Daily Papers

Autonomous vehicles increasingly utilize the vision-based perception module to acquire information about driving environments and detect obstacles. Correct detection and classification are important to ensure safe driving decisions. Existing works have demonstrated the feasibility of fooling the perception models such as object detectors and image classifiers with printed adversarial patches. However, most of them are indiscriminately offensive to every passing autonomous vehicle. In this paper, we propose TPatch, a physical adversarial patch triggered by acoustic signals. Unlike other adversarial patches, TPatch remains benign under normal circumstances but can be triggered to launch a hiding, creating or altering attack by a designed distortion introduced by signal injection attacks towards cameras. To avoid the suspicion of human drivers and make the attack practical and robust in the real world, we propose a content-based camouflage method and an attack robustness enhancement method to strengthen it. Evaluations with three object detectors, YOLO V3/V5 and Faster R-CNN, and eight image classifiers demonstrate the effectiveness of TPatch in both the simulation and the real world. We also discuss possible defenses at the sensor, algorithm, and system levels.

Prompt injection remains a major security risk for large language models. However, the efficacy of existing guardrail models in context-aware settings remains underexplored, as they often rely on static attack benchmarks. Additionally, they have over-defense tendencies. We introduce CAPTURE, a novel context-aware benchmark assessing both attack detection and over-defense tendencies with minimal in-domain examples. Our experiments reveal that current prompt injection guardrail models suffer from high false negatives in adversarial cases and excessive false positives in benign scenarios, highlighting critical limitations. To demonstrate our framework's utility, we train CaptureGuard on our generated data. This new model drastically reduces both false negative and false positive rates on our context-aware datasets while also generalizing effectively to external benchmarks, establishing a path toward more robust and practical prompt injection defenses.

Recently, Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) have shown a great ability to understand images. However, like traditional vision models, they are still vulnerable to adversarial images. Meanwhile, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) reasoning has been widely explored on MLLMs, which not only improves model's performance, but also enhances model's explainability by giving intermediate reasoning steps. Nevertheless, there is still a lack of study regarding MLLMs' adversarial robustness with CoT and an understanding of what the rationale looks like when MLLMs infer wrong answers with adversarial images. Our research evaluates the adversarial robustness of MLLMs when employing CoT reasoning, finding that CoT marginally improves adversarial robustness against existing attack methods. Moreover, we introduce a novel stop-reasoning attack technique that effectively bypasses the CoT-induced robustness enhancements. Finally, we demonstrate the alterations in CoT reasoning when MLLMs confront adversarial images, shedding light on their reasoning process under adversarial attacks.

To ensure the responsible distribution and use of open-source deep neural networks (DNNs), DNN watermarking has become a crucial technique to trace and verify unauthorized model replication or misuse. In practice, black-box watermarks manifest as specific predictive behaviors for specially crafted samples. However, due to the generalization nature of DNNs, the keys to extracting the watermark message are not unique, which would provide attackers with more opportunities. Advanced attack techniques can reverse-engineer approximate replacements for the original watermark keys, enabling subsequent watermark removal. In this paper, we explore black-box DNN watermarking specificity, which refers to the accuracy of a watermark's response to a key. Using this concept, we introduce Specificity-Enhanced Watermarking (SEW), a new method that improves specificity by reducing the association between the watermark and approximate keys. Through extensive evaluation using three popular watermarking benchmarks, we validate that enhancing specificity significantly contributes to strengthening robustness against removal attacks. SEW effectively defends against six state-of-the-art removal attacks, while maintaining model usability and watermark verification performance.

With the development of large language models (LLMs), detecting whether text is generated by a machine becomes increasingly challenging in the face of malicious use cases like the spread of false information, protection of intellectual property, and prevention of academic plagiarism. While well-trained text detectors have demonstrated promising performance on unseen test data, recent research suggests that these detectors have vulnerabilities when dealing with adversarial attacks such as paraphrasing. In this paper, we propose a framework for a broader class of adversarial attacks, designed to perform minor perturbations in machine-generated content to evade detection. We consider two attack settings: white-box and black-box, and employ adversarial learning in dynamic scenarios to assess the potential enhancement of the current detection model's robustness against such attacks. The empirical results reveal that the current detection models can be compromised in as little as 10 seconds, leading to the misclassification of machine-generated text as human-written content. Furthermore, we explore the prospect of improving the model's robustness over iterative adversarial learning. Although some improvements in model robustness are observed, practical applications still face significant challenges. These findings shed light on the future development of AI-text detectors, emphasizing the need for more accurate and robust detection methods.

The field of defense strategies against adversarial attacks has significantly grown over the last years, but progress is hampered as the evaluation of adversarial defenses is often insufficient and thus gives a wrong impression of robustness. Many promising defenses could be broken later on, making it difficult to identify the state-of-the-art. Frequent pitfalls in the evaluation are improper tuning of hyperparameters of the attacks, gradient obfuscation or masking. In this paper we first propose two extensions of the PGD-attack overcoming failures due to suboptimal step size and problems of the objective function. We then combine our novel attacks with two complementary existing ones to form a parameter-free, computationally affordable and user-independent ensemble of attacks to test adversarial robustness. We apply our ensemble to over 50 models from papers published at recent top machine learning and computer vision venues. In all except one of the cases we achieve lower robust test accuracy than reported in these papers, often by more than 10%, identifying several broken defenses.

Discrete adversarial attacks are symbolic perturbations to a language input that preserve the output label but lead to a prediction error. While such attacks have been extensively explored for the purpose of evaluating model robustness, their utility for improving robustness has been limited to offline augmentation only. Concretely, given a trained model, attacks are used to generate perturbed (adversarial) examples, and the model is re-trained exactly once. In this work, we address this gap and leverage discrete attacks for online augmentation, where adversarial examples are generated at every training step, adapting to the changing nature of the model. We propose (i) a new discrete attack, based on best-first search, and (ii) random sampling attacks that unlike prior work are not based on expensive search-based procedures. Surprisingly, we find that random sampling leads to impressive gains in robustness, outperforming the commonly-used offline augmentation, while leading to a speedup at training time of ~10x. Furthermore, online augmentation with search-based attacks justifies the higher training cost, significantly improving robustness on three datasets. Last, we show that our new attack substantially improves robustness compared to prior methods.

While prior research has proposed a plethora of methods that build neural classifiers robust against adversarial robustness, practitioners are still reluctant to adopt them due to their unacceptably severe clean accuracy penalties. This paper significantly alleviates this accuracy-robustness trade-off by mixing the output probabilities of a standard classifier and a robust classifier, where the standard network is optimized for clean accuracy and is not robust in general. We show that the robust base classifier's confidence difference for correct and incorrect examples is the key to this improvement. In addition to providing intuitions and empirical evidence, we theoretically certify the robustness of the mixed classifier under realistic assumptions. Furthermore, we adapt an adversarial input detector into a mixing network that adaptively adjusts the mixture of the two base models, further reducing the accuracy penalty of achieving robustness. The proposed flexible method, termed "adaptive smoothing", can work in conjunction with existing or even future methods that improve clean accuracy, robustness, or adversary detection. Our empirical evaluation considers strong attack methods, including AutoAttack and adaptive attack. On the CIFAR-100 dataset, our method achieves an 85.21% clean accuracy while maintaining a 38.72% ell_infty-AutoAttacked (epsilon = 8/255) accuracy, becoming the second most robust method on the RobustBench CIFAR-100 benchmark as of submission, while improving the clean accuracy by ten percentage points compared with all listed models. The code that implements our method is available at https://github.com/Bai-YT/AdaptiveSmoothing.

Despite the success of convolutional neural networks (CNNs) in many academic benchmarks for computer vision tasks, their application in the real-world is still facing fundamental challenges. One of these open problems is the inherent lack of robustness, unveiled by the striking effectiveness of adversarial attacks. Current attack methods are able to manipulate the network's prediction by adding specific but small amounts of noise to the input. In turn, adversarial training (AT) aims to achieve robustness against such attacks and ideally a better model generalization ability by including adversarial samples in the trainingset. However, an in-depth analysis of the resulting robust models beyond adversarial robustness is still pending. In this paper, we empirically analyze a variety of adversarially trained models that achieve high robust accuracies when facing state-of-the-art attacks and we show that AT has an interesting side-effect: it leads to models that are significantly less overconfident with their decisions, even on clean data than non-robust models. Further, our analysis of robust models shows that not only AT but also the model's building blocks (like activation functions and pooling) have a strong influence on the models' prediction confidences. Data & Project website: https://github.com/GeJulia/robustness_confidences_evaluation

Robustness to adversarial attack is typically evaluated with adversarial accuracy. This metric quantifies the number of points for which, given a threat model, successful adversarial perturbations cannot be found. While essential, this metric does not capture all aspects of robustness and in particular leaves out the question of how many perturbations can be found for each point. In this work we introduce an alternative approach, adversarial sparsity, which quantifies how difficult it is to find a successful perturbation given both an input point and a constraint on the direction of the perturbation. This constraint may be angular (L2 perturbations), or based on the number of pixels (Linf perturbations). We show that sparsity provides valuable insight on neural networks in multiple ways. analyzing the sparsity of existing robust models illustrates important differences between them that accuracy analysis does not, and suggests approaches for improving their robustness. When applying broken defenses effective against weak attacks but not strong ones, sparsity can discriminate between the totally ineffective and the partially effective defenses. Finally, with sparsity we can measure increases in robustness that do not affect accuracy: we show for example that data augmentation can by itself increase adversarial robustness, without using adversarial training.

Despite substantial investment in safety alignment, the vulnerability of large language models to sophisticated multi-turn adversarial attacks remains poorly characterized, and whether model scale or inference mode affects robustness is unknown. This study employed the TEMPEST multi-turn attack framework to evaluate ten frontier models from eight vendors across 1,000 harmful behaviors, generating over 97,000 API queries across adversarial conversations with automated evaluation by independent safety classifiers. Results demonstrated a spectrum of vulnerability: six models achieved 96% to 100% attack success rate (ASR), while four showed meaningful resistance, with ASR ranging from 42% to 78%; enabling extended reasoning on identical architecture reduced ASR from 97% to 42%. These findings indicate that safety alignment quality varies substantially across vendors, that model scale does not predict adversarial robustness, and that thinking mode provides a deployable safety enhancement. Collectively, this work establishes that current alignment techniques remain fundamentally vulnerable to adaptive multi-turn attacks regardless of model scale, while identifying deliberative inference as a promising defense direction.

Backdoor attacks, which maliciously control a well-trained model's outputs of the instances with specific triggers, are recently shown to be serious threats to the safety of reusing deep neural networks (DNNs). In this work, we propose an efficient online defense mechanism based on robustness-aware perturbations. Specifically, by analyzing the backdoor training process, we point out that there exists a big gap of robustness between poisoned and clean samples. Motivated by this observation, we construct a word-based robustness-aware perturbation to distinguish poisoned samples from clean samples to defend against the backdoor attacks on natural language processing (NLP) models. Moreover, we give a theoretical analysis about the feasibility of our robustness-aware perturbation-based defense method. Experimental results on sentiment analysis and toxic detection tasks show that our method achieves better defending performance and much lower computational costs than existing online defense methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/lancopku/RAP.

Robustness to adversarial attacks is typically obtained through expensive adversarial training with Projected Gradient Descent. Here we introduce ROPUST, a remarkably simple and efficient method to leverage robust pre-trained models and further increase their robustness, at no cost in natural accuracy. Our technique relies on the use of an Optical Processing Unit (OPU), a photonic co-processor, and a fine-tuning step performed with Direct Feedback Alignment, a synthetic gradient training scheme. We test our method on nine different models against four attacks in RobustBench, consistently improving over state-of-the-art performance. We perform an ablation study on the single components of our defense, showing that robustness arises from parameter obfuscation and the alternative training method. We also introduce phase retrieval attacks, specifically designed to increase the threat level of attackers against our own defense. We show that even with state-of-the-art phase retrieval techniques, ROPUST remains an effective defense.

As a research community, we are still lacking a systematic understanding of the progress on adversarial robustness which often makes it hard to identify the most promising ideas in training robust models. A key challenge in benchmarking robustness is that its evaluation is often error-prone leading to robustness overestimation. Our goal is to establish a standardized benchmark of adversarial robustness, which as accurately as possible reflects the robustness of the considered models within a reasonable computational budget. To this end, we start by considering the image classification task and introduce restrictions (possibly loosened in the future) on the allowed models. We evaluate adversarial robustness with AutoAttack, an ensemble of white- and black-box attacks, which was recently shown in a large-scale study to improve almost all robustness evaluations compared to the original publications. To prevent overadaptation of new defenses to AutoAttack, we welcome external evaluations based on adaptive attacks, especially where AutoAttack flags a potential overestimation of robustness. Our leaderboard, hosted at https://robustbench.github.io/, contains evaluations of 120+ models and aims at reflecting the current state of the art in image classification on a set of well-defined tasks in ell_infty- and ell_2-threat models and on common corruptions, with possible extensions in the future. Additionally, we open-source the library https://github.com/RobustBench/robustbench that provides unified access to 80+ robust models to facilitate their downstream applications. Finally, based on the collected models, we analyze the impact of robustness on the performance on distribution shifts, calibration, out-of-distribution detection, fairness, privacy leakage, smoothness, and transferability.

The bulk of existing research in defending against adversarial examples focuses on defending against a single (typically bounded Lp-norm) attack, but for a practical setting, machine learning (ML) models should be robust to a wide variety of attacks. In this paper, we present the first unified framework for considering multiple attacks against ML models. Our framework is able to model different levels of learner's knowledge about the test-time adversary, allowing us to model robustness against unforeseen attacks and robustness against unions of attacks. Using our framework, we present the first leaderboard, MultiRobustBench, for benchmarking multiattack evaluation which captures performance across attack types and attack strengths. We evaluate the performance of 16 defended models for robustness against a set of 9 different attack types, including Lp-based threat models, spatial transformations, and color changes, at 20 different attack strengths (180 attacks total). Additionally, we analyze the state of current defenses against multiple attacks. Our analysis shows that while existing defenses have made progress in terms of average robustness across the set of attacks used, robustness against the worst-case attack is still a big open problem as all existing models perform worse than random guessing.

Adversarial examples, generated by carefully crafted perturbation, have attracted considerable attention in research fields. Recent works have argued that the existence of the robust and non-robust features is a primary cause of the adversarial examples, and investigated their internal interactions in the feature space. In this paper, we propose a way of explicitly distilling feature representation into the robust and non-robust features, using Information Bottleneck. Specifically, we inject noise variation to each feature unit and evaluate the information flow in the feature representation to dichotomize feature units either robust or non-robust, based on the noise variation magnitude. Through comprehensive experiments, we demonstrate that the distilled features are highly correlated with adversarial prediction, and they have human-perceptible semantic information by themselves. Furthermore, we present an attack mechanism intensifying the gradient of non-robust features that is directly related to the model prediction, and validate its effectiveness of breaking model robustness.

In recent years, neural networks have become the default choice for image classification and many other learning tasks, even though they are vulnerable to so-called adversarial attacks. To increase their robustness against these attacks, there have emerged numerous detection mechanisms that aim to automatically determine if an input is adversarial. However, state-of-the-art detection mechanisms either rely on being tuned for each type of attack, or they do not generalize across different attack types. To alleviate these issues, we propose a novel technique for adversarial-image detection, RAID, that trains a secondary classifier to identify differences in neuron activation values between benign and adversarial inputs. Our technique is both more reliable and more effective than the state of the art when evaluated against six popular attacks. Moreover, a straightforward extension of RAID increases its robustness against detection-aware adversaries without affecting its effectiveness.

Recent work has demonstrated that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples---inputs that are almost indistinguishable from natural data and yet classified incorrectly by the network. In fact, some of the latest findings suggest that the existence of adversarial attacks may be an inherent weakness of deep learning models. To address this problem, we study the adversarial robustness of neural networks through the lens of robust optimization. This approach provides us with a broad and unifying view on much of the prior work on this topic. Its principled nature also enables us to identify methods for both training and attacking neural networks that are reliable and, in a certain sense, universal. In particular, they specify a concrete security guarantee that would protect against any adversary. These methods let us train networks with significantly improved resistance to a wide range of adversarial attacks. They also suggest the notion of security against a first-order adversary as a natural and broad security guarantee. We believe that robustness against such well-defined classes of adversaries is an important stepping stone towards fully resistant deep learning models. Code and pre-trained models are available at https://github.com/MadryLab/mnist_challenge and https://github.com/MadryLab/cifar10_challenge.

Large Language Models (LLMs) can be misused to spread online spam and misinformation. Content watermarking deters misuse by hiding a message in model-generated outputs, enabling their detection using a secret watermarking key. Robustness is a core security property, stating that evading detection requires (significant) degradation of the content's quality. Many LLM watermarking methods have been proposed, but robustness is tested only against non-adaptive attackers who lack knowledge of the watermarking method and can find only suboptimal attacks. We formulate the robustness of LLM watermarking as an objective function and propose preference-based optimization to tune adaptive attacks against the specific watermarking method. Our evaluation shows that (i) adaptive attacks substantially outperform non-adaptive baselines. (ii) Even in a non-adaptive setting, adaptive attacks optimized against a few known watermarks remain highly effective when tested against other unseen watermarks, and (iii) optimization-based attacks are practical and require less than seven GPU hours. Our findings underscore the need to test robustness against adaptive attackers.

AI-generated images have reached a quality level at which humans are incapable of reliably distinguishing them from real images. To counteract the inherent risk of fraud and disinformation, the detection of AI-generated images is a pressing challenge and an active research topic. While many of the presented methods claim to achieve high detection accuracy, they are usually evaluated under idealized conditions. In particular, the adversarial robustness is often neglected, potentially due to a lack of awareness or the substantial effort required to conduct a comprehensive robustness analysis. In this work, we tackle this problem by providing a simpler means to assess the robustness of AI-generated image detectors. We present RAID (Robust evaluation of AI-generated image Detectors), a dataset of 72k diverse and highly transferable adversarial examples. The dataset is created by running attacks against an ensemble of seven state-of-the-art detectors and images generated by four different text-to-image models. Extensive experiments show that our methodology generates adversarial images that transfer with a high success rate to unseen detectors, which can be used to quickly provide an approximate yet still reliable estimate of a detector's adversarial robustness. Our findings indicate that current state-of-the-art AI-generated image detectors can be easily deceived by adversarial examples, highlighting the critical need for the development of more robust methods. We release our dataset at https://huggingface.co/datasets/aimagelab/RAID and evaluation code at https://github.com/pralab/RAID.

Accurately evaluating adversarial robustness is a longstanding challenge. A flawed attack design can inflate robustness estimates, making deployment risk assessment and defense comparison unreliable. Historically, standardized attacks such as AutoAttack have largely resolved this for image classifiers, providing a reliable evaluation baseline for systematic comparison across defenses. However, no equivalent exists for LLM jailbreak evaluation yet, where designing such an attack is considerably more difficult. A reliable attack must, among other things, be black-box compatible, applicable to arbitrary defense pipelines, and efficient, which no existing method jointly satisfies. We introduce Indirect Harm Optimization (IHO), a masked diffusion language model attacker trained via iterative preference optimization against a harmfulness judge, requiring only black-box access to the target. The same method can be used without modification as a strong adaptive attack on individual behaviors, or as an efficient amortized policy that transfers to held-out behaviors and unseen target models without fine-tuning. Even against layered defenses, such as a Circuit Breaker-trained model combined with an auxiliary detector, IHO improves attack success considerably over state-of-the-art approaches, without any defense-specific adaptation. Our results position IHO as a practical step toward the kind of standardized jailbreak evaluation that has improved reliability in the past. Code and models are available on GitHub and Hugging Face.

Speech Language Models (SLMs) enable natural interactions via spoken instructions, which more effectively capture user intent by detecting nuances in speech. The richer speech signal introduces new security risks compared to text-based models, as adversaries can better bypass safety mechanisms by injecting imperceptible noise to speech. We analyze adversarial attacks and find that SLMs are substantially more vulnerable to jailbreak attacks, which can achieve a perfect 100% attack success rate in some instances. To improve security, we propose post-hoc patching defenses used to intervene during inference by modifying the SLM's activations that improve robustness up to 99% with (i) negligible impact on utility and (ii) without any re-training. We conduct ablation studies to maximize the efficacy of our defenses and improve the utility/security trade-off, validated with large-scale benchmarks unique to SLMs.

The deep neural networks are known to be vulnerable to well-designed adversarial attacks. The most successful defense technique based on adversarial training (AT) can achieve optimal robustness against particular attacks but cannot generalize well to unseen attacks. Another effective defense technique based on adversarial purification (AP) can enhance generalization but cannot achieve optimal robustness. Meanwhile, both methods share one common limitation on the degraded standard accuracy. To mitigate these issues, we propose a novel pipeline to acquire the robust purifier model, named Adversarial Training on Purification (AToP), which comprises two components: perturbation destruction by random transforms (RT) and purifier model fine-tuned (FT) by adversarial loss. RT is essential to avoid overlearning to known attacks, resulting in the robustness generalization to unseen attacks, and FT is essential for the improvement of robustness. To evaluate our method in an efficient and scalable way, we conduct extensive experiments on CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNette to demonstrate that our method achieves optimal robustness and exhibits generalization ability against unseen attacks.

The study of adversarial robustness has so far largely focused on perturbations bound in p-norms. However, state-of-the-art models turn out to be also vulnerable to other, more natural classes of perturbations such as translations and rotations. In this work, we thoroughly investigate the vulnerability of neural network--based classifiers to rotations and translations. While data augmentation offers relatively small robustness, we use ideas from robust optimization and test-time input aggregation to significantly improve robustness. Finally we find that, in contrast to the p-norm case, first-order methods cannot reliably find worst-case perturbations. This highlights spatial robustness as a fundamentally different setting requiring additional study. Code available at https://github.com/MadryLab/adversarial_spatial and https://github.com/MadryLab/spatial-pytorch.

The disparity in accuracy between classes in standard training is amplified during adversarial training, a phenomenon termed the robust fairness problem. Existing methodologies aimed to enhance robust fairness by sacrificing the model's performance on easier classes in order to improve its performance on harder ones. However, we observe that under adversarial attacks, the majority of the model's predictions for samples from the worst class are biased towards classes similar to the worst class, rather than towards the easy classes. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, we demonstrate that robust fairness deteriorates as the distance between classes decreases. Motivated by these insights, we introduce the Distance-Aware Fair Adversarial training (DAFA) methodology, which addresses robust fairness by taking into account the similarities between classes. Specifically, our method assigns distinct loss weights and adversarial margins to each class and adjusts them to encourage a trade-off in robustness among similar classes. Experimental results across various datasets demonstrate that our method not only maintains average robust accuracy but also significantly improves the worst robust accuracy, indicating a marked improvement in robust fairness compared to existing methods.

Recent advances in adversarial attacks uncover the intrinsic vulnerability of modern deep neural networks. Since then, extensive efforts have been devoted to enhancing the robustness of deep networks via specialized learning algorithms and loss functions. In this work, we take an architectural perspective and investigate the patterns of network architectures that are resilient to adversarial attacks. To obtain the large number of networks needed for this study, we adopt one-shot neural architecture search, training a large network for once and then finetuning the sub-networks sampled therefrom. The sampled architectures together with the accuracies they achieve provide a rich basis for our study. Our "robust architecture Odyssey" reveals several valuable observations: 1) densely connected patterns result in improved robustness; 2) under computational budget, adding convolution operations to direct connection edge is effective; 3) flow of solution procedure (FSP) matrix is a good indicator of network robustness. Based on these observations, we discover a family of robust architectures (RobNets). On various datasets, including CIFAR, SVHN, Tiny-ImageNet, and ImageNet, RobNets exhibit superior robustness performance to other widely used architectures. Notably, RobNets substantially improve the robust accuracy (~5% absolute gains) under both white-box and black-box attacks, even with fewer parameter numbers. Code is available at https://github.com/gmh14/RobNets.

How should we evaluate the robustness of language model defenses? Current defenses against jailbreaks and prompt injections (which aim to prevent an attacker from eliciting harmful knowledge or remotely triggering malicious actions, respectively) are typically evaluated either against a static set of harmful attack strings, or against computationally weak optimization methods that were not designed with the defense in mind. We argue that this evaluation process is flawed. Instead, we should evaluate defenses against adaptive attackers who explicitly modify their attack strategy to counter a defense's design while spending considerable resources to optimize their objective. By systematically tuning and scaling general optimization techniques-gradient descent, reinforcement learning, random search, and human-guided exploration-we bypass 12 recent defenses (based on a diverse set of techniques) with attack success rate above 90% for most; importantly, the majority of defenses originally reported near-zero attack success rates. We believe that future defense work must consider stronger attacks, such as the ones we describe, in order to make reliable and convincing claims of robustness.

Adversarial training, which is to enhance robustness against adversarial attacks, has received much attention because it is easy to generate human-imperceptible perturbations of data to deceive a given deep neural network. In this paper, we propose a new adversarial training algorithm that is theoretically well motivated and empirically superior to other existing algorithms. A novel feature of the proposed algorithm is to apply more regularization to data vulnerable to adversarial attacks than other existing regularization algorithms do. Theoretically, we show that our algorithm can be understood as an algorithm of minimizing the regularized empirical risk motivated from a newly derived upper bound of the robust risk. Numerical experiments illustrate that our proposed algorithm improves the generalization (accuracy on examples) and robustness (accuracy on adversarial attacks) simultaneously to achieve the state-of-the-art performance.

Evaluations of large language model (LLM) risks and capabilities are increasingly being incorporated into AI risk management and governance frameworks. Currently, most risk evaluations are conducted by designing inputs that elicit harmful behaviors from the system. However, a fundamental limitation of this approach is that the harmfulness of the behaviors identified during any particular evaluation can only lower bound the model's worst-possible-case behavior. As a complementary method for eliciting harmful behaviors, we propose evaluating LLMs with model tampering attacks which allow for modifications to latent activations or weights. We pit state-of-the-art techniques for removing harmful LLM capabilities against a suite of 5 input-space and 6 model tampering attacks. In addition to benchmarking these methods against each other, we show that (1) model resilience to capability elicitation attacks lies on a low-dimensional robustness subspace; (2) the attack success rate of model tampering attacks can empirically predict and offer conservative estimates for the success of held-out input-space attacks; and (3) state-of-the-art unlearning methods can easily be undone within 16 steps of fine-tuning. Together these results highlight the difficulty of removing harmful LLM capabilities and show that model tampering attacks enable substantially more rigorous evaluations than input-space attacks alone. We release models at https://huggingface.co/LLM-GAT

Deep learning has transformed AI applications but faces critical security challenges, including adversarial attacks, data poisoning, model theft, and privacy leakage. This survey examines these vulnerabilities, detailing their mechanisms and impact on model integrity and confidentiality. Practical implementations, including adversarial examples, label flipping, and backdoor attacks, are explored alongside defenses such as adversarial training, differential privacy, and federated learning, highlighting their strengths and limitations. Advanced methods like contrastive and self-supervised learning are presented for enhancing robustness. The survey concludes with future directions, emphasizing automated defenses, zero-trust architectures, and the security challenges of large AI models. A balanced approach to performance and security is essential for developing reliable deep learning systems.

Adversarial attacks have been a looming and unaddressed threat in the industry. However, through a decade-long history of the robustness evaluation literature, we have learned that mounting a strong or optimal attack is challenging. It requires both machine learning and domain expertise. In other words, the white-box threat model, religiously assumed by a large majority of the past literature, is unrealistic. In this paper, we propose a new practical threat model where the adversary relies on transfer attacks through publicly available surrogate models. We argue that this setting will become the most prevalent for security-sensitive applications in the future. We evaluate the transfer attacks in this setting and propose a specialized defense method based on a game-theoretic perspective. The defenses are evaluated under 24 public models and 11 attack algorithms across three datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet). Under this threat model, our defense, PubDef, outperforms the state-of-the-art white-box adversarial training by a large margin with almost no loss in the normal accuracy. For instance, on ImageNet, our defense achieves 62% accuracy under the strongest transfer attack vs only 36% of the best adversarially trained model. Its accuracy when not under attack is only 2% lower than that of an undefended model (78% vs 80%). We release our code at https://github.com/wagner-group/pubdef.

Most existing works focus on improving robustness against adversarial attacks bounded by a single l_p norm using adversarial training (AT). However, these AT models' multiple-norm robustness (union accuracy) is still low, which is crucial since in the real-world an adversary is not necessarily bounded by a single norm. The tradeoffs among robustness against multiple l_p perturbations and accuracy/robustness make obtaining good union and clean accuracy challenging. We design a logit pairing loss to improve the union accuracy by analyzing the tradeoffs from the lens of distribution shifts. We connect natural training (NT) with AT via gradient projection, to incorporate useful information from NT into AT, where we empirically and theoretically show it moderates the accuracy/robustness tradeoff. We propose a novel training framework RAMP, to boost the robustness against multiple l_p perturbations. RAMP can be easily adapted for robust fine-tuning and full AT. For robust fine-tuning, RAMP obtains a union accuracy up to 53.3% on CIFAR-10, and 29.1% on ImageNet. For training from scratch, RAMP achieves a union accuracy of 44.6% and good clean accuracy of 81.2% on ResNet-18 against AutoAttack on CIFAR-10. Beyond multi-norm robustness RAMP-trained models achieve superior universal robustness, effectively generalizing against a range of unseen adversaries and natural corruptions.

Adversarial robustness has been studied extensively in image classification, especially for the ell_infty-threat model, but significantly less so for related tasks such as object detection and semantic segmentation, where attacks turn out to be a much harder optimization problem than for image classification. We propose several problem-specific novel attacks minimizing different metrics in accuracy and mIoU. The ensemble of our attacks, SEA, shows that existing attacks severely overestimate the robustness of semantic segmentation models. Surprisingly, existing attempts of adversarial training for semantic segmentation models turn out to be weak or even completely non-robust. We investigate why previous adaptations of adversarial training to semantic segmentation failed and show how recently proposed robust ImageNet backbones can be used to obtain adversarially robust semantic segmentation models with up to six times less training time for PASCAL-VOC and the more challenging ADE20k. The associated code and robust models are available at https://github.com/nmndeep/robust-segmentation

The robustness of neural networks to adversarial examples has received great attention due to security implications. Despite various attack approaches to crafting visually imperceptible adversarial examples, little has been developed towards a comprehensive measure of robustness. In this paper, we provide a theoretical justification for converting robustness analysis into a local Lipschitz constant estimation problem, and propose to use the Extreme Value Theory for efficient evaluation. Our analysis yields a novel robustness metric called CLEVER, which is short for Cross Lipschitz Extreme Value for nEtwork Robustness. The proposed CLEVER score is attack-agnostic and computationally feasible for large neural networks. Experimental results on various networks, including ResNet, Inception-v3 and MobileNet, show that (i) CLEVER is aligned with the robustness indication measured by the ell_2 and ell_infty norms of adversarial examples from powerful attacks, and (ii) defended networks using defensive distillation or bounded ReLU indeed achieve better CLEVER scores. To the best of our knowledge, CLEVER is the first attack-independent robustness metric that can be applied to any neural network classifier.

As a new paradigm in machine learning, self-supervised learning (SSL) is capable of learning high-quality representations of complex data without relying on labels. In addition to eliminating the need for labeled data, research has found that SSL improves the adversarial robustness over supervised learning since lacking labels makes it more challenging for adversaries to manipulate model predictions. However, the extent to which this robustness superiority generalizes to other types of attacks remains an open question. We explore this question in the context of backdoor attacks. Specifically, we design and evaluate CTRL, an embarrassingly simple yet highly effective self-supervised backdoor attack. By only polluting a tiny fraction of training data (<= 1%) with indistinguishable poisoning samples, CTRL causes any trigger-embedded input to be misclassified to the adversary's designated class with a high probability (>= 99%) at inference time. Our findings suggest that SSL and supervised learning are comparably vulnerable to backdoor attacks. More importantly, through the lens of CTRL, we study the inherent vulnerability of SSL to backdoor attacks. With both empirical and analytical evidence, we reveal that the representation invariance property of SSL, which benefits adversarial robustness, may also be the very reason making \ssl highly susceptible to backdoor attacks. Our findings also imply that the existing defenses against supervised backdoor attacks are not easily retrofitted to the unique vulnerability of SSL.

Despite extensive diagnostics and debugging by developers, AI systems sometimes exhibit harmful unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is so large -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for inputs that may elicit harmful behaviors. Red-teaming and adversarial training (AT) are commonly used to improve robustness, however, they empirically struggle to fix failure modes that differ from the attacks used during training. In this work, we utilize latent adversarial training (LAT) to defend against vulnerabilities without leveraging knowledge of what they are or using inputs that elicit them. LAT makes use of the compressed, abstract, and structured latent representations of concepts that the network actually uses for prediction. Here, we use it to defend against failure modes without examples that elicit them. Specifically, we use LAT to remove trojans and defend against held-out classes of adversarial attacks. We show in image classification, text classification, and text generation tasks that LAT usually improves both robustness to novel attacks and performance on clean data relative to AT. This suggests that LAT can be a promising tool for defending against failure modes that are not explicitly identified by developers.

Adversarial robustness is essential for security and reliability of machine learning systems. However, adversarial robustness enhanced by defense algorithms is easily erased as the neural network's weights update to learn new tasks. To address this vulnerability, it is essential to improve the capability of neural networks in terms of robust continual learning. Specially, we propose a novel gradient projection technique that effectively stabilizes sample gradients from previous data by orthogonally projecting back-propagation gradients onto a crucial subspace before using them for weight updates. This technique can maintaining robustness by collaborating with a class of defense algorithms through sample gradient smoothing. The experimental results on four benchmarks including Split-CIFAR100 and Split-miniImageNet, demonstrate that the superiority of the proposed approach in mitigating rapidly degradation of robustness during continual learning even when facing strong adversarial attacks.

Adversarial Training is the most effective approach for improving the robustness of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs). However, compared to the large body of research in optimizing the adversarial training process, there are few investigations into how architecture components affect robustness, and they rarely constrain model capacity. Thus, it is unclear where robustness precisely comes from. In this work, we present the first large-scale systematic study on the robustness of DNN architecture components under fixed parameter budgets. Through our investigation, we distill 18 actionable robust network design guidelines that empower model developers to gain deep insights. We demonstrate these guidelines' effectiveness by introducing the novel Robust Architecture (RobArch) model that instantiates the guidelines to build a family of top-performing models across parameter capacities against strong adversarial attacks. RobArch achieves the new state-of-the-art AutoAttack accuracy on the RobustBench ImageNet leaderboard. The code is available at https://github.com/ShengYun-Peng/RobArch{this url}.

Recent work have demonstrated that robustness (to "corruption") can be at odds with generalization. Adversarial training, for instance, aims to reduce the problematic susceptibility of modern neural networks to small data perturbations. Surprisingly, overfitting is a major concern in adversarial training despite being mostly absent in standard training. We provide here theoretical evidence for this peculiar "robust overfitting" phenomenon. Subsequently, we advance a novel distributionally robust loss function bridging robustness and generalization. We demonstrate both theoretically as well as empirically the loss to enjoy a certified level of robustness against two common types of corruption--data evasion and poisoning attacks--while ensuring guaranteed generalization. We show through careful numerical experiments that our resulting holistic robust (HR) training procedure yields SOTA performance. Finally, we indicate that HR training can be interpreted as a direct extension of adversarial training and comes with a negligible additional computational burden. A ready-to-use python library implementing our algorithm is available at https://github.com/RyanLucas3/HR_Neural_Networks.

Recent studies have shown that robustness to adversarial attacks can be transferred across networks. In other words, we can make a weak model more robust with the help of a strong teacher model. We ask if instead of learning from a static teacher, can models "learn together" and "teach each other" to achieve better robustness? In this paper, we study how interactions among models affect robustness via knowledge distillation. We propose mutual adversarial training (MAT), in which multiple models are trained together and share the knowledge of adversarial examples to achieve improved robustness. MAT allows robust models to explore a larger space of adversarial samples, and find more robust feature spaces and decision boundaries. Through extensive experiments on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we demonstrate that MAT can effectively improve model robustness and outperform state-of-the-art methods under white-box attacks, bringing sim8% accuracy gain to vanilla adversarial training (AT) under PGD-100 attacks. In addition, we show that MAT can also mitigate the robustness trade-off among different perturbation types, bringing as much as 13.1% accuracy gain to AT baselines against the union of l_infty, l_2 and l_1 attacks. These results show the superiority of the proposed method and demonstrate that collaborative learning is an effective strategy for designing robust models.

The robustness of deep neural networks is crucial for safety-critical deployments, yet existing evaluation methods are often attack-dependent and lack interpretability. We propose a principled, attack-agnostic robustness metric based on the spectral norm of the Fisher Information Matrix (FIM), which quantifies the worst-case sensitivity of the model's output distribution to input perturbations. Theoretically, we establish that the FIM equals the variance of the input Jacobian and derive closed-form spectral bounds for common architectures, including VGG, ResNet, DenseNet, and Transformer, providing the first theoretical robustness ranking. To enable scalable evaluation, we develop efficient algorithms, including power iteration and Hutchinson-based estimation, that support both white-box and black-box settings. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets, including CIFAR, ImageNet, and medical images, and across multiple architectures show a strong correlation between our metric and adversarial vulnerability. Our framework serves as an interpretable diagnostic tool that complements attack-based evaluations, offering insights into architectural sensitivity and guiding the design of more robust models. Code is available at: https://github.com/franz-chang/SRP/.

Deep neural networks are susceptible to adversarial examples, posing a significant security risk in critical applications. Adversarial Training (AT) is a well-established technique to enhance adversarial robustness, but it often comes at the cost of decreased generalization ability. This paper proposes Robustness Critical Fine-Tuning (RiFT), a novel approach to enhance generalization without compromising adversarial robustness. The core idea of RiFT is to exploit the redundant capacity for robustness by fine-tuning the adversarially trained model on its non-robust-critical module. To do so, we introduce module robust criticality (MRC), a measure that evaluates the significance of a given module to model robustness under worst-case weight perturbations. Using this measure, we identify the module with the lowest MRC value as the non-robust-critical module and fine-tune its weights to obtain fine-tuned weights. Subsequently, we linearly interpolate between the adversarially trained weights and fine-tuned weights to derive the optimal fine-tuned model weights. We demonstrate the efficacy of RiFT on ResNet18, ResNet34, and WideResNet34-10 models trained on CIFAR10, CIFAR100, and Tiny-ImageNet datasets. Our experiments show that \method can significantly improve both generalization and out-of-distribution robustness by around 1.5% while maintaining or even slightly enhancing adversarial robustness. Code is available at https://github.com/microsoft/robustlearn.

Recently, test-time adaptation (TTA) has been proposed as a promising solution for addressing distribution shifts. It allows a base model to adapt to an unforeseen distribution during inference by leveraging the information from the batch of (unlabeled) test data. However, we uncover a novel security vulnerability of TTA based on the insight that predictions on benign samples can be impacted by malicious samples in the same batch. To exploit this vulnerability, we propose Distribution Invading Attack (DIA), which injects a small fraction of malicious data into the test batch. DIA causes models using TTA to misclassify benign and unperturbed test data, providing an entirely new capability for adversaries that is infeasible in canonical machine learning pipelines. Through comprehensive evaluations, we demonstrate the high effectiveness of our attack on multiple benchmarks across six TTA methods. In response, we investigate two countermeasures to robustify the existing insecure TTA implementations, following the principle of "security by design". Together, we hope our findings can make the community aware of the utility-security tradeoffs in deploying TTA and provide valuable insights for developing robust TTA approaches.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. A range of defense methods have been proposed to train adversarially robust DNNs, among which adversarial training has demonstrated promising results. However, despite preliminary understandings developed for adversarial training, it is still not clear, from the architectural perspective, what configurations can lead to more robust DNNs. In this paper, we address this gap via a comprehensive investigation on the impact of network width and depth on the robustness of adversarially trained DNNs. Specifically, we make the following key observations: 1) more parameters (higher model capacity) does not necessarily help adversarial robustness; 2) reducing capacity at the last stage (the last group of blocks) of the network can actually improve adversarial robustness; and 3) under the same parameter budget, there exists an optimal architectural configuration for adversarial robustness. We also provide a theoretical analysis explaning why such network configuration can help robustness. These architectural insights can help design adversarially robust DNNs. Code is available at https://github.com/HanxunH/RobustWRN.

We conduct experiments on the impact of increasing inference-time compute in reasoning models (specifically OpenAI o1-preview and o1-mini) on their robustness to adversarial attacks. We find that across a variety of attacks, increased inference-time compute leads to improved robustness. In many cases (with important exceptions), the fraction of model samples where the attack succeeds tends to zero as the amount of test-time compute grows. We perform no adversarial training for the tasks we study, and we increase inference-time compute by simply allowing the models to spend more compute on reasoning, independently of the form of attack. Our results suggest that inference-time compute has the potential to improve adversarial robustness for Large Language Models. We also explore new attacks directed at reasoning models, as well as settings where inference-time compute does not improve reliability, and speculate on the reasons for these as well as ways to address them.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have led to significant improvements in many tasks across various domains, such as code interpretation, response generation, and ambiguity handling. These LLMs, however, when upgrading, primarily prioritize enhancing user experience while neglecting security, privacy, and safety implications. Consequently, unintended vulnerabilities or biases can be introduced. Previous studies have predominantly focused on specific versions of the models and disregard the potential emergence of new attack vectors targeting the updated versions. Through the lens of adversarial examples within the in-context learning framework, this longitudinal study addresses this gap by conducting a comprehensive assessment of the robustness of successive versions of LLMs, vis-\`a-vis GPT-3.5. We conduct extensive experiments to analyze and understand the impact of the robustness in two distinct learning categories: zero-shot learning and few-shot learning. Our findings indicate that, in comparison to earlier versions of LLMs, the updated versions do not exhibit the anticipated level of robustness against adversarial attacks. In addition, our study emphasizes the increased effectiveness of synergized adversarial queries in most zero-shot learning and few-shot learning cases. We hope that our study can lead to a more refined assessment of the robustness of LLMs over time and provide valuable insights of these models for both developers and users.

Deep neural networks remain vulnerable to adversarial examples despite advances in architectures and training paradigms. We investigate how training data characteristics affect adversarial robustness across 36 state-of-the-art vision models spanning supervised, self-supervised, and contrastive learning approaches, trained on datasets from 1.2M to 22B images. Models were evaluated under six black-box attack categories: random perturbations, two types of geometric masks, COCO object manipulations, ImageNet-C corruptions, and ImageNet-R style shifts. Robustness follows a logarithmic scaling law with both data volume and model size: a tenfold increase in data reduces attack success rate (ASR) on average by ~3.2%, whereas a tenfold increase in model size reduces ASR on average by ~13.4%. Notably, some self-supervised models trained on curated datasets, such as DINOv2, outperform others trained on much larger but less curated datasets, challenging the assumption that scale alone drives robustness. Adversarial fine-tuning of ResNet50s improves generalization across structural variations but not across color distributions. Human evaluation reveals persistent gaps between human and machine vision. These results show that while scaling improves robustness, data quality, architecture, and training objectives play a more decisive role than raw scale in achieving broad-spectrum adversarial resilience.

With the rapid growth of information, recommender systems have become integral for providing personalized suggestions and overcoming information overload. However, their practical deployment often encounters "dirty" data, where noise or malicious information can lead to abnormal recommendations. Research on improving recommender systems' robustness against such dirty data has thus gained significant attention. This survey provides a comprehensive review of recent work on recommender systems' robustness. We first present a taxonomy to organize current techniques for withstanding malicious attacks and natural noise. We then explore state-of-the-art methods in each category, including fraudster detection, adversarial training, certifiable robust training against malicious attacks, and regularization, purification, self-supervised learning against natural noise. Additionally, we summarize evaluation metrics and common datasets used to assess robustness. We discuss robustness across varying recommendation scenarios and its interplay with other properties like accuracy, interpretability, privacy, and fairness. Finally, we delve into open issues and future research directions in this emerging field. Our goal is to equip readers with a holistic understanding of robust recommender systems and spotlight pathways for future research and development.

The living-off-the-land (LOTL) offensive methodologies rely on the perpetration of malicious actions through chains of commands executed by legitimate applications, identifiable exclusively by analysis of system logs. LOTL techniques are well hidden inside the stream of events generated by common legitimate activities, moreover threat actors often camouflage activity through obfuscation, making them particularly difficult to detect without incurring in plenty of false alarms, even using machine learning. To improve the performance of models in such an harsh environment, we propose an augmentation framework to enhance and diversify the presence of LOTL malicious activity inside legitimate logs. Guided by threat intelligence, we generate a dataset by injecting attack templates known to be employed in the wild, further enriched by malleable patterns of legitimate activities to replicate the behavior of evasive threat actors. We conduct an extensive ablation study to understand which models better handle our augmented dataset, also manipulated to mimic the presence of model-agnostic evasion and poisoning attacks. Our results suggest that augmentation is needed to maintain high-predictive capabilities, robustness to attack is achieved through specific hardening techniques like adversarial training, and it is possible to deploy near-real-time models with almost-zero false alarms.

In this paper we establish rigorous benchmarks for image classifier robustness. Our first benchmark, ImageNet-C, standardizes and expands the corruption robustness topic, while showing which classifiers are preferable in safety-critical applications. Then we propose a new dataset called ImageNet-P which enables researchers to benchmark a classifier's robustness to common perturbations. Unlike recent robustness research, this benchmark evaluates performance on common corruptions and perturbations not worst-case adversarial perturbations. We find that there are negligible changes in relative corruption robustness from AlexNet classifiers to ResNet classifiers. Afterward we discover ways to enhance corruption and perturbation robustness. We even find that a bypassed adversarial defense provides substantial common perturbation robustness. Together our benchmarks may aid future work toward networks that robustly generalize.

Machine Learning (ML) models have been utilized for malware detection for over two decades. Consequently, this ignited an ongoing arms race between malware authors and antivirus systems, compelling researchers to propose defenses for malware-detection models against evasion attacks. However, most if not all existing defenses against evasion attacks suffer from sizable performance degradation and/or can defend against only specific attacks, which makes them less practical in real-world settings. In this work, we develop a certified defense, DRSM (De-Randomized Smoothed MalConv), by redesigning the de-randomized smoothing technique for the domain of malware detection. Specifically, we propose a window ablation scheme to provably limit the impact of adversarial bytes while maximally preserving local structures of the executables. After showing how DRSM is theoretically robust against attacks with contiguous adversarial bytes, we verify its performance and certified robustness experimentally, where we observe only marginal accuracy drops as the cost of robustness. To our knowledge, we are the first to offer certified robustness in the realm of static detection of malware executables. More surprisingly, through evaluating DRSM against 9 empirical attacks of different types, we observe that the proposed defense is empirically robust to some extent against a diverse set of attacks, some of which even fall out of the scope of its original threat model. In addition, we collected 15.5K recent benign raw executables from diverse sources, which will be made public as a dataset called PACE (Publicly Accessible Collection(s) of Executables) to alleviate the scarcity of publicly available benign datasets for studying malware detection and provide future research with more representative data of the time.

Object detection is a critical component of various security-sensitive applications, such as autonomous driving and video surveillance. However, existing object detectors are vulnerable to adversarial attacks, which poses a significant challenge to their reliability and security. Through experiments, first, we found that existing works on improving the adversarial robustness of object detectors give a false sense of security. Second, we found that adversarially pre-trained backbone networks were essential for enhancing the adversarial robustness of object detectors. We then proposed a simple yet effective recipe for fast adversarial fine-tuning on object detectors with adversarially pre-trained backbones. Without any modifications to the structure of object detectors, our recipe achieved significantly better adversarial robustness than previous works. Finally, we explored the potential of different modern object detector designs for improving adversarial robustness with our recipe and demonstrated interesting findings, which inspired us to design state-of-the-art (SOTA) robust detectors. Our empirical results set a new milestone for adversarially robust object detection. Code and trained checkpoints are available at https://github.com/thu-ml/oddefense.

With the advent of Large Vision-Language Models (LVLMs), new attack vectors, such as cognitive bias, prompt injection, and jailbreaking, have emerged. Understanding these attacks promotes system robustness improvement and neural networks demystification. However, existing surveys often target attack taxonomy and lack in-depth analysis like 1) unified insights into adversariality, transferability, and generalization; 2) detailed evaluations framework; 3) motivation-driven attack categorizations; and 4) an integrated perspective on both traditional and LVLM attacks. This article addresses these gaps by offering a thorough summary of traditional and LVLM adversarial attacks, emphasizing their connections and distinctions, and providing actionable insights for future research.

The study of network robustness is a critical tool in the characterization and sense making of complex interconnected systems such as infrastructure, communication and social networks. While significant research has been conducted in all of these areas, gaps in the surveying literature still exist. Answers to key questions are currently scattered across multiple scientific fields and numerous papers. In this survey, we distill key findings across numerous domains and provide researchers crucial access to important information by--(1) summarizing and comparing recent and classical graph robustness measures; (2) exploring which robustness measures are most applicable to different categories of networks (e.g., social, infrastructure; (3) reviewing common network attack strategies, and summarizing which attacks are most effective across different network topologies; and (4) extensive discussion on selecting defense techniques to mitigate attacks across a variety of networks. This survey guides researchers and practitioners in navigating the expansive field of network robustness, while summarizing answers to key questions. We conclude by highlighting current research directions and open problems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional proficiency in instruction-following, becoming increasingly crucial across various applications. However, this capability brings with it the risk of prompt injection attacks, where attackers inject instructions into LLMs' input to elicit undesirable actions or content. Understanding the robustness of LLMs against such attacks is vital for their safe implementation. In this work, we establish a benchmark to evaluate the robustness of instruction-following LLMs against prompt injection attacks. Our objective is to determine the extent to which LLMs can be influenced by injected instructions and their ability to differentiate between these injected and original target instructions. Through extensive experiments with leading instruction-following LLMs, we uncover significant vulnerabilities in their robustness to such attacks. Our results indicate that some models are overly tuned to follow any embedded instructions in the prompt, overly focusing on the latter parts of the prompt without fully grasping the entire context. By contrast, models with a better grasp of the context and instruction-following capabilities will potentially be more susceptible to compromise by injected instructions. This underscores the need to shift the focus from merely enhancing LLMs' instruction-following capabilities to improving their overall comprehension of prompts and discernment of instructions that are appropriate to follow. We hope our in-depth analysis offers insights into the underlying causes of these vulnerabilities, aiding in the development of future solutions. Code and data are available at https://github.com/Leezekun/instruction-following-robustness-eval

The widespread use of large language models (LLMs) is increasing the demand for methods that detect machine-generated text to prevent misuse. The goal of our study is to stress test the detectors' robustness to malicious attacks under realistic scenarios. We comprehensively study the robustness of popular machine-generated text detectors under attacks from diverse categories: editing, paraphrasing, prompting, and co-generating. Our attacks assume limited access to the generator LLMs, and we compare the performance of detectors on different attacks under different budget levels. Our experiments reveal that almost none of the existing detectors remain robust under all the attacks, and all detectors exhibit different loopholes. Averaging all detectors, the performance drops by 35% across all attacks. Further, we investigate the reasons behind these defects and propose initial out-of-the-box patches to improve robustness.

With the perpetual increase of complexity of the state-of-the-art deep neural networks, it becomes a more and more challenging task to maintain their interpretability. Our work aims to evaluate the effects of adversarial training utilized to produce robust models - less vulnerable to adversarial attacks. It has been shown to make computer vision models more interpretable. Interpretability is as essential as robustness when we deploy the models to the real world. To prove the correlation between these two problems, we extensively examine the models using local feature-importance methods (SHAP, Integrated Gradients) and feature visualization techniques (Representation Inversion, Class Specific Image Generation). Standard models, compared to robust are more susceptible to adversarial attacks, and their learned representations are less meaningful to humans. Conversely, these models focus on distinctive regions of the images which support their predictions. Moreover, the features learned by the robust model are closer to the real ones.

The lack of adversarial robustness has been recognized as an important issue for state-of-the-art machine learning (ML) models, e.g., deep neural networks (DNNs). Thereby, robustifying ML models against adversarial attacks is now a major focus of research. However, nearly all existing defense methods, particularly for robust training, made the white-box assumption that the defender has the access to the details of an ML model (or its surrogate alternatives if available), e.g., its architectures and parameters. Beyond existing works, in this paper we aim to address the problem of black-box defense: How to robustify a black-box model using just input queries and output feedback? Such a problem arises in practical scenarios, where the owner of the predictive model is reluctant to share model information in order to preserve privacy. To this end, we propose a general notion of defensive operation that can be applied to black-box models, and design it through the lens of denoised smoothing (DS), a first-order (FO) certified defense technique. To allow the design of merely using model queries, we further integrate DS with the zeroth-order (gradient-free) optimization. However, a direct implementation of zeroth-order (ZO) optimization suffers a high variance of gradient estimates, and thus leads to ineffective defense. To tackle this problem, we next propose to prepend an autoencoder (AE) to a given (black-box) model so that DS can be trained using variance-reduced ZO optimization. We term the eventual defense as ZO-AE-DS. In practice, we empirically show that ZO-AE- DS can achieve improved accuracy, certified robustness, and query complexity over existing baselines. And the effectiveness of our approach is justified under both image classification and image reconstruction tasks. Codes are available at https://github.com/damon-demon/Black-Box-Defense.

Adversarial robustness has become a central goal in deep learning, both in the theory and the practice. However, successful methods to improve the adversarial robustness (such as adversarial training) greatly hurt generalization performance on the unperturbed data. This could have a major impact on how the adversarial robustness affects real world systems (i.e. many may opt to forego robustness if it can improve accuracy on the unperturbed data). We propose Interpolated Adversarial Training, which employs recently proposed interpolation based training methods in the framework of adversarial training. On CIFAR-10, adversarial training increases the standard test error (when there is no adversary) from 4.43% to 12.32%, whereas with our Interpolated adversarial training we retain the adversarial robustness while achieving a standard test error of only 6.45%. With our technique, the relative increase in the standard error for the robust model is reduced from 178.1% to just 45.5%. Moreover, we provide mathematical analysis of Interpolated Adversarial Training to confirm its efficiencies and demonstrate its advantages in terms of robustness and generalization.

Adversarial robustness evaluations of large language models (LLMs) typically report attack success rate (ASR) under fixed query budgets, implicitly treating all attacks as equally costly. In practice, the computational expense of different attack strategies can vary by orders of magnitude. Consequently, ASR at a fixed budget can obscure the true effort required to jailbreak a model, thereby making it hard to determine whether an attack's cost justifies its payoff to the attacker. We propose a compute-aware evaluation framework based on computational pressure, measured in cumulative floating-point operations (FLOPs), as a proxy for adversarial effort. We introduce risk-compute curves, which map compute budgets to attack risk, and derive two metrics that summarize the average pressure required for a given attack to succeed. Across ten models spanning three families and four different stages in language model training and alignment, evaluated with three attack strategies (gradient-based, iterative refinement, and template-based) on two jailbreak robustness benchmarks, we find: (1) alignment training has non-monotonic effects on compute-space robustness; (2) scaling model size reduces gradient-based attack effectiveness but has limited impact on cheaper template-based attacks; (3) gradient-based attacks optimized on a surrogate model can transfer to a separate target model, providing a way to reduce attacker costs; (4) compute cost varies by up to {approx}5{times} across harm categories within a single model; and (5) safety-aligned RL increases aggregate cost while leaving some categories disproportionately accessible. We release our framework to enable compute-aware risk assessment and evaluation.

Multi-modal models have shown a promising capability to effectively integrate information from various sources, yet meanwhile, they are found vulnerable to pervasive perturbations, such as uni-modal attacks and missing conditions. To counter these perturbations, robust multi-modal representations are highly expected, which are positioned well away from the discriminative multi-modal decision boundary. In this paper, different from conventional empirical studies, we focus on a commonly used joint multi-modal framework and theoretically discover that larger uni-modal representation margins and more reliable integration for modalities are essential components for achieving higher robustness. This discovery can further explain the limitation of multi-modal robustness and the phenomenon that multi-modal models are often vulnerable to attacks on the specific modality. Moreover, our analysis reveals how the widespread issue, that the model has different preferences for modalities, limits the multi-modal robustness by influencing the essential components and could lead to attacks on the specific modality highly effective. Inspired by our theoretical finding, we introduce a training procedure called Certifiable Robust Multi-modal Training (CRMT), which can alleviate this influence from modality preference and explicitly regulate essential components to significantly improve robustness in a certifiable manner. Our method demonstrates substantial improvements in performance and robustness compared with existing methods. Furthermore, our training procedure can be easily extended to enhance other robust training strategies, highlighting its credibility and flexibility.

The LLM unlearning technique has recently been introduced to comply with data regulations and address the safety and ethical concerns of LLMs by removing the undesired data-model influence. However, state-of-the-art unlearning methods face a critical vulnerability: they are susceptible to ``relearning'' the removed information from a small number of forget data points, known as relearning attacks. In this paper, we systematically investigate how to make unlearned models robust against such attacks. For the first time, we establish a connection between robust unlearning and sharpness-aware minimization (SAM) through a unified robust optimization framework, in an analogy to adversarial training designed to defend against adversarial attacks. Our analysis for SAM reveals that smoothness optimization plays a pivotal role in mitigating relearning attacks. Thus, we further explore diverse smoothing strategies to enhance unlearning robustness. Extensive experiments on benchmark datasets, including WMDP and MUSE, demonstrate that SAM and other smoothness optimization approaches consistently improve the resistance of LLM unlearning to relearning attacks. Notably, smoothness-enhanced unlearning also helps defend against (input-level) jailbreaking attacks, broadening our proposal's impact in robustifying LLM unlearning. Codes are available at https://github.com/OPTML-Group/Unlearn-Smooth.

LLM based agents are increasingly deployed in high stakes settings where they process external data sources such as emails, documents, and code repositories. This creates exposure to indirect prompt injection attacks, where adversarial instructions embedded in external content manipulate agent behavior without user awareness. A critical but underexplored dimension of this threat is concealment: since users tend to observe only an agent's final response, an attack can conceal its existence by presenting no clue of compromise in the final user facing response while successfully executing harmful actions. This leaves users unaware of the manipulation and likely to accept harmful outcomes as legitimate. We present findings from a large scale public red teaming competition evaluating this dual objective across three agent settings: tool calling, coding, and computer use. The competition attracted 464 participants who submitted 272000 attack attempts against 13 frontier models, yielding 8648 successful attacks across 41 scenarios. All models proved vulnerable, with attack success rates ranging from 0.5% (Claude Opus 4.5) to 8.5% (Gemini 2.5 Pro). We identify universal attack strategies that transfer across 21 of 41 behaviors and multiple model families, suggesting fundamental weaknesses in instruction following architectures. Capability and robustness showed weak correlation, with Gemini 2.5 Pro exhibiting both high capability and high vulnerability. To address benchmark saturation and obsoleteness, we will endeavor to deliver quarterly updates through continued red teaming competitions. We open source the competition environment for use in evaluations, along with 95 successful attacks against Qwen that did not transfer to any closed source model. We share model-specific attack data with respective frontier labs and the full dataset with the UK AISI and US CAISI to support robustness research.

Evaluating the robustness of a defense model is a challenging task in adversarial robustness research. Obfuscated gradients have previously been found to exist in many defense methods and cause a false signal of robustness. In this paper, we identify a more subtle situation called Imbalanced Gradients that can also cause overestimated adversarial robustness. The phenomenon of imbalanced gradients occurs when the gradient of one term of the margin loss dominates and pushes the attack towards to a suboptimal direction. To exploit imbalanced gradients, we formulate a Margin Decomposition (MD) attack that decomposes a margin loss into individual terms and then explores the attackability of these terms separately via a two-stage process. We also propose a multi-targeted and ensemble version of our MD attack. By investigating 24 defense models proposed since 2018, we find that 11 models are susceptible to a certain degree of imbalanced gradients and our MD attack can decrease their robustness evaluated by the best standalone baseline attack by more than 1%. We also provide an in-depth investigation on the likely causes of imbalanced gradients and effective countermeasures. Our code is available at https://github.com/HanxunH/MDAttack.

Mainstream backdoor attack methods typically demand substantial tuning data for poisoning, limiting their practicality and potentially degrading the overall performance when applied to Large Language Models (LLMs). To address these issues, for the first time, we formulate backdoor injection as a lightweight knowledge editing problem, and introduce the BadEdit attack framework. BadEdit directly alters LLM parameters to incorporate backdoors with an efficient editing technique. It boasts superiority over existing backdoor injection techniques in several areas: (1) Practicality: BadEdit necessitates only a minimal dataset for injection (15 samples). (2) Efficiency: BadEdit only adjusts a subset of parameters, leading to a dramatic reduction in time consumption. (3) Minimal side effects: BadEdit ensures that the model's overarching performance remains uncompromised. (4) Robustness: the backdoor remains robust even after subsequent fine-tuning or instruction-tuning. Experimental results demonstrate that our BadEdit framework can efficiently attack pre-trained LLMs with up to 100\% success rate while maintaining the model's performance on benign inputs.

Federated Learning (FL) is a distributed learning paradigm that enables different parties to train a model together for high quality and strong privacy protection. In this scenario, individual participants may get compromised and perform backdoor attacks by poisoning the data (or gradients). Existing work on robust aggregation and certified FL robustness does not study how hardening benign clients can affect the global model (and the malicious clients). In this work, we theoretically analyze the connection among cross-entropy loss, attack success rate, and clean accuracy in this setting. Moreover, we propose a trigger reverse engineering based defense and show that our method can achieve robustness improvement with guarantee (i.e., reducing the attack success rate) without affecting benign accuracy. We conduct comprehensive experiments across different datasets and attack settings. Our results on eight competing SOTA defense methods show the empirical superiority of our method on both single-shot and continuous FL backdoor attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/KaiyuanZh/FLIP.

Robustness is a long-overlooked problem in deepfake detection. However, detection performance is nearly worthless in the real world if it suffers under exposure to even slight image degradation. In addition to weaker degradations that can accidentally occur in the image processing pipeline, there is another risk of malicious deepfakes that specifically introduce degradations, purposefully exploiting the detector's weaknesses in that regard. Here, we present an overview of the NTIRE 2026 Robust Deepfake Detection Challenge, which specifically addresses that problem. Participants were tasked with building a detector that would later be tested on an unknown test-set, which included both common and uncommon degradations of various strengths. With a total number of 337 participants and 57 submissions to the final leaderboard, the first edition of the challenge was well received. To ensure the reliability of the results, participants were given only 24h to complete the test run with no labels provided, limiting the possibility of training on the test data. Furthermore, the top solutions were scored on a private test-set to detect any such overfitting. This report presents the competition setting, dataset preparation, as well as details and performance of methods. Top methods rely on large foundation models, ensembles, and degradation training to combine generality and robustness.

Instances-reweighted adversarial training (IRAT) can significantly boost the robustness of trained models, where data being less/more vulnerable to the given attack are assigned smaller/larger weights during training. However, when tested on attacks different from the given attack simulated in training, the robustness may drop significantly (e.g., even worse than no reweighting). In this paper, we study this problem and propose our solution--locally reweighted adversarial training (LRAT). The rationale behind IRAT is that we do not need to pay much attention to an instance that is already safe under the attack. We argue that the safeness should be attack-dependent, so that for the same instance, its weight can change given different attacks based on the same model. Thus, if the attack simulated in training is mis-specified, the weights of IRAT are misleading. To this end, LRAT pairs each instance with its adversarial variants and performs local reweighting inside each pair, while performing no global reweighting--the rationale is to fit the instance itself if it is immune to the attack, but not to skip the pair, in order to passively defend different attacks in future. Experiments show that LRAT works better than both IRAT (i.e., global reweighting) and the standard AT (i.e., no reweighting) when trained with an attack and tested on different attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional capabilities across diverse tasks, driving the development and widespread adoption of LLM-as-a-Judge systems for automated evaluation, including red teaming and benchmarking. However, these systems are susceptible to adversarial attacks that can manipulate evaluation outcomes, raising critical concerns about their robustness and trustworthiness. Existing evaluation methods for LLM-based judges are often fragmented and lack a unified framework for comprehensive robustness assessment. Furthermore, the impact of prompt template design and model selection on judge robustness has rarely been explored, and their performance in real-world deployments remains largely unverified. To address these gaps, we introduce RobustJudge, a fully automated and scalable framework designed to systematically evaluate the robustness of LLM-as-a-Judge systems. Specifically, RobustJudge investigates the effectiveness of 15 attack methods and 7 defense strategies across 12 models (RQ1), examines the impact of prompt template design and model selection (RQ2), and evaluates the security of real-world deployments (RQ3). Our study yields three key findings: (1) LLM-as-a-Judge systems are highly vulnerable to attacks such as PAIR and combined attacks, while defense mechanisms such as re-tokenization and LLM-based detectors can provide enhanced protection; (2) robustness varies substantially across prompt templates (up to 40%); (3) deploying RobustJudge on Alibaba's PAI platform uncovers previously undiscovered vulnerabilities. These results offer practical insights for building trustworthy LLM-as-a-Judge systems.

Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompts. In this work, we argue that one of the primary vulnerabilities underlying these attacks is that LLMs often consider system prompts (e.g., text from an application developer) to be the same priority as text from untrusted users and third parties. To address this, we propose an instruction hierarchy that explicitly defines how models should behave when instructions of different priorities conflict. We then propose a data generation method to demonstrate this hierarchical instruction following behavior, which teaches LLMs to selectively ignore lower-privileged instructions. We apply this method to GPT-3.5, showing that it drastically increases robustness -- even for attack types not seen during training -- while imposing minimal degradations on standard capabilities.

Counterfactual explanations and adversarial attacks have a related goal: flipping output labels with minimal perturbations regardless of their characteristics. Yet, adversarial attacks cannot be used directly in a counterfactual explanation perspective, as such perturbations are perceived as noise and not as actionable and understandable image modifications. Building on the robust learning literature, this paper proposes an elegant method to turn adversarial attacks into semantically meaningful perturbations, without modifying the classifiers to explain. The proposed approach hypothesizes that Denoising Diffusion Probabilistic Models are excellent regularizers for avoiding high-frequency and out-of-distribution perturbations when generating adversarial attacks. The paper's key idea is to build attacks through a diffusion model to polish them. This allows studying the target model regardless of its robustification level. Extensive experimentation shows the advantages of our counterfactual explanation approach over current State-of-the-Art in multiple testbeds.

As large language models (LLMs) are deployed in safety-critical settings, it is essential to ensure that their responses comply with safety standards. Prior research has revealed that LLMs often fail to grasp the notion of safe behaviors, resulting in either unjustified refusals to harmless prompts or the generation of harmful content. While substantial efforts have been made to improve their robustness, existing defenses often rely on costly fine-tuning of model parameters or employ suboptimal heuristic techniques. In this work, we take a novel approach to safeguard LLMs by learning to adapt the system prompts in instruction-tuned LLMs. While LLMs are typically pre-trained to follow a fixed system prompt, we investigate the impact of tailoring the system prompt to each specific user input on the safety of the responses. To this end, we propose Sysformer, a transformer model that updates an initial system prompt to a more robust system prompt in the LLM input embedding space while attending to the user prompt. While keeping the LLM parameters frozen, the Sysformer is trained to refuse to respond to a set of harmful prompts while responding ideally to a set of safe ones. Through extensive experiments on 5 LLMs from different families and 2 recent benchmarks, we demonstrate that Sysformer can significantly enhance the robustness of LLMs, leading to upto 80% gain in the refusal rate on harmful prompts while enhancing the compliance with the safe prompts by upto 90%. Results also generalize well to sophisticated jailbreaking attacks, making LLMs upto 100% more robust against different attack strategies. We hope our findings lead to cheaper safeguarding of LLMs and motivate future investigations into designing variable system prompts.

Harmful fine-tuning poses critical safety risks to fine-tuning-as-a-service for large language models. Existing defense strategies preemptively build robustness via attack simulation but suffer from fundamental limitations: (i) the infeasibility of extending attack simulations beyond bounded threat models due to the inherent difficulty of anticipating unknown attacks, and (ii) limited adaptability to varying attack settings, as simulation fails to capture their variability and complexity. To address these challenges, we propose Bayesian Data Scheduler (BDS), an adaptive tuning-stage defense strategy with no need for attack simulation. BDS formulates harmful fine-tuning defense as a Bayesian inference problem, learning the posterior distribution of each data point's safety attribute, conditioned on the fine-tuning and alignment datasets. The fine-tuning process is then constrained by weighting data with their safety attributes sampled from the posterior, thus mitigating the influence of harmful data. By leveraging the post hoc nature of Bayesian inference, the posterior is conditioned on the fine-tuning dataset, enabling BDS to tailor its defense to the specific dataset, thereby achieving adaptive defense. Furthermore, we introduce a neural scheduler based on amortized Bayesian learning, enabling efficient transfer to new data without retraining. Comprehensive results across diverse attack and defense settings demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of our approach. Code is available at https://github.com/Egg-Hu/Bayesian-Data-Scheduler.

In light of the burgeoning success of reinforcement learning (RL) in diverse real-world applications, considerable focus has been directed towards ensuring RL policies are robust to adversarial attacks during test time. Current approaches largely revolve around solving a minimax problem to prepare for potential worst-case scenarios. While effective against strong attacks, these methods often compromise performance in the absence of attacks or the presence of only weak attacks. To address this, we study policy robustness under the well-accepted state-adversarial attack model, extending our focus beyond only worst-case attacks. We first formalize this task at test time as a regret minimization problem and establish its intrinsic hardness in achieving sublinear regret when the baseline policy is from a general continuous policy class, Pi. This finding prompts us to refine the baseline policy class Pi prior to test time, aiming for efficient adaptation within a finite policy class Pi, which can resort to an adversarial bandit subroutine. In light of the importance of a small, finite Pi, we propose a novel training-time algorithm to iteratively discover non-dominated policies, forming a near-optimal and minimal Pi, thereby ensuring both robustness and test-time efficiency. Empirical validation on the Mujoco corroborates the superiority of our approach in terms of natural and robust performance, as well as adaptability to various attack scenarios.

Watermark algorithms for large language models (LLMs) have achieved extremely high accuracy in detecting text generated by LLMs. Such algorithms typically involve adding extra watermark logits to the LLM's logits at each generation step. However, prior algorithms face a trade-off between attack robustness and security robustness. This is because the watermark logits for a token are determined by a certain number of preceding tokens; a small number leads to low security robustness, while a large number results in insufficient attack robustness. In this work, we propose a semantic invariant watermarking method for LLMs that provides both attack robustness and security robustness. The watermark logits in our work are determined by the semantics of all preceding tokens. Specifically, we utilize another embedding LLM to generate semantic embeddings for all preceding tokens, and then these semantic embeddings are transformed into the watermark logits through our trained watermark model. Subsequent analyses and experiments demonstrated the attack robustness of our method in semantically invariant settings: synonym substitution and text paraphrasing settings. Finally, we also show that our watermark possesses adequate security robustness. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/THU-BPM/Robust_Watermark.

Deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples. Adversarial training (AT) is an effective defense against adversarial examples. However, AT is prone to overfitting which degrades robustness substantially. Recently, data augmentation (DA) was shown to be effective in mitigating robust overfitting if appropriately designed and optimized for AT. This work proposes a new method to automatically learn online, instance-wise, DA policies to improve robust generalization for AT. A novel policy learning objective, consisting of Vulnerability, Affinity and Diversity, is proposed and shown to be sufficiently effective and efficient to be practical for automatic DA generation during AT. This allows our method to efficiently explore a large search space for a more effective DA policy and evolve the policy as training progresses. Empirically, our method is shown to outperform or match all competitive DA methods across various model architectures (CNNs and ViTs) and datasets (CIFAR10, SVHN and Imagenette). Our DA policy reinforced vanilla AT to surpass several state-of-the-art AT methods (with baseline DA) in terms of both accuracy and robustness. It can also be combined with those advanced AT methods to produce a further boost in robustness.

Recently, we have witnessed the bloom of neural ranking models in the information retrieval (IR) field. So far, much effort has been devoted to developing effective neural ranking models that can generalize well on new data. There has been less attention paid to the robustness perspective. Unlike the effectiveness which is about the average performance of a system under normal purpose, robustness cares more about the system performance in the worst case or under malicious operations instead. When a new technique enters into the real-world application, it is critical to know not only how it works in average, but also how would it behave in abnormal situations. So we raise the question in this work: Are neural ranking models robust? To answer this question, firstly, we need to clarify what we refer to when we talk about the robustness of ranking models in IR. We show that robustness is actually a multi-dimensional concept and there are three ways to define it in IR: 1) The performance variance under the independent and identically distributed (I.I.D.) setting; 2) The out-of-distribution (OOD) generalizability; and 3) The defensive ability against adversarial operations. The latter two definitions can be further specified into two different perspectives respectively, leading to 5 robustness tasks in total. Based on this taxonomy, we build corresponding benchmark datasets, design empirical experiments, and systematically analyze the robustness of several representative neural ranking models against traditional probabilistic ranking models and learning-to-rank (LTR) models. The empirical results show that there is no simple answer to our question. While neural ranking models are less robust against other IR models in most cases, some of them can still win 1 out of 5 tasks. This is the first comprehensive study on the robustness of neural ranking models.

A membership inference attack allows an adversary to query a trained machine learning model to predict whether or not a particular example was contained in the model's training dataset. These attacks are currently evaluated using average-case "accuracy" metrics that fail to characterize whether the attack can confidently identify any members of the training set. We argue that attacks should instead be evaluated by computing their true-positive rate at low (e.g., <0.1%) false-positive rates, and find most prior attacks perform poorly when evaluated in this way. To address this we develop a Likelihood Ratio Attack (LiRA) that carefully combines multiple ideas from the literature. Our attack is 10x more powerful at low false-positive rates, and also strictly dominates prior attacks on existing metrics.

Activation steering has become a popular training-free method to control LLM behavior by injecting precomputed direction vectors into the model's residual stream at inference time. Yet its robustness to realistic input variation remains unstudied. We present the first systematic evaluation of activation steering robustness under adversarial text perturbations on the inputs, covering four extraction methods, three attack strategies, six personas from Anthropic Model-Written Evaluation Dataset, and five models ranging from 1.5B to 30B parameters. Attacks succeed broadly across all settings: directional robustness drops by up to 64%, post-attack confidence collapses near or below 0.25 across all methods and models, and steering strength degrades on nearly every steerable input. Layer selection is equally fragile, with the optimal layer identified by an automated method on clean inputs shifting by up to 17 positions under perturbation, a failure that compounds the vector-level breakdown. Extracting vectors from adversarially perturbed inputs partially recovers steerability for PCA and MD on mid-to-large models, but they consistently fail to locate the improved optimal layer, limiting the practical benefit of this mitigation. Together, these findings reveal that the brittleness of activation steering is structural rather than method-specific, and that current layer selection strategies are not robust enough for real-world deployment.

Current open-weight large language models (LLMs) are prone to malicious finetuning attacks, which could compromise the safety alignment of LLMs with only a few steps of supervised finetuning (SFT) on poisoned datasets. Existing alignment-stage defenses are primarily designed to defend against attacks that use parameter-efficient finetuning methods. However, they fail to defend against stronger attacks that use full-parameter finetuning. In this paper, we propose Patcher, a method inspired by adversarial training and bi-level optimization, to combat such attacks. Patcher strengthens the simulated attack by scaling up the optimization steps in the adversarial loop, thus forcing the defender to find model parameters that are insensitive to stronger attacks. Furthermore, we propose an efficient parallel algorithm to implement Patcher, decreasing the wall-clock time of training while preserving Patcher's performance. Extensive experiments show that Patcher substantially improves the model's robustness compared to vanilla SFT alignment, and transfers to diverse attack scenarios and model sizes. Code is available at https://github.com/haomingwen/patcher.

The advent of instruction-tuned Large Language Models designed for coding tasks (Code LLMs) has transformed software engineering practices. However, their robustness against various input challenges remains a critical concern. This study introduces DegradePrompter, a novel method designed to systematically evaluate the robustness of instruction-tuned Code LLMs. We assess the impact of diverse input challenges on the functionality and correctness of generated code using rigorous metrics and established benchmarks. Our comprehensive evaluation includes five state-of-the-art open-source models and three production-grade closed-source models, revealing varying degrees of robustness. Open-source models demonstrate an increased susceptibility to input perturbations, resulting in declines in functional correctness ranging from 12% to 34%. In contrast, commercial models demonstrate relatively greater resilience, with performance degradation ranging from 3% to 24%. To enhance the robustness of the models against these vulnerabilities, we investigate a straightforward yet effective mitigation strategy. Our findings highlight the need for robust defense mechanisms and comprehensive evaluations during both the development and deployment phases to ensure the resilience and reliability of automated code generation systems.

The trade-off between robustness and accuracy has been widely studied in the adversarial literature. Although still controversial, the prevailing view is that this trade-off is inherent, either empirically or theoretically. Thus, we dig for the origin of this trade-off in adversarial training and find that it may stem from the improperly defined robust error, which imposes an inductive bias of local invariance -- an overcorrection towards smoothness. Given this, we advocate employing local equivariance to describe the ideal behavior of a robust model, leading to a self-consistent robust error named SCORE. By definition, SCORE facilitates the reconciliation between robustness and accuracy, while still handling the worst-case uncertainty via robust optimization. By simply substituting KL divergence with variants of distance metrics, SCORE can be efficiently minimized. Empirically, our models achieve top-rank performance on RobustBench under AutoAttack. Besides, SCORE provides instructive insights for explaining the overfitting phenomenon and semantic input gradients observed on robust models. Code is available at https://github.com/P2333/SCORE.

Prompt injection attacks pose serious security risks across a wide range of real-world applications. While receiving increasing attention, the community faces a critical gap: the lack of a unified platform for prompt injection evaluation. This makes it challenging to reliably compare defenses, understand their true robustness under diverse attacks, or assess how well they generalize across tasks and benchmarks. For instance, many defenses initially reported as effective were later found to exhibit limited robustness on diverse datasets and attacks. To bridge this gap, we introduce PIArena, a unified and extensible platform for prompt injection evaluation that enables users to easily integrate state-of-the-art attacks and defenses and evaluate them across a variety of existing and new benchmarks. We also design a dynamic strategy-based attack that adaptively optimizes injected prompts based on defense feedback. Through comprehensive evaluation using PIArena, we uncover critical limitations of state-of-the-art defenses: limited generalizability across tasks, vulnerability to adaptive attacks, and fundamental challenges when an injected task aligns with the target task. The code and datasets are available at https://github.com/sleeepeer/PIArena.

Pre-trained language models (PLMs) have driven substantial progress in natural language processing but remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks, raising concerns about their robustness in real-world applications. Previous studies have sought to mitigate the impact of adversarial attacks by introducing adversarial perturbations into the training process, either implicitly or explicitly. While both strategies enhance robustness, they often incur high computational costs. In this work, we propose a simple yet effective add-on module that enhances the adversarial robustness of PLMs by removing instance-level principal components, without relying on conventional adversarial defences or perturbing the original training data. Our approach transforms the embedding space to approximate Gaussian properties, thereby reducing its susceptibility to adversarial perturbations while preserving semantic relationships. This transformation aligns embedding distributions in a way that minimises the impact of adversarial noise on decision boundaries, enhancing robustness without requiring adversarial examples or costly training-time augmentation. Evaluations on eight benchmark datasets show that our approach improves adversarial robustness while maintaining comparable before-attack accuracy to baselines, achieving a balanced trade-off between robustness and generalisation.

Training a high-performance deep neural network requires large amounts of data and computational resources. Protecting the intellectual property (IP) and commercial ownership of a deep model is challenging yet increasingly crucial. A major stream of watermarking strategies implants verifiable backdoor triggers by poisoning training samples, but these are often unrealistic due to data privacy and safety concerns and are vulnerable to minor model changes such as fine-tuning. To overcome these challenges, we propose a safe and robust backdoor-based watermark injection technique that leverages the diverse knowledge from a single out-of-distribution (OoD) image, which serves as a secret key for IP verification. The independence of training data makes it agnostic to third-party promises of IP security. We induce robustness via random perturbation of model parameters during watermark injection to defend against common watermark removal attacks, including fine-tuning, pruning, and model extraction. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed watermarking approach is not only time- and sample-efficient without training data, but also robust against the watermark removal attacks above.

Adversarial robustness often comes at the cost of degraded accuracy, impeding the real-life application of robust classification models. Training-based solutions for better trade-offs are limited by incompatibilities with already-trained high-performance large models, necessitating the exploration of training-free ensemble approaches. Observing that robust models are more confident in correct predictions than in incorrect ones on clean and adversarial data alike, we speculate amplifying this "benign confidence property" can reconcile accuracy and robustness in an ensemble setting. To achieve so, we propose "MixedNUTS", a training-free method where the output logits of a robust classifier and a standard non-robust classifier are processed by nonlinear transformations with only three parameters, which are optimized through an efficient algorithm. MixedNUTS then converts the transformed logits into probabilities and mixes them as the overall output. On CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet datasets, experimental results with custom strong adaptive attacks demonstrate MixedNUTS's vastly improved accuracy and near-SOTA robustness -- it boosts CIFAR-100 clean accuracy by 7.86 points, sacrificing merely 0.87 points in robust accuracy.

A popular class of defenses against prompt injection attacks on large language models (LLMs) relies on fine-tuning to separate instructions and data, so that the LLM does not follow instructions that might be present with data. We evaluate the robustness of this approach in the whitebox setting by constructing strong optimization-based attacks, and show that the defenses do not provide the claimed security properties. Specifically, we construct a novel attention-based attack algorithm for textual LLMs and apply it to three recent whitebox defenses SecAlign (CCS 2025), SecAlign++, and StruQ (USENIX Security 2025), showing attacks with success rates of up to 85-95\% on unseen prompts with modest increase in attacker budget in terms of tokens. Our findings make fundamental progress towards understanding the robustness of prompt injection defenses in the whitebox setting. We release our code and attacks at https://github.com/nishitvp/better_opts_attacks

Phishing attacks pose a significant threat to Internet users, with cybercriminals elaborately replicating the visual appearance of legitimate websites to deceive victims. Visual similarity-based detection systems have emerged as an effective countermeasure, but their effectiveness and robustness in real-world scenarios have been underexplored. In this paper, we comprehensively scrutinize and evaluate the effectiveness and robustness of popular visual similarity-based anti-phishing models using a large-scale dataset of 451k real-world phishing websites. Our analyses of the effectiveness reveal that while certain visual similarity-based models achieve high accuracy on curated datasets in the experimental settings, they exhibit notably low performance on real-world datasets, highlighting the importance of real-world evaluation. Furthermore, we find that the attackers evade the detectors mainly in three ways: (1) directly attacking the model pipelines, (2) mimicking benign logos, and (3) employing relatively simple strategies such as eliminating logos from screenshots. To statistically assess the resilience and robustness of existing models against adversarial attacks, we categorize the strategies attackers employ into visible and perturbation-based manipulations and apply them to website logos. We then evaluate the models' robustness using these adversarial samples. Our findings reveal potential vulnerabilities in several models, emphasizing the need for more robust visual similarity techniques capable of withstanding sophisticated evasion attempts. We provide actionable insights for enhancing the security of phishing defense systems, encouraging proactive actions.

Recently, Zaremba et al. demonstrated that increasing inference-time computation improves robustness in large proprietary reasoning LLMs. In this paper, we first show that smaller-scale, open-source models (e.g., DeepSeek R1, Qwen3, Phi-reasoning) can also benefit from inference-time scaling using a simple budget forcing strategy. More importantly, we reveal and critically examine an implicit assumption in prior work: intermediate reasoning steps are hidden from adversaries. By relaxing this assumption, we identify an important security risk, intuitively motivated and empirically verified as an inverse scaling law: if intermediate reasoning steps become explicitly accessible, increased inference-time computation consistently reduces model robustness. Finally, we discuss practical scenarios where models with hidden reasoning chains are still vulnerable to attacks, such as models with tool-integrated reasoning and advanced reasoning extraction attacks. Our findings collectively demonstrate that the robustness benefits of inference-time scaling depend heavily on the adversarial setting and deployment context. We urge practitioners to carefully weigh these subtle trade-offs before applying inference-time scaling in security-sensitive, real-world applications.

Existing works have made great progress in improving adversarial robustness, but typically test their method only on data from the same distribution as the training data, i.e. in-distribution (ID) testing. As a result, it is unclear how such robustness generalizes under input distribution shifts, i.e. out-of-distribution (OOD) testing. This omission is concerning as such distribution shifts are unavoidable when methods are deployed in the wild. To address this issue we propose a benchmark named OODRobustBench to comprehensively assess OOD adversarial robustness using 23 dataset-wise shifts (i.e. naturalistic shifts in input distribution) and 6 threat-wise shifts (i.e., unforeseen adversarial threat models). OODRobustBench is used to assess 706 robust models using 60.7K adversarial evaluations. This large-scale analysis shows that: 1) adversarial robustness suffers from a severe OOD generalization issue; 2) ID robustness correlates strongly with OOD robustness in a positive linear way. The latter enables the prediction of OOD robustness from ID robustness. We then predict and verify that existing methods are unlikely to achieve high OOD robustness. Novel methods are therefore required to achieve OOD robustness beyond our prediction. To facilitate the development of these methods, we investigate a wide range of techniques and identify several promising directions. Code and models are available at: https://github.com/OODRobustBench/OODRobustBench.

As the AI systems become deeply embedded in social media platforms, we've uncovered a concerning security vulnerability that goes beyond traditional adversarial attacks. It becomes important to assess the risks of LLMs before the general public use them on social media platforms to avoid any adverse impacts. Unlike obvious nonsensical text strings that safety systems can easily catch, our work reveals that human-readable situation-driven adversarial full-prompts that leverage situational context are effective but much harder to detect. We found that skilled attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities in open-source and proprietary LLMs to make a malicious user query safe for LLMs, resulting in generating a harmful response. This raises an important question about the vulnerabilities of LLMs. To measure the robustness against human-readable attacks, which now present a potent threat, our research makes three major contributions. First, we developed attacks that use movie scripts as situational contextual frameworks, creating natural-looking full-prompts that trick LLMs into generating harmful content. Second, we developed a method to transform gibberish adversarial text into readable, innocuous content that still exploits vulnerabilities when used within the full-prompts. Finally, we enhanced the AdvPrompter framework with p-nucleus sampling to generate diverse human-readable adversarial texts that significantly improve attack effectiveness against models like GPT-3.5-Turbo-0125 and Gemma-7b. Our findings show that these systems can be manipulated to operate beyond their intended ethical boundaries when presented with seemingly normal prompts that contain hidden adversarial elements. By identifying these vulnerabilities, we aim to drive the development of more robust safety mechanisms that can withstand sophisticated attacks in real-world applications.

The robustness of recent Large Language Models (LLMs) has become increasingly crucial as their applicability expands across various domains and real-world applications. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is a promising solution for addressing the limitations of LLMs, yet existing studies on the robustness of RAG often overlook the interconnected relationships between RAG components or the potential threats prevalent in real-world databases, such as minor textual errors. In this work, we investigate two underexplored aspects when assessing the robustness of RAG: 1) vulnerability to noisy documents through low-level perturbations and 2) a holistic evaluation of RAG robustness. Furthermore, we introduce a novel attack method, the Genetic Attack on RAG (GARAG), which targets these aspects. Specifically, GARAG is designed to reveal vulnerabilities within each component and test the overall system functionality against noisy documents. We validate RAG robustness by applying our GARAG to standard QA datasets, incorporating diverse retrievers and LLMs. The experimental results show that GARAG consistently achieves high attack success rates. Also, it significantly devastates the performance of each component and their synergy, highlighting the substantial risk that minor textual inaccuracies pose in disrupting RAG systems in the real world.

It is becoming increasingly clear that many machine learning classifiers are vulnerable to adversarial examples. In attempting to explain the origin of adversarial examples, previous studies have typically focused on the fact that neural networks operate on high dimensional data, they overfit, or they are too linear. Here we argue that the origin of adversarial examples is primarily due to an inherent uncertainty that neural networks have about their predictions. We show that the functional form of this uncertainty is independent of architecture, dataset, and training protocol; and depends only on the statistics of the logit differences of the network, which do not change significantly during training. This leads to adversarial error having a universal scaling, as a power-law, with respect to the size of the adversarial perturbation. We show that this universality holds for a broad range of datasets (MNIST, CIFAR10, ImageNet, and random data), models (including state-of-the-art deep networks, linear models, adversarially trained networks, and networks trained on randomly shuffled labels), and attacks (FGSM, step l.l., PGD). Motivated by these results, we study the effects of reducing prediction entropy on adversarial robustness. Finally, we study the effect of network architectures on adversarial sensitivity. To do this, we use neural architecture search with reinforcement learning to find adversarially robust architectures on CIFAR10. Our resulting architecture is more robust to white and black box attacks compared to previous attempts.

Designing models that are robust to small adversarial perturbations of their inputs has proven remarkably difficult. In this work we show that the reverse problem---making models more vulnerable---is surprisingly easy. After presenting some proofs of concept on MNIST, we introduce a generic tilting attack that injects vulnerabilities into the linear layers of pre-trained networks by increasing their sensitivity to components of low variance in the training data without affecting their performance on test data. We illustrate this attack on a multilayer perceptron trained on SVHN and use it to design a stand-alone adversarial module which we call a steganogram decoder. Finally, we show on CIFAR-10 that a poisoning attack with a poisoning rate as low as 0.1% can induce vulnerabilities to chosen imperceptible backdoor signals in state-of-the-art networks. Beyond their practical implications, these different results shed new light on the nature of the adversarial example phenomenon.

Large language model agents equipped with persistent memory are vulnerable to memory poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject malicious instructions through query only interactions that corrupt the agents long term memory and influence future responses. Recent work demonstrated that the MINJA (Memory Injection Attack) achieves over 95 % injection success rate and 70 % attack success rate under idealized conditions. However, the robustness of these attacks in realistic deployments and effective defensive mechanisms remain understudied. This work addresses these gaps through systematic empirical evaluation of memory poisoning attacks and defenses in Electronic Health Record (EHR) agents. We investigate attack robustness by varying three critical dimensions: initial memory state, number of indication prompts, and retrieval parameters. Our experiments on GPT-4o-mini, Gemini-2.0-Flash and Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct models using MIMIC-III clinical data reveal that realistic conditions with pre-existing legitimate memories dramatically reduce attack effectiveness. We then propose and evaluate two novel defense mechanisms: (1) Input/Output Moderation using composite trust scoring across multiple orthogonal signals, and (2) Memory Sanitization with trust-aware retrieval employing temporal decay and pattern-based filtering. Our defense evaluation reveals that effective memory sanitization requires careful trust threshold calibration to prevent both overly conservative rejection (blocking all entries) and insufficient filtering (missing subtle attacks), establishing important baselines for future adaptive defense mechanisms. These findings provide crucial insights for securing memory-augmented LLM agents in production environments.

Untrustworthy users can misuse image generators to synthesize high-quality deepfakes and engage in unethical activities. Watermarking deters misuse by marking generated content with a hidden message, enabling its detection using a secret watermarking key. A core security property of watermarking is robustness, which states that an attacker can only evade detection by substantially degrading image quality. Assessing robustness requires designing an adaptive attack for the specific watermarking algorithm. When evaluating watermarking algorithms and their (adaptive) attacks, it is challenging to determine whether an adaptive attack is optimal, i.e., the best possible attack. We solve this problem by defining an objective function and then approach adaptive attacks as an optimization problem. The core idea of our adaptive attacks is to replicate secret watermarking keys locally by creating surrogate keys that are differentiable and can be used to optimize the attack's parameters. We demonstrate for Stable Diffusion models that such an attacker can break all five surveyed watermarking methods at no visible degradation in image quality. Optimizing our attacks is efficient and requires less than 1 GPU hour to reduce the detection accuracy to 6.3% or less. Our findings emphasize the need for more rigorous robustness testing against adaptive, learnable attackers.

In the future, powerful AI systems may be deployed in high-stakes settings, where a single failure could be catastrophic. One technique for improving AI safety in high-stakes settings is adversarial training, which uses an adversary to generate examples to train on in order to achieve better worst-case performance. In this work, we used a safe language generation task (``avoid injuries'') as a testbed for achieving high reliability through adversarial training. We created a series of adversarial training techniques -- including a tool that assists human adversaries -- to find and eliminate failures in a classifier that filters text completions suggested by a generator. In our task, we determined that we can set very conservative classifier thresholds without significantly impacting the quality of the filtered outputs. We found that adversarial training increased robustness to the adversarial attacks that we trained on -- doubling the time for our contractors to find adversarial examples both with our tool (from 13 to 26 minutes) and without (from 20 to 44 minutes) -- without affecting in-distribution performance. We hope to see further work in the high-stakes reliability setting, including more powerful tools for enhancing human adversaries and better ways to measure high levels of reliability, until we can confidently rule out the possibility of catastrophic deployment-time failures of powerful models.

Recent advancements in Large Language Models (LLMs) have significantly enhanced their code generation capabilities. However, their robustness against adversarial misuse, particularly through multi-turn malicious coding prompts, remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce code decomposition attacks, where a malicious coding task is broken down into a series of seemingly benign subtasks across multiple conversational turns to evade safety filters. To facilitate systematic evaluation, we introduce , a large-scale benchmark designed to evaluate the robustness of code LLMs against both single-turn and multi-turn malicious prompts. Empirical results across open- and closed-source models reveal persistent vulnerabilities, especially under multi-turn scenarios. Fine-tuning on MOCHA improves rejection rates while preserving coding ability, and importantly, enhances robustness on external adversarial datasets with up to 32.4% increase in rejection rates without any additional supervision.

Modern language models often rely on Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) to encourage safe behaviors. However, they remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks due to three key limitations: (1) the inefficiency and high cost of human annotation, (2) the vast diversity of potential adversarial attacks, and (3) the risk of feedback bias and reward hacking. To address these challenges, we introduce Adversarial Preference Learning (APL), an iterative adversarial training method incorporating three key innovations. First, a direct harmfulness metric based on the model's intrinsic preference probabilities, eliminating reliance on external assessment. Second, a conditional generative attacker that synthesizes input-specific adversarial variations. Third, an iterative framework with automated closed-loop feedback, enabling continuous adaptation through vulnerability discovery and mitigation. Experiments on Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3 demonstrate that APL significantly enhances robustness, achieving 83.33% harmlessness win rate over the base model (evaluated by GPT-4o), reducing harmful outputs from 5.88% to 0.43% (measured by LLaMA-Guard), and lowering attack success rate by up to 65% according to HarmBench. Notably, APL maintains competitive utility, with an MT-Bench score of 6.59 (comparable to the baseline 6.78) and an LC-WinRate of 46.52% against the base model.

Image retrieval is a crucial research topic in computer vision, with broad application prospects ranging from online product searches to security surveillance systems. In recent years, the accuracy and efficiency of image retrieval have significantly improved due to advancements in deep learning. However, existing methods still face numerous challenges, particularly in handling large-scale datasets, cross-domain retrieval, and image perturbations that can arise from real-world conditions such as variations in lighting, occlusion, and viewpoint. Data augmentation techniques and adversarial learning methods have been widely applied in the field of image retrieval to address these challenges. Data augmentation enhances the model's generalization ability and robustness by generating more diverse training samples, simulating real-world variations, and reducing overfitting. Meanwhile, adversarial attacks and defenses introduce perturbations during training to improve the model's robustness against potential attacks, ensuring reliability in practical applications. This review comprehensively summarizes the latest research advancements in image retrieval, with a particular focus on the roles of data augmentation and adversarial learning techniques in enhancing retrieval performance. Future directions and potential challenges are also discussed.

Data errors, corruptions, and poisoning attacks during training pose a major threat to the reliability of modern AI systems. While extensive effort has gone into empirical mitigations, the evolving nature of attacks and the complexity of data require a more principled, provable approach to robustly learn on such data - and to understand how perturbations influence the final model. Hence, we introduce MIBP-Cert, a novel certification method based on mixed-integer bilinear programming (MIBP) that computes sound, deterministic bounds to provide provable robustness even under complex threat models. By computing the set of parameters reachable through perturbed or manipulated data, we can predict all possible outcomes and guarantee robustness. To make solving this optimization problem tractable, we propose a novel relaxation scheme that bounds each training step without sacrificing soundness. We demonstrate the applicability of our approach to continuous and discrete data, as well as different threat models - including complex ones that were previously out of reach.

Recent works have shown that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples that find samples close to the original image but can make the model misclassify. Even with access only to the model's output, an attacker can employ black-box attacks to generate such adversarial examples. In this work, we propose a simple and lightweight defense against black-box attacks by adding random noise to hidden features at intermediate layers of the model at inference time. Our theoretical analysis confirms that this method effectively enhances the model's resilience against both score-based and decision-based black-box attacks. Importantly, our defense does not necessitate adversarial training and has minimal impact on accuracy, rendering it applicable to any pre-trained model. Our analysis also reveals the significance of selectively adding noise to different parts of the model based on the gradient of the adversarial objective function, which can be varied during the attack. We demonstrate the robustness of our defense against multiple black-box attacks through extensive empirical experiments involving diverse models with various architectures.

With the increase of data in day-to-day life, businesses and different stakeholders need to analyze the data for better predictions. Traditionally, relational data has been a source of various insights, but with the increase in computational power and the need to understand deeper relationships between entities, the need to design new techniques has arisen. For this graph data analysis has become an extraordinary tool for understanding the data, which reveals more realistic and flexible modelling of complex relationships. Recently, Graph Neural Networks (GNNs) have shown great promise in various applications, such as social network analysis, recommendation systems, drug discovery, and more. However, many adversarial attacks can happen over the data, whether during training (poisoning attack) or during testing (evasion attack), which can adversely manipulate the desired outcome from the GNN model. Therefore, it is crucial to make the GNNs robust to such attacks. The existing robustness methods are computationally demanding and perform poorly when the intensity of attack increases. This paper presents a computationally efficient framework, namely, pLapGNN, based on weighted p-Laplacian for making GNNs robust. Empirical evaluation on real datasets establishes the efficacy and efficiency of the proposed method.

Protecting digital identities of human face from various attack vectors is paramount, and face anti-spoofing plays a crucial role in this endeavor. Current approaches primarily focus on detecting spoofing attempts within individual frames to detect presentation attacks. However, the emergence of hyper-realistic generative models capable of real-time operation has heightened the risk of digitally generated attacks. In light of these evolving threats, this paper aims to address two key aspects. First, it sheds light on the vulnerabilities of state-of-the-art face anti-spoofing methods against digital attacks. Second, it presents a comprehensive taxonomy of common threats encountered in face anti-spoofing systems. Through a series of experiments, we demonstrate the limitations of current face anti-spoofing detection techniques and their failure to generalize to novel digital attack scenarios. Notably, the existing models struggle with digital injection attacks including adversarial noise, realistic deepfake attacks, and digital replay attacks. To aid in the design and implementation of robust face anti-spoofing systems resilient to these emerging vulnerabilities, the paper proposes key design principles from model accuracy and robustness to pipeline robustness and even platform robustness. Especially, we suggest to implement the proactive face anti-spoofing system using active sensors to significant reduce the risks for unseen attack vectors and improve the user experience.

Visual modifications to text are often used to obfuscate offensive comments in social media (e.g., "!d10t") or as a writing style ("1337" in "leet speak"), among other scenarios. We consider this as a new type of adversarial attack in NLP, a setting to which humans are very robust, as our experiments with both simple and more difficult visual input perturbations demonstrate. We then investigate the impact of visual adversarial attacks on current NLP systems on character-, word-, and sentence-level tasks, showing that both neural and non-neural models are, in contrast to humans, extremely sensitive to such attacks, suffering performance decreases of up to 82\%. We then explore three shielding methods---visual character embeddings, adversarial training, and rule-based recovery---which substantially improve the robustness of the models. However, the shielding methods still fall behind performances achieved in non-attack scenarios, which demonstrates the difficulty of dealing with visual attacks.

As deep learning models are increasingly deployed in safety-critical applications, evaluating their vulnerabilities to adversarial perturbations is essential for ensuring their reliability and trustworthiness. Over the past decade, a large number of white-box adversarial robustness evaluation methods (i.e., attacks) have been proposed, ranging from single-step to multi-step methods and from individual to ensemble methods. Despite these advances, challenges remain in conducting meaningful and comprehensive robustness evaluations, particularly when it comes to large-scale testing and ensuring evaluations reflect real-world adversarial risks. In this work, we focus on image classification models and propose a novel individual attack method, Probability Margin Attack (PMA), which defines the adversarial margin in the probability space rather than the logits space. We analyze the relationship between PMA and existing cross-entropy or logits-margin-based attacks, and show that PMA can outperform the current state-of-the-art individual methods. Building on PMA, we propose two types of ensemble attacks that balance effectiveness and efficiency. Furthermore, we create a million-scale dataset, CC1M, derived from the existing CC3M dataset, and use it to conduct the first million-scale white-box adversarial robustness evaluation of adversarially-trained ImageNet models. Our findings provide valuable insights into the robustness gaps between individual versus ensemble attacks and small-scale versus million-scale evaluations.

With the increasing adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs), more customization is needed to ensure privacy-preserving and safe generation. We address this objective from two critical aspects: unlearning of sensitive information and robustness to jail-breaking attacks. We investigate various constrained optimization formulations that address both aspects in a unified manner, by finding the smallest possible interventions on LLM weights that either make a given vocabulary set unreachable or embed the LLM with robustness to tailored attacks by shifting part of the weights to a safer region. Beyond unifying two key properties, this approach contrasts with previous work in that it doesn't require an oracle classifier that is typically not available or represents a computational overhead. Surprisingly, we find that the simplest point-wise constraint-based intervention we propose leads to better performance than max-min interventions, while having a lower computational cost. Comparison against state-of-the-art defense methods demonstrates superior performance of the proposed approach.

One prominent approach toward resolving the adversarial vulnerability of deep neural networks is the two-player zero-sum paradigm of adversarial training, in which predictors are trained against adversarially chosen perturbations of data. Despite the promise of this approach, algorithms based on this paradigm have not engendered sufficient levels of robustness and suffer from pathological behavior like robust overfitting. To understand this shortcoming, we first show that the commonly used surrogate-based relaxation used in adversarial training algorithms voids all guarantees on the robustness of trained classifiers. The identification of this pitfall informs a novel non-zero-sum bilevel formulation of adversarial training, wherein each player optimizes a different objective function. Our formulation yields a simple algorithmic framework that matches and in some cases outperforms state-of-the-art attacks, attains comparable levels of robustness to standard adversarial training algorithms, and does not suffer from robust overfitting.

Recent research finds CNN models for image classification demonstrate overlapped adversarial vulnerabilities: adversarial attacks can mislead CNN models with small perturbations, which can effectively transfer between different models trained on the same dataset. Adversarial training, as a general robustness improvement technique, eliminates the vulnerability in a single model by forcing it to learn robust features. The process is hard, often requires models with large capacity, and suffers from significant loss on clean data accuracy. Alternatively, ensemble methods are proposed to induce sub-models with diverse outputs against a transfer adversarial example, making the ensemble robust against transfer attacks even if each sub-model is individually non-robust. Only small clean accuracy drop is observed in the process. However, previous ensemble training methods are not efficacious in inducing such diversity and thus ineffective on reaching robust ensemble. We propose DVERGE, which isolates the adversarial vulnerability in each sub-model by distilling non-robust features, and diversifies the adversarial vulnerability to induce diverse outputs against a transfer attack. The novel diversity metric and training procedure enables DVERGE to achieve higher robustness against transfer attacks comparing to previous ensemble methods, and enables the improved robustness when more sub-models are added to the ensemble. The code of this work is available at https://github.com/zjysteven/DVERGE

Recent advances in diffusion models have introduced a new era of text-guided image manipulation, enabling users to create realistic edited images with simple textual prompts. However, there is significant concern about the potential misuse of these methods, especially in creating misleading or harmful content. Although recent defense strategies, which introduce imperceptible adversarial noise to induce model failure, have shown promise, they remain ineffective against more sophisticated manipulations, such as editing with a mask. In this work, we propose DiffusionGuard, a robust and effective defense method against unauthorized edits by diffusion-based image editing models, even in challenging setups. Through a detailed analysis of these models, we introduce a novel objective that generates adversarial noise targeting the early stage of the diffusion process. This approach significantly improves the efficiency and effectiveness of adversarial noises. We also introduce a mask-augmentation technique to enhance robustness against various masks during test time. Finally, we introduce a comprehensive benchmark designed to evaluate the effectiveness and robustness of methods in protecting against privacy threats in realistic scenarios. Through extensive experiments, we show that our method achieves stronger protection and improved mask robustness with lower computational costs compared to the strongest baseline. Additionally, our method exhibits superior transferability and better resilience to noise removal techniques compared to all baseline methods. Our source code is publicly available at https://github.com/choi403/DiffusionGuard.

Adversarial training is exploited to develop a robust Deep Neural Network (DNN) model against the malicious altered data. These attacks may have catastrophic effects on DNN models but are indistinguishable for a human being. For example, an external attack can modify an image adding noises invisible for a human eye, but a DNN model misclassified the image. A key objective for developing robust DNN models is to use a learning algorithm that is fast but can also give model that is robust against different types of adversarial attacks. Especially for adversarial training, enormously long training times are needed for obtaining high accuracy under many different types of adversarial samples generated using different adversarial attack techniques. This paper aims at accelerating the adversarial training to enable fast development of robust DNN models against adversarial attacks. The general method for improving the training performance is the hyperparameters fine-tuning, where the learning rate is one of the most crucial hyperparameters. By modifying its shape (the value over time) and value during the training, we can obtain a model robust to adversarial attacks faster than standard training. First, we conduct experiments on two different datasets (CIFAR10, CIFAR100), exploring various techniques. Then, this analysis is leveraged to develop a novel fast training methodology, AccelAT, which automatically adjusts the learning rate for different epochs based on the accuracy gradient. The experiments show comparable results with the related works, and in several experiments, the adversarial training of DNNs using our AccelAT framework is conducted up to 2 times faster than the existing techniques. Thus, our findings boost the speed of adversarial training in an era in which security and performance are fundamental optimization objectives in DNN-based applications.

To ensure AI safety, instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs) are specifically trained to ensure alignment, which refers to making models behave in accordance with human intentions. While these models have demonstrated commendable results on various safety benchmarks, the vulnerability of their safety alignment has not been extensively studied. This is particularly troubling given the potential harm that LLMs can inflict. Existing attack methods on LLMs often rely on poisoned training data or the injection of malicious prompts. These approaches compromise the stealthiness and generalizability of the attacks, making them susceptible to detection. Additionally, these models often demand substantial computational resources for implementation, making them less practical for real-world applications. Inspired by recent success in modifying model behavior through steering vectors without the need for optimization, and drawing on its effectiveness in red-teaming LLMs, we conducted experiments employing activation steering to target four key aspects of LLMs: truthfulness, toxicity, bias, and harmfulness - across a varied set of attack settings. To establish a universal attack strategy applicable to diverse target alignments without depending on manual analysis, we automatically select the intervention layer based on contrastive layer search. Our experiment results show that activation attacks are highly effective and add little or no overhead to attack efficiency. Additionally, we discuss potential countermeasures against such activation attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/wang2226/Backdoor-Activation-Attack Warning: this paper contains content that can be offensive or upsetting.

As Large Language Models quickly become ubiquitous, it becomes critical to understand their security vulnerabilities. Recent work shows that text optimizers can produce jailbreaking prompts that bypass moderation and alignment. Drawing from the rich body of work on adversarial machine learning, we approach these attacks with three questions: What threat models are practically useful in this domain? How do baseline defense techniques perform in this new domain? How does LLM security differ from computer vision? We evaluate several baseline defense strategies against leading adversarial attacks on LLMs, discussing the various settings in which each is feasible and effective. Particularly, we look at three types of defenses: detection (perplexity based), input preprocessing (paraphrase and retokenization), and adversarial training. We discuss white-box and gray-box settings and discuss the robustness-performance trade-off for each of the defenses considered. We find that the weakness of existing discrete optimizers for text, combined with the relatively high costs of optimization, makes standard adaptive attacks more challenging for LLMs. Future research will be needed to uncover whether more powerful optimizers can be developed, or whether the strength of filtering and preprocessing defenses is greater in the LLMs domain than it has been in computer vision.

Adversarial attacks are carried out to reveal the vulnerability of deep neural networks. Textual adversarial attacking is challenging because text is discrete and a small perturbation can bring significant change to the original input. Word-level attacking, which can be regarded as a combinatorial optimization problem, is a well-studied class of textual attack methods. However, existing word-level attack models are far from perfect, largely because unsuitable search space reduction methods and inefficient optimization algorithms are employed. In this paper, we propose a novel attack model, which incorporates the sememe-based word substitution method and particle swarm optimization-based search algorithm to solve the two problems separately. We conduct exhaustive experiments to evaluate our attack model by attacking BiLSTM and BERT on three benchmark datasets. Experimental results demonstrate that our model consistently achieves much higher attack success rates and crafts more high-quality adversarial examples as compared to baseline methods. Also, further experiments show our model has higher transferability and can bring more robustness enhancement to victim models by adversarial training. All the code and data of this paper can be obtained on https://github.com/thunlp/SememePSO-Attack.

Adversarial attacks are widely used to evaluate model robustness, and in black-box scenarios, the transferability of these attacks becomes crucial. Existing generator-based attacks have excellent generalization and transferability due to their instance-agnostic nature. However, when training generators for multi-target tasks, the success rate of transfer attacks is relatively low due to the limitations of the model's capacity. To address these challenges, we propose a novel Dual-Flow framework for multi-target instance-agnostic adversarial attacks, utilizing Cascading Distribution Shift Training to develop an adversarial velocity function. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Dual-Flow significantly improves transferability over previous multi-target generative attacks. For example, it increases the success rate from Inception-v3 to ResNet-152 by 34.58%. Furthermore, our attack method shows substantially stronger robustness against defense mechanisms, such as adversarially trained models.

Clarification-seeking behavior is widely regarded as a desirable property of LLM agents, enabling them to resolve ambiguity before acting on underspecified tasks. However, the security implications of this interaction pattern remain unexplored. We investigate whether the transition from standard execution to a clarification-seeking state increases an agent's susceptibility to prompt injection attacks. We introduce ASPI (Ambiguous-State Prompt Injection), a benchmark of 728 task-attack scenarios that isolates clarification as a distinct agent state and measures how this state transition affects vulnerability under controlled conditions. Each benchmark instance is evaluated under matched execution and clarification settings: in the execution setting, the agent acts on a fully specified instruction and encounters adversarial content only through tool-returned data; in the clarification setting, the agent must first request and incorporate additional user input before acting. We evaluate ten frontier LLMs and find that clarification-seeking consistently and substantially amplifies vulnerability. For instance, attack success rises from 1.8% to 34.0% for o3 and from 2.2% to 35.7% for Gemini-3-Flash. A decomposition analysis reveals that this gap reflects both a state-dependent shift in how models process incoming content and a channel-specific effect arising from the agent-solicited clarification interface. These findings demonstrate that standard execution-time security evaluation systematically underestimates the attack surface of interactive agents, and that robustness under fully specified tasks does not translate to robustness under ambiguity. For reproducibility, our data and source code are available at https://github.com/scaleapi/aspi.

Recommender systems play a pivotal role in mitigating information overload in various fields. Nonetheless, the inherent openness of these systems introduces vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to insert fake users into the system's training data to skew the exposure of certain items, known as poisoning attacks. Adversarial training has emerged as a notable defense mechanism against such poisoning attacks within recommender systems. Existing adversarial training methods apply perturbations of the same magnitude across all users to enhance system robustness against attacks. Yet, in reality, we find that attacks often affect only a subset of users who are vulnerable. These perturbations of indiscriminate magnitude make it difficult to balance effective protection for vulnerable users without degrading recommendation quality for those who are not affected. To address this issue, our research delves into understanding user vulnerability. Considering that poisoning attacks pollute the training data, we note that the higher degree to which a recommender system fits users' training data correlates with an increased likelihood of users incorporating attack information, indicating their vulnerability. Leveraging these insights, we introduce the Vulnerability-aware Adversarial Training (VAT), designed to defend against poisoning attacks in recommender systems. VAT employs a novel vulnerability-aware function to estimate users' vulnerability based on the degree to which the system fits them. Guided by this estimation, VAT applies perturbations of adaptive magnitude to each user, not only reducing the success ratio of attacks but also preserving, and potentially enhancing, the quality of recommendations. Comprehensive experiments confirm VAT's superior defensive capabilities across different recommendation models and against various types of attacks.

In standard adversarial training, models are optimized to fit one-hot labels within allowable adversarial perturbation budgets. However, the ignorance of underlying distribution shifts brought by perturbations causes the problem of robust overfitting. To address this issue and enhance adversarial robustness, we analyze the characteristics of robust models and identify that robust models tend to produce smoother and well-calibrated outputs. Based on the observation, we propose a simple yet effective method, Annealing Self-Distillation Rectification (ADR), which generates soft labels as a better guidance mechanism that accurately reflects the distribution shift under attack during adversarial training. By utilizing ADR, we can obtain rectified distributions that significantly improve model robustness without the need for pre-trained models or extensive extra computation. Moreover, our method facilitates seamless plug-and-play integration with other adversarial training techniques by replacing the hard labels in their objectives. We demonstrate the efficacy of ADR through extensive experiments and strong performances across datasets.

Safety alignment in large language models (LLMs) is increasingly compromised by jailbreak attacks, which can manipulate these models to generate harmful or unintended content. Investigating these attacks is crucial for uncovering model vulnerabilities. However, many existing jailbreak strategies fail to keep pace with the rapid development of defense mechanisms, such as defensive suffixes, rendering them ineffective against defended models. To tackle this issue, we introduce a novel attack method called ArrAttack, specifically designed to target defended LLMs. ArrAttack automatically generates robust jailbreak prompts capable of bypassing various defense measures. This capability is supported by a universal robustness judgment model that, once trained, can perform robustness evaluation for any target model with a wide variety of defenses. By leveraging this model, we can rapidly develop a robust jailbreak prompt generator that efficiently converts malicious input prompts into effective attacks. Extensive evaluations reveal that ArrAttack significantly outperforms existing attack strategies, demonstrating strong transferability across both white-box and black-box models, including GPT-4 and Claude-3. Our work bridges the gap between jailbreak attacks and defenses, providing a fresh perspective on generating robust jailbreak prompts. We make the codebase available at https://github.com/LLBao/ArrAttack.

Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) have achieved excellent performance in various fields. However, DNNs' vulnerability to Adversarial Examples (AE) hinders their deployments to safety-critical applications. This paper presents a novel AE detection framework, named BEYOND, for trustworthy predictions. BEYOND performs the detection by distinguishing the AE's abnormal relation with its augmented versions, i.e. neighbors, from two prospects: representation similarity and label consistency. An off-the-shelf Self-Supervised Learning (SSL) model is used to extract the representation and predict the label for its highly informative representation capacity compared to supervised learning models. For clean samples, their representations and predictions are closely consistent with their neighbors, whereas those of AEs differ greatly. Furthermore, we explain this observation and show that by leveraging this discrepancy BEYOND can effectively detect AEs. We develop a rigorous justification for the effectiveness of BEYOND. Furthermore, as a plug-and-play model, BEYOND can easily cooperate with the Adversarial Trained Classifier (ATC), achieving the state-of-the-art (SOTA) robustness accuracy. Experimental results show that BEYOND outperforms baselines by a large margin, especially under adaptive attacks. Empowered by the robust relation net built on SSL, we found that BEYOND outperforms baselines in terms of both detection ability and speed. Our code will be publicly available.