Daily Papers

With the rise of personalized, persistent LLM agent frameworks such as OpenClaw, human-centered agentic social networks in which teams of collaborative AI agents serve individual users in a social network across multiple domains are becoming a reality. This setting creates novel privacy challenges: agents must coordinate across domain boundaries, mediate between humans, and interact with other users' agents, all while protecting sensitive personal information. While prior work has evaluated multi-agent coordination and privacy preservation, the dynamics and privacy risks of human-centered agentic social networks remain unexplored. To this end, we introduce AgentSocialBench, the first benchmark to systematically evaluate privacy risk in this setting, comprising scenarios across seven categories spanning dyadic and multi-party interactions, grounded in realistic user profiles with hierarchical sensitivity labels and directed social graphs. Our experiments reveal that privacy in agentic social networks is fundamentally harder than in single-agent settings: (1) cross-domain and cross-user coordination creates persistent leakage pressure even when agents are explicitly instructed to protect information, (2) privacy instructions that teach agents how to abstract sensitive information paradoxically cause them to discuss it more (we call it abstraction paradox). These findings underscore that current LLM agents lack robust mechanisms for privacy preservation in human-centered agentic social networks, and that new approaches beyond prompt engineering are needed to make agent-mediated social coordination safe for real-world deployment.

We propose a formal reconstruction of quantum mechanics grounded not in external mathematical abstractions, but in the structured dynamics of subjective experience. The Qualia Abstraction Language (QAL) models physical systems as evolving streams of introspective units, structured sequences of modality, shape, and functional effect, rather than as state vectors in Hilbert space. This approach reimagines core quantum concepts: superposition becomes a form of structured ambiguity; collapse is reframed as an introspective contraction; and entanglement is modeled as semantic resonance across streams of qualia. Drawing on insights from nominalist philosophy and oversight theoretic limits in AI, we argue that the observer paradox in quantum mechanics reflects not an ontological lacuna, but a linguistic one: the absence of a formal vocabulary for modeling first person structure. QAL introduces such a vocabulary, providing a morphodynamic framework that embeds the observer within the system and replaces abstract projection with endogenous transformation. We analyze the alignment of QAL with endophysical approaches, contrast it with standard interpretations of quantum theory, and explore its implications for a post Platonist, introspectively grounded physics.

Language models (LMs) require robust episodic grounding-the capacity to learn from and apply past experiences-to excel at physical planning tasks. Current episodic grounding approaches struggle with scalability and integration, limiting their effectiveness, especially for medium-sized LMs (7B parameters). While larger LMs (70-405B parameters) possess superior hierarchical representations and extensive pre-trained knowledge, they encounter a fundamental scale paradox: despite their advanced abstraction capabilities, they lack efficient mechanisms to leverage experience streams. We propose a scalable weak-to-strong episodic learning framework that effectively transfers episodic behaviors from smaller to larger LMs. This framework integrates Monte Carlo tree search for structured experience collection with a novel distillation method, preserving the inherent LM capabilities while embedding episodic memory. Experiments demonstrate our method surpasses state-of-the-art proprietary LMs by 3.45% across diverse planning and question-answering tasks. Layer-wise probing further indicates significant improvements in task alignment, especially within deeper LM layers, highlighting stable generalization even for previously unseen scenarios with increased planning complexity-conditions where baseline methods degrade markedly.

Causal abstraction is a promising theoretical framework for explainable artificial intelligence that defines when an interpretable high-level causal model is a faithful simplification of a low-level deep learning system. However, existing causal abstraction methods have two major limitations: they require a brute-force search over alignments between the high-level model and the low-level one, and they presuppose that variables in the high-level model will align with disjoint sets of neurons in the low-level one. In this paper, we present distributed alignment search (DAS), which overcomes these limitations. In DAS, we find the alignment between high-level and low-level models using gradient descent rather than conducting a brute-force search, and we allow individual neurons to play multiple distinct roles by analyzing representations in non-standard bases-distributed representations. Our experiments show that DAS can discover internal structure that prior approaches miss. Overall, DAS removes previous obstacles to conducting causal abstraction analyses and allows us to find conceptual structure in trained neural nets.

The mechanism by which RL contributes to reasoning capabilities-whether it incentivizes the synthesis of new skills or merely amplifies existing behaviors-remains a subject of intense debate. In this work, we investigate this question through the lens of Complementary Reasoning, a complex task that requires integrating internal parametric knowledge with external contextual information. Using a controlled synthetic dataset of human biographies, we strictly decouple this ability into two atomic skills: Parametric Reasoning (relying on internal knowledge) and Contextual Reasoning (depending on external information). To rigorously assess capability boundaries, we evaluate generalization across three distinct levels of difficulty: I.I.D., Composition, and Zero-shot settings. We find that while SFT is sufficient for in-distribution performance, it struggles with O.O.D. generalization, particularly in Zero-shot settings where relational combinations are novel. Crucially, we identify the SFT Generalization Paradox: Models supervised solely on the composite task achieve near-perfect in-distribution accuracy but collapse on out-of-distribution generalization, indicating their reliance on rote memorization of path shortcuts. In contrast, we find that RL acts as a reasoning synthesizer rather than a probability amplifier. However, we uncover a strict atomic prerequisite: RL can only synthesize these complex strategies if the base model has first mastered the independent atomic skills (Parametric and Contextual) via SFT. These findings challenge the view of RL as a mere amplifier, suggesting that given sufficient atomic foundations, RL can actively synthesize complex reasoning strategies from learned primitives without explicit supervision on such complex strategies. This indicates that decoupled atomic training followed by RL offers a scalable path to generalization for complex reasoning tasks.

The concept of causal abstraction got recently popularised to demystify the opaque decision-making processes of machine learning models; in short, a neural network can be abstracted as a higher-level algorithm if there exists a function which allows us to map between them. Notably, most interpretability papers implement these maps as linear functions, motivated by the linear representation hypothesis: the idea that features are encoded linearly in a model's representations. However, this linearity constraint is not required by the definition of causal abstraction. In this work, we critically examine the concept of causal abstraction by considering arbitrarily powerful alignment maps. In particular, we prove that under reasonable assumptions, any neural network can be mapped to any algorithm, rendering this unrestricted notion of causal abstraction trivial and uninformative. We complement these theoretical findings with empirical evidence, demonstrating that it is possible to perfectly map models to algorithms even when these models are incapable of solving the actual task; e.g., on an experiment using randomly initialised language models, our alignment maps reach 100% interchange-intervention accuracy on the indirect object identification task. This raises the non-linear representation dilemma: if we lift the linearity constraint imposed to alignment maps in causal abstraction analyses, we are left with no principled way to balance the inherent trade-off between these maps' complexity and accuracy. Together, these results suggest an answer to our title's question: causal abstraction is not enough for mechanistic interpretability, as it becomes vacuous without assumptions about how models encode information. Studying the connection between this information-encoding assumption and causal abstraction should lead to exciting future work.

The recent wave of generative AI has sparked unprecedented global attention, with both excitement and concern over potentially superhuman levels of artificial intelligence: models now take only seconds to produce outputs that would challenge or exceed the capabilities even of expert humans. At the same time, models still show basic errors in understanding that would not be expected even in non-expert humans. This presents us with an apparent paradox: how do we reconcile seemingly superhuman capabilities with the persistence of errors that few humans would make? In this work, we posit that this tension reflects a divergence in the configuration of intelligence in today's generative models relative to intelligence in humans. Specifically, we propose and test the Generative AI Paradox hypothesis: generative models, having been trained directly to reproduce expert-like outputs, acquire generative capabilities that are not contingent upon -- and can therefore exceed -- their ability to understand those same types of outputs. This contrasts with humans, for whom basic understanding almost always precedes the ability to generate expert-level outputs. We test this hypothesis through controlled experiments analyzing generation vs. understanding in generative models, across both language and image modalities. Our results show that although models can outperform humans in generation, they consistently fall short of human capabilities in measures of understanding, as well as weaker correlation between generation and understanding performance, and more brittleness to adversarial inputs. Our findings support the hypothesis that models' generative capability may not be contingent upon understanding capability, and call for caution in interpreting artificial intelligence by analogy to human intelligence.

The field of artificial intelligence (AI) is devoted to the creation of artificial decision-makers that can perform (at least) on par with the human counterparts on a domain of interest. Unlike the agents in traditional AI, the agents in artificial general intelligence (AGI) are required to replicate human intelligence in almost every domain of interest. Moreover, an AGI agent should be able to achieve this without (virtually any) further changes, retraining, or fine-tuning of the parameters. The real world is non-stationary, non-ergodic, and non-Markovian: we, humans, can neither revisit our past nor are the most recent observations sufficient statistics. Yet, we excel at a variety of complex tasks. Many of these tasks require longterm planning. We can associate this success to our natural faculty to abstract away task-irrelevant information from our overwhelming sensory experience. We make task-specific mental models of the world without much effort. Due to this ability to abstract, we can plan on a significantly compact representation of a task without much loss of performance. Not only this, we also abstract our actions to produce high-level plans: the level of action-abstraction can be anywhere between small muscle movements to a mental notion of "doing an action". It is natural to assume that any AGI agent competing with humans (at every plausible domain) should also have these abilities to abstract its experiences and actions. This thesis is an inquiry into the existence of such abstractions which aid efficient planing for a wide range of domains, and most importantly, these abstractions come with some optimality guarantees.

A faithful and interpretable explanation of an AI model's behavior and internal structure is a high-level explanation that is human-intelligible but also consistent with the known, but often opaque low-level causal details of the model. We argue that the theory of causal abstraction provides the mathematical foundations for the desired kinds of model explanations. In causal abstraction analysis, we use interventions on model-internal states to rigorously assess whether an interpretable high-level causal model is a faithful description of an AI model. Our contributions in this area are: (1) We generalize causal abstraction to cyclic causal structures and typed high-level variables. (2) We show how multi-source interchange interventions can be used to conduct causal abstraction analyses. (3) We define a notion of approximate causal abstraction that allows us to assess the degree to which a high-level causal model is a causal abstraction of a lower-level one. (4) We prove constructive causal abstraction can be decomposed into three operations we refer to as marginalization, variable-merge, and value-merge. (5) We formalize the XAI methods of LIME, causal effect estimation, causal mediation analysis, iterated nullspace projection, and circuit-based explanations as special cases of causal abstraction analysis.

Abstraction is a core tenet of human cognition and communication. When composing natural language instructions, humans naturally evoke abstraction to convey complex procedures in an efficient and concise way. Yet, interpreting and grounding abstraction expressed in NL has not yet been systematically studied in NLP, with no accepted benchmarks specifically eliciting abstraction in NL. In this work, we set the foundation for a systematic study of processing and grounding abstraction in NLP. First, we deliver a novel abstraction elicitation method and present Hexagons, a 2D instruction-following game. Using Hexagons we collected over 4k naturally-occurring visually-grounded instructions rich with diverse types of abstractions. From these data, we derive an instruction-to-execution task and assess different types of neural models. Our results show that contemporary models and modeling practices are substantially inferior to human performance, and that models' performance is inversely correlated with the level of abstraction, showing less satisfying performance on higher levels of abstraction. These findings are consistent across models and setups, confirming that abstraction is a challenging phenomenon deserving further attention and study in NLP/AI research.

We argue that progress toward AGI is theory limited rather than data or scale limited. Building on the critical rationalism of Popper and Deutsch, we challenge the Platonic Representation Hypothesis. Observationally equivalent worlds can diverge under interventions, so observational adequacy alone cannot guarantee interventional competence. We begin by laying foundations, definitions of knowledge, learning, intelligence, counterfactual competence and AGI, and then analyze the limits of observational learning that motivate an error centric shift. We recast the problem as three questions about how explicit and implicit errors evolve under an agent's actions, which errors are unreachable within a fixed hypothesis space, and how conjecture and criticism expand that space. From these questions we propose Causal Mechanics, a mechanisms first program in which hypothesis space change is a first class operation and probabilistic structure is used when useful rather than presumed. We advance structural principles that make error discovery and correction tractable, including a differential Locality and Autonomy Principle for modular interventions, a gauge invariant form of Independent Causal Mechanisms for separability, and the Compositional Autonomy Principle for analogy preservation, together with actionable diagnostics. The aim is a scaffold for systems that can convert unreachable errors into reachable ones and correct them.

Abstract reasoning from minimal examples remains a core unsolved problem for frontier foundation models such as GPT-5 and Grok 4. These models still fail to infer structured transformation rules from a handful of examples, which is a key hallmark of human intelligence. The Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus for Artificial General Intelligence (ARC-AGI) provides a rigorous testbed for this capability, demanding conceptual rule induction and transfer to novel tasks. Most existing methods treat ARC-AGI as a purely textual reasoning task, overlooking the fact that humans rely heavily on visual abstraction when solving such puzzles. However, our pilot experiments reveal a paradox: naively rendering ARC-AGI grids as images degrades performance due to imprecise rule execution. This leads to our central hypothesis that vision and language possess complementary strengths across distinct reasoning stages: vision supports global pattern abstraction and verification, whereas language specializes in symbolic rule formulation and precise execution. Building on this insight, we introduce two synergistic strategies: (1) Vision-Language Synergy Reasoning (VLSR), which decomposes ARC-AGI into modality-aligned subtasks; and (2) Modality-Switch Self-Correction (MSSC), which leverages vision to verify text-based reasoning for intrinsic error correction. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our approach yields up to a 4.33% improvement over text-only baselines across diverse flagship models and multiple ARC-AGI tasks. Our findings suggest that unifying visual abstraction with linguistic reasoning is a crucial step toward achieving generalizable, human-like intelligence in future foundation models. Source code will be released soon.

Wigner's Friend-type paradoxes challenge the assumption that events are absolute -- that when we measure a system, we obtain a single result, which is not relative to anything or anyone else. These paradoxes highlight the tension between quantum theory and our intuitions about reality being observer-independent. Building on a recent result that developed these paradoxes into a no-go theorem, namely the Local Friendliness Theorem, we introduce the Causal Friendliness Paradox, a time-ordered analogue of it. In this framework, we replace the usual locality assumption with Axiological Time Symmetry (ATS), and show that, when combined with the assumptions of Absoluteness of Observed Events (AOE), No Retrocausality (NRC), and Screening via Pseudo Events (SPE), we obtain a causal inequality. We then show that quantum mechanics violates this inequality and is therefore incompatible with at least one of these assumptions. To probe which assumption might be incompatible, we then examine whether AOE in its entirety is essential for this no-go result. We propose a weaker, operational form of AOE that still leads to inequalities that quantum mechanics violates. This result shows that even under relaxed assumptions, quantum theory resists reconciliation with classical notions of absolute events, reinforcing the foundational significance of Wigner's Friend-type paradoxes in timelike scenarios.

While generalist foundation models like Gemini and GPT-4o demonstrate impressive multi-modal competence, existing evaluations fail to test their intelligence in dynamic, interactive worlds. Static benchmarks lack agency, while interactive benchmarks suffer from a severe modal bottleneck, typically ignoring crucial auditory and temporal cues. To bridge this evaluation chasm, we introduce OmniPlay, a diagnostic benchmark designed not just to evaluate, but to probe the fusion and reasoning capabilities of agentic models across the full sensory spectrum. Built on a core philosophy of modality interdependence, OmniPlay comprises a suite of five game environments that systematically create scenarios of both synergy and conflict, forcing agents to perform genuine cross-modal reasoning. Our comprehensive evaluation of six leading omni-modal models reveals a critical dichotomy: they exhibit superhuman performance on high-fidelity memory tasks but suffer from systemic failures in challenges requiring robust reasoning and strategic planning. We demonstrate that this fragility stems from brittle fusion mechanisms, which lead to catastrophic performance degradation under modality conflict and uncover a counter-intuitive "less is more" paradox, where removing sensory information can paradoxically improve performance. Our findings suggest that the path toward robust AGI requires a research focus beyond scaling to explicitly address synergistic fusion. Our platform is available for anonymous review at https://github.com/fuqingbie/omni-game-benchmark.

Recent advances in generative AI have demonstrated remarkable ability to produce high-quality content. However, these models often exhibit "Paradox of Simplicity": while they can render intricate landscapes, they often fail at simple, deterministic tasks. To address this, we formalize Obedience as the ability to align with instructions and establish a hierarchical grading system ranging from basic semantic alignment to pixel-level systemic precision, which provides a unified paradigm for incorporating and categorizing existing literature. Then, we conduct case studies to identify common obedience gaps, revealing how generative priors often override logical constraints. To evaluate high-level obedience, we present VIOLIN (VIsual Obedience Level-4 EvaluatIoN), the first benchmark focused on pure color generation across six variants. Extensive experiments on SOTA models reveal fundamental obedience limitations and further exploratory insights. By establishing this framework, we aim to draw more attention on AI Obedience and encourage deeper exploration to bridge this gap.

Ecological management and decision-making typically focus on uncertainty about the future, but surprisingly little is known about how to account for uncertainty of the present: that is, the realities of having only partial or imperfect measurements. Our primary paradigms for handling decisions under uncertainty -- the precautionary principle and optimal control -- have so far given contradictory results. This paradox is best illustrated in the example of fisheries management, where many ideas that guide thinking about ecological decision making were first developed. We find that simplistic optimal control approaches have repeatedly concluded that a manager should increase catch quotas when faced with greater uncertainty about the fish biomass. Current best practices take a more precautionary approach, decreasing catch quotas by a fixed amount to account for uncertainty. Using comparisons to both simulated and historical catch data, we find that neither approach is sufficient to avoid stock collapses under moderate observational uncertainty. Using partially observed Markov decision process (POMDP) methods, we demonstrate how this paradox arises from flaws in the standard theory, which contributes to over-exploitation of fisheries and increased probability of economic and ecological collapse. In contrast, we find POMDP-based management avoids such over-exploitation while also generating higher economic value. These results have significant implications for how we handle uncertainty in both fisheries and ecological management more generally.

Existing multimodal large language models have achieved high-fidelity visual perception and exploratory visual generation. However, a precision paradox persists in complex reasoning tasks: optical perception systems transcribe symbols without capturing logical topology, while pixel-based generative models produce visual artifacts lacking mathematical exactness. To bridge this gap, we propose that reasoning over visual inputs be reconceptualized as optical decompression-the process of reconstructing latent logical structures from compressed visual tokens. Guided by the axiom that Parsing is Reasoning, we introduce Thinking with Drafting (TwD), which utilizes a minimalist Domain-Specific Language (DSL) as a grounding intermediate representation. Unlike standard approaches that hallucinate answers directly, TwD forces the model to draft its mental model into executable code, rendering deterministic visual proofs for self-verification. To validate this, we present VisAlg, a visual algebra benchmark. Experiments demonstrate that TwD serve as a superior cognitive scaffold. Our work establishes a closed-loop system where visual generation acts not as a creative output but as a logical verifier, offering a generalizable path for visual reasoning.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) is highly effective for enhancing LLM reasoning, yet recent evidence shows models like Qwen 2.5 achieve significant gains even with spurious or incorrect rewards. We investigate this phenomenon and identify a "Perplexity Paradox": spurious RLVR triggers a divergence where answer-token perplexity drops while prompt-side coherence degrades, suggesting the model is bypassing reasoning in favor of memorization. Using Path Patching, Logit Lens, JSD analysis, and Neural Differential Equations, we uncover a hidden Anchor-Adapter circuit that facilitates this shortcut. We localize a Functional Anchor in the middle layers (L18-20) that triggers the retrieval of memorized solutions, followed by Structural Adapters in later layers (L21+) that transform representations to accommodate the shortcut signal. Finally, we demonstrate that scaling specific MLP keys within this circuit allows for bidirectional causal steering-artificially amplifying or suppressing contamination-driven performance. Our results provide a mechanistic roadmap for identifying and mitigating data contamination in RLVR-tuned models. Code is available at https://github.com/idwts/How-RLVR-Activates-Memorization-Shortcuts.

In this paper, we present a method for converting a given scene image into a sketch using different types and multiple levels of abstraction. We distinguish between two types of abstraction. The first considers the fidelity of the sketch, varying its representation from a more precise portrayal of the input to a looser depiction. The second is defined by the visual simplicity of the sketch, moving from a detailed depiction to a sparse sketch. Using an explicit disentanglement into two abstraction axes -- and multiple levels for each one -- provides users additional control over selecting the desired sketch based on their personal goals and preferences. To form a sketch at a given level of fidelity and simplification, we train two MLP networks. The first network learns the desired placement of strokes, while the second network learns to gradually remove strokes from the sketch without harming its recognizability and semantics. Our approach is able to generate sketches of complex scenes including those with complex backgrounds (e.g., natural and urban settings) and subjects (e.g., animals and people) while depicting gradual abstractions of the input scene in terms of fidelity and simplicity.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Reasoning requires going beyond pattern matching or memorization of solutions to identify and implement "algorithmic procedures" that can be used to deduce answers to hard problems. Doing so requires realizing the most relevant primitives, intermediate results, or shared procedures, and building upon them. While RL post-training on long chains of thought ultimately aims to uncover this kind of algorithmic behavior, most reasoning traces learned by large models fail to consistently capture or reuse procedures, instead drifting into verbose and degenerate exploration. To address more effective reasoning, we introduce reasoning abstractions: concise natural language descriptions of procedural and factual knowledge that guide the model toward learning successful reasoning. We train models to be capable of proposing multiple abstractions given a problem, followed by RL that incentivizes building a solution while using the information provided by these abstractions. This results in a two-player RL training paradigm, abbreviated as RLAD, that jointly trains an abstraction generator and a solution generator. This setup effectively enables structured exploration, decouples learning signals of abstraction proposal and solution generation, and improves generalization to harder problems. We also show that allocating more test-time compute to generating abstractions is more beneficial for performance than generating more solutions at large test budgets, illustrating the role of abstractions in guiding meaningful exploration.

As robots are increasingly deployed in real-world scenarios, a key question is how to best transfer knowledge learned in one environment to another, where shifting constraints and human preferences render adaptation challenging. A central challenge remains that often, it is difficult (perhaps even impossible) to capture the full complexity of the deployment environment, and therefore the desired tasks, at training time. Consequently, the representation, or abstraction, of the tasks the human hopes for the robot to perform in one environment may be misaligned with the representation of the tasks that the robot has learned in another. We postulate that because humans will be the ultimate evaluator of system success in the world, they are best suited to communicating the aspects of the tasks that matter to the robot. Our key insight is that effective learning from human input requires first explicitly learning good intermediate representations and then using those representations for solving downstream tasks. We highlight three areas where we can use this approach to build interactive systems and offer future directions of work to better create advanced collaborative robots.

Humans can ground natural language commands to tasks at both abstract and fine-grained levels of specificity. For instance, a human forklift operator can be instructed to perform a high-level action, like "grab a pallet" or a low-level action like "tilt back a little bit." While robots are also capable of grounding language commands to tasks, previous methods implicitly assume that all commands and tasks reside at a single, fixed level of abstraction. Additionally, methods that do not use multiple levels of abstraction encounter inefficient planning and execution times as they solve tasks at a single level of abstraction with large, intractable state-action spaces closely resembling real world complexity. In this work, by grounding commands to all the tasks or subtasks available in a hierarchical planning framework, we arrive at a model capable of interpreting language at multiple levels of specificity ranging from coarse to more granular. We show that the accuracy of the grounding procedure is improved when simultaneously inferring the degree of abstraction in language used to communicate the task. Leveraging hierarchy also improves efficiency: our proposed approach enables a robot to respond to a command within one second on 90% of our tasks, while baselines take over twenty seconds on half the tasks. Finally, we demonstrate that a real, physical robot can ground commands at multiple levels of abstraction allowing it to efficiently plan different subtasks within the same planning hierarchy.

Generative AI powers a growing wave of companion chatbots, yet principles for fostering genuine connection remain unsettled. We test two routes: visible user authorship versus covert language-style mimicry. In a preregistered 3x2 experiment (N = 162), we manipulated user-controlled avatar generation (none, premade, user-generated) and Language Style Matching (LSM) (static vs. adaptive). Generating an avatar boosted rapport (omega^2 = .040, p = .013), whereas adaptive LSM underperformed static style on personalization and satisfaction (d = 0.35, p = .009) and was paradoxically judged less adaptive (t = 3.07, p = .003, d = 0.48). We term this an Adaptation Paradox: synchrony erodes connection when perceived as incoherent, destabilizing persona. To explain, we propose a stability-and-legibility account: visible authorship fosters natural interaction, while covert mimicry risks incoherence. Our findings suggest designers should prioritize legible, user-driven personalization and limit stylistic shifts rather than rely on opaque mimicry.

Machine learning has facilitated significant advancements across various robotics domains, including navigation, locomotion, and manipulation. Many such achievements have been driven by the extensive use of simulation as a critical tool for training and testing robotic systems prior to their deployment in real-world environments. However, simulations consist of abstractions and approximations that inevitably introduce discrepancies between simulated and real environments, known as the reality gap. These discrepancies significantly hinder the successful transfer of systems from simulation to the real world. Closing this gap remains one of the most pressing challenges in robotics. Recent advances in sim-to-real transfer have demonstrated promising results across various platforms, including locomotion, navigation, and manipulation. By leveraging techniques such as domain randomization, real-to-sim transfer, state and action abstractions, and sim-real co-training, many works have overcome the reality gap. However, challenges persist, and a deeper understanding of the reality gap's root causes and solutions is necessary. In this survey, we present a comprehensive overview of the sim-to-real landscape, highlighting the causes, solutions, and evaluation metrics for the reality gap and sim-to-real transfer.

State-of-the-art embedding models are increasingly derived from decoder-only Large Language Model (LLM) backbones adapted via contrastive learning. Given the emergence of reasoning models trained via Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), a natural question arises: do enhanced reasoning translate to superior semantic representations when these models serve as embedding initializations? Contrary to expectation, our evaluation on MTEB and BRIGHT reveals a **null effect**: embedding models initialized from RLVR-tuned backbones yield no consistent performance advantage over their base counterparts when subjected to identical training recipes. To unpack this paradox, we introduce **H**ierarchical **R**epresentation **S**imilarity **A**nalysis (HRSA), a framework that decomposes similarity across representation, geometry, and function levels. HRSA reveals that while RLVR induces irreversible latent manifold's local geometry reorganization and reversible coordinate basis drift, it preserves the global manifold geometry and linear readout. Consequently, subsequent contrastive learning drives strong alignment between base- and reasoning-initialized models, a phenomenon we term **Manifold Realignment**. Empirically, our findings suggest that unlike Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), RLVR optimizes trajectories within an existing semantic landscape rather than fundamentally restructuring the landscape itself.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) exhibit a fundamental semantic-to-geometric gap in spatial reasoning: they excel at qualitative semantic inference but their reasoning operates within a lossy semantic space, misaligned with high-fidelity geometry. Current paradigms fail to bridge this gap. Training-based methods suffer from an ``oracle paradox,'' learning flawed spatial logic from imperfect oracles. Tool-integrated methods constrain the final computation but critically leave the VLM's planning process unconstrained, resulting in geometrically flawed plans. In this work, we propose Geometrically-Constrained Agent (GCA), a training-free agentic paradigm that resolves this gap by introducing a formal task constraint. Specifically, we strategically decouples the VLM's role into two stages. First, acting as a semantic analyst, the VLM translates the user's ambiguous query into the formal, verifiable task constraint, which defines the reference frame and objective. Second, acting as a task solver, the VLM generates and executes tool calls strictly within the deterministic bounds defined by the constraint. This geometrically-constrained reasoning strategy successfully resolve the semantic-to-geometric gap, yielding a robust and verifiable reasoning pathway for spatial reasoning. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that GCA achieves SOTA performance on multiple spatial reasoning benchmarks, surpassing existing training-based and tool-integrated methods by ~27%. Please see our homepage at https://gca-spatial-reasoning.github.io.

Modern language models can imitate complex patterns through few-shot learning, enabling them to complete challenging tasks without fine-tuning. However, imitation can also lead models to reproduce inaccuracies or harmful content if present in the context. We study harmful imitation through the lens of a model's internal representations, and identify two related phenomena: "overthinking" and "false induction heads". The first phenomenon, overthinking, appears when we decode predictions from intermediate layers, given correct vs. incorrect few-shot demonstrations. At early layers, both demonstrations induce similar model behavior, but the behavior diverges sharply at some "critical layer", after which the accuracy given incorrect demonstrations progressively decreases. The second phenomenon, false induction heads, are a possible mechanistic cause of overthinking: these are heads in late layers that attend to and copy false information from previous demonstrations, and whose ablation reduces overthinking. Beyond scientific understanding, our results suggest that studying intermediate model computations could be a promising avenue for understanding and guarding against harmful model behaviors.

Current artificial intelligence systems exhibit a fundamental architectural limitation: they resolve ambiguity prematurely. This premature semantic collapse--collapsing multiple valid interpretations into single outputs--stems from classical identity assumptions in neural architectures. We propose Non-Resolution Reasoning (NRR), a framework treating ambiguity retention as a valid reasoning mode. NRR introduces three principles: (1) Non-Identity (A neq A)--the same symbol refers to different entities across contexts; (2) Approximate Identity (A approx A)--entities share partial structural overlap without being identical; (3) Non-Resolution--conflicting interpretations coexist without forced convergence. We formalize these through Multi-Vector Embeddings for context-dependent representation, Non-Collapsing Attention for parallel interpretation retention, and Contextual Identity Tracking (CIT) for maintaining A neq A across inference. We illustrate NRR through case studies in paradox handling, creative generation, and context-dependent reasoning. Functional verification in a synthetic two-turn disambiguation task shows NRR-lite maintains high entropy (H = 0.91 bits, near-maximum 1.0) at ambiguous turns while standard architectures collapse early (H = 0.15 bits), preserving interpretive flexibility until context arrives. NRR challenges the assumption that meaning must collapse to be useful. The question is not whether AI should resolve ambiguity, but when, how, and under whose control.

In most machine learning tasks, we evaluate a model M on a given data population S by measuring a population-level metric F(S;M). Examples of such evaluation metric F include precision/recall for (binary) recognition, the F1 score for multi-class classification, and the BLEU metric for language generation. On the other hand, the model M is trained by optimizing a sample-level loss G(S_t;M) at each learning step t, where S_t is a subset of S (a.k.a. the mini-batch). Popular choices of G include cross-entropy loss, the Dice loss, and sentence-level BLEU scores. A fundamental assumption behind this paradigm is that the mean value of the sample-level loss G, if averaged over all possible samples, should effectively represent the population-level metric F of the task, such as, that E[ G(S_t;M) ] approx F(S;M). In this paper, we systematically investigate the above assumption in several NLP tasks. We show, both theoretically and experimentally, that some popular designs of the sample-level loss G may be inconsistent with the true population-level metric F of the task, so that models trained to optimize the former can be substantially sub-optimal to the latter, a phenomenon we call it, Simpson's bias, due to its deep connections with the classic paradox known as Simpson's reversal paradox in statistics and social sciences.

Large language models are emerging as powerful tools for scientific law discovery, a foundational challenge in AI-driven science. However, existing benchmarks for this task suffer from a fundamental methodological trilemma, forcing a trade-off between scientific relevance, scalability, and resistance to memorization. Furthermore, they oversimplify discovery as static function fitting, failing to capture the authentic scientific process of uncovering embedded laws through the interactive exploration of complex model systems. To address these critical gaps, we introduce NewtonBench, a benchmark comprising 324 scientific law discovery tasks across 12 physics domains. Our design mitigates the evaluation trilemma by using metaphysical shifts - systematic alterations of canonical laws - to generate a vast suite of problems that are scalable, scientifically relevant, and memorization-resistant. Moreover, we elevate the evaluation from static function fitting to interactive model discovery, requiring agents to experimentally probe simulated complex systems to uncover hidden principles. Our extensive experiment reveals a clear but fragile capability for discovery in frontier LLMs: this ability degrades precipitously with increasing system complexity and exhibits extreme sensitivity to observational noise. Notably, we uncover a paradoxical effect of tool assistance: providing a code interpreter can hinder more capable models by inducing a premature shift from exploration to exploitation, causing them to satisfice on suboptimal solutions. These results demonstrate that robust, generalizable discovery in complex, interactive environments remains the core challenge. By providing a scalable, robust, and scientifically authentic testbed, NewtonBench offers a crucial tool for measuring true progress and guiding the development of next-generation AI agents capable of genuine scientific discovery.

The notions of disintegration and Bayesian inversion are fundamental in conditional probability theory. They produce channels, as conditional probabilities, from a joint state, or from an already given channel (in opposite direction). These notions exist in the literature, in concrete situations, but are presented here in abstract graphical formulations. The resulting abstract descriptions are used for proving basic results in conditional probability theory. The existence of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is discussed for discrete probability, and also for measure-theoretic probability --- via standard Borel spaces and via likelihoods. Finally, the usefulness of disintegration and Bayesian inversion is illustrated in several examples.

AI systems increasingly produce fluent, correct, end-to-end outcomes. Over time, this erodes users' ability to explain, verify, or intervene. We define this divergence as the Capability-Comprehension Gap: a decoupling where assisted performance improves while users' internal models deteriorate. This paper argues that prevailing approaches to transparency, user control, literacy, and governance do not define the foundational understanding humans must retain for oversight under sustained AI delegation. To formalize this, we define the Cognitive Integrity Threshold (CIT) as the minimum comprehension required to preserve oversight, autonomy, and accountable participation under AI assistance. CIT does not require full reasoning reconstruction, nor does it constrain automation. It identifies the threshold beyond which oversight becomes procedural and contestability fails. We operatinalize CIT through three functional dimensions: (i) verification capacity, (ii) comprehension-preserving interaction, and (iii) institutional scaffolds for governance. This motivates a design and governance agenda that aligns human-AI interaction with cognitive sustainability in responsibility-critical settings.

Goal representation affects the performance of Hierarchical Reinforcement Learning (HRL) algorithms by decomposing the complex learning problem into easier subtasks. Recent studies show that representations that preserve temporally abstract environment dynamics are successful in solving difficult problems and provide theoretical guarantees for optimality. These methods however cannot scale to tasks where environment dynamics increase in complexity i.e. the temporally abstract transition relations depend on larger number of variables. On the other hand, other efforts have tried to use spatial abstraction to mitigate the previous issues. Their limitations include scalability to high dimensional environments and dependency on prior knowledge. In this paper, we propose a novel three-layer HRL algorithm that introduces, at different levels of the hierarchy, both a spatial and a temporal goal abstraction. We provide a theoretical study of the regret bounds of the learned policies. We evaluate the approach on complex continuous control tasks, demonstrating the effectiveness of spatial and temporal abstractions learned by this approach.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

Recent reasoning LLMs (RLMs), especially those trained with verifier-based reinforcement learning, often perform worse with few-shot CoT than with direct answering. We revisit this paradox using high-quality reasoning traces from DeepSeek-R1 as demonstrations and find that adding more exemplars consistently degrades accuracy, even when demonstrations are optimal. A detailed analysis reveals two mechanisms behind this decline: (i) semantic misguidance, where high textual similarity leads the model to treat the target as the same as the exemplar and to copy intermediate steps verbatim; and (ii) strategy transfer failure, where the model struggles to extract useful reasoning strategies and apply them to target questions. Guided by these, we introduce Insight-to-Solve (I2S), a sequential test-time procedure that turns demonstrations into explicit, reusable insights and derives a target-specific reasoning trace; optionally, the reasoning is self-refined for coherence and correctness (I2S+). Extensive experiments on diverse benchmarks show that I2S and I2S+ consistently outperform both direct answering and test-time scaling baselines across open- and closed-source models. Even for GPT models, our method helps: on AIME'25, GPT-4.1 rises by +14.0%, and o1-mini improves by +2.7% on AIME and +1.7% on GPQA, indicating that in-context demonstrations can be harnessed effectively via insight-refine-solve framework.

Hallucination is a persistent challenge in large language models (LLMs), where even with rigorous quality control, models often generate distorted facts. This paradox, in which error generation continues despite high-quality training data, calls for a deeper understanding of the underlying LLM mechanisms. To address it, we propose a novel concept: knowledge overshadowing, where model's dominant knowledge can obscure less prominent knowledge during text generation, causing the model to fabricate inaccurate details. Building on this idea, we introduce a novel framework to quantify factual hallucinations by modeling knowledge overshadowing. Central to our approach is the log-linear law, which predicts that the rate of factual hallucination increases linearly with the logarithmic scale of (1) Knowledge Popularity, (2) Knowledge Length, and (3) Model Size. The law provides a means to preemptively quantify hallucinations, offering foresight into their occurrence even before model training or inference. Built on overshadowing effect, we propose a new decoding strategy CoDa, to mitigate hallucinations, which notably enhance model factuality on Overshadow (27.9%), MemoTrap (13.1%) and NQ-Swap (18.3%). Our findings not only deepen understandings of the underlying mechanisms behind hallucinations but also provide actionable insights for developing more predictable and controllable language models.

Large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI's o1 have demonstrated remarkable abilities in complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute and exhibiting human-like deep thinking. However, we identify a phenomenon we term underthinking, where o1-like LLMs frequently switch between different reasoning thoughts without sufficiently exploring promising paths to reach a correct solution. This behavior leads to inadequate depth of reasoning and decreased performance, particularly on challenging mathematical problems. To systematically analyze this issue, we conduct experiments on three challenging test sets and two representative open-source o1-like models, revealing that frequent thought switching correlates with incorrect responses. We introduce a novel metric to quantify underthinking by measuring token efficiency in incorrect answers. To address underthinking, we propose a decoding strategy with thought switching penalty TIP that discourages premature transitions between thoughts, encouraging deeper exploration of each reasoning path. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach improves accuracy across challenging datasets without requiring model fine-tuning. Our findings contribute to understanding reasoning inefficiencies in o1-like LLMs and offer a practical solution to enhance their problem-solving capabilities.

Abstraction ability is crucial in human intelligence, which can also benefit various tasks in NLP study. Existing work shows that LLMs are deficient in abstract ability, and how to improve it remains unexplored. In this work, we design the framework AbsInstruct to enhance LLMs' abstraction ability through instruction tuning. The framework builds instructions with in-depth explanations to assist LLMs in capturing the underlying rationale of abstraction. Meanwhile, we introduce a plausibility estimator to select instructions that are more consistent with the abstraction knowledge of LLMs to be aligned. Then, our framework combines abstraction instructions with general-purpose ones to build a hybrid dataset. Extensive experiments and analyses demonstrate that our framework can considerably enhance LLMs' abstraction ability with strong generalization performance while maintaining their general instruction-following abilities.

Partition logics -- non-Boolean event structures obtained by pasting Boolean algebras -- provide a natural language for situations in which a system has a definite latent state but can be accessed and resolved only through mutually incompatible coarse-grained modes of observation. We show that this structure arises in a range of social-science settings by constructing six explicit examples from personnel assessment, survey framing, clinical diagnosis, espionage coordination, legal pluralism, and organizational auditing. For each case we identify the latent state space, the observational contexts as partitions, and the shared atoms that intertwine contexts, yielding instances of the L_{12} bowtie, triangle, pentagon, and automaton partition logics. These examples make precise a notion of social complementarity: different modes of inquiry can be incompatible even though the underlying system remains fully value-definite. Complementarity in this sense does not entail contextuality or ontic indeterminacy. We further compare the classical probabilities generated by convex mixtures of dispersion-free states with the quantum-like Born probabilities available when the same exclusivity graph admits a faithful orthogonal representation. The framework thus separates logical structure from probabilistic realization and suggests empirically testable benchmarks for quantum-cognition models.

Whether neural networks can learn abstract reasoning or whether they merely rely on superficial statistics is a topic of recent debate. Here, we propose a dataset and challenge designed to probe abstract reasoning, inspired by a well-known human IQ test. To succeed at this challenge, models must cope with various generalisation `regimes' in which the training and test data differ in clearly-defined ways. We show that popular models such as ResNets perform poorly, even when the training and test sets differ only minimally, and we present a novel architecture, with a structure designed to encourage reasoning, that does significantly better. When we vary the way in which the test questions and training data differ, we find that our model is notably proficient at certain forms of generalisation, but notably weak at others. We further show that the model's ability to generalise improves markedly if it is trained to predict symbolic explanations for its answers. Altogether, we introduce and explore ways to both measure and induce stronger abstract reasoning in neural networks. Our freely-available dataset should motivate further progress in this direction.

Reciprocity is a fundamental symmetry present in many natural phenomena and engineered systems. Distinct situations where this symmetry is broken are typically grouped under the umbrella term "nonreciprocity", colloquially defined by: the action of A on B neq the action of B on A. In this review, we elucidate what nonreciprocity is by providing an introduction to its most salient classes: nonvariational dynamics, violations of Newton's third law, broken detailed balance, nonreciprocal responses and nonreciprocity of arbitrary linear operators. Next, we point out where to find these manifestations of non-reciprocity, from ensembles of particles with field mediated interactions to synthetic neural networks and open quantum systems. Given this breadth of contexts and the lack of an all-encompassing definition, it makes it all the more intriguing that some general conclusions can be gathered, when distinct definitions of nonreciprocity overlap. We explore what these universal consequences are with a special emphasis on collective phenomena that arise in nonreciprocal many-body systems. The topics covered include nonreciprocal phase transitions and non-normal amplification of noise and perturbations. We conclude with some open questions.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

We present a training system, which can provably defend significantly larger neural networks than previously possible, including ResNet-34 and DenseNet-100. Our approach is based on differentiable abstract interpretation and introduces two novel concepts: (i) abstract layers for fine-tuning the precision and scalability of the abstraction, (ii) a flexible domain specific language (DSL) for describing training objectives that combine abstract and concrete losses with arbitrary specifications. Our training method is implemented in the DiffAI system.

Complex problem-solving requires cognitive flexibility--the capacity to entertain multiple perspectives while preserving their distinctiveness. This flexibility replicates the "wisdom of crowds" within a single individual, allowing them to "think with many minds." While mental simulation enables imagined deliberation, cognitive constraints limit its effectiveness. We propose synthetic deliberation, a Large Language Model (LLM)-based method that simulates discourse between agents embodying diverse perspectives, as a solution. Using a custom GPT-based model, we showcase its benefits: concurrent processing of multiple viewpoints without cognitive degradation, parallel exploration of perspectives, and precise control over viewpoint synthesis. By externalizing the deliberative process and distributing cognitive labor between parallel search and integration, synthetic deliberation transcends mental simulation's limitations. This approach shows promise for strategic planning, policymaking, and conflict resolution.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

With the widespread adoption of large language models (LLMs), hallucinations, which are non-factual fabrications in model outputs, have become serious concerns. Reasoning capabilities have received attention as a self-verification process to improve output reliability. However, the effect of reasoning within a closed system where LLMs cannot rely on external tools or knowledge has yet to be clarified. We therefore conduct experiments under strict constraints (recommending peer-reviewed journal articles in computer science) to examine the effect of reasoning across multiple models (GPT-5.2 and Gemini 3 Flash). Our results reveal a problematic trade-off between constraint compliance and factual accuracy. Non-reasoning models exhibit high constraint violation rates (66-75%) but maintain factual accuracy, while reasoning models reduce violations (13-26%) but systematically distort known facts to satisfy constraints and increase complete fabrication. This trade-off pattern is consistent across both models despite different architectures, indicating a fundamental limitation of reasoning. Furthermore, reasoning does not uniformly improve output authenticity: effects diverge by model, reflecting different allocations of the compliance-truthfulness trade-off. These findings challenge the assumption that reasoning universally improves reliability: reasoning models trade honest constraint violations for detection-resistant distortions.

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

The foundational pretraining phase determines a model's capability ceiling, as post-training struggles to overcome capability foundations established during pretraining, yet it remains critically under-explored. This stems from a structural paradox: organizations with computational resources operate under commercial pressures that inhibit transparent disclosure, while academic institutions possess research freedom but lack pretraining-scale computational resources. daVinci-LLM occupies this unexplored intersection, combining industrial-scale resources with full research freedom to advance the science of pretraining. We adopt a fully-open paradigm that treats openness as scientific methodology, releasing complete data processing pipelines, full training processes, and systematic exploration results. Recognizing that the field lacks systematic methodology for data processing, we employ the Data Darwinism framework, a principled L0-L9 taxonomy from filtering to synthesis. We train a 3B-parameter model from random initialization across 8T tokens using a two-stage adaptive curriculum that progressively shifts from foundational capabilities to reasoning-intensive enhancement. Through 200+ controlled ablations, we establish that: processing depth systematically enhances capabilities, establishing it as a critical dimension alongside volume scaling; different domains exhibit distinct saturation dynamics, necessitating adaptive strategies from proportion adjustments to format shifts; compositional balance enables targeted intensification while preventing performance collapse; how evaluation protocol choices shape our understanding of pretraining progress. By releasing the complete exploration process, we enable the community to build upon our findings and systematic methodologies to form accumulative scientific knowledge in pretraining.

Artificial intelligence (AI) systems, and Large Language Models (LLMs) in particular, are increasingly employed for creative tasks like scientific idea generation, constituting a form of generalization from training data unaddressed by existing conceptual frameworks. Despite its similarities to compositional generalization (CG), combinatorial creativity (CC) is an open-ended ability. Instead of evaluating for accuracy or correctness against fixed targets, which would contradict the open-ended nature of CC, we propose a theoretical framework and algorithmic task for evaluating outputs by their degrees of novelty and utility. From here, we make several important empirical contributions: (1) We obtain the first insights into the scaling behavior of creativity for LLMs. (2) We discover that, for fixed compute budgets, there exist optimal model depths and widths for creative ability. (3) We find that the ideation-execution gap, whereby LLMs excel at generating novel scientific ideas but struggle to ensure their practical feasibility, may be explained by a more fundamental novelty-utility tradeoff characteristic of creativity algorithms in general. Importantly, this tradeoff remains persistent even at scale, casting doubt on the long-term creative potential of LLMs in their current form. Together, our conceptual framework and empirical findings provide a foundation for understanding and improving creativity in modern AI models, bridging the gap between human and machine intelligence.

While the ``deep reasoning'' paradigm has spurred significant advances in verifiable domains like mathematics, its application to open-ended, creative generation remains a critical challenge. The two dominant methods for instilling reasoning -- reinforcement learning (RL) and instruction distillation -- falter in this area; RL struggles with the absence of clear reward signals and high-quality reward models, while distillation is prohibitively expensive and capped by the teacher model's capabilities. To overcome these limitations, we introduce REverse-Engineered Reasoning (REER), a new paradigm that fundamentally shifts the approach. Instead of building a reasoning process ``forwards'' through trial-and-error or imitation, REER works ``backwards'' from known-good solutions to computationally discover the latent, step-by-step deep reasoning process that could have produced them. Using this scalable, gradient-free approach, we curate and open-source DeepWriting-20K, a large-scale dataset of 20,000 deep reasoning trajectories for open-ended tasks. Our model, DeepWriter-8B, trained on this data, not only surpasses strong open-source baselines but also achieves performance competitive with, and at times superior to, leading proprietary models like GPT-4o and Claude 3.5.

The "AI singularity" is often miscast as a monolithic, godlike mind. Evolution suggests a different path: intelligence is fundamentally plural, social, and relational. Recent advances in agentic AI reveal that frontier reasoning models, such as DeepSeek-R1, do not improve simply by "thinking longer". Instead, they simulate internal "societies of thought," spontaneous cognitive debates that argue, verify, and reconcile to solve complex tasks. Moreover, we are entering an era of human-AI centaurs: hybrid actors where collective agency transcends individual control. Scaling this intelligence requires shifting from dyadic alignment (RLHF) toward institutional alignment. By designing digital protocols, modeled on organizations and markets, we can build a social infrastructure of checks and balances. The next intelligence explosion will not be a single silicon brain, but a complex, combinatorial society specializing and sprawling like a city. No mind is an island.

Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has significantly advanced state-of-the-art AI capabilities. However, recent studies have shown that CoT reasoning is not always faithful when models face an explicit bias in their prompts, i.e., the CoT can give an incorrect picture of how models arrive at conclusions. We go further and show that unfaithful CoT can also occur on realistic prompts with no artificial bias. We find that when separately presented with the questions "Is X bigger than Y?" and "Is Y bigger than X?", models sometimes produce superficially coherent arguments to justify systematically answering Yes to both questions or No to both questions, despite such responses being logically contradictory. We show preliminary evidence that this is due to models' implicit biases towards Yes or No, thus labeling this unfaithfulness as Implicit Post-Hoc Rationalization. Our results reveal that several production models exhibit surprisingly high rates of post-hoc rationalization in our settings: GPT-4o-mini (13%) and Haiku 3.5 (7%). While frontier models are more faithful, especially thinking ones, none are entirely faithful: Gemini 2.5 Flash (2.17%), ChatGPT-4o (0.49%), DeepSeek R1 (0.37%), Gemini 2.5 Pro (0.14%), and Sonnet 3.7 with thinking (0.04%). We also investigate Unfaithful Illogical Shortcuts, where models use subtly illogical reasoning to try to make a speculative answer to hard maths problems seem rigorously proven. Our findings raise challenges for strategies for detecting undesired behavior in LLMs via the chain of thought.

In their recent Nature Human Behaviour paper, "Emergent analogical reasoning in large language models," (Webb, Holyoak, and Lu, 2023) the authors argue that "large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems." In this response, we provide counterexamples of the letter string analogies. In our tests, GPT-3 fails to solve even the easiest variants of the problems presented in the original paper. Zero-shot reasoning is an extraordinary claim that requires extraordinary evidence. We do not see that evidence in our experiments. To strengthen claims of humanlike reasoning such as zero-shot reasoning, it is important that the field develop approaches that rule out data memorization.

The nature of abstract reasoning is a matter of debate. Modern artificial neural network (ANN) models, like large language models, demonstrate impressive success when tested on abstract reasoning problems. However, it has been argued that their success reflects some form of memorization of similar problems (data contamination) rather than a general-purpose abstract reasoning capability. This concern is supported by evidence of brittleness, and the requirement of extensive training. In our study, we explored whether abstract reasoning can be achieved using the toolbox of ANNs, without prior training. Specifically, we studied an ANN model in which the weights of a naive network are optimized during the solution of the problem, using the problem data itself, rather than any prior knowledge. We tested this modeling approach on visual reasoning problems and found that it performs relatively well. Crucially, this success does not rely on memorization of similar problems. We further suggest an explanation of how it works. Finally, as problem solving is performed by changing the ANN weights, we explored the connection between problem solving and the accumulation of knowledge in the ANNs.

Shojaee et al. (2025) report that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit "accuracy collapse" on planning puzzles beyond certain complexity thresholds. We demonstrate that their findings primarily reflect experimental design limitations rather than fundamental reasoning failures. Our analysis reveals three critical issues: (1) Tower of Hanoi experiments systematically exceed model output token limits at reported failure points, with models explicitly acknowledging these constraints in their outputs; (2) The authors' automated evaluation framework fails to distinguish between reasoning failures and practical constraints, leading to misclassification of model capabilities; (3) Most concerningly, their River Crossing benchmarks include mathematically impossible instances for N > 5 due to insufficient boat capacity, yet models are scored as failures for not solving these unsolvable problems. When we control for these experimental artifacts, by requesting generating functions instead of exhaustive move lists, preliminary experiments across multiple models indicate high accuracy on Tower of Hanoi instances previously reported as complete failures. These findings highlight the importance of careful experimental design when evaluating AI reasoning capabilities.

Abstraction is at the heart of sketching due to the simple and minimal nature of line drawings. Abstraction entails identifying the essential visual properties of an object or scene, which requires semantic understanding and prior knowledge of high-level concepts. Abstract depictions are therefore challenging for artists, and even more so for machines. We present CLIPasso, an object sketching method that can achieve different levels of abstraction, guided by geometric and semantic simplifications. While sketch generation methods often rely on explicit sketch datasets for training, we utilize the remarkable ability of CLIP (Contrastive-Language-Image-Pretraining) to distill semantic concepts from sketches and images alike. We define a sketch as a set of B\'ezier curves and use a differentiable rasterizer to optimize the parameters of the curves directly with respect to a CLIP-based perceptual loss. The abstraction degree is controlled by varying the number of strokes. The generated sketches demonstrate multiple levels of abstraction while maintaining recognizability, underlying structure, and essential visual components of the subject drawn.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has emerged as a promising paradigm for advancing the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs). However, a critical paradox clouds its efficacy: RLVR-tuned models often underperform their base models on the Pass@K metric for solution-finding, leading to the hypothesis that RLVR merely re-weights existing reasoning paths at the cost of reasoning diversity. In this work, we resolve this contradiction by identifying the source of the problem: the Pass@K metric itself is a flawed measure of reasoning, as it credits correct final answers that probably arise from inaccurate or incomplete chains of thought (CoTs). To address this, we introduce a more precise evaluation metric, CoT-Pass@K, which mandates that both the reasoning path and the final answer be correct. We provide a new theoretical foundation that formalizes how RLVR, unlike traditional RL, is uniquely structured to incentivize logical integrity. Our empirical results are supportive: using CoT-Pass@K, we observe that RLVR can incentivize the generalization of correct reasoning for all values of K. Furthermore, by analyzing the training dynamics, we find that this enhanced reasoning capability emerges early in the training process and smoothly generalizes. Our work provides a clear perspective on the role of RLVR, offers a more reliable method for its evaluation, and confirms its potential to genuinely advance machine reasoning.

It is commonly thought that observers in distinct branches of an Everettian multiverse cannot communicate without violating the linearity of quantum theory. Here we show a counterexample, demonstrating that inter-branch communication is in fact possible, entirely within standard quantum theory. We do this by considering a Wigner's-friend scenario, where an observer (Wigner) can have quantum control over another observer (the friend). We present a thought experiment where the friend in superposition can receive a message written by a distinct copy of themselves in the multiverse, with the aid of Wigner. To maintain the unitarity of quantum theory, the observers must have no memory of the message that they sent. Our thought experiment challenges conventional wisdom regarding the ultimate limits of what is possible in an Everettian multiverse. It has a surprising potential application which involves using knowledge-creation paradoxes for testing Everettian quantum theory against single-world theories.

Artificial intelligence functions not as an epistemic leveller, but as an accelerant of cognitive stratification, entrenching and formalising informational castes within liberal-democratic societies. Synthesising formal epistemology, political theory, algorithmic architecture, and economic incentive structures, the argument traces how contemporary AI systems selectively amplify the reasoning capacity of individuals equipped with recursive abstraction, symbolic logic, and adversarial interrogation, whilst simultaneously pacifying the cognitively untrained through engagement-optimised interfaces. Fluency replaces rigour, immediacy displaces reflection, and procedural reasoning is eclipsed by reactive suggestion. The result is a technocratic realignment of power: no longer grounded in material capital alone, but in the capacity to navigate, deconstruct, and manipulate systems of epistemic production. Information ceases to be a commons; it becomes the substrate through which consent is manufactured and autonomy subdued. Deliberative democracy collapses not through censorship, but through the erosion of interpretive agency. The proposed response is not technocratic regulation, nor universal access, but the reconstruction of rational autonomy as a civic mandate, codified in education, protected by epistemic rights, and structurally embedded within open cognitive infrastructure.

Modern large language models (LLMs) like ChatGPT have shown remarkable performance on general language tasks but still struggle on complex reasoning tasks, which drives the research on cognitive behaviors of LLMs to explore human-like problem-solving strategies. Along this direction, one representative strategy is self-reflection, which asks an LLM to refine the solution with the feedback generated by itself iteratively. However, our study shows that such reflection-style methods suffer from the Degeneration-of-Thought (DoT) problem: once the LLM has established confidence in its solutions, it is unable to generate novel thoughts later through reflection even if its initial stance is incorrect. To address the DoT problem, we propose a Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) framework, in which multiple agents express their arguments in the state of "tit for tat" and a judge manages the debate process to obtain a final solution. Clearly, our MAD framework encourages divergent thinking in LLMs which would be helpful for tasks that require deep levels of contemplation. Experiment results on two challenging datasets, commonsense machine translation and counter-intuitive arithmetic reasoning, demonstrate the effectiveness of our MAD framework. Extensive analyses suggest that the adaptive break of debate and the modest level of "tit for tat" state are required for MAD to obtain good performance. Moreover, we find that LLMs might not be a fair judge if different LLMs are used for agents. Codes: https://github.com/Skytliang/Multi-Agents-Debate

Cognitive research indicates that abstraction ability is essential in human intelligence, which remains under-explored in language models. In this paper, we present AbsPyramid, a unified entailment graph of 221K textual descriptions of abstraction knowledge. While existing resources only touch nouns or verbs within simplified events or specific domains, AbsPyramid collects abstract knowledge for three components of diverse events to comprehensively evaluate the abstraction ability of language models in the open domain. Experimental results demonstrate that current LLMs face challenges comprehending abstraction knowledge in zero-shot and few-shot settings. By training on our rich abstraction knowledge, we find LLMs can acquire basic abstraction abilities and generalize to unseen events. In the meantime, we empirically show that our benchmark is comprehensive to enhance LLMs across two previous abstraction tasks.

Integer sequences are of central importance to the modeling of concepts admitting complete finitary descriptions. We introduce a novel view on the learning of such concepts and lay down a set of benchmarking tasks aimed at conceptual understanding by machine learning models. These tasks indirectly assess model ability to abstract, and challenge them to reason both interpolatively and extrapolatively from the knowledge gained by observing representative examples. To further aid research in knowledge representation and reasoning, we present FACT, the Finitary Abstraction Comprehension Toolkit. The toolkit surrounds a large dataset of integer sequences comprising both organic and synthetic entries, a library for data pre-processing and generation, a set of model performance evaluation tools, and a collection of baseline model implementations, enabling the making of the future advancements with ease.

As Large Language Models become more ubiquitous across domains, it becomes important to examine their inherent limitations critically. This work argues that hallucinations in language models are not just occasional errors but an inevitable feature of these systems. We demonstrate that hallucinations stem from the fundamental mathematical and logical structure of LLMs. It is, therefore, impossible to eliminate them through architectural improvements, dataset enhancements, or fact-checking mechanisms. Our analysis draws on computational theory and Godel's First Incompleteness Theorem, which references the undecidability of problems like the Halting, Emptiness, and Acceptance Problems. We demonstrate that every stage of the LLM process-from training data compilation to fact retrieval, intent classification, and text generation-will have a non-zero probability of producing hallucinations. This work introduces the concept of Structural Hallucination as an intrinsic nature of these systems. By establishing the mathematical certainty of hallucinations, we challenge the prevailing notion that they can be fully mitigated.

We design a suite of minimal algorithmic tasks that are a loose abstraction of open-ended real-world tasks. This allows us to cleanly and controllably quantify the creative limits of the present-day language model. Much like real-world tasks that require a creative, far-sighted leap of thought, our tasks require an implicit, open-ended stochastic planning step that either (a) discovers new connections in an abstract knowledge graph (like in wordplay, drawing analogies, or research) or (b) constructs new patterns (like in designing math problems or new proteins). In these tasks, we empirically and conceptually argue how next-token learning is myopic and memorizes excessively; comparatively, multi-token approaches, namely teacherless training and diffusion models, excel in producing diverse and original output. Secondly, in our tasks, we find that to elicit randomness from the Transformer without hurting coherence, it is better to inject noise right at the input layer (via a method we dub hash-conditioning) rather than defer to temperature sampling from the output layer. Thus, our work offers a principled, minimal test-bed for analyzing open-ended creative skills, and offers new arguments for going beyond next-token learning and softmax-based sampling. We make part of the code available under https://github.com/chenwu98/algorithmic-creativity

Parallel thinking has emerged as a promising paradigm for reasoning, yet it imposes significant computational burdens. Existing efficiency methods primarily rely on local, per-trajectory signals and lack principled mechanisms to exploit global dynamics across parallel branches. We introduce 2D probing, an interface that exposes the width-depth dynamics of parallel thinking by periodically eliciting intermediate answers from all branches. Our analysis reveals three key insights: non-monotonic scaling across width-depth allocations, heterogeneous reasoning branch lengths, and early stabilization of global consensus. Guided by these insights, we introduce Parallel-Probe, a training-free controller designed to optimize online parallel thinking. Parallel-Probe employs consensus-based early stopping to regulate reasoning depth and deviation-based branch pruning to dynamically adjust width. Extensive experiments across three benchmarks and multiple models demonstrate that Parallel-Probe establishes a superior Pareto frontier for test-time scaling. Compared to standard majority voting, it reduces sequential tokens by up to 35.8% and total token cost by over 25.8% while maintaining competitive accuracy.

Test-time reasoning significantly enhances pre-trained AI agents' performance. However, it requires an explicit environment model, often unavailable or overly complex in real-world scenarios. While MuZero enables effective model learning for search in perfect information games, extending this paradigm to imperfect information games presents substantial challenges due to more nuanced look-ahead reasoning techniques and large number of states relevant for individual decisions. This paper introduces an algorithm LAMIR that learns an abstracted model of an imperfect information game directly from the agent-environment interaction. During test time, this trained model is used to perform look-ahead reasoning. The learned abstraction limits the size of each subgame to a manageable size, making theoretically principled look-ahead reasoning tractable even in games where previous methods could not scale. We empirically demonstrate that with sufficient capacity, LAMIR learns the exact underlying game structure, and with limited capacity, it still learns a valuable abstraction, which improves game playing performance of the pre-trained agents even in large games.

Within the limited scope of this paper, we argue that artificial general intelligence cannot emerge from current neural network paradigms regardless of scale, nor is such an approach healthy for the field at present. Drawing on various notions, discussions, present-day developments and observations, current debates and critiques, experiments, and so on in between philosophy, including the Chinese Room Argument and Gödelian argument, neuroscientific ideas, computer science, the theoretical consideration of artificial intelligence, and learning theory, we address conceptually that neural networks are architecturally insufficient for genuine understanding. They operate as static function approximators of a limited encoding framework - a 'sophisticated sponge' exhibiting complex behaviours without structural richness that constitute intelligence. We critique the theoretical foundations the field relies on and created of recent times; for example, an interesting heuristic as neural scaling law (as an example, arXiv:2001.08361 ) made prominent in a wrong way of interpretation, The Universal Approximation Theorem addresses the wrong level of abstraction and, in parts, partially, the question of current architectures lacking dynamic restructuring capabilities. We propose a framework distinguishing existential facilities (computational substrate) from architectural organization (interpretive structures), and outline principles for what genuine machine intelligence would require, and furthermore, a conceptual method of structuralizing the richer framework on which the principle of neural network system takes hold.

Representations are at the core of all deep reinforcement learning (RL) methods for both Markov decision processes (MDPs) and partially observable Markov decision processes (POMDPs). Many representation learning methods and theoretical frameworks have been developed to understand what constitutes an effective representation. However, the relationships between these methods and the shared properties among them remain unclear. In this paper, we show that many of these seemingly distinct methods and frameworks for state and history abstractions are, in fact, based on a common idea of self-predictive abstraction. Furthermore, we provide theoretical insights into the widely adopted objectives and optimization, such as the stop-gradient technique, in learning self-predictive representations. These findings together yield a minimalist algorithm to learn self-predictive representations for states and histories. We validate our theories by applying our algorithm to standard MDPs, MDPs with distractors, and POMDPs with sparse rewards. These findings culminate in a set of preliminary guidelines for RL practitioners.

Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) on long Chain-of-Thought (CoT) trajectories has become a pivotal phase in building large reasoning models. However, how CoT trajectories from different sources influence the generalization performance of models remains an open question. In this paper, we conduct a comparative study using two sources of verified CoT trajectories generated by two competing models, DeepSeek-R1-0528 and gpt-oss-120b, with their problem sets controlled to be identical. Despite their comparable performance, we uncover a striking paradox: lower training loss does not translate to better generalization. SFT on DeepSeek-R1-0528 data achieves remarkably lower training loss, yet exhibits significantly worse generalization performance on reasoning benchmarks compared to those trained on gpt-oss-120b. To understand this paradox, we perform a multi-faceted analysis probing token-level SFT loss and step-level reasoning behaviors. Our analysis reveals a difference in reasoning patterns. gpt-oss-120b exhibits highly convergent and deductive trajectories, whereas DeepSeek-R1-0528 favors a divergent and branch-heavy exploration pattern. Consequently, models trained with DeepSeek-R1 data inherit inefficient exploration behaviors, often getting trapped in redundant exploratory branches that hinder them from reaching correct solutions. Building upon this insight, we propose a simple yet effective remedy of filtering out frequently branching trajectories to improve the generalization of SFT. Experiments show that training on selected DeepSeek-R1-0528 subsets surprisingly improves reasoning performance by up to 5.1% on AIME25, 5.5% on BeyondAIME, and on average 3.6% on five benchmarks.

The Monty Hall problem is a classic probability puzzle known for its counterintuitive solution, revealing fundamental discrepancies between mathematical reasoning and human intuition. To bridge this gap, we introduce a novel explanatory framework inspired by quantum measurement theory. Specifically, we conceptualize the hosts' actions-opening doors to reveal non-prizes-as analogous to quantum measurements that cause asymmetric collapses of the probability distribution. This quantum-inspired interpretation not only clarifies why the intuitive misunderstanding arises but also provides generalized formulas consistent with standard Bayesian results. We further validate our analytical approach using Monte Carlo simulations across various problem settings, demonstrating precise agreement between theoretical predictions and empirical outcomes. Our quantum analogy thus offers a powerful pedagogical tool, enhancing intuitive understanding of conditional probability phenomena through the lens of probability redistribution and quantum-like measurement operations.

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Given the intractably large size of the space of proofs, any model that is capable of general deductive reasoning must generalize to proofs of greater complexity. Recent studies have shown that large language models (LLMs) possess some abstract deductive reasoning ability given chain-of-thought prompts. However, they have primarily been tested on proofs using modus ponens or of a specific size, and from the same distribution as the in-context examples. To measure the general deductive reasoning ability of LLMs, we test on a broad set of deduction rules and measure their ability to generalize to more complex proofs from simpler demonstrations from multiple angles: depth-, width-, and compositional generalization. To facilitate systematic exploration, we construct a new synthetic and programmable reasoning dataset that enables control over deduction rules and proof complexity. Our experiments on four LLMs of various sizes and training objectives show that they are able to generalize to longer and compositional proofs. However, they require explicit demonstrations to produce hypothetical subproofs, specifically in proof by cases and proof by contradiction.

As the climate crisis deepens, artificial intelligence (AI) has emerged as a contested force: some champion its potential to advance renewable energy, materials discovery, and large-scale emissions monitoring, while others underscore its growing carbon footprint, water consumption, and material resource demands. Much of this debate has concentrated on direct impacts -- energy and water usage in data centers, e-waste from frequent hardware upgrades -- without addressing the significant indirect effects. This paper examines how the problem of Jevons' Paradox applies to AI, whereby efficiency gains may paradoxically spur increased consumption. We argue that understanding these second-order impacts requires an interdisciplinary approach, combining lifecycle assessments with socio-economic analyses. Rebound effects undermine the assumption that improved technical efficiency alone will ensure net reductions in environmental harm. Instead, the trajectory of AI's impact also hinges on business incentives and market logics, governance and policymaking, and broader social and cultural norms. We contend that a narrow focus on direct emissions misrepresents AI's true climate footprint, limiting the scope for meaningful interventions. We conclude with recommendations that address rebound effects and challenge the market-driven imperatives fueling uncontrolled AI growth. By broadening the analysis to include both direct and indirect consequences, we aim to inform a more comprehensive, evidence-based dialogue on AI's role in the climate crisis.

Recent work suggests that large language models may implicitly learn world models. How should we assess this possibility? We formalize this question for the case where the underlying reality is governed by a deterministic finite automaton. This includes problems as diverse as simple logical reasoning, geographic navigation, game-playing, and chemistry. We propose new evaluation metrics for world model recovery inspired by the classic Myhill-Nerode theorem from language theory. We illustrate their utility in three domains: game playing, logic puzzles, and navigation. In all domains, the generative models we consider do well on existing diagnostics for assessing world models, but our evaluation metrics reveal their world models to be far less coherent than they appear. Such incoherence creates fragility: using a generative model to solve related but subtly different tasks can lead to failures. Building generative models that meaningfully capture the underlying logic of the domains they model would be immensely valuable; our results suggest new ways to assess how close a given model is to that goal.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

Given a simple request like Put a washed apple in the kitchen fridge, humans can reason in purely abstract terms by imagining action sequences and scoring their likelihood of success, prototypicality, and efficiency, all without moving a muscle. Once we see the kitchen in question, we can update our abstract plans to fit the scene. Embodied agents require the same abilities, but existing work does not yet provide the infrastructure necessary for both reasoning abstractly and executing concretely. We address this limitation by introducing ALFWorld, a simulator that enables agents to learn abstract, text based policies in TextWorld (C\^ot\'e et al., 2018) and then execute goals from the ALFRED benchmark (Shridhar et al., 2020) in a rich visual environment. ALFWorld enables the creation of a new BUTLER agent whose abstract knowledge, learned in TextWorld, corresponds directly to concrete, visually grounded actions. In turn, as we demonstrate empirically, this fosters better agent generalization than training only in the visually grounded environment. BUTLER's simple, modular design factors the problem to allow researchers to focus on models for improving every piece of the pipeline (language understanding, planning, navigation, and visual scene understanding).

Standard evaluation protocols reveal a counterintuitive phenomenon: on 7.7% of benchmark problems spanning five datasets, larger language models underperform smaller ones by 28.4 percentage points despite 10-100x more parameters. Through systematic evaluation of 31 models (0.5B-405B parameters) across 1,485 problems, we identify the mechanism as spontaneous scale-dependent verbosity that introduces errors through overelaboration. Causal intervention experiments demonstrate this reflects correctable prompt design rather than fundamental capability limitations. Constraining large models to produce brief responses improves accuracy by 26 percentage points and reduces performance gaps by up to two-thirds. Most critically, brevity constraints completely reverse performance hierarchies on mathematical reasoning and scientific knowledge benchmarks, with large models achieving 7.7-15.9 percentage point advantages over small models -- direct inversions of the original gaps. These reversals prove large models possess superior latent capabilities that universal prompting masks. We validate findings through three independent contamination tests and demonstrate inverse scaling operates continuously across the full parameter spectrum, with dataset-specific optimal scales ranging from 0.5B to 3.0B parameters. Our results establish that maximizing large model performance requires scale-aware prompt engineering rather than universal evaluation protocols, with immediate implications for deployment: prompt adaptation simultaneously improves accuracy and reduces computational costs.

Divergent thinking, the cognitive process of generating diverse solutions, is a hallmark of human creativity and problem-solving. For machines, sampling diverse solution trajectories in complex reasoning problems is crucial for robust outcomes, data augmentation, and enhanced model generalization. Large language models (LLMs) often struggle with generating high-quality, diverse reasoning. While supervised fine-tuning helps with quality, it requires extensive supervision data to capture the full diversity of solutions. Alternatively, reinforcement learning methods like PPO aim to find limited highest-reward solutions while neglecting the solution diversity, akin to convergent thinking. To address these limitations, we propose Flow of Reasoning (FoR) -- an efficient LLM training approach enabling diverse reasoning with minimal data. FoR formulates multi-step LLM reasoning as a Markovian flow from an initial state to terminal states. The formulation allows to adapt principled GFlowNet approaches to train the LLM as a policy, which is able to sample multiple reasoning paths with probabilities proportional to the unnormalized reward. Empirical results show that, with limited training data (e.g., 15 examples), FoR can discover diverse high-quality solutions that excel greatly beyond current state-of-the-art methods across three tasks, including embodied reasoning (BlocksWorld), math puzzle solving (Game24), and logical reasoning (PrOntoQA). Code is available at https://github.com/Yu-Fangxu/FoR.

To enable Large Language Models (LLMs) to function as conscious agents with generalizable reasoning capabilities, it is crucial that they possess the reasoning ability to comprehend situational changes (transitions) in distribution triggered by environmental factors or actions from other agents. Despite its fundamental significance, this ability remains underexplored due to the complexity of modeling infinite possible changes in an event and their associated distributions, coupled with the lack of benchmark data with situational transitions. Addressing these gaps, we propose a novel formulation of reasoning with distributional changes as a three-step discriminative process, termed as MetAphysical ReaSoning. We then introduce the first-ever benchmark, MARS, comprising three tasks corresponding to each step. These tasks systematically assess LLMs' capabilities in reasoning the plausibility of (i) changes in actions, (ii) states caused by changed actions, and (iii) situational transitions driven by changes in action. Extensive evaluations with 20 (L)LMs of varying sizes and methods indicate that all three tasks in this process pose significant challenges, even for state-of-the-art LLMs and LMs after fine-tuning. Further analyses reveal potential causes for the underperformance of LLMs and demonstrate that pre-training them on large-scale conceptualization taxonomies can potentially enhance their metaphysical reasoning capabilities. Our data and models are publicly accessible at https://github.com/HKUST-KnowComp/MARS.

Frontier models are transitioning from multimodal large language models (MLLMs) that merely ingest visual information to unified multimodal models (UMMs) capable of native interleaved generation. This shift has sparked interest in using intermediate visualizations as a reasoning aid, akin to human mental imagery. Central to this idea is the ability to form, maintain, and manipulate visual representations in a goal-oriented manner. To evaluate and probe this capability, we develop MentisOculi, a procedural, stratified suite of multi-step reasoning problems amenable to visual solution, tuned to challenge frontier models. Evaluating visual strategies ranging from latent tokens to explicit generated imagery, we find they generally fail to improve performance. Analysis of UMMs specifically exposes a critical limitation: While they possess the textual reasoning capacity to solve a task and can sometimes generate correct visuals, they suffer from compounding generation errors and fail to leverage even ground-truth visualizations. Our findings suggest that despite their inherent appeal, visual thoughts do not yet benefit model reasoning. MentisOculi establishes the necessary foundation to analyze and close this gap across diverse model families.

Despite their impressive capabilities, LLMs exhibit a basic generalization failure known as the Reversal Curse, where they struggle to learn reversible factual associations. Understanding why this occurs could help identify weaknesses in current models and advance their generalization and robustness. In this paper, we conjecture that the Reversal Curse in LLMs is a manifestation of the long-standing binding problem in cognitive science, neuroscience and AI. Specifically, we identify two primary causes of the Reversal Curse stemming from transformers' limitations in conceptual binding: the inconsistency and entanglements of concept representations. We perform a series of experiments that support these conjectures. Our exploration leads to a model design based on JEPA (Joint-Embedding Predictive Architecture) that for the first time breaks the Reversal Curse without side-stepping it with specialized data augmentation or non-causal masking, and moreover, generalization could be further improved by incorporating special memory layers that support disentangled concept representations. We demonstrate that the skill of reversal unlocks a new kind of memory integration that enables models to solve large-scale arithmetic reasoning problems via parametric forward-chaining, outperforming frontier LLMs based on non-parametric memory and prolonged explicit reasoning.

Recently evolved large reasoning models (LRMs) show powerful performance in solving complex tasks with long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning capability. As these LRMs are mostly developed by post-training on formal reasoning tasks, whether they generalize the reasoning capability to help reduce hallucination in fact-seeking tasks remains unclear and debated. For instance, DeepSeek-R1 reports increased performance on SimpleQA, a fact-seeking benchmark, while OpenAI-o3 observes even severer hallucination. This discrepancy naturally raises the following research question: Are reasoning models more prone to hallucination? This paper addresses the question from three perspectives. (1) We first conduct a holistic evaluation for the hallucination in LRMs. Our analysis reveals that LRMs undergo a full post-training pipeline with cold start supervised fine-tuning (SFT) and verifiable reward RL generally alleviate their hallucination. In contrast, both distillation alone and RL training without cold start fine-tuning introduce more nuanced hallucinations. (2) To explore why different post-training pipelines alters the impact on hallucination in LRMs, we conduct behavior analysis. We characterize two critical cognitive behaviors that directly affect the factuality of a LRM: Flaw Repetition, where the surface-level reasoning attempts repeatedly follow the same underlying flawed logic, and Think-Answer Mismatch, where the final answer fails to faithfully match the previous CoT process. (3) Further, we investigate the mechanism behind the hallucination of LRMs from the perspective of model uncertainty. We find that increased hallucination of LRMs is usually associated with the misalignment between model uncertainty and factual accuracy. Our work provides an initial understanding of the hallucination in LRMs.

We study subliminal learning, a surprising phenomenon where language models transmit behavioral traits via semantically unrelated data. In our main experiments, a "teacher" model with some trait T (such as liking owls or being misaligned) generates a dataset consisting solely of number sequences. Remarkably, a "student" model trained on this dataset learns T. This occurs even when the data is filtered to remove references to T. We observe the same effect when training on code or reasoning traces generated by the same teacher model. However, we do not observe the effect when the teacher and student have different base models. To help explain our findings, we prove a theoretical result showing that subliminal learning occurs in all neural networks under certain conditions, and demonstrate subliminal learning in a simple MLP classifier. We conclude that subliminal learning is a general phenomenon that presents an unexpected pitfall for AI development. Distillation could propagate unintended traits, even when developers try to prevent this via data filtering.

In contrast to entropy, which increases monotonically, the "complexity" or "interestingness" of closed systems seems intuitively to increase at first and then decrease as equilibrium is approached. For example, our universe lacked complex structures at the Big Bang and will also lack them after black holes evaporate and particles are dispersed. This paper makes an initial attempt to quantify this pattern. As a model system, we use a simple, two-dimensional cellular automaton that simulates the mixing of two liquids ("coffee" and "cream"). A plausible complexity measure is then the Kolmogorov complexity of a coarse-grained approximation of the automaton's state, which we dub the "apparent complexity." We study this complexity measure, and show analytically that it never becomes large when the liquid particles are non-interacting. By contrast, when the particles do interact, we give numerical evidence that the complexity reaches a maximum comparable to the "coffee cup's" horizontal dimension. We raise the problem of proving this behavior analytically.

Abstract reasoning, the ability to reason from the abstract essence of a problem, serves as a key to generalization in human reasoning. However, eliciting language models to perform reasoning with abstraction remains unexplored. This paper seeks to bridge this gap by introducing a novel structured reasoning format called Abstraction-of-Thought (AoT). The uniqueness of AoT lies in its explicit requirement for varying levels of abstraction within the reasoning process. This approach could elicit language models to first contemplate on the abstract level before incorporating concrete details, which is overlooked by the prevailing step-by-step Chain-of-Thought (CoT) method. To align models with the AoT format, we present AoT Collection, a generic finetuning dataset consisting of 348k high-quality samples with AoT reasoning processes, collected via an automated and scalable pipeline. We finetune a wide range of language models with AoT Collection and conduct extensive evaluations on 23 unseen tasks from the challenging benchmark Big-Bench Hard. Experimental results indicate that models aligned to AoT reasoning format substantially outperform those aligned to CoT in many reasoning tasks.

Deep neural networks coupled with fast simulation and improved computation have led to recent successes in the field of reinforcement learning (RL). However, most current RL-based approaches fail to generalize since: (a) the gap between simulation and real world is so large that policy-learning approaches fail to transfer; (b) even if policy learning is done in real world, the data scarcity leads to failed generalization from training to test scenarios (e.g., due to different friction or object masses). Inspired from H-infinity control methods, we note that both modeling errors and differences in training and test scenarios can be viewed as extra forces/disturbances in the system. This paper proposes the idea of robust adversarial reinforcement learning (RARL), where we train an agent to operate in the presence of a destabilizing adversary that applies disturbance forces to the system. The jointly trained adversary is reinforced -- that is, it learns an optimal destabilization policy. We formulate the policy learning as a zero-sum, minimax objective function. Extensive experiments in multiple environments (InvertedPendulum, HalfCheetah, Swimmer, Hopper and Walker2d) conclusively demonstrate that our method (a) improves training stability; (b) is robust to differences in training/test conditions; and c) outperform the baseline even in the absence of the adversary.

We present a new type of game, the Liquidity Game. We draw inspiration from the UK government bond market and apply game theoretic approaches to its analysis. In Liquidity Games, market participants (agents) use non-cooperative games where the players' utility is directly defined by the liquidity of the game itself, offering a paradigm shift in our understanding of market dynamics. Each player's utility is intricately linked to the liquidity generated within the game, making the utility endogenous and dynamic. Players are not just passive recipients of utility based on external factors but active participants whose strategies and actions collectively shape and are shaped by the liquidity of the market. This reflexivity introduces a level of complexity and realism previously unattainable in conventional models. We apply Liquidity Game theoretic approaches to a simple UK bond market interaction and present results for market design and strategic behavior of participants. We tackle one of the largest issues within this mechanism, namely what strategy should market makers utilize when uncertain about the type of market maker they are interacting with, and what structure might regulators wish to see.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

Reinforcement learning (RL), large language models (LLMs), and vision-language models (VLMs) have been widely studied in isolation. However, existing infrastructure lacks the ability to deploy agents from different decision-making paradigms within the same environment, making it difficult to study them in hybrid multi-agent settings or to compare their behaviour fairly under identical conditions. We present MOSAIC, an open-source platform that bridges this gap by incorporating a diverse set of existing reinforcement learning environments and enabling heterogeneous agents (RL policies, LLMs, VLMs, and human players) to operate within them in ad-hoc team settings with reproducible results. MOSAIC introduces three contributions. (i) An IPC-based worker protocol that wraps both native and third-party frameworks as isolated subprocess workers, each executing its native training and inference logic unmodified, communicating through a versioned inter-process protocol. (ii) An operator abstraction that forms an agent-level interface by mapping workers to agents: each operator, regardless of whether it is backed by an RL policy, an LLM, or a human, conforms to a minimal unified interface. (iii) A deterministic cross-paradigm evaluation framework offering two complementary modes: a manual mode that advances up to N concurrent operators in lock-step under shared seeds for fine-grained visual inspection of behavioural differences, and a script mode that drives automated, long-running evaluation through declarative Python scripts, for reproducible experiments. We release MOSAIC as an open, visual-first platform to facilitate reproducible cross-paradigm research across the RL, LLM, and human-in-the-loop communities.

Can we learn more from data than existed in the generating process itself? Can new and useful information be constructed from merely applying deterministic transformations to existing data? Can the learnable content in data be evaluated without considering a downstream task? On these questions, Shannon information and Kolmogorov complexity come up nearly empty-handed, in part because they assume observers with unlimited computational capacity and fail to target the useful information content. In this work, we identify and exemplify three seeming paradoxes in information theory: (1) information cannot be increased by deterministic transformations; (2) information is independent of the order of data; (3) likelihood modeling is merely distribution matching. To shed light on the tension between these results and modern practice, and to quantify the value of data, we introduce epiplexity, a formalization of information capturing what computationally bounded observers can learn from data. Epiplexity captures the structural content in data while excluding time-bounded entropy, the random unpredictable content exemplified by pseudorandom number generators and chaotic dynamical systems. With these concepts, we demonstrate how information can be created with computation, how it depends on the ordering of the data, and how likelihood modeling can produce more complex programs than present in the data generating process itself. We also present practical procedures to estimate epiplexity which we show capture differences across data sources, track with downstream performance, and highlight dataset interventions that improve out-of-distribution generalization. In contrast to principles of model selection, epiplexity provides a theoretical foundation for data selection, guiding how to select, generate, or transform data for learning systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) display striking surface fluency yet systematically fail at tasks requiring symbolic reasoning, arithmetic accuracy, and logical consistency. This paper offers a structural diagnosis of such failures, revealing a persistent gap between comprehension and competence. Through controlled experiments and architectural analysis, we demonstrate that LLMs often articulate correct principles without reliably applying them--a failure rooted not in knowledge access, but in computational execution. We term this phenomenon the computational split-brain syndrome, where instruction and action pathways are geometrically and functionally dissociated. This core limitation recurs across domains, from mathematical operations to relational inferences, and explains why model behavior remains brittle even under idealized prompting. We argue that LLMs function as powerful pattern completion engines, but lack the architectural scaffolding for principled, compositional reasoning. Our findings delineate the boundary of current LLM capabilities and motivate future models with metacognitive control, principle lifting, and structurally grounded execution. This diagnosis also clarifies why mechanistic interpretability findings may reflect training-specific pattern coordination rather than universal computational principles, and why the geometric separation between instruction and execution pathways suggests limitations in neural introspection and mechanistic analysis.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged with remarkable capabilities in complex tasks through Chain-of-Thought reasoning, practical resource constraints have sparked interest in transferring these abilities to smaller models. However, achieving both domain performance and cross-domain generalization remains challenging. Existing approaches typically restrict students to following a single golden rationale and treat different reasoning paths independently. Due to distinct inductive biases and intrinsic preferences, alongside the student's evolving capacity and reasoning preferences during training, a teacher's "optimal" rationale could act as out-of-distribution noise. This misalignment leads to a degeneration of the student's latent reasoning distribution, causing suboptimal performance. To bridge this gap, we propose MIND, a capability-adaptive framework that transitions distillation from passive mimicry to active cognitive construction. We synthesize diverse teacher perspectives through a novel "Teaching Assistant" network. By employing a Feedback-Driven Inertia Calibration mechanism, this network utilizes inertia-filtered training loss to align supervision with the student's current adaptability, effectively enhancing performance while mitigating catastrophic forgetting. Extensive experiments demonstrate that MIND achieves state-of-the-art performance on both in-distribution and out-of-distribution benchmarks, and our sophisticated latent space analysis further confirms the mechanism of reasoning ability internalization.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

Visual illusions traditionally rely on spatial manipulations such as multi-view consistency. In this work, we introduce Progressive Semantic Illusions, a novel vector sketching task where a single sketch undergoes a dramatic semantic transformation through the sequential addition of strokes. We present Stroke of Surprise, a generative framework that optimizes vector strokes to satisfy distinct semantic interpretations at different drawing stages. The core challenge lies in the "dual-constraint": initial prefix strokes must form a coherent object (e.g., a duck) while simultaneously serving as the structural foundation for a second concept (e.g., a sheep) upon adding delta strokes. To address this, we propose a sequence-aware joint optimization framework driven by a dual-branch Score Distillation Sampling (SDS) mechanism. Unlike sequential approaches that freeze the initial state, our method dynamically adjusts prefix strokes to discover a "common structural subspace" valid for both targets. Furthermore, we introduce a novel Overlay Loss that enforces spatial complementarity, ensuring structural integration rather than occlusion. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method significantly outperforms state-of-the-art baselines in recognizability and illusion strength, successfully expanding visual anagrams from the spatial to the temporal dimension. Project page: https://stroke-of-surprise.github.io/

As AI becomes more capable, we entrust it with more general and consequential tasks. The risks from failure grow more severe with increasing task scope. It is therefore important to understand how extremely capable AI models will fail: Will they fail by systematically pursuing goals we do not intend? Or will they fail by being a hot mess, and taking nonsensical actions that do not further any goal? We operationalize this question using a bias-variance decomposition of the errors made by AI models: An AI's incoherence on a task is measured over test-time randomness as the fraction of its error that stems from variance rather than bias in task outcome. Across all tasks and frontier models we measure, the longer models spend reasoning and taking actions, the more incoherent their failures become. Incoherence changes with model scale in a way that is experiment dependent. However, in several settings, larger, more capable models are more incoherent than smaller models. Consequently, scale alone seems unlikely to eliminate incoherence. Instead, as more capable AIs pursue harder tasks, requiring more sequential action and thought, our results predict failures to be accompanied by more incoherent behavior. This suggests a future where AIs sometimes cause industrial accidents (due to unpredictable misbehavior), but are less likely to exhibit consistent pursuit of a misaligned goal. This increases the relative importance of alignment research targeting reward hacking or goal misspecification.

This paper claims that machine learning (ML) largely overlooks an important facet of general intelligence: robustness to a qualitatively unknown future in an open world. Such robustness relates to Knightian uncertainty (KU) in economics, i.e. uncertainty that cannot be quantified, which is excluded from consideration in ML's key formalisms. This paper aims to identify this blind spot, argue its importance, and catalyze research into addressing it, which we believe is necessary to create truly robust open-world AI. To help illuminate the blind spot, we contrast one area of ML, reinforcement learning (RL), with the process of biological evolution. Despite staggering ongoing progress, RL still struggles in open-world situations, often failing under unforeseen situations. For example, the idea of zero-shot transferring a self-driving car policy trained only in the US to the UK currently seems exceedingly ambitious. In dramatic contrast, biological evolution routinely produces agents that thrive within an open world, sometimes even to situations that are remarkably out-of-distribution (e.g. invasive species; or humans, who do undertake such zero-shot international driving). Interestingly, evolution achieves such robustness without explicit theory, formalisms, or mathematical gradients. We explore the assumptions underlying RL's typical formalisms, showing how they limit RL's engagement with the unknown unknowns characteristic of an ever-changing complex world. Further, we identify mechanisms through which evolutionary processes foster robustness to novel and unpredictable challenges, and discuss potential pathways to algorithmically embody them. The conclusion is that the intriguing remaining fragility of ML may result from blind spots in its formalisms, and that significant gains may result from direct confrontation with the challenge of KU.

After generalizing the Archimedean property of real numbers in such a way as to make it adaptable to non-numeric structures, we demonstrate that the real numbers cannot be used to accurately measure non-Archimedean structures. We argue that, since an agent with Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) should have no problem engaging in tasks that inherently involve non-Archimedean rewards, and since traditional reinforcement learning rewards are real numbers, therefore traditional reinforcement learning probably will not lead to AGI. We indicate two possible ways traditional reinforcement learning could be altered to remove this roadblock.

DeepSeek-R1 has shown that long chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning can naturally emerge through a simple reinforcement learning (RL) framework with rule-based rewards, where the training may directly start from the base models-a paradigm referred to as zero RL training. Most recent efforts to reproduce zero RL training have primarily focused on the Qwen2.5 model series, which may not be representative as we find the base models already exhibit strong instruction-following and self-reflection abilities. In this work, we investigate zero RL training across 10 diverse base models, spanning different families and sizes including LLama3-8B, Mistral-7B/24B, DeepSeek-Math-7B, Qwen2.5-math-7B, and all Qwen2.5 models from 0.5B to 32B. Leveraging several key design strategies-such as adjusting format reward and controlling query difficulty-we achieve substantial improvements in both reasoning accuracy and response length across most settings. However, by carefully monitoring the training dynamics, we observe that different base models exhibit distinct patterns during training. For instance, the increased response length does not always correlate with the emergence of certain cognitive behaviors such as verification (i.e., the "aha moment"). Notably, we observe the "aha moment" for the first time in small models not from the Qwen family. We share the key designs that enable successful zero RL training, along with our findings and practices. To facilitate further research, we open-source the code, models, and analysis tools.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

Many recent studies have found evidence for emergent reasoning capabilities in large language models (LLMs), but debate persists concerning the robustness of these capabilities, and the extent to which they depend on structured reasoning mechanisms. To shed light on these issues, we study the internal mechanisms that support abstract reasoning in LLMs. We identify an emergent symbolic architecture that implements abstract reasoning via a series of three computations. In early layers, symbol abstraction heads convert input tokens to abstract variables based on the relations between those tokens. In intermediate layers, symbolic induction heads perform sequence induction over these abstract variables. Finally, in later layers, retrieval heads predict the next token by retrieving the value associated with the predicted abstract variable. These results point toward a resolution of the longstanding debate between symbolic and neural network approaches, suggesting that emergent reasoning in neural networks depends on the emergence of symbolic mechanisms.

With the advent of DeepSeek-R1, a new wave of reinforcement learning (RL) methods has emerged that seem to unlock stronger mathematical reasoning. However, a closer look at the open-source ecosystem reveals a critical limitation: with sufficiently many draws (e.g., pass@1024), many existing base models already solve nearly all questions on widely used math benchmarks such as MATH-500 and AIME 2024. This suggests that the RL fine-tuning methods prevalent in the LLM reasoning literature largely sharpen existing solution modes rather than discovering entirely new ones. Such sharpening stands in contrast to the broader promise of RL: to foster exploration and to acquire new skills. To move beyond this plateau, we introduce MATH-Beyond (MATH-B), a benchmark deliberately constructed to defeat common open-source models of up to 8B parameters even under large sampling budgets. Improving performance on our benchmark via RL requires methods that learn to reason in ways that go beyond base model capabilities in repeated sampling. Since the problems are drawn from subsets of DAPO-Math-17K and DeepScaleR datasets, they remain topically equivalent to standard high-school math. Validating our premise, RL fine-tuned models such as Nemotron-Research-Reasoning-Qwen-1.5B and DeepScaleR-1.5B-Preview perform poorly on MATH-B at pass@1024, showing how existing approaches fall short on tackling harder instances. We hope MATH-B will catalyze exploration-driven RL approaches that elicit deeper reasoning capabilities. We release MATH-B at https://huggingface.co/datasets/brendel-group/MATH-Beyond.

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

There is an analogy that is often made between deep neural networks and actual brains, suggested by the nomenclature itself: the "neurons" in deep neural networks should correspond to neurons (or nerve cells, to avoid confusion) in the brain. We claim, however, that this analogy doesn't even type check: it is structurally flawed. In agreement with the slightly glib summary of Hebbian learning as "cells that fire together wire together", this article makes the case that the analogy should be different. Since the "neurons" in deep neural networks are managing the changing weights, they are more akin to the synapses in the brain; instead, it is the wires in deep neural networks that are more like nerve cells, in that they are what cause the information to flow. An intuition that nerve cells seem like more than mere wires is exactly right, and is justified by a precise category-theoretic analogy which we will explore in this article. Throughout, we will continue to highlight the error in equating artificial neurons with nerve cells by leaving "neuron" in quotes or by calling them artificial neurons. We will first explain how to view deep neural networks as nested dynamical systems with a very restricted sort of interaction pattern, and then explain a more general sort of interaction for dynamical systems that is useful throughout engineering, but which fails to adapt to changing circumstances. As mentioned, an analogy is then forced upon us by the mathematical formalism in which they are both embedded. We call the resulting encompassing generalization deeply interacting learning systems: they have complex interaction as in control theory, but adaptation to circumstances as in deep neural networks.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is a general paradigm for studying intelligent behaviour, with applications ranging from artificial intelligence to psychology and economics. AIXI is a universal solution to the RL problem; it can learn any computable environment. A technical subtlety of AIXI is that it is defined using a mixture over semimeasures that need not sum to 1, rather than over proper probability measures. In this work we argue that the shortfall of a semimeasure can naturally be interpreted as the agent's estimate of the probability of its death. We formally define death for generally intelligent agents like AIXI, and prove a number of related theorems about their behaviour. Notable discoveries include that agent behaviour can change radically under positive linear transformations of the reward signal (from suicidal to dogmatically self-preserving), and that the agent's posterior belief that it will survive increases over time.

Modern reinforcement learning (RL) systems capture deep truths about general, human problem-solving. In domains where new data can be simulated cheaply, these systems uncover sequential decision-making policies that far exceed the ability of any human. Society faces many problems whose solutions require this skill, but they are often in domains where new data cannot be cheaply simulated. In such scenarios, we can learn simulators from existing data, but these will only ever be approximately correct, and can be pathologically incorrect when queried outside of their training distribution. As a result, a misalignment between the environments in which we train our agents and the real-world in which we wish to deploy our agents is inevitable. Dealing with this misalignment is the primary concern of zero-shot reinforcement learning, a problem setting where the agent must generalise to a new task or domain with zero practice shots. Whilst impressive progress has been made on methods that perform zero-shot RL in idealised settings, new work is needed if these results are to be replicated in real-world settings. In this thesis, we argue that doing so requires us to navigate (at least) three constraints. First, the data quality constraint: real-world datasets are small and homogeneous. Second, the observability constraint: states, dynamics and rewards in the real-world are often only partially observed. And third, the data availability constraint: a priori access to data cannot always be assumed. This work proposes a suite of methods that perform zero-shot RL subject to these constraints. In a series of empirical studies we expose the failings of existing methods, and justify our techniques for remedying them. We believe these designs take us a step closer to RL methods that can be deployed to solve real-world problems.

Past analyses of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) assume that the human fully observes the environment. What happens when human feedback is based only on partial observations? We formally define two failure cases: deception and overjustification. Modeling the human as Boltzmann-rational w.r.t. a belief over trajectories, we prove conditions under which RLHF is guaranteed to result in policies that deceptively inflate their performance, overjustify their behavior to make an impression, or both. To help address these issues, we mathematically characterize how partial observability of the environment translates into (lack of) ambiguity in the learned return function. In some cases, accounting for partial observability makes it theoretically possible to recover the return function and thus the optimal policy, while in other cases, there is irreducible ambiguity. We caution against blindly applying RLHF in partially observable settings and propose research directions to help tackle these challenges.

This study explores the interference in temporal processing within a dual-task paradigm from an artificial intelligence (AI) perspective. In this context, the dual-task setup is implemented as a simplified version of the Overcooked environment with two variations, single task (T) and dual task (T+N). Both variations involve an embedded time production task, but the dual task (T+N) additionally involves a concurrent number comparison task. Two deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agents were separately trained for each of these tasks. These agents exhibited emergent behavior consistent with human timing research. Specifically, the dual task (T+N) agent exhibited significant overproduction of time relative to its single task (T) counterpart. This result was consistent across four target durations. Preliminary analysis of neural dynamics in the agents' LSTM layers did not reveal any clear evidence of a dedicated or intrinsic timer. Hence, further investigation is needed to better understand the underlying time-keeping mechanisms of the agents and to provide insights into the observed behavioral patterns. This study is a small step towards exploring parallels between emergent DRL behavior and behavior observed in biological systems in order to facilitate a better understanding of both.

People's decision-making abilities often fail to improve or may even erode when they rely on AI for decision-support, even when the AI provides informative explanations. We argue this is partly because people intuitively seek contrastive explanations, which clarify the difference between the AI's decision and their own reasoning, while most AI systems offer "unilateral" explanations that justify the AI's decision but do not account for users' thinking. To align human-AI knowledge on decision tasks, we introduce a framework for generating human-centered contrastive explanations that explain the difference between AI's choice and a predicted, likely human choice about the same task. Results from a large-scale experiment (N = 628) demonstrate that contrastive explanations significantly enhance users' independent decision-making skills compared to unilateral explanations, without sacrificing decision accuracy. Amid rising deskilling concerns, our research demonstrates that incorporating human reasoning into AI design can foster human skill development.

Cognitive science suggests that spatial ability develops progressively-from perception to reasoning and interaction. Yet in multimodal LLMs (MLLMs), this hierarchy remains poorly understood, as most studies focus on a narrow set of tasks. We introduce SpatialTree, a cognitive-science-inspired hierarchy that organizes spatial abilities into four levels: low-level perception (L1), mental mapping (L2), simulation (L3), and agentic competence (L4). Based on this taxonomy, we construct the first capability-centric hierarchical benchmark, thoroughly evaluating mainstream MLLMs across 27 sub-abilities. The evaluation results reveal a clear structure: L1 skills are largely orthogonal, whereas higher-level skills are strongly correlated, indicating increasing interdependency. Through targeted supervised fine-tuning, we uncover a surprising transfer dynamic-negative transfer within L1, but strong cross-level transfer from low- to high-level abilities with notable synergy. Finally, we explore how to improve the entire hierarchy. We find that naive RL that encourages extensive "thinking" is unreliable: it helps complex reasoning but hurts intuitive perception. We propose a simple auto-think strategy that suppresses unnecessary deliberation, enabling RL to consistently improve performance across all levels. By building SpatialTree, we provide a proof-of-concept framework for understanding and systematically scaling spatial abilities in MLLMs.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) have shown remarkable proficiency on general-purpose vision-language benchmarks, reaching or even exceeding human-level performance. However, these evaluations typically rely on standard in-distribution data, leaving the robustness of MLLMs largely unexamined when faced with scenarios that defy common-sense priors. To address this gap, we introduce VIA-Bench, a challenging benchmark designed to probe model performance on visual illusions and anomalies. It includes six core categories: color illusions, motion illusions, gestalt illusions, geometric and spatial illusions, general visual illusions, and visual anomalies. Through careful human-in-the-loop review, we construct over 1K high-quality question-answer pairs that require nuanced visual reasoning. Extensive evaluation of over 20 state-of-the-art MLLMs, including proprietary, open-source, and reasoning-enhanced models, uncovers significant vulnerabilities. Notably, we find that Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning offers negligible robustness, often yielding ``brittle mirages'' where the model's logic collapses under illusory stimuli. Our findings reveal a fundamental divergence between machine and human perception, suggesting that resolving such perceptual bottlenecks is critical for the advancement of artificial general intelligence. The benchmark data and code will be released.

Recent advances in deep thinking models have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities on mathematical and coding tasks. However, their effectiveness in embodied domains which require continuous interaction with environments through image action interleaved trajectories remains largely -unexplored. We present Embodied Reasoner, a model that extends o1 style reasoning to interactive embodied search tasks. Unlike mathematical reasoning that relies primarily on logical deduction, embodied scenarios demand spatial understanding, temporal reasoning, and ongoing self-reflection based on interaction history. To address these challenges, we synthesize 9.3k coherent Observation-Thought-Action trajectories containing 64k interactive images and 90k diverse thinking processes (analysis, spatial reasoning, reflection, planning, and verification). We develop a three-stage training pipeline that progressively enhances the model's capabilities through imitation learning, self-exploration via rejection sampling, and self-correction through reflection tuning. The evaluation shows that our model significantly outperforms those advanced visual reasoning models, e.g., it exceeds OpenAI o1, o3-mini, and Claude-3.7 by +9\%, 24\%, and +13\%. Analysis reveals our model exhibits fewer repeated searches and logical inconsistencies, with particular advantages in complex long-horizon tasks. Real-world environments also show our superiority while exhibiting fewer repeated searches and logical inconsistency cases.

Inverse Reinforcement Learning (IRL) is a powerful set of techniques for imitation learning that aims to learn a reward function that rationalizes expert demonstrations. Unfortunately, traditional IRL methods suffer from a computational weakness: they require repeatedly solving a hard reinforcement learning (RL) problem as a subroutine. This is counter-intuitive from the viewpoint of reductions: we have reduced the easier problem of imitation learning to repeatedly solving the harder problem of RL. Another thread of work has proved that access to the side-information of the distribution of states where a strong policy spends time can dramatically reduce the sample and computational complexities of solving an RL problem. In this work, we demonstrate for the first time a more informed imitation learning reduction where we utilize the state distribution of the expert to alleviate the global exploration component of the RL subroutine, providing an exponential speedup in theory. In practice, we find that we are able to significantly speed up the prior art on continuous control tasks.

Diffusion Large Language Models (dLLMs) break the rigid left-to-right constraint of traditional LLMs, enabling token generation in arbitrary orders. Intuitively, this flexibility implies a solution space that strictly supersets the fixed autoregressive trajectory, theoretically unlocking superior reasoning potential for general tasks like mathematics and coding. Consequently, numerous works have leveraged reinforcement learning (RL) to elicit the reasoning capability of dLLMs. In this paper, we reveal a counter-intuitive reality: arbitrary order generation, in its current form, narrows rather than expands the reasoning boundary of dLLMs. We find that dLLMs tend to exploit this order flexibility to bypass high-uncertainty tokens that are crucial for exploration, leading to a premature collapse of the solution space. This observation challenges the premise of existing RL approaches for dLLMs, where considerable complexities, such as handling combinatorial trajectories and intractable likelihoods, are often devoted to preserving this flexibility. We demonstrate that effective reasoning is better elicited by intentionally forgoing arbitrary order and applying standard Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) instead. Our approach, JustGRPO, is minimalist yet surprisingly effective (e.g., 89.1% accuracy on GSM8K) while fully retaining the parallel decoding ability of dLLMs. Project page: https://nzl-thu.github.io/the-flexibility-trap

It is clear that one of the primary tools we can use to mitigate the potential risk from a misbehaving AI system is the ability to turn the system off. As the capabilities of AI systems improve, it is important to ensure that such systems do not adopt subgoals that prevent a human from switching them off. This is a challenge because many formulations of rational agents create strong incentives for self-preservation. This is not caused by a built-in instinct, but because a rational agent will maximize expected utility and cannot achieve whatever objective it has been given if it is dead. Our goal is to study the incentives an agent has to allow itself to be switched off. We analyze a simple game between a human H and a robot R, where H can press R's off switch but R can disable the off switch. A traditional agent takes its reward function for granted: we show that such agents have an incentive to disable the off switch, except in the special case where H is perfectly rational. Our key insight is that for R to want to preserve its off switch, it needs to be uncertain about the utility associated with the outcome, and to treat H's actions as important observations about that utility. (R also has no incentive to switch itself off in this setting.) We conclude that giving machines an appropriate level of uncertainty about their objectives leads to safer designs, and we argue that this setting is a useful generalization of the classical AI paradigm of rational agents.

Unified Multimodal Models (UMMs) have shown remarkable progress in visual generation. Yet, existing benchmarks predominantly assess Crystallized Intelligence, which relies on recalling accumulated knowledge and learned schemas. This focus overlooks Generative Fluid Intelligence (GFI): the capacity to induce patterns, reason through constraints, and adapt to novel scenarios on the fly. To rigorously assess this capability, we introduce GENIUS (GEN Fluid Intelligence EvalUation Suite). We formalize GFI as a synthesis of three primitives. These include Inducing Implicit Patterns (e.g., inferring personalized visual preferences), Executing Ad-hoc Constraints (e.g., visualizing abstract metaphors), and Adapting to Contextual Knowledge (e.g., simulating counter-intuitive physics). Collectively, these primitives challenge models to solve problems grounded entirely in the immediate context. Our systematic evaluation of 12 representative models reveals significant performance deficits in these tasks. Crucially, our diagnostic analysis disentangles these failure modes. It demonstrates that deficits stem from limited context comprehension rather than insufficient intrinsic generative capability. To bridge this gap, we propose a training-free attention intervention strategy. Ultimately, GENIUS establishes a rigorous standard for GFI, guiding the field beyond knowledge utilization toward dynamic, general-purpose reasoning. Our dataset and code will be released at: https://github.com/arctanxarc/GENIUS{https://github.com/arctanxarc/GENIUS}.

In Marius von Senden's Space and Sight, a newly sighted blind patient describes the experience of a corner as lemon-like, because corners "prick" sight like lemons prick the tongue. Prickliness, here, is a dimension in the feature space of sensory experience, an effect of the perceived on the perceiver that arises where the two interact. In the account of the newly sighted, an effect familiar from one interaction translates to a novel context. Perception serves as the vehicle for generalization, in that an effect shared across different experiences produces a concrete abstraction grounded in those experiences. Cezanne and the post-impressionists, fluent in the language of experience translation, realized that the way to paint a concrete form that best reflected reality was to paint not what they saw, but what it was like to see. We envision a future of creation using AI where what it is like to see is replicable, transferrable, manipulable - part of the artist's palette that is both grounded in a particular context, and generalizable beyond it. An active line of research maps human-interpretable features onto directions in GAN latent space. Supervised and self-supervised approaches that search for anticipated directions or use off-the-shelf classifiers to drive image manipulation in embedding space are limited in the variety of features they can uncover. Unsupervised approaches that discover useful new directions show that the space of perceptually meaningful directions is nowhere close to being fully mapped. As this space is broad and full of creative potential, we want tools for direction discovery that capture the richness and generalizability of human perception. Our approach puts creators in the discovery loop during real-time tool use, in order to identify directions that are perceptually meaningful to them, and generate interpretable image translations along those directions.

The long chain-of-thought (LongCoT) capability is central to the recent breakthroughs achieved by large language models in complex reasoning tasks. However, the accompanying issue of ''underthinking'', where models exhibit shallow reasoning by frequently switching thoughts without sufficient exploration, limits both performance and token efficiency. To address this problem, we propose a simple yet effective reasoning strategy: the SmartSwitch inference framework. This framework can be easily integrated into any large language model as a plug-and-play solution, continuously monitoring the model's reasoning process to detect underthinking and guide it toward deeper exploration of promising but overlooked thoughts. Specifically, the perception module identifies points where thoughts switch and evaluates the potential of the preceding thought using an off-the-shelf process reward model (PRM). If a high-potential thought is found to be prematurely abandoned, the intervention module interrupts the ongoing inference, backtracks to the point before the switch, and inserts a "deepening prompt" to encourage further exploration along that promising path. Extensive experiments on challenging mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our method significantly enhances the performance of various large language models of different sizes.

Recent advances in applying reinforcement learning (RL) to large language models (LLMs) have led to substantial progress. In particular, a series of remarkable yet often counterintuitive phenomena have been reported in LLMs, exhibiting patterns not typically observed in traditional RL settings. For example, notable claims include that a single training example can match the performance achieved with an entire dataset, that the reward signal does not need to be very accurate, and that training solely with negative samples can match or even surpass sophisticated reward-based methods. However, the precise conditions under which these observations hold - and, critically, when they fail - remain unclear. In this work, we identify a key factor that differentiates RL observations: whether the pretrained model already exhibits strong Model-Task Alignment, as measured by pass@k accuracy on the evaluated task. Through a systematic and comprehensive examination of a series of counterintuitive claims, supported by rigorous experimental validation across different model architectures and task domains, our findings show that while standard RL training remains consistently robust across settings, many of these counterintuitive results arise only when the model and task already exhibit strong model-task alignment. In contrast, these techniques fail to drive substantial learning in more challenging regimes, where standard RL methods remain effective.