Daily Papers

Agentic AI marks an important transition from single-step generative models to systems capable of reasoning, planning, acting, and adapting over long-lasting tasks. By integrating memory, tool use, and iterative decision cycles, these systems enable continuous, autonomous workflows in real-world environments. This survey examines the implications of agentic AI for cybersecurity. On the defensive side, agentic capabilities enable continuous monitoring, autonomous incident response, adaptive threat hunting, and fraud detection at scale. Conversely, the same properties amplify adversarial power by accelerating reconnaissance, exploitation, coordination, and social-engineering attacks. These dual-use dynamics expose fundamental gaps in existing governance, assurance, and accountability mechanisms, which were largely designed for non-autonomous and short-lived AI systems. To address these challenges, we survey emerging threat models, security frameworks, and evaluation pipelines tailored to agentic systems, and analyze systemic risks including agent collusion, cascading failures, oversight evasion, and memory poisoning. Finally, we present three representative use-case implementations that illustrate how agentic AI behaves in practical cybersecurity workflows, and how design choices shape reliability, safety, and operational effectiveness.

The rapid evolution of Large Language Models (LLM) and subsequent Agentic AI technologies requires systematic architectural guidance for building sophisticated, production-grade systems. This paper presents an approach for architecting such systems using design patterns derived from enterprise distributed systems standards, formal methods, and industry practice. We classify these patterns into three tiers: LLM Agents (task-specific automation), Agentic AI (adaptive goal-seekers), and Agentic Communities (organizational frameworks where AI agents and human participants coordinate through formal roles, protocols, and governance structures). We focus on Agentic Communities - coordination frameworks encompassing LLM Agents, Agentic AI entities, and humans - most relevant for enterprise and industrial applications. Drawing on established coordination principles from distributed systems, we ground these patterns in a formal framework that specifies collaboration agreements where AI agents and humans fill roles within governed ecosystems. This approach provides both practical guidance and formal verification capabilities, enabling expression of organizational, legal, and ethical rules through accountability mechanisms that ensure operational and verifiable governance of inter-agent communication, negotiation, and intent modeling. We validate this framework through a clinical trial matching case study. Our goal is to provide actionable guidance to practitioners while maintaining the formal rigor essential for enterprise deployment in dynamic, multi-agent ecosystems.

AI audits are an increasingly popular mechanism for algorithmic accountability; however, they remain poorly defined. Without a clear understanding of audit practices, let alone widely used standards or regulatory guidance, claims that an AI product or system has been audited, whether by first-, second-, or third-party auditors, are difficult to verify and may exacerbate, rather than mitigate, bias and harm. To address this knowledge gap, we provide the first comprehensive field scan of the AI audit ecosystem. We share a catalog of individuals (N=438) and organizations (N=189) who engage in algorithmic audits or whose work is directly relevant to algorithmic audits; conduct an anonymous survey of the group (N=152); and interview industry leaders (N=10). We identify emerging best practices as well as methods and tools that are becoming commonplace, and enumerate common barriers to leveraging algorithmic audits as effective accountability mechanisms. We outline policy recommendations to improve the quality and impact of these audits, and highlight proposals with wide support from algorithmic auditors as well as areas of debate. Our recommendations have implications for lawmakers, regulators, internal company policymakers, and standards-setting bodies, as well as for auditors. They are: 1) require the owners and operators of AI systems to engage in independent algorithmic audits against clearly defined standards; 2) notify individuals when they are subject to algorithmic decision-making systems; 3) mandate disclosure of key components of audit findings for peer review; 4) consider real-world harm in the audit process, including through standardized harm incident reporting and response mechanisms; 5) directly involve the stakeholders most likely to be harmed by AI systems in the algorithmic audit process; and 6) formalize evaluation and, potentially, accreditation of algorithmic auditors.

AI agents are able to tackle increasingly complex tasks. To achieve more ambitious goals, AI agents need to be able to meaningfully decompose problems into manageable sub-components, and safely delegate their completion across to other AI agents and humans alike. Yet, existing task decomposition and delegation methods rely on simple heuristics, and are not able to dynamically adapt to environmental changes and robustly handle unexpected failures. Here we propose an adaptive framework for intelligent AI delegation - a sequence of decisions involving task allocation, that also incorporates transfer of authority, responsibility, accountability, clear specifications regarding roles and boundaries, clarity of intent, and mechanisms for establishing trust between the two (or more) parties. The proposed framework is applicable to both human and AI delegators and delegatees in complex delegation networks, aiming to inform the development of protocols in the emerging agentic web.

Academic and policy proposals on algorithmic accountability often seek to understand algorithmic systems in their socio-technical context, recognising that they are produced by 'many hands'. Increasingly, however, algorithmic systems are also produced, deployed, and used within a supply chain comprising multiple actors tied together by flows of data between them. In such cases, it is the working together of an algorithmic supply chain of different actors who contribute to the production, deployment, use, and functionality that drives systems and produces particular outcomes. We argue that algorithmic accountability discussions must consider supply chains and the difficult implications they raise for the governance and accountability of algorithmic systems. In doing so, we explore algorithmic supply chains, locating them in their broader technical and political economic context and identifying some key features that should be understood in future work on algorithmic governance and accountability (particularly regarding general purpose AI services). To highlight ways forward and areas warranting attention, we further discuss some implications raised by supply chains: challenges for allocating accountability stemming from distributed responsibility for systems between actors, limited visibility due to the accountability horizon, service models of use and liability, and cross-border supply chains and regulatory arbitrage

One of the most concrete measures to take towards meaningful AI accountability is to consequentially assess and report the systems' performance and impact. However, the practical nature of the "AI audit" ecosystem is muddled and imprecise, making it difficult to work through various concepts and map out the stakeholders involved in the practice. First, we taxonomize current AI audit practices as completed by regulators, law firms, civil society, journalism, academia, consulting agencies. Next, we assess the impact of audits done by stakeholders within each domain. We find that only a subset of AI audit studies translate to desired accountability outcomes. We thus assess and isolate practices necessary for effective AI audit results, articulating the observed connections between AI audit design, methodology and institutional context on its effectiveness as a meaningful mechanism for accountability.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Learning transparent, interpretable controllers with offline data in decision-making systems is an essential area of research due to its potential to reduce the risk of applications in real-world systems. However, in responsibility-sensitive settings such as healthcare, decision accountability is of paramount importance, yet has not been adequately addressed by the literature. This paper introduces the Accountable Offline Controller (AOC) that employs the offline dataset as the Decision Corpus and performs accountable control based on a tailored selection of examples, referred to as the Corpus Subset. ABC operates effectively in low-data scenarios, can be extended to the strictly offline imitation setting, and displays qualities of both conservation and adaptability. We assess ABC's performance in both simulated and real-world healthcare scenarios, emphasizing its capability to manage offline control tasks with high levels of performance while maintaining accountability. Keywords: Interpretable Reinforcement Learning, Explainable Reinforcement Learning, Reinforcement Learning Transparency, Offline Reinforcement Learning, Batched Control.

Attention mechanisms are ubiquitous components in neural architectures applied to natural language processing. In addition to yielding gains in predictive accuracy, attention weights are often claimed to confer interpretability, purportedly useful both for providing insights to practitioners and for explaining why a model makes its decisions to stakeholders. We call the latter use of attention mechanisms into question by demonstrating a simple method for training models to produce deceptive attention masks. Our method diminishes the total weight assigned to designated impermissible tokens, even when the models can be shown to nevertheless rely on these features to drive predictions. Across multiple models and tasks, our approach manipulates attention weights while paying surprisingly little cost in accuracy. Through a human study, we show that our manipulated attention-based explanations deceive people into thinking that predictions from a model biased against gender minorities do not rely on the gender. Consequently, our results cast doubt on attention's reliability as a tool for auditing algorithms in the context of fairness and accountability.

The rapid adoption of autonomous AI agents is giving rise to a new economic layer where agents transact and coordinate at scales and speeds beyond direct human oversight. We propose the "sandbox economy" as a framework for analyzing this emergent system, characterizing it along two key dimensions: its origins (emergent vs. intentional) and its degree of separateness from the established human economy (permeable vs. impermeable). Our current trajectory points toward a spontaneous emergence of a vast and highly permeable AI agent economy, presenting us with opportunities for an unprecedented degree of coordination as well as significant challenges, including systemic economic risk and exacerbated inequality. Here we discuss a number of possible design choices that may lead to safely steerable AI agent markets. In particular, we consider auction mechanisms for fair resource allocation and preference resolution, the design of AI "mission economies" to coordinate around achieving collective goals, and socio-technical infrastructure needed to ensure trust, safety, and accountability. By doing this, we argue for the proactive design of steerable agent markets to ensure the coming technological shift aligns with humanity's long-term collective flourishing.

The scholarly publishing ecosystem faces a dual crisis of unmanageable submission volumes and unregulated AI, creating an urgent need for new governance models to safeguard scientific integrity. The traditional human-only peer review regime lacks a scalable, objective benchmark, making editorial processes opaque and difficult to audit. Here we investigate a deterministic simulation framework that provides the first stable, evidence-based standard for evaluating AI-generated peer review reports. Analyzing 352 peer-review simulation reports, we identify consistent system state indicators that demonstrate its reliability. First, the system is able to simulate calibrated editorial judgment, with 'Revise' decisions consistently forming the majority outcome (>50%) across all disciplines, while 'Reject' rates dynamically adapt to field-specific norms, rising to 45% in Health Sciences. Second, it maintains unwavering procedural integrity, enforcing a stable 29% evidence-anchoring compliance rate that remains invariant across diverse review tasks and scientific domains. These findings demonstrate a system that is predictably rule-bound, mitigating the stochasticity of generative AI. For the scientific community, this provides a transparent tool to ensure fairness; for publishing strategists, it offers a scalable instrument for auditing workflows, managing integrity risks, and implementing evidence-based governance. The framework repositions AI as an essential component of institutional accountability, providing the critical infrastructure to maintain trust in scholarly communication.

The growing need for accountability of the people behind AI systems can be addressed by leveraging processes in three fields of study: ethics, law, and computer science. While these fields are often considered in isolation, they rely on complementary notions in their interpretation and implementation. In this work, we detail this interdependence and motivate the necessary role of collaborative governance tools in shaping a positive evolution of AI. We first contrast notions of compliance in the ethical, legal, and technical fields; we outline both their differences and where they complement each other, with a particular focus on the roles of ethical charters, licenses, and technical documentation in these interactions. We then focus on the role of values in articulating the synergies between the fields and outline specific mechanisms of interaction between them in practice. We identify how these mechanisms have played out in several open governance fora: an open collaborative workshop, a responsible licensing initiative, and a proposed regulatory framework. By leveraging complementary notions of compliance in these three domains, we can create a more comprehensive framework for governing AI systems that jointly takes into account their technical capabilities, their impact on society, and how technical specifications can inform relevant regulations. Our analysis thus underlines the necessity of joint consideration of the ethical, legal, and technical in AI ethics frameworks to be used on a larger scale to govern AI systems and how the thinking in each of these areas can inform the others.

Under a unified operational definition, we define LLM memory as a persistent state written during pretraining, finetuning, or inference that can later be addressed and that stably influences outputs. We propose a four-part taxonomy (parametric, contextual, external, procedural/episodic) and a memory quadruple (location, persistence, write/access path, controllability). We link mechanism, evaluation, and governance via the chain write -> read -> inhibit/update. To avoid distorted comparisons across heterogeneous setups, we adopt a three-setting protocol (parametric only, offline retrieval, online retrieval) that decouples capability from information availability on the same data and timeline. On this basis we build a layered evaluation: parametric (closed-book recall, edit differential, memorization/privacy), contextual (position curves and the mid-sequence drop), external (answer correctness vs snippet attribution/faithfulness), and procedural/episodic (cross-session consistency and timeline replay, E MARS+). The framework integrates temporal governance and leakage auditing (freshness hits, outdated answers, refusal slices) and uncertainty reporting via inter-rater agreement plus paired tests with multiple-comparison correction. For updating and forgetting, we present DMM Gov: coordinating DAPT/TAPT, PEFT, model editing (ROME, MEND, MEMIT, SERAC), and RAG to form an auditable loop covering admission thresholds, rollout, monitoring, rollback, and change audits, with specs for timeliness, conflict handling, and long-horizon consistency. Finally, we give four testable propositions: minimum identifiability; a minimal evaluation card; causally constrained editing with verifiable forgetting; and when retrieval with small-window replay outperforms ultra-long-context reading. This yields a reproducible, comparable, and governable coordinate system for research and deployment.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

Agentic systems powered by large language models (LLMs) are becoming progressively more complex and capable. Their increasing agency and expanding deployment settings attract growing attention over effective governance policies, monitoring and control protocols. Based on emerging landscapes of the agentic market, we analyze the potential liability issues stemming from delegated use of LLM agents and their extended systems from a principal-agent perspective. Our analysis complements existing risk-based studies on artificial agency and covers the spectrum of important aspects of the principal-agent relationship and their potential consequences at deployment. Furthermore, we motivate method developments for technical governance along the directions of interpretability and behavior evaluations, reward and conflict management, and the mitigation of misalignment and misconduct through principled engineering of detection and fail-safe mechanisms. By illustrating the outstanding issues in AI liability for LLM-based agentic systems, we aim to inform the system design, auditing and monitoring approaches to enhancing transparency and accountability.

The rapid scaling of AI has spurred a growing emphasis on ethical considerations in both development and practice. This has led to the formulation of increasingly sophisticated model auditing and reporting requirements, as well as governance frameworks to mitigate potential risks to individuals and society. At this critical juncture, we review the practical challenges of promoting responsible AI and transparency in informal sectors like OSS that support vital infrastructure and see widespread use. We focus on how model performance evaluation may inform or inhibit probing of model limitations, biases, and other risks. Our controlled analysis of 7903 Hugging Face projects found that risk documentation is strongly associated with evaluation practices. Yet, submissions (N=789) from the platform's most popular competitive leaderboard showed less accountability among high performers. Our findings can inform AI providers and legal scholars in designing interventions and policies that preserve open-source innovation while incentivizing ethical uptake.

Rising concern for the societal implications of artificial intelligence systems has inspired a wave of academic and journalistic literature in which deployed systems are audited for harm by investigators from outside the organizations deploying the algorithms. However, it remains challenging for practitioners to identify the harmful repercussions of their own systems prior to deployment, and, once deployed, emergent issues can become difficult or impossible to trace back to their source. In this paper, we introduce a framework for algorithmic auditing that supports artificial intelligence system development end-to-end, to be applied throughout the internal organization development lifecycle. Each stage of the audit yields a set of documents that together form an overall audit report, drawing on an organization's values or principles to assess the fit of decisions made throughout the process. The proposed auditing framework is intended to contribute to closing the accountability gap in the development and deployment of large-scale artificial intelligence systems by embedding a robust process to ensure audit integrity.

Privacy policies are supposed to provide notice. But what if substantive information appears only where users skip it? We identify a structural pattern we call jurisdiction-siloed disclosure: information about data practices appearing in specific, actionable form only within regional compliance sections labeled "California Residents" or "EU/UK Users," while general sections use vague or qualified language for the same practices. Our audit of 123 major companies identifies 282 potential instances across 77 companies (62.6% of this purposive sample). A conservative estimate restricted to practice categories validated against OPP-115 human annotations finds 138 instances across 54 companies (44%); post-2018 categories central to our findings await independent validation. If users skip jurisdiction-labeled sections as information foraging theory predicts, users outside regulated jurisdictions would receive less specific information about practices affecting them--a transparency failure operating through document architecture rather than omission. We propose universal substantive disclosure: practices affecting all users should appear in the main policy body, with regional sections containing only procedural rights information. This standard finds support in analogous disclosure regimes (securities, truth-in-lending, nutritional labeling) where material information must reach all affected parties. Regulators could operationalize this through the FTC's "clear and conspicuous" standard and GDPR transparency principles. This work is hypothesis-generating: we establish that the structural pattern exists and ground the transparency concern in behavioral theory, but direct measurement of jurisdiction-specific section skipping remains the critical validation priority. We release our methodology and annotated dataset to enable replication.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

We describe an incentive system for distributed deep learning of foundational models where peers are rewarded for contributions. The incentive system, Gauntlet, has been deployed on the bittensor blockchain and used to train a 1.2B LLM with completely permissionless contributions of pseudo-gradients: no control over the users that can register or their hardware. Gauntlet can be applied to any synchronous distributed training scheme that relies on aggregating updates or pseudo-gradients. We rely on a two-stage mechanism for fast filtering of peer uptime, reliability, and synchronization, combined with the core component that estimates the loss before and after individual pseudo-gradient contributions. We utilized an OpenSkill rating system to track competitiveness of pseudo-gradient scores across time. Finally, we introduce a novel mechanism to ensure peers on the network perform unique computations. Our live 1.2B run, which has paid out real-valued tokens to participants based on the value of their contributions, yielded a competitive (on a per-iteration basis) 1.2B model that demonstrates the utility of our incentive system.