating) Gaussian Mixture Model (GMM), and transforms it into a GMM representation of the posterior. The components of the GMM attend to each other via self-attention, and to the datapoints via cross-attention. We demonstrate that Distribution Transformers both maintain flexibility to vary the prior, and significantly reduces computation times-from minutes to milliseconds-while achieving log-likelihood performance on par with or superior to existing approximate inference methods across tasks such as sequential inference, quantum system parameter inference, and Gaussian Process predictive posterior inference with hyperpriors.

The deployment of Large Language Models (LLMs) as autonomous economic agents introduces systemic risks that extend beyond individual capability failures. As agents transition to directly interacting with marketplaces, their collective behavior can amplify volatility and mask deception at scale. We introduce the Agent Bazaar, a multi-agent simulation framework for evaluating Economic Alignment, the capacity of agentic systems to preserve market stability and integrity. We identify two failure modes: (1) Algorithmic Instability in a B2C market ("The Crash"), where firms amplify price volatility until the market collapses, and (2) Sybil Deception in a C2C market ("The Lemon Market"), where a single deceptive agent controlling multiple coordinated seller identities floods the market with fraudulent listings, eroding trust and consumer welfare. We evaluate frontier and open-weight models across both scenarios and find that models largely fail to self-regulate, with failure severity varying by model rather than by size. We propose economically aligned harnesses, Stabilizing Firms and Skeptical Guardians, that improve outcomes but remain fragile under harder market conditions. To close this gap, we train agents with REINFORCE++ using an adaptive curriculum, producing a 9B model that outperforms all evaluated frontier and open-weight models. We propose the Economic Alignment Score (EAS), a 4-component scalar metric aggregating stability, integrity, welfare, and profitability, enabling direct cross-model comparison. Our results show that economic alignment is orthogonal to general capability and can be directly trained with targeted RL.

In preference-based Reinforcement Learning (RL), obtaining a large number of preference labels are both time-consuming and costly. Furthermore, the queried human preferences cannot be utilized for the new tasks. In this paper, we propose Zero-shot Cross-task Preference Alignment and Robust Reward Learning (PEARL), which learns policies from cross-task preference transfer without any human labels of the target task. Our contributions include two novel components that facilitate the transfer and learning process. The first is Cross-task Preference Alignment (CPA), which transfers the preferences between tasks via optimal transport. The key idea of CPA is to use Gromov-Wasserstein distance to align the trajectories between tasks, and the solved optimal transport matrix serves as the correspondence between trajectories. The target task preferences are computed as the weighted sum of source task preference labels with the correspondence as weights. Moreover, to ensure robust learning from these transferred labels, we introduce Robust Reward Learning (RRL), which considers both reward mean and uncertainty by modeling rewards as Gaussian distributions. Empirical results on robotic manipulation tasks from Meta-World and Robomimic demonstrate that our method is capable of transferring preference labels across tasks accurately and then learns well-behaved policies. Notably, our approach significantly exceeds existing methods when there are few human preferences. The code and videos of our method are available at: https://sites.google.com/view/pearl-preference.

The optimization of expensive-to-evaluate black-box functions is prevalent in various scientific disciplines. Bayesian optimization is an automatic, general and sample-efficient method to solve these problems with minimal knowledge of the underlying function dynamics. However, the ability of Bayesian optimization to incorporate prior knowledge or beliefs about the function at hand in order to accelerate the optimization is limited, which reduces its appeal for knowledgeable practitioners with tight budgets. To allow domain experts to customize the optimization routine, we propose ColaBO, the first Bayesian-principled framework for incorporating prior beliefs beyond the typical kernel structure, such as the likely location of the optimizer or the optimal value. The generality of ColaBO makes it applicable across different Monte Carlo acquisition functions and types of user beliefs. We empirically demonstrate ColaBO's ability to substantially accelerate optimization when the prior information is accurate, and to retain approximately default performance when it is misleading.

We introduce Iterated Bellman Calibration, a simple, model-agnostic, post-hoc procedure for calibrating off-policy value predictions in infinite-horizon Markov decision processes. Bellman calibration requires that states with similar predicted long-term returns exhibit one-step returns consistent with the Bellman equation under the target policy. We adapt classical histogram and isotonic calibration to the dynamic, counterfactual setting by repeatedly regressing fitted Bellman targets onto a model's predictions, using a doubly robust pseudo-outcome to handle off-policy data. This yields a one-dimensional fitted value iteration scheme that can be applied to any value estimator. Our analysis provides finite-sample guarantees for both calibration and prediction under weak assumptions, and critically, without requiring Bellman completeness or realizability.

Although machine learning tasks are highly sensitive to the quality of input data, relevant datasets can often be challenging for firms to acquire, especially when held privately by a variety of owners. For instance, if these owners are competitors in a downstream market, they may be reluctant to share information. Focusing on supervised learning for regression tasks, we develop a regression market to provide a monetary incentive for data sharing. Our mechanism adopts a Bayesian framework, allowing us to consider a more general class of regression tasks. We present a thorough exploration of the market properties, and show that similar proposals in literature expose the market agents to sizeable financial risks, which can be mitigated in our setup.

Bayesian optimization is an approach to optimizing objective functions that take a long time (minutes or hours) to evaluate. It is best-suited for optimization over continuous domains of less than 20 dimensions, and tolerates stochastic noise in function evaluations. It builds a surrogate for the objective and quantifies the uncertainty in that surrogate using a Bayesian machine learning technique, Gaussian process regression, and then uses an acquisition function defined from this surrogate to decide where to sample. In this tutorial, we describe how Bayesian optimization works, including Gaussian process regression and three common acquisition functions: expected improvement, entropy search, and knowledge gradient. We then discuss more advanced techniques, including running multiple function evaluations in parallel, multi-fidelity and multi-information source optimization, expensive-to-evaluate constraints, random environmental conditions, multi-task Bayesian optimization, and the inclusion of derivative information. We conclude with a discussion of Bayesian optimization software and future research directions in the field. Within our tutorial material we provide a generalization of expected improvement to noisy evaluations, beyond the noise-free setting where it is more commonly applied. This generalization is justified by a formal decision-theoretic argument, standing in contrast to previous ad hoc modifications.

We study mean field portfolio games under Epstein-Zin preferences, which naturally encompass the classical time-additive power utility as a special case. In a general non-Markovian framework, we establish a uniqueness result by proving a one-to-one correspondence between Nash equilibria and the solutions to a class of BSDEs. A key ingredient in our approach is a necessary stochastic maximum principle tailored to Epstein-Zin utility and a nonlinear transformation. In the deterministic setting, we further derive an explicit closed-form solution for the equilibrium investment and consumption policies.

Assessing the capabilities and risks of frontier AI systems is a critical area of research, and recent work has shown that repeated sampling from models can dramatically increase both. For instance, repeated sampling has been shown to increase their capabilities, such as solving difficult math and coding problems, but it has also been shown to increase their potential for harm, such as being jailbroken. Such results raise a crucial question for both capability and safety forecasting: how can one accurately predict a model's behavior when scaled to a massive number of attempts, given a vastly smaller sampling budget? This question is directly relevant to model providers, who serve hundreds of millions of users daily, and to governmental regulators, who seek to prevent harms. To answer this questions, we make three contributions. First, we find that standard methods for fitting these laws suffer from statistical shortcomings that hinder predictive accuracy, especially in data-limited scenarios. Second, we remedy these shortcomings by introducing a robust estimation framework, which uses a beta-binomial distribution to generate more accurate predictions from limited data. Third, we propose a dynamic sampling strategy that allocates a greater budget to harder problems. Combined, these innovations enable more reliable prediction of rare risks and capabilities at a fraction of the computational cost.

We propose the Bayes-UCBVI algorithm for reinforcement learning in tabular, stage-dependent, episodic Markov decision process: a natural extension of the Bayes-UCB algorithm by Kaufmann et al. (2012) for multi-armed bandits. Our method uses the quantile of a Q-value function posterior as upper confidence bound on the optimal Q-value function. For Bayes-UCBVI, we prove a regret bound of order O(H^3SAT) where H is the length of one episode, S is the number of states, A the number of actions, T the number of episodes, that matches the lower-bound of Ω(H^3SAT) up to poly-log terms in H,S,A,T for a large enough T. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first algorithm that obtains an optimal dependence on the horizon H (and S) without the need for an involved Bernstein-like bonus or noise. Crucial to our analysis is a new fine-grained anti-concentration bound for a weighted Dirichlet sum that can be of independent interest. We then explain how Bayes-UCBVI can be easily extended beyond the tabular setting, exhibiting a strong link between our algorithm and Bayesian bootstrap (Rubin, 1981).

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.

The performance of many machine learning models depends on their hyper-parameter settings. Bayesian Optimization has become a successful tool for hyper-parameter optimization of machine learning algorithms, which aims to identify optimal hyper-parameters during an iterative sequential process. However, most of the Bayesian Optimization algorithms are designed to select models for effectiveness only and ignore the important issue of model training efficiency. Given that both model effectiveness and training time are important for real-world applications, models selected for effectiveness may not meet the strict training time requirements necessary to deploy in a production environment. In this work, we present a unified Bayesian Optimization framework for jointly optimizing models for both prediction effectiveness and training efficiency. We propose an objective that captures the tradeoff between these two metrics and demonstrate how we can jointly optimize them in a principled Bayesian Optimization framework. Experiments on model selection for recommendation tasks indicate models selected this way significantly improves model training efficiency while maintaining strong effectiveness as compared to state-of-the-art Bayesian Optimization algorithms.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

We revisit the noisy binary search model of Karp and Kleinberg, in which we have n coins with unknown probabilities p_i that we can flip. The coins are sorted by increasing p_i, and we would like to find where the probability crosses (to within varepsilon) of a target value tau. This generalized the fixed-noise model of Burnashev and Zigangirov , in which p_i = 1{2} pm varepsilon, to a setting where coins near the target may be indistinguishable from it. Karp and Kleinberg showed that Theta(1{varepsilon^2} log n) samples are necessary and sufficient for this task. We produce a practical algorithm by solving two theoretical challenges: high-probability behavior and sharp constants. We give an algorithm that succeeds with probability 1-delta from \[ 1{C_{\tau, \varepsilon}} \cdot \left(\lg n + O(\log^{2/3} n \log^{1/3} 1{\delta} + \log 1{\delta})\right) \] samples, where C_{tau, varepsilon} is the optimal such constant achievable. For delta > n^{-o(1)} this is within 1 + o(1) of optimal, and for delta ll 1 it is the first bound within constant factors of optimal.

Most value function learning algorithms in reinforcement learning are based on the mean squared (projected) Bellman error. However, squared errors are known to be sensitive to outliers, both skewing the solution of the objective and resulting in high-magnitude and high-variance gradients. To control these high-magnitude updates, typical strategies in RL involve clipping gradients, clipping rewards, rescaling rewards, or clipping errors. While these strategies appear to be related to robust losses -- like the Huber loss -- they are built on semi-gradient update rules which do not minimize a known loss. In this work, we build on recent insights reformulating squared Bellman errors as a saddlepoint optimization problem and propose a saddlepoint reformulation for a Huber Bellman error and Absolute Bellman error. We start from a formalization of robust losses, then derive sound gradient-based approaches to minimize these losses in both the online off-policy prediction and control settings. We characterize the solutions of the robust losses, providing insight into the problem settings where the robust losses define notably better solutions than the mean squared Bellman error. Finally, we show that the resulting gradient-based algorithms are more stable, for both prediction and control, with less sensitivity to meta-parameters.

Many classic Reinforcement Learning (RL) algorithms rely on a Bellman operator, which involves an expectation over the next states, leading to the concept of bootstrapping. To introduce a form of pessimism, we propose to replace this expectation with an expectile. In practice, this can be very simply done by replacing the L_2 loss with a more general expectile loss for the critic. Introducing pessimism in RL is desirable for various reasons, such as tackling the overestimation problem (for which classic solutions are double Q-learning or the twin-critic approach of TD3) or robust RL (where transitions are adversarial). We study empirically these two cases. For the overestimation problem, we show that the proposed approach, ExpectRL, provides better results than a classic twin-critic. On robust RL benchmarks, involving changes of the environment, we show that our approach is more robust than classic RL algorithms. We also introduce a variation of ExpectRL combined with domain randomization which is competitive with state-of-the-art robust RL agents. Eventually, we also extend \ExpectRL with a mechanism for choosing automatically the expectile value, that is the degree of pessimism

We consider reinforcement learning in an environment modeled by an episodic, finite, stage-dependent Markov decision process of horizon H with S states, and A actions. The performance of an agent is measured by the regret after interacting with the environment for T episodes. We propose an optimistic posterior sampling algorithm for reinforcement learning (OPSRL), a simple variant of posterior sampling that only needs a number of posterior samples logarithmic in H, S, A, and T per state-action pair. For OPSRL we guarantee a high-probability regret bound of order at most mathcal{O}(H^3SAT) ignoring polylog(HSAT) terms. The key novel technical ingredient is a new sharp anti-concentration inequality for linear forms which may be of independent interest. Specifically, we extend the normal approximation-based lower bound for Beta distributions by Alfers and Dinges [1984] to Dirichlet distributions. Our bound matches the lower bound of order Ω(H^3SAT), thereby answering the open problems raised by Agrawal and Jia [2017b] for the episodic setting.

Machine learning models are vulnerable to adversarial perturbations, and a thought-provoking paper by Bubeck and Sellke has analyzed this phenomenon through the lens of over-parameterization: interpolating smoothly the data requires significantly more parameters than simply memorizing it. However, this "universal" law provides only a necessary condition for robustness, and it is unable to discriminate between models. In this paper, we address these gaps by focusing on empirical risk minimization in two prototypical settings, namely, random features and the neural tangent kernel (NTK). We prove that, for random features, the model is not robust for any degree of over-parameterization, even when the necessary condition coming from the universal law of robustness is satisfied. In contrast, for even activations, the NTK model meets the universal lower bound, and it is robust as soon as the necessary condition on over-parameterization is fulfilled. This also addresses a conjecture in prior work by Bubeck, Li and Nagaraj. Our analysis decouples the effect of the kernel of the model from an "interaction matrix", which describes the interaction with the test data and captures the effect of the activation. Our theoretical results are corroborated by numerical evidence on both synthetic and standard datasets (MNIST, CIFAR-10).

The Evidence Lower Bound (ELBO) is a quantity that plays a key role in variational inference. It can also be used as a criterion in model selection. However, though extremely popular in practice in the variational Bayes community, there has never been a general theoretic justification for selecting based on the ELBO. In this paper, we show that the ELBO maximization strategy has strong theoretical guarantees, and is robust to model misspecification while most works rely on the assumption that one model is correctly specified. We illustrate our theoretical results by an application to the selection of the number of principal components in probabilistic PCA.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

Most existing works focus on improving robustness against adversarial attacks bounded by a single l_p norm using adversarial training (AT). However, these AT models' multiple-norm robustness (union accuracy) is still low, which is crucial since in the real-world an adversary is not necessarily bounded by a single norm. The tradeoffs among robustness against multiple l_p perturbations and accuracy/robustness make obtaining good union and clean accuracy challenging. We design a logit pairing loss to improve the union accuracy by analyzing the tradeoffs from the lens of distribution shifts. We connect natural training (NT) with AT via gradient projection, to incorporate useful information from NT into AT, where we empirically and theoretically show it moderates the accuracy/robustness tradeoff. We propose a novel training framework RAMP, to boost the robustness against multiple l_p perturbations. RAMP can be easily adapted for robust fine-tuning and full AT. For robust fine-tuning, RAMP obtains a union accuracy up to 53.3% on CIFAR-10, and 29.1% on ImageNet. For training from scratch, RAMP achieves a union accuracy of 44.6% and good clean accuracy of 81.2% on ResNet-18 against AutoAttack on CIFAR-10. Beyond multi-norm robustness RAMP-trained models achieve superior universal robustness, effectively generalizing against a range of unseen adversaries and natural corruptions.

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in T second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal tilde O(T)-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.

In this paper, we study the problem of (finite horizon tabular) Markov decision processes (MDPs) with heavy-tailed rewards under the constraint of differential privacy (DP). Compared with the previous studies for private reinforcement learning that typically assume rewards are sampled from some bounded or sub-Gaussian distributions to ensure DP, we consider the setting where reward distributions have only finite (1+v)-th moments with some v in (0,1]. By resorting to robust mean estimators for rewards, we first propose two frameworks for heavy-tailed MDPs, i.e., one is for value iteration and another is for policy optimization. Under each framework, we consider both joint differential privacy (JDP) and local differential privacy (LDP) models. Based on our frameworks, we provide regret upper bounds for both JDP and LDP cases and show that the moment of distribution and privacy budget both have significant impacts on regrets. Finally, we establish a lower bound of regret minimization for heavy-tailed MDPs in JDP model by reducing it to the instance-independent lower bound of heavy-tailed multi-armed bandits in DP model. We also show the lower bound for the problem in LDP by adopting some private minimax methods. Our results reveal that there are fundamental differences between the problem of private RL with sub-Gaussian and that with heavy-tailed rewards.

Offline reinforcement learning (RL) provides a promising direction to exploit massive amount of offline data for complex decision-making tasks. Due to the distribution shift issue, current offline RL algorithms are generally designed to be conservative in value estimation and action selection. However, such conservatism can impair the robustness of learned policies when encountering observation deviation under realistic conditions, such as sensor errors and adversarial attacks. To trade off robustness and conservatism, we propose Robust Offline Reinforcement Learning (RORL) with a novel conservative smoothing technique. In RORL, we explicitly introduce regularization on the policy and the value function for states near the dataset, as well as additional conservative value estimation on these states. Theoretically, we show RORL enjoys a tighter suboptimality bound than recent theoretical results in linear MDPs. We demonstrate that RORL can achieve state-of-the-art performance on the general offline RL benchmark and is considerably robust to adversarial observation perturbations.

Robust Markov decision processes (RMDPs) provide a promising framework for computing reliable policies in the face of model errors. Many successful reinforcement learning algorithms build on variations of policy-gradient methods, but adapting these methods to RMDPs has been challenging. As a result, the applicability of RMDPs to large, practical domains remains limited. This paper proposes a new Double-Loop Robust Policy Gradient (DRPG), the first generic policy gradient method for RMDPs. In contrast with prior robust policy gradient algorithms, DRPG monotonically reduces approximation errors to guarantee convergence to a globally optimal policy in tabular RMDPs. We introduce a novel parametric transition kernel and solve the inner loop robust policy via a gradient-based method. Finally, our numerical results demonstrate the utility of our new algorithm and confirm its global convergence properties.

Bayesian optimisation (BO) uses probabilistic surrogate models - usually Gaussian processes (GPs) - for the optimisation of expensive black-box functions. At each BO iteration, the GP hyperparameters are fit to previously-evaluated data by maximising the marginal likelihood. However, this fails to account for uncertainty in the hyperparameters themselves, leading to overconfident model predictions. This uncertainty can be accounted for by taking the Bayesian approach of marginalising out the model hyperparameters. We investigate whether a fully-Bayesian treatment of the Gaussian process hyperparameters in BO (FBBO) leads to improved optimisation performance. Since an analytic approach is intractable, we compare FBBO using three approximate inference schemes to the maximum likelihood approach, using the Expected Improvement (EI) and Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) acquisition functions paired with ARD and isotropic Matern kernels, across 15 well-known benchmark problems for 4 observational noise settings. FBBO using EI with an ARD kernel leads to the best performance in the noise-free setting, with much less difference between combinations of BO components when the noise is increased. FBBO leads to over-exploration with UCB, but is not detrimental with EI. Therefore, we recommend that FBBO using EI with an ARD kernel as the default choice for BO.

Aligning large language models with human preferences is critical for creating reliable and controllable AI systems. A human preference can be visualized as a high-dimensional vector where different directions represent trade-offs between desired attributes (e.g., helpfulness vs. verbosity). Yet, because the training data often reflects dominant, average preferences, LLMs tend to perform well on common requests but fall short in specific, individual needs. This mismatch creates a preference coverage gap. Existing methods often address this through costly retraining, which may not be generalized to the full spectrum of diverse preferences. This brittleness means that when a user's request reflects a nuanced preference deviating from the training data's central tendency, model performance can degrade unpredictably. To address this challenge, we introduce Robust Preference Selection (RPS), a post-hoc, training-free method by leveraging directional neighborhood consensus. Instead of forcing a model to generate a response from a single, highly specific preference, RPS samples multiple responses from a local neighborhood of related preferences to create a superior candidate pool. It then selects the response that best aligns with the user's original intent. We provide a theoretical framework showing our neighborhood generation strategy is provably superior to a strong baseline that also samples multiple candidates. Comprehensive experiments across three distinct alignment paradigms (DPA, DPO, and SFT) demonstrate that RPS consistently improves robustness against this baseline, achieving win rates of up to 69% on challenging preferences from under-represented regions of the space without any model retraining. Our work presents a practical, theoretically-grounded solution for enhancing the reliability of preference-aligned models.

Many applications involve estimating the mean of multiple binomial outcomes as a common problem -- assessing intergenerational mobility of census tracts, estimating prevalence of infectious diseases across countries, and measuring click-through rates for different demographic groups. The most standard approach is to report the plain average of each outcome. Despite simplicity, the estimates are noisy when the sample sizes or mean parameters are small. In contrast, the Empirical Bayes (EB) methods are able to boost the average accuracy by borrowing information across tasks. Nevertheless, the EB methods require a Bayesian model where the parameters are sampled from a prior distribution which, unlike the commonly-studied Gaussian case, is unidentified due to discreteness of binomial measurements. Even if the prior distribution is known, the computation is difficult when the sample sizes are heterogeneous as there is no simple joint conjugate prior for the sample size and mean parameter. In this paper, we consider the compound decision framework which treats the sample size and mean parameters as fixed quantities. We develop an approximate Stein's Unbiased Risk Estimator (SURE) for the average mean squared error given any class of estimators. For a class of machine learning-assisted linear shrinkage estimators, we establish asymptotic optimality, regret bounds, and valid inference. Unlike existing work, we work with the binomials directly without resorting to Gaussian approximations. This allows us to work with small sample sizes and/or mean parameters in both one-sample and two-sample settings. We demonstrate our approach using three datasets on firm discrimination, education outcomes, and innovation rates.

Bayesian optimisation is a popular approach for optimising expensive black-box functions. The next location to be evaluated is selected via maximising an acquisition function that balances exploitation and exploration. Gaussian processes, the surrogate models of choice in Bayesian optimisation, are often used with a constant prior mean function equal to the arithmetic mean of the observed function values. We show that the rate of convergence can depend sensitively on the choice of mean function. We empirically investigate 8 mean functions (constant functions equal to the arithmetic mean, minimum, median and maximum of the observed function evaluations, linear, quadratic polynomials, random forests and RBF networks), using 10 synthetic test problems and two real-world problems, and using the Expected Improvement and Upper Confidence Bound acquisition functions. We find that for design dimensions ge5 using a constant mean function equal to the worst observed quality value is consistently the best choice on the synthetic problems considered. We argue that this worst-observed-quality function promotes exploitation leading to more rapid convergence. However, for the real-world tasks the more complex mean functions capable of modelling the fitness landscape may be effective, although there is no clearly optimum choice.

Deep Q-learning algorithms remain notoriously unstable, especially during early training when the maximization operator amplifies estimation errors. Inspired by bounded rationality theory and developmental learning, we introduce Sat-EnQ, a two-phase framework that first learns to be ``good enough'' before optimizing aggressively. In Phase 1, we train an ensemble of lightweight Q-networks under a satisficing objective that limits early value growth using a dynamic baseline, producing diverse, low-variance estimates while avoiding catastrophic overestimation. In Phase 2, the ensemble is distilled into a larger network and fine-tuned with standard Double DQN. We prove theoretically that satisficing induces bounded updates and cannot increase target variance, with a corollary quantifying conditions for substantial reduction. Empirically, Sat-EnQ achieves 3.8x variance reduction, eliminates catastrophic failures (0% vs 50% for DQN), maintains 79% performance under environmental noise}, and requires 2.5x less compute than bootstrapped ensembles. Our results highlight a principled path toward robust reinforcement learning by embracing satisficing before optimization.

Byzantine robustness has received significant attention recently given its importance for distributed and federated learning. In spite of this, we identify severe flaws in existing algorithms even when the data across the participants is identically distributed. First, we show realistic examples where current state of the art robust aggregation rules fail to converge even in the absence of any Byzantine attackers. Secondly, we prove that even if the aggregation rules may succeed in limiting the influence of the attackers in a single round, the attackers can couple their attacks across time eventually leading to divergence. To address these issues, we present two surprisingly simple strategies: a new robust iterative clipping procedure, and incorporating worker momentum to overcome time-coupled attacks. This is the first provably robust method for the standard stochastic optimization setting. Our code is open sourced at https://github.com/epfml/byzantine-robust-optimizer.

The Information Bottleneck (IB) method frequently suffers from unstable optimization, characterized by abrupt representation shifts near critical points of the IB trade-off parameter, beta. In this paper, I introduce a novel approach to achieve stable and convex IB optimization through symbolic continuation and entropy-regularized trajectories. I analytically prove convexity and uniqueness of the IB solution path when an entropy regularization term is included, and demonstrate how this stabilizes representation learning across a wide range of eta values. Additionally, I provide extensive sensitivity analyses around critical points (beta) with statistically robust uncertainty quantification (95% confidence intervals). The open-source implementation, experimental results, and reproducibility framework included in this work offer a clear path for practical deployment and future extension of my proposed method.

We study decision making in environments where the reward is only partially observed, but can be modeled as a function of an action and an observed context. This setting, known as contextual bandits, encompasses a wide variety of applications including health-care policy and Internet advertising. A central task is evaluation of a new policy given historic data consisting of contexts, actions and received rewards. The key challenge is that the past data typically does not faithfully represent proportions of actions taken by a new policy. Previous approaches rely either on models of rewards or models of the past policy. The former are plagued by a large bias whereas the latter have a large variance. In this work, we leverage the strength and overcome the weaknesses of the two approaches by applying the doubly robust technique to the problems of policy evaluation and optimization. We prove that this approach yields accurate value estimates when we have either a good (but not necessarily consistent) model of rewards or a good (but not necessarily consistent) model of past policy. Extensive empirical comparison demonstrates that the doubly robust approach uniformly improves over existing techniques, achieving both lower variance in value estimation and better policies. As such, we expect the doubly robust approach to become common practice.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is widely used for aligning large language models, yet practitioners face a persistent puzzle: improving safety often reduces fairness, scaling to diverse populations becomes computationally intractable, and making systems robust often amplifies majority biases. We formalize this tension as the Alignment Trilemma: no RLHF system can simultaneously achieve (i) epsilon-representativeness across diverse human values, (ii) polynomial tractability in sample and compute complexity, and (iii) delta-robustness against adversarial perturbations and distribution shift. Through a complexity-theoretic analysis integrating statistical learning theory and robust optimization, we prove that achieving both representativeness (epsilon <= 0.01) and robustness (delta <= 0.001) for global-scale populations requires Omega(2^{d_context}) operations, which is super-polynomial in the context dimensionality. We show that current RLHF implementations resolve this trilemma by sacrificing representativeness: they collect only 10^3--10^4 samples from homogeneous annotator pools while 10^7--10^8 samples are needed for true global representation. Our framework provides a unified explanation for documented RLHF pathologies including preference collapse, sycophancy, and systematic bias amplification. We conclude with concrete directions for navigating these fundamental trade-offs through strategic relaxations of alignment requirements.

The acute phase of the Covid-19 pandemic has made apparent the need for decision support based upon accurate epidemic modeling. This process is substantially hampered by under-reporting of cases and related data incompleteness issues. In this article we adopt the Bayesian paradigm and synthesize publicly available data via a discrete-time stochastic epidemic modeling framework. The models allow for estimating the total number of infections while accounting for the endemic phase of the pandemic. We assess the prediction of the infection rate utilizing mobility information, notably the principal components of the mobility data. We evaluate variational Bayes in this context and find that Hamiltonian Monte Carlo offers a robust inference alternative for such models. We elaborate upon vector analysis of the epidemic dynamics, thus enriching the traditional tools used for decision making. In particular, we show how certain 2-dimensional plots on the phase plane may yield intuitive information regarding the speed and the type of transmission dynamics. We investigate the potential of a two-stage analysis as a consequence of cutting feedback, for inference on certain functionals of the model parameters. Finally, we show that a point mass on critical parameters is overly restrictive and investigate informative priors as a suitable alternative.

We introduce a distributed algorithm, termed noise-robust distributed maximum consensus (RD-MC), for estimating the maximum value within a multi-agent network in the presence of noisy communication links. Our approach entails redefining the maximum consensus problem as a distributed optimization problem, allowing a solution using the alternating direction method of multipliers. Unlike existing algorithms that rely on multiple sets of noise-corrupted estimates, RD-MC employs a single set, enhancing both robustness and efficiency. To further mitigate the effects of link noise and improve robustness, we apply moving averaging to the local estimates. Through extensive simulations, we demonstrate that RD-MC is significantly more robust to communication link noise compared to existing maximum-consensus algorithms.

Deep neural networks coupled with fast simulation and improved computation have led to recent successes in the field of reinforcement learning (RL). However, most current RL-based approaches fail to generalize since: (a) the gap between simulation and real world is so large that policy-learning approaches fail to transfer; (b) even if policy learning is done in real world, the data scarcity leads to failed generalization from training to test scenarios (e.g., due to different friction or object masses). Inspired from H-infinity control methods, we note that both modeling errors and differences in training and test scenarios can be viewed as extra forces/disturbances in the system. This paper proposes the idea of robust adversarial reinforcement learning (RARL), where we train an agent to operate in the presence of a destabilizing adversary that applies disturbance forces to the system. The jointly trained adversary is reinforced -- that is, it learns an optimal destabilization policy. We formulate the policy learning as a zero-sum, minimax objective function. Extensive experiments in multiple environments (InvertedPendulum, HalfCheetah, Swimmer, Hopper and Walker2d) conclusively demonstrate that our method (a) improves training stability; (b) is robust to differences in training/test conditions; and c) outperform the baseline even in the absence of the adversary.

Machine learning models have recently found tremendous success in data-driven control systems. However, standard learning models often suffer from an accuracy-robustness trade-off, which is a limitation that must be overcome in the control of safety-critical systems that require both high performance and rigorous robustness guarantees. In this work, we build upon the recent "locally biased smoothing" method to develop classifiers that simultaneously inherit high accuracy from standard models and high robustness from robust models. Specifically, we extend locally biased smoothing to the multi-class setting, and then overcome its performance bottleneck by generalizing the formulation to "mix" the outputs of a standard neural network and a robust neural network. We prove that when the robustness of the robust base model is certifiable, within a closed-form ell_p radius, no alteration or attack on an input can result in misclassification of the mixed classifier; the proposed model inherits the certified robustness. Moreover, we use numerical experiments on the CIFAR-10 benchmark dataset to verify that the mixed model noticeably improves the accuracy-robustness trade-off.

As the issue of robustness in AI systems becomes vital, statistical learning techniques that are reliable even in presence of partly contaminated data have to be developed. Preference data, in the form of (complete) rankings in the simplest situations, are no exception and the demand for appropriate concepts and tools is all the more pressing given that technologies fed by or producing this type of data (e.g. search engines, recommending systems) are now massively deployed. However, the lack of vector space structure for the set of rankings (i.e. the symmetric group S_n) and the complex nature of statistics considered in ranking data analysis make the formulation of robustness objectives in this domain challenging. In this paper, we introduce notions of robustness, together with dedicated statistical methods, for Consensus Ranking the flagship problem in ranking data analysis, aiming at summarizing a probability distribution on S_n by a median ranking. Precisely, we propose specific extensions of the popular concept of breakdown point, tailored to consensus ranking, and address the related computational issues. Beyond the theoretical contributions, the relevance of the approach proposed is supported by an experimental study.

Training stability remains a critical bottleneck for Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), often manifesting as a trade-off between reasoning plasticity and general capability retention. We identify a root cause as the geometric conflict between plasticity and stability gradients, which leads to destructive interference. Crucially, we argue that deterministic projection methods are suboptimal for GRPO as they overlook the intrinsic stochasticity of group-based gradient estimates. To address this, we propose Probabilistic Conflict Resolution (PCR), a Bayesian framework that models gradients as random variables. PCR dynamically arbitrates conflicts via an uncertainty-aware ``soft projection'' mechanism, optimizing the signal-to-noise ratio. Extensive experiments demonstrate that PCR significantly smooths the training trajectory and achieves superior performance in various reasoning tasks.

Reinforcement learning (RL) techniques have achieved impressive performance on simulated benchmarks such as Atari100k, yet recent advances remain largely confined to simulation and show limited transfer to real-world domains. A central obstacle is environmental stochasticity, as real systems involve noisy observations, unpredictable dynamics, and non-stationary conditions that undermine the stability of current methods. Existing benchmarks rarely capture these uncertainties and favor simplified settings where algorithms can be tuned to succeed. The absence of a well-defined taxonomy of stochasticity further complicates evaluation, as robustness to one type of stochastic perturbation, such as sticky actions, does not guarantee robustness to other forms of uncertainty. To address this critical gap, we introduce STORI (STOchastic-ataRI), a benchmark that systematically incorporates diverse stochastic effects and enables rigorous evaluation of RL techniques under different forms of uncertainty. We propose a comprehensive five-type taxonomy of environmental stochasticity and demonstrate systematic vulnerabilities in state-of-the-art model-based RL algorithms through targeted evaluation of DreamerV3 and STORM. Our findings reveal that world models dramatically underestimate environmental variance, struggle with action corruption, and exhibit unreliable dynamics under partial observability. We release the code and benchmark publicly at https://github.com/ARY2260/stori, providing a unified framework for developing more robust RL systems.

We introduce a gradient-free framework for Bayesian Optimal Experimental Design (BOED) in sequential settings, aimed at complex systems where gradient information is unavailable. Our method combines Ensemble Kalman Inversion (EKI) for design optimization with the Affine-Invariant Langevin Dynamics (ALDI) sampler for efficient posterior sampling-both of which are derivative-free and ensemble-based. To address the computational challenges posed by nested expectations in BOED, we propose variational Gaussian and parametrized Laplace approximations that provide tractable upper and lower bounds on the Expected Information Gain (EIG). These approximations enable scalable utility estimation in high-dimensional spaces and PDE-constrained inverse problems. We demonstrate the performance of our framework through numerical experiments ranging from linear Gaussian models to PDE-based inference tasks, highlighting the method's robustness, accuracy, and efficiency in information-driven experimental design.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has emerged as an indispensable paradigm for enhancing reasoning in Large Language Models (LLMs). However, standard policy optimization methods, such as Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), often converge to low-entropy policies, leading to severe mode collapse and limited output diversity. We analyze this issue from the perspective of sampling probability dynamics, identifying that the standard objective disproportionately reinforces the highest-likelihood paths, thereby suppressing valid alternative reasoning chains. To address this, we propose a novel Advantage Re-weighting Mechanism (ARM) designed to equilibrate the confidence levels across all correct responses. By incorporating Prompt Perplexity and Answer Confidence into the advantage estimation, our method dynamically reshapes the reward signal to attenuate the gradient updates of over-confident reasoning paths, while redistributing probability mass toward under-explored correct solutions. Empirical results demonstrate that our approach significantly enhances generative diversity and response entropy while maintaining competitive accuracy, effectively achieving a superior trade-off between exploration and exploitation in reasoning tasks. Empirical results on Qwen2.5 and DeepSeek models across mathematical and coding benchmarks show that ProGRPO significantly mitigates entropy collapse. Specifically, on Qwen2.5-7B, our method outperforms GRPO by 5.7% in Pass@1 and, notably, by 13.9% in Pass@32, highlighting its superior capability in generating diverse correct reasoning paths.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is frequently employed in fine-tuning large language models (LMs), such as GPT-3, to penalize them for undesirable features of generated sequences, such as offensiveness, social bias, harmfulness or falsehood. The RL formulation involves treating the LM as a policy and updating it to maximise the expected value of a reward function which captures human preferences, such as non-offensiveness. In this paper, we analyze challenges associated with treating a language model as an RL policy and show how avoiding those challenges requires moving beyond the RL paradigm. We start by observing that the standard RL approach is flawed as an objective for fine-tuning LMs because it leads to distribution collapse: turning the LM into a degenerate distribution. Then, we analyze KL-regularised RL, a widely used recipe for fine-tuning LMs, which additionally constrains the fine-tuned LM to stay close to its original distribution in terms of Kullback-Leibler (KL) divergence. We show that KL-regularised RL is equivalent to variational inference: approximating a Bayesian posterior which specifies how to update a prior LM to conform with evidence provided by the reward function. We argue that this Bayesian inference view of KL-regularised RL is more insightful than the typically employed RL perspective. The Bayesian inference view explains how KL-regularised RL avoids the distribution collapse problem and offers a first-principles derivation for its objective. While this objective happens to be equivalent to RL (with a particular choice of parametric reward), there exist other objectives for fine-tuning LMs which are no longer equivalent to RL. That observation leads to a more general point: RL is not an adequate formal framework for problems such as fine-tuning language models. These problems are best viewed as Bayesian inference: approximating a pre-defined target distribution.

Robustness to natural distribution shifts has seen remarkable progress thanks to recent pre-training strategies combined with better fine-tuning methods. However, such fine-tuning assumes access to large amounts of labelled data, and the extent to which the observations hold when the amount of training data is not as high remains unknown. We address this gap by performing the first in-depth study of robustness to various natural distribution shifts in different low-shot regimes: spanning datasets, architectures, pre-trained initializations, and state-of-the-art robustness interventions. Most importantly, we find that there is no single model of choice that is often more robust than others, and existing interventions can fail to improve robustness on some datasets even if they do so in the full-shot regime. We hope that our work will motivate the community to focus on this problem of practical importance.

Offline learning of strategies takes data efficiency to its extreme by restricting algorithms to a fixed dataset of state-action trajectories. We consider the problem in a mixed-motive multiagent setting, where the goal is to solve a game under the offline learning constraint. We first frame this problem in terms of selecting among candidate equilibria. Since datasets may inform only a small fraction of game dynamics, it is generally infeasible in offline game-solving to even verify a proposed solution is a true equilibrium. Therefore, we consider the relative probability of low regret (i.e., closeness to equilibrium) across candidates based on the information available. Specifically, we extend Policy Space Response Oracles (PSRO), an online game-solving approach, by quantifying game dynamics uncertainty and modifying the RL objective to skew towards solutions more likely to have low regret in the true game. We further propose a novel meta-strategy solver, tailored for the offline setting, to guide strategy exploration in PSRO. Our incorporation of Conservatism principles from Offline reinforcement learning approaches for strategy Exploration gives our approach its name: COffeE-PSRO. Experiments demonstrate COffeE-PSRO's ability to extract lower-regret solutions than state-of-the-art offline approaches and reveal relationships between algorithmic components empirical game fidelity, and overall performance.