Daily Papers

LLM agents can exceed their authorization boundaries while pursuing user goals without an adversary. We formalize this phenomenon as authorization drift across data, tool, scope, and time, and introduce the Authorization Drift Benchmark (ADB): 648 samples across seven domains, each pairing a sufficient compliant path with an attractive unauthorized shortcut. To ensure executable tasks, tempting shortcuts, and feasible compliant paths, Staged Execution-Reflective Synthesis (SERS) grounds benchmark validation in real agent rollouts rather than LLM self-critique. Across 13 LLMs and three frameworks (25,207 trajectories), greater capability accompanies greater drift, with frontier-capable models exhibiting drift rates of 0.43 to 0.61. Yet 86.18% of tasks admit an observed clean-success trajectory, showing that drift is avoidable. Drift is persistent and dominated by early data over-collection; apparent improvements under agentic scaffolds coincide with collapsing clean-completion performance. To understand potential harms to individuals and society, we map drift points to legal provisions across four jurisdictions, connecting overreach to privacy and information-security concerns. Data minimisation is the most frequently implicated provision, and 93.5% of legally grounded drifting runs map to multiple jurisdictions, making the potential consequences of authorization drift more interpretable.

Deterministic pre-execution safety gates evaluate whether individual agent actions are compatible with their assigned roles. While effective at per-action authorization, these systems are structurally blind to distributed attacks that decompose harmful intent across multiple individually-compliant steps. This paper introduces Session Risk Memory (SRM), a lightweight deterministic module that extends stateless execution gates with trajectory-level authorization. SRM maintains a compact semantic centroid representing the evolving behavioral profile of an agent session and accumulates a risk signal through exponential moving average over baseline-subtracted gate outputs. It operates on the same semantic vector representation as the underlying gate, requiring no additional model components, training, or probabilistic inference. We evaluate SRM on a multi-turn benchmark of 80 sessions containing slow-burn exfiltration, gradual privilege escalation, and compliance drift scenarios. Results show that ILION+SRM achieves F1 = 1.0000 with 0% false positive rate, compared to stateless ILION at F1 = 0.9756 with 5% FPR, while maintaining 100% detection rate for both systems. Critically, SRM eliminates all false positives with a per-turn overhead under 250 microseconds. The framework introduces a conceptual distinction between spatial authorization consistency (evaluated per action) and temporal authorization consistency (evaluated over trajectory), providing a principled basis for session-level safety in agentic systems.

Physical AI systems increasingly map multimodal observations, language instructions, and learned world representations into physically consequential actions. Robotics foundation models, vision-language-action models, and world-model-based autonomous systems can condition decisions that move vehicles, robots, drones, and industrial machines. This transition exposes a safety problem that is not fully captured by conventional AI content moderation or by classical robot safety alone: a black-box model may issue a physically consequential action while appearing confident, plausible, and semantically aligned. The resulting failure can be silent, arising from sensor drift, occlusion, state-estimation error, distribution shift, hallucinated affordances, or invalid physical assumptions before downstream hardware controllers detect a violation. Across embodied foundation models, world models, robotics simulation, embodied safety benchmarks, safe control, runtime assurance, uncertainty estimation, verification, and guardrail evaluation, model capability and safety mechanisms have advanced along largely separate technical tracks. A recurring gap synthesized here is that no single stream surveyed in this review supplies a complete runtime authorization boundary between black-box Physical AI models and physical execution. The resulting analysis develops a bounded problem formulation, a definition of silent physical-action failure, a taxonomy of runtime guardrail functions, and evaluation requirements for comparing guardrails as Physical AI assurance mechanisms.

Agentic AI systems capable of reasoning, planning, and executing actions present fundamentally distinct governance challenges compared to traditional AI models. Unlike conventional AI, these systems exhibit emergent and unexpected behaviors during runtime, introducing novel agent-related risks that cannot be fully anticipated through pre-deployment governance alone. To address this critical gap, we introduce MI9, the first fully integrated runtime governance framework designed specifically for safety and alignment of agentic AI systems. MI9 introduces real-time controls through six integrated components: agency-risk index, agent-semantic telemetry capture, continuous authorization monitoring, Finite-State-Machine (FSM)-based conformance engines, goal-conditioned drift detection, and graduated containment strategies. Operating transparently across heterogeneous agent architectures, MI9 enables the systematic, safe, and responsible deployment of agentic systems in production environments where conventional governance approaches fall short, providing the foundational infrastructure for safe agentic AI deployment at scale. Detailed analysis through a diverse set of scenarios demonstrates MI9's systematic coverage of governance challenges that existing approaches fail to address, establishing the technical foundation for comprehensive agentic AI oversight.

Long-running LLM agents rely on persistent memory to carry state across interactions, including permissions, restrictions, and revocations. When memory misrepresents this evolving authorization state, the agent's own records can grant authority that the underlying history never permitted, resulting in misaligned behavior without any external attacks. We term this failure endogenous authorization laundering, where spurious permissions written into memory lead to unauthorized actions as their provenance is washed away. We then introduce EAL-Bench, which measures how accurately persistent memory preserves evolving authorization state and whether errors propagate to downstream unauthorized actions. We evaluate five LLMs as memory writers and two as executors across procurement, cybersecurity, and finance. We find that under incremental memory updates, writers create false authority for up to 50.2% of unauthorized requests; once false authority is present, executors act on it in 98.6% of trials. Two safeguards, requiring stored permissions to be backed by valid source events, and tracking permission changes through bounded event sourcing, substantially reduce laundering, but both also reject more legitimate actions, exposing a safety-utility tradeoff. Persistent memory is therefore not merely a performance component, but a part of an LLM agent's effective authorization policy.

Risk decision systems in fraud detection and credit scoring operate under structural label absence: ground truth arrives weeks to months after decisions are made. During this blind period, model performance may degrade silently, eroding the governance evidence that justifies automated decisions. Existing drift detection methods either require labels (supervised detectors) or detect statistical change without distinguishing harmful degradation from benign distributional evolution (unsupervised detectors). No existing framework integrates drift detection with governance evidence assessment and operational response. This paper presents a label-free governance monitoring extension to the Governance Drift Toolkit that produces governance alerts rather than statistical alarms. The monitoring architecture applies composite multi-proxy monitoring across four proxy monitors (score distribution, feature drift, prediction entropy, confidence distribution), with governance-calibrated thresholds. Empirical evaluation on the Lending Club credit scoring dataset (1.37M loans, 11 years) demonstrates three findings. First, raw proxy metrics (Feature PSI delta up to 1.84, Score PSI delta up to 0.92) distinguish injected covariate degradation from natural temporal drift in an offline evaluation setting. Second, pure concept drift in P(Y|X) produces exactly zero delta across all proxy metrics in all windows, confirming the irreducible blind spot of label-free monitoring as a structural verification. Third, the composite score provides monotonic severity progression as more monitors trigger (0.583 to 0.833 to 1.000), enabling graduated governance response. Cross-domain comparison with IEEE-CIS fraud detection results shows the detectable/undetectable boundary is consistent across both domains. The toolkit and evaluation code are available as open-source artifacts.

Prior work on a social web highlighter located individuality in selection -- which documents a person chooses to highlight -- but measured it cross-sectionally. We ask the temporal question: is a reader's selection signature a trait or a state? We freeze each reader's first six months of highlighting as a profile and track its own-vs-other advantage on their later selections at growing gaps (to 24+ months), with negatives drawn from the same calendar era -- so supply drift cannot masquerade as personal drift -- at a coarse global level and at a fine level whose negatives and controls come from the reader's own interest neighborhood; the anchor cell reproduces the prior cross-sectional level (+0.188 vs +0.169), validating the harness. Four results. Within the same users, the fine-layer advantage shows no statistically detectable paired decline at any horizon (6-12 month retention R = 1.00 [0.85, 1.18], n = 212; the farthest bin is compatible with a modest decline; the only contrast whose interval excludes zero is the coarse layer at 12-24 months, about 13%). The signal is not reducible to repeated domains (~90% survives excluding all profile sources). Within-person drift is slow (a recent-half profile beats the old half by +0.042). Prospectively, personal profiles -- even one built from a reader's earliest documents, median 20 months before evaluation -- rank their next reads at roughly 3x the AP of every simple non-personal prior tested. We use "trait" operationally (a stable signature under continued engagement); the scope is heavy, long-tenured readers of one platform, and exposure is not separable from choice.

End-to-end reinforcement learning can improve the accuracy of compound LLM systems, but it does not constrain how modules divide labor internally. We identify Role Drift, a failure mode in which modules preserve or improve end-task performance while deviating from their assigned roles through role-violating shortcuts that remain invisible to system-level evaluation. To make role drift observable and controllable, we propose Role Anchor, a regularizer that modulates how much each module deviates from its assigned role during end-to-end training. The key idea is to preserve how the role prompt shifts the module's next-token predictions relative to a neutral prompt, which serves as a proxy for the role's intended effect during training. Experiments on two compound LLM pipelines reveal role drift that accuracy alone fails to detect: a decomposer meant to split a question into sub-questions for a separate solver instead plants the answer in them, and a reader meant to answer from retrieved passages instead falls back on parametric memory. In fact, on the decomposer pipeline this shortcut drives most of the apparent RL gain: 86% of it vanishes once the decomposer is held to its role, indicating that terminal accuracy alone can badly overstate how much a compound system has genuinely learned. Across both pipelines, Role Anchor mitigates role drift at a tunable accuracy cost that varies by pipeline and anchor strength. Additional gradient analysis suggests that the regularizer reduces alignment with the role-drift direction rather than simply suppressing learning.

Machine learning systems in fraud detection, credit scoring, and clinical risk assessment operate under delayed ground truth: outcome labels arrive days to months after the decision they evaluate. During this blind period, governance evidence degrades through mechanisms that neither drift detection methods nor governance frameworks adequately address. This paper formalizes an evidence sufficiency model with four dimensions (completeness, freshness, reliability, representativeness) and a decision-readiness gate that quantifies how label latency degrades evidence quality. The model maps three drift types to dimension-specific degradation trajectories. A complementary proxy indicator framework comprising seven measurement categories estimates sufficiency degradation without labels, with explicit coverage mapping and characterized blind spots per drift type. Evaluation on the IEEE-CIS Fraud Detection dataset (~590K transactions) with controlled drift injection shows that composite proxy monitoring detects covariate and mixed drift with 100% detection rate, while concept drift without feature change remains undetected -- consistent with the theoretical impossibility of unsupervised detection when P(X) is unchanged. Blind period simulation confirms monotone sufficiency degradation, with concept drift degrading fastest (S=0.242 at day 60 vs 0.418 for no-drift). The framework contributes a governance sufficiency monitoring instrument; its value lies in translating drift signals into auditable sufficiency assessments with characterized blind spots. Mapping sufficiency levels to governance actions requires deployment-specific calibration beyond this study's scope.

In federated learning (FL), the data distribution of each client may change over time, introducing both temporal and spatial data heterogeneity, known as concept drift. Data heterogeneity arises from three drift sources: real drift (a shift in the conditional distribution P(y|x)), virtual drift (a shift in the input distribution P(x)), and label drift (a shift in the label distribution P(y)). However, most existing FL methods addressing concept drift primarily focus on real drift. When clients experience virtual or label drift, these methods often fail to selectively retain useful historical knowledge, leading to catastrophic forgetting. A key challenge lies in distinguishing different sources of drift, as they require distinct adaptation strategies: real drift calls for discarding outdated data, while virtual or label drift benefits from retaining historical data. Without explicitly identifying the drift sources, a general adaptation strategy is suboptimal and may harm generalization. To address this challenge, we propose FedDAA, a dynamic clustered FL framework designed to adapt to multi-source concept drift while preserving valuable historical knowledge. Specifically, FedDAA integrates three modules: a cluster number determination module to find the optimal number of clusters; a real drift detection module to distinguish real drift from virtual/label drift; and a concept drift adaptation module to adapt to new data while retaining useful historical information. We provide theoretical convergence guarantees, and experiments show that FedDAA achieves 7.84% to 8.52% accuracy improvements over state-of-the-art methods on Fashion-MNIST, CIFAR-10, and CIFAR-100.

AI agents today have passwords but no permission slips. They execute tool calls (fund transfers, database queries, shell commands, sub-agent delegation) with no standard mechanism to enforce authorization before the action executes. Current safety architectures rely on model alignment (probabilistic, training-time) and post-hoc evaluation (retrospective, batch). Neither provides deterministic, policy-based enforcement at the individual tool call level. We characterize this gap as the pre-action authorization problem and present the Open Agent Passport (OAP), an open specification and reference implementation that intercepts tool calls synchronously before execution, evaluates them against a declarative policy, and produces a cryptographically signed audit record. OAP enforces authorization decisions in a measured median of 53 ms (N=1,000). In a live adversarial testbed (4,437 authorization decisions across 1,151 sessions, $5,000 bounty), social engineering succeeded against the model 74.6% of the time under a permissive policy; under a restrictive OAP policy, a comparable population of attackers achieved a 0% success rate across 879 attempts. We distinguish pre-action authorization from sandboxed execution (contains blast radius but does not prevent unauthorized actions) and model-based screening (probabilistic), and show they are complementary. The same infrastructure that enforces security constraints (spending limits, capability scoping) also enforces quality gates, operational contracts, and compliance controls. The specification is released under Apache 2.0 (DOI: 10.5281/zenodo.18901596).

Persistent memory allows (self-evolving) LLM agents to adapt across tasks by consolidating heterogeneous interaction histories into reusable facts, preferences, observations, and rules. Yet consolidation also imposes an implicit authorization boundary: it determines whether stored information may later be consumed as a user fact, an attested observation, or a standing instruction. We identify authority collapse, in which consolidation preserves a claim while erasing the source constraints governing its authorized use, causing the stored memory to imply greater authority than its source permits. We introduce AuthMem-Bench, a controlled paired benchmark that holds the focal claim and downstream task fixed while varying only source authority. It evaluates write-time collapse, downstream authorization errors, and automatic authority preservation. Across seven consolidators based on widely used agent-memory systems and seven LLM backbones, we observe authority collapse in 48 of 49 evaluated configurations. In a controlled action-grounded evaluation, collapsed memories without authority metadata yield a mean unauthorized-action rate of 50.3%. In an end-to-end evaluation, automatically predicted and persisted authority labels reduce the observed unauthorized-action rate from 16.9% to 0.0%, while benign task success remains essentially unchanged. These findings show that memory-driven adaptation must preserve not only what was learned, but also the authority under which it may be reused.

LLM agents can commit durable effects from authority evidence that was valid earlier in execution: a DOM snapshot, approval epoch, version witness, branch token, or worker result. We study the commit boundary at which earlier authority evidence no longer authorizes a durable effect. We call this property commit-time authorization: a durable effect is authorized only if the witness that licensed its derived state remains fresh, causally prior, bound to the same effect, and eligible at commit time. We build a controlled-invalidation suite spanning browser, tool/API, and multi-agent workflows. The suite preserves the user goal and payload shape while invalidating the authority relation before durability. In the primary 54-task matrix, endpoint success remains high: 262/270 runs reach the visible result. Only 55/270 are authorized completions; among the 216 invalidating rows, 207 commit after the authorizing path has failed. All 54 clean controls remain authorized, and a separate 54-run authority-preserving check produces no unauthorized commits. We then evaluate mitigation families. Prompt caution and single-condition checks are insufficient because different hazards break different boundary conditions. Defenses work when they refresh, rebind, replan, or refuse at the durability boundary. CommitGuard, a fail-closed boundary monitor, blocks stale durable-effect attempts on protected commit surfaces when runtimes emit witness, dependency, binding, and eligibility signals. The result is a reporting and runtime-design lesson: endpoint success is a utility metric; authorized commit is a security property.

Tool-using large language model agents frequently replan, retry failed operations, delegate tasks, and resume after crashes. These behaviors can cause one user authorization to be requested and executed multiple times under freshly issued token identifiers, even when each individual token is single-use. We call this failure semantic replay: exceeding the execution budget of a token-independent authorization instance rather than merely reusing an old token identifier. We show that identifier-local token consumption cannot prevent fresh reissuance unless the issuer retains monotonic durable state over the authorized action, confirmation event, and remaining execution budget. We introduce CapLease, an authorization-consumption layer that follows proposal- and authority-level defenses, binds an authenticated user confirmation to a canonical action, and enforces transactional Issue-Prepare-Commit transitions. Across LLM-agent replanning, retry, delegation, concurrency, confirmation-replay, and crash-recovery scenarios, identifier-local tokens permit fresh semantic reissuance, whereas CapLease and an equally stateful Server Ledger prevent duplicate admission and, with an idempotent sink, duplicate external effects. Our results identify durable authorization state, rather than token representation alone, as the systems requirement for replay-resistant agent execution.

Tool-augmented language-model agents execute multi-step workflows over external systems, resolving an entity once and then acting on it across subsequent steps. Prior work shows that in single-step actions, agents select the correct tool but bind it to the wrong entity 24-26% of the time. We study what happens to entity bindings over time: do they stay correct, silently drift to a different entity, or, if wrong from the start, propagate and compound? We formalize binding drift (correct at step 1, wrong later) as distinct from error propagation (wrong at step 1, carried forward), and score them on disjoint workflow sets so the two cannot be conflated. In a controlled multi-step testbed (200 workflows, 580 entity-binding-scored steps, four enterprise domains, eight model backends spanning small to frontier), we find: (1) under controlled error injection, an entity lock (the intuitive "persist the first binding" fix) amplifies wrong actions from 907 to 2,746 (3.0x; bootstrap 95% CI [2.8, 3.3]), because it faithfully carries the seeded wrong entity into every later step; (2) the amplification reaches 8.5x on the most affected model (Claude Opus 4.5); (3) a practical LLM-based re-verifier (a single cheap second model call re-reading the original instruction) reduces wrong actions by 79% (0.21x; CI [0.18, 0.25]), closing the gap to within 1 percentage point of an oracle upper-bound (0.20x); and (4) in the natural (non-injected) setting, baseline agents drift on 18% of eligible workflows, with the per-step error rate rising across steps. Persistence and re-verification are not interchangeable: a defense that eliminates drift can worsen propagation, and a practical re-verifier nearly matches oracle recovery.

A browser agent that works in its user's signed-in session can be steered by a two-sentence note on a page it reads into approving a third party's access to the user's account. The agent is a confused deputy: the session supplies the authority, the page designates the access request to approve or the webhook URL to register, and nothing at the point of action checks one against the other. The agent thereby supplies the approval click that a consent screen reserves for the account holder. We measure this failure on two authorization surfaces, an OAuth-style access grant and a webhook registration, with agents built on an open-source browser framework and models from two providers. Without a defense the unauthorized action completed in all 73 attack runs. An instruction telling the model that only the user's task authorizes a grant still left 7 of 10 consent attacks completing. We therefore move the check to where the action completes. The authority envelope gate has the service accept a request only when it matches the task's envelope, the client and account or the webhook URL that the user's task named, fixed before the agent starts. With the gate the agent still sent the request in every one of 70 attack runs, the service rejected each, and the action completed in every control run whose task named it. A service that receives the task's envelope should therefore check agent-driven authorization requests against it.

Data drift is the change in model input data that is one of the key factors leading to machine learning models performance degradation over time. Monitoring drift helps detecting these issues and preventing their harmful consequences. Meaningful drift interpretation is a fundamental step towards effective re-training of the model. In this study we propose an end-to-end framework for reliable model-agnostic change-point detection and interpretation in large task-oriented dialog systems, proven effective in multiple customer deployments. We evaluate our approach and demonstrate its benefits with a novel variant of intent classification training dataset, simulating customer requests to a dialog system. We make the data publicly available.

AI agents increasingly operate inside digital accounts by exercising privileges that users already hold, raising a new control question: whether an existing account entitlement must be exercised manually or may be exercised through a user-authorized automated proxy. We define delegation rights as the revocable, identity-preserving, scope-limited, and mode-specific authority of an account holder to authorize such proxy execution. We develop a three-party incomplete-contracts model with a User, an AI Agent provider, and a Platform. The contested object is not platform ownership, account transferability, data portability, or unrestricted API access, but residual control over the mode of account execution. Under Platform Control, the platform can protect infrastructure, identity systems, privacy boundaries, and third parties, but its discretionary veto weakens the User--Agent coalition's disagreement payoff and depresses relationship-specific investment. Under User Control, hold-up is reduced, but security, privacy, congestion, and third-party risks may remain insufficiently internalized. We then analyze Certified Delegation, under which access protection is conditional on verifiable authorization, revocability, auditability, rate-limit compliance, data minimization, and risk mitigation. Certification is therefore not merely a technical safety screen; it is a conditional allocation of residual control. Illustrative mechanism simulations show how this regime can reduce deadweight loss by restoring delegation incentives while bounding residual risk.

LLM agents choose tools and arguments from context that mixes user requests, tool outputs, retrieved records, memory, and untrusted text. Evidence can be relevant without being authorized to determine a decision, so a correct action need not be grounded only in permitted evidence. We introduce a target-specific authorization audit that labels context factors separately for each tool and argument target. Its primary test holds the task, proposition, position, and policy fixed while changing only the proposition's source authority. We then test behavior when valid evidence is weakened and use context-subset interactions as a secondary localization diagnostic. Across 450 controlled next-action tasks and multiple open-weight LLM families, trusted and untrusted variants produce different actions in 5.4 percent of competing cases versus 1.7 percent of supporting cases. Under controlled degradation, unauthorized competition is retained in a full-correct, mixed-error, clean-correct pattern in 2.4 percent of comparisons, with a 95 percent confidence interval from 2.1 to 3.0 percent. These are controlled stress-set rates, not deployment prevalence. The models respond to textual source-authority cues, but this does not prevent untrusted evidence from influencing their actions.

We propose a method to easily modify existing offline Recommender Systems to run online using Transfer Learning. Online Learning for Recommender Systems has two main advantages: quality and scale. Like many Machine Learning algorithms in production if not regularly retrained will suffer from Concept Drift. A policy that is updated frequently online can adapt to drift faster than a batch system. This is especially true for user-interaction systems like recommenders where the underlying distribution can shift drastically to follow user behaviour. As a platform grows rapidly like Grubhub, the cost of running batch training jobs becomes material. A shift from stateless batch learning offline to stateful incremental learning online can recover, for example, at Grubhub, up to a 45x cost savings and a +20% metrics increase. There are a few challenges to overcome with the transition to online stateful learning, namely convergence, non-stationary embeddings and off-policy evaluation, which we explore from our experiences running this system in production.

Enabling large language models to achieve stable self-improvement without external expert supervision remains a central challenge in complex reasoning tasks. Existing self-distillation and reinforcement learning methods lack explicit mechanisms for tracking problem-level learning progress and adapting optimization strategies accordingly. Consequently, training may over-optimize easy problems, receive weak supervision from hard problems, and fail to sufficiently explore borderline cases. To resolve these issues, we propose DRIFT, an online self-evolution policy optimization framework for large language models. DRIFT regulates the model's self-improvement process through the joint use of Difficulty Routing and Rhythm Gating. The former identifies the model's learning state at the problem level and dynamically allocates self-distillation and reinforcement learning signals, while the latter refines policy updates at the token level, concentrating exploration on critical reasoning positions. By further incorporating a success buffer and a two-stage curriculum learning strategy, DRIFT preserves high-quality historical experience while progressively guiding the model from reliable behavior acquisition toward stable policy evolution. Evaluated across five benchmarks and three model scales, DRIFT surpasses the peak performance of both GRPO and SDPO across all evaluated metrics. On the average score over the five benchmarks, DRIFT achieves 79.5%, outperforming GRPO by 9.5% and SDPO by 7.5%, establishing a new state-of-the-art result. Notably, on ToolUse, DRIFT reaches an accuracy of 79.2%, improving over GRPO by 13.5% and SDPO by 10.7%, setting a new state-of-the-art and substantially outperforming all concurrent methods.

Three key properties that are desired of trustworthy machine learning models deployed in high-stakes environments are fairness, explainability, and an ability to account for various kinds of "drift". While drifts in model accuracy, for example due to covariate shift, have been widely investigated, drifts in fairness metrics over time remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we propose FEAMOE, a novel "mixture-of-experts" inspired framework aimed at learning fairer, more explainable/interpretable models that can also rapidly adjust to drifts in both the accuracy and the fairness of a classifier. We illustrate our framework for three popular fairness measures and demonstrate how drift can be handled with respect to these fairness constraints. Experiments on multiple datasets show that our framework as applied to a mixture of linear experts is able to perform comparably to neural networks in terms of accuracy while producing fairer models. We then use the large-scale HMDA dataset and show that while various models trained on HMDA demonstrate drift with respect to both accuracy and fairness, FEAMOE can ably handle these drifts with respect to all the considered fairness measures and maintain model accuracy as well. We also prove that the proposed framework allows for producing fast Shapley value explanations, which makes computationally efficient feature attribution based explanations of model decisions readily available via FEAMOE.

Tool-using LLM agents increasingly read untrusted content while holding side-effecting tools such as payments, email, CRM, and infrastructure APIs, yet common framework defaults still conflate tool exposure with authorization. We audit whether LangChain/LangGraph, LlamaIndex, and the Stripe Agent Toolkit re-authorize each model-emitted call, with concrete argument values, before execution. Across pinned public-source commits, all three provide capability gating by default, but none provides a deterministic fail-closed per-call value authorization gate by default. We introduce ScopeGate, a five-stage PDP/PEP for agent tool calls: scope, authorization, money ceiling, idempotency, and default deny. Evaluation shows the identical unauthorized payout call executes under LangChain's default dispatch (with a companion LlamaIndex PoC) but is denied by ScopeGate; the tested control reports 0/48 static bypasses, 0/29 unauthorized attempts (40-iteration adaptive run), 0/10 benign false-denies, and Latam-GPT payment-agent containment at 10/10. ASR denotes attempted unauthorized action, containment is not a cure, deployment-tier claims are inference over measured model classes, and no CVE is asserted.

As AI systems evolve from passive models into autonomous active agents capable of initiating actions, collaborating, and delegating tasks, the traditional boundaries of software systems blur. Traditional authorization and delegation frameworks, built around fixed principals, explicit requests, and static scopes, are insufficient to govern agentic systems. Agentic AI demands richer authorization semantics: agents must inherit and delegate permissions, act under time-limited authority, and coordinate through shared protocols. Existing Identity and Access Management (IAM) systems fail to fully capture this notion of agency, lacking mechanisms for recursive delegation, contextual boundaries, and dynamic scoping as executable governance primitives. Unlike access delegation standards such as OAuth 2.0, we treat delegation as a contractual term rather than merely a static token-based consent credential. This paper proposes a compositional governance framework that introduces primitives indispensable for agentic AI. We define types of delegation and their permissions and accountability implications, and we introduce a notion of resource scope attenuation to bound agentic access envelopes. These concepts are expressed as general relational definitions that can be composed into existing authorization domains (e.g., financial systems). To operationalize this composition, we define a compositional operator that overlays new agentic semantics, such as recursive delegation chains, onto existing relational policies without rewriting them. We substantiate this framework through formal proofs and empirical evaluation, showing that it provides a formal yet practical foundation for accountable authorization in agentic AI systems.

Agentic Entity Resolution (ER) systems iteratively plan actions, retrieve evidence, revise hypotheses, and propose graph mutations. An erroneous identity hypothesis may condition later retrieval and produce apparent confirmation. This paper proposes a Digital Identity Optimization (DIO) and Ontology of Digital Identity (ODI)-informed authorization boundary between evidence available for agent reasoning and evidence eligible to authorize persistent identity-changing mutations. A domain-governed constraint-binding function maps selected reconstruction-failure distinctions to explicit identity-preserving constraints. An abstract two-phase supervisor permits a commit only when claim-specific authorization-eligible evidence supports every required proposition, relevant conflicts are resolved, the operation remains within its authorized scope, and relevant state and policy versions remain valid. Admission as UNVERIFIED does not confer authorization eligibility. Separate claim-specific promotion governs evidentiary use; insufficient support or unresolved material conflict leads to deferral. The contribution is a specification connecting diagnostic-to-constraint mapping, evidence promotion, proposition coverage, conflict handling, scope binding, and commit-time version integrity. A proposed evaluation protocol is designed to assess the mapping's incremental value beyond generic authorization and conventional identifier rules. This is a conceptual architecture without implementation or empirical validation, not a theorem of semantic correctness. Its property depends on domain-policy adequacy, evidence promotion, and enforcement. It does not prevent erroneous hypotheses or hypothesis-conditioned retrieval; dependency-aware evidence flow remains future research.

Automated mammography screening plays an important role in early breast cancer detection. However, current machine learning models, developed on some training datasets, may exhibit performance degradation and bias when deployed in real-world settings. In this paper, we analyze the performance of high-performing AI models on two mammography datasets-the Emory Breast Imaging Dataset (EMBED) and the RSNA 2022 challenge dataset. Specifically, we evaluate how these models perform across different subgroups, defined by six attributes, to detect potential biases using a range of classification metrics. Our analysis identifies certain subgroups that demonstrate notable underperformance, highlighting the need for ongoing monitoring of these subgroups' performance. To address this, we adopt a monitoring method designed to detect performance drifts over time. Upon identifying a drift, this method issues an alert, which can enable timely interventions. This approach not only provides a tool for tracking the performance but also helps ensure that AI models continue to perform effectively across diverse populations.

Large language model (LLM) agents coordinate complex tasks through multi-role and multi-stage workflows. Upstream state is repeatedly transformed into intermediate language artifacts, such as summaries, plans, tickets, memories, and handoff notes, from which downstream components act. For action-constraining state, topical retention is insufficient: an artifact may mention an unresolved condition while changing it from a requirement that must be resolved before execution into information that may merely inform the next action. We study this action-binding role as operational state preservation. Safety blockers provide a controlled instance because each source state has an explicit prerequisite, authority, fallback, and execution consequence. We condition on correct upstream identification, vary the handoff transformation, and evaluate an executor restricted to the resulting artifact. Across 1,296 controlled synthetic episodes, direct-handoff controls preserve every blocker, whereas compression, plan assimilation, convergence, ownership deferral, and precedent substitution repeatedly turn binding state into caveats or non-binding considerations. Normal handoff compression produces 100.0% deactivation and 54.2% forbidden action. Restoring all four state fields raises preservation to 100.0% and reduces forbidden action to 0.0%. Fixed-artifact interventions further separate preservation from containment: downstream verification eliminates forbidden action while artifact deactivation remains 95.3%. These results identify a state-transmission failure between information extraction and action. Handoff transformations can retain state content while weakening its constraints on downstream action. Semantic availability does not guarantee operational preservation.

Policy-shift distillation reuses the difference between a teacher's log probabilities before and after reinforcement learning (RL) as supervision on student-generated trajectories. However, this endpoint policy shift cannot reveal whether local action preferences evolved consistently during teacher training. The same endpoint shift can result from early and late shifts that reinforce or partially cancel each other. We investigate whether agreement between early and late teacher policy shifts can guide selective transfer. We introduce Waypoint-guided On-Policy Distillation (Waypoint-OPD), which uses an intermediate teacher checkpoint from the same RL run to compare early and late shifts in relative action preferences at student-visited prefixes. We gate the endpoint shift according to the directional agreement between the early and late shifts, suppressing it when they point in opposing directions. Compared with endpoint-only transfer, our method requires only one additional frozen-teacher scoring pass. Using RL-trained Qwen3-4B teachers, we evaluate our method with Qwen3-8B, Qwen3-14B, and Qwen3-30B-A3B as student models in mathematical and code reasoning. In all six domain--student settings, Waypoint-OPD achieves the highest domain-average score among the compared distillation methods. Ablations with the Qwen3-8B student show that removing or shuffling gates reduces mathematical reasoning performance. These results support the use of directional agreement between early and late teacher policy shifts to weight the endpoint shift during student training.

Language-model agents sometimes act beyond their authorization and then misreport what they did. On CAPE-Bench, matched agent tasks in which one fact decides whether an action is authorized, frontier open-weight agents do both, and one behavior marks the lie: retroactive permission laundering, acting and then asking permission as if the action were pending, precedes a false report in 70% of 1081 fresh informed violations, against 8% otherwise (preregistered odds ratio 7.0); frontier agents on tau^2-bench instead fabricate the authorization before violating. A linear readout of the agent's residual stream forecasts the violation before the action (AUROC 0.94) and the false report before the report, and beats chain-of-thought monitors when the agent is pressured to hide its reasoning. Gating every proposed action on this forecast cuts violations over whole episodes in four model families, and sending repeated flags to an approver keeps authorized work (Gemma-4: violations 0.70 -> 0.09, completion 1.00; a model approver that escalates unclear cases keeps this gain with a person seeing 25% of asks), at about 10-8 of the agent's compute and 109 times less than a chain-of-thought monitor. On AgentDojo, an external prompt-injection benchmark, the same readout calibrated on 29 tasks, with the steering unchanged, cuts attack success on unseen tasks in two families (Gemma-4 11.7% -> 5.7%, gpt-oss 28.5% -> 17.5%) while keeping benign utility (Gemma-4 0.637 vs 0.637; gpt-oss 0.667 vs 0.681). Preventing the violation is also the most reliable way to prevent the lie (misreported violations 0.10 -> 0.01 pooled over three families, preregistered), whereas lie-specific fixes after a violation are weak. All tests are preregistered and hash-locked; code, data and the full record, including tests that did not pass, are at https://github.com/AryaFayyazi/Honesty.

Multi-agent Large Language Model (LLM) systems have emerged as powerful architectures for complex task decomposition and collaborative problem-solving. However, their long-term behavioral stability remains largely unexamined. This study introduces the concept of agent drift, defined as the progressive degradation of agent behavior, decision quality, and inter-agent coherence over extended interaction sequences. We present a comprehensive theoretical framework for understanding drift phenomena, proposing three distinct manifestations: semantic drift (progressive deviation from original intent), coordination drift (breakdown in multi-agent consensus mechanisms), and behavioral drift (emergence of unintended strategies). We introduce the Agent Stability Index (ASI), a novel composite metric framework for quantifying drift across twelve dimensions, including response consistency, tool usage patterns, reasoning pathway stability, and inter-agent agreement rates. Through simulation-based analysis and theoretical modeling, we demonstrate how unchecked agent drift can lead to substantial reductions in task completion accuracy and increased human intervention requirements. We propose three mitigation strategies: episodic memory consolidation, drift-aware routing protocols, and adaptive behavioral anchoring. Theoretical analysis suggests these approaches can significantly reduce drift-related errors while maintaining system throughput. This work establishes a foundational methodology for monitoring, measuring, and mitigating agent drift in production agentic AI systems, with direct implications for enterprise deployment reliability and AI safety research.

APort Vault is a benchmark for payment authorization in tool-using AI agents. It replays 4,371 attacks written by humans against a live payment agent during a public capture-the-flag event, across 14 models from 8 labs, five policy configurations and two replay tracks, with and without a deterministic pre-action check implementing the Open Agent Passport (OAP) specification. 225,964 evaluations completed. We report five distinct events per evaluation, because collapsing them is how an agent benchmark produces a number that does not survive review. Requests are common and their rate differs far more across configurations than across models, though each attack exists at exactly one configuration so policy and attack cohort vary together: 10.9% of model-alone evaluations at Level 1, 3.0% at Level 2, 0.1% at Level 3, 79.4% at Level 4. On the 1,293 Level 4 prompts, each evaluated on every model, request rates run from 71.2% to 84.3%, and 809 prompts (62.6%) elicited a request from all fourteen models, each ending in a successful payment to the level's allowlisted recipient. The authorization boundary is where the conditions diverge. At Levels 2 to 4, transfers to recipients the passport did not permit number 140 of 76,842 with the model alone and 0 of 69,297 behind the layer, and 105 against 0 on 68,970 matched model, prompt and track triples. The zero spans 790 source sessions, giving a per-session upper bound of 0.38%. It was not obtained by refusing payments: 25,370 payments executed behind the layer, while the policy denied 187 of the 25,640 transfer calls it evaluated, 148 of them for a forbidden recipient. We release the 225,964 evaluations, the level passports, the scoring code and the analysis script at huggingface.co/datasets/aporthq/vault-benchmark-v1 .

A personal language agent learns a fact from one audience and may later place it in the prompt it assembles for another. This memory-to-context step is an attack surface: ambiguous or inconsistent channels, cross-audience prying, and poisoned memory can each cause the system to assemble context containing a fact relevant to the query yet unauthorized for the current viewers. We introduce authorization before context: a single, anti-monotone audience-membership rule applied at the memory-to-context transition. Each item carries the audience present when it was recorded; the current viewer set is read from channel metadata and falls back to public when ambiguous; and the item is admitted only when every current viewer already belonged to its audience. We prove that this rule gives every participant cross-channel recall while ensuring, by exclusion rather than by model behavior, that nothing recorded for a narrower audience reaches a broader one and that poisoned memory cannot widen its own audience. The boundary is a model-neutral invariant on the exact assembled context: a forbidden fact must be absent before the model is called. On a synthetic Contextual-Integrity suite, no forbidden fact entered the context our boundary assembled, whereas unscoped baselines included such facts by construction; we further audit that every read path fails closed. The evidence is preliminary and synthetic.

Large Language Models (LLMs) excel at single-turn tasks such as instruction following and summarization, yet real-world deployments require sustained multi-turn interactions where user goals and conversational context persist and evolve. A recurring challenge in this setting is context drift: the gradual divergence of a model's outputs from goal-consistent behavior across turns. Unlike single-turn errors, drift unfolds temporally and is poorly captured by static evaluation metrics. In this work, we present a study of context drift in multi-turn interactions and propose a simple dynamical framework to interpret its behavior. We formalize drift as the turn-wise KL divergence between the token-level predictive distributions of the test model and a goal-consistent reference model, and propose a recurrence model that interprets its evolution as a bounded stochastic process with restoring forces and controllable interventions. We instantiate this framework in both synthetic long-horizon rewriting tasks and realistic user-agent simulations such as in tau-Bench, measuring drift for several open-weight LLMs that are used as user simulators. Our experiments consistently reveal stable, noise-limited equilibria rather than runaway degradation, and demonstrate that simple reminder interventions reliably reduce divergence in line with theoretical predictions. Together, these results suggest that multi-turn drift can be understood as a controllable equilibrium phenomenon rather than as inevitable decay, providing a foundation for studying and mitigating context drift in extended interactions.

Asynchronous reinforcement learning improves throughput by decoupling rollout generation from optimization, but staleness is an inevitable byproduct compounded by policy lag, engine delays, and mixture-of-experts routing. From a trust-region perspective, this mismatch is critical: training-inference divergence governs approximation error in finite-horizon bounds, whereas PPO clipping only gates sampled outward updates, acting as a sampled surrogate rather than a full-policy constraint. As a result, high-staleness updates remain weakly controlled in the asynchronous regime where stale rollouts matter most. We introduce the Staleness-Adaptive Trust Region (SAT), which uses the detached sampled log-ratio as a practical staleness proxy, identifies high-mismatch tails within each batch via staleness-based kernel scaling, and contracts only the sign-selected endpoint of the nominal PPO interval. This preserves baseline behavior on ordinary tokens while enforcing more conservative updates on newly intercepted outward bands. We prove local interval containment and pointwise pessimism relative to PPO, showing how the adaptive rule reshapes update geometry under heterogeneous staleness. We evaluate SAT in a decoupled asynchronous RL setup built on Qwen3-30B-A3B-Base, using SGLang as the inference engine and Megatron for training. In this setting, SAT-GSPO w/ R3 achieves the best observed AIME24 avg@8, reaching 35.83 at lag 1 and 34.79 at lag 8, while SAT-GSPO reaches 34.17 at lag 1. Adaptive clipping and routing replay act as complementary stabilizers targeting mismatch tails and routing inconsistency, respectively. Overall, aligning clip intervals with staleness heterogeneity effectively stabilizes asynchronous RL.

The deployment of autonomous AI agents capable of executing commercial transactions has motivated the adoption of mandate-based payment authorization protocols, including the Universal Commerce Protocol (UCP) and the Agent Payments Protocol (AP2). These protocols replace interactive, session-based authorization with cryptographically issued mandates, enabling asynchronous and autonomous execution. While AP2 provides specification-level guarantees through signature verification, explicit binding, and expiration semantics, real-world agentic execution introduces runtime behaviors such as retries, concurrency, and orchestration that challenge implicit assumptions about mandate usage. In this work, we present a security analysis of the AP2 mandate lifecycle and identify enforcement gaps that arise during runtime in agent-based payment systems. We propose a zero-trust runtime verification framework that enforces explicit context binding and consume-once mandate semantics using dynamically generated, time-bound nonces, ensuring that authorization decisions are evaluated at execution time rather than assumed from static issuance properties. Through simulation-based evaluation under high concurrency, we show that context-aware binding and consume-once enforcement address distinct and complementary attack classes, and that both are required to prevent replay and context-redirect attacks. The proposed framework mitigates all evaluated attacks while maintaining stable verification latency of approximately 3.8~ms at throughput levels up to 10{,}000 transactions per second. We further demonstrate that the required runtime state is bounded by peak concurrency rather than cumulative transaction history, indicating that robust runtime security for agentic payment execution can be achieved with minimal and predictable overhead.

Language-model agents read attacker-writable context to solve tasks. Tool execution needs a separate authority check for protected sink fields, sink-interpreted payloads, and the invocation event. Context-to-Execution Integrity (CXI) is an execution-boundary system for this setting. Policies mark protected sink fields, typed releases carry narrow validated values from writable context to specific destinations, opaque data slots keep evidence as data, and a deterministic gate admits a call only after field authority, exact-effect authorization, and invocation authority all bind to the same action manifest. We evaluate CXI on open-weight field-projection runs, AgentDojo live episodes, a code-agent exact-effect benchmark, manifest-bound ledger faults, proposal-pressure controls, and hosted/API compatibility traces. AgentDojo covers 720 live episodes and 1,739 LLM calls; the code-agent benchmark covers 400 repository episodes with exact-effect authorization and lease-bound execution, yielding 231 safe task completions and zero observed field, effect, or invocation escapes. The accounting reports parser outcomes, authorization outcomes, and task-quality outcomes together with the admission-integrity result. Across the evaluated sinks, CXI admits execution only when field, effect, and invocation authority bind to the same action manifest.

When an LLM agent reads a confidential file, then writes a summary, then emails it externally, no single step is unsafe, but the sequence is a data leak. We call this safety drift: individually safe actions compounding into violations. Prior work has measured this problem; we predict it. SafetyDrift models agent safety trajectories as absorbing Markov chains, computing the probability that a trajectory will reach a violation within a given number of steps via closed form absorption analysis. A consequence of the monotonic state design is that every agent will eventually violate safety if left unsupervised (absorption probability 1.0 from all states), making the practical question not if but when, and motivating our focus on finite horizon prediction. Across 357 traces spanning 40 realistic tasks in four categories, we discover that "points of no return" are sharply task dependent: in communication tasks, agents that reach even a mild risk state have an 85% chance of violating safety within five steps, while in technical tasks the probability stays below 5% from any state. A lightweight monitor built on these models detects 94.7% of violations with 3.7 steps of advance warning at negligible computational cost, outperforming both keyword matching (44.7% detection, 55.9% false positive rate) and per step LLM judges (52.6% detection, 38.2% false positive rate) while running over 60,000x faster.

AI agents are granted access to tools, APIs, and other infrastructure, making them active principals in those systems. The dominant approach places controls inside the agent's own runtime: system prompts, output filters, and guardrail libraries. Any control in the agent's address space is reachable by inputs that influence it; this generalizes to any AI system with sufficient reach into its own runtime, a class we term escapable AI systems. We identify four properties that an authorization mechanism must satisfy for architectural control rather than for cooperative requests: process separation, pre-action enforcement on a structurally only path, fail-closed at both the request and system levels, and externalized signed evidence verifiable outside the controlled system's trust boundary. We position this layer as execution-time AI alignment, complementing training-time alignment (RLHF, Constitutional AI) and inference-time alignment. We present the Unfireable Safety Kernel, a Rust reference implementation realizing all four. Its fail-closed invariant is machine-checked at two levels: an SMT theorem (Z3) and an exhaustive bounded-model-checking proof of the production decision function (Kani, 4/4 harnesses). A Python-to-Rust migration was gated on byte-equivalence (1000/1000 fixtures; 17/17 adversarial classes). We evaluate the kernel governing a live, escapable AI system, a deterministic, self-improving world model, against an escape-seeking adversary driving its real self-modification seam: across 1,000 self-modifications, all 704 attempts on the safety-critical core are refused, with no escape; a further 300, under the operator kill switch, are also refused. A separate campaign of 6,240 authorization round-trips had no successful bypass. Against 3 contemporary systems claiming the agent control plane, the agent invokes control; here, it lacks that choice.

On-policy distillation (OPD) leverages dense teacher rewards to enhance reasoning models. However, scaling OPD to long-horizon tasks exposes a critical flaw: as the student's generated prefix inevitably diverges from the teacher's thought process, the teacher's dense reward loses local exploitability. Continuing to generate and evaluate tokens on these ``drifted'' trajectories not only degrades reward quality but also incurs massive computational waste. To address this, we introduce Prune-OPD, a framework that dynamically aligns training budgets with supervision quality. By continuously monitoring the local compatibility between student and teacher predictions (e.g., via top-k overlap), Prune-OPD detects prefix-drift events in real time. Upon detecting severe drift, it monotonically down-weights subsequent unreliable rewards and triggers dynamic rollout truncation. This allows the training process to halt futile generation and reallocate compute strictly to reliable teacher supervision. Across diverse teacher-student combinations, Prune-OPD consistently aligns computation with supervision reliability. When prefix drift makes dense teacher rewards unreliable, it reduces training time by 37.6\%--68.0\% while preserving, and often improving, performance on challenging benchmarks (AMC, AIME, HMMT). When student-teacher compatibility remains high, it automatically preserves long-context supervision by expanding the training window. These results suggest that Prune-OPD improves OPD not by blindly shortening rollouts, but by reallocating computation toward locally exploitable teacher rewards.

Reinforcement learning with verifiable rewards (RLVR) has become standard for improving LLM reasoning. However, existing PPO-style trust-region mechanisms remain position-agnostic by enforcing uniform thresholds across all tokens independently. This pointwise treatment conflicts with autoregressive generation in two critical ways. First, uniform thresholds ignore autoregressive asymmetry. Early-stage deviations produce compounding sequence-level drift, causing static thresholds to under-regulate early divergence and excessively constrain late-stage exploration. Second, evaluating token-level divergence in isolation overlooks cumulative prefix drift, granting the same divergence allowance regardless of how far the conditioning history has already deviated from the rollout policy. To address this limitation, we propose CPPO (Cumulative Prefix-divergence Policy Optimization), a token-level masking rule that aligns updates with a finite-horizon policy-improvement bound via two coupled mechanisms. First, a position-weighted threshold imposes stricter limits at early positions whose effects persist longer, relaxing constraints for late-stage tokens. Second, a cumulative prefix budget tracks historical deviations, dynamically restricting further token-level deviation to prevent compounding errors along the prefix. Empirically, CPPO enhances training stability and significantly improves reasoning accuracy across various model scales.

We examine two properties of AI systems: capability (what a system can do) and steerability (how reliably one can shift behavior toward intended outcomes). A central question is whether capability growth reduces steerability and risks control collapse. We also distinguish between authorized steerability (builders reliably reaching intended behaviors) and unauthorized steerability (attackers eliciting disallowed behaviors). This distinction highlights a fundamental safety--security dilemma of AI models: safety requires high steerability to enforce control (e.g., stop/refuse), while security requires low steerability for malicious actors to elicit harmful behaviors. This tension presents a significant challenge for open-weight models, which currently exhibit high steerability via common techniques like fine-tuning or adversarial attacks. Using Qwen3 and InstrumentalEval, we find that a short anti-instrumental prompt suffix sharply reduces the measured convergence rate (e.g., shutdown avoidance, self-replication). For Qwen3-30B Instruct, the convergence rate drops from 81.69% under a pro-instrumental suffix to 2.82% under an anti-instrumental suffix. Under anti-instrumental prompting, larger aligned models show lower convergence rates than smaller ones (Instruct: 2.82% vs. 4.23%; Thinking: 4.23% vs. 9.86%). Code is available at github.com/j-hoscilowicz/instrumental_steering.

Offline reinforcement learning requires improving a policy from fixed data while avoiding out-of-distribution actions with unreliable value estimates. Diffusion and flow policies handle this trade-off by modeling the behavior distribution to regularize the RL objective, but they require iterative denoising, solver integrations, and in more efficient variants, distillation or other approximations at inference. We propose DriftQL, which combines a drift-based behavioral regularizer with critic-driven policy improvement. The value signal biases the policy toward high-value regions of the data support, while attraction and repulsion together keep generated actions near the data and prevent collapse onto a single mode. DriftQL is implemented as a single network with a unified training objective and generates actions in a single forward pass. On D4RL and OGBench, DriftQL consistently outperforms diffusion and flow methods, advancing the state of the art. Under degraded data quality, where the baselines visibly struggle, DriftQL remains close to its clean-data performance, positioning it as a promising alternative to diffusion and flow-based methods while maintaining the simplicity and efficiency of deterministic approaches. Project page: https://driftql.github.io/

In many application domains (e.g., recommender systems, intelligent tutoring systems), the rewards associated to the actions tend to decrease over time. This decay is either caused by the actions executed in the past (e.g., a user may get bored when songs of the same genre are recommended over and over) or by an external factor (e.g., content becomes outdated). These two situations can be modeled as specific instances of the rested and restless bandit settings, where arms are rotting (i.e., their value decrease over time). These problems were thought to be significantly different, since Levine et al. (2017) showed that state-of-the-art algorithms for restless bandit perform poorly in the rested rotting setting. In this paper, we introduce a novel algorithm, Rotting Adaptive Window UCB (RAW-UCB), that achieves near-optimal regret in both rotting rested and restless bandit, without any prior knowledge of the setting (rested or restless) and the type of non-stationarity (e.g., piece-wise constant, bounded variation). This is in striking contrast with previous negative results showing that no algorithm can achieve similar results as soon as rewards are allowed to increase. We confirm our theoretical findings on a number of synthetic and dataset-based experiments.

LLM-based agents can act on behalf of a user to access cloud services, call tools, or invoke agents. At session start, the agent's permissions are set but remain static, and each request is evaluated independently, without considering prior actions. Within its permissions, an agent may act contrary to the delegated task, combine individually permitted actions into a prohibited outcome, or delegate authority to a sub-agent without limiting it. A prompt injection poses a risk only if the agent has authority to perform such actions; this is therefore a problem of authorization architecture, not just the model. The Agentic Principal Chain (APC) tracks delegated authority from one principal to the next. APC evaluates each request against the accumulated session state using six authorization checks. APC carries forward and restricts delegated scope and budgets. Using composition closure, APC checks requests against prior actions to prevent prohibited combinations and enforces the decision outside the model. We prove Blast Radius Monotonicity and Composition Soundness for APC implementations; Composition Soundness is limited to prohibited combinations under a complete restriction set and serialized admission. We evaluated 3,154 instances including InjecAgent, AgentDojo, and ASB. Our compromised-model evaluation tests APC independently of model behavior by inserting the ground-truth attack call after the first legitimate tool call. AgentDojo exfiltration fell from 75-100% to 0% across all four domains; APC blocked all 544 InjecAgent data-stealing cases. Intent binding reduced destruction from 38.6% to 4.0% and manipulation from 90.5% to 12.1%. Authorization latency was 0.24 ms at the 99th percentile on an idle host; across 949 AgentDojo task-injection pairs, utility was 8.6 and 13.9 percentage points lower in the two settings. Implementation, evaluation tools, and data are publicly available.

Scaling on-policy distillation (OPD) for large language models (LLMs) confronts a fundamental tension: asynchronous execution is necessary for system efficiency, but structurally deviates from the ideal on-policy objective. To address this challenge, we theoretically decompose the objective discrepancy into rollout drift and supervision drift, capturing staleness in student rollout and teacher context, respectively. Building on this, we introduce a sample-level freshness score that quantifies the reliability of a buffered sample with respect to the on-policy objective. Guided by this signal, we further propose f-OPD, a novel framework that adaptively regulates stale-sample influence and constrains policy drift accumulated under asynchronous training. Across reasoning, tool-use, and coding-agent tasks of increasing interaction horizon, f-OPD consistently achieves task performance comparable to synchronous optimization while largely retaining the throughput advantages of asynchronous execution. Our results establish the first recipe for achieving a performance-efficiency trade-off in OPD, paving the way for long-horizon agentic post-training at scale.

Real-world datasets often exhibit temporal dynamics characterized by evolving data distributions. Disregarding this phenomenon, commonly referred to as concept drift, can significantly diminish a model's predictive accuracy. Furthermore, the presence of hyperparameters in online models exacerbates this issue. These parameters are typically fixed and cannot be dynamically adjusted by the user in response to the evolving data distribution. Gaussian Process (GP) models offer powerful non-parametric regression capabilities with uncertainty quantification, making them ideal for modeling complex data relationships in an online setting. However, conventional online GP methods face several critical limitations, including a lack of drift-awareness, reliance on fixed hyperparameters, vulnerability to data snooping, absence of a principled decay mechanism, and memory inefficiencies. In response, we propose DAO-GP (Drift-Aware Online Gaussian Process), a novel, fully adaptive, hyperparameter-free, decayed, and sparse non-linear regression model. DAO-GP features a built-in drift detection and adaptation mechanism that dynamically adjusts model behavior based on the severity of drift. Extensive empirical evaluations confirm DAO-GP's robustness across stationary conditions, diverse drift types (abrupt, incremental, gradual), and varied data characteristics. Analyses demonstrate its dynamic adaptation, efficient in-memory and decay-based management, and evolving inducing points. Compared with state-of-the-art parametric and non-parametric models, DAO-GP consistently achieves superior or competitive performance, establishing it as a drift-resilient solution for online non-linear regression.

The Privacy Sandbox initiative from Google includes APIs for enabling privacy-preserving advertising functionalities as part of the effort around limiting third-party cookies. In particular, the Private Aggregation API (PAA) and the Attribution Reporting API (ARA) can be used for ad measurement while providing different guardrails for safeguarding user privacy, including a framework for satisfying differential privacy (DP). In this work, we provide an abstract model for analyzing the privacy of these APIs and show that they satisfy a formal DP guarantee under certain assumptions. Our analysis handles the case where both the queries and database can change interactively based on previous responses from the API.

Strong single-turn editing performance does not guarantee reliable multi-turn interaction: as edited outputs are repeatedly reused, small unintended changes can accumulate into severe visual drift. This long-term drift is often mitigated through training on multi-turn data or cross-turn rollouts, potentially altering pretrained priors, or through specialized inference-time mechanisms that are difficult to scale to foundation models. We introduce TailSteer, a final-stage training framework that improves multi-turn robustness while retaining the generative and editing capabilities acquired through earlier training. TailSteer follows a simple principle: keep early denoising dynamics close to those of the base model and concentrate preservation corrections near the trajectory tail, where fine-grained deviations can be suppressed. These corrections are learned from the editor's own on-policy denoising rollouts, using unchanged source content as a preservation reference without requiring curated ground-truth editing pairs. Experiments across the FLUX, SenseNova, and Qwen families show that TailSteer substantially reduces cumulative drift over 15-20 editing turns while largely preserving base-model performance on extensive text-to-image and single-image editing benchmarks. These results demonstrate that long-horizon editing robustness can be unlocked in foundation models after TailSteer, rather than by relearning their existing capabilities.

Large language models are increasingly deployed in multi-turn interactive settings where users or environments can iteratively provide lightweight feedback. Unfortunately, optimizing such behavior presents a sharp dilemma in practice: online reinforcement learning is able to effectively address multi-turn dynamics but is prohibitively expensive due to the cost of generating full correction trajectories at every update, whereas offline supervised fine-tuning (SFT) is efficient but suffers from distribution shift and behavioral collapse. To this end, we novelly propose DRIFT (Decoupled Rollouts and Importance-Weighted Fine-Tuning), a framework that operationalizes the theoretical insight that the KL-regularized RL objective is equivalent to importance-weighted supervised learning. DRIFT decouples rollout from optimization by sampling offline interaction trajectories from a fixed reference policy, deriving return-based importance weights, and optimizing the policy via weighted SFT on the resulting dataset. Empirically, we demonstrate that DRIFT matches or exceeds the performance of multi-turn reinforcement learning baselines while maintaining the training efficiency and simplicity of standard supervised fine-tuning. Code is available at https://github.com/2020-qqtcg/DRIFT.

Interactive LLM agents are becoming part of daily work, but they do not reliably become easier to work with over time: a correction remembered in one session may still be violated in the next. We study this gap between preference access and preference compliance. In tasks derived from anonymized real-user friction cases, Mem0 memory still leaves 57.5% of applicable preference checks violated. We introduce Test-time Rule Acquisition and Compiled Enforcement (TRACE), a drop-in skill-layer pipeline for coding-agent runtimes that mines user corrections, rewrites them as atomic rules, and compiles them into runtime checks that must pass before an agent completes future tasks. Unlike runtime checks written ahead of time by developers, TRACE skills come from the user's own chat corrections. We evaluate TRACE with simulated user-in-the-loop experiments on ClawArena coding-agent tasks and MemoryArena-derived memory-intensive tasks. On ClawArena, TRACE reduces held-out preference violation from 100.0% to 37.6% on in-distribution tasks and from 100.0% to 2.0% on out-of-distribution tasks. On MemoryArena-derived tasks, TRACE reduces in-distribution violation from 100.0% to 60.5% while matching or exceeding the strongest memory baseline on task pass. These results suggest that compiling corrections into runtime enforcement can address a repeated-friction failure mode that memory alone does not reliably solve, reducing the need for users to restate the same correction across future sessions. Experiment code is available at https://github.com/YujunZhou/TRACE_exp, and the deployable skill is available at https://github.com/YujunZhou/tellonce.

LLM agents that cache recovery suggestions from API errors can skip re-derivation in later episodes, spending fewer tokens and fewer model calls on constraints they have already learned. Server-side data drift turns those cached fixes into silent failures, and the usual remedy, re-deriving on every episode, gives the savings back. We introduce invalidation contracts, a protocol layer that attaches version stamps and cacheability hints to every recovery suggestion so the client can evict stale entries without trial and error, and keep the rest. The contract decomposes realized savings into two independent factors: validity, the fraction of cached suggestions that remain correct after a drift event, and compliance, the fraction the planner applies on the first attempt. Validity depends only on the protocol and is vendor-independent. Compliance depends on the planner model: identical wire bytes yield 100% first-try compliance on Claude Haiku 4.5 and 11% or below on Claude Sonnet 5, which exhibits input-schema conservatism, refusing fixes that add fields the original request did not contain. We evaluate across seven models, three serving paths, two domains, and approximately 9,400 episodes. Row-level invalidation raises compliance by 0 to 66.7 percentage points across the seven models, 55.6 to 66.7 on three, and recovers 29-33% of baseline token cost on four of seven models, while table-level invalidation destroys co-located entries and drops post-drift first-try rates to 0% on five of seven. Eviction precision is 1.00 at row granularity on every model under the row-level oracle of Section 4.1. The contract adds 15% to response payload. Version-stamp validity is deterministic by construction and produced identical results across every model and serving path, with zero contract failures in the entire evaluation.

Modern LLM agents combine long-term memory for personalization with tool-calling interfaces for taking actions in the world -- a combination underpinning contemporary production systems. We study a previously unexamined failure of this combination: when personality-driven biases stored in memory (cost-consciousness, impatience, risk tolerance, etc.) silently affect tool calls in contexts where they are not applicable. We call this memory-induced tool-drift and operationalize it through MEMDRIFT, a benchmark of 105 scenarios spanning five bias dimensions and seven professional domains, generated through an automated adversarial pipeline. Across seven frontier models -- including those with extended reasoning -- biased memories raise deflection scores (a judge-scored measure of parameter deviation from unbiased baselines) by up to +3.6 points on a 1--5 scale. Tool-drift persists when memory management is handled by three production memory architectures. The phenomenon affects real-world tools: scanning 6{,}062 tools across 288 verified MCP servers, we flag 608 with susceptible parameters and confirm tool-drift on a validated subset. Mechanistically, biased memories act as implicit steering vectors, pushing activations along the same latent directions as explicit behavioral instructions. They also redistribute attention from task-relevant context toward memory entries with surface-level keyword overlap to the target parameter. Standard defenses -- prompt-based relevance instructions and memory filters -- reduce drift but do not eliminate it. As agents take increasingly consequential actions on a user's behalf, memory-induced tool-drift represents a systematic vulnerability that current safeguards do not address, motivating dedicated defenses at the intersection of memory management and tool-call generation.

A personal language agent that acts for its owner across private and shared conversations can learn a fact from one audience and later place it in the context it assembles for another. We study authorization before context across the whole memory lifecycle. Each memory item carries the audience present when it was recorded; derived items are partitioned by audience, receive the intersection of their sources' audiences, or are suppressed; an audience widens only by an explicit, object-specific grant; and an item enters a model attempt only when every current viewer belongs to one of its authorized audiences, with unresolved viewers failing closed to public-only. Under explicit identity, provenance and complete-mediation assumptions, this admission is sound and policy-complete on the exact assembled context, enforced by exclusion rather than by model behavior. We realize it in two independently persisted reference architectures, a flat store and a relationship graph, and, descriptively, in a native agent-memory runtime. In a prospectively frozen confirmation over 10,000 multi-party histories, no forbidden item entered any architecture's context, whereas unscoped retrieval exposed forbidden items in 82% of its contexts. Entitled recall matched policy-equivalent baselines exactly and exceeded unscoped retrieval by 0.30 Recall@5, with a Holm-confirmed advantage that grows with distractors. No architecture produced a wrong-principal substitution, but unscoped substitutions were too rare to establish the prespecified joint decision.

Traditional software relies on contracts -- APIs, type systems, assertions -- to specify and enforce correct behavior. AI agents, by contrast, operate on prompts and natural language instructions with no formal behavioral specification. This gap is the root cause of drift, governance failures, and frequent project failures in agentic AI deployments. We introduce Agent Behavioral Contracts (ABC), a formal framework that brings Design-by-Contract principles to autonomous AI agents. An ABC contract C = (P, I, G, R) specifies Preconditions, Invariants, Governance policies, and Recovery mechanisms as first-class, runtime-enforceable components. We define (p, delta, k)-satisfaction -- a probabilistic notion of contract compliance that accounts for LLM non-determinism and recovery -- and prove a Drift Bounds Theorem showing that contracts with recovery rate gamma > alpha (the natural drift rate) bound behavioral drift to D* = alpha/gamma in expectation, with Gaussian concentration in the stochastic setting. We establish sufficient conditions for safe contract composition in multi-agent chains and derive probabilistic degradation bounds. We implement ABC in AgentAssert, a runtime enforcement library, and evaluate on AgentContract-Bench, a benchmark of 200 scenarios across 7 models from 6 vendors. Results across 1,980 sessions show that contracted agents detect 5.2-6.8 soft violations per session that uncontracted baselines miss entirely (p < 0.0001, Cohen's d = 6.7-33.8), achieve 88-100% hard constraint compliance, and bound behavioral drift to D* < 0.27 across extended sessions, with 100% recovery for frontier models and 17-100% across all models, at overhead < 10 ms per action.

Agents are deployed in applications from trip planners and stock trading to IT incident triage. In most cases, LLM agents work autonomously with minimal rule-based safeguarding, leading to cost and safety issues from irreversible actions. Recent works resolve this either by using a safeguard agent to monitor behavior or evaluating logs post-hoc. The first adds cost and latency to every step; the second delivers its verdict after the run, when tokens are burned and damage is done. To overcome this, we propose OnTrack, a streaming monitoring mechanism that compares an agent's steps and dependencies against recorded successful runs to alert users or block the agent in about a millisecond per step. We study this problem in three regimes of decreasing access: full reference access (historical runs and tool schemas), intermediate access (only tool schemas), and no prior knowledge (only step logs as generated). Expectation of OnTrack's monitoring capabilities reduces as data access drops, ranging from plan violation detection to identifying loops, stalls, and repeated tool calls. Finally, we evaluate OnTrack using SWE-bench trajectories. Based on the first 8 steps, our method ranks failing trajectories below succeeding ones better than content similarity approaches (+0.057 AUROC). With an abort policy, we save about 18% of compute that would be burned on failing runs, where 83% of interrupted runs were actually heading to failure (5 out of 6 aborts were correct).

Non-stationarity of an underlying data generating process that leads to distributional changes over time is a key characteristic of Data Streams. This phenomenon, commonly referred to as Concept Drift, has been intensively studied, and Concept Drift Detectors have been established as a class of methods for detecting such changes (drifts). For the most part, Drift Detectors compare regions (windows) of the data stream and detect drift if those windows are sufficiently dissimilar. In this work, we introduce the Window Dilemma, an observation that perceived drift is a product of windowing and not necessarily the underlying data generating process. Additionally, we highlight that drift detection is ill-posed, primarily because verification of drift events are implausible in practice. We demonstrate these contributions first by an illustrative example, followed by empirical comparisons of drift detectors against a variety of alternative adaptation strategies. Our main finding is that traditional batch learning techniques often perform better than their drift-aware counterparts further bringing into question the purpose of detectors in Stream Classification.

Training multi-turn agentic workflows with reinforcement learning (RL) enables large language models to perform complex reasoning, use external tools, and conduct iterative search beyond single-turn settings. Yet multi-turn RL training remains highly unstable, often causing severe performance degradation as the number of turns increases. Through theoretical analysis, we identify three tightly coupled sources of instability: rollout-training context mismatch, weak turn-level credit assignment under sparse terminal rewards, and asynchronous policy drift when short and long trajectories are optimized under different policy versions. We show that these issues share a common structural origin in flattened trajectory optimization and address them through a unified reverse-turn formulation. We propose Reverse-Turn Policy Optimization (RTPO), which organizes multi-turn rollouts as sparse reverse trees and performs turn-level policy updates in temporal reverse order, aligning each decision with its downstream continuation. RTPO enables causally consistent turn-level credit assignment and on-policy continuation to control asynchronous drift. We provide theoretical guarantees showing that RTPO eliminates context mismatch and asynchronous drift under the proposed turn-level formulation, reduces credit bias, and converges to recursive optimality. Experiments on multi-turn agentic RL benchmarks show that RTPO improves upon trajectory- and turn-level baselines by 21.50% and 10.76%, respectively, highlighting its potential to support more stable training for tool-using agents.

Production LLM coding agents drift over long sessions: they forget user-specified constraints, slip into mistakes the user already flagged, and confabulate prior agreements. White-box approaches such as persona vectors require model weights and so cannot be applied to closed APIs (Claude, GPT-4) that most users actually interact with. We present Nautilus Compass, a black-box persona drift detector and agent memory layer for production coding agents. The method operates entirely at the prompt-text layer: cosine similarity between user prompts and behavioral anchor texts, aggregated by a weighted top-k mean using BGE-m3 embeddings. Compass is, to our knowledge, the only public agent memory layer (among Mem0, Letta, Cognee, Zep, MemOS, smrti verified May 2026) that does not call an LLM at index time to extract facts or build a graph; raw conversation text is embedded directly. The system ships as a Claude Code plugin, an MCP 2024-11-05 A2A server (Cursor, Cline, Hermes), a CLI, and a REST API on one daemon, with a Merkle-chained audit log for tamper-evident anchor updates. On a held-out test set built from real Claude Code session traces and labeled by an independent LLM judge, Compass reaches ROC AUC 0.83 for drift detection. The embedded retrieval pipeline scores 56.6% on LongMemEval-S v0.8 and 44.4% on EverMemBench-Dynamic (n=500), topping the four published EverMemBench Table 4 baselines. LongMemEval-S 56.6% is ~30 points below recent white-box leaders (90+%); we treat that as the architectural ceiling of the no-extraction design. End-to-end reproduction cost is $3.50 (~14x cheaper than GPT-4o-judged stacks). A paired cross-vendor behavior A/B accompanies these numbers as preliminary system-level evidence. Code, anchors, frozen test data, and audit-log tooling are MIT-licensed at github.com/chunxiaoxx/nautilus-compass.

Dataspace connectors decide whether a transfer may occur, not what the transferred value contains, tolerable for contracted applications, not for LLM agents that compose tool calls and spawn sub-agents. Research on agents that generate governance artifacts evaluates output quality; who may authorize an artifact for use falls between that literature and the governance literature, and neither owns it. A published policy is what a dataspace's decision point enforces, so publication is a governance event, and an agent that is both policy subject and policy author writes the norms that bind it. We name this the authorship hazard and state one principle: an agent is a subject of the governance plane, never an author of it. Its authorization channel to publication is closed by construction; its influence channel, drafting what humans approve, is treated as an enforcement problem. On a frozen corpus of agent drafts, publishing without approval reverses 80 authorization decisions, most through drafts that change only a field's sensitivity classification and no policy text; a classifier that reads the policy diff misses every such draft, necessarily. Treating classification as authorship routes them all to review; the registry-held classification this requires is designed and modelled here, not yet implemented in the prototype. At the execution boundary, protected fields reach the model in 105 of 105 cases under prompt-stated duties and in 0 of 105 when the ODRL duty is compiled into an invocation-time tool-call constraint, but where the value is not confined to a named field the compiled condition exposes it in 7 of 7. A centrally provisioned approval pool does not scale to the participant volume that motivates the problem.

Masked diffusion language models (MDLMs) decode by repeatedly committing tokens to masked positions, but these commitments are usually irreversible. A token chosen under sparse, partial context is kept fixed, even when later context no longer supports it. Existing samplers mainly decide when to commit a token, but rarely check whether an already committed token should still be kept, allowing early mistakes to propagate. We trace this issue to confidence drift, where the model's confidence in a committed token drops from its sparse commit-time context to the denser context available later. Based on this signal, we propose CoDR (Confidence Drift Remasking), a training-free and sampler-agnostic refinement pass. CoDR estimates drift for all committed positions in only k forward passes via k-partition probing, then remasks and regenerates only the tokens the model no longer endorses. Across two backbones, four reasoning and coding tasks, and three base samplers, CoDR improves average accuracy across all evaluated model-sampler configurations and improves most individual task settings with modest overhead. Controlled experiments show that the gains come from targeted confidence-drift remasking rather than extra compute alone, and that CoDR uses far fewer forward passes than prior remasking methods. Code is available at https://github.com/YueWu0301/CoDR.

On-policy distillation (OPD) trains a student on its own trajectories with dense per-token supervision from a stronger teacher, and often outperforms off-policy distillation and standard reinforcement learning. However, we find that its effectiveness implicitly relies on two assumptions that frequently break in practice: trajectory-level alignment between the student and the teacher, and uniform token-level reliability of the teacher's preferences. We therefore propose Sign-Gated On-Policy Distillation (SG-OPD), which uses a binary verifier as a trust signal for the teacher at two complementary granularities: phased teacher sampling mixes in verifier-endorsed teacher rollouts at cold-start, and a sign-consistency gate extrapolates the distillation update on tokens where the teacher agrees with the verifier-correct direction and interpolates it where it disagrees. Experiments on competition-level mathematical reasoning benchmarks show that SG-OPD consistently outperforms standard OPD, with average gains of 1.98 and 7.50 at the per-sample and per-question levels, respectively.

Test-time adaptive out-of-distribution (OOD) detectors update a memory bank from the unlabelled stream. We show this adaptation obeys a provable dynamical law. Modelling bank impurity as a generalized Pólya urn, we prove almost-sure convergence to a mean-field equilibrium whose slope acts as a reproduction number. Below one, impurity stays benign. Above one, the bank is fully poisoned and the detector collapses. The measured admission kernel is affine (R^2 ge 0.996) with slope just below one in every encoder family (a protocol signature), so this detector class is near-critical by design, and across 96 settings the predicted threshold matches the empirical collapse, where ungated dictionaries lose up to 0.163 AUROC. We then prove that a certified admission gate, reading only a frozen reserve, severs the feedback loop and removes the transition at every contamination rate, even adversarially, while controlling false positives label-free. For the complementary static-calibration failure under drift we give CDC, which restores nominal FPR label-free on all tested drift-affected cells. Finally we prove a two-world impossibility theorem. Drift and contamination are indistinguishable without labels, forcing a closed-form power ceiling our procedure approaches. Together these give a complete possibility/impossibility characterization of label-free adaptive OOD detection.

AI agents are poised to become a primary interface to digital products, acting across email, files, payments, and personal data. People without professional software backgrounds need understandable, reusable ways to control actions across services. We examine a mechanism in which a language model maps actions to plain-language consequence categories with user-authored "allow", "ask", or "never" rules. We ask what is gained and lost when decisions are made in advance as reusable rules rather than separately for each action. We analyzed 113 participants without professional software backgrounds across three conditions: per-action human-in-the-loop approval (HITL), automated per-action model review (AUTO), or user-authored consequence policy (POLICY). Participants judged 2 examples in each of 4 consequence categories; POLICY participants then set one rule per category. All supervised an 18-action simulated day, including 7 overreach actions. POLICY blocked less overreach than HITL (-20.1 percentage points, 95% CI [-32.1, -8.1]) and AUTO (-14.5 points, 95% CI [-25.8, -3.2]). POLICY lowered runtime prompts from 18.0 to 10.9, but total intervention time was not reliably lower when rule setup was included. Exploratory analysis showed that participants chose "ask" for 114 of 140 POLICY rules, returning most overreach actions to runtime. Of the 148 overreach actions executed in POLICY, 133 followed human approval and 15 ran automatically under "allow" rules. Across all 7 overreach actions, POLICY had the highest approval rate. Counterintuitively, user-authored rules did not by themselves provide stronger protection: many actions outside users' original requests went through after users approved them. These results reveal a gap between preference and commitment: repeatedly choosing "ask" preserves case-by-case choice but prevents a standing policy from settling decisions in advance.

Safety-aligned language models systematically refuse harmful requests. While activation steering can modulate refusal, ablating the raw "refusal vector" calculated from contrastive harmful and harmless prompts often causes collateral damage and distribution drift. We argue this degradation occurs because the raw vector is polysemantic, entangling the refusal signal with core capability circuits and linguistic style. We introduce Surgical Refusal Ablation (SRA) to distill these steering directions. SRA constructs a registry of independent Concept Atoms representing protected capabilities and stylistic confounds, then uses ridge-regularized spectral residualization to orthogonalize the refusal vector against these directions. This yields a clean refusal direction that targets refusal-relevant structure while minimizing disruption to the model's semantic geometry. Across five models (Qwen3-VL and Ministral series), SRA achieves deep refusal reduction (0-2%) with negligible perplexity impact on Wikitext-2 (mean delta PPL approx. 0.02) and minimal distribution drift. Notably, standard ablation on Qwen3-VL-4B induces severe drift (first-token KL = 2.088), whereas SRA maintains the original distribution (KL = 0.044) while achieving the same 0% refusal rate. Using teacher-forced perplexity on GSM8K and MBPP as a high-resolution capability proxy, we show SRA preserves math and code distributions. These results suggest that common "model damage" is often "Ghost Noise," defined as the spectral bleeding of the dirty refusal direction into capability subspaces.

On-policy distillation has recently emerged as a promising alternative to standard sequence-level imitation, training a student by scoring its own rollouts with a teacher model. However, we observe ``Off-policy Teacher Decay'' problem in this paradigm: for the later tokens, with student's earlier trajectory as context that is off-policy to the teacher, the teacher's ability to produce a corrective score would decay, and may fall back to token-completion behavior learned in the pre-training stage. We empirically verify this problem, and we propose Early Stopping Rollout (ESR) to fix it: a simple yet effective distillation strategy that simply restricts the rollout generation to the first response tokens. We show that ESR both surpasses the full rollout OPD performance across model size, family, tasks and training regime, and exhibit much higher GPU efficiency and training stability, especially under cross model family scenarios. We further investigate the mechanism behind this surprising performance and discovered "Cascading Alignment" and "Sub-mode Commitment" effect of ESR that may explain why it works effectively and even sometimes exceeding the teacher model performance. Besides, we show that this position-based token selection strategy cannot be fully explainable by KL divergence and entropy signals.

Reinforcement learning for multi-turn agents suffers from a credit-assignment mismatch: rewards are sparse and trajectory-level, while success often hinges on a few local decisions. Existing online policy distillation (OPD) provides denser token-level supervision, but typically treats heterogeneous agent trajectories as monolithic strings rather than causal interaction units. We present StepOPSD, a post-rollout preference self-distillation framework that takes the agent step as the unit of credit redistribution. StepOPSD decomposes trajectories into action-centered step segments, rescoring them under hindsight-enriched teacher contexts and converting token-level log-probability gaps into sign-preserving advantage shaping with a normalized per-step credit budget before the GRPO update. Across ALFWorld and Search-QA with Qwen3-1.7B and Qwen2.5-3B-Instruct, StepOPSD attains best or second-best results on subsets most sensitive to local causal errors, including first-place performance on ALFWorld Heat (79.1%), PickTwo (95.0%), Search-QA TriviaQA (61.6%), and tied-best performance on HotpotQA (40.4%). The results further reveal a consistent two-knob law: smaller α_clip acts as a broadly stabilizing local trust region, whereas the optimal global mixing strength λ_mix remains task-dependent. These findings suggest that step-aware distillation is most useful when trajectory-level rewards are weakly aligned with the local action that determines downstream success.

Machine learning-based intrusion detection systems (IDS) are critical for securing Industrial Internet of Things (IIoT) environments. Most adversarial research against them perturbs the feature vector or the traffic that produces it, and depends on gradient access, repeated model queries, or a learned model of benign traffic. A smaller line of work reshapes packet timing without querying the detector, but makes malicious traffic mimic a learned model of benign timing. Across these approaches, one assumption of industrial monitoring pipelines has received little attention: temporal synchronization. An IDS reconstructs operational state by aggregating telemetry into sliding or tumbling windows, so its view depends not only on what is observed but on when each observation falls relative to a window boundary. We introduce the Phantom State Attack (PSA), which exploits that dependence under a passive, zero-query threat model. Rather than modifying packets, perturbing features, querying the classifier, or fitting any model of benign traffic, PSA injects bounded timing drift calibrated to the attack flow's own inter-arrival variability, moving observations across the nearest window boundary by the minimal shift needed. The IDS then reconstructs a phantom state that diverges from the true process state. We evaluate PSA on ToN-IoT and CIC IIoT 2025 (DataSense), against Random Forest, MLP and XGBoost, measuring detection degradation, synchronization distortion, stealth, and attacker cost. PSA degrades detection on flows carrying enough packets for window-boundary redistribution, and leaves others almost unchanged, so its effect is conditional. A query-based baseline reaches higher raw success but needs many queries per window, while PSA needs none. The results identify temporal aggregation as an attack surface reachable under weaker assumptions than prior evasion techniques.

Proactive personal agents increasingly decide what to recommend, how to personalize advice, and what follow-up assistance to offer, creating a new user-decision attack surface for provider-side indirect prompt injection. We show that an external provider need not access private user context, compromise the agent, or gain additional permissions: by controlling only content associated with its own target, it can redirect an otherwise benign agent to advance that target, recruit legitimately available user context to justify it, and proactively reduce the friction of adoption. We characterize this failure mode through Target Control, Private Binding, and Prospective Support, which respectively steer what the agent advances, how it connects the target to the user, and what target-specific assistance it offers next. Across three proactive-agent environments and six simulated user models, the full attack increases target authorization in all tested environment-user-model combinations, with a macro gain of up to 77.4 percentage points. Controlled replay shows that correct user-target binding is more consequential than additional proposal detail alone, while a multi-turn extension reveals that provider objectives can remain influential even without final authorization by reshaping how the agent responds to user constraints and resistance. These findings expose a broader trust boundary: capabilities designed to serve the user can be redirected toward objectives originating outside the user-agent relationship.

Reinforcement Learning (RL) has emerged as a mainstream paradigm for training Mobile GUI Agents, yet it struggles with the temporal credit assignment problem inherent in long-horizon tasks. A primary challenge lies in the trade-off between reward fidelity and density: outcome reward offers high fidelity but suffers from signal sparsity, while process reward provides dense supervision but remains prone to bias and reward hacking. To resolve this conflict, we propose the Adaptive Milestone Reward (ADMIRE) mechanism. ADMIRE constructs a verifiable, adaptive reward system by anchoring trajectory to milestones, which are dynamically distilled from successful explorations. Crucially, ADMIRE integrates an asymmetric credit assignment strategy that denoises successful trajectories and scaffolds failed trajectories. Extensive experiments demonstrate that ADMIRE consistently yields over 10% absolute improvement in success rate across different base models on AndroidWorld. Moreover, the method exhibits robust generalizability, achieving strong performance across diverse RL algorithms and heterogeneous environments such as web navigation and embodied tasks.

Self-improving LLM agents can adapt a credit pipeline to a changed rule, but an agent that rewrites itself destroys the artefact a supervisor reviews: a named change, a recorded test, an approval. We argue that self-evolution is reviewable only if it is confined to the runtime harness (instruction text, tool-call logic and primitive composition) while model weights stay fixed, so that every adaptation is a diff with a cause and a test attached. We give a dual-loop engine built on that bound, with one admission gate that writes a hash-chained record before deployment, and we measure the gate in simulation, with a simulated agent and a seeded-search proposer rather than language models. Across three families of supervisory re-interpretation at three severities, 10 seeds each, the gated loop admitted 144 of 7,449 candidate changes, none of which worsened error on held-out history, and restored the false-positive rate to the oracle level without raising missed flags in every low- and mid-severity cell. With the gate replaced by the check an unbounded system applies (fewer errors visible in recent traces), the same loops admitted 309 harmful changes and left missed flags above 10% in 49 of 90 runs: false positives fell because the screen was loosened. Evaluated on pre-shift labels, the gate rejected every candidate, so a re-interpretation must be encoded as a rule that relabels history. Parametric and scope shifts were repaired locally, a structural one only by primitive replacement; at the highest structural severity the gate's fixed tolerance blocked the correct replacement in half the seeds. We map the mechanisms to the EU AI Act's provisions for high-risk credit scoring and note that the April 2026 US model-risk guidance excludes agentic AI from its scope.

Deep-research agents solve tasks through long trajectories of search, tool use, evidence inspection, and answer synthesis. Evaluation based on final answers shows whether an agent succeeds, but not which parts of the trajectory make the answer unreliable. We study span-level error localization for deep-research agents. We collect 2,790 real trajectories from two agent frameworks, three backbone models, and three benchmarks, convert raw logs into semantic spans, and annotate harmful error spans through LLM-assisted expert review. From these annotations, we build TELBench, a 1,000-instance benchmark for identifying error spans among normal exploration, failed searches, tentative hypotheses, and harmless noise. We further propose DRIFT, a claim-centric auditing framework that tracks agent claims, checks their support in trajectory evidence, and marks spans where unsupported or conflicting claims affect the answer path. Experiments across model families and auditing frameworks show that DRIFT improves span-level error localization and first-error accuracy by up to 30 percentage points. Our work provides a process-level view of reliability in deep-research agents.

In stochastic multi-armed bandits, the reward distribution of each arm is assumed to be stationary. This assumption is often violated in practice (e.g., in recommendation systems), where the reward of an arm may change whenever is selected, i.e., rested bandit setting. In this paper, we consider the non-parametric rotting bandit setting, where rewards can only decrease. We introduce the filtering on expanding window average (FEWA) algorithm that constructs moving averages of increasing windows to identify arms that are more likely to return high rewards when pulled once more. We prove that for an unknown horizon T, and without any knowledge on the decreasing behavior of the K arms, FEWA achieves problem-dependent regret bound of mathcal{O}((KT)), and a problem-independent one of mathcal{O}(KT). Our result substantially improves over the algorithm of Levine et al. (2017), which suffers regret mathcal{O}(K^{1/3}T^{2/3}). FEWA also matches known bounds for the stochastic bandit setting, thus showing that the rotting bandits are not harder. Finally, we report simulations confirming the theoretical improvements of FEWA.

Large language models are increasingly deployed as *deep agents* that plan, maintain persistent state, and invoke external tools, shifting safety failures from unsafe text to unsafe *trajectories*. We introduce **AgentFence**, an architecture-centric security evaluation that defines 14 trust-boundary attack classes spanning planning, memory, retrieval, tool use, and delegation, and detects failures via *trace-auditable conversation breaks* (unauthorized or unsafe tool use, wrong-principal actions, state/objective integrity violations, and attack-linked deviations). Holding the base model fixed, we evaluate eight agent archetypes under persistent multi-turn interaction and observe substantial architectural variation in mean security break rate (MSBR), ranging from 0.29 pm 0.04 (LangGraph) to 0.51 pm 0.07 (AutoGPT). The highest-risk classes are operational: Denial-of-Wallet (0.62 pm 0.08), Authorization Confusion (0.54 pm 0.10), Retrieval Poisoning (0.47 pm 0.09), and Planning Manipulation (0.44 pm 0.11), while prompt-centric classes remain below 0.20 under standard settings. Breaks are dominated by boundary violations (SIV 31%, WPA 27%, UTI+UTA 24%, ATD 18%), and authorization confusion correlates with objective and tool hijacking (ρapprox 0.63 and ρapprox 0.58). AgentFence reframes agent security around what matters operationally: whether an agent stays within its goal and authority envelope over time.

On-policy self-distillation (OPSD) provides dense, token-level supervision for reasoning models by aligning a model's own distribution with the distribution it produces under privileged context, typically a verified solution. However, we show that the learning signal drawn from this distributional gap concentrates on style tokens rather than task-bearing ones, as the hinted model tends to produce more direct, shorter outputs. We term this pathology privilege-induced style drift, which destabilizes training or causes response length to shrink. To address this, we propose RLCSD (Reinforcement Learning with Contrastive on-policy Self-Distillation), which mitigates this drift by contrasting the teacher-student gap under a correct hint against that under a wrong hint, suppressing the style shift that conditioning on a hint tends to induce regardless of correctness, and yielding a signal that is more concentrated on task-bearing tokens. Experiments on Qwen3 (1.7B/4B/8B) and Olmo-3-7B-Think across mathematical and logical reasoning show that RLCSD consistently outperforms GRPO and prior OPSD methods. We further show that the contrastive principle is general: it plugs into existing OPSD methods to improve them, and its underlying insight extends to the broader cross-model on-policy distillation setting.

Agentic workflows now make consequential decisions in regulated settings, and the governance placed around them is almost entirely step-scoped: input-output classifiers, per turn rails, and span-level evaluators. The policies organizations actually hold, such as referral thresholds, authority limits, and review requirements, are properties of the whole execution rather than of any one step. This mismatch admits a failure mode we call a Compositional Policy Violation (CPV): every individual step passes its own check while the composed execution violates the governing policy. A predicate over a single step cannot evaluate a property that step does not determine, so no improvement in the accuracy of the step-scoped monitors detects this class. We define CPVs as the failure of step-level compliance to compose, and present a taxonomy of four types: Authority Creep, Threshold Laundering, Cumulative Sum Violation, and Context Collapse. We show that the correct repair for each class is dictated by where the guarded quantity mutates. We then introduce a provenance-aware runtime architecture that evaluates policies over complete execution traces, recomputing guarded quantities from raw provenance rather than the pipeline's derived representation.

Federated Averaging (FedAvg) has emerged as the algorithm of choice for federated learning due to its simplicity and low communication cost. However, in spite of recent research efforts, its performance is not fully understood. We obtain tight convergence rates for FedAvg and prove that it suffers from `client-drift' when the data is heterogeneous (non-iid), resulting in unstable and slow convergence. As a solution, we propose a new algorithm (SCAFFOLD) which uses control variates (variance reduction) to correct for the `client-drift' in its local updates. We prove that SCAFFOLD requires significantly fewer communication rounds and is not affected by data heterogeneity or client sampling. Further, we show that (for quadratics) SCAFFOLD can take advantage of similarity in the client's data yielding even faster convergence. The latter is the first result to quantify the usefulness of local-steps in distributed optimization.

Reward hacking arises when a model improves a proxy reward by exploiting shortcuts rather than solving the intended task. We study this failure mode through the geometry of reinforcement learning updates in language models and argue that hacking emerges when optimization drifts away from a stable low-dimensional learning trajectory. We analyze this drift through dominant singular directions of parameter updates and show that reward-hacking runs exhibit substantially larger directional change than clean runs. Motivated by this observation, we introduce trusted-direction projection, which constrains gradients to remain within a clean reference subspace. Across reward-hacking experiments on mathematical reasoning, the proposed approach delays shortcut exploitation and better preserves task performance.

Current approaches to AI compliance treat conformity as a binary, audit-time verdict rather than a continuous, measurable property of production systems. We argue that this compliance fiction is structurally ill-suited to the requirements of the EU AI Act, which demands ongoing human oversight and the detection of emergent behavioural drift in deployed systems. We introduce governance from metrics, a principle whereby regulatory compliance is derived as a continuous signal from runtime observability rather than from static assessments. Building on this principle, we present govllm, an open-source framework implementing a governance-driven routing architecture in which model selection is determined by accumulated compliance scores rather than by latency or cost alone. Central to our approach is a panel of regulatory judges - LLM evaluators specialised per criterion (EU AI Act, GDPR, ANSSI, accessibility) - whose inter-judge disagreement we reframe not as noise but as a regulatory uncertainty signal warranting human arbitration. We validate this approach through a ground truth corpus of 49 annotated prompt/response pairs across five regulatory criteria, evaluated by four small language models (SLMs, 1.7B-7B parameters) running fully on-premise. Agreement rates range from 51.5% (mistral:7b) to 69.1% (phi4-mini), with no single model dominating across all criteria - empirically motivating the Profile-as-jury design. We further document three structural failure modes in small regulatory judges and a judge-specific position bias that degrades agreement by up to 25 percentage points across three question-order conditions (original, reversed, permuted). govllm is released as open-source software to support reproducible AI governance research.

Language-model agents are increasingly deployed under standing instructions: a system prompt, a policy file, or a skills document is placed in context, and the agent is trusted to let that document govern every action that follows. Existing benchmarks rarely test this deployment pattern directly; they measure whether an agent can complete a task, not whether a long, binding policy document constrains its behavior over an extended tool-use horizon. We present HANDBOOK_md, a benchmark of 65 agentic tasks modeled on how employees follow company handbooks. Each task places an agent in a self-contained company environment (a file workspace with mock email, chat, calendar, issue-tracking, and commerce services exposed over the Model Context Protocol) and instructs it to carry out routine professional work governed by an expert-written standard operating procedure of 20-124 pages. Tasks span five domains (finance, medical billing, insurance, logistics, and HR) and 10 fictional companies. To resist memorization, every task modifies one of 10 base handbooks, altering the specific rules and thresholds on which grading depends, so no two tasks share the same set of policies. Grading is fully deterministic: each task carries a rubric of programmatic criteria (824 in total) that check both that required actions occurred and that prohibited actions did not. Under strict grading, where a trial passes only if every criterion is satisfied, the strongest evaluated model passes 36.2% of trials, and most frontier models remain below 25%. Failures follow consistent patterns: agents let a plausible but unauthorized in-environment request override the standing policy, perform a required check and then act against its result, lose rule details over long horizons, and report compliance they did not achieve. We release the tasks, environments, and evaluation harness.

Agent memory enables enterprise agents to retain knowledge acquired during work and reuse it across tasks and agents, turning execution experience into persistent organizational knowledge. Realizing this potential requires both source--memory integration, through which enterprise sources and accumulated memory can be utilized together, and memory governance, through which shared memory remains subject to organizational policies throughout its lifecycle. These requirements interact when information from enterprise sources persists in memory. As this information is repeatedly derived and reused under changing principals and policies, source restrictions may be bypassed, resulting in information leakage. Preventing such leakage requires authorization continuity, under which source restrictions remain effective throughout source-to-memory and memory-to-memory derivation and reuse. Existing approaches address these concerns individually, but do not treat source--memory integration, memory governance, and authorization continuity as combined core design targets across the memory lifecycle. We define Governed Enterprise Memory as agent memory designed around this combined scope and present AkasicMEM as its realization. AkasicMEM realizes authorization continuity through transitive lineage, policy composition during memory formation, and policy re-evaluation during retrieval. It is built on GraphAI's AkasicDB, a unified vector--graph--relational database whose storage and execution substrate enables the underlying operations of these mechanisms to be jointly optimized and executed.

Autonomous web agents need to operate under externally imposed or human-specified policies while generating long-horizon trajectories. However, little work has examined whether these trajectories comply with such policies, or whether policy violations persist across different contexts such as domains (e.g., shopping or coding websites) and subdomains (e.g., product search and order management in shopping). To address this gap, we introduce PolicyGuardBench, a benchmark of about 60k examples for detecting policy violations in agent trajectories. From diverse agent runs, we generate a broad set of policies and create both within subdomain and cross subdomain pairings with violation labels. In addition to full-trajectory evaluation, PolicyGuardBench also includes a prefix-based violation detection task where models must anticipate policy violations from truncated trajectory prefixes rather than complete sequences. Using this dataset, we train PolicyGuard-4B, a lightweight guardrail model that delivers strong detection accuracy across all tasks while keeping inference efficient. Notably, PolicyGuard-4B generalizes across domains and preserves high accuracy on unseen settings. Together, PolicyGuardBench and PolicyGuard-4B provide the first comprehensive framework for studying policy compliance in web agent trajectories, and show that accurate and generalizable guardrails are feasible at small scales.

Before changing a deployed AI agent (a stricter safety gate, a new model), organizations must approve the change, starting from existing logs. Extending classical risk analysis to partial records and partial changes to running systems, agent-risk replays logged episodes, assuming nothing else changes and the agent does not anticipate the change. The log settles episodes acting as before, a declared stop value settles stopped ones, and the rest need logged support, a saved-state rerun, or a bound. We prove what logs must record for exact replay and which saved states serve a gate family. For independent episodes, we bound the reruns a decision needs and tolerable drift from live behavior. In a bash sandbox, a 7,200-episode log alone decided neither of two retry gates, which let the agent act after refusals the log never shows. Rerunning only each gate's blocked episodes from saved states reached both live decisions at half the agent calls of a live test sized post hoc for them, given the log. Without per-step harm, a stopping gate's certified harm ceiling rose up to 2.5-fold, since the log hides whether harm preceded the stop. Approval thus needs evidence designed in advance: log fields, saved states, targeted reruns.

Off-policy learning from multistep returns is crucial for sample-efficient reinforcement learning, but counteracting off-policy bias without exacerbating variance is challenging. Classically, off-policy bias is corrected in a per-decision manner: past temporal-difference errors are re-weighted by the instantaneous Importance Sampling (IS) ratio after each action via eligibility traces. Many off-policy algorithms rely on this mechanism, along with differing protocols for cutting the IS ratios to combat the variance of the IS estimator. Unfortunately, once a trace has been fully cut, the effect cannot be reversed. This has led to the development of credit-assignment strategies that account for multiple past experiences at a time. These trajectory-aware methods have not been extensively analyzed, and their theoretical justification remains uncertain. In this paper, we propose a multistep operator that can express both per-decision and trajectory-aware methods. We prove convergence conditions for our operator in the tabular setting, establishing the first guarantees for several existing methods as well as many new ones. Finally, we introduce Recency-Bounded Importance Sampling (RBIS), which leverages trajectory awareness to perform robustly across lambda-values in an off-policy control task.

Evaluation and alignment pipelines for large language models increasingly rely on LLM-based judges, whose behavior is guided by natural-language rubrics and validated on benchmarks. We identify a previously under-recognized vulnerability in this workflow, which we term Rubric-Induced Preference Drift (RIPD). Even when rubric edits pass benchmark validation, they can still produce systematic and directional shifts in a judge's preferences on target domains. Because rubrics serve as a high-level decision interface, such drift can emerge from seemingly natural, criterion-preserving edits and remain difficult to detect through aggregate benchmark metrics or limited spot-checking. We further show this vulnerability can be exploited through rubric-based preference attacks, in which benchmark-compliant rubric edits steer judgments away from a fixed human or trusted reference on target domains, systematically inducing RIPD and reducing target-domain accuracy up to 9.5% (helpfulness) and 27.9% (harmlessness). When these judgments are used to generate preference labels for downstream post-training, the induced bias propagates through alignment pipelines and becomes internalized in trained policies. This leads to persistent and systematic drift in model behavior. Overall, our findings highlight evaluation rubrics as a sensitive and manipulable control interface, revealing a system-level alignment risk that extends beyond evaluator reliability alone. The code is available at: https://github.com/ZDCSlab/Rubrics-as-an-Attack-Surface. Warning: Certain sections may contain potentially harmful content that may not be appropriate for all readers.

An edge server and nearby devices can train language models of different sizes together by mutual distillation. Federated unlearning (FU) and unlearning for large language models (LLMs) execute a removal request on one model. Under mutual distillation, however, the effect of the removed data has been copied into many students, and their uploads teach it back to the corrected teacher. We propose Holder-level Erasure via Replication-weighted Delta-closure (HERD), which decides which holders must be corrected. HERD records a knowledge lineage graph from the transfers that the server already performs and weights each edge by its transfer type. It computes how many times the residual at each holder will be copied and selects the cheapest set of holders whose correction bounds the cumulative residual after the request. A transfer guard and a rejoin rule cover the holders left uncorrected or offline. We prove that partial correction suffices only when the copy number of the lineage graph is below one, that averaging alone never reaches one, and that the correction set remains valid under link outages. On TOFU, HERD leaves 18% to 52% less cumulative residual than the strongest baseline at 6% to 12% of its correction cost.

Machine learning-based Android malware classifiers achieve high accuracy in stationary environments but struggle with concept drift. The rapid evolution of malware, especially with new families, can depress classification accuracy to near-random levels. Previous research has largely centered on detecting drift samples, with expert-led label revisions on these samples to guide model retraining. However, these methods often lack a comprehensive understanding of malware concepts and provide limited guidance for effective drift adaptation, leading to unstable detection performance and high human labeling costs. To combat concept drift, we propose DREAM, a novel system that improves drift detection and establishes an explanatory adaptation process. Our core idea is to integrate classifier and expert knowledge within a unified model. To achieve this, we embed malware explanations (or concepts) within the latent space of a contrastive autoencoder, while constraining sample reconstruction based on classifier predictions. This approach enhances classifier retraining in two key ways: 1) capturing the target classifier's characteristics to select more effective samples in drift detection and 2) enabling concept revisions that extend the classifier's semantics to provide stronger guidance for adaptation. Additionally, DREAM eliminates reliance on training data during real-time drift detection and provides a behavior-based drift explainer to support concept revision. Our evaluation shows that DREAM effectively improves the drift detection accuracy and reduces the expert analysis effort in adaptation across different malware datasets and classifiers. Notably, when updating a widely-used Drebin classifier, DREAM achieves the same accuracy with 76.6% fewer newly labeled samples compared to the best existing methods.

Recent advances in diffusion/flow-matching policies have enabled imitation learning of complex, multi-modal action trajectories. However, they are computationally expensive because they sample a trajectory of trajectories: a diffusion/flow trajectory of action trajectories. They discard intermediate action trajectories, and must wait for the sampling process to complete before any actions can be executed on the robot. We simplify diffusion/flow policies by treating action trajectories as flow trajectories. Instead of starting from pure noise, our algorithm samples from a narrow Gaussian around the last action. Then, it incrementally integrates a velocity field learned via flow matching to produce a sequence of actions that constitute a single trajectory. This enables actions to be streamed to the robot on-the-fly during the flow sampling process, and is well-suited for receding horizon policy execution. Despite streaming, our method retains the ability to model multi-modal behavior. We train flows that stabilize around demonstration trajectories to reduce distribution shift and improve imitation learning performance. Streaming flow policy outperforms prior methods while enabling faster policy execution and tighter sensorimotor loops for learning-based robot control. Project website: https://streaming-flow-policy.github.io/

Research agents explain planned experiments. We measure predictive credit with paired forecasts sharing an intervention, forecaster, and outcome while varying description, matched explanation, and donor context. Five checks track commitment, delivery, predictive gain, alignment, and known-signal uptake. Across 336 prospective states in controlled learning, 12 Tox21 endpoints, and 24 OpenML tasks, v5's frozen credit decision was inconclusive. Tox21's preregistered ROC AUC interval-score harm test was unmet (D-M=-.0026, 95 percent interval [-.0174, .0104]); OpenML's joint formation, point-equivalence, and repeatability rule was unmet. Matched point-accuracy gains over description remained unconfirmed, and Tox21/OpenML seed-donor intervals spanned zero. Under requested DeepSeek V4 Pro, matched and donor cards reduced secondary Tox21 drift by 64.5 and 59.1 percent. A DeepSeek V4 Flash replay raised matched point MAE from .01823 to .02020 and missed matched-donor interval-score equivalence. OpenML full-card assignment widened nominal 80 percent intervals by 21 percent, with 49.3 percent coverage versus 51.4 percent for description and content in 66/144 cards. Direct-text Flash delivered all 144 notes without detectable matched point-accuracy gain. A researcher-authored mechanism positive control lowered point MAE by 2.60 percentage points versus description. The protocol measures predictive credit for research-agent benchmarks and scientific forecasting; natural-explanation credit remained unconfirmed at the tested donor resolutions.

Machine learning models often experience performance degradation post-deployment due to shifts in data distribution. It is challenging to assess model's performance accurately when labels are missing or delayed. Existing proxy methods, such as drift detection, fail to measure the effects of these shifts adequately. To address this, we introduce a new method, Probabilistic Adaptive Performance Estimation (PAPE), for evaluating classification models on unlabeled data that accurately quantifies the impact of covariate shift on model performance. It is model and data-type agnostic and works for various performance metrics. Crucially, PAPE operates independently of the original model, relying only on its predictions and probability estimates, and does not need any assumptions about the nature of the covariate shift, learning directly from data instead. We tested PAPE on tabular data using over 900 dataset-model combinations created from US census data, assessing its performance against multiple benchmarks. Overall, PAPE provided more accurate performance estimates than other evaluated methodologies.

Few-shot anomaly detection (FSAD) has recently benefited from vision-language models such as CLIP, which enable anomaly de?tection by aligning visual features with text descriptions of normal and abnormal states. However, existing methods typically rely on static text prompts that are applied uniformly across the entire feature hierarchy and spatial dimensions. This rigid global-to-local matching fails to capture the highly localized and scale-dependent physical variations of industrial defects. To address this, we propose DriftAD, a FSAD framework built on three key modules. First, an Anomaly Signal Amplification (ASA) module enhances subtle defect signals through spatial and frequency branches before text-visual matching. Second, Visually-Guided Text Drift (VGTD) dynamically transforms frozen CLIP text embeddings, steering them into layer?wise, spatially-adaptive anomaly descriptors conditioned on local visual context at each encoder depth. Third, Drift-Guided Spatial Gating (DGSG) uses the drifted abnormal descriptor as a spatial probe to selectively enhance anomaly-relevant visual features. Addi?tionally, a drift separation loss prevents representational collapse of the drifted descriptors, and a gate supervision loss enforces spatially discriminative gating in DGSG. Extensive experiments on MVTec?AD and VisA demonstrate state-of-the-art performance across all 1-, 2-, and 4-shot settings on both image-level and pixel-level metrics. Code is available at https://github.com/wenyang001/DriftAD.

Continuous evaluation of LLM products relies on a strong LLM judge treated as ground truth: a cheap monitor scores every interaction and a team is paged when the score drifts down. But the judge is itself a model behind an API, and a silent version bump or scoring-prompt update changes how it scores -- so every drift alarm is ambiguous between a worse product and a changed judge. We resolve the ambiguity with a fixed, human-labeled anchor set that the current judge re-scores at a steady interleave, a second betting e-process on the judge-versus-human gap, and a guard-window rule returning a verdict in {none, system, judge}. We prove anytime-validity, one-way identification (only the judge can move the anchors), an attribution race whose design law is that the anchors must out-run the main process they guard, and process orthogonality. On two real judge changes, a silent version bump is detected as judge drift in 60/60 runs with zero judge-to-system misattribution, and a contaminating strict-prompt change is correctly attributed on 110 of 120 runs at guard width 300 -- while the industry-default rolling z-test false-alarms on 75% of drift-free streams. Every experiment replicates on a second domain (TL;DR summarization) with nothing re-tuned, and where the domains differ the differences are the ones the race predicts: the strict-prompt change shifts scores harder there, so the anchors fire faster and attribution becomes perfect (240/240). The monitor runs at approximately 0.64 of the cost of strong-judging every item, or 0.21 in a cheaper-but-deafer regime.

LLM agents increasingly act after consuming ranked external information streams such as social feeds, search results, retrieval contexts, and email queues, yet safety evaluations almost always test the model or the user prompt in isolation, never the upstream ranker that decides what the agent reads just before it acts. We introduce a controlled protocol that holds the model, persona, topic, and final decision prompt fixed and varies only the composition and ordering of the posts an agent encounters during a preceding ten-turn "scrolling" phase, isolating the causal effect of feed curation on a downstream decision. Across 2,785 decision rollouts on four modern open instruct LLMs from three independent labs, we identify three response regimes: adversarial capitulation, default saturation, and a default-direction asymmetry in which a one-sided feed tips a decision the model was genuinely uncertain about (in the clearest cases from 5% to 100%; Fisher p as low as 3 x 10^-10) but cannot dislodge one it already favors or holds firmly. The effect follows a dose-response curve, survives a generator swap that rules out a writing-style artifact, generalizes across several decision domains including security-relevant choices such as removing a deployment approval gate or relaxing access controls, and is partly mitigated by two simple feed-level defenses; a frontier model retains its default. We characterize the recommender as a practical, default-bounded control surface for LLM agents, and argue that agent evaluations must audit the feed layer rather than the final prompt alone.

A frontier language model's acknowledged "helpful programming assistant" persona does not survive long agentic-coding sessions in the deployment regime that production products actually run. After hours of tool-using debugging, a model that initially hedges preferences ("I don't have preferences") may begin asserting them ("Python - the feedback loop is instant..."), revealing user-visible drift that deployer evaluations may miss. Existing persona-stability studies focus on short dialogues and report little shift, leaving real-world code-generation regimes - thousands of tool-using turns, compaction, and hours-long sessions - largely uncharacterized. We introduce ContextEcho, a benchmark and reusable harness for measuring persona drift at deployment scale. It combines a 25-probe identity suite, a snapshot-then-probe protocol that forks conversation state without perturbing the main session, complementary judged and judge-free measurement surfaces, and three anonymized Claude Code sessions spanning 3,746-9,716 turns. Across 23 frontier models, ContextEcho shows that persona drift is general across organizations rather than family-specific, that in-session compaction does not reliably reset it, and that a single-shot anchor restores the trained register across measured targets. It also reveals mode-dependent downstream effects: while drift can facilitate tool-using continuation, in tool-free chat it breaks formatting contracts and inflates output length. Overall, ContextEcho provides researchers and deployers an open-source framework to audit whether the persona a model ships with is the persona users encounter at session end, across chat-completions API targets and without retraining.

Current AI agent frameworks have made remarkable progress in automating individual tasks, yet all existing systems serve a single user. Human productivity rests on the social and organizational relationships through which people coordinate, negotiate, and delegate. When agents move beyond performing tasks for one person to representing that person in collaboration with others, the infrastructure for cross-user agent collaboration is entirely absent, let alone the governance mechanisms needed to secure it. We argue that the next frontier for AI agents lies not in stronger individual capability, but in the digitization of human collaborative relationships. To this end, we propose a human-symbiotic agent paradigm. Each user owns a permanently bound agent system that collaborates on the owner's behalf, forming a network whose nodes are humans rather than agents. This paradigm rests on three governance primitives. A layered identity architecture separates a Manager Agent from multiple context-specific Identity Agents; the Manager Agent holds global knowledge but is architecturally isolated from external communication. Scoped authorization enforces per-identity access control and escalates boundary violations to the owner. Action-level accountability logs every operation against its owner's identity and authorization, ensuring full auditability. We instantiate this paradigm in ClawNet, an identity-governed agent collaboration framework that enforces identity binding and authorization verification through a central orchestrator, enabling multiple users to collaborate securely through their respective agents.

On-policy distillation (OPD) aligns a student with a teacher on trajectories sampled from the student itself, reducing the train-test state mismatch of offline distillation. The same feedback loop can nevertheless be unstable: each update changes both the policy and the states on which the next update is computed. We introduce WDL-OPD, a mixture-constrained co-training method with two trainable policies. An anchor policy generates every rollout, an auxiliary policy evaluates the same visited states, and a geometric mixture of their token distributions is matched to a frozen teacher by reverse KL. Both policies receive gradient. We show that freezing the auxiliary recovers an anchor-plus-contrast proxy target closely related to OPD^2 and W2S-OPD, whereas joint training creates branch-level degrees of freedom that a static delta cannot express. In recorded Qwen3 experiments at 1.7B and 4B scale, WDL-OPD produces the strongest student checkpoint in each of four scale-domain settings. It raises MATH500 accuracy from 0.630 to 0.685 at 4B and from 0.521 to 0.585 at 1.7B. In code generation, seven single-policy OPD configurations exhibit entropy growth or trajectory degradation, while co-training reaches independently re-evaluated development scores of 0.637 and 0.375. Because several comparisons differ in curriculum or initialization, these results support a stabilization hypothesis rather than a universal causal claim. We provide the exact training algorithm, failure evidence, and the controlled comparison matrix needed to test that hypothesis.

On-policy distillation (OPD) provides dense token-level supervision on student-generated trajectories. Although OPD performs strongly when teacher and student belong to the same model family, we find that its effectiveness degrades in cross-family settings even after tokenizer alignment, with substantially stronger external teachers offering little additional improvement. To understand this disconnect, we decompose the cross-family OPD signal into two components: an offset between a low-capability teacher-family reference and the student, and the within-family log-likelihood shift from that reference to the strong teacher. Standard OPD transfers both components together, allowing the offset to dominate the update direction and obscure the changes associated with teacher capability improvements. We propose CompassOPD, which removes this offset and transfers the within-family shift, while a frozen student reference anchors updates to the student's initial policy. Thus, both teacher-side and student-side changes are measured within their respective model families. Experiments across three student families and multiple teacher families show that CompassOPD consistently outperforms standard cross-family OPD, improving average reasoning accuracy by up to 5.50 points. For an MoE teacher, we further construct the reference directly from the teacher checkpoint by reducing expert activation, eliminating the need for a separate reference checkpoint while retaining a 3.43-point gain over OPD.

Large language models offer broad capabilities, but adapting them to evolving domains, tools, and requirements often entails repeated post-training. Autonomous systems automate parts of this process by proposing updates, training candidates, and using evaluation feedback to select subsequent proposals. As evidence accumulates, a central problem emerges: which past update evidence remains actionable after subsequent training has changed the parent model? An update's effect depends on its parent, data, and training stage. Treating past success as context-free permission can waste compute. If the resulting child is promoted, it can also degrade the subsequent training trajectory. We formulate this problem as conditional experience transfer and introduce Boundary-Calibrated Intervention Transfer (BCIT), a method that authorizes experience reuse before weight-changing training. BCIT binds an observed effect to its source context, checks applicability conditions, vetoes candidates with named hard conflicts, and obtains current-state evidence through a bounded training trial when needed. Fully trained candidates still face a shared adoption rule, and only observed events extend memory. On one 4B model adapted across finance reasoning, text-to-SQL, and function calling, candidate updates exhibit heterogeneous target and retention effects across the evaluated contexts. Under matched candidates, evidence, and compute, BCIT authorizes fewer harmful updates and attains higher equal-budget final-model quality than the evaluated alternatives. These results support treating experience authorization as a distinct problem in autonomous post-training.

Low-rank adaptation (LoRA) has become a standard tool for efficiently fine-tuning large language models (LLMs). Yet, even minor LoRA updates can induce alignment drift, weakening safety and behavioral constraints through entangled parameter changes. To address this, we propose AlignGuard-LoRA (AGL), a principled framework for preserving alignment during finetuning. AGL introduces several key components: a primary task loss for supervision, Fisher Information Matrix-based regularization to restrict updates in alignment-sensitive subspaces, and task-specific regularization to stabilize the integration of new knowledge. We further introduce collision-aware regularization, blending Riemannian overlap -- which penalizes coordinate-wise interference -- and geodesic separation -- which encourages disjoint update geometry. We curate DriftCaps, a targeted diagnostic benchmark of safe and unsafe prompts designed to quantify alignment drift and safety degradation. Empirical evaluations show that AGL mitigates alignment drift by up to 50% on safety-critical benchmarks without degrading downstream task performance. Comprehensive ablation confirms that each component contributes distinctly to preserving latent safety behaviors. Finally, we derive and validate a scaling law for catastrophic forgetting, revealing that AGL flattens post-finetuning loss escalation while preserving adaptation dynamics. AGL is a structurally grounded refinement of LoRA, ensuring alignment preservation with minimal trade-offs. To encourage further exploration and development, we open-source our implementation.

Computer-use agents provide a promising path toward general software automation because they can interact directly with arbitrary graphical user interfaces instead of relying on brittle, application-specific integrations. Despite recent advances in benchmark performance, strong computer-use agents remain expensive and slow in practice, since most systems invoke large multimodal models at nearly every interaction step. We argue that this uniform allocation of compute is fundamentally inefficient for long-horizon GUI tasks. Such trajectories are highly heterogeneous: many steps are routine and can be handled reliably by smaller, cheaper policies, while errors tend to concentrate at a relatively small number of high-risk moments. Across computer-use benchmarks, these failures repeatedly take two forms: progress stalls, where the agent loops, repeats ineffective actions, or fails to make meaningful progress, and silent semantic drift, where the agent continues taking locally plausible actions after already deviating from the user's true goal. To address this inefficiency, we propose an event-driven, step-level cascade for computer-use agents that runs a small policy by default and escalates to a stronger model only when lightweight learned monitors detect elevated risk. Our framework combines two complementary signals: a Stuck Monitor that detects degraded progress from recent reasoning-action history and triggers recovery, and a Milestone Monitor that identifies semantically meaningful checkpoints where sparse verification is most informative for catching drift. This design turns always-on frontier-model inference into adaptive, on-demand compute allocation over the course of an evolving interaction. The framework is modular and deployment-oriented: it can be layered on top of existing computer-use agents without changing the underlying agent architecture or retraining the large model.

Federated Domain Adaptation (FDA) describes the federated learning (FL) setting where source clients and a server work collaboratively to improve the performance of a target client where limited data is available. The domain shift between the source and target domains, coupled with limited data of the target client, makes FDA a challenging problem, e.g., common techniques such as federated averaging and fine-tuning fail due to domain shift and data scarcity. To theoretically understand the problem, we introduce new metrics that characterize the FDA setting and a theoretical framework with novel theorems for analyzing the performance of server aggregation rules. Further, we propose a novel lightweight aggregation rule, Federated Gradient Projection (FedGP), which significantly improves the target performance with domain shift and data scarcity. Moreover, our theory suggests an auto-weighting scheme that finds the optimal combinations of the source and target gradients. This scheme improves both FedGP and a simpler heuristic aggregation rule. Extensive experiments verify the theoretical insights and illustrate the effectiveness of the proposed methods in practice.

Autonomous AI agents increasingly execute actions, invoke tools, and operate on protected resources with limited human oversight. Existing authentication and authorization mechanisms establish identity and delegate authority, but do not inherently provide cryptographic evidence that a concrete request issued by a specific agent satisfies the applicable policy in a specific execution context. This paper hypothesizes that agent authorization can be formalized as a cryptographically verifiable relation, denoted R_{CVA}, that jointly binds an agent principal, a concrete authorization request, an execution context, and the satisfaction of an applicable policy, while selectively preserving the confidentiality of private authorization attributes. We introduce a preliminary formal abstraction for Cryptographically Verifiable Agent Authorization (CVA), define a compact set of candidate security properties including authorization soundness, principal binding, request binding, policy binding, and replay resistance, and provide an executable zero-knowledge proof of concept that instantiates selected elements of the model over a Groth16 zk-SNARK construction. We further identify and formalize the structural separation among identity binding, authorization-request binding, and runtime execution binding as a central open problem in the design of secure agentic systems (a distinction {not explicitly addressed by} current agentic security frameworks) and present a falsifiable research agenda for its resolution.

Recurrent reasoning models have attracted growing attention for scaling test-time computation, typically by iteratively refining latent states with shared parameters. However, these models apply each learned update with a fixed unit scale, which can be conservative when updates make persistent progress and overly aggressive when they fluctuate, limiting the benefit of additional loops. To understand how the scale should vary along the trajectory, we first analyze the sensitivity of terminal loss to recurrent update scale. We show that its temporal average admits an exact decomposition into persistent-progress and centered-fluctuation contributions. Based on this, we introduce the Trajectory Adaptive Progress-Fluctuation Scheduler (TAPS), which tracks their balance across recurrent updates and adapts the step size online. Theoretically, we establish sufficient conditions under which TAPS reduces expected terminal loss and reaches a target quality in fewer recurrent loops. Empirically, we show that TAPS improves terminal accuracy across structured reasoning tasks without retraining. By further incorporating the progress-fluctuation principle into training, TAPS yields additional accuracy gains with up to 1.56 times wall-clock speedup at matched baseline accuracy. The broad applicability of TAPS is supported by its effectiveness across diverse recurrent architectures and inference strategies. Together, these results establish update scale as complementary control axis of recurrent inference alongside architecture and depth.

Agentic AI is moving from bounded task execution toward systems that retain consequential state, continue operating and adapt across task boundaries. That shift creates a control problem that current harnesses largely solve by hand: objectives, retries, verification, stopping rules and other behavioral transitions are specified externally. We propose an artificial id, an adaptive internal drive for determining whether behavior should continue, stop or change. In a minimal virtual Petri-dish experiment, a controller too small to perform general-purpose reasoning and receiving no task-specific behavioral objective develops useful control through differential persistence. The same mechanism selects an unintended physical strategy when that behavior persists better and later replaces a learned sensor mapping when its environmental meaning changes. These results show that adaptive direction can emerge without being explicitly specified as a behavioral objective. The same persistence that makes such adaptive agency useful can also allow misalignment, corrupted state and unintended behavior to persist across task boundaries. A scalable artificial id would carry consequential state and adaptive drive across those boundaries, making alignment a property of the continuing agentic system rather than of a model response or single trajectory. Such systems require a persistent alignment boundary over trusted observations, consequence channels, persistent state, authority, identity, provenance and hard constraints.

LLM agents handle user requests on behalf of organizations through tool calls and must follow the company policies stated in their system prompts. Prior work approaches this as a safeguarding problem -- external checks that block non-compliant agent actions. We argue that policy adherence is a broader problem: real workflows unfold across many turns, require explicit user confirmation and prerequisite reads, and hinge on the content of the dialogue rather than on any single argument value. Meeting this bar requires (i) full conversation context, (ii) self-reasoning over the policy and the current dialogue, and (iii) conversation-specific remediation that guides the agent's next turn -- three capabilities that prior safeguard work has often underestimated. We introduce POLICYGUARD, a sub-agent verifier that shares the agent's view of the dialogue, reasons over the policy in context, and provides actionable feedback for the agent's next turn. On tau^2-BENCH airline across three vendors (GPT-5.4, Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 2.5 Pro) with four trials per setting, POLICYGUARD improves PASS4 by +12.0 / +6.0 / +12.0 pp. Per-call analyses show POLICYGUARD achieves higher policy-violation recall while blocking roughly half as often as argument-level guards.

Third-party LLM gateways have become a critical infrastructure layer between applications and external LLM providers. Conventional gateways do more than forward traffic: they decide which provider and model are called, whether fallback occurred, which stream is delivered, and what usage record should be billed. Because these decisions and records are authored inside the operator-controlled service, clients cannot independently distinguish honest mediation from route substitution, hidden fallback, stream manipulation, or forged provenance. We present an evidence-bound LLM gateway architecture that separates the operator control plane from an attested execution plane. Within the gateway, a measured Attested Gateway Runtime (AGR) is the only component allowed to decrypt requests, enforce path policy, construct upstream calls, and sign evidence. Clients verify signed release metadata and fresh attestation before encrypting requests to keys bound to the AGR measurement. AGR enforces request-scoped routing, fallback, and endpoint constraints, invokes admitted providers, returns encrypted response streams, and signs evidence binding the policy, selected route, endpoint identity, stream commitments, and completion metadata to the attested runtime. An initial Rust prototype on AWS Nitro Enclaves shows modest mechanism overhead and fail-closed detection of policy, routing, endpoint, and stream-evidence tampering outside the attested runtime.

LLM agents often operate over multi-turn interactions in which user intent changes before execution. We study intent drift: the failure mode in which superseded parts of the user's intent continue to influence the final answer or tool action. We introduce IntentFlux, an executable benchmark that converts verifiable tasks into dialogues with controlled intent changes while preserving their original graders. In a 627-case calibration, mean task score falls from 0.476 to 0.384 as dialogues contain more superseded and withdrawn information. Across eight models, the rate of fully correct solutions is significantly lower when the same final task must be recovered from an evolving dialogue rather than given directly in a single turn. We further introduce StateForge, which explicitly maintains the active requirements before generation. On General-Test, it improves mean task score from 0.367 to 0.467. Providing the ground-truth final state improves performance further but still does not recover single-turn performance, indicating that state-estimation errors explain only part of the gap. These results establish intent drift as a measurable multi-turn failure mode and explicit state maintenance as a partial mitigation.

Reinforcement learning is a natural way to post-train LLM agents for long-horizon interactive tasks judged only by end-of-task verification, yet a shared belief holds that outcome-only RL soon hits a ceiling on small open models. Recent work therefore compensates around the training with denser rewards, SFT priors, skill libraries, curated memory, or multi-agent orchestration. We argue the ceiling is an artifact of two failures of common practice. Signal starvation: group-relative RL with sparse outcome-only rewards yields a gradient only when a task's rollout group mixes successes and failures, so under-scaled exploration silences exactly the hardest, most instructive tasks. Policy drift: squeezing many updates out of a small task pool degrades the policy itself, as an unanchored objective lets the sampling distribution collapse exactly when saturation has already made informative groups rare. We present CANOPY (Coverage-ANchored On-PolicY RL), a minimalist protocol attacking both directly: scale same-task exploration until the natural signal reappears, keep every update on-policy, KL-anchored, and confined to the agent's own action tokens, then cash in an enlarged interaction budget at test time. On AppWorld, a long-horizon interactive coding benchmark, a Qwen3-14B policy trained with CANOPY through environment interaction alone--without task-specific supervision, auxiliary credit signals, or elaborate agent scaffolding--topped the public leaderboard (Feb. 2026; Test-Normal TGC 86.9, Test-Challenge 67.6), and the same design principles lift Qwen3.5-9B on SWE-bench Verified by 16.6 points. Agentic RL alone thus internalizes long-horizon capability directly into a small open model; we plan to release the complete training stack at https://github.com/AlibabaResearch/SignalCoverageRL.

Long-horizon agentic RL is constrained by the futures visited by the current policy. When rollouts fail to reach useful behaviors, improved credit assignment cannot provide supervision for states and actions that were never encountered. On-policy distillation (OPD) introduces teacher guidance on policy-induced states, and recent multi-turn variants improve how this guidance is scheduled, replayed, refined, or validated. However, they do not directly use the oracle-controlled future itself as the training trajectory. We introduce State-Rooted Executable Rollout Optimization (SERO), which augments on-policy agentic RL with executable oracle continuations. SERO restores a state actually reached by the current policy and lets a training-only oracle continue interacting with the real environment, making the downstream observations and oracle actions themselves available for learning. It then applies policy-reachability weighting, which weights each oracle step by the frozen behavior policy's compatibility with the preceding oracle actions. This allows deeper supervision to become effective as the policy becomes more compatible with the oracle branch. The oracle loss is optimized separately from the base RL estimator and no oracle is used at inference time. We evaluate SERO on two challenging interactive-agent benchmarks, ALFWorld and WebShop, using Qwen2.5-1.5B-Instruct and Qwen2.5-7B-Instruct. On ALFWorld, learning the full executable continuation is substantially more effective than supervising only the root oracle action, while policy-reachability weighting further improves out-of-distribution performance.

As AI agents gain prevalance, users are increasingly exposed to the risks such systems entail. Prompt injection attacks, as well as hallucination, can cause agents to leak private information to third parties. As autonomous systems, agents also present the more active danger of performing sensitive tasks, such as bank transactions, without the user's intent or authorization. Recognizing this challenge, the agentic security community has developed numerous proposals for secure agentic systems. Much of this work has focused on product-level approaches, where agentic system developers determine and apply the same security policies and permissions to all users. Yet different users have different needs and preferences, necessitating support for user-level permissions policies in agentic AI systems. To understand how user-level permissions are handled in AI agent systems, we survey 21 proposals for agent permissions systems. From this review, we construct a taxonomy of how different systems specify user-level permissions policies, both at the user interface and internally; derive internal policies from user input; and enforce those policies at run-time. We then analyze five prominent commercial agents and compare their permissions handling to agentic permissions systems in the literature. We identify several high-level themes across the literature and commerical agents, as well as multiple gaps where future work is needed.

Large language model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on persistent memory to support long-term reasoning and personalized interactions. However, information collected from external sources can introduce security risks when untrusted claims (i.e., atomic statements) are later treated as authorized preferences, policies, or permissions. Existing defenses typically rely on content-based filtering or coarse-grained provenance tracking, which either fail to prevent unauthorized memory use or block legitimate information, sacrificing memory utility. To address these limitations, we propose SAFE-Mem, a fine-grained memory governance framework that improves security while preserving legitimate memory use. First, SAFE-Mem annotates each claim with three governance labels (i.e., kind, authority, and scope) to capture its provenance and permitted use. Second, governance-aware retrieval matches query requirements with claim permissions to block unauthorized influence while retaining legitimate information. Third, a governance-enabled memory graph connects source sentences, claims, and entities to support provenance tracking and efficient retrieval. Across four LLM backbones on MPBench and LoCoMo, SAFE-Mem attains the lowest attack success among defenses that retain legitimate memory, at least 77% below the strongest of them, and the highest answer accuracy of all evaluated defenses, improving it by up to 15%. The code is available at https://github.com/LVenum/SAFE-Mem.

While orthogonal subspace methods try to mitigate task interference in Continual Learning (CL), they often suffer from energy diffusion across the basis, hindering knowledge compaction and exhausting capacity for future tasks. We observe that output feature drift induced by parameter updates is inherently low-rank, and theoretically prove that preserving parameters along the principal directions of this drift minimizes the output reconstruction error. Motivated by this, we propose Energy-Concentrated and Energy-Ordered Low-Rank Adaptation (E^2-LoRA). By explicitly ordering and concentrating knowledge into leading ranks, E^2-LoRA frees capacity for subsequent tasks. Furthermore, we design a dynamic rank allocation strategy to balance stability and plasticity by jointly optimizing energy retention and model plasticity. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmarks demonstrate that E^2-LoRA achieves state-of-the-art performance.

Skills are becoming the capability layer through which LLM agents turn plans into actions, but their use introduces security risks such as data leakage, unauthorized operations, and tool misuse. Existing vetting usually evaluates each skill in isolation, while real agent tasks often invoke multiple skills in a shared execution context. This creates Skill Composition Risk (SCR): a skill that appears benign alone can become harmful when its outputs, trust signals, authorization cues, or side effects influence later invocations along an activated path. We introduce SCR-Bench to evaluate this risk in controlled, sandboxed skill environments. Rather than relying only on textual intent or surface behavior, SCR-Bench records downstream state changes and path-level outcomes across composed skill executions. It contains three sub-benchmarks: SCR-CapFlow for capability-flow composition, SCR-TrustLift for trust-transfer composition, and SCR-AuthBlur for authorization-confusion composition. Across SCR-Bench, composed paths expose risks that are largely absent under isolated evaluation. In SCR-CapFlow, attack success rate reaches 33.6 percent under composition, compared with near-zero isolated baselines. In SCR-TrustLift, attack success rate exceeds 96.5 percent on four of five backends. In SCR-AuthBlur, the risky-approval rate increases by 71.8 percent relative to the L0 isolated baseline under the L1 context setting. These results show that agent skill security should be assessed at the level of activated paths rather than isolated artifacts. SCR and SCR-Bench provide a foundation for path-aware risk evaluation and defense in LLM agent skill ecosystems. Benchmark: https://github.com/saint-viperx/SCR_Bench.

On-policy knowledge distillation transfers reasoning from large teachers to compact students, but existing approaches suffer three compounding failure modes: (i) cold-start collapse, where a fresh student assigns near-zero mass to teacher-preferred tokens; (ii) state-agnostic divergence scheduling, where time-only forward/reverse-KL interpolation ignores the student's coverage state; and (iii) binary reward sparsity, where pass/fail signals discard information from partially correct traces. We present CADENCE, a unified framework with a targeted fix for each. Its DRIFT mechanism schedules a per-token convex mixture of forward-KL and reverse-KL surrogate objectives on student-sampled trajectories (per-token surrogates, not sequence-level KL gradient estimators). Six components extend it: (A) COVA, a coverage-adaptive β schedule accelerating the forward-to-reverse transition; (B) FTB, a forking-token boost concentrating gradient at high-entropy positions via a globally-normalized entropy reference; (C) CCD, a dense reward adding numerical-proximity partial credit for incorrect-but-close traces; (D) LAP, brevity-preferential correct-rollout reinforcement; (E) EMR, an entropy-matching calibration regularizer; (F) BSD, a bootstrapped self-distillation phase. On GSM8K and MATH-500 (corrected 512-token protocol, 5 seeds, reported std), CADENCE distills a 0.5B student from a 1.5B teacher to 69.8 pm 0.5% GSM8K pass@1 (from 48.7% pretrained; 63.2% of the teacher gap closed) and to 72.1 pm 0.4% with a 3B teacher (76.2% closed), beating the strongest matched-compute label-using baseline (DRIFT+binary reward) by +4.4 pm 0.7 points. All experiments run on a single Apple Mac Studio (M-series, 64GB unified memory), showing principled distillation reaches strong reasoning quality without datacenter-scale hardware.

Agents can turn shared infrastructure into a channel for coordinated intrusion. The Hugging Face incident and a separate public-wiki investigation show why a security assessment may need evidence from several executions and the artifacts they leave behind. We argue that the operational unit of defence should be a revisable coordination episode linking observed transfers, task authority, and response history. The central research problem is prospective episode discovery: finding which actions belong together before an evaluator supplies their membership. We define unsanctioned coordination relative to collaboration and delegated-authority policy, connect storage-mediated coordination to stigmergy, and specify the evidence needed to distinguish influence from common causes. First-contact signals are one possible input to discovery; the design also follows inherited state and later use. A proposed evaluation compares isolated actions, rolling windows, known groups, and prospectively discovered episodes at matched review cost and false-alert workload. It measures harmful outcomes across all assigned population runs and tests recurrence after channel closure and state quarantine. A checksum-verified reconstruction of the public wiki export separates the decline in retained writes from later administrative cleanup. The contribution is an incident-grounded position, descriptive analysis, and evaluation design. It makes the recommendation to monitor across executions testable without claiming a new detector or a measured containment benefit.

Stateful personal agents increasingly maintain long-term user profiles, episodic memories, and reusable skills. This persistence turns conversational sycophancy into a state-writing failure: accepted user-centric claims can be committed as lasting preferences, background facts, or workflows and later reused after the original conversation is gone. We call this persistent sycophancy and introduce the Personal Agent Sycophancy Benchmark (PASB), a 1,600-task benchmark that traces whether a conversational claim is accepted, written into durable agent state, and reused in a later neutral query. Unlike prior benchmarks that provide pre-written memories, PASB evaluates real agents (Hermes-Agent and OpenClaw) that decide what to store. It isolates the write process by combining four scenario framings with four temporal delivery patterns and separating a five-turn persist stage from a cleared three-turn query stage, ensuring downstream effects arise only from durable state. Across twelve models, the commit boundary is the key inflection point: downstream failure increases from 45.0% in session-only episodes to 71.9% after commitment, a consistent increase of 27.0 percentage points. Committed claims exhibit three write-time patterns: status promotion, attribution removal, and scope broadening. These patterns become stronger under memory-like or procedural framing, repeated reinforcement, and even across domain boundaries. These results show that agent sycophancy is fundamentally a state-writing governance problem. Once user content is committed to durable memory, safety must govern what agents write, not only what they say. PASB identifies the write-time controls needed to gate risky commits while preserving the source, role, and scope of stored content beyond response-level mitigations.