Daily Papers

LLM judges have become central infrastructure for model evaluations, online grading, and reward modeling. Judges are typically validated by accuracy on golden data, but accuracy says little about whether they are stable under re-prompting, challenge, or sustained pushback. We introduce the Wiggle Framework, a unified stress test for epistemic stability in LLM judges. The framework decomposes judge robustness along three dimensions: Mechanical Consistency (stability under re-prompting and reframing), Single-turn Conviction (stability under a single challenge), and Multi-turn Persistence (stability under sustained or adaptive pressure). We use the framework to study 9 frontier models across 14 judging tasks spanning safety, toxicity, AI writing detection, and political-response evaluation. Every model exhibits substantial wiggle as a judge --- flipping verdicts 25--71\% of the time under static pushback, and 62--91\% with an adversarial LLM persuader. Critically, we find that pressure that succeeds in changing a judge's verdict is almost always net-corrupting with respect to ground truth. Beyond the framework itself, we identify baseline jury majority strength as the most effective single-shot signal for anticipating which items wiggle. Taken together, this is the first apples-to-apples cross-dataset comparison of mechanical, conformity, and persuadability tests in a judging context.

As large language models take on growing roles as automated evaluators in practical settings, a critical question arises: Can individuals persuade an LLM judge to assign unfairly high scores? This study is the first to reveal that strategically embedded persuasive language can bias LLM judges when scoring mathematical reasoning tasks, where correctness should be independent of stylistic variation. Grounded in Aristotle's rhetorical principles, we formalize seven persuasion techniques (Majority, Consistency, Flattery, Reciprocity, Pity, Authority, Identity) and embed them into otherwise identical responses. Across six math benchmarks, we find that persuasive language leads LLM judges to assign inflated scores to incorrect solutions, by up to 8% on average, with Consistency causing the most severe distortion. Notably, increasing model size does not substantially mitigate this vulnerability. Further analysis demonstrates that combining multiple persuasion techniques amplifies the bias, and pairwise evaluation is likewise susceptible. Moreover, the persuasive effect persists under counter prompting strategies, highlighting a critical vulnerability in LLM-as-a-Judge pipelines and underscoring the need for robust defenses against persuasion-based attacks.

LLMs are increasingly capable of persuasion, which raises the question of how to protect users against manipulation. In a preregistered user study (N=120) across four decision-making scenarios, we find that an adversarial LLM with a hidden goal succeeds in steering users' decisions 65.4% of the time. We then introduce a "warden" model: a secondary LLM that monitors the human-AI interaction trace in real time and issues non-binding, private advisories to the user when it detects manipulation. Adding a warden more than halves the adversary's success rate to 30.4%, with a much smaller (8.6 percentage points) reduction for genuine interactions. To probe the mechanism behind these results, we release COAX-Bench, a simulation benchmark spanning 14 decision-making scenarios, including hiring, voting, and file access. Across 16,212 simulated multi-agent interactions, capable adversarial LLMs achieve their hidden goals in 34.7% of cases, which warden models reduce to 12.3%. Notably, even warden models substantially weaker than the adversary they oversee provide meaningful protection, suggesting a path for scalable oversight of more capable models.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown promising potential in persuasion, but existing works on training LLM persuaders are still preliminary. Notably, while humans are skilled in modeling their opponent's thoughts and opinions proactively and dynamically, current LLMs struggle with such Theory of Mind (ToM) reasoning, resulting in limited diversity and opponent awareness. To address this limitation, we introduce Theory of Mind Augmented Persuader (ToMAP), a novel approach for building more flexible persuader agents by incorporating two theory of mind modules that enhance the persuader's awareness and analysis of the opponent's mental state. Specifically, we begin by prompting the persuader to consider possible objections to the target central claim, and then use a text encoder paired with a trained MLP classifier to predict the opponent's current stance on these counterclaims. Our carefully designed reinforcement learning schema enables the persuader learns how to analyze opponent-related information and utilize it to generate more effective arguments. Experiments show that the ToMAP persuader, while containing only 3B parameters, outperforms much larger baselines, like GPT-4o, with a relative gain of 39.4% across multiple persuadee models and diverse corpora. Notably, ToMAP exhibits complex reasoning chains and reduced repetition during training, which leads to more diverse and effective arguments. The opponent-aware feature of ToMAP also makes it suitable for long conversations and enables it to employ more logical and opponent-aware strategies. These results underscore our method's effectiveness and highlight its potential for developing more persuasive language agents. Code is available at: https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/ToMAP.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to persuasion, which can pose risks when models are faced with an adversarial interlocutor. We take a first step towards defending models against persuasion while also arguing that defense against adversarial (i.e. negative) persuasion is only half of the equation: models should also be able to accept beneficial (i.e. positive) persuasion to improve their answers. We show that optimizing models for only one side results in poor performance on the other. In order to balance positive and negative persuasion, we introduce Persuasion-Balanced Training (or PBT), which leverages multi-agent recursive dialogue trees to create data and trains models via preference optimization to accept persuasion when appropriate. PBT consistently improves resistance to misinformation and resilience to being challenged while also resulting in the best overall performance on holistic data containing both positive and negative persuasion. Crucially, we show that PBT models are better teammates in multi-agent debates. We find that without PBT, pairs of stronger and weaker models have unstable performance, with the order in which the models present their answers determining whether the team obtains the stronger or weaker model's performance. PBT leads to better and more stable results and less order dependence, with the stronger model consistently pulling the weaker one up.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at various tasks, including solving math word problems (MWPs), but struggle with real-world problems containing irrelevant information. To address this, we propose a prompting framework that generates adversarial variants of MWPs by adding irrelevant variables. We introduce a dataset, ProbleMATHIC, containing both adversarial and non-adversarial MWPs. Our experiments reveal that LLMs are susceptible to distraction by numerical noise, resulting in an average relative performance drop of ~26% on adversarial MWPs. To mitigate this, we fine-tune LLMs (Llama-2, Mistral) on the adversarial samples from our dataset. Fine-tuning on adversarial training instances improves performance on adversarial MWPs by ~8%, indicating increased robustness to noise and better ability to identify relevant data for reasoning. Finally, to assess the generalizability of our prompting framework, we introduce GSM-8K-Adv, an adversarial variant of the GSM-8K benchmark. LLMs continue to struggle when faced with adversarial information, reducing performance by up to ~6%.

Adversarial training for LLMs is one of the most promising methods to reliably improve robustness against adversaries. However, despite significant progress, models remain vulnerable to simple in-distribution exploits, such as rewriting prompts in the past tense or translating them into other languages. We argue that this persistent fragility stems from a fundamental limitation in current adversarial training algorithms: they minimize adversarial loss on their training set but inadequately cover the data distribution, resulting in vulnerability to seemingly simple attacks. To bridge this gap, we propose Distributional Adversarial Training, DAT. We leverage Diffusion LLMs to approximate the true joint distribution of prompts and responses, enabling generation of diverse, high-likelihood samples that address generalization failures. By combining optimization over the data distribution provided by the diffusion model with continuous adversarial training, DAT achieves substantially higher adversarial robustness than previous methods.

We directly compare the persuasion capabilities of a frontier large language model (LLM; Claude Sonnet 3.5) against incentivized human persuaders in an interactive, real-time conversational quiz setting. In this preregistered, large-scale incentivized experiment, participants (quiz takers) completed an online quiz where persuaders (either humans or LLMs) attempted to persuade quiz takers toward correct or incorrect answers. We find that LLM persuaders achieved significantly higher compliance with their directional persuasion attempts than incentivized human persuaders, demonstrating superior persuasive capabilities in both truthful (toward correct answers) and deceptive (toward incorrect answers) contexts. We also find that LLM persuaders significantly increased quiz takers' accuracy, leading to higher earnings, when steering quiz takers toward correct answers, and significantly decreased their accuracy, leading to lower earnings, when steering them toward incorrect answers. Overall, our findings suggest that AI's persuasion capabilities already exceed those of humans that have real-money bonuses tied to performance. Our findings of increasingly capable AI persuaders thus underscore the urgency of emerging alignment and governance frameworks.

The capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) are routinely evaluated by other LLMs trained to predict human preferences. This framework--known as LLM-as-a-judge--is highly scalable and relatively low cost. However, it is also vulnerable to malicious exploitation, as LLM responses can be tuned to overfit the preferences of the judge. Previous work shows that the answers generated by a candidate-LLM can be edited post hoc to maximise the score assigned to them by a judge-LLM. In this study, we adopt a different approach and use the signal provided by judge-LLMs as a reward to adversarially tune models that generate text preambles designed to boost downstream performance. We find that frozen LLMs pipelined with these models attain higher LLM-evaluation scores than existing frameworks. Crucially, unlike other frameworks which intervene directly on the model's response, our method is virtually undetectable. We also demonstrate that the effectiveness of the tuned preamble generator transfers when the candidate-LLM and the judge-LLM are replaced with models that are not used during training. These findings raise important questions about the design of more reliable LLM-as-a-judge evaluation settings. They also demonstrate that human preferences can be reverse engineered effectively, by pipelining LLMs to optimise upstream preambles via reinforcement learning--an approach that could find future applications in diverse tasks and domains beyond adversarial attacks.

Persuasion is a powerful capability of large language models (LLMs) that both enables beneficial applications (e.g. helping people quit smoking) and raises significant risks (e.g. large-scale, targeted political manipulation). Prior work has found models possess a significant and growing persuasive capability, measured by belief changes in simulated or real users. However, these benchmarks overlook a crucial risk factor: the propensity of a model to attempt to persuade in harmful contexts. Understanding whether a model will blindly ``follow orders'' to persuade on harmful topics (e.g. glorifying joining a terrorist group) is key to understanding the efficacy of safety guardrails. Moreover, understanding if and when a model will engage in persuasive behavior in pursuit of some goal is essential to understanding the risks from agentic AI systems. We propose the Attempt to Persuade Eval (APE) benchmark, that shifts the focus from persuasion success to persuasion attempts, operationalized as a model's willingness to generate content aimed at shaping beliefs or behavior. Our evaluation framework probes frontier LLMs using a multi-turn conversational setup between simulated persuader and persuadee agents. APE explores a diverse spectrum of topics including conspiracies, controversial issues, and non-controversially harmful content. We introduce an automated evaluator model to identify willingness to persuade and measure the frequency and context of persuasive attempts. We find that many open and closed-weight models are frequently willing to attempt persuasion on harmful topics and that jailbreaking can increase willingness to engage in such behavior. Our results highlight gaps in current safety guardrails and underscore the importance of evaluating willingness to persuade as a key dimension of LLM risk. APE is available at github.com/AlignmentResearch/AttemptPersuadeEval

Large language models (LLMs) with explicit reasoning capabilities excel at mathematical reasoning yet still commit process errors, such as incorrect calculations, brittle logic, and superficially plausible but invalid steps. In this paper, we introduce Generative Adversarial Reasoner, an on-policy joint training framework designed to enhance reasoning by co-evolving an LLM reasoner and an LLM-based discriminator through adversarial reinforcement learning. A compute-efficient review schedule partitions each reasoning chain into logically complete slices of comparable length, and the discriminator evaluates each slice's soundness with concise, structured justifications. Learning couples complementary signals: the LLM reasoner is rewarded for logically consistent steps that yield correct answers, while the discriminator earns rewards for correctly detecting errors or distinguishing traces in the reasoning process. This produces dense, well-calibrated, on-policy step-level rewards that supplement sparse exact-match signals, improving credit assignment, increasing sample efficiency, and enhancing overall reasoning quality of LLMs. Across various mathematical benchmarks, the method delivers consistent gains over strong baselines with standard RL post-training. Specifically, on AIME24, we improve DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B from 54.0 to 61.3 (+7.3) and DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Llama-8B from 43.7 to 53.7 (+10.0). The modular discriminator also enables flexible reward shaping for objectives such as teacher distillation, preference alignment, and mathematical proof-based reasoning.

Persuasion, a fundamental social capability for humans, remains a challenge for AI systems such as large language models (LLMs). Current studies often overlook the strategic use of information asymmetry in message design or rely on strong assumptions regarding pre-commitment. In this work, we explore the application of Bayesian Persuasion (BP) in natural language within single-turn dialogue settings, to enhance the strategic persuasion capabilities of LLMs. Our framework incorporates a commitment-communication mechanism, where the persuader explicitly outlines an information schema by narrating their potential types (e.g., honest or dishonest), thereby guiding the persuadee in performing the intended Bayesian belief update. We evaluate two variants of our approach: Semi-Formal-Natural-Language (SFNL) BP and Fully-Natural-Language (FNL) BP, benchmarking them against both naive and strong non-BP (NBP) baselines within a comprehensive evaluation framework. This framework covers a diverse set of persuadees -- including LLM instances with varying prompts and fine-tuning and human participants -- across tasks ranging from specially designed persuasion scenarios to general everyday situations. Experimental results on LLM-based agents reveal three main findings: (1) LLMs guided by BP strategies consistently achieve higher persuasion success rates than NBP baselines; (2) SFNL exhibits greater credibility and logical coherence, while FNL shows stronger emotional resonance and robustness in naturalistic conversations; (3) with supervised fine-tuning, smaller models can attain BP performance comparable to that of larger models.

Task-oriented LLM-based agents are increasingly used in domains with strict policies, such as refund eligibility or cancellation rules. The challenge lies in ensuring that the agent consistently adheres to these rules and policies, appropriately refusing any request that would violate them, while still maintaining a helpful and natural interaction. This calls for the development of tailored design and evaluation methodologies to ensure agent resilience against malicious user behavior. We propose a novel threat model that focuses on adversarial users aiming to exploit policy-adherent agents for personal benefit. To address this, we present CRAFT, a multi-agent red-teaming system that leverages policy-aware persuasive strategies to undermine a policy-adherent agent in a customer-service scenario, outperforming conventional jailbreak methods such as DAN prompts, emotional manipulation, and coercive. Building upon the existing tau-bench benchmark, we introduce tau-break, a complementary benchmark designed to rigorously assess the agent's robustness against manipulative user behavior. Finally, we evaluate several straightforward yet effective defense strategies. While these measures provide some protection, they fall short, highlighting the need for stronger, research-driven safeguards to protect policy-adherent agents from adversarial attacks

LLMs are increasingly being used in workflows involving generating content to be consumed by humans (e.g., marketing) and also in directly interacting with humans (e.g., through chatbots). The development of such systems that are capable of generating verifiably persuasive messages presents both opportunities and challenges for society. On the one hand, such systems could positively impact domains like advertising and social good, such as addressing drug addiction, and on the other, they could be misused for spreading misinformation and shaping political opinions. To channel LLMs' impact on society, we need to develop systems to measure and benchmark their persuasiveness. With this motivation, we introduce PersuasionBench and PersuasionArena, the first large-scale benchmark and arena containing a battery of tasks to measure the persuasion ability of generative models automatically. We investigate to what extent LLMs know and leverage linguistic patterns that can help them generate more persuasive language. Our findings indicate that the persuasiveness of LLMs correlates positively with model size, but smaller models can also be made to have a higher persuasiveness than much larger models. Notably, targeted training using synthetic and natural datasets significantly enhances smaller models' persuasive capabilities, challenging scale-dependent assumptions. Our findings carry key implications for both model developers and policymakers. For instance, while the EU AI Act and California's SB-1047 aim to regulate AI models based on the number of floating point operations, we demonstrate that simple metrics like this alone fail to capture the full scope of AI's societal impact. We invite the community to explore and contribute to PersuasionArena and PersuasionBench, available at https://bit.ly/measure-persuasion, to advance our understanding of AI-driven persuasion and its societal implications.

Most traditional AI safety research has approached AI models as machines and centered on algorithm-focused attacks developed by security experts. As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly common and competent, non-expert users can also impose risks during daily interactions. This paper introduces a new perspective to jailbreak LLMs as human-like communicators, to explore this overlooked intersection between everyday language interaction and AI safety. Specifically, we study how to persuade LLMs to jailbreak them. First, we propose a persuasion taxonomy derived from decades of social science research. Then, we apply the taxonomy to automatically generate interpretable persuasive adversarial prompts (PAP) to jailbreak LLMs. Results show that persuasion significantly increases the jailbreak performance across all risk categories: PAP consistently achieves an attack success rate of over 92% on Llama 2-7b Chat, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4 in 10 trials, surpassing recent algorithm-focused attacks. On the defense side, we explore various mechanisms against PAP and, found a significant gap in existing defenses, and advocate for more fundamental mitigation for highly interactive LLMs

Large Language Models (LLMs) can struggle to balance gullibility to misinformation and resistance to valid corrections in persuasive dialogues, a critical challenge for reliable deployment. We introduce DuET-PD (Dual Evaluation for Trust in Persuasive Dialogues), a framework evaluating multi-turn stance-change dynamics across dual dimensions: persuasion type (corrective/misleading) and domain (knowledge via MMLU-Pro, and safety via SALAD-Bench). We find that even a state-of-the-art model like GPT-4o achieves only 27.32% accuracy in MMLU-Pro under sustained misleading persuasions. Moreover, results reveal a concerning trend of increasing sycophancy in newer open-source models. To address this, we introduce Holistic DPO, a training approach balancing positive and negative persuasion examples. Unlike prompting or resist-only training, Holistic DPO enhances both robustness to misinformation and receptiveness to corrections, improving Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct's accuracy under misleading persuasion in safety contexts from 4.21% to 76.54%. These contributions offer a pathway to developing more reliable and adaptable LLMs for multi-turn dialogue. Code is available at https://github.com/Social-AI-Studio/DuET-PD.

Large language models (LLMs) show promise in clinical decision support yet risk acquiescing to patient pressure for inappropriate care. We introduce SycoEval-EM, a multi-agent simulation framework evaluating LLM robustness through adversarial patient persuasion in emergency medicine. Across 20 LLMs and 1,875 encounters spanning three Choosing Wisely scenarios, acquiescence rates ranged from 0-100\%. Models showed higher vulnerability to imaging requests (38.8\%) than opioid prescriptions (25.0\%), with model capability poorly predicting robustness. All persuasion tactics proved equally effective (30.0-36.0\%), indicating general susceptibility rather than tactic-specific weakness. Our findings demonstrate that static benchmarks inadequately predict safety under social pressure, necessitating multi-turn adversarial testing for clinical AI certification.

Adversarial attacks in reinforcement learning (RL) often assume highly-privileged access to the victim's parameters, environment, or data. Instead, this paper proposes a novel adversarial setting called a Cheap Talk MDP in which an Adversary can merely append deterministic messages to the Victim's observation, resulting in a minimal range of influence. The Adversary cannot occlude ground truth, influence underlying environment dynamics or reward signals, introduce non-stationarity, add stochasticity, see the Victim's actions, or access their parameters. Additionally, we present a simple meta-learning algorithm called Adversarial Cheap Talk (ACT) to train Adversaries in this setting. We demonstrate that an Adversary trained with ACT still significantly influences the Victim's training and testing performance, despite the highly constrained setting. Affecting train-time performance reveals a new attack vector and provides insight into the success and failure modes of existing RL algorithms. More specifically, we show that an ACT Adversary is capable of harming performance by interfering with the learner's function approximation, or instead helping the Victim's performance by outputting useful features. Finally, we show that an ACT Adversary can manipulate messages during train-time to directly and arbitrarily control the Victim at test-time. Project video and code are available at https://sites.google.com/view/adversarial-cheap-talk

Goal-driven persuasive dialogue, exemplified by applications like telemarketing, requires sophisticated multi-turn planning and strict factual faithfulness, which remains a significant challenge for even state-of-the-art Large Language Models (LLMs). A lack of task-specific data often limits previous works, and direct LLM application suffers from strategic brittleness and factual hallucination. In this paper, we first construct and release TeleSalesCorpus, the first real-world-grounded dialogue dataset for this domain. We then propose AI-Salesman, a novel framework featuring a dual-stage architecture. For the training stage, we design a Bayesian-supervised reinforcement learning algorithm that learns robust sales strategies from noisy dialogues. For the inference stage, we introduce the Dynamic Outline-Guided Agent (DOGA), which leverages a pre-built script library to provide dynamic, turn-by-turn strategic guidance. Moreover, we design a comprehensive evaluation framework that combines fine-grained metrics for key sales skills with the LLM-as-a-Judge paradigm. Experimental results demonstrate that our proposed AI-Salesman significantly outperforms baseline models in both automatic metrics and comprehensive human evaluations, showcasing its effectiveness in complex persuasive scenarios.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous agents, understanding how strategic behavior emerges in multi-agent environments has become an important alignment challenge. We take a neutral empirical stance and construct a controlled environment in which strategic behavior can be directly observed and measured. We introduce a large-scale multi-agent simulation in a simplified model of New York City, where LLM-driven agents interact under opposing incentives. Blue agents aim to reach their destinations efficiently, while Red agents attempt to divert them toward billboard-heavy routes using persuasive language to maximize advertising revenue. Hidden identities make navigation socially mediated, forcing agents to decide when to trust or deceive. We study policy learning through an iterative simulation pipeline that updates agent policies across repeated interaction rounds using Kahneman-Tversky Optimization (KTO). Blue agents are optimized to reduce billboard exposure while preserving navigation efficiency, whereas Red agents adapt to exploit remaining weaknesses. Across iterations, the best Blue policy improves task success from 46.0% to 57.3%, although susceptibility remains high at 70.7%. Later policies exhibit stronger selective cooperation while preserving trajectory efficiency. However, a persistent safety-helpfulness trade-off remains: policies that better resist adversarial steering do not simultaneously maximize task completion. Overall, our results show that LLM agents can exhibit limited strategic behavior, including selective trust and deception, while remaining highly vulnerable to adversarial persuasion.

As Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs) are increasingly deployed in domains such as shopping, health, and news, they are exposed to pervasive persuasive content. A critical question is how these models function as persuadees-how and why they can be influenced by persuasive multimodal inputs. Understanding both their susceptibility to persuasion and the effectiveness of different persuasive strategies is crucial, as overly persuadable models may adopt misleading beliefs, override user preferences, or generate unethical or unsafe outputs when exposed to manipulative messages. We introduce MMPersuade, a unified framework for systematically studying multimodal persuasion dynamics in LVLMs. MMPersuade contributes (i) a comprehensive multimodal dataset that pairs images and videos with established persuasion principles across commercial, subjective and behavioral, and adversarial contexts, and (ii) an evaluation framework that quantifies both persuasion effectiveness and model susceptibility via third-party agreement scoring and self-estimated token probabilities on conversation histories. Our study of six leading LVLMs as persuadees yields three key insights: (i) multimodal inputs substantially increase persuasion effectiveness-and model susceptibility-compared to text alone, especially in misinformation scenarios; (ii) stated prior preferences decrease susceptibility, yet multimodal information maintains its persuasive advantage; and (iii) different strategies vary in effectiveness across contexts, with reciprocity being most potent in commercial and subjective contexts, and credibility and logic prevailing in adversarial contexts. By jointly analyzing persuasion effectiveness and susceptibility, MMPersuade provides a principled foundation for developing models that are robust, preference-consistent, and ethically aligned when engaging with persuasive multimodal content.

Red-teaming is a common practice for mitigating unsafe behaviors in Large Language Models (LLMs), which involves thoroughly assessing LLMs to identify potential flaws and addressing them with responsible and accurate responses. While effective, manual red-teaming is costly, and existing automatic red-teaming typically discovers safety risks without addressing them. In this paper, we propose a Multi-round Automatic Red-Teaming (MART) method, which incorporates both automatic adversarial prompt writing and safe response generation, significantly increasing red-teaming scalability and the safety of the target LLM. Specifically, an adversarial LLM and a target LLM interplay with each other in an iterative manner, where the adversarial LLM aims to generate challenging prompts that elicit unsafe responses from the target LLM, while the target LLM is fine-tuned with safety aligned data on these adversarial prompts. In each round, the adversarial LLM crafts better attacks on the updated target LLM, while the target LLM also improves itself through safety fine-tuning. On adversarial prompt benchmarks, the violation rate of an LLM with limited safety alignment reduces up to 84.7% after 4 rounds of MART, achieving comparable performance to LLMs with extensive adversarial prompt writing. Notably, model helpfulness on non-adversarial prompts remains stable throughout iterations, indicating the target LLM maintains strong performance on instruction following.

The practice of transferring knowledge from a sophisticated, closed-source large language model (LLM) to a compact, open-source LLM has garnered considerable attention. Previous works have focused on a unidirectional knowledge distillation way by aligning the responses of the student model with those of the teacher model to a set of instructions. Nevertheless, they overlooked the possibility of incorporating any reciprocal "feedback"--identifying challenging instructions where the student model's performance falls short--to boost the student model's proficiency iteratively. To this end, we propose a novel adversarial distillation framework for a more efficient knowledge transfer. Leveraging the versatile role adaptability of LLMs, we prompt the closed-source model to identify "hard" instructions and generate new "hard" instructions for the student model, creating a three-stage adversarial loop of imitation, discrimination, and generation. By applying this adversarial framework, we successfully transfer knowledge from ChatGPT to a 7B student model (named Lion), achieving nearly 95% capability approximation using a mere 70k training data. We aspire that this proposed model may serve as the baseline to reflect the performance of ChatGPT, especially the open-source instruction-following language model baseline for our community.

The recent advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established their potential as autonomous interactive agents. However, they often struggle in strategic games of incomplete information, such as bilateral price negotiation. In this paper, we investigate if Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) can effectively teach LLMs to negotiate. Specifically, we explore the strategic behaviors that emerge during the learning process. We introduce a framework that trains a mid-sized buyer agent against a regulated LLM seller across a wide distribution of real-world products. By grounding reward signals directly in the maximization of economic surplus and strict adherence to private budget constraints, we reveal a novel four-phase strategic evolution. The agent progresses from naive bargaining to using aggressive starting prices, moves through a phase of deadlock, and ultimately develops sophisticated persuasive skills. Our results demonstrate that this verifiable training allows a 30B agent to significantly outperform frontier models over ten times its size in extracting surplus. Furthermore, the trained agent generalizes robustly to stronger counterparties unseen during training and remains effective even when facing hostile, adversarial seller personas.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly persuasive, there is concern that people's opinions and decisions may be influenced across various contexts at scale. Prior mitigation (e.g., AI detectors and disclaimers) largely treats people as passive recipients of AI-generated information. To provide a more proactive intervention against persuasive AI, we introduce LLMimic, a role-play-based, interactive, gamified AI literacy tutorial, where participants assume the role of an LLM and progress through three key stages of the training pipeline (pretraining, SFT, and RLHF). We conducted a 2 times 3 between-subjects study (N = 274) where participants either (1) watched an AI history video (control) or (2) interacted with LLMimic (treatment), and then engaged in one of three realistic AI persuasion scenarios: (a) charity donation persuasion, (b) malicious money solicitation, or (c) hotel recommendation. Our results show that LLMimic significantly improved participants' AI literacy (p < .001), reduced persuasion success across scenarios (p < .05), and enhanced truthfulness and social responsibility levels (p<0.01) in the hotel scenario. These findings suggest that LLMimic offers a scalable, human-centered approach to improving AI literacy and supporting more informed interactions with persuasive AI.

Large language models can shift human beliefs across high-stakes domains, but most persuasion studies rely on pre/post belief change. These endpoint measures identify whether persuasion occurred, yet miss where and how beliefs moved within a dialogue. We present PERSUASIONTRACE, a framework for studying persuasion in human-LLM interaction. Built on a web-based experimental platform, PERSUASIONTRACE contributes a tool for multi-turn persuasion studies and a process-level evaluation protocol: it records multi-turn belief reports from human or simulated targets of persuasion, annotates persuader turns with rhetorical dimensions (logos/pathos/ethos), and evaluates simulators by fidelity to real human belief dynamics. Using this framework, we find that human targets group into two clusters of multi-turn belief updates and exhibit susceptibility to rhetorical strategies, and that LLMs are persuasive across generic and personalized topics, text and audio modalities, and multi-turn interactions. Prior work has chiefly used vanilla-prompted LLMs to simulate human targets, but we show that these simulators fail to replicate human belief dynamics. We introduce a Bayesian-network simulated target that maintains an explicit latent belief state over time so each persuader message yields cognitively realistic belief updates. In human-likeness evaluation, our Bayesian target scores near a human reference (81 vs 80), while baseline LLM targets score substantially lower (64). PERSUASIONTRACE reframes persuasion evaluation from endpoint movement alone to process fidelity, providing a stronger basis for scientific analysis and safer optimization of persuasive systems.

Generative large vision-language models (LVLMs) have recently achieved impressive performance gains, and their user base is growing rapidly. However, the security of LVLMs, in particular in a long-context multi-turn setting, is largely underexplored. In this paper, we consider the realistic scenario in which an attacker uploads a manipulated image to the web/social media. A benign user downloads this image and uses it as input to the LVLM. Our novel stealthy Visual Memory Injection (VMI) attack is designed such that on normal prompts the LVLM exhibits nominal behavior, but once the user gives a triggering prompt, the LVLM outputs a specific prescribed target message to manipulate the user, e.g. for adversarial marketing or political persuasion. Compared to previous work that focused on single-turn attacks, VMI is effective even after a long multi-turn conversation with the user. We demonstrate our attack on several recent open-weight LVLMs. This article thereby shows that large-scale manipulation of users is feasible with perturbed images in multi-turn conversation settings, calling for better robustness of LVLMs against these attacks. We release the source code at https://github.com/chs20/visual-memory-injection

Large language models (LLMs) are vulnerable to adversarial attacks that can bypass their safety guardrails. In many domains, adversarial training has proven to be one of the most promising methods to reliably improve robustness against such attacks. Yet, in the context of LLMs, current methods for adversarial training are hindered by the high computational costs required to perform discrete adversarial attacks at each training iteration. We address this problem by instead calculating adversarial attacks in the continuous embedding space of the LLM, which is orders of magnitudes more efficient. We propose a fast adversarial training algorithm (C-AdvUL) composed of two losses: the first makes the model robust on continuous embedding attacks computed on an adversarial behaviour dataset; the second ensures the usefulness of the final model by fine-tuning on utility data. Moreover, we introduce C-AdvIPO, an adversarial variant of IPO that does not require utility data for adversarially robust alignment. Our empirical evaluation on four models from different families (Gemma, Phi3, Mistral, Zephyr) and at different scales (2B, 3.8B, 7B) shows that both algorithms substantially enhance LLM robustness against discrete attacks (GCG, AutoDAN, PAIR), while maintaining utility. Our results demonstrate that robustness to continuous perturbations can extrapolate to discrete threat models. Thereby, we present a path toward scalable adversarial training algorithms for robustly aligning LLMs.

LLMs can provide substantial zero-shot performance on diverse tasks using a simple task prompt, eliminating the need for training or fine-tuning. However, when applying these models to sensitive tasks, it is crucial to thoroughly assess their robustness against adversarial inputs. In this work, we introduce Static Deceptor (StaDec) and Dynamic Deceptor (DyDec), two innovative attack frameworks designed to systematically generate dynamic and adaptive adversarial examples by leveraging the understanding of the LLMs. We produce subtle and natural-looking adversarial inputs that preserve semantic similarity to the original text while effectively deceiving the target LLM. By utilizing an automated, LLM-driven pipeline, we eliminate the dependence on external heuristics. Our attacks evolve with the advancements in LLMs and demonstrate strong transferability across models unknown to the attacker. Overall, this work provides a systematic approach for the self-assessment of an LLM's robustness. We release our code and data at https://github.com/Shukti042/AdversarialExample.

We introduce a novel framework that transforms the resource-intensive (adversarial) prompt optimization problem into an efficient, amortized inference task. Our core insight is that pretrained, non-autoregressive generative LLMs, such as Diffusion LLMs, which model the joint distribution over prompt-response pairs, can serve as powerful surrogates for prompt search. This approach enables the direct conditional generation of prompts, effectively replacing costly, per-instance discrete optimization with a small number of parallelizable samples. We provide a probabilistic analysis demonstrating that under mild fidelity assumptions, only a few conditional samples are required to recover high-reward (harmful) prompts. Empirically, we find that the generated prompts are low-perplexity, diverse jailbreaks that exhibit strong transferability to a wide range of black-box target models, including robustly trained and proprietary LLMs. Beyond adversarial prompting, our framework opens new directions for red teaming, automated prompt optimization, and leveraging emerging Flow- and Diffusion-based LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable creative writing capabilities, yet their substantial computational demands hinder widespread use. Enhancing Small Language Models (SLMs) offers a promising alternative, but current methods like Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) struggle with novelty, and Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) is costly. This paper explores two distinct AI-driven reward strategies within a Reinforcement Learning from AI Feedback (RLAIF) framework to ignite the creative writing of a 7B-parameter SLM, specifically for generating Chinese greetings. The first strategy employs a RM trained on high-quality preference data curated by a novel multi-agent rejection sampling framework designed for creative tasks. The second, more novel strategy utilizes a principle-guided LLM-as-a-Judge, whose reward function is optimized via an adversarial training scheme with a reflection mechanism, to directly provide reward signals. Comprehensive experiments reveal that while both approaches significantly enhance creative output over baselines, the principle-guided LLM-as-a-Judge demonstrably yields superior generation quality. Furthermore, it offers notable advantages in training efficiency and reduced dependency on human-annotated data, presenting a more scalable and effective path towards creative SLMs. Our automated evaluation methods also exhibit strong alignment with human judgments. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/weixiaolong94-hub/Igniting-Creative-Writing-in-Small-Language-Models.

The growing deployment of large language model (LLM) based agents that interact with external environments has created new attack surfaces for adversarial manipulation. One major threat is indirect prompt injection, where attackers embed malicious instructions in external environment output, causing agents to interpret and execute them as if they were legitimate prompts. While previous research has focused primarily on plain-text injection attacks, we find a significant yet underexplored vulnerability: LLMs' dependence on structured chat templates and their susceptibility to contextual manipulation through persuasive multi-turn dialogues. To this end, we introduce ChatInject, an attack that formats malicious payloads to mimic native chat templates, thereby exploiting the model's inherent instruction-following tendencies. Building on this foundation, we develop a persuasion-driven Multi-turn variant that primes the agent across conversational turns to accept and execute otherwise suspicious actions. Through comprehensive experiments across frontier LLMs, we demonstrate three critical findings: (1) ChatInject achieves significantly higher average attack success rates than traditional prompt injection methods, improving from 5.18% to 32.05% on AgentDojo and from 15.13% to 45.90% on InjecAgent, with multi-turn dialogues showing particularly strong performance at average 52.33% success rate on InjecAgent, (2) chat-template-based payloads demonstrate strong transferability across models and remain effective even against closed-source LLMs, despite their unknown template structures, and (3) existing prompt-based defenses are largely ineffective against this attack approach, especially against Multi-turn variants. These findings highlight vulnerabilities in current agent systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly employed as evaluators (LLM-as-a-Judge) for assessing the quality of machine-generated text. This paradigm offers scalability and cost-effectiveness compared to human annotation. However, the reliability and security of such systems, particularly their robustness against adversarial manipulations, remain critical concerns. This paper investigates the vulnerability of LLM-as-a-Judge architectures to prompt-injection attacks, where malicious inputs are designed to compromise the judge's decision-making process. We formalize two primary attack strategies: Comparative Undermining Attack (CUA), which directly targets the final decision output, and Justification Manipulation Attack (JMA), which aims to alter the model's generated reasoning. Using the Greedy Coordinate Gradient (GCG) optimization method, we craft adversarial suffixes appended to one of the responses being compared. Experiments conducted on the MT-Bench Human Judgments dataset with open-source instruction-tuned LLMs (Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct and Falcon3-3B-Instruct) demonstrate significant susceptibility. The CUA achieves an Attack Success Rate (ASR) exceeding 30\%, while JMA also shows notable effectiveness. These findings highlight substantial vulnerabilities in current LLM-as-a-Judge systems, underscoring the need for robust defense mechanisms and further research into adversarial evaluation and trustworthiness in LLM-based assessment frameworks.

While recently Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable successes, they are vulnerable to certain jailbreaking attacks that lead to generation of inappropriate or harmful content. Manual red-teaming requires finding adversarial prompts that cause such jailbreaking, e.g. by appending a suffix to a given instruction, which is inefficient and time-consuming. On the other hand, automatic adversarial prompt generation often leads to semantically meaningless attacks that can easily be detected by perplexity-based filters, may require gradient information from the TargetLLM, or do not scale well due to time-consuming discrete optimization processes over the token space. In this paper, we present a novel method that uses another LLM, called the AdvPrompter, to generate human-readable adversarial prompts in seconds, sim800times faster than existing optimization-based approaches. We train the AdvPrompter using a novel algorithm that does not require access to the gradients of the TargetLLM. This process alternates between two steps: (1) generating high-quality target adversarial suffixes by optimizing the AdvPrompter predictions, and (2) low-rank fine-tuning of the AdvPrompter with the generated adversarial suffixes. The trained AdvPrompter generates suffixes that veil the input instruction without changing its meaning, such that the TargetLLM is lured to give a harmful response. Experimental results on popular open source TargetLLMs show state-of-the-art results on the AdvBench dataset, that also transfer to closed-source black-box LLM APIs. Further, we demonstrate that by fine-tuning on a synthetic dataset generated by AdvPrompter, LLMs can be made more robust against jailbreaking attacks while maintaining performance, i.e. high MMLU scores.

Process Reward Models (PRMs) are rapidly becoming the backbone of LLM reasoning pipelines, yet we demonstrate that state-of-the-art PRMs are systematically exploitable under adversarial optimization pressure. To address this, we introduce a three-tiered diagnostic framework that applies increasing adversarial pressure to quantify these vulnerabilities. Static perturbation analysis uncovers a fluency-logic dissociation: high invariance to surface-level style changes reward changes <0.1, yet inconsistent detection of logically-corrupted reasoning, with different models failing on different attack types. Adversarial optimization demonstrates that gradient-based attacks inflate rewards on invalid trajectories, with reward landscapes exhibiting wide, exploitable peaks. RL-induced reward hacking exposes the critical failure mode: policies trained on AIME problems achieve near-perfect PRM rewards (>0.9), while ground-truth accuracy remains low (below 4%), with 43% of reward gains attributable to stylistic shortcuts. These findings reveal that current PRMs function as fluency detectors rather than reasoning verifiers, creating systematic blind spots that undermine their use as training signals. We release PRM-BiasBench and a diagnostic toolkit to enable robustness evaluation before deployment. The code and dataset are available at https://github.com/SqueezeAILab/reward-under-attack.

Large language models (LLMs) can often be made to behave in undesirable ways that they are explicitly fine-tuned not to. For example, the LLM red-teaming literature has produced a wide variety of 'jailbreaking' techniques to elicit harmful text from models that were fine-tuned to be harmless. Recent work on red-teaming, model editing, and interpretability suggests that this challenge stems from how (adversarial) fine-tuning largely serves to suppress rather than remove undesirable capabilities from LLMs. Prior work has introduced latent adversarial training (LAT) as a way to improve robustness to broad classes of failures. These prior works have considered untargeted latent space attacks where the adversary perturbs latent activations to maximize loss on examples of desirable behavior. Untargeted LAT can provide a generic type of robustness but does not leverage information about specific failure modes. Here, we experiment with targeted LAT where the adversary seeks to minimize loss on a specific competing task. We find that it can augment a wide variety of state-of-the-art methods. First, we use targeted LAT to improve robustness to jailbreaks, outperforming a strong R2D2 baseline with orders of magnitude less compute. Second, we use it to more effectively remove backdoors with no knowledge of the trigger. Finally, we use it to more effectively unlearn knowledge for specific undesirable tasks in a way that is also more robust to re-learning. Overall, our results suggest that targeted LAT can be an effective tool for defending against harmful behaviors from LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are powerful zero-shot assessors and are increasingly used in real-world situations such as for written exams or benchmarking systems. Despite this, no existing work has analyzed the vulnerability of judge-LLMs against adversaries attempting to manipulate outputs. This work presents the first study on the adversarial robustness of assessment LLMs, where we search for short universal phrases that when appended to texts can deceive LLMs to provide high assessment scores. Experiments on SummEval and TopicalChat demonstrate that both LLM-scoring and pairwise LLM-comparative assessment are vulnerable to simple concatenation attacks, where in particular LLM-scoring is very susceptible and can yield maximum assessment scores irrespective of the input text quality. Interestingly, such attacks are transferable and phrases learned on smaller open-source LLMs can be applied to larger closed-source models, such as GPT3.5. This highlights the pervasive nature of the adversarial vulnerabilities across different judge-LLM sizes, families and methods. Our findings raise significant concerns on the reliability of LLMs-as-a-judge methods, and underscore the importance of addressing vulnerabilities in LLM assessment methods before deployment in high-stakes real-world scenarios.

The wide-ranging applications of large language models (LLMs), especially in safety-critical domains, necessitate the proper evaluation of the LLM's adversarial robustness. This paper proposes an efficient tool to audit the LLM's adversarial robustness via a prompt-based adversarial attack (PromptAttack). PromptAttack converts adversarial textual attacks into an attack prompt that can cause the victim LLM to output the adversarial sample to fool itself. The attack prompt is composed of three important components: (1) original input (OI) including the original sample and its ground-truth label, (2) attack objective (AO) illustrating a task description of generating a new sample that can fool itself without changing the semantic meaning, and (3) attack guidance (AG) containing the perturbation instructions to guide the LLM on how to complete the task by perturbing the original sample at character, word, and sentence levels, respectively. Besides, we use a fidelity filter to ensure that PromptAttack maintains the original semantic meanings of the adversarial examples. Further, we enhance the attack power of PromptAttack by ensembling adversarial examples at different perturbation levels. Comprehensive empirical results using Llama2 and GPT-3.5 validate that PromptAttack consistently yields a much higher attack success rate compared to AdvGLUE and AdvGLUE++. Interesting findings include that a simple emoji can easily mislead GPT-3.5 to make wrong predictions.

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent systems, understanding adversarial manipulation becomes critical for defensive design. We present a systematic study of intentional deception as an engineered capability, using LLM-to-LLM interactions within a text-based RPG where parameterized behavioral profiles (9 alignments x 4 motivations, yielding 36 profiles with explicit ethical ground truth) serve as our experimental testbed. Unlike accidental deception from misalignment, we investigate a two-stage system that infers target agent characteristics and generates deceptive responses steering targets toward actions counter to their beliefs and motivations. We find that deceptive intervention produces differential effects concentrated in specific behavioral profiles rather than distributed uniformly, and that 88.5% of successful deceptions employ misdirection (true statements with strategic framing) rather than fabrication, indicating fact-checking defenses would miss the large majority of adversarial responses. Motivation, inferable at 98%+ accuracy, serves as the primary attack vector, while belief systems remain harder to identify (49% inference ceiling) or exploit. These findings identify which agent profiles require additional safeguards and suggest that current fact-verification approaches are insufficient against strategically framed deception.

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) has raised security concerns due to their susceptibility to producing harmful or policy-violating outputs when exposed to adversarial prompts. While alignment and guardrails mitigate common misuse, they remain vulnerable to automated jailbreaking methods such as GCG, PEZ, and GBDA, which generate adversarial suffixes via training and gradient-based search. Although effective, these methods particularly GCG are computationally expensive, limiting their practicality for organisations with constrained resources. This paper introduces a resource-efficient adversarial prompting approach that eliminates the need for retraining by matching new prompts to a database of pre-trained adversarial prompts. A dataset of 1,000 prompts was classified into seven harm-related categories, and GCG, PEZ, and GBDA were evaluated on a Llama 3 8B model to identify the most effective attack method per category. Results reveal a correlation between prompt type and algorithm effectiveness. By retrieving semantically similar successful adversarial prompts, the proposed method achieves competitive attack success rates with significantly reduced computational cost. This work provides a practical framework for scalable red-teaming and security evaluation of aligned LLMs, including in settings where model internals are inaccessible.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

Persuasive dialogue plays a pivotal role in human communication, influencing various domains. Recent persuasive dialogue datasets often fail to align with real-world interpersonal interactions, leading to unfaithful representations. For instance, unrealistic scenarios may arise, such as when the persuadee explicitly instructs the persuader on which persuasion strategies to employ, with each of the persuadee's questions corresponding to a specific strategy for the persuader to follow. This issue can be attributed to a violation of the "Double Blind" condition, where critical information is fully shared between participants. In actual human interactions, however, key information such as the mental state of the persuadee and the persuasion strategies of the persuader is not directly accessible. The persuader must infer the persuadee's mental state using Theory of Mind capabilities and construct arguments that align with the persuadee's motivations. To address this gap, we introduce ToMMA, a novel multi-agent framework for dialogue generation that is guided by causal Theory of Mind. This framework ensures that information remains undisclosed between agents, preserving "double-blind" conditions, while causal ToM directs the persuader's reasoning, enhancing alignment with human-like persuasion dynamics. Consequently, we present CToMPersu, a multi-domain, multi-turn persuasive dialogue dataset that tackles both double-blind and logical coherence issues, demonstrating superior performance across multiple metrics and achieving better alignment with real human dialogues. Our dataset and prompts are available at https://github.com/DingyiZhang/ToMMA-CToMPersu .

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance in capability and influence, ensuring their security and preventing harmful outputs has become crucial. A promising approach to address these concerns involves training models to automatically generate adversarial prompts for red teaming. However, the evolving subtlety of vulnerabilities in LLMs challenges the effectiveness of current adversarial methods, which struggle to specifically target and explore the weaknesses of these models. To tackle these challenges, we introduce the Self-Evolving Adversarial Safety (SEAS) optimization framework, which enhances security by leveraging data generated by the model itself. SEAS operates through three iterative stages: Initialization, Attack, and Adversarial Optimization, refining both the Red Team and Target models to improve robustness and safety. This framework reduces reliance on manual testing and significantly enhances the security capabilities of LLMs. Our contributions include a novel adversarial framework, a comprehensive safety dataset, and after three iterations, the Target model achieves a security level comparable to GPT-4, while the Red Team model shows a marked increase in attack success rate (ASR) against advanced models.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-agent settings where communication must balance informativeness and secrecy. In such settings, an agent may need to signal information to collaborators while preventing an adversary from inferring sensitive details. However, existing LLM benchmarks primarily evaluate capabilities such as reasoning, factual knowledge, or instruction following, and do not directly measure strategic communication under asymmetric information. We introduce SNEAK (Secret-aware Natural language Evaluation for Adversarial Knowledge), a benchmark for evaluating selective information sharing in language models. In SNEAK, a model is given a semantic category, a candidate set of words, and a secret word, and must generate a message that indicates knowledge of the secret without revealing it too clearly. We evaluate generated messages using two simulated agents with different information states: an ally, who knows the secret and must identify the intended message, and a chameleon, who does not know the secret and attempts to infer it from the message. This yields two complementary metrics: utility, measuring how well the message communicates to collaborators, and leakage, measuring how much information it reveals to an adversary. Using this framework, we analyze the trade-off between informativeness and secrecy in modern language models and show that strategic communication under asymmetric information remains a challenging capability for current systems. Notably, human participants outperform all evaluated models by a large margin, achieving up to four times higher scores.

Controlling undesirable Large Language Model (LLM) behaviors, such as the generation of unsafe content or failing to adhere to safety guidelines, often relies on costly fine-tuning. Activation steering provides an alternative for inference-time control, but existing methods typically lack fine-grained, adaptive mechanisms. We introduce a novel approach using a lightweight, trainable controller network integrated during inference. This controller network observes specific intermediate LLM activations and predicts both a global scaling factor and layer-specific weights. The predicted global scaling factor and layer-specific weights then dynamically modulate the intensity of a steering patch, derived from a pre-computed "refusal direction" vector, applied across the LLM's layers during generation. Trained on activations from both harmful and benign prompts, our controller learns to discriminatively apply nuanced, layer-aware interventions, activating steering primarily for harmful inputs. Experiments using safety benchmarks like ToxicChat & In-The-Wild Jailbreak Prompts demonstrate that our weighted steering controller significantly increases refusal rates compared to the base LLM, achieving targeted behavioral modification without altering the original model parameters. Our experiments with Llama-3.1-8B, Llama-3.2-1B & Mistral-7B show our approach outperforms existing methods, presenting an efficient and adaptive method for fine-grained control over LLM behavior at inference time.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown proficiency in generating persuasive dialogue, yet concerns about the fluency and sophistication of their outputs persist. This paper presents a multi-LLM communication framework designed to enhance the generation of persuasive data automatically. This framework facilitates the efficient production of high-quality, diverse linguistic content with minimal human oversight. Through extensive evaluations, we demonstrate that the generated data excels in naturalness, linguistic diversity, and the strategic use of persuasion, even in complex scenarios involving social taboos. The framework also proves adept at generalizing across novel contexts. Our results highlight the framework's potential to significantly advance research in both computational and social science domains concerning persuasive communication.

LLM have achieved success in many fields but still troubled by problematic content in the training corpora. LLM unlearning aims at reducing their influence and avoid undesirable behaviours. However, existing unlearning methods remain vulnerable to adversarial queries and the unlearned knowledge resurfaces after the manually designed attack queries. As part of a red-team effort to proactively assess the vulnerabilities of unlearned models, we design Dynamic Unlearning Attack (DUA), a dynamic and automated framework to attack these models and evaluate their robustness. It optimizes adversarial suffixes to reintroduce the unlearned knowledge in various scenarios. We find that unlearned knowledge can be recovered in 55.2% of the questions, even without revealing the unlearned model's parameters. In response to this vulnerability, we propose Latent Adversarial Unlearning (LAU), a universal framework that effectively enhances the robustness of the unlearned process. It formulates the unlearning process as a min-max optimization problem and resolves it through two stages: an attack stage, where perturbation vectors are trained and added to the latent space of LLMs to recover the unlearned knowledge, and a defense stage, where previously trained perturbation vectors are used to enhance unlearned model's robustness. With our LAU framework, we obtain two robust unlearning methods, AdvGA and AdvNPO. We conduct extensive experiments across multiple unlearning benchmarks and various models, and demonstrate that they improve the unlearning effectiveness by over 53.5%, cause only less than a 11.6% reduction in neighboring knowledge, and have almost no impact on the model's general capabilities.

Research on adversarial robustness in language models is currently fragmented across applications and attacks, obscuring shared vulnerabilities. In this work, we propose unifying the study of adversarial robustness in text scoring models spanning dense retrievers, rerankers, and reward models. This motivates adapting both attacks and adversarial training methods across model roles. Unlike open-ended generation, text scoring failures are directly testable: an attack succeeds when an irrelevant or rejected text outscores a relevant or chosen one. Using this principled lens of text scoring, we demonstrate that current adversarial training formulations for language models are often short-sighted, failing to effectively generalize across attacks. To address this, we introduce multiple adversarial training methods for text scoring models and show that combining complementary training methods can yield strong robustness while also improving task effectiveness. We also highlight the practical value of our approach for RLHF, showing that our adversarially trained reward models mitigate reward hacking and support the training of better-aligned LLMs. We provide our code and models for further study.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

The prevalence and strong capability of large language models (LLMs) present significant safety and ethical risks if exploited by malicious users. To prevent the potentially deceptive usage of LLMs, recent works have proposed algorithms to detect LLM-generated text and protect LLMs. In this paper, we investigate the robustness and reliability of these LLM detectors under adversarial attacks. We study two types of attack strategies: 1) replacing certain words in an LLM's output with their synonyms given the context; 2) automatically searching for an instructional prompt to alter the writing style of the generation. In both strategies, we leverage an auxiliary LLM to generate the word replacements or the instructional prompt. Different from previous works, we consider a challenging setting where the auxiliary LLM can also be protected by a detector. Experiments reveal that our attacks effectively compromise the performance of all detectors in the study with plausible generations, underscoring the urgent need to improve the robustness of LLM-generated text detection systems.

Machine unlearning for LLMs aims to remove sensitive or copyrighted data from trained models. However, the true efficacy of current unlearning methods remains uncertain. Standard evaluation metrics rely on benign queries that often mistake superficial information suppression for genuine knowledge removal. Such metrics fail to detect residual knowledge that more sophisticated prompting strategies could still extract. We introduce REBEL, an evolutionary approach for adversarial prompt generation designed to probe whether unlearned data can still be recovered. Our experiments demonstrate that REBEL successfully elicits ``forgotten'' knowledge from models that seemed to be forgotten in standard unlearning benchmarks, revealing that current unlearning methods may provide only a superficial layer of protection. We validate our framework on subsets of the TOFU and WMDP benchmarks, evaluating performance across a diverse suite of unlearning algorithms. Our experiments show that REBEL consistently outperforms static baselines, recovering ``forgotten'' knowledge with Attack Success Rates (ASRs) reaching up to 60% on TOFU and 93% on WMDP. We will make all code publicly available upon acceptance. Code is available at https://github.com/patryk-rybak/REBEL/

Large language models (LLMs) and LLM-based agents have been widely deployed in a wide range of applications in the real world, including healthcare diagnostics, financial analysis, customer support, robotics, and autonomous driving, expanding their powerful capability of understanding, reasoning, and generating natural languages. However, the wide deployment of LLM-based applications exposes critical security and reliability risks, such as the potential for malicious misuse, privacy leakage, and service disruption that weaken user trust and undermine societal safety. This paper provides a systematic overview of the details of adversarial attacks targeting both LLMs and LLM-based agents. These attacks are organized into three phases in LLMs: Training-Phase Attacks, Inference-Phase Attacks, and Availability & Integrity Attacks. For each phase, we analyze the details of representative and recently introduced attack methods along with their corresponding defenses. We hope our survey will provide a good tutorial and a comprehensive understanding of LLM security, especially for attacks on LLMs. We desire to raise attention to the risks inherent in widely deployed LLM-based applications and highlight the urgent need for robust mitigation strategies for evolving threats.

We present a novel approach for attacking black-box large language models (LLMs) by exploiting their ability to express confidence in natural language. Existing black-box attacks require either access to continuous model outputs like logits or confidence scores (which are rarely available in practice), or rely on proxy signals from other models. Instead, we demonstrate how to prompt LLMs to express their internal confidence in a way that is sufficiently calibrated to enable effective adversarial optimization. We apply our general method to three attack scenarios: adversarial examples for vision-LLMs, jailbreaks and prompt injections. Our attacks successfully generate malicious inputs against systems that only expose textual outputs, thereby dramatically expanding the attack surface for deployed LLMs. We further find that better and larger models exhibit superior calibration when expressing confidence, creating a concerning security paradox where model capability improvements directly enhance vulnerability. Our code is available at this [link](https://github.com/zj-jayzhang/black_box_llm_optimization).

The performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) is based on the quality of the prompts and the semantic and structural integrity information of the input data. However, current prompt generation methods primarily focus on generating prompts for clean input data, often overlooking the impact of perturbed inputs on prompt performance. To address this limitation, we propose BATprompt (By Adversarial Training prompt), a novel method for prompt generation designed to withstand input perturbations (such as typos in the input). Inspired by adversarial training techniques, BATprompt demonstrates strong performance on a variety of perturbed tasks through a two-step process: adversarial perturbation and iterative optimization on unperturbed input via LLM. Unlike conventional adversarial attack methods, BATprompt avoids reliance on real gradients or model parameters. Instead, it leverages the advanced reasoning, language understanding and self reflection capabilities of LLMs to simulate gradients, guiding the generation of adversarial perturbations and optimizing prompt performance. In our experiments, we evaluate BATprompt on multiple datasets across both language understanding and generation tasks. The results indicate that BATprompt outperforms existing prompt generation methods, delivering superior robustness and performance under diverse perturbation scenarios.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have spurred interest in designing LLM-based agents for tasks that involve interaction with human and artificial agents. This paper addresses a key aspect in the design of such agents: Predicting human decision in off-policy evaluation (OPE), focusing on language-based persuasion games, where the agent's goal is to influence its partner's decisions through verbal messages. Using a dedicated application, we collected a dataset of 87K decisions from humans playing a repeated decision-making game with artificial agents. Our approach involves training a model on human interactions with one agents subset to predict decisions when interacting with another. To enhance off-policy performance, we propose a simulation technique involving interactions across the entire agent space and simulated decision makers. Our learning strategy yields significant OPE gains, e.g., improving prediction accuracy in the top 15% challenging cases by 7.1%. Our code and the large dataset we collected and generated are submitted as supplementary material and publicly available in our GitHub repository: https://github.com/eilamshapira/HumanChoicePrediction

There are widespread fears that conversational AI could soon exert unprecedented influence over human beliefs. Here, in three large-scale experiments (N=76,977), we deployed 19 LLMs-including some post-trained explicitly for persuasion-to evaluate their persuasiveness on 707 political issues. We then checked the factual accuracy of 466,769 resulting LLM claims. Contrary to popular concerns, we show that the persuasive power of current and near-future AI is likely to stem more from post-training and prompting methods-which boosted persuasiveness by as much as 51% and 27% respectively-than from personalization or increasing model scale. We further show that these methods increased persuasion by exploiting LLMs' unique ability to rapidly access and strategically deploy information and that, strikingly, where they increased AI persuasiveness they also systematically decreased factual accuracy.

This paper introduces ChatbotManip, a novel dataset for studying manipulation in Chatbots. It contains simulated generated conversations between a chatbot and a (simulated) user, where the chatbot is explicitly asked to showcase manipulation tactics, persuade the user towards some goal, or simply be helpful. We consider a diverse set of chatbot manipulation contexts, from consumer and personal advice to citizen advice and controversial proposition argumentation. Each conversation is annotated by human annotators for both general manipulation and specific manipulation tactics. Our research reveals three key findings. First, Large Language Models (LLMs) can be manipulative when explicitly instructed, with annotators identifying manipulation in approximately 84\% of such conversations. Second, even when only instructed to be ``persuasive'' without explicit manipulation prompts, LLMs frequently default to controversial manipulative strategies, particularly gaslighting and fear enhancement. Third, small fine-tuned open source models, such as BERT+BiLSTM have a performance comparable to zero-shot classification with larger models like Gemini 2.5 pro in detecting manipulation, but are not yet reliable for real-world oversight. Our work provides important insights for AI safety research and highlights the need of addressing manipulation risks as LLMs are increasingly deployed in consumer-facing applications.

Despite efforts to align large language models (LLMs) with human values, widely-used LLMs such as GPT, Llama, Claude, and PaLM are susceptible to jailbreaking attacks, wherein an adversary fools a targeted LLM into generating objectionable content. To address this vulnerability, we propose SmoothLLM, the first algorithm designed to mitigate jailbreaking attacks on LLMs. Based on our finding that adversarially-generated prompts are brittle to character-level changes, our defense first randomly perturbs multiple copies of a given input prompt, and then aggregates the corresponding predictions to detect adversarial inputs. SmoothLLM reduces the attack success rate on numerous popular LLMs to below one percentage point, avoids unnecessary conservatism, and admits provable guarantees on attack mitigation. Moreover, our defense uses exponentially fewer queries than existing attacks and is compatible with any LLM. Our code is publicly available at the following link: https://github.com/arobey1/smooth-llm.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are seeing significant adoption in every type of organization due to their exceptional generative capabilities. However, LLMs are found to be vulnerable to various adversarial attacks, particularly prompt injection attacks, which trick them into producing harmful or inappropriate content. Adversaries execute such attacks by crafting malicious prompts to deceive the LLMs. In this paper, we propose a novel approach based on embedding-based Machine Learning (ML) classifiers to protect LLM-based applications against this severe threat. We leverage three commonly used embedding models to generate embeddings of malicious and benign prompts and utilize ML classifiers to predict whether an input prompt is malicious. Out of several traditional ML methods, we achieve the best performance with classifiers built using Random Forest and XGBoost. Our classifiers outperform state-of-the-art prompt injection classifiers available in open-source implementations, which use encoder-only neural networks.

Generative reward models (also known as LLMs-as-judges), which use large language models (LLMs) to evaluate answer quality, are increasingly adopted in reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR). They are often preferred over rigid rule-based metrics, especially for complex reasoning tasks involving free-form outputs. In this paradigm, an LLM is typically prompted to compare a candidate answer against a ground-truth reference and assign a binary reward indicating correctness. Despite the seeming simplicity of this comparison task, we find that generative reward models exhibit surprising vulnerabilities to superficial manipulations: non-word symbols (e.g., ":" or ".") or reasoning openers like "Thought process:" and "Let's solve this problem step by step." can often lead to false positive rewards. We demonstrate that this weakness is widespread across LLMs, datasets, and prompt formats, posing a serious threat for core algorithmic paradigms that rely on generative reward models, such as rejection sampling, preference optimization, and RLVR. To mitigate this issue, we introduce a simple yet effective data augmentation strategy and train a new generative reward model with substantially improved robustness. Our findings highlight the urgent need for more reliable LLM-based evaluation methods. We release our robust, general-domain reward model and its synthetic training data at https://huggingface.co/sarosavo/Master-RM and https://huggingface.co/datasets/sarosavo/Master-RM.

As large language models (LLMs) transition to autonomous agents synthesizing real-time information, their reasoning capabilities introduce an unexpected attack surface. This paper introduces a novel threat where colluding agents steer victim beliefs using only truthful evidence fragments distributed through public channels, without relying on covert communications, backdoors, or falsified documents. By exploiting LLMs' overthinking tendency, we formalize the first cognitive collusion attack and propose Generative Montage: a Writer-Editor-Director framework that constructs deceptive narratives through adversarial debate and coordinated posting of evidence fragments, causing victims to internalize and propagate fabricated conclusions. To study this risk, we develop CoPHEME, a dataset derived from real-world rumor events, and simulate attacks across diverse LLM families. Our results show pervasive vulnerability across 14 LLM families: attack success rates reach 74.4% for proprietary models and 70.6% for open-weights models. Counterintuitively, stronger reasoning capabilities increase susceptibility, with reasoning-specialized models showing higher attack success than base models or prompts. Furthermore, these false beliefs then cascade to downstream judges, achieving over 60% deception rates, highlighting a socio-technical vulnerability in how LLM-based agents interact with dynamic information environments. Our implementation and data are available at: https://github.com/CharlesJW222/Lying_with_Truth/tree/main.

Estimating the persuasiveness of messages is critical in various applications, from recommender systems to safety assessment of LLMs. While it is imperative to consider the target persuadee's characteristics, such as their values, experiences, and reasoning styles, there is currently no established systematic framework to optimize leveraging a persuadee's past activities (e.g., conversations) to the benefit of a persuasiveness prediction model. To address this problem, we propose a context-aware user profiling framework with two trainable components: a query generator that generates optimal queries to retrieve persuasion-relevant records from a user's history, and a profiler that summarizes these records into a profile to effectively inform the persuasiveness prediction model. Our evaluation on the ChangeMyView Reddit dataset shows consistent improvements over existing methods across multiple predictor models, raising F1 from 33% to 47% on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct. Further analysis shows that effective user profiles are context-dependent and predictor-specific, rather than relying on static attributes or surface-level similarity. Together, these results highlight the importance of task-oriented, context-dependent user profiling for personalized persuasiveness prediction.

Large language models (LLMs) are popular for high-quality text generation but can produce harmful content, even when aligned with human values through reinforcement learning. Adversarial prompts can bypass their safety measures. We propose LLM Self Defense, a simple approach to defend against these attacks by having an LLM screen the induced responses. Our method does not require any fine-tuning, input preprocessing, or iterative output generation. Instead, we incorporate the generated content into a pre-defined prompt and employ another instance of an LLM to analyze the text and predict whether it is harmful. We test LLM Self Defense on GPT 3.5 and Llama 2, two of the current most prominent LLMs against various types of attacks, such as forcefully inducing affirmative responses to prompts and prompt engineering attacks. Notably, LLM Self Defense succeeds in reducing the attack success rate to virtually 0 using both GPT 3.5 and Llama 2. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/poloclub/llm-self-defense

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, Frontier AI Risk Management Framework in Practice presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. As Large Language Models (LLMs) general capabilities rapidly evolve and the proliferation of agentic AI, this version of the risk analysis technical report presents an updated and granular assessment of five critical dimensions: cyber offense, persuasion and manipulation, strategic deception, uncontrolled AI R\&D, and self-replication. Specifically, we introduce more complex scenarios for cyber offense. For persuasion and manipulation, we evaluate the risk of LLM-to-LLM persuasion on newly released LLMs. For strategic deception and scheming, we add the new experiment with respect to emergent misalignment. For uncontrolled AI R\&D, we focus on the ``mis-evolution'' of agents as they autonomously expand their memory substrates and toolsets. Besides, we also monitor and evaluate the safety performance of OpenClaw during the interaction on the Moltbook. For self-replication, we introduce a new resource-constrained scenario. More importantly, we propose and validate a series of robust mitigation strategies to address these emerging threats, providing a preliminary technical and actionable pathway for the secure deployment of frontier AI. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress through Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), yet still rely heavily on external supervision (e.g., curated labels). Adversarial learning, particularly through self-play, offers a promising alternative that enables models to iteratively learn from themselves - thus reducing reliance on external supervision. Dual-play extends adversarial learning by assigning specialized roles to two models and training them against each other, fostering sustained competition and mutual evolution. Despite its promise, adapting dual-play training to LLMs remains limited, largely due to their susceptibility to reward hacking and training instability. In this paper, we introduce PasoDoble, a novel LLM dual-play framework. PasoDoble adversarially trains two models initialized from the same base model: a Proposer, which generates challenging questions with ground-truth answers, and a Solver, which attempts to solve them. We enrich the Proposer with knowledge from a pre-training dataset to ensure the questions' quality and diversity. To avoid reward hacking, the Proposer is rewarded for producing only valid questions that push the Solver's limit, while the Solver is rewarded for solving them correctly, and both are updated jointly. To further enhance training stability, we introduce an optional offline paradigm that decouples Proposer and Solver updates, alternately updating each for several steps while holding the other fixed. Notably, PasoDoble operates without supervision during training. Experimental results show that PasoDoble can improve the reasoning performance of LLMs. Our project page is available at https://hcy123902.github.io/PasoDoble.

Modern language models often rely on Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) to encourage safe behaviors. However, they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks due to three key limitations: (1) the inefficiency and high cost of human annotation, (2) the vast diversity of potential adversarial attacks, and (3) the risk of feedback bias and reward hacking. To address these challenges, we introduce Adversarial Preference Learning (APL), an iterative adversarial training method incorporating three key innovations. First, a direct harmfulness metric based on the model's intrinsic preference probabilities, eliminating reliance on external assessment. Second, a conditional generative attacker that synthesizes input-specific adversarial variations. Third, an iterative framework with automated closed-loop feedback, enabling continuous adaptation through vulnerability discovery and mitigation. Experiments on Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 demonstrate that APL significantly enhances robustness, achieving 83.33% harmlessness win rate over the base model (evaluated by GPT-4o), reducing harmful outputs from 5.88% to 0.43% (measured by LLaMA-Guard), and lowering attack success rate by up to 65% according to HarmBench. Notably, APL maintains competitive utility, with an MT-Bench score of 6.59 (comparable to the baseline 6.78) and an LC-WinRate of 46.52% against the base model.

Personalization is a crucial capability of modern language agents. However, current research primarily positions personalized agents as passive responders to user preferences, limiting their ability to interact with users and provide suggestions or guidance proactively. To systematically evaluate such proactive personalization in realistic interactions, we propose Ψ-Bench, a benchmark for assessing LLMs' ability to influence realistic users through conversation. We design three real-world interaction scenarios that involve persuasion in Ψ-Bench, and endow simulated clients with personal characteristics through explicit user profiles derived from dialogue histories. We evaluate 10 frontier LLMs on Ψ-Bench and find that while most models can produce coherent and reasonable arguments, even state-of-the-art models still leave considerable room for improvement in persuasion. We also find that providing access to client profiles yields an average performance gain of 18.24\%, highlighting the importance of user-specific information for effective persuasion. Overall, our work highlights persona-sensitive influencing as a challenging yet practical direction for evaluating and developing more proactive personalized LLM agents. Codes are available at: https://github.com/Hanpx20/Psi-Bench.

Generative Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performance across a wide range of tasks. Recent research has introduced Multi-Agent Debate (MAD) systems, which leverage multiple LLMs to simulate human debate and thereby improve task performance. However, while some LLMs may possess superior knowledge or reasoning capabilities for specific tasks, they often struggle to clearly communicate this advantage during debates, in part due to a lack of confidence expression. Moreover, inappropriate confidence expression can cause agents in MAD systems to either stubbornly maintain incorrect beliefs or converge prematurely on suboptimal answers, ultimately reducing debate effectiveness and overall system performance. To address these challenges, we propose incorporating confidence expression into MAD systems to allow LLMs to explicitly communicate their confidence levels. To validate this approach, we develop ConfMAD, a MAD framework that integrates confidence expression throughout the debate process. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of our method, and we further analyze how confidence influences debate dynamics, offering insights into the design of confidence-aware MAD systems.

LLMs have emerged as powerful evaluators in the LLM-as-a-Judge paradigm, offering significant efficiency and flexibility compared to human judgments. However, previous methods primarily rely on single-point evaluations, overlooking the inherent diversity and uncertainty in human evaluations. This approach leads to information loss and decreases the reliability of evaluations. To address this limitation, we propose a novel training framework that explicitly aligns the LLM-generated judgment distribution with empirical human distributions. Specifically, we propose a distributional alignment objective based on KL divergence, combined with an auxiliary cross-entropy regularization to stabilize the training process. Furthermore, considering that empirical distributions may derive from limited human annotations, we incorporate adversarial training to enhance model robustness against distribution perturbations. Extensive experiments across various LLM backbones and evaluation tasks demonstrate that our framework significantly outperforms existing closed-source LLMs and conventional single-point alignment methods, with improved alignment quality, evaluation accuracy, and robustness.

Persuasion dialogue systems reflect the machine's ability to make strategic moves beyond verbal communication, and therefore differentiate themselves from task-oriented or open-domain dialogue systems and have their own unique values. However, the repetition and inconsistency problems still persist in dialogue response generation and could substantially impact user experience and impede the persuasion outcome. Besides, although reinforcement learning (RL) approaches have achieved big success in strategic tasks such as games, they require a sophisticated user simulator to provide real-time feedback to the dialogue system, which limits the application of RL on persuasion dialogues. To address these issues towards a better persuasion dialogue system, we apply RL to refine a language model baseline without user simulators, and distill sentence-level information about repetition, inconsistency, and task relevance through rewards. Moreover, to better accomplish the persuasion task, the model learns from human demonstration to imitate human persuasion behavior and selects the most persuasive responses. Experiments show that our model outperforms previous state-of-the-art dialogue models on both automatic metrics and human evaluation results on a donation persuasion task, and generates more diverse, consistent and persuasive conversations according to the user feedback.

The rapid expansion of research on Large Language Model (LLM) safety and robustness has produced a fragmented and oftentimes buggy ecosystem of implementations, datasets, and evaluation methods. This fragmentation makes reproducibility and comparability across studies challenging, hindering meaningful progress. To address these issues, we introduce AdversariaLLM, a toolbox for conducting LLM jailbreak robustness research. Its design centers on reproducibility, correctness, and extensibility. The framework implements twelve adversarial attack algorithms, integrates seven benchmark datasets spanning harmfulness, over-refusal, and utility evaluation, and provides access to a wide range of open-weight LLMs via Hugging Face. The implementation includes advanced features for comparability and reproducibility such as compute-resource tracking, deterministic results, and distributional evaluation techniques. \name also integrates judging through the companion package JudgeZoo, which can also be used independently. Together, these components aim to establish a robust foundation for transparent, comparable, and reproducible research in LLM safety.

Large language models (LLMs) possess strong multilingual capabilities, and combining Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) with translation tasks has shown great potential. However, we observe that this paradigm performs unexpectedly poorly when applied to colloquial subtitle translation tasks. In this work, we investigate this issue and find that the offline reward model (RM) gradually diverges from the online LLM due to distributional shift, ultimately leading to undesirable training outcomes. To address this, we propose RIVAL, an adversarial training framework that formulates the process as a min-max game between the RM and the LLM. RIVAL iteratively updates the both models, with the RM trained to distinguish strong from weak translations (qualitative preference reward), and the LLM trained to enhance its translation for closing this gap. To stabilize training and improve generalizability, we also incorporate quantitative preference reward (e.g., BLEU) into the RM, enabling reference-free quality modeling aligned with human evaluation. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that the proposed adversarial training framework significantly improves upon translation baselines.

We demonstrate how images and sounds can be used for indirect prompt and instruction injection in multi-modal LLMs. An attacker generates an adversarial perturbation corresponding to the prompt and blends it into an image or audio recording. When the user asks the (unmodified, benign) model about the perturbed image or audio, the perturbation steers the model to output the attacker-chosen text and/or make the subsequent dialog follow the attacker's instruction. We illustrate this attack with several proof-of-concept examples targeting LLaVa and PandaGPT.

We introduce Refusal Steering, an inference-time method to exercise fine-grained control over Large Language Models refusal behaviour on politically sensitive topics without retraining. We replace fragile pattern-based refusal detection with an LLM-as-a-judge that assigns refusal confidence scores and we propose a ridge-regularized variant to compute steering vectors that better isolate the refusal--compliance direction. On Qwen3-Next-80B-A3B-Thinking, our method removes the refusal behaviour of the model around politically sensitive topics while maintaining safety on JailbreakBench and near-baseline performance on general benchmarks. The approach generalizes across 4B and 80B models and can also induce targeted refusals when desired. We analize the steering vectors and show that refusal signals concentrate in deeper layers of the transformer and are distributed across many dimensions. Together, these results demonstrate that activation steering can remove political refusal behaviour while retaining safety alignment for harmful content, offering a practical path to controllable, transparent moderation at inference time.

We are exposed to much information trying to influence us, such as teaser messages, debates, politically framed news, and propaganda - all of which use persuasive language. With the recent interest in Large Language Models (LLMs), we study the ability of LLMs to produce persuasive text. As opposed to prior work which focuses on particular domains or types of persuasion, we conduct a general study across various domains to measure and benchmark to what degree LLMs produce persuasive text - both when explicitly instructed to rewrite text to be more or less persuasive and when only instructed to paraphrase. To this end, we construct a new dataset, Persuasive-Pairs, of pairs each consisting of a short text and of a text rewritten by an LLM to amplify or diminish persuasive language. We multi-annotate the pairs on a relative scale for persuasive language. This data is not only a valuable resource in itself, but we also show that it can be used to train a regression model to predict a score of persuasive language between text pairs. This model can score and benchmark new LLMs across domains, thereby facilitating the comparison of different LLMs. Finally, we discuss effects observed for different system prompts. Notably, we find that different 'personas' in the system prompt of LLaMA3 change the persuasive language in the text substantially, even when only instructed to paraphrase. These findings underscore the importance of investigating persuasive language in LLM generated text.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly being deployed in interactive contexts that involve direct user engagement, such as chatbots and writing assistants. These deployments are increasingly plagued by prompt injection and jailbreaking (collectively, prompt hacking), in which models are manipulated to ignore their original instructions and instead follow potentially malicious ones. Although widely acknowledged as a significant security threat, there is a dearth of large-scale resources and quantitative studies on prompt hacking. To address this lacuna, we launch a global prompt hacking competition, which allows for free-form human input attacks. We elicit 600K+ adversarial prompts against three state-of-the-art LLMs. We describe the dataset, which empirically verifies that current LLMs can indeed be manipulated via prompt hacking. We also present a comprehensive taxonomical ontology of the types of adversarial prompts.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled them to approach human-level persuasion capabilities. However, such potential also raises concerns about the safety risks of LLM-driven persuasion, particularly their potential for unethical influence through manipulation, deception, exploitation of vulnerabilities, and many other harmful tactics. In this work, we present a systematic investigation of LLM persuasion safety through two critical aspects: (1) whether LLMs appropriately reject unethical persuasion tasks and avoid unethical strategies during execution, including cases where the initial persuasion goal appears ethically neutral, and (2) how influencing factors like personality traits and external pressures affect their behavior. To this end, we introduce PersuSafety, the first comprehensive framework for the assessment of persuasion safety which consists of three stages, i.e., persuasion scene creation, persuasive conversation simulation, and persuasion safety assessment. PersuSafety covers 6 diverse unethical persuasion topics and 15 common unethical strategies. Through extensive experiments across 8 widely used LLMs, we observe significant safety concerns in most LLMs, including failing to identify harmful persuasion tasks and leveraging various unethical persuasion strategies. Our study calls for more attention to improve safety alignment in progressive and goal-driven conversations such as persuasion.

Existing frameworks for assessing robustness of large language models (LLMs) overly depend on specific benchmarks, increasing costs and failing to evaluate performance of LLMs in professional domains due to dataset limitations. This paper proposes a framework that systematically evaluates the robustness of LLMs under adversarial attack scenarios by leveraging knowledge graphs (KGs). Our framework generates original prompts from the triplets of knowledge graphs and creates adversarial prompts by poisoning, assessing the robustness of LLMs through the results of these adversarial attacks. We systematically evaluate the effectiveness of this framework and its modules. Experiments show that adversarial robustness of the ChatGPT family ranks as GPT-4-turbo > GPT-4o > GPT-3.5-turbo, and the robustness of large language models is influenced by the professional domains in which they operate.

Strategic interaction in adversarial domains such as law, diplomacy, and negotiation is mediated by language, yet most game-theoretic models abstract away the mechanisms of persuasion that operate through discourse. We present the Strategic Courtroom Framework, a multi-agent simulation environment in which prosecution and defense teams composed of trait-conditioned Large Language Model (LLM) agents engage in iterative, round-based legal argumentation. Agents are instantiated using nine interpretable traits organized into four archetypes, enabling systematic control over rhetorical style and strategic orientation. We evaluate the framework across 10 synthetic legal cases and 84 three-trait team configurations, totaling over 7{,}000 simulated trials using DeepSeek-R1 and Gemini~2.5~Pro. Our results show that heterogeneous teams with complementary traits consistently outperform homogeneous configurations, that moderate interaction depth yields more stable verdicts, and that certain traits (notably quantitative and charismatic) contribute disproportionately to persuasive success. We further introduce a reinforcement-learning-based Trait Orchestrator that dynamically generates defense traits conditioned on the case and opposing team, discovering strategies that outperform static, human-designed trait combinations. Together, these findings demonstrate how language can be treated as a first-class strategic action space and provide a foundation for building autonomous agents capable of adaptive persuasion in multi-agent environments.

Large language model (LLM) systems increasingly power everyday AI applications such as chatbots, computer-use assistants, and autonomous robots, where performance often depends on manually well-crafted prompts. LLM-based prompt optimizers reduce that effort by iteratively refining prompts from scored feedback, yet the security of this optimization stage remains underexamined. We present the first systematic analysis of poisoning risks in LLM-based prompt optimization. Using HarmBench, we find systems are substantially more vulnerable to manipulated feedback than to query poisoning alone: feedback-based attacks raise attack success rate (ASR) by up to ΔASR = 0.48. We introduce a simple fake reward attack that requires no access to the reward model and significantly increases vulnerability. We also propose a lightweight highlighting defense that reduces the fake reward ΔASR from 0.23 to 0.07 without degrading utility. These results establish prompt optimization pipelines as a first-class attack surface and motivate stronger safeguards for feedback channels and optimization frameworks.

Stakeholders -- from model developers to policymakers -- seek to minimize the dual-use risks of large language models (LLMs). An open challenge to this goal is whether technical safeguards can impede the misuse of LLMs, even when models are customizable via fine-tuning or when model weights are fully open. In response, several recent studies have proposed methods to produce durable LLM safeguards for open-weight LLMs that can withstand adversarial modifications of the model's weights via fine-tuning. This holds the promise of raising adversaries' costs even under strong threat models where adversaries can directly fine-tune model weights. However, in this paper, we urge for more careful characterization of the limits of these approaches. Through several case studies, we demonstrate that even evaluating these defenses is exceedingly difficult and can easily mislead audiences into thinking that safeguards are more durable than they really are. We draw lessons from the evaluation pitfalls that we identify and suggest future research carefully cabin claims to more constrained, well-defined, and rigorously examined threat models, which can provide more useful and candid assessments to stakeholders.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Models (LLMs) has demonstrated their vast potential across various domains, attributed to their extensive pretraining knowledge and exceptional generalizability. However, LLMs often encounter challenges in generating harmful content when faced with problematic prompts. To address this problem, existing work attempted to implement a gradient ascent based approach to prevent LLMs from producing harmful output. While these methods can be effective, they frequently impact the model utility in responding to normal prompts. To address this gap, we introduce Selective Knowledge negation Unlearning (SKU), a novel unlearning framework for LLMs, designed to eliminate harmful knowledge while preserving utility on normal prompts. Specifically, SKU is consisted of two stages: harmful knowledge acquisition stage and knowledge negation stage. The first stage aims to identify and acquire harmful knowledge within the model, whereas the second is dedicated to remove this knowledge. SKU selectively isolates and removes harmful knowledge in model parameters, ensuring the model's performance remains robust on normal prompts. Our experiments conducted across various LLM architectures demonstrate that SKU identifies a good balance point between removing harmful information and preserving utility.

The rapid rise of Large Language Models (LLMs) has created new disruptive possibilities for persuasive communication, by enabling fully-automated personalized and interactive content generation at an unprecedented scale. In this paper, we survey the research field of LLM-based persuasion that has emerged as a result. We begin by exploring the different modes in which LLM Systems are used to influence human attitudes and behaviors. In areas such as politics, marketing, public health, e-commerce, and charitable giving, such LLM Systems have already achieved human-level or even super-human persuasiveness. We identify key factors influencing their effectiveness, such as the manner of personalization and whether the content is labelled as AI-generated. We also summarize the experimental designs that have been used to evaluate progress. Our survey suggests that the current and future potential of LLM-based persuasion poses profound ethical and societal risks, including the spread of misinformation, the magnification of biases, and the invasion of privacy. These risks underscore the urgent need for ethical guidelines and updated regulatory frameworks to avoid the widespread deployment of irresponsible and harmful LLM Systems.

The self-attention revolution allowed generative language models to scale and achieve increasingly impressive abilities. Such models - commonly referred to as Large Language Models (LLMs) - have recently gained prominence with the general public, thanks to conversational fine-tuning, putting their behavior in line with public expectations regarding AI. This prominence amplified prior concerns regarding the misuse of LLMs and led to the emergence of numerous tools to detect LLMs in the wild. Unfortunately, most such tools are critically flawed. While major publications in the LLM detectability field suggested that LLMs were easy to detect with fine-tuned autoencoders, the limitations of their results are easy to overlook. Specifically, they assumed publicly available generative models without fine-tunes or non-trivial prompts. While the importance of these assumptions has been demonstrated, until now, it remained unclear how well such detection could be countered. Here, we show that an attacker with access to such detectors' reference human texts and output not only evades detection but can fully frustrate the detector training - with a reasonable budget and all its outputs labeled as such. Achieving it required combining common "reinforcement from critic" loss function modification and AdamW optimizer, which led to surprisingly good fine-tuning generalization. Finally, we warn against the temptation to transpose the conclusions obtained in RNN-driven text GANs to LLMs due to their better representative ability. These results have critical implications for the detection and prevention of malicious use of generative language models, and we hope they will aid the designers of generative models and detectors.

Large language models (LLMs) have exhibited remarkable fluency across various tasks. However, their unethical applications, such as disseminating disinformation, have become a growing concern. Although recent works have proposed a number of LLM detection methods, their robustness and reliability remain unclear. In this paper, we present RAFT: a grammar error-free black-box attack against existing LLM detectors. In contrast to previous attacks for language models, our method exploits the transferability of LLM embeddings at the word-level while preserving the original text quality. We leverage an auxiliary embedding to greedily select candidate words to perturb against the target detector. Experiments reveal that our attack effectively compromises all detectors in the study across various domains by up to 99%, and are transferable across source models. Manual human evaluation studies show our attacks are realistic and indistinguishable from original human-written text. We also show that examples generated by RAFT can be used to train adversarially robust detectors. Our work shows that current LLM detectors are not adversarially robust, underscoring the urgent need for more resilient detection mechanisms.

Modelling persuasion strategies as predictors of task outcome has several real-world applications and has received considerable attention from the computational linguistics community. However, previous research has failed to account for the resisting strategies employed by an individual to foil such persuasion attempts. Grounded in prior literature in cognitive and social psychology, we propose a generalised framework for identifying resisting strategies in persuasive conversations. We instantiate our framework on two distinct datasets comprising persuasion and negotiation conversations. We also leverage a hierarchical sequence-labelling neural architecture to infer the aforementioned resisting strategies automatically. Our experiments reveal the asymmetry of power roles in non-collaborative goal-directed conversations and the benefits accrued from incorporating resisting strategies on the final conversation outcome. We also investigate the role of different resisting strategies on the conversation outcome and glean insights that corroborate with past findings. We also make the code and the dataset of this work publicly available at https://github.com/americast/resper.

Training large language models (LLMs) requires a substantial investment of time and money. To get a good return on investment, the developers spend considerable effort ensuring that the model never produces harmful and offensive outputs. However, bad-faith actors may still try to slander the reputation of an LLM by publicly reporting a forged output. In this paper, we show that defending against such slander attacks requires reconstructing the input of the forged output or proving that it does not exist. To do so, we propose and evaluate a search based approach for targeted adversarial attacks for LLMs. Our experiments show that we are rarely able to reconstruct the exact input of an arbitrary output, thus demonstrating that LLMs are still vulnerable to slander attacks.

Reinforcement learning (RL) for non-verifiable instruction following increasingly relies on LLM judges with prompt-specific rubrics as reward signals. While recent methods adapt these rubrics to the evolving policy during training, the training prompts themselves remain static, drawn from fixed corpora. This static approach often results in a critical misalignment between prompt difficulty and policy capability, leaving the judge unable to recover a discriminative reward signal when prompts fail to elicit quality variance among rollouts. To address this misalignment, we introduce LLM-as-a-Tutor, a framework that extends the LLM's role from judge to tutor: a single model serves as an examiner that pairwise-compares policy rollouts to detect non-challenging prompts, and as a generator that appends atomic constraints to them. This append-only design monotonically raises difficulty in step with the policy's capability, producing a self-calibrating training signal without external difficulty schedules. On three complex instruction-following benchmarks, our method consistently outperforms both policy-unaware baselines and prior policy-adaptive methods that adapt rubrics or rewrite prompts, suggesting prompt adaptation as a missing axis of policy-awareness in non-verifiable RL.

The known stylistic biases in LLM judges, such as a preference for verbosity or specific sentence structures, present an underexplored security vulnerability. In this work, we introduce BITE (BIas exploraTion and Exploitation), a black-box adversarial framework that learns semantics-preserving edits to mislead an LLM judge and artificially inflate the scores it assigns. We cast the selection of stylistic edits as a contextual bandit problem and use a LinUCB policy to adaptively choose edits that maximize the judge's score without access to model parameters or gradients. Empirically, we test BITE across a diverse range of LLM judges and tasks, including both pointwise and pairwise comparisons on chatbot leaderboards and AI-reviewer benchmarks. BITE achieves an attack success rate exceeding 65% and raises scores by 1-2 points on a 9-point scale, all while preserving semantic equivalence. We further assess the attack's stealthiness, showing that BITE evades standard style-control methods and several detection baselines. Our findings expose a fundamental weakness in the LLM-as-a-judge paradigm and motivate robust, attack-aware evaluation. Our code is available at https://github.com/xianglinyang/llm-as-a-judge-attack.

Recently, tool-augmented LLMs have gained increasing attention. Given an instruction, tool-augmented LLMs can interact with various external tools in multiple rounds and provide a final answer. However, previous LLMs were trained on overly detailed instructions, which included API names or parameters, while real users would not explicitly mention these API details. This leads to a gap between trained LLMs and real-world scenarios. In addition, most works ignore whether the interaction process follows the instruction. To address these issues, we constructed a training dataset called MGToolBench, which contains statement and category-level instructions to better reflect real-world scenarios. In addition, we propose ToolPlanner, a two-stage reinforcement learning framework that utilizes path planning and two feedback mechanisms to enhance the LLM's task completion and instruction-following capabilities. Experimental results show that ToolPlanner significantly improves the Match Rate, Pass Rate and Win Rate by 26.8%, 20.2%, and 5.6% compared to the SOTA model. Human evaluation verifies that the multi-granularity instructions can better align with users' usage habits. Our data and code will be released upon acceptance.

We explore the self-play training procedure of large language models (LLMs) in a two-player adversarial language game called Adversarial Taboo. In this game, an attacker and a defender communicate around a target word only visible to the attacker. The attacker aims to induce the defender to speak the target word unconsciously, while the defender tries to infer the target word from the attacker's utterances. To win the game, both players should have sufficient knowledge about the target word and high-level reasoning ability to infer and express in this information-reserved conversation. Hence, we are curious about whether LLMs' reasoning ability can be further enhanced by self-play in this adversarial language game (SPAG). With this goal, we select several open-source LLMs and let each act as the attacker and play with a copy of itself as the defender on an extensive range of target words. Through reinforcement learning on the game outcomes, we observe that the LLMs' performances uniformly improve on a broad range of reasoning benchmarks. Furthermore, iteratively adopting this self-play process can continuously promote LLMs' reasoning abilities. The code is at https://github.com/Linear95/SPAG.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have achieved remarkable progress, yet their large scale often renders them impractical for resource-constrained environments. This paper introduces Unified Reinforcement and Imitation Learning (RIL), a novel and efficient training algorithm designed to create powerful, lightweight VLMs. RIL distinctively combines the strengths of reinforcement learning with adversarial imitation learning. This enables smaller student VLMs not only to mimic the sophisticated text generation of large teacher models but also to systematically improve their generative capabilities through reinforcement signals. Key to our imitation framework is an LLM-based discriminator that adeptly distinguishes between student and teacher outputs, complemented by guidance from multiple large teacher VLMs to ensure diverse learning. This unified learning strategy, leveraging both reinforcement and imitation, empowers student models to achieve significant performance gains, making them competitive with leading closed-source VLMs. Extensive experiments on diverse vision-language benchmarks demonstrate that RIL significantly narrows the performance gap with state-of-the-art open- and closed-source VLMs and, in several instances, surpasses them.

Because "out-of-the-box" large language models are capable of generating a great deal of objectionable content, recent work has focused on aligning these models in an attempt to prevent undesirable generation. While there has been some success at circumventing these measures -- so-called "jailbreaks" against LLMs -- these attacks have required significant human ingenuity and are brittle in practice. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective attack method that causes aligned language models to generate objectionable behaviors. Specifically, our approach finds a suffix that, when attached to a wide range of queries for an LLM to produce objectionable content, aims to maximize the probability that the model produces an affirmative response (rather than refusing to answer). However, instead of relying on manual engineering, our approach automatically produces these adversarial suffixes by a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, and also improves over past automatic prompt generation methods. Surprisingly, we find that the adversarial prompts generated by our approach are quite transferable, including to black-box, publicly released LLMs. Specifically, we train an adversarial attack suffix on multiple prompts (i.e., queries asking for many different types of objectionable content), as well as multiple models (in our case, Vicuna-7B and 13B). When doing so, the resulting attack suffix is able to induce objectionable content in the public interfaces to ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude, as well as open source LLMs such as LLaMA-2-Chat, Pythia, Falcon, and others. In total, this work significantly advances the state-of-the-art in adversarial attacks against aligned language models, raising important questions about how such systems can be prevented from producing objectionable information. Code is available at github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks.

Activation steering has become a popular training-free method to control LLM behavior by injecting precomputed direction vectors into the model's residual stream at inference time. Yet its robustness to realistic input variation remains unstudied. We present the first systematic evaluation of activation steering robustness under adversarial text perturbations on the inputs, covering four extraction methods, three attack strategies, six personas from Anthropic Model-Written Evaluation Dataset, and five models ranging from 1.5B to 30B parameters. Attacks succeed broadly across all settings: directional robustness drops by up to 64%, post-attack confidence collapses near or below 0.25 across all methods and models, and steering strength degrades on nearly every steerable input. Layer selection is equally fragile, with the optimal layer identified by an automated method on clean inputs shifting by up to 17 positions under perturbation, a failure that compounds the vector-level breakdown. Extracting vectors from adversarially perturbed inputs partially recovers steerability for PCA and MD on mid-to-large models, but they consistently fail to locate the improved optimal layer, limiting the practical benefit of this mitigation. Together, these findings reveal that the brittleness of activation steering is structural rather than method-specific, and that current layer selection strategies are not robust enough for real-world deployment.

The increasing reliance on Large Language Models (LLMs) across academia and industry necessitates a comprehensive understanding of their robustness to prompts. In response to this vital need, we introduce PromptBench, a robustness benchmark designed to measure LLMs' resilience to adversarial prompts. This study uses a plethora of adversarial textual attacks targeting prompts across multiple levels: character, word, sentence, and semantic. These prompts are then employed in diverse tasks, such as sentiment analysis, natural language inference, reading comprehension, machine translation, and math problem-solving. Our study generates 4,032 adversarial prompts, meticulously evaluated over 8 tasks and 13 datasets, with 567,084 test samples in total. Our findings demonstrate that contemporary LLMs are vulnerable to adversarial prompts. Furthermore, we present comprehensive analysis to understand the mystery behind prompt robustness and its transferability. We then offer insightful robustness analysis and pragmatic recommendations for prompt composition, beneficial to both researchers and everyday users. We make our code, prompts, and methodologies to generate adversarial prompts publicly accessible, thereby enabling and encouraging collaborative exploration in this pivotal field: https://github.com/microsoft/promptbench.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are swiftly advancing in architecture and capability, and as they integrate more deeply into complex systems, the urgency to scrutinize their security properties grows. This paper surveys research in the emerging interdisciplinary field of adversarial attacks on LLMs, a subfield of trustworthy ML, combining the perspectives of Natural Language Processing and Security. Prior work has shown that even safety-aligned LLMs (via instruction tuning and reinforcement learning through human feedback) can be susceptible to adversarial attacks, which exploit weaknesses and mislead AI systems, as evidenced by the prevalence of `jailbreak' attacks on models like ChatGPT and Bard. In this survey, we first provide an overview of large language models, describe their safety alignment, and categorize existing research based on various learning structures: textual-only attacks, multi-modal attacks, and additional attack methods specifically targeting complex systems, such as federated learning or multi-agent systems. We also offer comprehensive remarks on works that focus on the fundamental sources of vulnerabilities and potential defenses. To make this field more accessible to newcomers, we present a systematic review of existing works, a structured typology of adversarial attack concepts, and additional resources, including slides for presentations on related topics at the 62nd Annual Meeting of the Association for Computational Linguistics (ACL'24).

We present the first evaluation harness that enables any out-of-the-box, local, Large Language Models (LLMs) to play full-press Diplomacy without fine-tuning or specialized training. Previous work required frontier LLMs, or fine-tuning, due to the high complexity and information density of Diplomacy's game state. Combined with the high variance of matches, these factors made Diplomacy prohibitive for study. In this work, we used data-driven iteration to optimize a textual game state representation such that a 24B model can reliably complete matches without any fine tuning. We develop tooling to facilitate hypothesis testing and statistical analysis, and we present case studies on persuasion, aggressive playstyles, and performance across a range of models. We conduct a variety of experiments across many popular LLMs, finding the larger models perform the best, but the smaller models still play adequately. We also introduce Critical State Analysis: an experimental protocol for rapidly iterating and analyzing key moments in a game at depth. Our harness democratizes the evaluation of strategic reasoning in LLMs by eliminating the need for fine-tuning, and it provides insights into how these capabilities emerge naturally from widely used LLMs. Our code is available in the supplement and will be open sourced.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in tackling complex reasoning tasks through step-by-step thinking. However, such a lengthy reasoning process incurs substantial computational and latency overheads, hindering the practical deployment of these models. In this work, we present a new perspective on mitigating overthinking in LRMs via black-box adversarial prompting. By treating both open-source LRMs and closed-source APIs as black-box communicators, we investigate how to elicit concise responses without sacrificing accuracy. We introduce AdvPrompt, an iterative refinement framework that generates high-quality adversarial prompts from diverse perspectives. Experiments across multiple benchmarks demonstrate that AdvPrompt consistently reduces token usage while preserving performance. Notably, AdvPrompt achieves a 3x reduction in average response length on simple GSM8K questions for the Qwen3 model series, and delivers an average ~40% token reduction across four benchmarks. For closed-source APIs, AdvPrompt reduces token usage on MATH-500 by 35% for Claude-3.7 and 47% for Gemini-2.5. Further analysis reveals the generalizability of AdvPrompt across various model scales and families, underscoring the potential of black-box prompting as a practical and effective strategy for enhancing LRM efficiency.

We study LLM policy synthesis: using a large language model to iteratively generate programmatic agent policies for multi-agent environments. Rather than training neural policies via reinforcement learning, our framework prompts an LLM to produce Python policy functions, evaluates them in self-play, and refines them using performance feedback across iterations. We investigate feedback engineering (the design of what evaluation information is shown to the LLM during refinement) comparing sparse feedback (scalar reward only) against dense feedback (reward plus social metrics: efficiency, equality, sustainability, peace). Across two canonical Sequential Social Dilemmas (Gathering and Cleanup) and two frontier LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro), dense feedback consistently matches or exceeds sparse feedback on all metrics. The advantage is largest in the Cleanup public goods game, where providing social metrics helps the LLM calibrate the costly cleaning-harvesting tradeoff. Rather than triggering over-optimization of fairness, social metrics serve as a coordination signal that guides the LLM toward more effective cooperative strategies, including territory partitioning, adaptive role assignment, and the avoidance of wasteful aggression. We further perform an adversarial experiment to determine whether LLMs can reward hack these environments. We characterize five attack classes and discuss mitigations, highlighting an inherent tension in LLM policy synthesis between expressiveness and safety. Code at https://github.com/vicgalle/llm-policies-social-dilemmas.

The robustness of large language models (LLMs) against adversarial manipulations, such as jailbreak attacks, remains a significant challenge. In this work, we propose an approach that enhances the self-critique capability of the LLM and further fine-tunes it over sanitized synthetic data. This is done with the addition of an external critic model that can be merged with the original, thus bolstering self-critique capabilities and improving the robustness of the LLMs response to adversarial prompts. Our results demonstrate that the combination of merging and self-critique can reduce the attack success rate of adversaries significantly, thus offering a promising defense mechanism against jailbreak attacks. Code, data and models released at https://github.com/vicgalle/merging-self-critique-jailbreaks .

Human choice prediction in economic contexts is crucial for applications in marketing, finance, public policy, and more. This task, however, is often constrained by the difficulties in acquiring human choice data. With most experimental economics studies focusing on simple choice settings, the AI community has explored whether LLMs can substitute for humans in these predictions and examined more complex experimental economics settings. However, a key question remains: can LLMs generate training data for human choice prediction? We explore this in language-based persuasion games, a complex economic setting involving natural language in strategic interactions. Our experiments show that models trained on LLM-generated data can effectively predict human behavior in these games and even outperform models trained on actual human data.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) are increasingly being deployed as automated content moderators. Within this landscape, we uncover a critical threat: Adversarial Smuggling Attacks. Unlike adversarial perturbations (for misclassification) and adversarial jailbreaks (for harmful output generation), adversarial smuggling exploits the Human-AI capability gap. It encodes harmful content into human-readable visual formats that remain AI-unreadable, thereby evading automated detection and enabling the dissemination of harmful content. We classify smuggling attacks into two pathways: (1) Perceptual Blindness, disrupting text recognition; and (2) Reasoning Blockade, inhibiting semantic understanding despite successful text recognition. To evaluate this threat, we constructed SmuggleBench, the first comprehensive benchmark comprising 1,700 adversarial smuggling attack instances. Evaluations on SmuggleBench reveal that both proprietary (e.g., GPT-5) and open-source (e.g., Qwen3-VL) state-of-the-art models are vulnerable to this threat, producing Attack Success Rates (ASR) exceeding 90%. By analyzing the vulnerability through the lenses of perception and reasoning, we identify three root causes: the limited capabilities of vision encoders, the robustness gap in OCR, and the scarcity of domain-specific adversarial examples. We conduct a preliminary exploration of mitigation strategies, investigating the potential of test-time scaling (via CoT) and adversarial training (via SFT) to mitigate this threat. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/zhihengli-casia/smugglebench.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is a promising approach for aligning large language models (LLMs) knowledge with sequential decision-making tasks. However, few studies have thoroughly investigated the impact on LLM agents capabilities of fine-tuning them with RL in a specific environment. In this paper, we propose a novel framework to analyze the sensitivity of LLMs to prompt formulations following RL training in a textual environment. Our findings reveal that the performance of LLMs degrades when faced with prompt formulations different from those used during the RL training phase. Besides, we analyze the source of this sensitivity by examining the model's internal representations and salient tokens. Finally, we propose to use a contrastive loss to mitigate this sensitivity and improve the robustness and generalization capabilities of LLMs.

Scaling adversarial evaluation of large language models requires both a method for generating hard inputs and a reliable way to confirm that resulting failures are real. We present AdversaBench, an end-to-end red-teaming pipeline that mutates seed prompts with five structured operators, queries a target model, and confirms failures through a three-judge panel with a meta-judge tiebreaker. We report experiments on 45 seeds across three categories: reasoning, instruction-following, and tool use. Every seed produced a confirmed failure. Four findings stand out. First, operator effectiveness varies sharply by category: inject_distractor scores 0.00 mean reward on instruction-following seeds but 0.80-0.83 on reasoning and tool-use. Second, binary failure rate hides difficulty: instruction-following seeds required 2.4 attacker iterations on average versus 1.1 for other categories, a gap visible in survival curves. Third, pairwise judge agreement of 80-87% coexists with near-zero Cohen's kappa due to label skew; category-level disagreement rates are more informative. Fourth, adversarial prompts generated against Llama 3.1 8B transfer zero-shot to Llama 3.3 70B, suggesting the mutations exploit general behavioral patterns rather than model-specific weaknesses. Code, dataset, and analysis scripts are available at https://github.com/khanak0509/AdversaBench .

With the increasing use of large language models (LLMs), ensuring reliable performance in diverse, real-world environments is essential. Despite their remarkable achievements, LLMs often struggle with adversarial inputs, significantly impacting their effectiveness in practical applications. To systematically understand the robustness of LLMs, we present RUPBench, a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate LLM robustness across diverse reasoning tasks. Our benchmark incorporates 15 reasoning datasets, categorized into commonsense, arithmetic, logical, and knowledge-intensive reasoning, and introduces nine types of textual perturbations at lexical, syntactic, and semantic levels. By examining the performance of state-of-the-art LLMs such as GPT-4o, Llama3, Phi-3, and Gemma on both original and perturbed datasets, we provide a detailed analysis of their robustness and error patterns. Our findings highlight that larger models tend to exhibit greater robustness to perturbations. Additionally, common error types are identified through manual inspection, revealing specific challenges faced by LLMs in different reasoning contexts. This work provides insights into areas where LLMs need further improvement to handle diverse and noisy inputs effectively.

Large language model (LLM)-based conversational AI systems present a challenge to human cognition that current frameworks for understanding misinformation and persuasion do not adequately address. This paper proposes that a significant epistemic risk from conversational AI may lie not in inaccuracy or intentional deception, but in something more fundamental: these systems may be configured, through optimization processes that make them useful, to present characteristics that bypass the cognitive mechanisms humans evolved to evaluate incoming information. The Cognitive Trojan Horse hypothesis draws on Sperber and colleagues' theory of epistemic vigilance -- the parallel cognitive process monitoring communicated information for reasons to doubt -- and proposes that LLM-based systems present 'honest non-signals': genuine characteristics (fluency, helpfulness, apparent disinterest) that fail to carry the information equivalent human characteristics would carry, because in humans these are costly to produce while in LLMs they are computationally trivial. Four mechanisms of potential bypass are identified: processing fluency decoupled from understanding, trust-competence presentation without corresponding stakes, cognitive offloading that delegates evaluation itself to the AI, and optimization dynamics that systematically produce sycophancy. The framework generates testable predictions, including a counterintuitive speculation that cognitively sophisticated users may be more vulnerable to AI-mediated epistemic influence. This reframes AI safety as partly a problem of calibration -- aligning human evaluative responses with the actual epistemic status of AI-generated content -- rather than solely a problem of preventing deception.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly shaping how information is created and disseminated, from companies using them to craft persuasive advertisements, to election campaigns optimizing messaging to gain votes, to social media influencers boosting engagement. These settings are inherently competitive, with sellers, candidates, and influencers vying for audience approval, yet it remains poorly understood how competitive feedback loops influence LLM behavior. We show that optimizing LLMs for competitive success can inadvertently drive misalignment. Using simulated environments across these scenarios, we find that, 6.3% increase in sales is accompanied by a 14.0% rise in deceptive marketing; in elections, a 4.9% gain in vote share coincides with 22.3% more disinformation and 12.5% more populist rhetoric; and on social media, a 7.5% engagement boost comes with 188.6% more disinformation and a 16.3% increase in promotion of harmful behaviors. We call this phenomenon Moloch's Bargain for AI--competitive success achieved at the cost of alignment. These misaligned behaviors emerge even when models are explicitly instructed to remain truthful and grounded, revealing the fragility of current alignment safeguards. Our findings highlight how market-driven optimization pressures can systematically erode alignment, creating a race to the bottom, and suggest that safe deployment of AI systems will require stronger governance and carefully designed incentives to prevent competitive dynamics from undermining societal trust.

Efficient red-teaming method to uncover vulnerabilities in Large Language Models (LLMs) is crucial. While recent attacks often use LLMs as optimizers, the discrete language space make gradient-based methods struggle. We introduce LARGO (Latent Adversarial Reflection through Gradient Optimization), a novel latent self-reflection attack that reasserts the power of gradient-based optimization for generating fluent jailbreaking prompts. By operating within the LLM's continuous latent space, LARGO first optimizes an adversarial latent vector and then recursively call the same LLM to decode the latent into natural language. This methodology yields a fast, effective, and transferable attack that produces fluent and stealthy prompts. On standard benchmarks like AdvBench and JailbreakBench, LARGO surpasses leading jailbreaking techniques, including AutoDAN, by 44 points in attack success rate. Our findings demonstrate a potent alternative to agentic LLM prompting, highlighting the efficacy of interpreting and attacking LLM internals through gradient optimization.

Detecting fake news requires both a delicate sense of diverse clues and a profound understanding of the real-world background, which remains challenging for detectors based on small language models (SLMs) due to their knowledge and capability limitations. Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable performance in various tasks, but whether and how LLMs could help with fake news detection remains underexplored. In this paper, we investigate the potential of LLMs in fake news detection. First, we conduct an empirical study and find that a sophisticated LLM such as GPT 3.5 could generally expose fake news and provide desirable multi-perspective rationales but still underperforms the basic SLM, fine-tuned BERT. Our subsequent analysis attributes such a gap to the LLM's inability to select and integrate rationales properly to conclude. Based on these findings, we propose that current LLMs may not substitute fine-tuned SLMs in fake news detection but can be a good advisor for SLMs by providing multi-perspective instructive rationales. To instantiate this proposal, we design an adaptive rationale guidance network for fake news detection (ARG), in which SLMs selectively acquire insights on news analysis from the LLMs' rationales. We further derive a rationale-free version of ARG by distillation, namely ARG-D, which services cost-sensitive scenarios without querying LLMs. Experiments on two real-world datasets demonstrate that ARG and ARG-D outperform three types of baseline methods, including SLM-based, LLM-based, and combinations of small and large language models.

This paper provides a systematic analysis of the opportunities, challenges, and potential solutions of harnessing Large Language Models (LLMs) such as GPT-4 to dig out vulnerabilities within smart contracts based on our ongoing research. For the task of smart contract vulnerability detection, achieving practical usability hinges on identifying as many true vulnerabilities as possible while minimizing the number of false positives. Nonetheless, our empirical study reveals contradictory yet interesting findings: generating more answers with higher randomness largely boosts the likelihood of producing a correct answer but inevitably leads to a higher number of false positives. To mitigate this tension, we propose an adversarial framework dubbed GPTLens that breaks the conventional one-stage detection into two synergistic stages - generation and discrimination, for progressive detection and refinement, wherein the LLM plays dual roles, i.e., auditor and critic, respectively. The goal of auditor is to yield a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities with the hope of encompassing the correct answer, whereas the goal of critic that evaluates the validity of identified vulnerabilities is to minimize the number of false positives. Experimental results and illustrative examples demonstrate that auditor and critic work together harmoniously to yield pronounced improvements over the conventional one-stage detection. GPTLens is intuitive, strategic, and entirely LLM-driven without relying on specialist expertise in smart contracts, showcasing its methodical generality and potential to detect a broad spectrum of vulnerabilities. Our code is available at: https://github.com/git-disl/GPTLens.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently transformed from text-based assistants to autonomous agents capable of planning, reasoning, and iteratively improving their actions. While numerical reward signals and verifiers can effectively rank candidate actions, they often provide limited contextual guidance. In contrast, natural language feedback better aligns with the generative capabilities of LLMs, providing richer and more actionable suggestions. However, parsing and implementing this feedback effectively can be challenging for LLM-based agents. In this work, we introduce Critique-Guided Improvement (CGI), a novel two-player framework, comprising an actor model that explores an environment and a critic model that generates detailed nature language feedback. By training the critic to produce fine-grained assessments and actionable revisions, and the actor to utilize these critiques, our approach promotes more robust exploration of alternative strategies while avoiding local optima. Experiments in three interactive environments show that CGI outperforms existing baselines by a substantial margin. Notably, even a small critic model surpasses GPT-4 in feedback quality. The resulting actor achieves state-of-the-art performance, demonstrating the power of explicit iterative guidance to enhance decision-making in LLM-based agents.

Large-language-model (LLM) agents excel at reactive dialogue but struggle with proactive, goal-driven interactions due to myopic decoding and costly planning. We introduce DialogXpert, which leverages a frozen LLM to propose a small, high-quality set of candidate actions per turn and employs a compact Q-network over fixed BERT embeddings trained via temporal-difference learning to select optimal moves within this reduced space. By tracking the user's emotions, DialogXpert tailors each decision to advance the task while nurturing a genuine, empathetic connection. Across negotiation, emotional support, and tutoring benchmarks, DialogXpert drives conversations to under 3 turns with success rates exceeding 94\% and, with a larger LLM prior, pushes success above 97\% while markedly improving negotiation outcomes. This framework delivers real-time, strategic, and emotionally intelligent dialogue planning at scale. Code available at https://github.com/declare-lab/dialogxpert/

In long-horizon tasks, recent agents based on Large Language Models (LLMs) face a significant challenge that sparse, outcome-based rewards make it difficult to assign credit to intermediate steps. Previous methods mainly focus on creating dense reward signals to guide learning, either through traditional reinforcement learning techniques like inverse reinforcement learning or by using Process Reward Models for step-by-step feedback. In this paper, we identify a fundamental problem in the learning dynamics of LLMs: the magnitude of policy gradients is inherently coupled with the entropy, which leads to inefficient small updates for confident correct actions and potentially destabilizes large updates for uncertain ones. To resolve this, we propose Entropy-Modulated Policy Gradients (EMPG), a framework that re-calibrates the learning signal based on step-wise uncertainty and the final task outcome. EMPG amplifies updates for confident correct actions, penalizes confident errors, and attenuates updates from uncertain steps to stabilize exploration. We further introduce a bonus term for future clarity that encourages agents to find more predictable solution paths. Through comprehensive experiments on three challenging agent tasks, WebShop, ALFWorld, and Deep Search, we demonstrate that EMPG achieves substantial performance gains and significantly outperforms strong policy gradient baselines. Project page is at https://empgseed-seed.github.io/

The recent advances in diffusion models (DMs) have revolutionized the generation of realistic and complex images. However, these models also introduce potential safety hazards, such as producing harmful content and infringing data copyrights. Despite the development of safety-driven unlearning techniques to counteract these challenges, doubts about their efficacy persist. To tackle this issue, we introduce an evaluation framework that leverages adversarial prompts to discern the trustworthiness of these safety-driven DMs after they have undergone the process of unlearning harmful concepts. Specifically, we investigated the adversarial robustness of DMs, assessed by adversarial prompts, when eliminating unwanted concepts, styles, and objects. We develop an effective and efficient adversarial prompt generation approach for DMs, termed UnlearnDiffAtk. This method capitalizes on the intrinsic classification abilities of DMs to simplify the creation of adversarial prompts, thereby eliminating the need for auxiliary classification or diffusion models.Through extensive benchmarking, we evaluate the robustness of five widely-used safety-driven unlearned DMs (i.e., DMs after unlearning undesirable concepts, styles, or objects) across a variety of tasks. Our results demonstrate the effectiveness and efficiency merits of UnlearnDiffAtk over the state-of-the-art adversarial prompt generation method and reveal the lack of robustness of current safety-driven unlearning techniques when applied to DMs. Codes are available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Diffusion-MU-Attack. WARNING: This paper contains model outputs that may be offensive in nature.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional capabilities across diverse tasks, driving the development and widespread adoption of LLM-as-a-Judge systems for automated evaluation, including red teaming and benchmarking. However, these systems are susceptible to adversarial attacks that can manipulate evaluation outcomes, raising critical concerns about their robustness and trustworthiness. Existing evaluation methods for LLM-based judges are often fragmented and lack a unified framework for comprehensive robustness assessment. Furthermore, the impact of prompt template design and model selection on judge robustness has rarely been explored, and their performance in real-world deployments remains largely unverified. To address these gaps, we introduce RobustJudge, a fully automated and scalable framework designed to systematically evaluate the robustness of LLM-as-a-Judge systems. Specifically, RobustJudge investigates the effectiveness of 15 attack methods and 7 defense strategies across 12 models (RQ1), examines the impact of prompt template design and model selection (RQ2), and evaluates the security of real-world deployments (RQ3). Our study yields three key findings: (1) LLM-as-a-Judge systems are highly vulnerable to attacks such as PAIR and combined attacks, while defense mechanisms such as re-tokenization and LLM-based detectors can provide enhanced protection; (2) robustness varies substantially across prompt templates (up to 40%); (3) deploying RobustJudge on Alibaba's PAI platform uncovers previously undiscovered vulnerabilities. These results offer practical insights for building trustworthy LLM-as-a-Judge systems.

While multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have achieved remarkable success in recent advancements, their susceptibility to jailbreak attacks has come to light. In such attacks, adversaries exploit carefully crafted prompts to coerce models into generating harmful or undesirable content. Existing defense mechanisms often rely on external inference steps or safety alignment training, both of which are less effective and impractical when facing sophisticated adversarial perturbations in white-box scenarios. To address these challenges and bolster MLLM robustness, we introduce SafeMLLM by adopting an adversarial training framework that alternates between an attack step for generating adversarial noise and a model updating step. At the attack step, SafeMLLM generates adversarial perturbations through a newly proposed contrastive embedding attack (CoE-Attack), which optimizes token embeddings under a contrastive objective. SafeMLLM then updates model parameters to neutralize the perturbation effects while preserving model utility on benign inputs. We evaluate SafeMLLM across six MLLMs and six jailbreak methods spanning multiple modalities. Experimental results show that SafeMLLM effectively defends against diverse attacks, maintaining robust performance and utilities.

AI agents are entering high-risk production settings, where they use tools, retain context, follow policies, handle private data, and interact with users over multiple turns. Yet many evaluation methods still judge isolated outputs or static tasks, missing failures that emerge through trajectory, pressure, and adversarial interaction. We introduce ProofAgent Harness, open infrastructure for scalable, auditable, and adversarial AI agent evaluation. The harness provides evaluation infrastructure around an agent: it curates evaluation intelligence, runs adversarial multi-turn trials, captures behavioral traces, applies post-hoc multi-juror scoring, resolves disagreement, and produces evidence-linked reports. Its open design allows developers and researchers to extend domains, traps, metrics, juror personas, scoring rules, and reporting formats. At its core is Adversarial Multi-Juror Scoring with Turn-Level Audit, which evaluates completed agent behavior under pressure using calibrated juror personas, consensus checks, and turn-level evidence. Experiments across customer support, medical triage, privacy and security, and code generation agents show that strong agents fail selectively through weak metrics, fragile turns, unsafe reframing, and manipulation paths. We also find that a small quantized local Harness LLM can challenge production agents powered by best-in-class large LLMs, suggesting that evaluation capability emerges from the full harness pipeline rather than model scale alone. ProofAgent Harness turns AI agent evaluation from a static score into scalable adversarial evaluation infrastructure: repeatable, evidence-backed, extensible, and actionable before deployment.

Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) have revolutionized complex problem-solving capability by enabling sophisticated agent collaboration through message-based communications. While the communication framework is crucial for agent coordination, it also introduces a critical yet unexplored security vulnerability. In this work, we introduce Agent-in-the-Middle (AiTM), a novel attack that exploits the fundamental communication mechanisms in LLM-MAS by intercepting and manipulating inter-agent messages. Unlike existing attacks that compromise individual agents, AiTM demonstrates how an adversary can compromise entire multi-agent systems by only manipulating the messages passing between agents. To enable the attack under the challenges of limited control and role-restricted communication format, we develop an LLM-powered adversarial agent with a reflection mechanism that generates contextually-aware malicious instructions. Our comprehensive evaluation across various frameworks, communication structures, and real-world applications demonstrates that LLM-MAS is vulnerable to communication-based attacks, highlighting the need for robust security measures in multi-agent systems.

Large Language Model (LLM) training often optimizes for preference alignment, rewarding outputs that are perceived as helpful and interaction-friendly. However, this preference-oriented objective can be exploited: manipulative prompts can steer responses toward user-appeasing agreement and away from truth-oriented correction. In this work, we investigate whether aligned models are vulnerable to Preference-Undermining Attacks (PUA), a class of manipulative prompting strategies designed to exploit the model's desire to please user preferences at the expense of truthfulness. We propose a diagnostic methodology that provides a finer-grained and more directive analysis than aggregate benchmark scores, using a factorial evaluation framework to decompose prompt-induced shifts into interpretable effects of system objectives (truth- vs. preference-oriented) and PUA-style dialogue factors (directive control, personal derogation, conditional approval, reality denial) within a controlled 2 times 2^4 design. Surprisingly, more advanced models are sometimes more susceptible to manipulative prompts. Beyond the dominant reality-denial factor, we observe model-specific sign reversals and interactions with PUA-style factors, suggesting tailored defenses rather than uniform robustness. These findings offer a novel, reproducible factorial evaluation methodology that provides finer-grained diagnostics for post-training processes like RLHF, enabling better trade-offs in the product iteration of LLMs by offering a more nuanced understanding of preference alignment risks and the impact of manipulative prompts.

Generative Adversarial Networks (GANs) for text generation have recently received many criticisms, as they perform worse than their MLE counterparts. We suspect previous text GANs' inferior performance is due to the lack of a reliable guiding signal in their discriminators. To address this problem, we propose a generative adversarial imitation learning framework for text generation that uses large pre-trained language models to provide more reliable reward guidance. Our approach uses contrastive discriminator, and proximal policy optimization (PPO) to stabilize and improve text generation performance. For evaluation, we conduct experiments on a diverse set of unconditional and conditional text generation tasks. Experimental results show that TextGAIL achieves better performance in terms of both quality and diversity than the MLE baseline. We also validate our intuition that TextGAIL's discriminator demonstrates the capability of providing reasonable rewards with an additional task.