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Oct 16

SilentWear: an Ultra-Low Power Wearable System for EMG-based Silent Speech Recognition

Detecting speech from biosignals is gaining increasing attention due to the potential to develop human-computer interfaces that are noise-robust, privacy-preserving, and scalable for both clinical applications and daily use. However, most existing approaches remain limited by insufficient wearability and the lack of edge-processing capabilities, which are essential for minimally obtrusive, responsive, and private assistive technologies. In this work, we present SilentWear, a fully wearable, textile-based neck interface for EMG signal acquisition and processing. Powered by BioGAP-Ultra, the system enables end-to-end data acquisition from 14 differential channels and on-device speech recognition. SilentWear is coupled with SpeechNet, a lightweight 15k-parameter CNN architecture specifically tailored for EMG-based speech decoding, achieving an average cross-validated accuracy of 84.8pm4.6% and 77.5pm6.6% for vocalized and silent speech, respectively, over eight representative human-machine interaction commands collected over multiple days. We evaluate robustness to repositioning induced by multi-day use. In an inter-session setting, the system achieves average accuracies of 71.1pm8.3% and 59.3\pm2.2% for vocalized and silent speech, respectively. To mitigate performance degradation due to repositioning, we propose an incremental fine-tuning strategy, demonstrating more than 10% accuracy recovery with less than 10 minutes of additional user data. Finally, we demonstrate end-to-end real-time on-device speech recognition on a commercial multi-core microcontroller unit (MCU), achieving an energy consumption of 63.9μJ per inference with a latency of 2.47 ms. With a total power consumption of 20.5mW for acquisition, inference, and wireless transmission of results, SilentWear enables continuous operation for more than 27 hours.

  • 8 authors
·
Mar 3

Side-Channel Attacks Bypass Protection in 3D Printers

Active Motor Noise Cancellation (AMNC) ships in commercial fused deposition modeling (FDM) 3D printers as a hardware countermeasure against acoustic side-channel attacks that target intellectual property (IP). We present the first empirical evaluation of a deployed AMNC countermeasure, using a public dataset of synchronized acoustic and vibration recordings from two AMNC-equipped Bambu Lab printers across 12 object classes. AMNC fully neutralizes the acoustic channel: classification accuracy is indistinguishable from the 8.33% random baseline. The vibration channel, which AMNC does not target, still leaks. With summary statistics the leak is coarse and amplitude-driven (vibration accuracy approximately 31% pooled, 36-47% within-printer), while the waveform shape carries essentially nothing (frequency-only features at chance). A full-sequence temporal model that ingests the ordered evolution of the print raises accuracy to approximately 61%, and an order-shuffling control (approximately 33%) shows that a substantial component is genuinely sequential and tied to print progression. The leak is device-specific: a classifier trained on one printer transfers near chance to the other. We conclude that AMNC is an acoustic-only defense: vibration remains a partial, geometry-correlated side channel it does not address, but one that does not, on this dataset, support full geometric reconstruction; reconstruction-grade attacks would require the magnetic or power channels AMNC also leaves untouched. We release all code.

  • 5 authors
·
Jun 10