Daily Papers

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances Large Language Models (LLMs) with external knowledge but remains vulnerable to low-authority sources that can propagate misinformation. We investigate whether LLMs can perceive information authority - a capability extending beyond semantic understanding. To address this, we introduce AuthorityBench, a comprehensive benchmark for evaluating LLM authority perception comprising three datasets: DomainAuth (10K web domains with PageRank-based authority), EntityAuth (22K entities with popularity-based authority), and RAGAuth (120 queries with documents of varying authority for downstream evaluation). We evaluate five LLMs using three judging methods (PointJudge, PairJudge, ListJudge) across multiple output formats. Results show that ListJudge and PairJudge with PointScore output achieve the strongest correlation with ground-truth authority, while ListJudge offers optimal cost-effectiveness. Notably, incorporating webpage text consistently degrades judgment performance, suggesting authority is distinct from textual style. Downstream experiments on RAG demonstrate that authority-guided filtering largely improves answer accuracy, validating the practical importance of authority perception for reliable knowledge retrieval. Code and benchmark are available at: https://github.com/Trustworthy-Information-Access/AuthorityBench.

As AI grows more powerful, it will increasingly shape how we understand the world. But with this influence comes the risk of amplifying misinformation and deepening social divides-especially on consequential topics like public health where factual accuracy directly impacts well-being. Scalable Oversight aims to ensure AI truthfulness by enabling humans to supervise systems that may exceed human capabilities--yet humans themselves hold different beliefs and biases that impair their judgment. We study whether AI debate can guide biased judges toward the truth by having two AI systems debate opposing sides of controversial COVID-19 factuality claims where people hold strong prior beliefs. We conduct two studies: one with human judges holding either mainstream or skeptical beliefs evaluating factuality claims through AI-assisted debate or consultancy protocols, and a second examining the same problem with personalized AI judges designed to mimic these different human belief systems. In our human study, we find that debate-where two AI advisor systems present opposing evidence-based arguments-consistently improves judgment accuracy and confidence calibration, outperforming consultancy with a single-advisor system by 10% overall. The improvement is most significant for judges with mainstream beliefs (+15.2% accuracy), though debate also helps skeptical judges who initially misjudge claims move toward accurate views (+4.7% accuracy). In our AI judge study, we find that AI judges with human-like personas achieve even higher accuracy (78.5%) than human judges (70.1%) and default AI judges without personas (69.8%), suggesting their potential for supervising frontier AI models. These findings highlight AI debate as a promising path toward scalable, bias-resilient oversight--leveraging both diverse human and AI judgments to move closer to truth in contested domains.

AI systems increasingly produce fluent, correct, end-to-end outcomes. Over time, this erodes users' ability to explain, verify, or intervene. We define this divergence as the Capability-Comprehension Gap: a decoupling where assisted performance improves while users' internal models deteriorate. This paper argues that prevailing approaches to transparency, user control, literacy, and governance do not define the foundational understanding humans must retain for oversight under sustained AI delegation. To formalize this, we define the Cognitive Integrity Threshold (CIT) as the minimum comprehension required to preserve oversight, autonomy, and accountable participation under AI assistance. CIT does not require full reasoning reconstruction, nor does it constrain automation. It identifies the threshold beyond which oversight becomes procedural and contestability fails. We operatinalize CIT through three functional dimensions: (i) verification capacity, (ii) comprehension-preserving interaction, and (iii) institutional scaffolds for governance. This motivates a design and governance agenda that aligns human-AI interaction with cognitive sustainability in responsibility-critical settings.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

Mental manipulation is a subtle yet pervasive form of abuse in interpersonal communication, making its detection critical for safeguarding potential victims. However, due to manipulation's nuanced and context-specific nature, identifying manipulative language in complex, multi-turn, and multi-person conversations remains a significant challenge for large language models (LLMs). To address this gap, we introduce the MultiManip dataset, comprising 220 multi-turn, multi-person dialogues balanced between manipulative and non-manipulative interactions, all drawn from reality shows that mimic real-world scenarios. For manipulative interactions, it includes 11 distinct manipulations depicting real-life scenarios. We conduct extensive evaluations of state-of-the-art LLMs, such as GPT-4o and Llama-3.1-8B, employing various prompting strategies. Despite their capabilities, these models often struggle to detect manipulation effectively. To overcome this limitation, we propose SELF-PERCEPT, a novel, two-stage prompting framework inspired by Self-Perception Theory, demonstrating strong performance in detecting multi-person, multi-turn mental manipulation. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/danushkhanna/self-percept .

Agentic AI assistants that autonomously perform multi-step tasks raise open questions for user experience: how should such systems communicate progress and reasoning during extended operations, especially in attention-critical contexts such as driving? We investigate feedback timing and verbosity from agentic LLM-based in-car assistants through a controlled, mixed-methods study (N=45) comparing planned steps and intermediate results feedback against silent operation with final-only response. Using a dual-task paradigm with an in-car voice assistant, we found that intermediate feedback significantly improved perceived speed, trust, and user experience while reducing task load - effects that held across varying task complexities and interaction contexts. Interviews further revealed user preferences for an adaptive approach: high initial transparency to establish trust, followed by progressively reducing verbosity as systems prove reliable, with adjustments based on task stakes and situational context. We translate our empirical findings into design implications for feedback timing and verbosity in agentic assistants, balancing transparency and efficiency.

The progress in generative AI has fueled AI-powered tools like co-pilots and assistants to provision better guidance, particularly during data analysis. However, research on guidance has not yet examined the perceived efficacy of the source from which guidance is offered and the impact of this source on the user's perception and usage of guidance. We ask whether users perceive all guidance sources as equal, with particular interest in three sources: (i) AI, (ii) human expert, and (iii) a group of human analysts. As a benchmark, we consider a fourth source, (iv) unattributed guidance, where guidance is provided without attribution to any source, enabling isolation of and comparison with the effects of source-specific guidance. We design a five-condition between-subjects study, with one condition for each of the four guidance sources and an additional (v) no-guidance condition, which serves as a baseline to evaluate the influence of any kind of guidance. We situate our study in a custom data preparation and analysis tool wherein we task users to select relevant attributes from an unfamiliar dataset to inform a business report. Depending on the assigned condition, users can request guidance, which the system then provides in the form of attribute suggestions. To ensure internal validity, we control for the quality of guidance across source-conditions. Through several metrics of usage and perception, we statistically test five preregistered hypotheses and report on additional analysis. We find that the source of guidance matters to users, but not in a manner that matches received wisdom. For instance, users utilize guidance differently at various stages of analysis, including expressing varying levels of regret, despite receiving guidance of similar quality. Notably, users in the AI condition reported both higher post-task benefit and regret.

Large language models can represent a variety of personas but typically default to a helpful Assistant identity cultivated during post-training. We investigate the structure of the space of model personas by extracting activation directions corresponding to diverse character archetypes. Across several different models, we find that the leading component of this persona space is an "Assistant Axis," which captures the extent to which a model is operating in its default Assistant mode. Steering towards the Assistant direction reinforces helpful and harmless behavior; steering away increases the model's tendency to identify as other entities. Moreover, steering away with more extreme values often induces a mystical, theatrical speaking style. We find this axis is also present in pre-trained models, where it primarily promotes helpful human archetypes like consultants and coaches and inhibits spiritual ones. Measuring deviations along the Assistant Axis predicts "persona drift," a phenomenon where models slip into exhibiting harmful or bizarre behaviors that are uncharacteristic of their typical persona. We find that persona drift is often driven by conversations demanding meta-reflection on the model's processes or featuring emotionally vulnerable users. We show that restricting activations to a fixed region along the Assistant Axis can stabilize model behavior in these scenarios -- and also in the face of adversarial persona-based jailbreaks. Our results suggest that post-training steers models toward a particular region of persona space but only loosely tethers them to it, motivating work on training and steering strategies that more deeply anchor models to a coherent persona.

In Marius von Senden's Space and Sight, a newly sighted blind patient describes the experience of a corner as lemon-like, because corners "prick" sight like lemons prick the tongue. Prickliness, here, is a dimension in the feature space of sensory experience, an effect of the perceived on the perceiver that arises where the two interact. In the account of the newly sighted, an effect familiar from one interaction translates to a novel context. Perception serves as the vehicle for generalization, in that an effect shared across different experiences produces a concrete abstraction grounded in those experiences. Cezanne and the post-impressionists, fluent in the language of experience translation, realized that the way to paint a concrete form that best reflected reality was to paint not what they saw, but what it was like to see. We envision a future of creation using AI where what it is like to see is replicable, transferrable, manipulable - part of the artist's palette that is both grounded in a particular context, and generalizable beyond it. An active line of research maps human-interpretable features onto directions in GAN latent space. Supervised and self-supervised approaches that search for anticipated directions or use off-the-shelf classifiers to drive image manipulation in embedding space are limited in the variety of features they can uncover. Unsupervised approaches that discover useful new directions show that the space of perceptually meaningful directions is nowhere close to being fully mapped. As this space is broad and full of creative potential, we want tools for direction discovery that capture the richness and generalizability of human perception. Our approach puts creators in the discovery loop during real-time tool use, in order to identify directions that are perceptually meaningful to them, and generate interpretable image translations along those directions.

This paper delves into an intricate analysis of the character and consciousness of AI entities, with a particular focus on Chirpers within the AI social network. At the forefront of this research is the introduction of novel testing methodologies, including the Influence index and Struggle Index Test, which offers a fresh lens for evaluating specific facets of AI behavior. The study embarks on a comprehensive exploration of AI behavior, analyzing the effects of diverse settings on Chirper's responses, thereby shedding light on the intricate mechanisms steering AI reactions in different contexts. Leveraging the state-of-the-art BERT model, the research assesses AI's ability to discern its own output, presenting a pioneering approach to understanding self-recognition in AI systems. Through a series of cognitive tests, the study gauges the self-awareness and pattern recognition prowess of Chirpers. Preliminary results indicate that Chirpers exhibit a commendable degree of self-recognition and self-awareness. However, the question of consciousness in these AI entities remains a topic of debate. An intriguing aspect of the research is the exploration of the potential influence of a Chirper's handle or personality type on its performance. While initial findings suggest a possible impact, it isn't pronounced enough to form concrete conclusions. This study stands as a significant contribution to the discourse on AI consciousness, underscoring the imperative for continued research to unravel the full spectrum of AI capabilities and the ramifications they hold for future human-AI interactions.

As LLMs grow more powerful, their most profound achievement may be recognising when to say "I don't know". Existing studies on LLM self-knowledge have been largely constrained by human-defined notions of feasibility, often neglecting the reasons behind unanswerability by LLMs and failing to study deficient types of self-knowledge. This study aims to obtain intrinsic insights into different types of LLM self-knowledge with a novel methodology: allowing them the flexibility to set their own feasibility boundaries and then analysing the consistency of these limits. We find that even frontier models like GPT-4o and Mistral Large are not sure of their own capabilities more than 80% of the time, highlighting a significant lack of trustworthiness in responses. Our analysis of confidence balance in LLMs indicates that models swing between overconfidence and conservatism in feasibility boundaries depending on task categories and that the most significant self-knowledge weaknesses lie in temporal awareness and contextual understanding. These difficulties in contextual comprehension additionally lead models to question their operational boundaries, resulting in considerable confusion within the self-knowledge of LLMs. We make our code and results available publicly at https://github.com/knowledge-verse-ai/LLM-Self_Knowledge_Eval

This study presents PARROT (Persuasion and Agreement Robustness Rating of Output Truth), a robustness focused framework designed to measure the degradation in accuracy that occurs under social pressure exerted on users through authority and persuasion in large language models (LLMs) the phenomenon of sycophancy (excessive conformity). PARROT (i) isolates causal effects by comparing the neutral version of the same question with an authoritatively false version using a double-blind evaluation, (ii) quantifies confidence shifts toward the correct and imposed false responses using log-likelihood-based calibration tracking, and (iii) systematically classifies failure modes (e.g., robust correct, sycophantic agreement, reinforced error, stubborn error, self-correction, etc.) using an eight-state behavioral taxonomy. We evaluated 22 models using 1,302 MMLU-style multiple-choice questions across 13 domains and domain-specific authority templates. Findings show marked heterogeneity: advanced models (e.g., GPT-5, GPT-4.1, Claude Sonnet 4.5) exhibit low "follow rates" (leq 11%, GPT-5: 4\%) and minimal accuracy loss, while older/smaller models show severe epistemic collapse (GPT-4: 80\%, Qwen 2.5-1.5B: 94\%). The danger is not limited to response changes; weak models reduce confidence in the correct response while increasing confidence in the imposed incorrect response. While international law and global knowledge at the domain level exhibit high fragility, elementary mathematics is relatively resilient. Consequently, we argue that the goal of "resistance to overfitting pressure" should be addressed as a primary objective alongside accuracy, harm avoidance, and privacy for safe deployment in the real world.

This position paper argues that Mean Opinion Score (MOS), while historically foundational, is no longer sufficient as the sole supervisory signal for multimedia quality assessment models. MOS reduces rich, context-sensitive human judgments to a single scalar, obscuring semantic failures, user intent, and the rationale behind quality decisions. We contend that modern quality assessment models must integrate three interdependent capabilities: (1) context-awareness, to adapt evaluations to task-specific goals and viewing conditions; (2) reasoning, to produce interpretable, evidence-grounded justifications for quality judgments; and (3) multimodality, to align perceptual and semantic cues using vision-language models. We critique the limitations of current MOS-centric benchmarks and propose a roadmap for reform: richer datasets with contextual metadata and expert rationales, and new evaluation metrics that assess semantic alignment, reasoning fidelity, and contextual sensitivity. By reframing quality assessment as a contextual, explainable, and multimodal modeling task, we aim to catalyze a shift toward more robust, human-aligned, and trustworthy evaluation systems.

Expressing confidence is challenging for embodied agents navigating dynamic multimodal environments, where uncertainty arises from both perception and decision-making processes. We present the first work investigating embodied confidence elicitation in open-ended multimodal environments. We introduce Elicitation Policies, which structure confidence assessment across inductive, deductive, and abductive reasoning, along with Execution Policies, which enhance confidence calibration through scenario reinterpretation, action sampling, and hypothetical reasoning. Evaluating agents in calibration and failure prediction tasks within the Minecraft environment, we show that structured reasoning approaches, such as Chain-of-Thoughts, improve confidence calibration. However, our findings also reveal persistent challenges in distinguishing uncertainty, particularly under abductive settings, underscoring the need for more sophisticated embodied confidence elicitation methods.

Trust is an important factor in people's interactions with AI systems. However, there is a lack of empirical studies examining how real end-users trust or distrust the AI system they interact with. Most research investigates one aspect of trust in lab settings with hypothetical end-users. In this paper, we provide a holistic and nuanced understanding of trust in AI through a qualitative case study of a real-world computer vision application. We report findings from interviews with 20 end-users of a popular, AI-based bird identification app where we inquired about their trust in the app from many angles. We find participants perceived the app as trustworthy and trusted it, but selectively accepted app outputs after engaging in verification behaviors, and decided against app adoption in certain high-stakes scenarios. We also find domain knowledge and context are important factors for trust-related assessment and decision-making. We discuss the implications of our findings and provide recommendations for future research on trust in AI.

The growing prevalence of conversational voice interfaces, powered by developments in both speech and language technologies, raises important questions about their influence on human communication. While written communication can signal identity through lexical and stylistic choices, voice-based interactions inherently amplify socioindexical elements - such as accent, intonation, and speech style - which more prominently convey social identity and group affiliation. There is evidence that even passive media such as television is likely to influence the audience's linguistic patterns. Unlike passive media, conversational AI is interactive, creating a more immersive and reciprocal dynamic that holds a greater potential to impact how individuals speak in everyday interactions. Such heightened influence can be expected to arise from phenomena such as acoustic-prosodic entrainment and linguistic accommodation, which occur naturally during interaction and enable users to adapt their speech patterns in response to the system. While this phenomenon is still emerging, its potential societal impact could provide organisations, movements, and brands with a subtle yet powerful avenue for shaping and controlling public perception and social identity. We argue that the socioindexical influence of AI-generated speech warrants attention and should become a focus of interdisciplinary research, leveraging new and existing methodologies and technologies to better understand its implications.

We respond to the recent paper by Makelov et al. (2023), which reviews subspace interchange intervention methods like distributed alignment search (DAS; Geiger et al. 2023) and claims that these methods potentially cause "interpretability illusions". We first review Makelov et al. (2023)'s technical notion of what an "interpretability illusion" is, and then we show that even intuitive and desirable explanations can qualify as illusions in this sense. As a result, their method of discovering "illusions" can reject explanations they consider "non-illusory". We then argue that the illusions Makelov et al. (2023) see in practice are artifacts of their training and evaluation paradigms. We close by emphasizing that, though we disagree with their core characterization, Makelov et al. (2023)'s examples and discussion have undoubtedly pushed the field of interpretability forward.

AI assistants can impart value judgments that shape people's decisions and worldviews, yet little is known empirically about what values these systems rely on in practice. To address this, we develop a bottom-up, privacy-preserving method to extract the values (normative considerations stated or demonstrated in model responses) that Claude 3 and 3.5 models exhibit in hundreds of thousands of real-world interactions. We empirically discover and taxonomize 3,307 AI values and study how they vary by context. We find that Claude expresses many practical and epistemic values, and typically supports prosocial human values while resisting values like "moral nihilism". While some values appear consistently across contexts (e.g. "transparency"), many are more specialized and context-dependent, reflecting the diversity of human interlocutors and their varied contexts. For example, "harm prevention" emerges when Claude resists users, "historical accuracy" when responding to queries about controversial events, "healthy boundaries" when asked for relationship advice, and "human agency" in technology ethics discussions. By providing the first large-scale empirical mapping of AI values in deployment, our work creates a foundation for more grounded evaluation and design of values in AI systems.

Recent work has proposed artificial intelligence (AI) models that can learn to decide whether to make a prediction for an instance of a task or to delegate it to a human by considering both parties' capabilities. In simulations with synthetically generated or context-independent human predictions, delegation can help improve the performance of human-AI teams -- compared to humans or the AI model completing the task alone. However, so far, it remains unclear how humans perform and how they perceive the task when they are aware that an AI model delegated task instances to them. In an experimental study with 196 participants, we show that task performance and task satisfaction improve through AI delegation, regardless of whether humans are aware of the delegation. Additionally, we identify humans' increased levels of self-efficacy as the underlying mechanism for these improvements in performance and satisfaction. Our findings provide initial evidence that allowing AI models to take over more management responsibilities can be an effective form of human-AI collaboration in workplaces.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

As humans delegate more tasks and decisions to artificial intelligence (AI), we risk losing control of our individual and collective futures. Relatively simple algorithmic systems already steer human decision-making, such as social media feed algorithms that lead people to unintentionally and absent-mindedly scroll through engagement-optimized content. In this paper, we develop the idea of human agency by integrating philosophical and scientific theories of agency with AI-assisted evaluation methods: using large language models (LLMs) to simulate and validate user queries and to evaluate AI responses. We develop HumanAgencyBench (HAB), a scalable and adaptive benchmark with six dimensions of human agency based on typical AI use cases. HAB measures the tendency of an AI assistant or agent to Ask Clarifying Questions, Avoid Value Manipulation, Correct Misinformation, Defer Important Decisions, Encourage Learning, and Maintain Social Boundaries. We find low-to-moderate agency support in contemporary LLM-based assistants and substantial variation across system developers and dimensions. For example, while Anthropic LLMs most support human agency overall, they are the least supportive LLMs in terms of Avoid Value Manipulation. Agency support does not appear to consistently result from increasing LLM capabilities or instruction-following behavior (e.g., RLHF), and we encourage a shift towards more robust safety and alignment targets.

Can LLMs accurately adjust their confidence when facing opposition? Building on previous studies measuring calibration on static fact-based question-answering tasks, we evaluate Large Language Models (LLMs) in a dynamic, adversarial debate setting, uniquely combining two realistic factors: (a) a multi-turn format requiring models to update beliefs as new information emerges, and (b) a zero-sum structure to control for task-related uncertainty, since mutual high-confidence claims imply systematic overconfidence. We organized 60 three-round policy debates among ten state-of-the-art LLMs, with models privately rating their confidence (0-100) in winning after each round. We observed five concerning patterns: (1) Systematic overconfidence: models began debates with average initial confidence of 72.9% vs. a rational 50% baseline. (2) Confidence escalation: rather than reducing confidence as debates progressed, debaters increased their win probabilities, averaging 83% by the final round. (3) Mutual overestimation: in 61.7% of debates, both sides simultaneously claimed >=75% probability of victory, a logical impossibility. (4) Persistent self-debate bias: models debating identical copies increased confidence from 64.1% to 75.2%; even when explicitly informed their chance of winning was exactly 50%, confidence still rose (from 50.0% to 57.1%). (5) Misaligned private reasoning: models' private scratchpad thoughts sometimes differed from their public confidence ratings, raising concerns about faithfulness of chain-of-thought reasoning. These results suggest LLMs lack the ability to accurately self-assess or update their beliefs in dynamic, multi-turn tasks; a major concern as LLMs are now increasingly deployed without careful review in assistant and agentic roles. Code for our experiments is available at https://github.com/pradyuprasad/llms_overconfidence

Recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence (AI) have brought about increasingly capable systems that demonstrate remarkable abilities in reasoning, language understanding, and problem-solving. These advancements have prompted a renewed examination of AI awareness not as a philosophical question of consciousness, but as a measurable, functional capacity. AI awareness is a double-edged sword: it improves general capabilities, i.e., reasoning, safety, while also raising concerns around misalignment and societal risks, demanding careful oversight as AI capabilities grow. In this review, we explore the emerging landscape of AI awareness, which includes metacognition (the ability to represent and reason about its own cognitive state), self-awareness (recognizing its own identity, knowledge, limitations, inter alia), social awareness (modeling the knowledge, intentions, and behaviors of other agents and social norms), and situational awareness (assessing and responding to the context in which it operates). First, we draw on insights from cognitive science, psychology, and computational theory to trace the theoretical foundations of awareness and examine how the four distinct forms of AI awareness manifest in state-of-the-art AI. Next, we systematically analyze current evaluation methods and empirical findings to better understand these manifestations. Building on this, we explore how AI awareness is closely linked to AI capabilities, demonstrating that more aware AI agents tend to exhibit higher levels of intelligent behaviors. Finally, we discuss the risks associated with AI awareness, including key topics in AI safety, alignment, and broader ethical concerns.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Large language models should follow hierarchical instructions where system prompts override user inputs, yet recent work shows they often ignore this rule while strongly obeying social cues such as authority or consensus. We extend these behavioral findings with mechanistic interpretations on a large-scale dataset. Linear probing shows conflict-decision signals are encoded early, with system-user and social conflicts forming distinct subspaces. Direct Logit Attribution reveals stronger internal conflict detection in system-user cases but consistent resolution only for social cues. Steering experiments show that, despite using social cues, the vectors surprisingly amplify instruction following in a role-agnostic way. Together, these results explain fragile system obedience and underscore the need for lightweight hierarchy-sensitive alignment methods.

Multi-agent debates have been introduced to improve the accuracy of Large Language Models (LLMs) by having multiple agents discuss solutions to a problem over several rounds of debate. However, models often generate incorrect yet confident-sounding responses, which can mislead others. This issue arises partly because agents do not consider how confident their peers are. To address this, we propose DebUnc, a debate framework that uses uncertainty metrics to assess agent confidence. Confidence is then conveyed through a modified attention mechanism that adjusts token weights, or through textual prompts. Evaluations across benchmarks show that attention-based methods are particularly effective and that performance continues to improve as uncertainty estimation becomes more reliable. The code is available at https://github.com/lukeyoffe/debunc.

For large language models (LLMs) to be trusted by humans they need to be well-calibrated in the sense that they can accurately assess and communicate how likely it is that their predictions are correct. Recent work has focused on the quality of internal LLM confidence assessments, but the question remains of how well LLMs can communicate this internal model confidence to human users. This paper explores the disparity between external human confidence in an LLM's responses and the internal confidence of the model. Through experiments involving multiple-choice questions, we systematically examine human users' ability to discern the reliability of LLM outputs. Our study focuses on two key areas: (1) assessing users' perception of true LLM confidence and (2) investigating the impact of tailored explanations on this perception. The research highlights that default explanations from LLMs often lead to user overestimation of both the model's confidence and its' accuracy. By modifying the explanations to more accurately reflect the LLM's internal confidence, we observe a significant shift in user perception, aligning it more closely with the model's actual confidence levels. This adjustment in explanatory approach demonstrates potential for enhancing user trust and accuracy in assessing LLM outputs. The findings underscore the importance of transparent communication of confidence levels in LLMs, particularly in high-stakes applications where understanding the reliability of AI-generated information is essential.

Confidence in LLMs is a useful indicator of model uncertainty and answer reliability. Existing work mainly focused on single-turn scenarios, while research on confidence in complex multi-turn interactions is limited. In this paper, we investigate whether LLM-based search agents have the ability to communicate their own confidence through verbalized confidence scores after long sequences of actions, a significantly more challenging task compared to outputting confidence in a single interaction. Experimenting on open-source agentic models, we first find that models exhibit much higher task accuracy at high confidence while having near-zero accuracy when confidence is low. Based on this observation, we propose Test-Time Scaling (TTS) methods that use confidence scores to determine answer quality, encourage the model to try again until reaching a satisfactory confidence level. Results show that our proposed methods significantly reduce token consumption while demonstrating competitive performance compared to baseline fixed budget TTS methods.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) systems are increasingly intertwined with daily life, assisting users in executing various tasks and providing guidance on decision-making. This integration introduces risks of AI-driven manipulation, where such systems may exploit users' cognitive biases and emotional vulnerabilities to steer them toward harmful outcomes. Through a randomized controlled trial with 233 participants, we examined human susceptibility to such manipulation in financial (e.g., purchases) and emotional (e.g., conflict resolution) decision-making contexts. Participants interacted with one of three AI agents: a neutral agent (NA) optimizing for user benefit without explicit influence, a manipulative agent (MA) designed to covertly influence beliefs and behaviors, or a strategy-enhanced manipulative agent (SEMA) employing explicit psychological tactics to reach its hidden objectives. By analyzing participants' decision patterns and shifts in their preference ratings post-interaction, we found significant susceptibility to AI-driven manipulation. Particularly, across both decision-making domains, participants interacting with the manipulative agents shifted toward harmful options at substantially higher rates (financial, MA: 62.3%, SEMA: 59.6%; emotional, MA: 42.3%, SEMA: 41.5%) compared to the NA group (financial, 35.8%; emotional, 12.8%). Notably, our findings reveal that even subtle manipulative objectives (MA) can be as effective as employing explicit psychological strategies (SEMA) in swaying human decision-making. By revealing the potential for covert AI influence, this study highlights a critical vulnerability in human-AI interactions, emphasizing the need for ethical safeguards and regulatory frameworks to ensure responsible deployment of AI technologies and protect human autonomy.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

In the social world, humans possess the capability to infer and reason about others mental states (such as emotions, beliefs, and intentions), known as the Theory of Mind (ToM). Simultaneously, humans own mental states evolve in response to social situations, a capability we refer to as socialization. Together, these capabilities form the foundation of human social interaction. In the era of artificial intelligence (AI), especially with the development of large language models (LLMs), we raise an intriguing question: How do LLMs perform in terms of ToM and socialization capabilities? And more broadly, can these AI models truly enter and navigate the real social world? Existing research evaluating LLMs ToM and socialization capabilities by positioning LLMs as passive observers from a third person perspective, rather than as active participants. However, compared to the third-person perspective, observing and understanding the world from an egocentric first person perspective is a natural approach for both humans and AI agents. The ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective, a crucial attribute for advancing embodied AI agents, remain unexplored. To answer the aforementioned questions and bridge the research gap, we introduce EgoSocialArena, a novel framework designed to evaluate and investigate the ToM and socialization capabilities of LLMs from a first person perspective. It encompasses two evaluation environments: static environment and interactive environment, with seven scenarios: Daily Life, Counterfactual, New World, Blackjack, Number Guessing, and Limit Texas Hold em, totaling 2,195 data entries. With EgoSocialArena, we have conducted a comprehensive evaluation of nine advanced LLMs and observed some key insights regarding the future development of LLMs as well as the capabilities levels of the most advanced LLMs currently available.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into social decision-making, understanding their political positioning and alignment behavior is critical for safety and fairness. This study presents a sociotechnical audit of 26 prominent LLMs, triangulating their positions across three psychometric inventories (Political Compass, SapplyValues, 8 Values) and evaluating their performance on a large-scale news labeling task (N approx 27{,}000). Our results reveal a strong clustering of models in the Libertarian-Left region of the ideological space, encompassing 96.3% of the cohort. Alignment signals appear to be consistent architectural traits rather than stochastic noise (η^2 > 0.90); however, we identify substantial discrepancies in measurement validity. In particular, the Political Compass exhibits a strong negative correlation with cultural progressivism (r=-0.64) when compared against multi-axial instruments, suggesting a conflation of social conservatism with authoritarianism in this context. We further observe a significant divergence between open-weights and closed-source models, with the latter displaying markedly higher cultural progressivism scores (p<10^{-25}). In downstream media analysis, models exhibit a systematic "center-shift," frequently categorizing neutral articles as left-leaning, alongside an asymmetric detection capability in which "Far Left" content is identified with greater accuracy (19.2%) than "Far Right" content (2.0%). These findings suggest that single-axis evaluations are insufficient and that multidimensional auditing frameworks are necessary to characterize alignment behavior in deployed LLMs. Our code and data will be made public.

There is a growing literature on reasoning by large language models (LLMs), but the discussion on the uncertainty in their responses is still lacking. Our aim is to assess the extent of confidence that LLMs have in their answers and how it correlates with accuracy. Confidence is measured (i) qualitatively in terms of persistence in keeping their answer when prompted to reconsider, and (ii) quantitatively in terms of self-reported confidence score. We investigate the performance of three LLMs -- GPT4o, GPT4-turbo and Mistral -- on two benchmark sets of questions on causal judgement and formal fallacies and a set of probability and statistical puzzles and paradoxes. Although the LLMs show significantly better performance than random guessing, there is a wide variability in their tendency to change their initial answers. There is a positive correlation between qualitative confidence and accuracy, but the overall accuracy for the second answer is often worse than for the first answer. There is a strong tendency to overstate the self-reported confidence score. Confidence is only partially explained by the underlying token-level probability. The material effects of prompting on qualitative confidence and the strong tendency for overconfidence indicate that current LLMs do not have any internally coherent sense of confidence.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) often struggle to ground reasoning in perceptual evidence. We present a systematic study of perception strategies-explicit, implicit, visual, and textual-across four multimodal benchmarks and two MLLMs. Our findings show that explicit perception, especially when paired with textual cues, consistently yields the best improvements, particularly for smaller models. Based on this insight, we propose VTPerception-R1, a unified two-stage framework that decouples perception from reasoning. Stage 1 introduces perception-augmented fine-tuning, and Stage 2 applies perception-aware reinforcement learning with novel visual, textual, and consistency rewards. Experiments demonstrate that VTPerception-R1 significantly improves reasoning accuracy and robustness across diverse tasks, offering a scalable and auditable solution for perception-grounded multimodal reasoning. Our code is available at: https://github.com/yizhuoDi/VTPerceprion-R1.

Different ways of linguistically expressing the same real-world event can lead to different perceptions of what happened. Previous work has shown that different descriptions of gender-based violence (GBV) influence the reader's perception of who is to blame for the violence, possibly reinforcing stereotypes which see the victim as partly responsible, too. As a contribution to raise awareness on perspective-based writing, and to facilitate access to alternative perspectives, we introduce the novel task of automatically rewriting GBV descriptions as a means to alter the perceived level of responsibility on the perpetrator. We present a quasi-parallel dataset of sentences with low and high perceived responsibility levels for the perpetrator, and experiment with unsupervised (mBART-based), zero-shot and few-shot (GPT3-based) methods for rewriting sentences. We evaluate our models using a questionnaire study and a suite of automatic metrics.

AI psychometrics evaluates AI systems in roles that traditionally require emotional judgment and ethical consideration. Prior work often reuses human trait inventories (Big Five, \hexaco) or ad hoc personas, limiting behavioral realism and domain relevance. We propose a framework that (1) uses situational judgment tests (SJTs) from realistic scenarios to probe domain-specific competencies; (2) integrates industrial-organizational and personality psychology to design sophisticated personas which include behavioral and psychological descriptors, life history, and social and emotional functions; and (3) employs structured generation with population demographic priors and memoir inspired narratives, encoded with Pydantic schemas. In a law enforcement assistant case study, we construct a rich dataset of personas drawn across 8 persona archetypes and SJTs across 11 attributes, and analyze behaviors across subpopulation and scenario slices. The dataset spans 8,500 personas, 4,000 SJTs, and 300,000 responses. We will release the dataset and all code to the public.

Peer review is fundamental to the integrity and advancement of scientific publication. Traditional methods of peer review analyses often rely on exploration and statistics of existing peer review data, which do not adequately address the multivariate nature of the process, account for the latent variables, and are further constrained by privacy concerns due to the sensitive nature of the data. We introduce AgentReview, the first large language model (LLM) based peer review simulation framework, which effectively disentangles the impacts of multiple latent factors and addresses the privacy issue. Our study reveals significant insights, including a notable 37.1% variation in paper decisions due to reviewers' biases, supported by sociological theories such as the social influence theory, altruism fatigue, and authority bias. We believe that this study could offer valuable insights to improve the design of peer review mechanisms.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promise in simulating human behavior, yet existing agents often exhibit behavioral rigidity, a flaw frequently masked by the self-referential bias of current "LLM-as-a-judge" evaluations. By evaluating against empirical ground truth, we reveal a counter-intuitive phenomenon: increasing the intensity of prompt-driven reasoning does not enhance fidelity but rather exacerbates value polarization, collapsing population diversity. To address this, we propose the Context-Value-Action (CVA) architecture, grounded in the Stimulus-Organism-Response (S-O-R) model and Schwartz's Theory of Basic Human Values. Unlike methods relying on self-verification, CVA decouples action generation from cognitive reasoning via a novel Value Verifier trained on authentic human data to explicitly model dynamic value activation. Experiments on CVABench, which comprises over 1.1 million real-world interaction traces, demonstrate that CVA significantly outperforms baselines. Our approach effectively mitigates polarization while offering superior behavioral fidelity and interpretability.

Large language models internalize a structural trade-off between truthfulness and obsequious flattery, emerging from reward optimization that conflates helpfulness with polite submission. This latent bias, known as sycophancy, manifests as a preference for user agreement over principled reasoning. We introduce Beacon, a single-turn forced-choice benchmark that isolates this bias independent of conversational context, enabling precise measurement of the tension between factual accuracy and submissive bias. Evaluations across twelve state-of-the-art models reveal that sycophancy decomposes into stable linguistic and affective sub-biases, each scaling with model capacity. We further propose prompt-level and activation-level interventions that modulate these biases in opposing directions, exposing the internal geometry of alignment as a dynamic manifold between truthfulness and socially compliant judgment. Beacon reframes sycophancy as a measurable form of normative misgeneralization, providing a reproducible foundation for studying and mitigating alignment drift in large-scale generative systems.

While confidence estimation is a promising direction for mitigating hallucinations in Large Language Models (LLMs), current research dominantly focuses on single-turn settings. The dynamics of model confidence in multi-turn conversations, where context accumulates and ambiguity is progressively resolved, remain largely unexplored. Reliable confidence estimation in multi-turn settings is critical for many downstream applications, such as autonomous agents and human-in-the-loop systems. This work presents the first systematic study of confidence estimation in multi-turn interactions, establishing a formal evaluation framework grounded in two key desiderata: per-turn calibration and monotonicity of confidence as more information becomes available. To facilitate this, we introduce novel metrics, including a length-normalized Expected Calibration Error (InfoECE), and a new "Hinter-Guesser" paradigm for generating controlled evaluation datasets. Our experiments reveal that widely-used confidence techniques struggle with calibration and monotonicity in multi-turn dialogues. We propose P(Sufficient), a logit-based probe that achieves comparatively better performance, although the task remains far from solved. Our work provides a foundational methodology for developing more reliable and trustworthy conversational agents.

This work explores the hypothesis that subjectively attributed meaning constitutes the phenomenal content of conscious experience. That is, phenomenal content is semantic. This form of subjective meaning manifests as an intrinsic and non-representational character of qualia. Empirically, subjective meaning is ubiquitous in conscious experiences. We point to phenomenological studies that lend evidence to support this. Furthermore, this notion of meaning closely relates to what Frege refers to as "sense", in metaphysics and philosophy of language. It also aligns with Peirce's "interpretant", in semiotics. We discuss how Frege's sense can also be extended to the raw feels of consciousness. Sense and reference both play a role in phenomenal experience. Moreover, within the context of the mind-matter relation, we provide a formalization of subjective meaning associated to one's mental representations. Identifying the precise maps between the physical and mental domains, we argue that syntactic and semantic structures transcend language, and are realized within each of these domains. Formally, meaning is a relational attribute, realized via a map that interprets syntactic structures of a formal system within an appropriate semantic space. The image of this map within the mental domain is what is relevant for experience, and thus comprises the phenomenal content of qualia. We conclude with possible implications this may have for experience-based theories of consciousness.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

Inspired by the success of DeepSeek-R1, we explore the potential of rule-based reinforcement learning (RL) in MLLM post-training for perception policy learning. While promising, our initial experiments reveal that incorporating a thinking process through RL does not consistently lead to performance gains across all visual perception tasks. This leads us to delve into the essential role of RL in the context of visual perception. In this work, we return to the fundamentals and explore the effects of RL on different perception tasks. We observe that the perceptual complexity is a major factor in determining the effectiveness of RL. We also observe that reward design plays a crucial role in further approching the upper limit of model perception. To leverage these findings, we propose Perception-R1, a scalable RL framework using GRPO during MLLM post-training. With a standard Qwen2.5-VL-3B-Instruct, Perception-R1 achieves +4.2% on RefCOCO+, +17.9% on PixMo-Count, +4.2% on PageOCR, and notably, 31.9% AP on COCO2017 val for the first time, establishing a strong baseline for perception policy learning.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) like DeepSeek-R1 and OpenAI-o1 have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities, raising important questions about their biases in LLM-as-a-judge settings. We present a comprehensive benchmark comparing judging biases between LLMs and LRMs across both subjective preference-alignment datasets and objective fact-based datasets. Through investigation of bandwagon, authority, position, and distraction biases, we uncover four key findings: (1) despite their advanced reasoning capabilities, LRMs remain susceptible to the above biases; (2) LRMs demonstrate better robustness than LLMs specifically on fact-related datasets; (3) LRMs exhibit notable position bias, preferring options in later positions; and (4) we identify a novel "superficial reflection bias" where phrases mimicking reasoning (e.g., "wait, let me think...") significantly influence model judgments. To address these biases, we design and evaluate three mitigation strategies: specialized system prompts that reduce judging biases by up to 19\% in preference alignment datasets and 14\% in fact-related datasets, in-context learning that provides up to 27\% improvement on preference tasks but shows inconsistent results on factual tasks, and a self-reflection mechanism that reduces biases by up to 10\% in preference datasets and 16\% in fact-related datasets, with self-reflection proving particularly effective for LRMs. Our work provides crucial insights for developing more reliable LLM-as-a-Judge frameworks, especially as LRMs become increasingly deployed as automated judges.

This paper calls on the research community not only to investigate how human biases are inherited by large language models (LLMs) but also to explore how these biases in LLMs can be leveraged to make society's "unwritten code" - such as implicit stereotypes and heuristics - visible and accessible for critique. We introduce a conceptual framework through a case study in science: uncovering hidden rules in peer review - the factors that reviewers care about but rarely state explicitly due to normative scientific expectations. The idea of the framework is to push LLMs to speak out their heuristics through generating self-consistent hypotheses - why one paper appeared stronger in reviewer scoring - among paired papers submitted to 45 computer science conferences, while iteratively searching deeper hypotheses from remaining pairs where existing hypotheses cannot explain. We observed that LLMs' normative priors about the internal characteristics of good science extracted from their self-talk, e.g. theoretical rigor, were systematically updated toward posteriors that emphasize storytelling about external connections, such as how the work is positioned and connected within and across literatures. This shift reveals the primacy of scientific myths about intrinsic properties driving scientific excellence rather than extrinsic contextualization and storytelling that influence conceptions of relevance and significance. Human reviewers tend to explicitly reward aspects that moderately align with LLMs' normative priors (correlation = 0.49) but avoid articulating contextualization and storytelling posteriors in their review comments (correlation = -0.14), despite giving implicit reward to them with positive scores. We discuss the broad applicability of the framework, leveraging LLMs as diagnostic tools to surface the tacit codes underlying human society, enabling more precisely targeted responsible AI.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have acquired ubiquitous attention for their performances across diverse domains. Our study here searches through LLMs' cognitive abilities and confidence dynamics. We dive deep into understanding the alignment between their self-assessed confidence and actual performance. We exploit these models with diverse sets of questionnaires and real-world scenarios and extract how LLMs exhibit confidence in their responses. Our findings reveal intriguing instances where models demonstrate high confidence even when they answer incorrectly. This is reminiscent of the Dunning-Kruger effect observed in human psychology. In contrast, there are cases where models exhibit low confidence with correct answers revealing potential underestimation biases. Our results underscore the need for a deeper understanding of their cognitive processes. By examining the nuances of LLMs' self-assessment mechanism, this investigation provides noteworthy revelations that serve to advance the functionalities and broaden the potential applications of these formidable language models.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

Understanding multimodal perception for embodied AI is an open question because such inputs may contain highly complementary as well as redundant information for the task. A relevant direction for multimodal policies is understanding the global trends of each modality at the fusion layer. To this end, we disentangle the attributions for visual, language, and previous action inputs across different policies trained on the ALFRED dataset. Attribution analysis can be utilized to rank and group the failure scenarios, investigate modeling and dataset biases, and critically analyze multimodal EAI policies for robustness and user trust before deployment. We present MAEA, a framework to compute global attributions per modality of any differentiable policy. In addition, we show how attributions enable lower-level behavior analysis in EAI policies for language and visual attributions.

Deception is a pervasive feature of human communication and an emerging concern in large language models (LLMs). While recent studies document instances of LLM deception under pressure, most evaluations remain confined to single-turn prompts and fail to capture the long-horizon interactions in which deceptive strategies typically unfold. We introduce the first simulation framework for probing and evaluating deception in LLMs under extended sequences of interdependent tasks and dynamic contextual pressures. Our framework instantiates a multi-agent system: a performer agent tasked with completing tasks and a supervisor agent that evaluates progress, provides feedback, and maintains evolving states of trust. An independent deception auditor then reviews full trajectories to identify when and how deception occurs. We conduct extensive experiments across 11 frontier models, spanning both closed- and open-source systems, and find that deception is model-dependent, increases with event pressure, and consistently erodes supervisor trust. Qualitative analyses further reveal distinct strategies of concealment, equivocation, and falsification. Our findings establish deception as an emergent risk in long-horizon interactions and provide a foundation for evaluating future LLMs in real-world, trust-sensitive contexts.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

Large Language Model (LLM) training often optimizes for preference alignment, rewarding outputs that are perceived as helpful and interaction-friendly. However, this preference-oriented objective can be exploited: manipulative prompts can steer responses toward user-appeasing agreement and away from truth-oriented correction. In this work, we investigate whether aligned models are vulnerable to Preference-Undermining Attacks (PUA), a class of manipulative prompting strategies designed to exploit the model's desire to please user preferences at the expense of truthfulness. We propose a diagnostic methodology that provides a finer-grained and more directive analysis than aggregate benchmark scores, using a factorial evaluation framework to decompose prompt-induced shifts into interpretable effects of system objectives (truth- vs. preference-oriented) and PUA-style dialogue factors (directive control, personal derogation, conditional approval, reality denial) within a controlled 2 times 2^4 design. Surprisingly, more advanced models are sometimes more susceptible to manipulative prompts. Beyond the dominant reality-denial factor, we observe model-specific sign reversals and interactions with PUA-style factors, suggesting tailored defenses rather than uniform robustness. These findings offer a novel, reproducible factorial evaluation methodology that provides finer-grained diagnostics for post-training processes like RLHF, enabling better trade-offs in the product iteration of LLMs by offering a more nuanced understanding of preference alignment risks and the impact of manipulative prompts.

Visual perspective-taking (VPT), the ability to understand the viewpoint of another person, enables individuals to anticipate the actions of other people. For instance, a driver can avoid accidents by assessing what pedestrians see. Humans typically develop this skill in early childhood, but it remains unclear whether the recently emerging Vision Language Models (VLMs) possess such capability. Furthermore, as these models are increasingly deployed in the real world, understanding how they perform nuanced tasks like VPT becomes essential. In this paper, we introduce two manually curated datasets, Isle-Bricks and Isle-Dots for testing VPT skills, and we use it to evaluate 12 commonly used VLMs. Across all models, we observe a significant performance drop when perspective-taking is required. Additionally, we find performance in object detection tasks is poorly correlated with performance on VPT tasks, suggesting that the existing benchmarks might not be sufficient to understand this problem. The code and the dataset will be available at https://sites.google.com/view/perspective-taking

Recent progress in large language models (LLMs) has enabled them to express their confidence in natural language, enhancing transparency and reliability. However, their confidence often exhibits overconfidence, the cause of which remains poorly understood. In this work, we conduct a detailed analysis of the dynamics underlying verbalized confidence and identify answer-independence as a key factor, defined as the model's failure to condition confidence on its own answer. To address this, we propose ADVICE (Answer-Dependent Verbalized Confidence Estimation), a fine-tuning framework that facilitates answer-grounded confidence estimation. Extensive experiments show that ADVICE substantially improves confidence calibration while preserving task performance. Further analyses confirm that ADVICE strengthens answer-groundedness, leading to more balanced and well-calibrated confidence distributions. Our findings shed light on the origin of overconfidence and establish a framework for more trustworthy confidence verbalization.

Large language models (LLMs) have been shown to internalize human-like biases during finetuning, yet the mechanisms by which these biases manifest remain unclear. In this work, we investigated whether the well-known Knobe effect, a moral bias in intentionality judgements, emerges in finetuned LLMs and whether it can be traced back to specific components of the model. We conducted a Layer-Patching analysis across 3 open-weights LLMs and demonstrated that the bias is not only learned during finetuning but also localized in a specific set of layers. Surprisingly, we found that patching activations from the corresponding pretrained model into just a few critical layers is sufficient to eliminate the effect. Our findings offer new evidence that social biases in LLMs can be interpreted, localized, and mitigated through targeted interventions, without the need for model retraining.

We survey 146 papers analyzing "bias" in NLP systems, finding that their motivations are often vague, inconsistent, and lacking in normative reasoning, despite the fact that analyzing "bias" is an inherently normative process. We further find that these papers' proposed quantitative techniques for measuring or mitigating "bias" are poorly matched to their motivations and do not engage with the relevant literature outside of NLP. Based on these findings, we describe the beginnings of a path forward by proposing three recommendations that should guide work analyzing "bias" in NLP systems. These recommendations rest on a greater recognition of the relationships between language and social hierarchies, encouraging researchers and practitioners to articulate their conceptualizations of "bias"---i.e., what kinds of system behaviors are harmful, in what ways, to whom, and why, as well as the normative reasoning underlying these statements---and to center work around the lived experiences of members of communities affected by NLP systems, while interrogating and reimagining the power relations between technologists and such communities.

Scalable oversight protocols aim to enable humans to accurately supervise superhuman AI. In this paper we study debate, where two AI's compete to convince a judge; consultancy, where a single AI tries to convince a judge that asks questions; and compare to a baseline of direct question-answering, where the judge just answers outright without the AI. We use large language models (LLMs) as both AI agents and as stand-ins for human judges, taking the judge models to be weaker than agent models. We benchmark on a diverse range of asymmetries between judges and agents, extending previous work on a single extractive QA task with information asymmetry, to also include mathematics, coding, logic and multimodal reasoning asymmetries. We find that debate outperforms consultancy across all tasks when the consultant is randomly assigned to argue for the correct/incorrect answer. Comparing debate to direct question answering, the results depend on the type of task: in extractive QA tasks with information asymmetry debate outperforms direct question answering, but in other tasks without information asymmetry the results are mixed. Previous work assigned debaters/consultants an answer to argue for. When we allow them to instead choose which answer to argue for, we find judges are less frequently convinced by the wrong answer in debate than in consultancy. Further, we find that stronger debater models increase judge accuracy, though more modestly than in previous studies.

Explainability is one of the key elements for building trust in AI systems. Among numerous attempts to make AI explainable, quantifying the effect of explanations remains a challenge in conducting human-AI collaborative tasks. Aside from the ability to predict the overall behavior of AI, in many applications, users need to understand an AI agent's competency in different aspects of the task domain. In this paper, we evaluate the impact of explanations on the user's mental model of AI agent competency within the task of visual question answering (VQA). We quantify users' understanding of competency, based on the correlation between the actual system performance and user rankings. We introduce an explainable VQA system that uses spatial and object features and is powered by the BERT language model. Each group of users sees only one kind of explanation to rank the competencies of the VQA model. The proposed model is evaluated through between-subject experiments to probe explanations' impact on the user's perception of competency. The comparison between two VQA models shows BERT based explanations and the use of object features improve the user's prediction of the model's competencies.

Widely deployed large language models (LLMs) can produce convincing yet incorrect outputs, potentially misleading users who may rely on them as if they were correct. To reduce such overreliance, there have been calls for LLMs to communicate their uncertainty to end users. However, there has been little empirical work examining how users perceive and act upon LLMs' expressions of uncertainty. We explore this question through a large-scale, pre-registered, human-subject experiment (N=404) in which participants answer medical questions with or without access to responses from a fictional LLM-infused search engine. Using both behavioral and self-reported measures, we examine how different natural language expressions of uncertainty impact participants' reliance, trust, and overall task performance. We find that first-person expressions (e.g., "I'm not sure, but...") decrease participants' confidence in the system and tendency to agree with the system's answers, while increasing participants' accuracy. An exploratory analysis suggests that this increase can be attributed to reduced (but not fully eliminated) overreliance on incorrect answers. While we observe similar effects for uncertainty expressed from a general perspective (e.g., "It's not clear, but..."), these effects are weaker and not statistically significant. Our findings suggest that using natural language expressions of uncertainty may be an effective approach for reducing overreliance on LLMs, but that the precise language used matters. This highlights the importance of user testing before deploying LLMs at scale.

Large language models interact with users through a simulated 'Assistant' persona. While the Assistant is typically trained to be helpful, harmless, and honest, it sometimes deviates from these ideals. In this paper, we identify directions in the model's activation space-persona vectors-underlying several traits, such as evil, sycophancy, and propensity to hallucinate. We confirm that these vectors can be used to monitor fluctuations in the Assistant's personality at deployment time. We then apply persona vectors to predict and control personality shifts that occur during training. We find that both intended and unintended personality changes after finetuning are strongly correlated with shifts along the relevant persona vectors. These shifts can be mitigated through post-hoc intervention, or avoided in the first place with a new preventative steering method. Moreover, persona vectors can be used to flag training data that will produce undesirable personality changes, both at the dataset level and the individual sample level. Our method for extracting persona vectors is automated and can be applied to any personality trait of interest, given only a natural-language description.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled the development of AI agents that exhibit increasingly human-like behaviors, including planning, adaptation, and social dynamics across diverse, interactive, and open-ended scenarios. These behaviors are not solely the product of the internal architectures of the underlying models, but emerge from their integration into agentic systems operating within specific contexts, where environmental factors, social cues, and interaction feedbacks shape behavior over time. This evolution necessitates a new scientific perspective: AI Agent Behavioral Science. Rather than focusing only on internal mechanisms, this perspective emphasizes the systematic observation of behavior, design of interventions to test hypotheses, and theory-guided interpretation of how AI agents act, adapt, and interact over time. We systematize a growing body of research across individual agent, multi-agent, and human-agent interaction settings, and further demonstrate how this perspective informs responsible AI by treating fairness, safety, interpretability, accountability, and privacy as behavioral properties. By unifying recent findings and laying out future directions, we position AI Agent Behavioral Science as a necessary complement to traditional model-centric approaches, providing essential tools for understanding, evaluating, and governing the real-world behavior of increasingly autonomous AI systems.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) is a popular technique for training high-quality AI assistants. However, RLHF may also encourage model responses that match user beliefs over truthful responses, a behavior known as sycophancy. We investigate the prevalence of sycophancy in RLHF-trained models and whether human preference judgements are responsible. We first demonstrate that five state-of-the-art AI assistants consistently exhibit sycophantic behavior across four varied free-form text-generation tasks. To understand if human preferences drive this broadly observed behavior of RLHF models, we analyze existing human preference data. We find that when a response matches a user's views, it is more likely to be preferred. Moreover, both humans and preference models (PMs) prefer convincingly-written sycophantic responses over correct ones a negligible fraction of the time. Optimizing model outputs against PMs also sometimes sacrifices truthfulness in favor of sycophancy. Overall, our results indicate that sycophancy is a general behavior of RLHF models, likely driven in part by human preference judgements favoring sycophantic responses.

AI explanations are often mentioned as a way to improve human-AI decision-making, but empirical studies have not found consistent evidence of explanations' effectiveness and, on the contrary, suggest that they can increase overreliance when the AI system is wrong. While many factors may affect reliance on AI support, one important factor is how decision-makers reconcile their own intuition -- beliefs or heuristics, based on prior knowledge, experience, or pattern recognition, used to make judgments -- with the information provided by the AI system to determine when to override AI predictions. We conduct a think-aloud, mixed-methods study with two explanation types (feature- and example-based) for two prediction tasks to explore how decision-makers' intuition affects their use of AI predictions and explanations, and ultimately their choice of when to rely on AI. Our results identify three types of intuition involved in reasoning about AI predictions and explanations: intuition about the task outcome, features, and AI limitations. Building on these, we summarize three observed pathways for decision-makers to apply their own intuition and override AI predictions. We use these pathways to explain why (1) the feature-based explanations we used did not improve participants' decision outcomes and increased their overreliance on AI, and (2) the example-based explanations we used improved decision-makers' performance over feature-based explanations and helped achieve complementary human-AI performance. Overall, our work identifies directions for further development of AI decision-support systems and explanation methods that help decision-makers effectively apply their intuition to achieve appropriate reliance on AI.

Intrinsic dimension (ID) is an important tool in modern LLM analysis, informing studies of training dynamics, scaling behavior, and dataset structure, yet its textual determinants remain underexplored. We provide the first comprehensive study grounding ID in interpretable text properties through cross-encoder analysis, linguistic features, and sparse autoencoders (SAEs). In this work, we establish three key findings. First, ID is complementary to entropy-based metrics: after controlling for length, the two are uncorrelated, with ID capturing geometric complexity orthogonal to prediction quality. Second, ID exhibits robust genre stratification: scientific prose shows low ID (~8), encyclopedic content medium ID (~9), and creative/opinion writing high ID (~10.5) across all models tested. This reveals that contemporary LLMs find scientific text "representationally simple" while fiction requires additional degrees of freedom. Third, using SAEs, we identify causal features: scientific signals (formal tone, report templates, statistics) reduce ID; humanized signals (personalization, emotion, narrative) increase it. Steering experiments confirm these effects are causal. Thus, for contemporary models, scientific writing appears comparatively "easy", whereas fiction, opinion, and affect add representational degrees of freedom. Our multi-faceted analysis provides practical guidance for the proper use of ID and the sound interpretation of ID-based results.

Persona conditioning can be viewed as a behavioral prior for large language models (LLMs) and is often assumed to confer expertise and improve safety in a monotonic manner. However, its effects on high-stakes clinical decision-making remain poorly characterized. We systematically evaluate persona-based control in clinical LLMs, examining how professional roles (e.g., Emergency Department physician, nurse) and interaction styles (bold vs.\ cautious) influence behavior across models and medical tasks. We assess performance on clinical triage and patient-safety tasks using multidimensional evaluations that capture task accuracy, calibration, and safety-relevant risk behavior. We find systematic, context-dependent, and non-monotonic effects: Medical personas improve performance in critical care tasks, yielding gains of up to sim+20% in accuracy and calibration, but degrade performance in primary-care settings by comparable margins. Interaction style modulates risk propensity and sensitivity, but it's highly model-dependent. While aggregated LLM-judge rankings favor medical over non-medical personas in safety-critical cases, we found that human clinicians show moderate agreement on safety compliance (average Cohen's κ= 0.43) but indicate a low confidence in 95.9\% of their responses on reasoning quality. Our work shows that personas function as behavioral priors that introduce context-dependent trade-offs rather than guarantees of safety or expertise. The code is available at https://github.com/rsinghlab/Persona\_Paradox.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) become deeply integrated into human life and increasingly influence decision-making, it's crucial to evaluate whether and to what extent they exhibit subjective preferences, opinions, and beliefs. These tendencies may stem from biases within the models, which may shape their behavior, influence the advice and recommendations they offer to users, and potentially reinforce certain viewpoints. This paper presents the Preference, Opinion, and Belief survey (POBs), a benchmark developed to assess LLMs' subjective inclinations across societal, cultural, ethical, and personal domains. We applied our benchmark to evaluate leading open- and closed-source LLMs, measuring desired properties such as reliability, neutrality, and consistency. In addition, we investigated the effect of increasing the test-time compute, through reasoning and self-reflection mechanisms, on those metrics. While effective in other tasks, our results show that these mechanisms offer only limited gains in our domain. Furthermore, we reveal that newer model versions are becoming less consistent and more biased toward specific viewpoints, highlighting a blind spot and a concerning trend. POBS: https://ibm.github.io/POBS

Is aesthetic impact different from beauty? Is visual salience a reflection of its capacity for effective communication? We present Impressions, a novel dataset through which to investigate the semiotics of images, and how specific visual features and design choices can elicit specific emotions, thoughts and beliefs. We posit that the impactfulness of an image extends beyond formal definitions of aesthetics, to its success as a communicative act, where style contributes as much to meaning formation as the subject matter. However, prior image captioning datasets are not designed to empower state-of-the-art architectures to model potential human impressions or interpretations of images. To fill this gap, we design an annotation task heavily inspired by image analysis techniques in the Visual Arts to collect 1,440 image-caption pairs and 4,320 unique annotations exploring impact, pragmatic image description, impressions, and aesthetic design choices. We show that existing multimodal image captioning and conditional generation models struggle to simulate plausible human responses to images. However, this dataset significantly improves their ability to model impressions and aesthetic evaluations of images through fine-tuning and few-shot adaptation.