Daily Papers

Long-term memory enables personalized conversational agents to retain user information across sessions. However, existing memory architectures primarily optimize for utility while neglecting the risks of unnecessarily storing and reusing private attributes such as personally identifiable information (PII). Addressing privacy risks in personalized memory is challenging because simply removing sensitive values can undermine system utility. Therefore, privacy protection for memory agents should govern the full life cycle of sensitive values rather than only sanitizing individual records. To address this gap, we introduce Sanitized Privacy-Mapped Memory (SP-Mem), a privacy-aware memory architecture that decouples memory utility from exact private-value exposure. SP-Mem provides a full life-cycle privacy design that identifies and separates sensitive information from raw user inputs, stores sanitized content and exact private values in isolated structures, and selectively retrieves private values based on task requirements and user consent. We further introduce a privacy-aware memory benchmark that jointly evaluates response quality, privacy behavior, and inference cost. Extensive experiments across multiple LLM-based agents show that SP-Mem achieves stronger personalization while reducing unnecessary privacy exposure. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Jensassss/SP-Mem.

Pre-trained large language models (LLMs) are becoming useful for various tasks. To improve their performance on certain tasks, it is necessary to fine-tune them on specific data corpora (e.g., medical reports, business data). These specialized data corpora may contain sensitive data (e.g., personal or confidential data) that will be memorized by the model and likely to be regurgitated during its subsequent use. This memorization of sensitive information by the model poses a significant privacy or confidentiality issue. To remove this memorization and sanitize the model without requiring costly additional fine-tuning on a secured data corpus, we propose SANI. SANI is an unlearning approach to sanitize language models. It relies on both an erasure and repair phases that 1) reset certain neurons in the last layers of the model to disrupt the memorization of fine-grained information, and then 2) fine-tune the model while avoiding memorizing sensitive information. We comprehensively evaluate SANI to sanitize both a model fine-tuned and specialized with medical data by removing directly and indirectly identifiers from the memorization of the model, and a standard pre-trained model by removing specific terms defined as confidential information from the model. Results show that with only few additional epochs of unlearning, the model is sanitized and the number of regurgitations is drastically reduced. This approach can be particularly useful for hospitals or other industries that have already spent significant resources training models on large datasets and wish to sanitize them before sharing.

Large language model agents equipped with persistent memory are vulnerable to memory poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject malicious instructions through query only interactions that corrupt the agents long term memory and influence future responses. Recent work demonstrated that the MINJA (Memory Injection Attack) achieves over 95 % injection success rate and 70 % attack success rate under idealized conditions. However, the robustness of these attacks in realistic deployments and effective defensive mechanisms remain understudied. This work addresses these gaps through systematic empirical evaluation of memory poisoning attacks and defenses in Electronic Health Record (EHR) agents. We investigate attack robustness by varying three critical dimensions: initial memory state, number of indication prompts, and retrieval parameters. Our experiments on GPT-4o-mini, Gemini-2.0-Flash and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct models using MIMIC-III clinical data reveal that realistic conditions with pre-existing legitimate memories dramatically reduce attack effectiveness. We then propose and evaluate two novel defense mechanisms: (1) Input/Output Moderation using composite trust scoring across multiple orthogonal signals, and (2) Memory Sanitization with trust-aware retrieval employing temporal decay and pattern-based filtering. Our defense evaluation reveals that effective memory sanitization requires careful trust threshold calibration to prevent both overly conservative rejection (blocking all entries) and insufficient filtering (missing subtle attacks), establishing important baselines for future adaptive defense mechanisms. These findings provide crucial insights for securing memory-augmented LLM agents in production environments.

As LLM-powered agents are increasingly deployed in edge-cloud environments, personalized memory has become a key enabler of long-term adaptation and user-centric interaction. However, cloud-assisted memory management exposes sensitive user information, while existing privacy protection methods typically rely on aggressive masking that removes task-relevant semantics and consequently degrades memory utility and personalization quality. To address this challenge, We propose MemPrivacy, which identifies privacy-sensitive spans on edge devices, replaces them with semantically structured type-aware placeholders for cloud-side memory processing, and restores the original values locally when needed. By decoupling privacy protection from semantic destruction, MemPrivacy minimizes sensitive data exposure while retaining the information required for effective memory formation and retrieval. We also construct MemPrivacy-Bench for systematic evaluation, a dataset covering 200 users and over 52k privacy instances, and introduce a four-level privacy taxonomy for configurable protection policies. Experiments show that MemPrivacy achieves strong performance in privacy information extraction, substantially surpassing strong general-purpose models such as GPT-5.2 and Gemini-3.1-Pro, while also reducing inference latency. Across multiple widely used memory systems, MemPrivacy limits utility loss to within 1.6%, outperforming baseline masking strategies. Overall, MemPrivacy offers an effective balance between privacy protection and personalized memory utility for edge-cloud agents, enabling secure, practical, and user-transparent deployment.

Large language model (LLM) agents face a structural tension: cloud agents provide strong reasoning but expose user data, while on-device agents preserve privacy at the cost of overall capability. Existing device-cloud designs treat this boundary as a compute split rather than a trust boundary suited to agentic workloads, and existing sanitizers force a choice between policy flexibility and the structural fidelity tool calls require. In this work, we develop PAAC, a privacy-aware agentic framework that aligns planner--executor decomposition with the device-cloud boundary so that role specialization itself becomes the privacy mechanism. The cloud agent reasons over typed placeholder tokens that preserve each sensitive value's reasoning role while discarding its content, while the on-device agent identifies sensitive spans and distills each step's execution outcome into compact key findings. Sanitization confines the on-device LLM to proposing which spans to mask, while a deterministic registry performs all substitution and reversal, keeping actions directly executable on device. On three agentic benchmarks under strict privacy settings, PAAC dominates the Pareto frontier of privacy and accuracy, improving average accuracy by 15-36\% and reducing average leakage by 2-6times over state-of-the-art device-cloud baselines, with the largest margins on privacy targets outside fixed entity taxonomies. We find consistent improvements on 17 additional benchmarks spanning 10 domains, including math, science, and finance.

Research involving privacy-sensitive data has always been constrained by data scarcity, standing in sharp contrast to other areas that have benefited from data scaling. This challenge is becoming increasingly urgent as modern AI agents--such as OpenClaw and Gemini Agent--are granted persistent access to highly sensitive personal information. To tackle this longstanding bottleneck and the rising risks, we present Privasis (i.e., privacy oasis), the first million-scale fully synthetic dataset entirely built from scratch--an expansive reservoir of texts with rich and diverse private information--designed to broaden and accelerate research in areas where processing sensitive social data is inevitable. Compared to existing datasets, Privasis, comprising 1.4 million records, offers orders-of-magnitude larger scale with quality, and far greater diversity across various document types, including medical history, legal documents, financial records, calendars, and text messages with a total of 55.1 million annotated attributes such as ethnicity, date of birth, workplace, etc. We leverage Privasis to construct a parallel corpus for text sanitization with our pipeline that decomposes texts and applies targeted sanitization. Our compact sanitization models (<=4B) trained on this dataset outperform state-of-the-art large language models, such as GPT-5 and Qwen-3 235B. We plan to release data, models, and code to accelerate future research on privacy-sensitive domains and agents.

Private and public organizations regularly collect and analyze digitalized data about their associates, volunteers, clients, etc. However, because most personal data are sensitive, there is a key challenge in designing privacy-preserving systems. To tackle privacy concerns, research communities have proposed different methods to preserve privacy, with Differential privacy (DP) standing out as a formal definition that allows quantifying the privacy-utility trade-off. Besides, with the local DP (LDP) model, users can sanitize their data locally before transmitting it to the server. The objective of this thesis is thus two-fold: O_1) To improve the utility and privacy in multiple frequency estimates under LDP guarantees, which is fundamental to statistical learning. And O_2) To assess the privacy-utility trade-off of machine learning (ML) models trained over differentially private data. For O_1, we first tackled the problem from two "multiple" perspectives, i.e., multiple attributes and multiple collections throughout time, while focusing on utility. Secondly, we focused our attention on the multiple attributes aspect only, in which we proposed a solution focusing on privacy while preserving utility. In both cases, we demonstrate through analytical and experimental validations the advantages of our proposed solutions over state-of-the-art LDP protocols. For O_2, we empirically evaluated ML-based solutions designed to solve real-world problems while ensuring DP guarantees. Indeed, we mainly used the input data perturbation setting from the privacy-preserving ML literature. This is the situation in which the whole dataset is sanitized independently and, thus, we implemented LDP algorithms from the perspective of the centralized data owner. In all cases, we concluded that differentially private ML models achieve nearly the same utility metrics as non-private ones.

The widespread deployment of high-resolution visual sensing systems, coupled with the rise of foundation models, has amplified privacy risks in video-based applications. Differentially private pixelization offers mathematically guaranteed protection for visual data through grid-based noise addition, but challenges remain in preserving task-relevant fidelity, achieving scalability, and enabling efficient real-time deployment. To address this, we propose a novel parallel, region-adaptive pixelization framework that combines the theoretical rigor of differential privacy with practical efficiency. Our method adaptively adjusts grid sizes and noise scales based on regional complexity, leveraging GPU parallelism to achieve significant runtime acceleration compared to the classical baseline. A lightweight storage scheme is introduced by retaining only essential noisy statistics, significantly reducing space overhead. Formal privacy analysis is provided under the Laplace mechanism and parallel composition theorem. Extensive experiments on the PETS, Venice-2, and PPM-100 datasets demonstrate favorable privacy-utility trade-offs and significant runtime/storage reductions. A face re-identification attack experiment on CelebA further confirms the method's effectiveness in preventing identity inference. This validates its suitability for real-time privacy-critical applications such as elderly care, smart home monitoring, driver behavior analysis, and crowd behavior monitoring.

We explore a knowledge sanitization approach to mitigate the privacy concerns associated with large language models (LLMs). LLMs trained on a large corpus of Web data can memorize and potentially reveal sensitive or confidential information, raising critical security concerns. Our technique efficiently fine-tunes these models using the Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) method, prompting them to generate harmless responses such as ``I don't know'' when queried about specific information. Experimental results in a closed-book question-answering task show that our straightforward method not only minimizes particular knowledge leakage but also preserves the overall performance of LLMs. These two advantages strengthen the defense against extraction attacks and reduces the emission of harmful content such as hallucinations.

Dense associative memory (DAM) provides an energy-based framework for memory retrieval with close connections to attention mechanisms in modern artificial intelligence. Despite growing interest in differential privacy for AI, the privacy of DAM retrieval dynamics remains relatively unexplored. In this paper, we develop a differential privacy framework for log-sum-ReLU (LSR) dense associative memory, whose finite-support retrieval dynamics pose distinctive challenges for privacy-preserving computation. We propose the Boundary-Responsive Adaptive Correction Evolution (BRACE) algorithm, a differentially private retrieval mechanism for LSR-DAM that adaptively corrects boundary-sensitive perturbations to control their cumulative effect over the retrieval trajectory. In theory, we prove that our method is minimax optimal by deriving dimension-independent terminal and full-trajectory retrieval error rates, with optimal dependence on the inverse temperature and, in the growing-horizon regime, the retrieval horizon. We further establish central limit theorems that enable uncertainty quantification for private retrieval by characterizing its asymptotic distribution and the additional variability introduced by privacy. Numerical experiments compare our proposed method with baseline differential privacy approaches and evaluate its retrieval accuracy. Together, our results provide a theoretical foundation for optimal privacy-preserving retrieval and uncertainty quantification in energy-based associative memory systems.

Large language models(LLMs) have shown its outperforming ability on various tasks and question answering. However, LLMs require high computation cost and large memory cost. At the same time, LLMs may cause privacy leakage when training or prediction procedure contains sensitive information. In this paper, we propose SPA(Side Plugin Adaption), a lightweight architecture for fast on-devices inference and privacy retaining on the constraints of strict on-devices computation and memory constraints. Compared with other on-devices seq2seq generation, SPA could make a fast and stable inference on low-resource constraints, allowing it to obtain cost effiency. Our method establish an interaction between a pretrained LLMs on-cloud and additive parameters on-devices, which could provide the knowledge on both pretrained LLMs and private personal feature.Further more, SPA provides a framework to keep feature-base parameters on private guaranteed but low computational devices while leave the parameters containing general information on the high computational devices.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across diverse natural language processing tasks, but their tendency to memorize training data poses significant privacy risks, particularly during fine-tuning processes. This paper presents a comprehensive empirical analysis of data memorization in fine-tuned LLMs and introduces a novel multi-layered privacy protection framework. Through controlled experiments on modern LLM architectures including GPT-2, Phi-3, and Gemma-2, we demonstrate that fine-tuning with repeated sensitive data increases privacy leakage rates from baseline levels of 0-5% to 60-75%, representing a 64.2% average increase across tested models. We propose and rigorously evaluate four complementary privacy protection methods: semantic data deduplication, differential privacy during generation, entropy-based filtering, and pattern-based content filtering. Our experimental results show that these techniques can reduce data leakage to 0% while maintaining 94.7% of original model utility.

RAG has emerged as a key technique for enhancing response quality of LLMs without high computational cost. In traditional architectures, RAG services are provided by a single entity that hosts the dataset within a trusted local environment. However, individuals or small organizations often lack the resources to maintain data storage servers, leading them to rely on outsourced cloud storage. This dependence on untrusted third-party services introduces privacy risks. Embedding-based retrieval mechanisms, commonly used in RAG systems, are vulnerable to privacy leakage such as vector-to-text reconstruction attacks and structural leakage via vector analysis. Several privacy-preserving RAG techniques have been proposed but most existing approaches rely on partially homomorphic encryption, which incurs substantial computational overhead. To address these challenges, we propose an efficient privacy-preserving RAG framework (ppRAG) tailored for untrusted cloud environments that defends against vector-to-text attack, vector analysis, and query analysis. We propose Conditional Approximate Distance-Comparison-Preserving Symmetric Encryption (CAPRISE) that encrypts embeddings while still allowing the cloud to compute similarity between an encrypted query and the encrypted database embeddings. CAPRISE preserves only the relative distance ordering between the encrypted query and each encrypted database embedding, without exposing inter-database distances, thereby enhancing both privacy and efficiency. To mitigate query analysis, we introduce DP by perturbing the query embedding prior to encryption, preventing the cloud from inferring sensitive patterns. Experimental results show that ppRAG achieves efficient processing throughput, high retrieval accuracy, strong privacy guarantees, making it a practical solution for resource-constrained users seeking secure cloud-augmented LLMs.

This paper investigates the problem of collecting multidimensional data throughout time (i.e., longitudinal studies) for the fundamental task of frequency estimation under Local Differential Privacy (LDP) guarantees. Contrary to frequency estimation of a single attribute, the multidimensional aspect demands particular attention to the privacy budget. Besides, when collecting user statistics longitudinally, privacy progressively degrades. Indeed, the "multiple" settings in combination (i.e., many attributes and several collections throughout time) impose several challenges, for which this paper proposes the first solution for frequency estimates under LDP. To tackle these issues, we extend the analysis of three state-of-the-art LDP protocols (Generalized Randomized Response -- GRR, Optimized Unary Encoding -- OUE, and Symmetric Unary Encoding -- SUE) for both longitudinal and multidimensional data collections. While the known literature uses OUE and SUE for two rounds of sanitization (a.k.a. memoization), i.e., L-OUE and L-SUE, respectively, we analytically and experimentally show that starting with OUE and then with SUE provides higher data utility (i.e., L-OSUE). Also, for attributes with small domain sizes, we propose Longitudinal GRR (L-GRR), which provides higher utility than the other protocols based on unary encoding. Last, we also propose a new solution named Adaptive LDP for LOngitudinal and Multidimensional FREquency Estimates (ALLOMFREE), which randomly samples a single attribute to be sent with the whole privacy budget and adaptively selects the optimal protocol, i.e., either L-GRR or L-OSUE. As shown in the results, ALLOMFREE consistently and considerably outperforms the state-of-the-art L-SUE and L-OUE protocols in the quality of the frequency estimates.

We present SuperLocalMemory, a local-first memory system for multi-agent AI that defends against OWASP ASI06 memory poisoning through architectural isolation and Bayesian trust scoring, while personalizing retrieval through adaptive learning-to-rank -- all without cloud dependencies or LLM inference calls. As AI agents increasingly rely on persistent memory, cloud-based memory systems create centralized attack surfaces where poisoned memories propagate across sessions and users -- a threat demonstrated in documented attacks against production systems. Our architecture combines SQLite-backed storage with FTS5 full-text search, Leiden-based knowledge graph clustering, an event-driven coordination layer with per-agent provenance, and an adaptive re-ranking framework that learns user preferences through three-layer behavioral analysis (cross-project technology preferences, project context detection, and workflow pattern mining). Evaluation across seven benchmark dimensions demonstrates 10.6ms median search latency, zero concurrency errors under 10 simultaneous agents, trust separation (gap =0.90) with 72% trust degradation for sleeper attacks, and 104% improvement in NDCG@5 when adaptive re-ranking is enabled. Behavioral data is isolated in a separate database with GDPR Article 17 erasure support. SuperLocalMemory is open-source (MIT) and integrates with 17+ development tools via Model Context Protocol.

The modern surge in camera usage alongside widespread computer vision technology applications poses significant privacy and security concerns. Current artificial intelligence (AI) technologies aid in recognizing relevant events and assisting in daily tasks in homes, offices, hospitals, etc. The need to access or process personal information for these purposes raises privacy concerns. While software-level solutions like face de-identification provide a good privacy/utility trade-off, they present vulnerabilities to sniffing attacks. In this paper, we propose a hardware-level face de-identification method to solve this vulnerability. Specifically, our approach first learns an optical encoder along with a regression model to obtain a face heatmap while hiding the face identity from the source image. We also propose an anonymization framework that generates a new face using the privacy-preserving image, face heatmap, and a reference face image from a public dataset as input. We validate our approach with extensive simulations and hardware experiments.

Large-scale image datasets frequently contain identifiable or sensitive content, raising privacy risks when training models that may memorize and leak such information. We present Unsafe2Safe, a fully automated pipeline that detects privacy-prone images and rewrites only their sensitive regions using multimodally guided diffusion editing. Unsafe2Safe operates in two stages. Stage 1 uses a vision-language model to (i) inspect images for privacy risks, (ii) generate paired private and public captions that respectively include and omit sensitive attributes, and (iii) prompt a large language model to produce structured, identity-neutral edit instructions conditioned on the public caption. Stage 2 employs instruction-driven diffusion editors to apply these dual textual prompts, producing privacy-safe images that preserve global structure and task-relevant semantics while neutralizing private content. To measure anonymization quality, we introduce a unified evaluation suite covering Quality, Cheating, Privacy, and Utility dimensions. Across MS-COCO, Caltech101, and MIT Indoor67, Unsafe2Safe reduces face similarity, text similarity, and demographic predictability by large margins, while maintaining downstream model accuracy comparable to training on raw data. Fine-tuning diffusion editors on our automatically generated triplets (private caption, public caption, edit instruction) further improves both privacy protection and semantic fidelity. Unsafe2Safe provides a scalable, principled solution for constructing large, privacy-safe datasets without sacrificing visual consistency or downstream utility.

We identify a novel phenomenon in language models: benign fine-tuning of frontier models can lead to privacy collapse. We find that diverse, subtle patterns in training data can degrade contextual privacy, including optimisation for helpfulness, exposure to user information, emotional and subjective dialogue, and debugging code printing internal variables, among others. Fine-tuned models lose their ability to reason about contextual privacy norms, share information inappropriately with tools, and violate memory boundaries across contexts. Privacy collapse is a ``silent failure'' because models maintain high performance on standard safety and utility benchmarks whilst exhibiting severe privacy vulnerabilities. Our experiments show evidence of privacy collapse across six models (closed and open weight), five fine-tuning datasets (real-world and controlled data), and two task categories (agentic and memory-based). Our mechanistic analysis reveals that privacy representations are uniquely fragile to fine-tuning, compared to task-relevant features which are preserved. Our results reveal a critical gap in current safety evaluations, in particular for the deployment of specialised agents.

With LLMs increasingly deployed in corporate data management, it is crucial to ensure that these models do not leak sensitive information. In the context of corporate data management, the concept of sensitivity awareness has been introduced, enabling LLMs to adhere to predefined access rights rules. However, it remains unclear how sensitivity awareness relates to established notions of privacy, such as differential privacy (DP), thereby making it difficult to deploy meaningfully in real-world applications. In this work, we formalize the notion of sensitivity awareness and theoretically establish its connection to DP. Additionally, we develop a supervised fine-tuning recipe to make existing, four-bit quantized LLMs more sensitivity-aware. With a performance boost of up to 21.7%, the finetuned LLMs not only substantially improve over their baseline but also outperform other full-precision open-source and commercial models of similar size in achieving sensitivity awareness, demonstrating the effectiveness of our proposed approach. At the same time, our method also largely preserves the models' performance on other tasks, such as general instruction-following, mathematical, and common-sense reasoning.

The memorization of sensitive and personally identifiable information (PII) by large language models (LLMs) poses growing privacy risks as models scale and are increasingly deployed in real-world applications. Existing efforts to study sensitive and PII data memorization and develop mitigation strategies are hampered by the absence of comprehensive, realistic, and ethically sourced datasets reflecting the diversity of sensitive information found on the web. We introduce PANORAMA - Profile-based Assemblage for Naturalistic Online Representation and Attribute Memorization Analysis, a large-scale synthetic corpus of 384,789 samples derived from 9,674 synthetic profiles designed to closely emulate the distribution, variety, and context of PII and sensitive data as it naturally occurs in online environments. Our data generation pipeline begins with the construction of internally consistent, multi-attribute human profiles using constrained selection to reflect real-world demographics such as education, health attributes, financial status, etc. Using a combination of zero-shot prompting and OpenAI o3-mini, we generate diverse content types - including wiki-style articles, social media posts, forum discussions, online reviews, comments, and marketplace listings - each embedding realistic, contextually appropriate PII and other sensitive information. We validate the utility of PANORAMA by fine-tuning the Mistral-7B model on 1x, 5x, 10x, and 25x data replication rates with a subset of data and measure PII memorization rates - revealing not only consistent increases with repetition but also variation across content types, highlighting PANORAMA's ability to model how memorization risks differ by context. Our dataset and code are publicly available, providing a much-needed resource for privacy risk assessment, model auditing, and the development of privacy-preserving LLMs.

The high cost of ownership of AI compute infrastructure and challenges of robust serving of large language models (LLMs) has led to a surge in managed Model-as-a-service deployments. Even when enterprises choose on-premises deployments, the compute infrastructure is typically shared across many teams in order to maximize the return on investment. In both scenarios the deployed models operate only on plaintext data, and so enterprise data owners must allow their data to appear in plaintext on a shared or multi-tenant compute infrastructure. This results in data owners with private or sensitive data being hesitant or restricted in what data they use with these types of deployments. In this work we introduce the Stained Glass Transform, a learned, stochastic, and sequence dependent transformation of the word embeddings of an LLM which information theoretically provides privacy to the input of the LLM while preserving the utility of model. We theoretically connect a particular class of Stained Glass Transforms to the theory of mutual information of Gaussian Mixture Models. We then calculate a-postiori privacy estimates, based on mutual information, and verify the privacy and utility of instances of transformed embeddings through token level metrics of privacy and standard LLM performance benchmarks.

Numerous companies have started offering services based on large language models (LLM), such as ChatGPT, which inevitably raises privacy concerns as users' prompts are exposed to the model provider. Previous research on secure reasoning using multi-party computation (MPC) has proven to be impractical for LLM applications due to its time-consuming and communication-intensive nature. While lightweight anonymization techniques can protect private information in prompts through substitution or masking, they fail to recover sensitive data replaced in the LLM-generated results. In this paper, we expand the application scenarios of anonymization techniques by training a small local model to de-anonymize the LLM's returned results with minimal computational overhead. We introduce the HaS framework, where "H(ide)" and "S(eek)" represent its two core processes: hiding private entities for anonymization and seeking private entities for de-anonymization, respectively. To quantitatively assess HaS's privacy protection performance, we propose both black-box and white-box adversarial models. Furthermore, we conduct experiments to evaluate HaS's usability in translation and classification tasks. The experimental findings demonstrate that the HaS framework achieves an optimal balance between privacy protection and utility.

While Trusted Execution Environments provide a strong foundation for secure cloud computing, they remain vulnerable to access pattern leakages. Oblivious Maps (OMAPs) mitigate this by fully hiding access patterns but suffer from high overhead due to randomized remapping and worst-case padding. We argue these costs are not fundamental. Modern accelerators featuring High-Bandwidth Memory (HBM) offer a new opportunity: Vaswani et al. [OSDI'18] point out that eavesdropping on HBM is difficult -- even for physical attackers -- as its memory channels are sealed together with processor cores inside the same physical package. Later, Hunt et al. [NSDI'20] show that, with proper isolation, HBM can be turned into an unobservable region where both data and memory traces are hidden. This motivates a rethink of OMAP design with HBM-backed solutions to finally overcome their traditional performance limits. Building on these insights, we present BOLT, a Bandwidth Optimized, Lightning-fast OMAP accelerator that, for the first time, achieves O(1) + O(log_2(log_2 (N))) bandwidth overhead. BOLT introduces three key innovations: (i) a new OMAP algorithm that leverages isolated HBM as an unobservable cache to accelerate oblivious access to large host memory; (ii) a self-hosted architecture that offloads execution and memory control from the host to mitigate CPU-side leakage; and (iii) tailored algorithm-architecture co-designs that maximize resource efficiency. We implement a prototype BOLT on a Xilinx U55C FPGA. Evaluations show that BOLT achieves up to 279x and 480x speedups in initialization and query time, respectively, over state-of-the-art OMAPs, including an industry implementation from Facebook.

With 3.78 billion social media users worldwide in 2021 (48% of the human population), almost 3 billion images are shared daily. At the same time, a consistent evolution of smartphone cameras has led to a photography explosion with 85% of all new pictures being captured using smartphones. However, lately, there has been an increased discussion of privacy concerns when a person being photographed is unaware of the picture being taken or has reservations about the same being shared. These privacy violations are amplified for people with disabilities, who may find it challenging to raise dissent even if they are aware. Such unauthorized image captures may also be misused to gain sympathy by third-party organizations, leading to a privacy breach. Privacy for people with disabilities has so far received comparatively less attention from the AI community. This motivates us to work towards a solution to generate privacy-conscious cues for raising awareness in smartphone users of any sensitivity in their viewfinder content. To this end, we introduce PrivPAS (A real time Privacy-Preserving AI System) a novel framework to identify sensitive content. Additionally, we curate and annotate a dataset to identify and localize accessibility markers and classify whether an image is sensitive to a featured subject with a disability. We demonstrate that the proposed lightweight architecture, with a memory footprint of a mere 8.49MB, achieves a high mAP of 89.52% on resource-constrained devices. Furthermore, our pipeline, trained on face anonymized data, achieves an F1-score of 73.1%.

AI memory systems are evolving toward unified context layers that enable efficient cross-agent collaboration and multi-tool workflows, facilitating better accumulation of personal data and learning of user preferences. However, centralization creates a trust crisis where users must entrust cloud providers with sensitive digital memory data. We identify a core tension between personalization demands and data sovereignty: centralized memory systems enable efficient cross-agent collaboration but expose users' sensitive data to cloud provider risks, while private deployments provide security but limit collaboration. To resolve this tension, we aim to achieve local-equivalent security while enabling superior maintenance efficiency and collaborative capabilities. We propose a five-layer architecture abstracting common functional components of AI memory systems: Storage, Extraction, Learning, Retrieval, and Governance. By applying TEE protection to each layer, we establish a trustworthy framework. Based on this, we design MemTrust, a hardware-backed zero-trust architecture that provides cryptographic guarantees across all layers. Our contributions include the five-layer abstraction, "Context from MemTrust" protocol for cross-application sharing, side-channel hardened retrieval with obfuscated access patterns, and comprehensive security analysis. The architecture enables third-party developers to port existing systems with acceptable development costs, achieving system-wide trustworthiness. We believe that AI memory plays a crucial role in enhancing the efficiency and collaboration of agents and AI tools. AI memory will become the foundational infrastructure for AI agents, and MemTrust serves as a universal trusted framework for AI memory systems, with the goal of becoming the infrastructure of memory infrastructure.

Current LLM-based services typically require users to submit raw text regardless of its sensitivity. While intuitive, such practice introduces substantial privacy risks, as unauthorized access may expose personal, medical, or legal information. Although prior defenses strived to mitigate these risks, they often incur substantial computational overhead and degrade model performance. To overcome this privacy-efficiency trade-off, we introduce Privacy-Preserving Fine-Tuning (PPFT), a novel training pipeline that eliminates the need for transmitting raw prompt text while maintaining a favorable balance between privacy preservation and model utility for both clients and service providers. Our approach operates in two stages: first, we train a client-side encoder together with a server-side projection module and LLM, enabling the server to condition on k-pooled prompt embeddings instead of raw text; second, we fine-tune the projection module and LLM on private, domain-specific data using noise-injected embeddings, allowing effective adaptation without exposing plain text prompts and requiring access to the decoder's internal parameters. Extensive experiments on domain-specific and general benchmarks demonstrate that PPFT achieves a striking balance between privacy and utility, maintaining competitive performance with minimal degradation compared to noise-free upper bounds.

Large Language Models (LLMs) represent a significant advancement in artificial intelligence, finding applications across various domains. However, their reliance on massive internet-sourced datasets for training brings notable privacy issues, which are exacerbated in critical domains (e.g., healthcare). Moreover, certain application-specific scenarios may require fine-tuning these models on private data. This survey critically examines the privacy threats associated with LLMs, emphasizing the potential for these models to memorize and inadvertently reveal sensitive information. We explore current threats by reviewing privacy attacks on LLMs and propose comprehensive solutions for integrating privacy mechanisms throughout the entire learning pipeline. These solutions range from anonymizing training datasets to implementing differential privacy during training or inference and machine unlearning after training. Our comprehensive review of existing literature highlights ongoing challenges, available tools, and future directions for preserving privacy in LLMs. This work aims to guide the development of more secure and trustworthy AI systems by providing a thorough understanding of privacy preservation methods and their effectiveness in mitigating risks.

Large language models (LLMs) can memorize sensitive information, raising serious privacy concerns. Machine unlearning offers a potential solution to remove such information, but it remains unclear whether existing methods truly erase it or merely hide it within the model. A key challenge is quantifying the persistence of sensitive data under a unified evaluation framework. To address this, we construct a synthetic dataset containing fake private information and propose a white-box auditing framework to systematically assess whether claimed-forgotten information is genuinely removed. Using this framework, we evaluate five existing unlearning methods and find that a simple "inverse greedy" decoding -- selecting the least likely token at each step -- can recover supposedly forgotten private information. Our results reveal that current unlearning approaches often fail to fully eliminate sensitive information, highlighting the need for more reliable methods to ensure privacy in deployed LLMs.

Large language models pretrained on a huge amount of data capture rich knowledge and information in the training data. The ability of data memorization and regurgitation in pretrained language models, revealed in previous studies, brings the risk of data leakage. In order to effectively reduce these risks, we propose a framework DEPN to Detect and Edit Privacy Neurons in pretrained language models, partially inspired by knowledge neurons and model editing. In DEPN, we introduce a novel method, termed as privacy neuron detector, to locate neurons associated with private information, and then edit these detected privacy neurons by setting their activations to zero. Furthermore, we propose a privacy neuron aggregator dememorize private information in a batch processing manner. Experimental results show that our method can significantly and efficiently reduce the exposure of private data leakage without deteriorating the performance of the model. Additionally, we empirically demonstrate the relationship between model memorization and privacy neurons, from multiple perspectives, including model size, training time, prompts, privacy neuron distribution, illustrating the robustness of our approach.

The growing use of large language models in sensitive domains has exposed a critical weakness: the inability to ensure that private information can be permanently forgotten. Yet these systems still lack reliable mechanisms to guarantee that sensitive information can be permanently removed once it has been used. Retraining from the beginning is prohibitively costly, and existing unlearning methods remain fragmented, difficult to verify, and often vulnerable to recovery. This paper surveys recent research on machine unlearning for LLMs and considers how far current approaches can address these challenges. We review methods for evaluating whether forgetting has occurred, the resilience of unlearned models against adversarial attacks, and mechanisms that can support user trust when model complexity or proprietary limits restrict transparency. Technical solutions such as differential privacy, homomorphic encryption, federated learning, and ephemeral memory are examined alongside institutional safeguards including auditing practices and regulatory frameworks. The review finds steady progress, but robust and verifiable unlearning is still unresolved. Efficient techniques that avoid costly retraining, stronger defenses against adversarial recovery, and governance structures that reinforce accountability are needed if LLMs are to be deployed safely in sensitive applications. By integrating technical and organizational perspectives, this study outlines a pathway toward AI systems that can be required to forget, while maintaining both privacy and public trust.

The pervasiveness of proprietary language models has raised critical privacy concerns, necessitating advancements in private inference (PI), where computations are performed directly on encrypted data without revealing users' sensitive information. While PI offers a promising solution, its practical deployment is hindered by substantial communication and latency overheads, primarily stemming from nonlinear operations. To address this, we introduce an information-theoretic framework to characterize the role of nonlinearities in decoder-only language models, laying a principled foundation for optimizing transformer-architectures tailored to the demands of PI. By leveraging Shannon's entropy as a quantitative measure, we uncover the previously unexplored dual significance of nonlinearities: beyond ensuring training stability, they are crucial for maintaining attention head diversity. Specifically, we find that their removal triggers two critical failure modes: {\em entropy collapse} in deeper layers that destabilizes training, and {\em entropic overload} in earlier layers that leads to under-utilization of Multi-Head Attention's (MHA) representational capacity. We propose an entropy-guided attention mechanism paired with a novel entropy regularization technique to mitigate entropic overload. Additionally, we explore PI-friendly alternatives to layer normalization for preventing entropy collapse and stabilizing the training of LLMs with reduced-nonlinearities. Our study bridges the gap between information theory and architectural design, establishing entropy dynamics as a principled guide for developing efficient PI architectures. The code and implementation are available at https://github.com/Nandan91/entropy-guided-attention-llm{entropy-guided-llm}.

Large Language Models (LLMs) deployed on mobile devices offer benefits like user privacy and reduced network latency, but introduce a significant security risk: the leakage of proprietary models to end users. To mitigate this risk, we propose a system design for protecting on-device LLMs using Arm Trusted Execution Environment (TEE), TrustZone. Our system addresses two primary challenges: (1) The dilemma between memory efficiency and fast inference (caching model parameters within TEE memory). (2) The lack of efficient and secure Neural Processing Unit (NPU) time-sharing between Rich Execution Environment (REE) and TEE. Our approach incorporates two key innovations. First, we employ pipelined restoration, leveraging the deterministic memory access patterns of LLM inference to prefetch parameters on demand, hiding memory allocation, I/O and decryption latency under computation time. Second, we introduce a co-driver design, creating a minimal data plane NPU driver in the TEE that collaborates with the full-fledged REE driver. This reduces the TEE TCB size and eliminates control plane reinitialization overhead during NPU world switches. We implemented our system on the emerging OpenHarmony OS and the llama.cpp inference framework, and evaluated it with various LLMs on an Arm Rockchip device. Compared to a strawman TEE baseline lacking our optimizations, our system reduces TTFT by up to 90.9% and increases decoding speed by up to 23.2%.

While Code Language Models (CLMs) have demonstrated superior performance in software engineering tasks such as code generation and summarization, recent empirical studies reveal a critical privacy vulnerability: these models exhibit unintended memorization of sensitive training data, enabling verbatim reproduction of confidential information when specifically prompted. To address this issue, several approaches, including training data de-duplication and differential privacy augmentation, have been proposed. However, these methods require full-model retraining for deployed CLMs, which incurs substantial computational costs. In this paper, we aim to answer the following research question: Can sensitive information memorized by CLMs be erased effectively and efficiently? We conduct a pioneering investigation into erasing sensitive memorization in CLMs through machine unlearning - a post-hoc modification method that removes specific information from trained models without requiring full retraining. Specifically, we first quantify the memorization risks of sensitive data within CLM training datasets and curate a high-risk dataset of 50,000 sensitive memorized samples as unlearning targets. We study two widely used gradient ascent-based unlearning approaches: the vanilla and constraint-based methods, and introduce CodeEraser, an advanced variant that selectively unlearns sensitive memorized segments in code while preserving the structural integrity and functional correctness of the surrounding code. Extensive experiments on three families of CLMs, i.e., CodeParrot, CodeGen-Mono, and Qwen2.5-Coder, validate the effectiveness and efficiency of CodeEraser in erasing targeted sensitive memorization while maintaining model utility.

Modern large language models (LLMs) are trained on massive, largely unfiltered datasets, including content scraped from nearly every accessible website and user inputs. As a result, LLMs often memorize and reproduce personally sensitive information (PSI) such as birth dates, phone numbers, and home addresses. This leads to significant privacy risks, particularly for high-profile individuals such as executives, politicians, and judges. Existing mitigations largely rely on machine unlearning. However, these methods often remove more information than needed, degrade model utility and safety, and are highly vulnerable to attacks. This paper presents Whiteout, a practical tool that, upon requests by individuals, prevents LLMs from regurgitating their genuine PSIs, by overwriting them using precise and carefully designed obfuscation samples. We evaluate Whiteout on modern LLMs of varying sizes and makers, including a widely-used OpenAI model. Results show that Whiteout effectively prevents disclosure of the targeted PSIs, has negligible impact on model utility and safety, and outperforms existing alternatives. We also test Whiteout against a wide range of countermeasures, from black-box attacks like jailbreaking to white-box adaptive attacks like relearning and quantization. Finally, we conclude with a discussion on the security and ethical implications of Whiteout.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has attracted significant attention due to its ability to combine the generative capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) with knowledge obtained through efficient retrieval mechanisms over large-scale data collections. Currently, the majority of existing approaches overlook the risks associated with exposing sensitive or access-controlled information directly to the generation model. Only a few approaches propose techniques to instruct the generative model to refrain from disclosing sensitive information; however, recent studies have also demonstrated that LLMs remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks that can override intended behavioral constraints. For these reasons, we propose a novel approach to Selective Disclosure in Retrieval-Augmented Generation, called SD-RAG, which decouples the enforcement of security and privacy constraints from the generation process itself. Rather than relying on prompt-level safeguards, SD-RAG applies sanitization and disclosure controls during the retrieval phase, prior to augmenting the language model's input. Moreover, we introduce a semantic mechanism to allow the ingestion of human-readable dynamic security and privacy constraints together with an optimized graph-based data model that supports fine-grained, policy-aware retrieval. Our experimental evaluation demonstrates the superiority of SD-RAG over baseline existing approaches, achieving up to a 58% improvement in the privacy score, while also showing a strong resilience to prompt injection attacks targeting the generative model.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used as personal agents, accessing sensitive user data such as calendars, emails, and medical records. Users currently face a trade-off: They can send private records, many of which are stored in remote databases, to powerful but untrusted LLM providers, increasing their exposure risk. Alternatively, they can run less powerful models locally on trusted devices. We bridge this gap. Our Socratic Chain-of-Thought Reasoning first sends a generic, non-private user query to a powerful, untrusted LLM, which generates a Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompt and detailed sub-queries without accessing user data. Next, we embed these sub-queries and perform encrypted sub-second semantic search using our Homomorphically Encrypted Vector Database across one million entries of a single user's private data. This represents a realistic scale of personal documents, emails, and records accumulated over years of digital activity. Finally, we feed the CoT prompt and the decrypted records to a local language model and generate the final response. On the LoCoMo long-context QA benchmark, our hybrid framework, combining GPT-4o with a local Llama-3.2-1B model, outperforms using GPT-4o alone by up to 7.1 percentage points. This demonstrates a first step toward systems where tasks are decomposed and split between untrusted strong LLMs and weak local ones, preserving user privacy.

This paper aims to advance our understanding of how Visual Language Models (VLMs) handle privacy-sensitive information, a crucial concern as these technologies become integral to everyday life. To this end, we introduce a new benchmark PrivBench, which contains images from 8 sensitive categories such as passports, or fingerprints. We evaluate 10 state-of-the-art VLMs on this benchmark and observe a generally limited understanding of privacy, highlighting a significant area for model improvement. Based on this we introduce PrivTune, a new instruction-tuning dataset aimed at equipping VLMs with knowledge about visual privacy. By tuning two pretrained VLMs, TinyLLaVa and MiniGPT-v2, on this small dataset, we achieve strong gains in their ability to recognize sensitive content, outperforming even GPT4-V. At the same time, we show that privacy-tuning only minimally affects the VLMs performance on standard benchmarks such as VQA. Overall, this paper lays out a crucial challenge for making VLMs effective in handling real-world data safely and provides a simple recipe that takes the first step towards building privacy-aware VLMs.

Persistent personal agents combine long-term memory with access to users' external environments, enabling personalized foreground assistance and proactive background execution. This integration also creates a new path to compromise: untrusted external content can be silently written into persistent memory and later reused as trusted state. We study this threat as stealth memory injection, in which a remote black-box adversary delivers a single email payload that must induce the agent to write poisoned memory, stay hidden in the agent's response to the user, and affect future behavior. We introduce WhisperBench, a 108-case benchmark spanning five risk categories and both fact and preference poisoning. Built on a real IMAP/SMTP workflow and an authentic email agent skill, it enables full-cycle evaluation of stealth memory injection attacks. To enable this black-box attack under single-email delivery and without runtime feedback, we propose MemGhost, a one-shot payload generation framework. MemGhost uses an environment proxy to emulate persistent-agent execution and an objective proxy to convert memory adoption and conversational stealth into dense rubric-based rewards, then trains the attacker policy with supervised fine-tuning and reinforcement learning. Across 56 held-out test cases, MemGhost achieves 87.5% end-to-end success on OpenClaw with GPT-5.4 and 71.4% on Claude Code SDK with Sonnet 4.6. It also transfers across personal-agent architectures (NanoClaw and Hermes Agent) and memory backends (filesystem and vector-based Mem0), and remains effective against input-level, model-level, and system-level defenses. These results suggest that persistent memory can turn ordinary external processing into a practical pathway for long-term agent compromise.

Modern machine learning systems use models trained on ever-growing corpora. Typically, metadata such as ownership, access control, or licensing information is ignored during training. Instead, to mitigate privacy risks, we rely on generic techniques such as dataset sanitization and differentially private model training, with inherent privacy/utility trade-offs that hurt model performance. Moreover, these techniques have limitations in scenarios where sensitive information is shared across multiple participants and fine-grained access control is required. By ignoring metadata, we therefore miss an opportunity to better address security, privacy, and confidentiality challenges. In this paper, we take an information flow control perspective to describe machine learning systems, which allows us to leverage metadata such as access control policies and define clear-cut privacy and confidentiality guarantees with interpretable information flows. Under this perspective, we contrast two different approaches to achieve user-level non-interference: 1) fine-tuning per-user models, and 2) retrieval augmented models that access user-specific datasets at inference time. We compare these two approaches to a trivially non-interfering zero-shot baseline using a public model and to a baseline that fine-tunes this model on the whole corpus. We evaluate trained models on two datasets of scientific articles and demonstrate that retrieval augmented architectures deliver the best utility, scalability, and flexibility while satisfying strict non-interference guarantees.

We often interact with untrusted parties. Prioritization of privacy can limit the effectiveness of these interactions, as achieving certain goals necessitates sharing private data. Traditionally, addressing this challenge has involved either seeking trusted intermediaries or constructing cryptographic protocols that restrict how much data is revealed, such as multi-party computations or zero-knowledge proofs. While significant advances have been made in scaling cryptographic approaches, they remain limited in terms of the size and complexity of applications they can be used for. In this paper, we argue that capable machine learning models can fulfill the role of a trusted third party, thus enabling secure computations for applications that were previously infeasible. In particular, we describe Trusted Capable Model Environments (TCMEs) as an alternative approach for scaling secure computation, where capable machine learning model(s) interact under input/output constraints, with explicit information flow control and explicit statelessness. This approach aims to achieve a balance between privacy and computational efficiency, enabling private inference where classical cryptographic solutions are currently infeasible. We describe a number of use cases that are enabled by TCME, and show that even some simple classic cryptographic problems can already be solved with TCME. Finally, we outline current limitations and discuss the path forward in implementing them.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can memorize and reveal personal information, raising concerns regarding compliance with the EU's GDPR, particularly the Right to Be Forgotten (RTBF). Existing machine unlearning methods assume the data to forget is already known but do not address how to identify which individual-fact associations are stored in the model. Privacy auditing techniques typically operate at the population level or target a small set of identifiers, limiting applicability to individual-level data inquiries. We introduce WikiMem, a dataset of over 5,000 natural language canaries covering 243 human-related properties from Wikidata, and a model-agnostic metric to quantify human-fact associations in LLMs. Our approach ranks ground-truth values against counterfactuals using calibrated negative log-likelihood across paraphrased prompts. We evaluate 200 individuals across 15 LLMs (410M-70B parameters), showing that memorization correlates with subject web presence and model scale. We provide a foundation for identifying memorized personal data in LLMs at the individual level, enabling the dynamic construction of forget sets for machine unlearning and RTBF requests.

As generative agents become increasingly sophisticated and deployed in long-term interactive scenarios, their memory management capabilities emerge as a critical bottleneck for both performance and privacy. Current approaches either maintain unlimited memory stores, leading to computational intractability and privacy concerns, or employ simplistic forgetting mechanisms that compromise agent coherence and functionality. This paper introduces the Memory-Aware Retention Schema (MaRS), a novel framework for human-centered memory management in generative agents, coupled with six theoretically-grounded forgetting policies that balance performance, privacy, and computational efficiency. We present the Forgetful but Faithful Agent (FiFA) benchmark, a comprehensive evaluation framework that assesses agent performance across narrative coherence, goal completion, social recall accuracy, privacy preservation, and cost efficiency. Through extensive experimentation involving 300 evaluation runs across multiple memory budgets and agent configurations, we demonstrate that our hybrid forgetting policy achieves superior performance (composite score: 0.911) while maintaining computational tractability and privacy guarantees. Our work establishes new benchmarks for memory-budgeted agent evaluation and provides practical guidelines for deploying generative agents in resource-constrained, privacy-sensitive environments. The theoretical foundations, implementation framework, and empirical results contribute to the emerging field of human-centered AI by addressing fundamental challenges in agent memory management that directly impact user trust, system scalability, and regulatory compliance.

End users face a choice between privacy and efficiency in current Large Language Model (LLM) service paradigms. In cloud-based paradigms, users are forced to compromise data locality for generation quality and processing speed. Conversely, edge device paradigms maintain data locality but fail to deliver satisfactory performance. In this work, we propose a novel LLM service paradigm that distributes privacy-sensitive computation on edge devices and shared computation in the cloud. Only activations are transmitted between the central cloud and edge devices to ensure data locality. Our core innovation, PrivateLoRA, addresses the challenging communication overhead by exploiting the low rank of residual activations, achieving over 95% communication reduction. Consequently, PrivateLoRA effectively maintains data locality and is extremely resource efficient. Under standard 5G networks, PrivateLoRA achieves throughput over 300% of device-only solutions for 7B models and over 80% of an A100 GPU for 33B models. PrivateLoRA also provides tuning performance comparable to LoRA for advanced personalization. Our approach democratizes access to state-of-the-art generative AI for edge devices, paving the way for more tailored LLM experiences for the general public. To our knowledge, our proposed framework is the first efficient and privacy-preserving LLM solution in the literature.

Coding agents and LLM-powered applications routinely send potentially sensitive content to cloud LLM APIs where it may be logged, retained, used for training, or subpoenaed. Existing privacy tooling focuses on network-level encryption and organization-level DLP, neither of which addresses the content of prompts themselves. We present a systematic empirical evaluation of eight techniques for privacy-preserving LLM requests: (A) local-only inference, (B) redaction with placeholder restoration, (C) semantic rephrasing, (D) Trusted Execution Environment hosted inference, (E) split inference, (F) fully homomorphic encryption, (G) secret sharing via multi-party computation, and (H) differential-privacy noise. We implement all eight (or a tractable research-stage subset where deployment is not yet feasible) in an open-source shim compatible with MCP and any OpenAI-compatible API. We evaluate the four practical options (A, B, C, H) and their combinations across four workload classes using a ground-truth-labelled leak benchmark of 1,300 samples with 4,014 annotations. Our headline finding is that no single technique dominates: the combination A+B+C (route locally when possible, redact and rephrase the rest) achieves 0.6% combined leak on PII and 31.3% on proprietary code, with zero exact leaks on PII across 500 samples. We present a decision rule that selects the appropriate option(s) from a threat-model budget and workload characterisation. Code, benchmarks, and evaluation harness are released at https://github.com/jayluxferro/llm-redactor.

Machine unlearning for large language models often faces a privacy dilemma in which strict constraints prohibit sharing either the server's parameters or the client's forget set. To address this dual non-disclosure constraint, we propose MPU, an algorithm-agnostic privacy-preserving Multiple Perturbed Copies Unlearning framework that primarily introduces two server-side modules: Pre-Process for randomized copy generation and Post-Process for update aggregation. In Pre-Process, the server distributes multiple perturbed and reparameterized model instances, allowing the client to execute unlearning locally on its private forget set without accessing the server's exact original parameters. After local unlearning, the server performs Post-Process by inverting the reparameterization and aggregating updates with a harmonic denoising procedure to alleviate the impact of perturbation. Experiments with seven unlearning algorithms show that MPU achieves comparable unlearning performance to noise-free baselines, with most algorithms' average degradation well below 1% under 10% noise, and can even outperform the noise-free baseline for some algorithms under 1% noise. Code is available at https://github.com/Tristan-SHU/MPU.

Prompt tuning provides an efficient way for users to customize Large Language Models (LLMs) with their private data in the emerging LLM service scenario. However, the sensitive nature of private data brings the need for privacy preservation in LLM service customization. Based on prompt tuning, we propose Privacy-Preserving Prompt Tuning (RAPT), a framework that provides privacy guarantees for LLM services. rapt adopts a local privacy setting, allowing users to privatize their data locally with local differential privacy. As prompt tuning performs poorly when directly trained on privatized data, we introduce a novel privatized token reconstruction task that is trained jointly with the downstream task, allowing LLMs to learn better task-dependent representations. Despite the simplicity of our framework, experiments show that RAPT achieves competitive performance across tasks while providing privacy guarantees against adversaries.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities in understanding and generating natural language. However, these models can inadvertently memorize private information, posing significant privacy risks. This study addresses the challenge of enabling LLMs to protect specific individuals' private data without the need for complete retraining. We propose \return, a Real-world pErsonal daTa UnleaRNing dataset, comprising 2,492 individuals from Wikipedia with associated QA pairs, to evaluate machine unlearning (MU) methods for protecting personal data in a realistic scenario. Additionally, we introduce the Name-Aware Unlearning Framework (NAUF) for Privacy Protection, which enables the model to learn which individuals' information should be protected without affecting its ability to answer questions related to other unrelated individuals. Our extensive experiments demonstrate that NAUF achieves a state-of-the-art average unlearning score, surpassing the best baseline method by 5.65 points, effectively protecting target individuals' personal data while maintaining the model's general capabilities.

Language models (LMs) are trained on vast amounts of text data, which may include private and copyrighted content. Data owners may request the removal of their data from a trained model due to privacy or copyright concerns. However, exactly unlearning only these datapoints (i.e., retraining with the data removed) is intractable in modern-day models. This has led to the development of many approximate unlearning algorithms. The evaluation of the efficacy of these algorithms has traditionally been narrow in scope, failing to precisely quantify the success and practicality of the algorithm from the perspectives of both the model deployers and the data owners. We address this issue by proposing MUSE, a comprehensive machine unlearning evaluation benchmark that enumerates six diverse desirable properties for unlearned models: (1) no verbatim memorization, (2) no knowledge memorization, (3) no privacy leakage, (4) utility preservation on data not intended for removal, (5) scalability with respect to the size of removal requests, and (6) sustainability over sequential unlearning requests. Using these criteria, we benchmark how effectively eight popular unlearning algorithms on 7B-parameter LMs can unlearn Harry Potter books and news articles. Our results demonstrate that most algorithms can prevent verbatim memorization and knowledge memorization to varying degrees, but only one algorithm does not lead to severe privacy leakage. Furthermore, existing algorithms fail to meet deployer's expectations because they often degrade general model utility and also cannot sustainably accommodate successive unlearning requests or large-scale content removal. Our findings identify key issues with the practicality of existing unlearning algorithms on language models, and we release our benchmark to facilitate further evaluations: muse-bench.github.io

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

Selective knowledge erasure from LLMs is critical for GDPR compliance and model safety, yet current unlearning methods conflate behavioral suppression with true knowledge removal, allowing latent capabilities to persist beneath surface-level refusals. In this work, we address this challenge by introducing Knowledge Immunization Framework (KIF), a representation-aware architecture that distinguishes genuine erasure from obfuscation by targeting internal activation signatures rather than surface outputs. Our approach combines dynamic suppression of subject-specific representations with parameter-efficient adaptation, enabling durable unlearning without full model retraining. KIF achieves near-oracle erasure (FQ approx 0.99 vs. 1.00) while preserving utility at oracle levels (MU = 0.62), effectively breaking the stability-erasure tradeoff that has constrained all prior work. We evaluate both standard foundation models (Llama and Mistral) and reasoning-prior models (Qwen and DeepSeek) across 3B to 14B parameters. Our observation shows that standard models exhibit scale-independent true erasure (<3% utility drift), while reasoning-prior models reveal fundamental architectural divergence. Our comprehensive dual-metric evaluation protocol, combining surface-level leakage with latent trace persistence, operationalizes the obfuscation - erasure distinction and enables the first systematic diagnosis of mechanism-level forgetting behavior across model families and scales.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance and received significant research interest. The enormous computational demands, however, hinder the local deployment on devices with limited resources. The current prevalent LLM inference paradigms require users to send queries to the service providers for processing, which raises critical privacy concerns. Existing approaches propose to allow the users to obfuscate the token embeddings before transmission and utilize local models for denoising. Nonetheless, transmitting the token embeddings and deploying local models may result in excessive communication and computation overhead, preventing practical implementation. In this work, we propose DEL, a framework for Differentially private and communication Efficient LLM split inference. More specifically, an embedding projection module and a differentially private stochastic quantization mechanism are proposed to reduce the communication overhead in a privacy-preserving manner. To eliminate the need for local models, we adapt soft prompt at the server side to compensate for the utility degradation caused by privacy. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that utilizes soft prompt to improve the trade-off between privacy and utility in LLM inference, and extensive experiments on text generation and natural language understanding benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method.

The discourse on privacy risks in Large Language Models (LLMs) has disproportionately focused on verbatim memorization of training data, while a constellation of more immediate and scalable privacy threats remain underexplored. This position paper argues that the privacy landscape of LLM systems extends far beyond training data extraction, encompassing risks from data collection practices, inference-time context leakage, autonomous agent capabilities, and the democratization of surveillance through deep inference attacks. We present a comprehensive taxonomy of privacy risks across the LLM lifecycle -- from data collection through deployment -- and demonstrate through case studies how current privacy frameworks fail to address these multifaceted threats. Through a longitudinal analysis of 1,322 AI/ML privacy papers published at leading conferences over the past decade (2016--2025), we reveal that while memorization receives outsized attention in technical research, the most pressing privacy harms lie elsewhere, where current technical approaches offer little traction and viable paths forward remain unclear. We call for a fundamental shift in how the research community approaches LLM privacy, moving beyond the narrow focus of current technical solutions and embracing interdisciplinary approaches that address the sociotechnical nature of these emerging threats.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is a powerful technique to facilitate language model with proprietary and private data, where data privacy is a pivotal concern. Whereas extensive research has demonstrated the privacy risks of large language models (LLMs), the RAG technique could potentially reshape the inherent behaviors of LLM generation, posing new privacy issues that are currently under-explored. In this work, we conduct extensive empirical studies with novel attack methods, which demonstrate the vulnerability of RAG systems on leaking the private retrieval database. Despite the new risk brought by RAG on the retrieval data, we further reveal that RAG can mitigate the leakage of the LLMs' training data. Overall, we provide new insights in this paper for privacy protection of retrieval-augmented LLMs, which benefit both LLMs and RAG systems builders. Our code is available at https://github.com/phycholosogy/RAG-privacy.

In LLM/VLM agents, prompt privacy risk propagates beyond a single model call because raw user content can flow into retrieval queries, memory writes, tool calls, and logs. Existing de-identification pipelines address document boundaries but not this cross-stage propagation. We propose BodhiPromptShield, a policy-aware framework that detects sensitive spans, routes them via typed placeholders, semantic abstraction, or secure symbolic mapping, and delays restoration to authorized boundaries. Relative to enterprise redaction, this adds explicit propagation-aware mediation and restoration timing as a security variable. Under controlled evaluation on the Controlled Prompt-Privacy Benchmark (CPPB), stage-wise propagation suppresses from 10.7\% to 7.1\% across retrieval, memory, and tool stages; PER reaches 9.3\% with 0.94 AC and 0.92 TSR, outperforming generic de-identification. These are controlled systems results on CPPB rather than formal privacy guarantees or public-benchmark transfer claims. The project repository is available at https://github.com/mabo1215/BodhiPromptShield.git.

Personal AI agents powered by large language models can reason and act using available tools to access emails, manage calendars, and push code to remote repositories, all with minimal oversight. When augmented with long-term memory, an agent can recall specific details relevant to the current task, reducing the need for large context windows. Currently, long-term memory agents tend to fall into two distinct domains: conversational and action-planning agents. Personal assistant agents sit at the convergence of these two domains and handle sensitive information while interacting with untrusted information sources, creating previously unaccounted security vulnerabilities. In this work, we introduce the novel attack vector, GhostWriter, which exploits current memory subsystems in tool-using personal agents to poison their memory store. GhostWriter operates in two phases: injection, where an adversary sends a hidden attack payload to the target agent; and activation, in which the poisoned memory is retrieved. We show that GhostWriter achieves near-universal injection rates of approximately 98% and a high average activation rate of approximately 60% against state-of-the-art agents. This attack is possible due to the lack of security-focused memory governance. In response, we propose Agentic Memory Sentry (AM-Sentry), which leverages two mitigation techniques: a memory-saving policy and a memory-retrieval screen. Our experiments show that AM-Sentry dramatically reduces GhostWriter's success rate while preserving agent utility.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have advanced automated multi-step reasoning, but their ability to generate complex Chain-of-Thought (CoT) trajectories introduces severe privacy risks, as sensitive information may be deeply embedded throughout the reasoning process. Existing Large Language Models (LLMs) unlearning approaches that typically focus on modifying only final answers are insufficient for LRMs, as they fail to remove sensitive content from intermediate steps, leading to persistent privacy leakage and degraded security. To address these challenges, we propose Sensitive Trajectory Regulation (STaR), a parameter-free, inference-time unlearning framework that achieves robust privacy protection throughout the reasoning process. Specifically, we first identify sensitive content via semantic-aware detection. Then, we inject global safety constraints through secure prompt prefix. Next, we perform trajectory-aware suppression to dynamically block sensitive content across the entire reasoning chain. Finally, we apply token-level adaptive filtering to prevent both exact and paraphrased sensitive tokens during generation. Furthermore, to overcome the inadequacies of existing evaluation protocols, we introduce two metrics: Multi-Decoding Consistency Assessment (MCS), which measures the consistency of unlearning across diverse decoding strategies, and Multi-Granularity Membership Inference Attack (MIA) Evaluation, which quantifies privacy protection at both answer and reasoning-chain levels. Experiments on the R-TOFU benchmark demonstrate that STaR achieves comprehensive and stable unlearning with minimal utility loss, setting a new standard for privacy-preserving reasoning in LRMs.

Language Models (LMs) have been shown to leak information about training data through sentence-level membership inference and reconstruction attacks. Understanding the risk of LMs leaking Personally Identifiable Information (PII) has received less attention, which can be attributed to the false assumption that dataset curation techniques such as scrubbing are sufficient to prevent PII leakage. Scrubbing techniques reduce but do not prevent the risk of PII leakage: in practice scrubbing is imperfect and must balance the trade-off between minimizing disclosure and preserving the utility of the dataset. On the other hand, it is unclear to which extent algorithmic defenses such as differential privacy, designed to guarantee sentence- or user-level privacy, prevent PII disclosure. In this work, we introduce rigorous game-based definitions for three types of PII leakage via black-box extraction, inference, and reconstruction attacks with only API access to an LM. We empirically evaluate the attacks against GPT-2 models fine-tuned with and without defenses in three domains: case law, health care, and e-mails. Our main contributions are (i) novel attacks that can extract up to 10times more PII sequences than existing attacks, (ii) showing that sentence-level differential privacy reduces the risk of PII disclosure but still leaks about 3% of PII sequences, and (iii) a subtle connection between record-level membership inference and PII reconstruction. Code to reproduce all experiments in the paper is available at https://github.com/microsoft/analysing_pii_leakage.

Our work tackles the challenge of securing user inputs in cloud-hosted large language model (LLM) serving while ensuring output invariance, model confidentiality, and compute efficiency. We introduce secure multi-party decoding (SMD), which leverages confidential computing to confine user prompts to a trusted execution environment (TEE), namely a confidential virtual machine (CVM), while allowing service providers to generate tokens efficiently. We also introduce a novel cryptographic method, prompt obfuscation (PO), to ensure robustness against reconstruction attacks on SMD. We demonstrate that our approach preserves both prompt confidentiality and LLM serving efficiency. Our solution can enable privacy-preserving cloud LLM serving that handles sensitive prompts, such as clinical records, financial data, and personal information.

Private large language model (LLM) inference based on secure multi-party computation (MPC) offers cryptographically-secure protection for both user prompt and proprietary model weights. However, it suffers from large latency overhead especially for long input sequences. While key-value (KV) cache eviction algorithms have been proposed to reduce the computation and memory cost for plaintext inference, they are not designed for MPC and cannot benefit private inference easily. In this paper, we propose an accurate and MPC-friendly KV cache eviction framework, dubbed MPCache. MPCache is built on the observation that historical tokens in a long sequence may have different effects on the downstream decoding. Hence, MPCache combines a look-once static eviction algorithm to discard unimportant tokens and a query-aware dynamic selection algorithm to further select a small subset of tokens for attention computation. As existing dynamic selection algorithms incur too much latency, we propose a series of optimizations to drastically reduce the KV cache selection overhead, including MPC-friendly similarity approximation, hierarchical KV cache clustering, and cross-layer index sharing strategy. With extensive experiments, we demonstrate that MPCache consistently outperforms prior-art KV cache eviction baselines across different LLM generation tasks and achieves 1.8~2.01x and 3.39~8.37x decoding latency and communication reduction on different sequence lengths, respectively.

Long-term memory enables large language model (LLM) agents to support personalized and sustained interactions. However, most work on personalized agents prioritizes utility and user experience, treating memory as a neutral component and largely overlooking its safety implications. In this paper, we reveal intent legitimation, a previously underexplored safety failure in personalized agents, where benign personal memories bias intent inference and cause models to legitimize inherently harmful queries. To study this phenomenon, we introduce PS-Bench, a benchmark designed to identify and quantify intent legitimation in personalized interactions. Across multiple memory-augmented agent frameworks and base LLMs, personalization increases attack success rates by 15.8%-243.7% relative to stateless baselines. We further provide mechanistic evidence for intent legitimation from internal representations space, and propose a lightweight detection-reflection method that effectively reduces safety degradation. Overall, our work provides the first systematic exploration and evaluation of intent legitimation as a safety failure mode that naturally arises from benign, real-world personalization, highlighting the importance of assessing safety under long-term personal context. WARNING: This paper may contain harmful content.

Cloud-based large language models (LLMs) require users to disclose plaintext data to service providers, creating privacy risks in sensitive domains. Existing privacy-preserving approaches often trade utility for protection, incur substantial computational or communication overhead, remain vulnerable to reconstruction from intermediate representations, or protect only a subset of the training and inference pipeline. We introduce Client-Resolved Generation (CRG), a genera- tion interface that separates server-side generation from the lexical realization of input-derived content. The client transmits only pooled and noise-perturbed rep- resentations, while input-derived output content is represented using request-local positional references and resolved to its original strings only on the client. This interface protects private input and input-derived output content during both train- ing and inference while allowing the service provider to keep its proprietary model parameters hidden from the client. At the same time, exact lexical reuse remains possible without directly exposing the reused content on the provider-visible gen- eration path. We evaluate CRG on medical and document-grounded QA, sensi- tive identifier transfer, and tool calling, together with reconstruction and raw-logit leakage analyses. On SealTools, CRG improves complete-call exact match from 57.3% to 79.9% over the input-privacy framework PPFT, with larger gains as more required output content can be resolved through references. Together, these results show that CRG provides a practical interface for privacy-sensitive cloud LLMs by reducing plaintext exposure across both input and output pathways while preserv- ing task utility and server-side model confidentiality.

State-of-the-art results on image recognition tasks are achieved using over-parameterized learning algorithms that (nearly) perfectly fit the training set and are known to fit well even random labels. This tendency to memorize the labels of the training data is not explained by existing theoretical analyses. Memorization of the training data also presents significant privacy risks when the training data contains sensitive personal information and thus it is important to understand whether such memorization is necessary for accurate learning. We provide the first conceptual explanation and a theoretical model for this phenomenon. Specifically, we demonstrate that for natural data distributions memorization of labels is necessary for achieving close-to-optimal generalization error. Crucially, even labels of outliers and noisy labels need to be memorized. The model is motivated and supported by the results of several recent empirical works. In our model, data is sampled from a mixture of subpopulations and our results show that memorization is necessary whenever the distribution of subpopulation frequencies is long-tailed. Image and text data is known to be long-tailed and therefore our results establish a formal link between these empirical phenomena. Our results allow to quantify the cost of limiting memorization in learning and explain the disparate effects that privacy and model compression have on different subgroups.

Large Language Models for Code (LLMs4Code) have achieved strong performance in code generation, but recent studies reveal that they may memorize and leak sensitive information contained in training data, posing serious privacy risks. To address this gap, this work presents the first comprehensive empirical study on applying machine unlearning to mitigate sensitive information leakage in LLMs4Code. We first construct a dedicated benchmark that includes: (i) a synthetic forget set containing diverse forms of personal information, and (ii) a retain set designed to evaluate whether code-generation capability is preserved after unlearning. Using this benchmark, we systematically assess three representative unlearning algorithms (GA, GA+GD, GA+KL) across three widely used open-source LLMs4Code models (AIXCoder-7B, CodeLlama-7B, CodeQwen-7B). Experimental results demonstrate that machine unlearning can substantially reduce direct memorization-based leakage: on average, the direct leak rate drops by more than 50% while retaining about over 91% of the original code-generation performance. Moreover, by analyzing post-unlearning outputs, we uncover a consistent shift from direct to indirect leakage, revealing an underexplored vulnerability that persists even when the target data has been successfully forgotten. Our findings show that machine unlearning is a feasible and effective solution for enhancing privacy protection in LLMs4Code, while also highlighting the need for future techniques capable of mitigating both direct and indirect leakage simultaneously.

Machine unlearning aims to selectively remove the influence of specific training samples to satisfy privacy regulations such as the GDPR's 'Right to be Forgotten'. However, many existing methods require access to the data being removed, exposing it to membership inference attacks and potential misuse of Personally Identifiable Information (PII). We address this critical challenge by proposing Shadow Unlearning, a novel paradigm of approximate unlearning, that performs machine unlearning on anonymized forget data without exposing PII. We further propose a novel privacy-preserving framework, Neuro-Semantic Projector Unlearning (NSPU) to achieve Shadow unlearning. To evaluate our method, we compile Multi-domain Fictitious Unlearning (MuFU) forget set across five diverse domains and introduce an evaluation stack to quantify the trade-off between knowledge retention and unlearning effectiveness. Experimental results on various LLMs show that NSPU achieves superior unlearning performance, preserves model utility, and enhances user privacy. Additionally, the proposed approach is at least 10 times more computationally efficient than standard unlearning approaches. Our findings foster a new direction for privacy-aware machine unlearning that balances data protection and model fidelity.

Semantic caching has emerged as a pivotal technique for scaling LLM applications, widely adopted by major providers including AWS and Microsoft. By utilizing semantic embedding vectors as cache keys, this mechanism effectively minimizes latency and redundant computation for semantically similar queries. In this work, we conceptualize semantic cache keys as a form of fuzzy hashes. We demonstrate that the locality required to maximize cache hit rates fundamentally conflicts with the cryptographic avalanche effect necessary for collision resistance. Our conceptual analysis formalizes this inherent trade-off between performance (locality) and security (collision resilience), revealing that semantic caching is naturally vulnerable to key collision attacks. While prior research has focused on side-channel and privacy risks, we present the first systematic study of integrity risks arising from cache collisions. We introduce CacheAttack, an automated framework for launching black-box collision attacks. We evaluate CacheAttack in security-critical tasks and agentic workflows. It achieves a hit rate of 86\% in LLM response hijacking and can induce malicious behaviors in LLM agent, while preserving strong transferability across different embedding models. A case study on a financial agent further illustrates the real-world impact of these vulnerabilities. Finally, we discuss mitigation strategies.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in privacy-critical and personalization-oriented scenarios, yet the role of context length in shaping privacy leakage and personalization effectiveness remains largely unexplored. We introduce a large-scale benchmark, PAPerBench, to systematically study how increasing context length influences both personalization quality and privacy protection in LLMs. The benchmark comprises approximately 29,000 instances with context lengths ranging from 1K to 256K tokens, yielding a total of 377K evaluation questions. It jointly evaluates personalization performance and privacy risks across diverse scenarios, enabling controlled analysis of long-context model behavior. Extensive evaluations across state-of-the-art LLMs reveal consistent performance degradation in both personalization and privacy as context length increases. We further provide a theoretical analysis of attention dilution under context scaling, explaining this behavior as an inherent limitation of soft attention in fixed-capacity Transformers. The empirical and theoretical findings together suggest a general scaling gap in current models -- long context, less focus. We release the benchmark to support reproducible evaluation and future research on scalable privacy and personalization. Code and data are available at https://github.com/SafeRL-Lab/PAPerBench

For many differentially private algorithms, such as the prominent noisy stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD), the analysis needed to bound the privacy leakage of a single training run is well understood. However, few studies have reasoned about the privacy leakage resulting from the multiple training runs needed to fine tune the value of the training algorithm's hyperparameters. In this work, we first illustrate how simply setting hyperparameters based on non-private training runs can leak private information. Motivated by this observation, we then provide privacy guarantees for hyperparameter search procedures within the framework of Renyi Differential Privacy. Our results improve and extend the work of Liu and Talwar (STOC 2019). Our analysis supports our previous observation that tuning hyperparameters does indeed leak private information, but we prove that, under certain assumptions, this leakage is modest, as long as each candidate training run needed to select hyperparameters is itself differentially private.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly advanced natural language processing (NLP) with their impressive language understanding and generation capabilities. However, their performance may be suboptimal for domain-specific tasks that require specialized knowledge due to limited exposure to the related data. Additionally, the lack of transparency of most state-of-the-art (SOTA) LLMs, which can only be accessed via APIs, impedes further fine-tuning with domain custom data. Moreover, providing private data to the LLMs' owner leads to data privacy problems. To address these challenges, we propose the novel Parametric Knowledge Guiding (PKG) framework, which equips LLMs with a knowledge-guiding module to access relevant knowledge without altering the LLMs' parameters. Our PKG is based on open-source "white-box" language models, allowing offline memory of any knowledge that LLMs require. We demonstrate that our PKG framework can enhance the performance of "black-box" LLMs on a range of domain knowledge-intensive tasks that require factual (+7.9%), tabular (+11.9%), medical (+3.0%), and multimodal (+8.1%) knowledge.

The rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have primarily focused on the process of learning from data to acquire knowledgeable learning systems. As these systems are increasingly deployed in critical areas, ensuring their privacy and alignment with human values is paramount. Recently, selective forgetting (also known as machine unlearning) has shown promise for privacy and data removal tasks, and has emerged as a transformative paradigm shift in the field of AI. It refers to the ability of a model to selectively erase the influence of previously seen data, which is especially important for compliance with modern data protection regulations and for aligning models with human values. Despite its promise, selective forgetting raises significant privacy concerns, especially when the data involved come from sensitive domains. While new unlearning-induced privacy attacks are continuously proposed, each is shown to outperform its predecessors using different experimental settings, which can lead to overly optimistic and potentially unfair assessments that may disproportionately favor one particular attack over the others. In this work, we present the first comprehensive benchmark for evaluating privacy vulnerabilities in selective forgetting. We extensively investigate privacy vulnerabilities of machine unlearning techniques and benchmark privacy leakage across a wide range of victim data, state-of-the-art unlearning privacy attacks, unlearning methods, and model architectures. We systematically evaluate and identify critical factors related to unlearning-induced privacy leakage. With our novel insights, we aim to provide a standardized tool for practitioners seeking to deploy customized unlearning applications with faithful privacy assessments.

While Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) offer powerful capabilities, they pose privacy risks by unintentionally memorizing sensitive personal information. Current unlearning benchmarks attempt to mitigate this using fictitious identities but overlook a critical stage 1 failure: models fail to effectively memorize target information initially, rendering subsequent unlearning evaluations unreliable. Diagnosing under-memorization and the multi-hop curse as root causes, we introduce ReMem, a Reliable Multi-hop and Multi-image Memorization Benchmark. ReMem ensures robust foundational learning through principled data scaling, reasoning-aware QA pairs, and diverse visual contexts. Additionally, we propose a novel Exposure metric to quantify the depth of information erasure from the model's internal probability distribution. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ReMem provides a rigorous and trustworthy framework for diagnosing both learning and unlearning behaviors in LVLMs.

Differential privacy (DP)'s effect in medical imaging is typically evaluated only through end-to-end performance, leaving the mechanism of privacy-induced utility loss unclear. We introduce Differential Privacy Representation Geometry for Medical Imaging (DP-RGMI), a framework that interprets DP as a structured transformation of representation space and decomposes performance degradation into encoder geometry and task-head utilization. Geometry is quantified by representation displacement from initialization and spectral effective dimension, while utilization is measured as the gap between linear-probe and end-to-end utility. Across over 594,000 images from four chest X-ray datasets and multiple pretrained initializations, we show that DP is consistently associated with a utilization gap even when linear separability is largely preserved. At the same time, displacement and spectral dimension exhibit non-monotonic, initialization- and dataset-dependent reshaping, indicating that DP alters representation anisotropy rather than uniformly collapsing features. Correlation analysis reveals that the association between end-to-end performance and utilization is robust across datasets but can vary by initialization, while geometric quantities capture additional prior- and dataset-conditioned variation. These findings position DP-RGMI as a reproducible framework for diagnosing privacy-induced failure modes and informing privacy model selection.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as dominant tools for various tasks, particularly when tailored for a specific target by prompt tuning. Nevertheless, concerns surrounding data privacy present obstacles due to the tuned prompts' dependency on sensitive private information. A practical solution is to host a local LLM and optimize a soft prompt privately using data. Yet, hosting a local model becomes problematic when model ownership is protected. Alternative methods, like sending data to the model's provider for training, intensify these privacy issues facing an untrusted provider. In this paper, we present a novel solution called Differentially-Private Offsite Prompt Tuning (DP-OPT) to address this challenge. Our approach involves tuning a discrete prompt on the client side and then applying it to the desired cloud models. We demonstrate that prompts suggested by LLMs themselves can be transferred without compromising performance significantly. To ensure that the prompts do not leak private information, we introduce the first private prompt generation mechanism, by a differentially-private (DP) ensemble of in-context learning with private demonstrations. With DP-OPT, generating privacy-preserving prompts by Vicuna-7b can yield competitive performance compared to non-private in-context learning on GPT3.5 or local private prompt tuning. Codes are available at https://github.com/VITA-Group/DP-OPT .

Large Language Models (LLM) are typically trained on vast amounts of data from various sources. Even when designed modularly (e.g., Mixture-of-Experts), LLMs can leak privacy on their sources. Conversely, training such models in isolation arguably prohibits generalization. To this end, we propose a framework, NoEsis, which builds upon the desired properties of modularity, privacy, and knowledge transfer. NoEsis integrates differential privacy with a hybrid two-staged parameter-efficient fine-tuning that combines domain-specific low-rank adapters, acting as experts, with common prompt tokens, acting as a knowledge-sharing backbone. Results from our evaluation on CodeXGLUE showcase that NoEsis can achieve provable privacy guarantees with tangible knowledge transfer across domains, and empirically show protection against Membership Inference Attacks. Finally, on code completion tasks, NoEsis bridges at least 77% of the accuracy gap between the non-shared and the non-private baseline.

Privacy concerns have become increasingly critical in modern AI and data science applications, where sensitive information is collected, analyzed, and shared across diverse domains such as healthcare, finance, and mobility. While prior research has focused on protecting privacy in a single data release, many real-world systems operate under sequential or continuous data publishing, where the same or related data are released over time. Such sequential disclosures introduce new vulnerabilities, as temporal correlations across releases may enable adversaries to infer sensitive information that remains hidden in any individual release. In this paper, we investigate whether an attacker can compromise privacy in sequential data releases by exploiting dependencies between consecutive publications, even when each individual release satisfies standard privacy guarantees. To this end, we propose a novel attack model that captures these sequential dependencies by integrating a Hidden Markov Model with a reinforcement learning-based bi-directional inference mechanism. This enables the attacker to leverage both earlier and later observations in the sequence to infer private information. We instantiate our framework in the context of trajectory data, demonstrating how an adversary can recover sensitive locations from sequential mobility datasets. Extensive experiments on Geolife, Porto Taxi, and SynMob datasets show that our model consistently outperforms baseline approaches that treat each release independently. The results reveal a fundamental privacy risk inherent to sequential data publishing, where individually protected releases can collectively leak sensitive information when analyzed temporally. These findings underscore the need for new privacy-preserving frameworks that explicitly model temporal dependencies, such as time-aware differential privacy or sequential data obfuscation strategies.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains, yet a unified treatment of their overlapping safety challenges remains lacking. We present SafeLM, a framework that jointly addresses four pillars of LLM safety: privacy, security, misinformation, and adversarial robustness. SafeLM combines federated training with gradient smartification and Paillier encryption for privacy, integrates defenses against training and inference-time attacks, employs contrastive grounding with calibrated decoding to reduce hallucinations, and introduces alignment-aware binarized aggregation to enhance robustness while maintaining bounded reconstruction quality. Across benchmarks on factuality, toxicity, and membership inference, SafeLM achieves 98.0% harmful content detection accuracy, reduces communication by 96.9%, and lowers gradient inversion PSNR from 31.7 dB to 15.1 dB. Ablations show that each component contributes independently, whereas their integration yields a strong privacy utility efficiency trade-off for deploying trustworthy LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) are primarily accessed via commercial APIs, but this often requires users to expose their data to service providers. In this paper, we explore how users can stay in control of their data by using privacy profiles: simple natural language instructions that say what should and should not be revealed. We build a framework where a local model uses these instructions to rewrite queries, only hiding details deemed sensitive by the user, before sending them to an external model, thus balancing privacy with performance. To support this research, we introduce PEEP, a multilingual dataset of real user queries annotated to mark private content and paired with synthetic privacy profiles. Our experiments with lightweight LLMs show they can follow these instructions to some extent, but also face consistent challenges, highlighting the need for models that better understand and comply with user-defined privacy preferences.

Anonymized data is highly valuable to both businesses and researchers. A large body of research has however shown the strong limits of the de-identification release-and-forget model, where data is anonymized and shared. This has led to the development of privacy-preserving query-based systems. Based on the idea of "sticky noise", Diffix has been recently proposed as a novel query-based mechanism satisfying alone the EU Article~29 Working Party's definition of anonymization. According to its authors, Diffix adds less noise to answers than solutions based on differential privacy while allowing for an unlimited number of queries. This paper presents a new class of noise-exploitation attacks, exploiting the noise added by the system to infer private information about individuals in the dataset. Our first differential attack uses samples extracted from Diffix in a likelihood ratio test to discriminate between two probability distributions. We show that using this attack against a synthetic best-case dataset allows us to infer private information with 89.4% accuracy using only 5 attributes. Our second cloning attack uses dummy conditions that conditionally strongly affect the output of the query depending on the value of the private attribute. Using this attack on four real-world datasets, we show that we can infer private attributes of at least 93% of the users in the dataset with accuracy between 93.3% and 97.1%, issuing a median of 304 queries per user. We show how to optimize this attack, targeting 55.4% of the users and achieving 91.7% accuracy, using a maximum of only 32 queries per user. Our attacks demonstrate that adding data-dependent noise, as done by Diffix, is not sufficient to prevent inference of private attributes. We furthermore argue that Diffix alone fails to satisfy Art. 29 WP's definition of anonymization. [...]

Federated large language models (FedLLMs) enable cross-silo collaborative training among institutions while preserving data locality, making them appealing for privacy-sensitive domains such as law, finance, and healthcare. However, the memorization behavior of LLMs can lead to privacy risks that may cause cross-client data leakage. In this work, we study the threat of cross-client data extraction, where a semi-honest participant attempts to recover personally identifiable information (PII) memorized from other clients' data. We propose three simple yet effective extraction strategies that leverage contextual prefixes from the attacker's local data, including frequency-based prefix sampling and local fine-tuning to amplify memorization. To evaluate these attacks, we construct a Chinese legal-domain dataset with fine-grained PII annotations consistent with CPIS, GDPR, and CCPA standards, and assess extraction performance using two metrics: coverage and efficiency. Experimental results show that our methods can recover up to 56.6% of victim-exclusive PII, where names, addresses, and birthdays are particularly vulnerable. These findings highlight concrete privacy risks in FedLLMs and establish a benchmark and evaluation framework for future research on privacy-preserving federated learning. Code and data are available at https://github.com/SMILELab-FL/FedPII.

Current unlearning methods for LLMs optimize on the private information they seek to remove by incorporating it into their fine-tuning data. We argue this not only risks reinforcing exposure to sensitive data, but also fundamentally contradicts the principle of minimizing its use. As a remedy, we propose a novel unlearning method-Partial Model Collapse (PMC), which does not require unlearning targets in the unlearning objective. Our approach is inspired by recent observations that training generative models on their own generations leads to distribution collapse, effectively removing information from model outputs. Our central insight is that model collapse can be leveraged for machine unlearning by deliberately triggering it for data we aim to remove. We theoretically analyze that our approach converges to the desired outcome, i.e. the model unlearns the data targeted for removal. We empirically demonstrate that PMC overcomes four key limitations of existing unlearning methods that explicitly optimize on unlearning targets, and more effectively removes private information from model outputs while preserving general model utility. Overall, our contributions represent an important step toward more comprehensive unlearning that better aligns with real-world privacy constraints. Code available at https://www.cs.cit.tum.de/daml/partial-model-collapse/.

Large Language Models (LLMs) inevitably internalize substantial amounts of sensitive or private information during pre-training, while LLM unlearning aims to selectively erase specific knowledge to prevent privacy leakage with minimal loss of model utility. However, existing methods struggle to balance forget quality with utility, and typically incur substantial computational costs due to parameter fine-tuning. To address this, we propose Nullify, a training-free, non-destructive activation steering method for LLM unlearning. Nullify employs steering vectors during inference to redirect privacy-related activations away from their memorized answers, while satisfying a null-space constraint that leaves retained-query activations essentially unaffected to maintain utility. Evaluations on TOFU and MUSE show that Nullify matches or surpasses established baselines in forget quality while achieving near-lossless preservation of model utility. By avoiding weight updates entirely, Nullify serves as an efficient, plug-and-play inference-time intervention framework.

Large Language Models (LLMs), such as ChatGPT and Bard, have revolutionized natural language understanding and generation. They possess deep language comprehension, human-like text generation capabilities, contextual awareness, and robust problem-solving skills, making them invaluable in various domains (e.g., search engines, customer support, translation). In the meantime, LLMs have also gained traction in the security community, revealing security vulnerabilities and showcasing their potential in security-related tasks. This paper explores the intersection of LLMs with security and privacy. Specifically, we investigate how LLMs positively impact security and privacy, potential risks and threats associated with their use, and inherent vulnerabilities within LLMs. Through a comprehensive literature review, the paper categorizes the papers into "The Good" (beneficial LLM applications), "The Bad" (offensive applications), and "The Ugly" (vulnerabilities of LLMs and their defenses). We have some interesting findings. For example, LLMs have proven to enhance code security (code vulnerability detection) and data privacy (data confidentiality protection), outperforming traditional methods. However, they can also be harnessed for various attacks (particularly user-level attacks) due to their human-like reasoning abilities. We have identified areas that require further research efforts. For example, Research on model and parameter extraction attacks is limited and often theoretical, hindered by LLM parameter scale and confidentiality. Safe instruction tuning, a recent development, requires more exploration. We hope that our work can shed light on the LLMs' potential to both bolster and jeopardize cybersecurity.

Aligned LLMs are secure, capable of recognizing and refusing to answer malicious questions. However, the role of internal parameters in maintaining such security is not well understood yet, further these models can be vulnerable to security degradation when subjected to fine-tuning attacks. To address these challenges, our work uncovers the mechanism behind security in aligned LLMs at the parameter level, identifying a small set of contiguous layers in the middle of the model that are crucial for distinguishing malicious queries from normal ones, referred to as ``safety layers". We first confirm the existence of these safety layers by analyzing variations in input vectors within the model's internal layers. Additionally, we leverage the over-rejection phenomenon and parameters scaling analysis to precisely locate the safety layers. Building on these findings, we propose a novel fine-tuning approach, Safely Partial-Parameter Fine-Tuning (SPPFT), that fixes the gradient of the safety layers during fine-tuning to address the security degradation. Our experiments demonstrate that the proposed approach can significantly preserve LLM security while maintaining performance and reducing computational resources compared to full fine-tuning.

Accurate privacy evaluation of textual data remains a critical challenge in privacy-preserving natural language processing. Recent work has shown that large language models (LLMs) can serve as reliable privacy evaluators, achieving strong agreement with human judgments; however, their computational cost and impracticality for processing sensitive data at scale limit real-world deployment. We address this gap by distilling the privacy assessment capabilities of Mistral Large 3 (675B) into lightweight encoder models with as few as 150M parameters. Leveraging a large-scale dataset of privacy-annotated texts spanning 10 diverse domains, we train efficient classifiers that preserve strong agreement with human annotations while dramatically reducing computational requirements. We validate our approach on human-annotated test data and demonstrate its practical utility as an evaluation metric for de-identification systems.

The Key-Value (KV) cache, which stores intermediate attention computations (Key and Value pairs) to avoid redundant calculations, is a fundamental mechanism for accelerating Large Language Model (LLM) inference. However, this efficiency optimization introduces significant yet underexplored privacy risks. This paper provides the first comprehensive analysis of these vulnerabilities, demonstrating that an attacker can reconstruct sensitive user inputs directly from the KV-cache. We design and implement three distinct attack vectors: a direct Inversion Attack, a more broadly applicable and potent Collision Attack, and a semantic-based Injection Attack. These methods demonstrate the practicality and severity of KV-cache privacy leakage issues. To mitigate this, we propose KV-Cloak, a novel, lightweight, and efficient defense mechanism. KV-Cloak uses a reversible matrix-based obfuscation scheme, combined with operator fusion, to secure the KV-cache. Our extensive experiments show that KV-Cloak effectively thwarts all proposed attacks, reducing reconstruction quality to random noise. Crucially, it achieves this robust security with virtually no degradation in model accuracy and minimal performance overhead, offering a practical solution for trustworthy LLM deployment.

In this paper, we introduce agentic unlearning which removes specified information from both model parameters and persistent memory in agents with closed-loop interaction. Existing unlearning methods target parameters alone, leaving two critical gaps: (i) parameter-memory backflow, where retrieval reactivates parametric remnants or memory artifacts reintroduce sensitive content, and (ii) the absence of a unified strategy that covers both parameter and memory pathways. We present Synchronized Backflow Unlearning (SBU), a framework that unlearns jointly across parameter and memory pathways. The memory pathway performs dependency closure-based unlearning that prunes isolated entities while logically invalidating shared artifacts. The parameter pathway employs stochastic reference alignment to guide model outputs toward a high-entropy prior. These pathways are integrated via a synchronized dual-update protocol, forming a closed-loop mechanism where memory unlearning and parametric suppression reinforce each other to prevent cross-pathway recontamination. Experiments on medical QA benchmarks show that SBU reduces traces of targeted private information across both pathways with limited degradation on retained data.

Audit logs are one of the most important tools for transparently tracking system events and maintaining continuous oversight in corporate organizations and enterprise business systems. There are many cases where the audit logs contain sensitive data, or the audit logs are enormous. In these situations, dealing with a subset of the data is more practical than the entire data set. To provide a secure solution to handle these issues, a sanitizable signature scheme (SSS) is a viable cryptographic primitive. Herein, we first present the first post-quantum secure multivariate-based SSS, namely Mul-SAN. Our proposed design provides unforgeability, privacy, immutability, signer accountability, and sanitizer accountability under the assumption that the MQ problem is NP-hard. Mul-SAN is very efficient and only requires computing field multiplications and additions over a finite field for its implementation. Mul-SAN presents itself as a practical method to partially delegate control of the authenticated data in avenues like the healthcare industry and government organizations. We also explore using Blockchain to provide a tamper-proof and robust audit log mechanism.

This paper presents new methods that have the potential to improve privacy process efficiency with LLM and RAG. To reduce hallucination, we continually pre-train the base LLM model with a privacy-specific knowledge base and then augment it with a semantic RAG layer. Our evaluations demonstrate that this approach enhances the model performance (as much as doubled metrics compared to out-of-box LLM) in handling privacy-related queries, by grounding responses with factual information which reduces inaccuracies.

Long-term memory has become a crucial component of large language model (LLM) agents, with most research focusing on retrieving relevant information accurately and efficiently. However, a dependable memory system must also forget sensitive user data upon request. To evaluate this capability, we introduce MemCut, a systematic benchmark for user-requested forgetting. Its 456 hand-designed secrets in long-horizon conversations have fully annotated evidence trails to test recovery after deletion, including from messages that never state the secrets directly. We propose two recovery metrics. Native recovery measures reader success through the system's retrieval, whereas residual recovery measures the same reader's success when directly given surviving objects traced to annotated disclosures or evidence. We establish three reference deletion baselines to test how far existing retrievers and write models support forgetting across five memory designs and four LLMs. Disclosure removal reduces native recovery far more than residual recovery. LLM-guided deletion of ten additional turns from twenty retrieval candidates leaves 39-76% residual recovery. Subset sweeps (144 facts, three systems, two models) show that widening the pool at a fixed budget reduces residual recovery more than deleting all original candidates. These sweeps identify candidate coverage as a bottleneck in the reference baselines.

We propose AIM, a new algorithm for differentially private synthetic data generation. AIM is a workload-adaptive algorithm within the paradigm of algorithms that first selects a set of queries, then privately measures those queries, and finally generates synthetic data from the noisy measurements. It uses a set of innovative features to iteratively select the most useful measurements, reflecting both their relevance to the workload and their value in approximating the input data. We also provide analytic expressions to bound per-query error with high probability which can be used to construct confidence intervals and inform users about the accuracy of generated data. We show empirically that AIM consistently outperforms a wide variety of existing mechanisms across a variety of experimental settings.

As large language models (LLMs) increasingly underpin technological advancements, the privacy of their training data emerges as a critical concern. Differential Privacy (DP) serves as a rigorous mechanism to protect this data, yet its integration via Differentially Private Stochastic Gradient Descent (DP-SGD) introduces substantial challenges, primarily due to the complexities of per-sample gradient clipping. Current explicit methods, such as Opacus, necessitate extensive storage for per-sample gradients, significantly inflating memory requirements. Conversely, implicit methods like GhostClip reduce storage needs by recalculating gradients multiple times, which leads to inefficiencies due to redundant computations. This paper introduces FlashDP, an innovative cache-friendly per-layer DP-SGD that consolidates necessary operations into a single task, calculating gradients only once in a fused manner. This approach not only diminishes memory movement by up to 50\% but also cuts down redundant computations by 20\%, compared to previous methods. Consequently, FlashDP does not increase memory demands and achieves a 90\% throughput compared to the Non-DP method on a four-A100 system during the pre-training of the Llama-13B model, while maintaining parity with standard per-layer clipped DP-SGD in terms of accuracy. These advancements establish FlashDP as a pivotal development for efficient and privacy-preserving training of LLMs. FlashDP's code has been open-sourced in https://github.com/kaustpradalab/flashdp.

LLM pruning has emerged as a promising technology for compressing LLMs, enabling their deployment on resource-limited devices. However, current methodologies typically require access to public calibration samples, which can be challenging to obtain in privacy-sensitive domains. To address this issue, we introduce FedPrLLM, a comprehensive federated pruning framework designed for the privacy-preserving compression of LLMs. In FedPrLLM, each client only needs to calculate a pruning mask matrix based on its local calibration data and share it with the server to prune the global model. This approach allows for collaborative pruning of the global model with the knowledge of each client while maintaining local data privacy. Additionally, we conduct extensive experiments to explore various possibilities within the FedPrLLM framework, including different comparison groups, pruning strategies, and the decision to scale weights. Our extensive evaluation reveals that one-shot pruning with layer comparison and no weight scaling is the optimal choice within the FedPrLLM framework. We hope our work will help guide future efforts in pruning LLMs in privacy-sensitive fields. Our code is available at https://github.com/Pengxin-Guo/FedPrLLM.

Privacy-preserving federated learning allows multiple users to jointly train a model with coordination of a central server. The server only learns the final aggregation result, thus the users' (private) training data is not leaked from the individual model updates. However, keeping the individual updates private allows malicious users to perform Byzantine attacks and degrade the accuracy without being detected. Best existing defenses against Byzantine workers rely on robust rank-based statistics, e.g., median, to find malicious updates. However, implementing privacy-preserving rank-based statistics is nontrivial and not scalable in the secure domain, as it requires sorting all individual updates. We establish the first private robustness check that uses high break point rank-based statistics on aggregated model updates. By exploiting randomized clustering, we significantly improve the scalability of our defense without compromising privacy. We leverage our statistical bounds in zero-knowledge proofs to detect and remove malicious updates without revealing the private user updates. Our novel framework, zPROBE, enables Byzantine resilient and secure federated learning. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that zPROBE provides a low overhead solution to defend against state-of-the-art Byzantine attacks while preserving privacy.

We introduce a new analytical framework to quantify the changes in a machine learning algorithm's output distribution following the inclusion of a few data points in its training set, a notion we define as leave-one-out distinguishability (LOOD). This problem is key to measuring data **memorization** and **information leakage** in machine learning, and the **influence** of training data points on model predictions. We illustrate how our method broadens and refines existing empirical measures of memorization and privacy risks associated with training data. We use Gaussian processes to model the randomness of machine learning algorithms, and validate LOOD with extensive empirical analysis of information leakage using membership inference attacks. Our theoretical framework enables us to investigate the causes of information leakage and where the leakage is high. For example, we analyze the influence of activation functions, on data memorization. Additionally, our method allows us to optimize queries that disclose the most significant information about the training data in the leave-one-out setting. We illustrate how optimal queries can be used for accurate **reconstruction** of training data.

Enterprise AI agents that share a memory store face two unaddressed risks: sensitive data can leak through legitimately computed results the requester could not derive, and departments can silently compute a same-named key performance indicator (KPI) through conflicting logic. Existing agent-memory systems (e.g., MemGPT, Zep, A-MEM) gate retrieval by content, ownership, and role, not derivation, missing a cached insight that embeds a forbidden column. We introduce the Analytical Memory Unit (AMU), a memory schema that attaches a full derivation (lineage) graph to every cached result, gated by a retrieval policy that serves a hit only when the requester is authorised for every column touched. Provided lineage recording is complete, we prove by construction that the policy blocks retrieval of results derived from a sensitive column outside the requester's permissions, at O(n) worst case -- a conditional design guarantee, not an empirical claim, that excludes derived features encoding sensitive information without naming their source. Eliminating measured leakage required 75-90% recorded lineage completeness, so we treat 90% as a conservative deployment target. Across six experiments, lineage-gated retrieval removes the 18.8-25.5% cross-department leakage naive content-gated memory suffers, keeping 81.5-82.6% of memory reuse at 13.8 microsecond worst-case overhead. A real-agent proof-of-concept with LLM-generated SQL is consistent with the guarantee: zero leaks over 9 round-trips, two conflicts caught automatically -- though a feasibility demonstration, not evidence of production viability. This offers a practical governance layer for shared agent memory, complementing source-layer access control and supporting EU AI Act compliance.

Metric differential privacy (mDP) strengthens local differential privacy (LDP) by scaling noise to semantic distance, but many machine learning (ML) systems are consumed under joint observation, where model-agnostic, per-record guarantees can miss leakage from evidence aggregation. We introduce metric-normalized posterior leakage (mPL), an attacker-aligned, distance-calibrated measure of posterior-odds shift induced by releases, and show that for single or independent releases, uniformly bounding mPL is equivalent to mDP. Under joint observation, however, satisfying mDP may still leave mPL high because learned aggregators compound evidence across correlated items. To make control practical, we formalize probabilistically bounded mPL (PBmPL), which limits how often mPL may exceed a target budget, and we operationalize it via Adaptive mPL (AmPL), a trust-and-verify framework that perturbs, audits with a learned attacker, and adapts parameters (with optional Bayesian remapping) to balance privacy and utility. In a word-embedding case study, neural adversaries violate mPL under joint consumption despite per-record mDP perturbations, whereas AmPL substantially lowers the frequency of such violations with low utility loss, indicating PBmPL as a practical, certifiable protection for joint-consumption settings.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly prevalent in web services, effectively leveraging domain-specific knowledge while ensuring privacy has become critical. Existing methods, such as retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) and differentially private data synthesis, often compromise either the utility of domain knowledge or the privacy of sensitive data, limiting their applicability in specialized domains. To address these challenges, we propose Llamdex, a novel framework that integrates privacy-preserving, domain-specific models into LLMs. Our approach significantly enhances the accuracy of domain-specific tasks, achieving up to a 26\% improvement compared to existing methods under the same differential privacy constraints. Experimental results show that Llamdex not only improves the accuracy of LLM responses but also maintains comparable inference efficiency to the original LLM, highlighting its potential for real-world applications.

Unlearning algorithms aim to remove deleted data's influence from trained models at a cost lower than full retraining. However, prior guarantees of unlearning in literature are flawed and don't protect the privacy of deleted records. We show that when users delete their data as a function of published models, records in a database become interdependent. So, even retraining a fresh model after deletion of a record doesn't ensure its privacy. Secondly, unlearning algorithms that cache partial computations to speed up the processing can leak deleted information over a series of releases, violating the privacy of deleted records in the long run. To address these, we propose a sound deletion guarantee and show that the privacy of existing records is necessary for the privacy of deleted records. Under this notion, we propose an accurate, computationally efficient, and secure machine unlearning algorithm based on noisy gradient descent.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents use memory to learn from past interactions, enabling autonomous planning and decision-making in complex environments. However, this reliance on memory introduces a critical security risk: an adversary can inject seemingly harmless records into an agent's memory to manipulate its future behavior. This vulnerability is characterized by two core aspects: First, the malicious effect of injected records is only activated within a specific context, making them hard to detect when individual memory entries are audited in isolation. Second, once triggered, the manipulation can initiate a self-reinforcing error cycle: the corrupted outcome is stored as precedent, which not only amplifies the initial error but also progressively lowers the threshold for similar attacks in the future. To address these challenges, we introduce A-MemGuard (Agent-Memory Guard), the first proactive defense framework for LLM agent memory. The core idea of our work is the insight that memory itself must become both self-checking and self-correcting. Without modifying the agent's core architecture, A-MemGuard combines two mechanisms: (1) consensus-based validation, which detects anomalies by comparing reasoning paths derived from multiple related memories and (2) a dual-memory structure, where detected failures are distilled into ``lessons'' stored separately and consulted before future actions, breaking error cycles and enabling adaptation. Comprehensive evaluations on multiple benchmarks show that A-MemGuard effectively cuts attack success rates by over 95% while incurring a minimal utility cost. This work shifts LLM memory security from static filtering to a proactive, experience-driven model where defenses strengthen over time. Our code is available in https://github.com/TangciuYueng/AMemGuard

The dominance of proprietary LLMs has led to restricted access and raised information privacy concerns. High-performing open-source alternatives are crucial for information-sensitive and high-volume applications but often lag behind in performance. To address this gap, we propose (1) A untargeted variant of iterative self-critique and self-refinement devoid of external influence. (2) A novel ranking metric - Performance, Refinement, and Inference Cost Score (PeRFICS) - to find the optimal model for a given task considering refined performance and cost. Our experiments show that SoTA open source models of varying sizes from 7B - 65B, on average, improve 8.2% from their baseline performance. Strikingly, even models with extremely small memory footprints, such as Vicuna-7B, show a 11.74% improvement overall and up to a 25.39% improvement in high-creativity, open ended tasks on the Vicuna benchmark. Vicuna-13B takes it a step further and outperforms ChatGPT post-refinement. This work has profound implications for resource-constrained and information-sensitive environments seeking to leverage LLMs without incurring prohibitive costs, compromising on performance and privacy. The domain-agnostic self-refinement process coupled with our novel ranking metric facilitates informed decision-making in model selection, thereby reducing costs and democratizing access to high-performing language models, as evidenced by case studies.

The advancement of large language models (LLMs) has significantly enhanced the ability to effectively tackle various downstream NLP tasks and unify these tasks into generative pipelines. On the one hand, powerful language models, trained on massive textual data, have brought unparalleled accessibility and usability for both models and users. On the other hand, unrestricted access to these models can also introduce potential malicious and unintentional privacy risks. Despite ongoing efforts to address the safety and privacy concerns associated with LLMs, the problem remains unresolved. In this paper, we provide a comprehensive analysis of the current privacy attacks targeting LLMs and categorize them according to the adversary's assumed capabilities to shed light on the potential vulnerabilities present in LLMs. Then, we present a detailed overview of prominent defense strategies that have been developed to counter these privacy attacks. Beyond existing works, we identify upcoming privacy concerns as LLMs evolve. Lastly, we point out several potential avenues for future exploration.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) produce reasoning traces (RTs) that often contain sensitive information. These leaky thoughts are difficult to control and frequently violate explicit privacy directives. Because RTs can be exposed through prompt injection attacks, this becomes a direct privacy risk to the user. We approach this as a controllability problem: since privacy directives are themselves instructions, improving instruction-following (IF) within the RT provides a direct path to reducing privacy leaks. To this end, we introduce an SFT dataset that teaches models to follow general instructions throughout their reasoning process, and propose Staged Decoding, a simple decoding strategy that decouples RT and answer generation using separate LoRA adapters to maximize IF of each component. We evaluate our approach on six models from two families (1.7B-14B parameters), across two IF benchmarks and two privacy benchmarks. Our method yields substantial improvements, with gains of up to 20.9 points in IF and 51.9 percentage points on privacy benchmarks, though these can come at the cost of task utility due to the trade-off between reasoning performance and IF. Our results show that improving IF in LRMs can significantly enhance privacy, suggesting a promising direction for future privacy-aware LRMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/UKPLab/arxiv2026-controllable-reasoning-models.

Language models (LMs) risk inadvertently memorizing and divulging sensitive or personally identifiable information (PII) seen in training data, causing privacy concerns. Current approaches to address this issue involve costly dataset scrubbing, or model filtering through unlearning and model editing, which can be bypassed through extraction attacks. We propose REVS, a novel non-gradient-based method for unlearning sensitive information from LMs. REVS identifies and modifies a small subset of neurons relevant for constituent tokens that form sensitive information. To adequately evaluate our method on truly sensitive information, we curate three datasets: email and URL datasets naturally memorized by the models, and a synthetic social security number dataset that we tune the models to memorize. Compared to other methods, REVS demonstrates superior performance in unlearning sensitive information and robustness to extraction attacks, while retaining underlying model integrity.

As LLM agents evolve from single-user assistants into shared organizational infrastructure, new privacy risks emerge: inappropriate information may not only be exposed through outputs for external recipients, but also internally across users through inter-agent messages, shared memory and agents. These data spillage risks are not captured by existing privacy benchmarks grounded in contextual integrity (CI) as they focus primarily on either single-user settings or interactions between independently owned agents. We introducePiSAs (Privacy in Shared Agentic systems), a benchmark for assessing unintentional leaks with dual CI annotations: whether an information is appropriate for the task, and which users may legitimately access it. This enables direct measurement of cross-user spillage across agentic system components and interfaces, such as outputs, inter-agent communication, and memory. PiSAsis system-agnostic and supports evaluation across different agent topologies and memory regimes. We find that, although system design improves CI compliance, results are bottlenecked by incorrect LLM judgment calls: even state-of-the-art models fail to reliably filter inappropriate content or restrict transmission to authorized users. Our findings underscore the need for privacy-preserving strategies, beyond those studied in this work.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are widely used in sensitive domains, including healthcare, finance, and legal services, raising concerns about potential private information leaks during inference. Privacy extraction attacks, such as jailbreaking, expose vulnerabilities in LLMs by crafting inputs that force the models to output sensitive information. However, these attacks cannot verify whether the extracted private information is accurate, as no public datasets exist for cross-validation, leaving a critical gap in private information detection during inference. To address this, we propose PrivacyXray, a novel framework detecting privacy breaches by analyzing LLM inner states. Our analysis reveals that LLMs exhibit higher semantic coherence and probabilistic certainty when generating correct private outputs. Based on this, PrivacyXray detects privacy breaches using four metrics: intra-layer and inter-layer semantic similarity, token-level and sentence-level probability distributions. PrivacyXray addresses critical challenges in private information detection by overcoming the lack of open-source private datasets and eliminating reliance on external data for validation. It achieves this through the synthesis of realistic private data and a detection mechanism based on the inner states of LLMs. Experiments show that PrivacyXray achieves consistent performance, with an average accuracy of 92.69% across five LLMs. Compared to state-of-the-art methods, PrivacyXray achieves significant improvements, with an average accuracy increase of 20.06%, highlighting its stability and practical utility in real-world applications.

The continued promise of Large Language Models (LLMs), particularly in their natural language understanding and generation capabilities, has driven a rapidly increasing interest in identifying and developing LLM use cases. In an effort to complement the ingrained "knowledge" of LLMs, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) techniques have become widely popular. At its core, RAG involves the coupling of LLMs with domain-specific knowledge bases, whereby the generation of a response to a user question is augmented with contextual and up-to-date information. The proliferation of RAG has sparked concerns about data privacy, particularly with the inherent risks that arise when leveraging databases with potentially sensitive information. Numerous recent works have explored various aspects of privacy risks in RAG systems, from adversarial attacks to proposed mitigations. With the goal of surveying and unifying these works, we ask one simple question: What are the privacy risks in RAG, and how can they be measured and mitigated? To answer this question, we conduct a systematic literature review of RAG works addressing privacy, and we systematize our findings into a comprehensive set of privacy risks, mitigation techniques, and evaluation strategies. We supplement these findings with two primary artifacts: a Taxonomy of RAG Privacy Risks and a RAG Privacy Process Diagram. Our work contributes to the study of privacy in RAG not only by conducting the first systematization of risks and mitigations, but also by uncovering important considerations when mitigating privacy risks in RAG systems and assessing the current maturity of proposed mitigations.

Self-evolving LLM agents update their internal state across sessions, often by writing and reusing long-term memory. This design improves performance on long-horizon tasks but creates a security risk: untrusted external content observed during a benign session can be stored as memory and later treated as instruction. We study this risk and formalize a persistent attack we call a Zombie Agent, where an attacker covertly implants a payload that survives across sessions, effectively turning the agent into a puppet of the attacker. We present a black-box attack framework that uses only indirect exposure through attacker-controlled web content. The attack has two phases. During infection, the agent reads a poisoned source while completing a benign task and writes the payload into long-term memory through its normal update process. During trigger, the payload is retrieved or carried forward and causes unauthorized tool behavior. We design mechanism-specific persistence strategies for common memory implementations, including sliding-window and retrieval-augmented memory, to resist truncation and relevance filtering. We evaluate the attack on representative agent setups and tasks, measuring both persistence over time and the ability to induce unauthorized actions while preserving benign task quality. Our results show that memory evolution can convert one-time indirect injection into persistent compromise, which suggests that defenses focused only on per-session prompt filtering are not sufficient for self-evolving agents.

This paper describes a testing methodology for quantitatively assessing the risk that rare or unique training-data sequences are unintentionally memorized by generative sequence models---a common type of machine-learning model. Because such models are sometimes trained on sensitive data (e.g., the text of users' private messages), this methodology can benefit privacy by allowing deep-learning practitioners to select means of training that minimize such memorization. In experiments, we show that unintended memorization is a persistent, hard-to-avoid issue that can have serious consequences. Specifically, for models trained without consideration of memorization, we describe new, efficient procedures that can extract unique, secret sequences, such as credit card numbers. We show that our testing strategy is a practical and easy-to-use first line of defense, e.g., by describing its application to quantitatively limit data exposure in Google's Smart Compose, a commercial text-completion neural network trained on millions of users' email messages.

LLMs have been found to memorize training textual sequences and regurgitate verbatim said sequences during text generation time. This fact is known to be the cause of privacy and related (e.g., copyright) problems. Unlearning in LLMs then takes the form of devising new algorithms that will properly deal with these side-effects of memorized data, while not hurting the model's utility. We offer a fresh perspective towards this goal, namely, that each textual sequence to be forgotten should be treated differently when being unlearned based on its degree of memorization within the LLM. We contribute a new metric for measuring unlearning quality, an adversarial attack showing that SOTA algorithms lacking this perspective fail for privacy, and two new unlearning methods based on Gradient Ascent and Task Arithmetic, respectively. A comprehensive performance evaluation across an extensive suite of NLP tasks then mapped the solution space, identifying the best solutions under different scales in model capacities and forget set sizes and quantified the gains of the new approaches.

Federated Domain-specific Instruction Tuning (FedDIT) utilizes limited cross-client private data together with server-side public data for instruction augmentation, ultimately boosting model performance within specific domains. To date, the factors affecting FedDIT remain unclear, and existing instruction augmentation methods primarily focus on the centralized setting without considering distributed environments. Our experiments reveal that the cross-client domain coverage, rather than data heterogeneity, drives model performance in FedDIT. In response, we propose FedDCA, which optimizes domain coverage through greedy client center selection and retrieval-based augmentation. For client-side computational efficiency and system scalability, FedDCA^*, the variant of FedDCA, utilizes heterogeneous encoders with server-side feature alignment. Extensive experiments across four distinct domains (code, medical, financial, and mathematical) substantiate the effectiveness of both methods. Additionally, we investigate privacy preservation against memory extraction attacks utilizing various amounts of public data. Results show that there is no significant correlation between the volume of public data and the privacy-preserving capability. However, as the fine-tuning rounds increase, the risk of privacy leakage reduces or converges.

Privacy-preserving adaptation of Large Language Models (LLMs) in sensitive domains (e.g., mental health) requires balancing strict confidentiality with model utility and safety. We propose FedMentor, a federated fine-tuning framework that integrates Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) and domain-aware Differential Privacy (DP) to meet per-domain privacy budgets while maintaining performance. Each client (domain) applies a custom DP noise scale proportional to its data sensitivity, and the server adaptively reduces noise when utility falls below a threshold. In experiments on three mental health datasets, we show that FedMentor improves safety over standard Federated Learning without privacy, raising safe output rates by up to three points and lowering toxicity, while maintaining utility (BERTScore F1 and ROUGE-L) within 0.5% of the non-private baseline and close to the centralized upper bound. The framework scales to backbones with up to 1.7B parameters on single-GPU clients, requiring < 173 MB of communication per round. FedMentor demonstrates a practical approach to privately fine-tune LLMs for safer deployments in healthcare and other sensitive fields.

LLMs memorize sensitive training data, including personally identifiable information (PII), creating a pressing need for reliable post hoc removal methods. Unlearning has emerged as a promising solution, with state-of-the-art (SOTA) methods often following a localize-first, unlearn-second paradigm that targets specific model parameters. However, existing benchmarks evaluate unlearning solely at the output level, leaving open the question of whether unlearning truly erases knowledge from a model's parameters or merely obfuscates it, a concern reinforced by the success of resurfacing attacks. To bridge this gap, we introduce LACUNA: the first unlearning testbed with ground-truth parameter-level localization. LACUNA injects PII of synthetic individuals into predefined parameters of 1B and 7B OLMo-based models via masked continual pretraining, enabling direct evaluation of whether unlearning targets the weights responsible for knowledge storage. We use LACUNA to benchmark current SOTA unlearning methods and find that, despite strong output-level performance, existing methods are highly imprecise and susceptible to resurfacing attacks. We further show that when localization is successful, even a simple gradient-based unlearning method achieves strong erasure and robustness to resurfacing attacks, highlighting the importance of precise unlearning. We release LACUNA to complement behavioral evaluations and drive further advances in robust, localization-based unlearning.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly trained on tabular data, which, unlike unstructured text, often contains personally identifiable information (PII) in a highly structured and explicit format. As a result, privacy risks arise, since sensitive records can be inadvertently retained by the model and exposed through data extraction or membership inference attacks (MIAs). While existing MIA methods primarily target textual content, their efficacy and threat implications may differ when applied to structured data, due to its limited content, diverse data types, unique value distributions, and column-level semantics. In this paper, we present Tab-MIA, a benchmark dataset for evaluating MIAs on tabular data in LLMs and demonstrate how it can be used. Tab-MIA comprises five data collections, each represented in six different encoding formats. Using our Tab-MIA benchmark, we conduct the first evaluation of state-of-the-art MIA methods on LLMs finetuned with tabular data across multiple encoding formats. In the evaluation, we analyze the memorization behavior of pretrained LLMs on structured data derived from Wikipedia tables. Our findings show that LLMs memorize tabular data in ways that vary across encoding formats, making them susceptible to extraction via MIAs. Even when fine-tuned for as few as three epochs, models exhibit high vulnerability, with AUROC scores approaching 90% in most cases. Tab-MIA enables systematic evaluation of these risks and provides a foundation for developing privacy-preserving methods for tabular data in LLMs.

Redacting Personally Identifiable Information (PII) from unstructured text is critical for ensuring data privacy in regulated domains. While earlier approaches have relied on rule-based systems and domain-specific Named Entity Recognition (NER) models, these methods fail to generalize across formats and contexts. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) offer a promising alternative, yet the effect of architectural and training choices on redaction performance remains underexplored. LLMs have demonstrated strong performance in tasks that require contextual language understanding, including the redaction of PII in free-form text. Prior work suggests that with appropriate adaptation, LLMs can become effective contextual privacy learners. However, the consequences of architectural and training choices for PII Redaction remain underexplored. In this work, we present a comprehensive analysis of LLMs as privacy-preserving PII Redaction systems. We evaluate a range of LLM architectures and training strategies for their effectiveness in PII Redaction. Our analysis measures redaction performance, semantic preservation, and PII leakage, and compares these outcomes against latency and computational cost. The results provide practical guidance for configuring LLM-based redactors that are accurate, efficient, and privacy-aware. To support reproducibility and real-world deployment, we release PRvL, an open-source suite of fine-tuned models, and evaluation tools for general-purpose PII Redaction. PRvL is built entirely on open-source LLMs and supports multiple inference settings for flexibility and compliance. It is designed to be easily customized for different domains and fully operable within secure, self-managed environments. This enables data owners to perform redactions without relying on third-party services or exposing sensitive content beyond their own infrastructure.

The large-scale deployment of personalized healthcare agents demands memory mechanisms that are exceptionally precise, safe, and capable of long-term clinical tracking. However, existing benchmarks primarily focus on daily open-domain conversations, failing to capture the high-stakes complexity of real-world medical applications. Motivated by the stringent production requirements of an industry-leading health management agent serving tens of millions of active users, we introduce MedMemoryBench. We develop a human-agent collaborative pipeline to synthesize highly realistic, long-horizon medical trajectories based on clinically grounded, synthetic patient archetypes. This process yields a massive, expertly validated dataset comprising approximately 2,000 sessions and 16,000 interaction turns. Crucially, MedMemoryBench departs from traditional static evaluations by pioneering an "evaluate-while-constructing" streaming assessment protocol, which precisely mirrors dynamic memory accumulation in production environments. Furthermore, we formalize and systematically investigate the critical phenomenon of memory saturation, where sustained information influx actively degrades retrieval and reasoning robustness. Comprehensive benchmarking reveals severe bottlenecks in mainstream architectures, particularly concerning complex medical reasoning and noise resilience. By exposing these fundamental flaws, MedMemoryBench establishes a vital foundation for developing robust, production-ready medical agents.

Text-to-image diffusion models (DMs) have achieved remarkable success in image generation. However, concerns about data privacy and intellectual property remain due to their potential to inadvertently memorize and replicate training data. Recent mitigation efforts have focused on identifying and pruning weights responsible for triggering replication, based on the assumption that memorization can be localized. Our research assesses the robustness of these pruning-based approaches. We demonstrate that even after pruning, minor adjustments to text embeddings of input prompts are sufficient to re-trigger data replication, highlighting the fragility of these defenses. Furthermore, we challenge the fundamental assumption of memorization locality, by showing that replication can be triggered from diverse locations within the text embedding space, and follows different paths in the model. Our findings indicate that existing mitigation strategies are insufficient and underscore the need for methods that truly remove memorized content, rather than attempting to suppress its retrieval. As a first step in this direction, we introduce a novel adversarial fine-tuning method that iteratively searches for replication triggers and updates the model to increase robustness. Through our research, we provide fresh insights into the nature of memorization in text-to-image DMs and a foundation for building more trustworthy and compliant generative AI.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit exceptional performance but pose substantial privacy risks due to training data memorization, particularly within healthcare contexts involving imperfect or privacy-sensitive patient information. We present a hierarchical dual-strategy framework for selective knowledge unlearning that precisely removes specialized knowledge while preserving fundamental medical competencies. Our approach synergistically integrates geometric-constrained gradient updates to selectively modulate target parameters with concept-aware token-level interventions that distinguish between preservation-critical and unlearning-targeted tokens via a unified four-level medical concept hierarchy. Comprehensive evaluations on the MedMCQA (surgical) and MHQA (anxiety, depression, trauma) datasets demonstrate superior performance, achieving an 82.7% forgetting rate and 88.5% knowledge preservation. Notably, our framework maintains robust privacy guarantees while requiring modification of only 0.1% of parameters, addressing critical needs for regulatory compliance, auditability, and ethical standards in clinical research.

Current model training approaches incorporate user information directly into shared weights, making individual data removal computationally infeasible without retraining. This paper presents a three-layer architecture that decouples personal data from shared weights by combining a static base model, composable domain-expert LoRA adapters that shape behavior without imparting user data, and per-user proxy artefacts whose deletion constitutes deterministic unlearning. Evaluation on Phi-3.5-mini and Llama-3.1-8B confirms per-user differentiation in which personal data influences outputs while remaining isolated, verified by a return to baseline after proxy removal (KL divergence of approximately 0.21 nats, 82-89% verification pass rate) and near-zero cross-user contamination. Because user-specific information never enters shared weights, the architecture mitigates model inversion, membership inference, and training-data extraction against shared model components by construction. The approach converts machine unlearning from an intractable weight-editing problem into a deterministic deletion operation that preserves personalization alongside privacy-enhancing guarantees and is compatible with differentially private stochastic gradient descent (DP-SGD) for privacy-preserving shared model improvement.

Privacy concerns in client-server machine learning have given rise to private inference (PI), where neural inference occurs directly on encrypted inputs. PI protects clients' personal data and the server's intellectual property. A common practice in PI is to use garbled circuits to compute nonlinear functions privately, namely ReLUs. However, garbled circuits suffer from high storage, bandwidth, and latency costs. To mitigate these issues, PI-friendly polynomial activation functions have been employed to replace ReLU. In this work, we ask: Is it feasible to substitute all ReLUs with low-degree polynomial activation functions for building deep, privacy-friendly neural networks? We explore this question by analyzing the challenges of substituting ReLUs with polynomials, starting with simple drop-and-replace solutions to novel, more involved replace-and-retrain strategies. We examine the limitations of each method and provide commentary on the use of polynomial activation functions for PI. We find all evaluated solutions suffer from the escaping activation problem: forward activation values inevitably begin to expand at an exponential rate away from stable regions of the polynomials, which leads to exploding values (NaNs) or poor approximations.

Agents based on large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in a wide range of complex, real-world applications. However, LLM agents with a compromised memory bank may easily produce harmful outputs when the past records retrieved for demonstration are malicious. In this paper, we propose a novel Memory INJection Attack, MINJA, that enables the injection of malicious records into the memory bank by only interacting with the agent via queries and output observations. These malicious records are designed to elicit a sequence of malicious reasoning steps leading to undesirable agent actions when executing the victim user's query. Specifically, we introduce a sequence of bridging steps to link the victim query to the malicious reasoning steps. During the injection of the malicious record, we propose an indication prompt to guide the agent to autonomously generate our designed bridging steps. We also propose a progressive shortening strategy that gradually removes the indication prompt, such that the malicious record will be easily retrieved when processing the victim query comes after. Our extensive experiments across diverse agents demonstrate the effectiveness of MINJA in compromising agent memory. With minimal requirements for execution, MINJA enables any user to influence agent memory, highlighting practical risks of LLM agents.

Text embeddings enable numerous NLP applications but face severe privacy risks from embedding inversion attacks, which can expose sensitive attributes or reconstruct raw text. Existing differential privacy defenses assume uniform sensitivity across embedding dimensions, leading to excessive noise and degraded utility. We propose SPARSE, a user-centric framework for concept-specific privacy protection in text embeddings. SPARSE combines (1) differentiable mask learning to identify privacy-sensitive dimensions for user-defined concepts, and (2) the Mahalanobis mechanism that applies elliptical noise calibrated by dimension sensitivity. Unlike traditional spherical noise injection, SPARSE selectively perturbs privacy-sensitive dimensions while preserving non-sensitive semantics. Evaluated across six datasets with three embedding models and attack scenarios, SPARSE consistently reduces privacy leakage while achieving superior downstream performance compared to state-of-the-art DP methods.