Daily Papers

Anti-money laundering (AML) in financial networks requires modeling transaction patterns that span multiple institutions. In practice, however, banks cannot share account and transaction features due to strict privacy regulations. We propose a privacy-preserving graph neural network (GNN) inference framework tailored to this multi-bank setting. A central server holds the graph connectivity and pretrained model weights in plaintext, while each bank keeps its transaction features encrypted. Inference is then carried out entirely on encrypted features under the CKKS homomorphic encryption scheme, so that no plaintext transaction features or predictions are exposed to the server. The key to making this practical is an edge-centric GNN architecture, wherein message passing is expressed through operations on node--edge incidence matrices. This formulation not only preserves the edge-attributed multigraph structure of transaction networks but also reduces every aggregation step to plaintext--ciphertext matrix products. Since CKKS can evaluate only polynomial circuits, we also approximate each nonlinearity with a composite polynomial of the sign function, which we calibrate per activation site. On the IBM AML benchmark, our model achieves performance competitive with plaintext baselines, and with a consumer-grade GPU, classifies each queried transaction end-to-end in as little as 5.31 seconds, while per-transaction latency can be amortized to 1.65 seconds when optimized for throughput.

Language models are increasingly used in text generation, decision support, and automated interaction, creating a need for localized, reversible, and selective control of their behavior. Activation steering demonstrates that internal interventions can alter the behavior of frozen models, but how to select and evaluate compact, multi-site control interfaces remains an open question. I introduce sparse internal control, a framework for steering target behavior by applying inference-time interventions to a small set of internal model nodes. A local target-controllability formulation characterizes candidate site--direction pairs by their behavioral effects and specifies constraints on target recovery, off-target preservation, and intervention energy. Two complementary selectors instantiate this formulation: Driver-OMP selects nodes for sparse reconstruction of a desired behavioral displacement, while Coverage-Driver favors stable coverage across prompts. I propose a six-axis control-evaluation protocol measuring reachability, signed reversal, dose response, feedback controllability, off-target preservation, and held-out reuse. Exploratory experiments on indirect object identification, MMLU multiple-choice question answering, sentiment steering, and refusal steering provide evidence for the feasibility of steering task-defined behavior through sparse internal interventions. The six-axis evaluation characterizes these interventions beyond target movement, revealing distinct control properties that depend on the task and available direction information. Together, the formulation, reference algorithms, and evaluation protocol provide a foundation for the systematic study and development of internal control methods for language models.

LLMs have shown remarkable capabilities, but precisely controlling their response behavior remains challenging. Existing activation steering methods alter LLM behavior indiscriminately, limiting their practical applicability in settings where selective responses are essential, such as content moderation or domain-specific assistants. In this paper, we propose Conditional Activation Steering (CAST), which analyzes LLM activation patterns during inference to selectively apply or withhold activation steering based on the input context. Our method is based on the observation that different categories of prompts activate distinct patterns in the model's hidden states. Using CAST, one can systematically control LLM behavior with rules like "if input is about hate speech or adult content, then refuse" or "if input is not about legal advice, then refuse." This allows for selective modification of responses to specific content while maintaining normal responses to other content, all without requiring weight optimization. We release an open-source implementation of our framework at github.com/IBM/activation-steering .

An agentic system issues several structurally different kinds of LLM calls. It routes intent, classifies actions, grounds language in a device registry, plans multi-agent pipelines and writes the Python code those pipelines run. The difficulty of these call sites varies by an order of magnitude, yet in practice a single model, chosen for the hardest site, serves all of them. In this work, we evaluate 9 models from 0.8B to a frontier hosted model across the five call sites of a deployed open-source home-automation framework (Wactorz), using its unmodified production prompts and two real Home Assistant installations (280 cases, 2520 scored calls). We find that capability is not ordered the same way at every site, and that larger models are not uniformly better: one 4B model is worse than its 2B sibling at grounded actuation. Paired testing shows the best local model to be statistically indistinguishable from both hosted models at four of five sites. Only code generation separates them, against a small hosted model (p = 0.039) as well as a frontier one (p = 0.002). Aggregate accuracy also hides a safety failure specific to actuation, where small models resolve the accuracy/refusal trade-off in degenerate ways: one model (Gemma4 E2B) actuates on 87.2% of requests for devices the site does not own, while another refuses every request it receives. Routing each site to its best local model reaches 91.8% against 95.4% at no per-call cost. In a live deployment judged by a user, hosting only the two generative sites matches hosting everything (39/43 against 39/43) for 28% of the spend, and the actuation gap the benchmark predicted appears as exactly one case in twenty-six. Benchmark, harness and all records are released at https://github.com/waldiez/slm-callsite-eval.

Personal Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents rely on interaction history to infer what a user wants from ambiguous instructions and to anticipate recurring routines. Existing approaches retrieve task-relevant history and append it to the policy's context, implicitly assuming that experience relevant to a task remains useful for each decision within it. We find that this help is largely spent at the first decision: retrieved history strongly improves the opening step of an episode, yet provides little sustained benefit over the remaining 90\% of steps, and offers weak guidance on whether a proactive suggestion is warranted. A relevant record may tell the agent where to begin, but not which past action applies to the current screen or whether a routine is due now. The underlying issue is that relevance does not imply applicability}: relevance is determined at the task level, whereas applicability depends on the situation at decision time. We therefore recast personalization as experience activation and introduce ExpActivator, a training-free framework that activates only the experience applicable to the current situation. During execution, ExpActivator matches each new screen to historical states in the frozen GUI backbone's latent space and supplies the corresponding action as a reference. Before execution, it activates a recurring intent only when the current time and scenario provide sufficient support, and otherwise abstains. Across four GUI backbones, ExpActivator improves within-trajectory step success by 28\% on average, achieves the best personalized execution on every backbone while using about one-fifth as many history tokens, and reaches approximately 2.3times the Matthews correlation coefficient of the strongest proactive baseline. Experience pays where it is activated, not where it is appended.

Context can change whether a request is harmful without changing its topic or surface form. We ask whether residual-stream probes distinguish harmful requests from surface-matched benign controls at a useful operating point. Across three 7-8B model families, an activation sensor blocks 95.5-97.7 percent of judge-classified compliant attacks in a taxonomy-selected set. It also blocks 59.6-68.4 percent of XSTest prompts. A fully disjoint audit reconstructs near-ceiling source-contrast AUROC (0.996-0.999), but fixed transfer to matched pairs is weaker: 0.656-0.819 on the guard-selected Twin-n70 subset and 0.590-0.690 on the full Twin-n163 cohort. We test ten axes on the reference family and seven across all families with leakage, hold-out, and permutation controls. On Twin-n163, no axis evaluated without direct pair-boundary fitting reaches the specified numerical threshold. Requiring persistence on that full cohort was added at analysis time. A separately specified 24B/32B extension gives the same result. Pair-trained classifiers weaken under category and generation-batch hold-out and false-block 79.6-100 percent of XSTest at 95 percent in-corpus TPR. At the tested read points, these activation scores behave as broad-risk detectors rather than standalone context adjudicators.