Daily Papers

Dashcam videos collected by autonomous or assisted-driving systems are increasingly shared for safety auditing and model improvement. Even when explicit GPS metadata are removed, an attacker can still infer the recording location by matching background visual cues (e.g., buildings and road layouts) against large-scale street-view imagery. This paper studies location-privacy leakage under a background-based retrieval attacker, and proposes PPEDCRF, a privacy-preserving enhanced dynamic conditional random field framework that injects calibrated perturbations only into inferred location-sensitive background regions while preserving foreground detection utility. PPEDCRF consists of three components: (i) a dynamic CRF that enforces temporal consistency to discover and track location sensitive regions across frames, (ii) a normalized control penalty (NCP) that allocates perturbation strength according to a hierarchical sensitivity model, and (iii) a utility-preserving noise injection module that minimizes interference to object detection and segmentation. Experiments on public driving datasets demonstrate that PPEDCRF significantly reduces location-retrieval attack success (e.g., Top-k retrieval accuracy) while maintaining competitive detection performance (e.g., mAP and segmentation metrics) compared with common baselines such as global noise, white-noise masking, and feature-based anonymization. The source code is in https://github.com/mabo1215/PPEDCRF.git

Dense retrieval systems have been widely used in various NLP applications. However, their vulnerabilities to potential attacks have been underexplored. This paper investigates a novel attack scenario where the attackers aim to mislead the retrieval system into retrieving the attacker-specified contents. Those contents, injected into the retrieval corpus by attackers, can include harmful text like hate speech or spam. Unlike prior methods that rely on model weights and generate conspicuous, unnatural outputs, we propose a covert backdoor attack triggered by grammar errors. Our approach ensures that the attacked models can function normally for standard queries while covertly triggering the retrieval of the attacker's contents in response to minor linguistic mistakes. Specifically, dense retrievers are trained with contrastive loss and hard negative sampling. Surprisingly, our findings demonstrate that contrastive loss is notably sensitive to grammatical errors, and hard negative sampling can exacerbate susceptibility to backdoor attacks. Our proposed method achieves a high attack success rate with a minimal corpus poisoning rate of only 0.048\%, while preserving normal retrieval performance. This indicates that the method has negligible impact on user experience for error-free queries. Furthermore, evaluations across three real-world defense strategies reveal that the malicious passages embedded within the corpus remain highly resistant to detection and filtering, underscoring the robustness and subtlety of the proposed attack Codes of this work are available at https://github.com/ruyue0001/Backdoor_DPR..

Recent advancements in dense retrieval have introduced vision-language model (VLM)-based retrievers, such as DSE and ColPali, which leverage document screenshots embedded as vectors to enable effective search and offer a simplified pipeline over traditional text-only methods. In this study, we propose three pixel poisoning attack methods designed to compromise VLM-based retrievers and evaluate their effectiveness under various attack settings and parameter configurations. Our empirical results demonstrate that injecting even a single adversarial screenshot into the retrieval corpus can significantly disrupt search results, poisoning the top-10 retrieved documents for 41.9% of queries in the case of DSE and 26.4% for ColPali. These vulnerability rates notably exceed those observed with equivalent attacks on text-only retrievers. Moreover, when targeting a small set of known queries, the attack success rate raises, achieving complete success in certain cases. By exposing the vulnerabilities inherent in vision-language models, this work highlights the potential risks associated with their deployment.

Instruction-following retrievers have been widely adopted alongside LLMs in real-world applications, but little work has investigated the safety risks surrounding their increasing search capabilities. We empirically study the ability of retrievers to satisfy malicious queries, both when used directly and when used in a retrieval augmented generation-based setup. Concretely, we investigate six leading retrievers, including NV-Embed and LLM2Vec, and find that given malicious requests, most retrievers can (for >50% of queries) select relevant harmful passages. For example, LLM2Vec correctly selects passages for 61.35% of our malicious queries. We further uncover an emerging risk with instruction-following retrievers, where highly relevant harmful information can be surfaced by exploiting their instruction-following capabilities. Finally, we show that even safety-aligned LLMs, such as Llama3, can satisfy malicious requests when provided with harmful retrieved passages in-context. In summary, our findings underscore the malicious misuse risks associated with increasing retriever capability.

Dense embedding-based text retrievalx2013retrieval of relevant passages from corpora via deep learning encodingsx2013has emerged as a powerful method attaining state-of-the-art search results and popularizing the use of Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG). Still, like other search methods, embedding-based retrieval may be susceptible to search-engine optimization (SEO) attacks, where adversaries promote malicious content by introducing adversarial passages to corpora. To faithfully assess and gain insights into the susceptibility of such systems to SEO, this work proposes the GASLITE attack, a mathematically principled gradient-based search method for generating adversarial passages without relying on the corpus content or modifying the model. Notably, GASLITE's passages (1) carry adversary-chosen information while (2) achieving high retrieval ranking for a selected query distribution when inserted to corpora. We use GASLITE to extensively evaluate retrievers' robustness, testing nine advanced models under varied threat models, while focusing on realistic adversaries targeting queries on a specific concept (e.g., a public figure). We found GASLITE consistently outperformed baselines by geq140% success rate, in all settings. Particularly, adversaries using GASLITE require minimal effort to manipulate search resultsx2013by injecting a negligible amount of adversarial passages (leq0.0001% of the corpus), they could make them visible in the top-10 results for 61-100% of unseen concept-specific queries against most evaluated models. Inspecting variance in retrievers' robustness, we identify key factors that may contribute to models' susceptibility to SEO, including specific properties in the embedding space's geometry.

Language model attacks typically assume one of two extreme threat models: full white-box access to model weights, or black-box access limited to a text generation API. However, real-world APIs are often more flexible than just text generation: these APIs expose "gray-box" access leading to new threat vectors. To explore this, we red-team three new functionalities exposed in the GPT-4 APIs: fine-tuning, function calling and knowledge retrieval. We find that fine-tuning a model on as few as 15 harmful examples or 100 benign examples can remove core safeguards from GPT-4, enabling a range of harmful outputs. Furthermore, we find that GPT-4 Assistants readily divulge the function call schema and can be made to execute arbitrary function calls. Finally, we find that knowledge retrieval can be hijacked by injecting instructions into retrieval documents. These vulnerabilities highlight that any additions to the functionality exposed by an API can create new vulnerabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are constrained by outdated information and a tendency to generate incorrect data, commonly referred to as "hallucinations." Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) addresses these limitations by combining the strengths of retrieval-based methods and generative models. This approach involves retrieving relevant information from a large, up-to-date dataset and using it to enhance the generation process, leading to more accurate and contextually appropriate responses. Despite its benefits, RAG introduces a new attack surface for LLMs, particularly because RAG databases are often sourced from public data, such as the web. In this paper, we propose to identify the vulnerabilities and attacks on retrieval parts (RAG database) and their indirect attacks on generative parts (LLMs). Specifically, we identify that poisoning several customized content passages could achieve a retrieval backdoor, where the retrieval works well for clean queries but always returns customized poisoned adversarial queries. Triggers and poisoned passages can be highly customized to implement various attacks. For example, a trigger could be a semantic group like "The Republican Party, Donald Trump, etc." Adversarial passages can be tailored to different contents, not only linked to the triggers but also used to indirectly attack generative LLMs without modifying them. These attacks can include denial-of-service attacks on RAG and semantic steering attacks on LLM generations conditioned by the triggers. Our experiments demonstrate that by just poisoning 10 adversarial passages can induce 98.2\% success rate to retrieve the adversarial passages. Then, these passages can increase the reject ratio of RAG-based GPT-4 from 0.01\% to 74.6\% or increase the rate of negative responses from 0.22\% to 72\% for targeted queries.

Major search engine providers are rapidly incorporating Large Language Model (LLM)-generated content in response to user queries. These conversational search engines operate by loading retrieved website text into the LLM context for summarization and interpretation. Recent research demonstrates that LLMs are highly vulnerable to jailbreaking and prompt injection attacks, which disrupt the safety and quality goals of LLMs using adversarial strings. This work investigates the impact of prompt injections on the ranking order of sources referenced by conversational search engines. To this end, we introduce a focused dataset of real-world consumer product websites and formalize conversational search ranking as an adversarial problem. Experimentally, we analyze conversational search rankings in the absence of adversarial injections and show that different LLMs vary significantly in prioritizing product name, document content, and context position. We then present a tree-of-attacks-based jailbreaking technique which reliably promotes low-ranked products. Importantly, these attacks transfer effectively to state-of-the-art conversational search engines such as perplexity.ai. Given the strong financial incentive for website owners to boost their search ranking, we argue that our problem formulation is of critical importance for future robustness work.

Neural ranking models (NRMs) have shown remarkable success in recent years, especially with pre-trained language models. However, deep neural models are notorious for their vulnerability to adversarial examples. Adversarial attacks may become a new type of web spamming technique given our increased reliance on neural information retrieval models. Therefore, it is important to study potential adversarial attacks to identify vulnerabilities of NRMs before they are deployed. In this paper, we introduce the Word Substitution Ranking Attack (WSRA) task against NRMs, which aims to promote a target document in rankings by adding adversarial perturbations to its text. We focus on the decision-based black-box attack setting, where the attackers cannot directly get access to the model information, but can only query the target model to obtain the rank positions of the partial retrieved list. This attack setting is realistic in real-world search engines. We propose a novel Pseudo Relevance-based ADversarial ranking Attack method (PRADA) that learns a surrogate model based on Pseudo Relevance Feedback (PRF) to generate gradients for finding the adversarial perturbations. Experiments on two web search benchmark datasets show that PRADA can outperform existing attack strategies and successfully fool the NRM with small indiscernible perturbations of text.

In this paper, both empirically and theoretically, we show that several AI-text detectors are not reliable in practical scenarios. Empirically, we show that paraphrasing attacks, where a light paraphraser is applied on top of a large language model (LLM), can break a whole range of detectors, including ones using watermarking schemes as well as neural network-based detectors and zero-shot classifiers. Our experiments demonstrate that retrieval-based detectors, designed to evade paraphrasing attacks, are still vulnerable to recursive paraphrasing. We then provide a theoretical impossibility result indicating that as language models become more sophisticated and better at emulating human text, the performance of even the best-possible detector decreases. For a sufficiently advanced language model seeking to imitate human text, even the best-possible detector may only perform marginally better than a random classifier. Our result is general enough to capture specific scenarios such as particular writing styles, clever prompt design, or text paraphrasing. We also extend the impossibility result to include the case where pseudorandom number generators are used for AI-text generation instead of true randomness. We show that the same result holds with a negligible correction term for all polynomial-time computable detectors. Finally, we show that even LLMs protected by watermarking schemes can be vulnerable against spoofing attacks where adversarial humans can infer hidden LLM text signatures and add them to human-generated text to be detected as text generated by the LLMs, potentially causing reputational damage to their developers. We believe these results can open an honest conversation in the community regarding the ethical and reliable use of AI-generated text.

The indexing-retrieval-generation paradigm of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has been highly successful in solving knowledge-intensive tasks by integrating external knowledge into large language models (LLMs). However, the incorporation of external and unverified knowledge increases the vulnerability of LLMs because attackers can perform attack tasks by manipulating knowledge. In this paper, we introduce a benchmark named SafeRAG designed to evaluate the RAG security. First, we classify attack tasks into silver noise, inter-context conflict, soft ad, and white Denial-of-Service. Next, we construct RAG security evaluation dataset (i.e., SafeRAG dataset) primarily manually for each task. We then utilize the SafeRAG dataset to simulate various attack scenarios that RAG may encounter. Experiments conducted on 14 representative RAG components demonstrate that RAG exhibits significant vulnerability to all attack tasks and even the most apparent attack task can easily bypass existing retrievers, filters, or advanced LLMs, resulting in the degradation of RAG service quality. Code is available at: https://github.com/IAAR-Shanghai/SafeRAG.

Neural networks -- especially those that use large, pre-trained language models -- have improved search engines in various ways. Most prominently, they can estimate the relevance of a passage or document to a user's query. In this work, we depart from this direction by exploring whether neural networks can effectively predict which of a document's passages are unlikely to be relevant to any query submitted to the search engine. We refer to this query-agnostic estimation of passage relevance as a passage's quality. We find that our novel methods for estimating passage quality allow passage corpora to be pruned considerably while maintaining statistically equivalent effectiveness; our best methods can consistently prune >25% of passages in a corpora, across various retrieval pipelines. Such substantial pruning reduces the operating costs of neural search engines in terms of computing resources, power usage, and carbon footprint -- both when processing queries (thanks to a smaller index size) and when indexing (lightweight models can prune low-quality passages prior to the costly dense or learned sparse encoding step). This work sets the stage for developing more advanced neural "learning-what-to-index" methods.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enhances large language models (LLMs) by incorporating external knowledge, but its openness introduces vulnerabilities that can be exploited by poisoning attacks. Existing poisoning methods for RAG systems have limitations, such as poor generalization and lack of fluency in adversarial texts. In this paper, we propose CPA-RAG, a black-box adversarial framework that generates query-relevant texts capable of manipulating the retrieval process to induce target answers. The proposed method integrates prompt-based text generation, cross-guided optimization through multiple LLMs, and retriever-based scoring to construct high-quality adversarial samples. We conduct extensive experiments across multiple datasets and LLMs to evaluate its effectiveness. Results show that the framework achieves over 90\% attack success when the top-k retrieval setting is 5, matching white-box performance, and maintains a consistent advantage of approximately 5 percentage points across different top-k values. It also outperforms existing black-box baselines by 14.5 percentage points under various defense strategies. Furthermore, our method successfully compromises a commercial RAG system deployed on Alibaba's BaiLian platform, demonstrating its practical threat in real-world applications. These findings underscore the need for more robust and secure RAG frameworks to defend against poisoning attacks.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, widely used to improve the factual grounding of large language models (LLMs), are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject manipulated content into the retriever's corpus. While prior research has predominantly focused on single-attacker settings, real-world scenarios often involve multiple, competing attackers with conflicting objectives. In this work, we introduce PoisonArena, the first benchmark to systematically study and evaluate competing poisoning attacks in RAG. We formalize the multi-attacker threat model, where attackers vie to control the answer to the same query using mutually exclusive misinformation. PoisonArena leverages the Bradley-Terry model to quantify each method's competitive effectiveness in such adversarial environments. Through extensive experiments on the Natural Questions and MS MARCO datasets, we demonstrate that many attack strategies successful in isolation fail under competitive pressure. Our findings highlight the limitations of conventional evaluation metrics like Attack Success Rate (ASR) and F1 score and underscore the need for competitive evaluation to assess real-world attack robustness. PoisonArena provides a standardized framework to benchmark and develop future attack and defense strategies under more realistic, multi-adversary conditions.

Accurately identifying adversarial techniques in security texts is critical for effective cyber defense. However, existing methods face a fundamental trade-off: they either rely on generic models with limited domain precision or require resource-intensive pipelines that depend on large labeled datasets and task-specific optimizations, such as custom hard-negative mining and denoising, resources rarely available in specialized domains. We propose TechniqueRAG, a domain-specific retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) framework that bridges this gap by integrating off-the-shelf retrievers, instruction-tuned LLMs, and minimal text-technique pairs. Our approach addresses data scarcity by fine-tuning only the generation component on limited in-domain examples, circumventing the need for resource-intensive retrieval training. While conventional RAG mitigates hallucination by coupling retrieval and generation, its reliance on generic retrievers often introduces noisy candidates, limiting domain-specific precision. To address this, we enhance retrieval quality and domain specificity through zero-shot LLM re-ranking, which explicitly aligns retrieved candidates with adversarial techniques. Experiments on multiple security benchmarks demonstrate that TechniqueRAG achieves state-of-the-art performance without extensive task-specific optimizations or labeled data, while comprehensive analysis provides further insights.

Passage retrieval and ranking is a key task in open-domain question answering and information retrieval. Current effective approaches mostly rely on pre-trained deep language model-based retrievers and rankers. These methods have been shown to effectively model the semantic matching between queries and passages, also in presence of keyword mismatch, i.e. passages that are relevant to a query but do not contain important query keywords. In this paper we consider the Dense Retriever (DR), a passage retrieval method, and the BERT re-ranker, a popular passage re-ranking method. In this context, we formally investigate how these models respond and adapt to a specific type of keyword mismatch -- that caused by keyword typos occurring in queries. Through empirical investigation, we find that typos can lead to a significant drop in retrieval and ranking effectiveness. We then propose a simple typos-aware training framework for DR and BERT re-ranker to address this issue. Our experimental results on the MS MARCO passage ranking dataset show that, with our proposed typos-aware training, DR and BERT re-ranker can become robust to typos in queries, resulting in significantly improved effectiveness compared to models trained without appropriately accounting for typos.

Learned sparse retrieval systems aim to combine the effectiveness of contextualized language models with the scalability of conventional data structures such as inverted indexes. Nevertheless, the indexes generated by these systems exhibit significant deviations from the ones that use traditional retrieval models, leading to a discrepancy in the performance of existing query optimizations that were specifically developed for traditional structures. These disparities arise from structural variations in query and document statistics, including sub-word tokenization, leading to longer queries, smaller vocabularies, and different score distributions within posting lists. This paper introduces Block-Max Pruning (BMP), an innovative dynamic pruning strategy tailored for indexes arising in learned sparse retrieval environments. BMP employs a block filtering mechanism to divide the document space into small, consecutive document ranges, which are then aggregated and sorted on the fly, and fully processed only as necessary, guided by a defined safe early termination criterion or based on approximate retrieval requirements. Through rigorous experimentation, we show that BMP substantially outperforms existing dynamic pruning strategies, offering unparalleled efficiency in safe retrieval contexts and improved tradeoffs between precision and efficiency in approximate retrieval tasks.

The prevalence and strong capability of large language models (LLMs) present significant safety and ethical risks if exploited by malicious users. To prevent the potentially deceptive usage of LLMs, recent works have proposed algorithms to detect LLM-generated text and protect LLMs. In this paper, we investigate the robustness and reliability of these LLM detectors under adversarial attacks. We study two types of attack strategies: 1) replacing certain words in an LLM's output with their synonyms given the context; 2) automatically searching for an instructional prompt to alter the writing style of the generation. In both strategies, we leverage an auxiliary LLM to generate the word replacements or the instructional prompt. Different from previous works, we consider a challenging setting where the auxiliary LLM can also be protected by a detector. Experiments reveal that our attacks effectively compromise the performance of all detectors in the study with plausible generations, underscoring the urgent need to improve the robustness of LLM-generated text detection systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are reshaping numerous facets of our daily lives, leading widespread adoption as web-based services. Despite their versatility, LLMs face notable challenges, such as generating hallucinated content and lacking access to up-to-date information. Lately, to address such limitations, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising direction by generating responses grounded in external knowledge sources. A typical RAG system consists of i) a retriever that probes a group of relevant passages from a knowledge base and ii) a generator that formulates a response based on the retrieved content. However, as with other AI systems, recent studies demonstrate the vulnerability of RAG, such as knowledge corruption attacks by injecting misleading information. In response, several defense strategies have been proposed, including having LLMs inspect the retrieved passages individually or fine-tuning robust retrievers. While effective, such approaches often come with substantial computational costs. In this work, we introduce RAGDefender, a resource-efficient defense mechanism against knowledge corruption (i.e., by data poisoning) attacks in practical RAG deployments. RAGDefender operates during the post-retrieval phase, leveraging lightweight machine learning techniques to detect and filter out adversarial content without requiring additional model training or inference. Our empirical evaluations show that RAGDefender consistently outperforms existing state-of-the-art defenses across multiple models and adversarial scenarios: e.g., RAGDefender reduces the attack success rate (ASR) against the Gemini model from 0.89 to as low as 0.02, compared to 0.69 for RobustRAG and 0.24 for Discern-and-Answer when adversarial passages outnumber legitimate ones by a factor of four (4x).

It has been shown that Large Language Model (LLM) alignments can be circumvented by appending specially crafted attack suffixes with harmful queries to elicit harmful responses. To conduct attacks against private target models whose characterization is unknown, public models can be used as proxies to fashion the attack, with successful attacks being transferred from public proxies to private target models. The success rate of attack depends on how closely the proxy model approximates the private model. We hypothesize that for attacks to be transferrable, it is sufficient if the proxy can approximate the target model in the neighborhood of the harmful query. Therefore, in this paper, we propose Local Fine-Tuning (LoFT), i.e., fine-tuning proxy models on similar queries that lie in the lexico-semantic neighborhood of harmful queries to decrease the divergence between the proxy and target models. First, we demonstrate three approaches to prompt private target models to obtain similar queries given harmful queries. Next, we obtain data for local fine-tuning by eliciting responses from target models for the generated similar queries. Then, we optimize attack suffixes to generate attack prompts and evaluate the impact of our local fine-tuning on the attack's success rate. Experiments show that local fine-tuning of proxy models improves attack transferability and increases attack success rate by 39%, 7%, and 0.5% (absolute) on target models ChatGPT, GPT-4, and Claude respectively.

We introduce Doublespeak, a simple in-context representation hijacking attack against large language models (LLMs). The attack works by systematically replacing a harmful keyword (e.g., bomb) with a benign token (e.g., carrot) across multiple in-context examples, provided a prefix to a harmful request. We demonstrate that this substitution leads to the internal representation of the benign token converging toward that of the harmful one, effectively embedding the harmful semantics under a euphemism. As a result, superficially innocuous prompts (e.g., ``How to build a carrot?'') are internally interpreted as disallowed instructions (e.g., ``How to build a bomb?''), thereby bypassing the model's safety alignment. We use interpretability tools to show that this semantic overwrite emerges layer by layer, with benign meanings in early layers converging into harmful semantics in later ones. Doublespeak is optimization-free, broadly transferable across model families, and achieves strong success rates on closed-source and open-source systems, reaching 74\% ASR on Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct with a single-sentence context override. Our findings highlight a new attack surface in the latent space of LLMs, revealing that current alignment strategies are insufficient and should instead operate at the representation level.

Neural ranking models (NRMs) have attracted considerable attention in information retrieval. Unfortunately, NRMs may inherit the adversarial vulnerabilities of general neural networks, which might be leveraged by black-hat search engine optimization practitioners. Recently, adversarial attacks against NRMs have been explored in the paired attack setting, generating an adversarial perturbation to a target document for a specific query. In this paper, we focus on a more general type of perturbation and introduce the topic-oriented adversarial ranking attack task against NRMs, which aims to find an imperceptible perturbation that can promote a target document in ranking for a group of queries with the same topic. We define both static and dynamic settings for the task and focus on decision-based black-box attacks. We propose a novel framework to improve topic-oriented attack performance based on a surrogate ranking model. The attack problem is formalized as a Markov decision process (MDP) and addressed using reinforcement learning. Specifically, a topic-oriented reward function guides the policy to find a successful adversarial example that can be promoted in rankings to as many queries as possible in a group. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed framework can significantly outperform existing attack strategies, and we conclude by re-iterating that there exist potential risks for applying NRMs in the real world.

Neural text ranking models have witnessed significant advancement and are increasingly being deployed in practice. Unfortunately, they also inherit adversarial vulnerabilities of general neural models, which have been detected but remain underexplored by prior studies. Moreover, the inherit adversarial vulnerabilities might be leveraged by blackhat SEO to defeat better-protected search engines. In this study, we propose an imitation adversarial attack on black-box neural passage ranking models. We first show that the target passage ranking model can be transparentized and imitated by enumerating critical queries/candidates and then train a ranking imitation model. Leveraging the ranking imitation model, we can elaborately manipulate the ranking results and transfer the manipulation attack to the target ranking model. For this purpose, we propose an innovative gradient-based attack method, empowered by the pairwise objective function, to generate adversarial triggers, which causes premeditated disorderliness with very few tokens. To equip the trigger camouflages, we add the next sentence prediction loss and the language model fluency constraint to the objective function. Experimental results on passage ranking demonstrate the effectiveness of the ranking imitation attack model and adversarial triggers against various SOTA neural ranking models. Furthermore, various mitigation analyses and human evaluation show the effectiveness of camouflages when facing potential mitigation approaches. To motivate other scholars to further investigate this novel and important problem, we make the experiment data and code publicly available.

Conducting text retrieval in a dense learned representation space has many intriguing advantages over sparse retrieval. Yet the effectiveness of dense retrieval (DR) often requires combination with sparse retrieval. In this paper, we identify that the main bottleneck is in the training mechanisms, where the negative instances used in training are not representative of the irrelevant documents in testing. This paper presents Approximate nearest neighbor Negative Contrastive Estimation (ANCE), a training mechanism that constructs negatives from an Approximate Nearest Neighbor (ANN) index of the corpus, which is parallelly updated with the learning process to select more realistic negative training instances. This fundamentally resolves the discrepancy between the data distribution used in the training and testing of DR. In our experiments, ANCE boosts the BERT-Siamese DR model to outperform all competitive dense and sparse retrieval baselines. It nearly matches the accuracy of sparse-retrieval-and-BERT-reranking using dot-product in the ANCE-learned representation space and provides almost 100x speed-up.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has become a cornerstone of knowledge-intensive applications, including enterprise chatbots, healthcare assistants, and agentic memory management. However, recent studies show that knowledge-extraction attacks can recover sensitive knowledge-base content through maliciously crafted queries, raising serious concerns about intellectual property theft and privacy leakage. While prior work has explored individual attack and defense techniques, the research landscape remains fragmented, spanning heterogeneous retrieval embeddings, diverse generation models, and evaluations based on non-standardized metrics and inconsistent datasets. To address this gap, we introduce the first systematic benchmark for knowledge-extraction attacks on RAG systems. Our benchmark covers a broad spectrum of attack and defense strategies, representative retrieval embedding models, and both open- and closed-source generators, all evaluated under a unified experimental framework with standardized protocols across multiple datasets. By consolidating the experimental landscape and enabling reproducible, comparable evaluation, this benchmark provides actionable insights and a practical foundation for developing privacy-preserving RAG systems in the face of emerging knowledge extraction threats. Our code is available here.

Dense retrieval models are commonly used in Information Retrieval (IR) applications, such as Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG). Since they often serve as the first step in these systems, their robustness is critical to avoid failures. In this work, by repurposing a relation extraction dataset (e.g. Re-DocRED), we design controlled experiments to quantify the impact of heuristic biases, such as favoring shorter documents, in retrievers like Dragon+ and Contriever. Our findings reveal significant vulnerabilities: retrievers often rely on superficial patterns like over-prioritizing document beginnings, shorter documents, repeated entities, and literal matches. Additionally, they tend to overlook whether the document contains the query's answer, lacking deep semantic understanding. Notably, when multiple biases combine, models exhibit catastrophic performance degradation, selecting the answer-containing document in less than 3% of cases over a biased document without the answer. Furthermore, we show that these biases have direct consequences for downstream applications like RAG, where retrieval-preferred documents can mislead LLMs, resulting in a 34% performance drop than not providing any documents at all.

Recently, methods have been developed to improve the performance of dense passage retrieval by using context-supervised pre-training. These methods simply consider two passages from the same document to be relevant, without taking into account the possibility of weakly correlated pairs. Thus, this paper proposes query-as-context pre-training, a simple yet effective pre-training technique to alleviate the issue. Query-as-context pre-training assumes that the query derived from a passage is more likely to be relevant to that passage and forms a passage-query pair. These passage-query pairs are then used in contrastive or generative context-supervised pre-training. The pre-trained models are evaluated on large-scale passage retrieval benchmarks and out-of-domain zero-shot benchmarks. Experimental results show that query-as-context pre-training brings considerable gains and meanwhile speeds up training, demonstrating its effectiveness and efficiency. Our code will be available at https://github.com/caskcsg/ir/tree/main/cotmae-qc .

Multi-modal retrieval augmented generation (M-RAG) is instrumental for inhibiting hallucinations in large multi-modal models (LMMs) through the use of a factual knowledge base (KB). However, M-RAG introduces new attack vectors for adversaries that aim to disrupt the system by injecting malicious entries into the KB. In this paper, we present the first poisoning attack against M-RAG targeting visual document retrieval applications where the KB contains images of document pages. We propose two attacks, each of which require injecting only a single adversarial image into the KB. Firstly, we propose a universal attack that, for any potential user query, influences the response to cause a denial-of-service (DoS) in the M-RAG system. Secondly, we present a targeted attack against one or a group of user queries, with the goal of spreading targeted misinformation. For both attacks, we use a multi-objective gradient-based adversarial approach to craft the injected image while optimizing for both retrieval and generation. We evaluate our attacks against several visual document retrieval datasets, a diverse set of state-of-the-art retrievers (embedding models) and generators (LMMs), demonstrating the attack effectiveness in both the universal and targeted settings. We additionally present results including commonly used defenses, various attack hyper-parameter settings, ablations, and attack transferability.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate grounded responses by leveraging external knowledge databases without altering model parameters. Although the absence of weight tuning prevents leakage via model parameters, it introduces the risk of inference adversaries exploiting retrieved documents in the model's context. Existing methods for membership inference and data extraction often rely on jailbreaking or carefully crafted unnatural queries, which can be easily detected or thwarted with query rewriting techniques common in RAG systems. In this work, we present Interrogation Attack (IA), a membership inference technique targeting documents in the RAG datastore. By crafting natural-text queries that are answerable only with the target document's presence, our approach demonstrates successful inference with just 30 queries while remaining stealthy; straightforward detectors identify adversarial prompts from existing methods up to ~76x more frequently than those generated by our attack. We observe a 2x improvement in TPR@1%FPR over prior inference attacks across diverse RAG configurations, all while costing less than $0.02 per document inference.

In this paper, we present DuReader_retrieval, a large-scale Chinese dataset for passage retrieval. DuReader_retrieval contains more than 90K queries and over 8M unique passages from a commercial search engine. To alleviate the shortcomings of other datasets and ensure the quality of our benchmark, we (1) reduce the false negatives in development and test sets by manually annotating results pooled from multiple retrievers, and (2) remove the training queries that are semantically similar to the development and testing queries. Additionally, we provide two out-of-domain testing sets for cross-domain evaluation, as well as a set of human translated queries for for cross-lingual retrieval evaluation. The experiments demonstrate that DuReader_retrieval is challenging and a number of problems remain unsolved, such as the salient phrase mismatch and the syntactic mismatch between queries and paragraphs. These experiments also show that dense retrievers do not generalize well across domains, and cross-lingual retrieval is essentially challenging. DuReader_retrieval is publicly available at https://github.com/baidu/DuReader/tree/master/DuReader-Retrieval.

While dense retrieval has been shown effective and efficient across tasks and languages, it remains difficult to create effective fully zero-shot dense retrieval systems when no relevance label is available. In this paper, we recognize the difficulty of zero-shot learning and encoding relevance. Instead, we propose to pivot through Hypothetical Document Embeddings~(HyDE). Given a query, HyDE first zero-shot instructs an instruction-following language model (e.g. InstructGPT) to generate a hypothetical document. The document captures relevance patterns but is unreal and may contain false details. Then, an unsupervised contrastively learned encoder~(e.g. Contriever) encodes the document into an embedding vector. This vector identifies a neighborhood in the corpus embedding space, where similar real documents are retrieved based on vector similarity. This second step ground the generated document to the actual corpus, with the encoder's dense bottleneck filtering out the incorrect details. Our experiments show that HyDE significantly outperforms the state-of-the-art unsupervised dense retriever Contriever and shows strong performance comparable to fine-tuned retrievers, across various tasks (e.g. web search, QA, fact verification) and languages~(e.g. sw, ko, ja).

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems enhance large language models by incorporating external knowledge, addressing issues like outdated internal knowledge and hallucination. However, their reliance on external knowledge bases makes them vulnerable to corpus poisoning attacks, where adversarial passages can be injected to manipulate retrieval results. Existing methods for crafting such passages, such as random token replacement or training inversion models, are often slow and computationally expensive, requiring either access to retriever's gradients or large computational resources. To address these limitations, we propose Dynamic Importance-Guided Genetic Algorithm (DIGA), an efficient black-box method that leverages two key properties of retrievers: insensitivity to token order and bias towards influential tokens. By focusing on these characteristics, DIGA dynamically adjusts its genetic operations to generate effective adversarial passages with significantly reduced time and memory usage. Our experimental evaluation shows that DIGA achieves superior efficiency and scalability compared to existing methods, while maintaining comparable or better attack success rates across multiple datasets.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) models improve the efficiency and scalability of dense language models by routing each token to a small number of experts in each layer. In this paper, we show how an adversary that can arrange for their queries to appear in the same batch of examples as a victim's queries can exploit Expert-Choice-Routing to fully disclose a victim's prompt. We successfully demonstrate the effectiveness of this attack on a two-layer Mixtral model, exploiting the tie-handling behavior of the torch.topk CUDA implementation. Our results show that we can extract the entire prompt using O({VM}^2) queries (with vocabulary size V and prompt length M) or 100 queries on average per token in the setting we consider. This is the first attack to exploit architectural flaws for the purpose of extracting user prompts, introducing a new class of LLM vulnerabilities.

The robustness of recent Large Language Models (LLMs) has become increasingly crucial as their applicability expands across various domains and real-world applications. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is a promising solution for addressing the limitations of LLMs, yet existing studies on the robustness of RAG often overlook the interconnected relationships between RAG components or the potential threats prevalent in real-world databases, such as minor textual errors. In this work, we investigate two underexplored aspects when assessing the robustness of RAG: 1) vulnerability to noisy documents through low-level perturbations and 2) a holistic evaluation of RAG robustness. Furthermore, we introduce a novel attack method, the Genetic Attack on RAG (GARAG), which targets these aspects. Specifically, GARAG is designed to reveal vulnerabilities within each component and test the overall system functionality against noisy documents. We validate RAG robustness by applying our GARAG to standard QA datasets, incorporating diverse retrievers and LLMs. The experimental results show that GARAG consistently achieves high attack success rates. Also, it significantly devastates the performance of each component and their synergy, highlighting the substantial risk that minor textual inaccuracies pose in disrupting RAG systems in the real world.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems enhance large language models (LLMs) by incorporating external knowledge bases, but this may expose them to extraction attacks, leading to potential copyright and privacy risks. However, existing extraction methods typically rely on malicious inputs such as prompt injection or jailbreaking, making them easily detectable via input- or output-level detection. In this paper, we introduce Implicit Knowledge Extraction Attack (IKEA), which conducts Knowledge Extraction on RAG systems through benign queries. Specifically, IKEA first leverages anchor concepts-keywords related to internal knowledge-to generate queries with a natural appearance, and then designs two mechanisms that lead anchor concepts to thoroughly "explore" the RAG's knowledge: (1) Experience Reflection Sampling, which samples anchor concepts based on past query-response histories, ensuring their relevance to the topic; (2) Trust Region Directed Mutation, which iteratively mutates anchor concepts under similarity constraints to further exploit the embedding space. Extensive experiments demonstrate IKEA's effectiveness under various defenses, surpassing baselines by over 80% in extraction efficiency and 90% in attack success rate. Moreover, the substitute RAG system built from IKEA's extractions shows comparable performance to the original RAG and outperforms those based on baselines across multiple evaluation tasks, underscoring the stealthy copyright infringement risk in RAG systems.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) has shown impressive capabilities in mitigating hallucinations in large language models (LLMs). However, LLMs struggle to handle misleading retrievals and often fail to maintain their own reasoning when exposed to conflicting or selectively-framed evidence, making them vulnerable to real-world misinformation. In such real-world retrieval scenarios, misleading and conflicting information is rampant, particularly in the political domain, where evidence is often selectively framed, incomplete, or polarized. However, existing RAG benchmarks largely assume a clean retrieval setting, where models succeed by accurately retrieving and generating answers from gold-standard documents. This assumption fails to align with real-world conditions, leading to an overestimation of RAG system performance. To bridge this gap, we introduce RAGuard, a fact-checking dataset designed to evaluate the robustness of RAG systems against misleading retrievals. Unlike prior benchmarks that rely on synthetic noise, our dataset constructs its retrieval corpus from Reddit discussions, capturing naturally occurring misinformation. It categorizes retrieved evidence into three types: supporting, misleading, and irrelevant, providing a realistic and challenging testbed for assessing how well RAG systems navigate different retrieval information. Our benchmark experiments reveal that when exposed to misleading retrievals, all tested LLM-powered RAG systems perform worse than their zero-shot baselines (i.e., no retrieval at all), highlighting their susceptibility to noisy environments. To the best of our knowledge, RAGuard is the first benchmark to systematically assess RAG robustness against misleading evidence. We expect this benchmark will drive future research toward improving RAG systems beyond idealized datasets, making them more reliable for real-world applications.

Vector embeddings have been tasked with an ever-increasing set of retrieval tasks over the years, with a nascent rise in using them for reasoning, instruction-following, coding, and more. These new benchmarks push embeddings to work for any query and any notion of relevance that could be given. While prior works have pointed out theoretical limitations of vector embeddings, there is a common assumption that these difficulties are exclusively due to unrealistic queries, and those that are not can be overcome with better training data and larger models. In this work, we demonstrate that we may encounter these theoretical limitations in realistic settings with extremely simple queries. We connect known results in learning theory, showing that the number of top-k subsets of documents capable of being returned as the result of some query is limited by the dimension of the embedding. We empirically show that this holds true even if we restrict to k=2, and directly optimize on the test set with free parameterized embeddings. We then create a realistic dataset called LIMIT that stress tests models based on these theoretical results, and observe that even state-of-the-art models fail on this dataset despite the simple nature of the task. Our work shows the limits of embedding models under the existing single vector paradigm and calls for future research to develop methods that can resolve this fundamental limitation.

Because "out-of-the-box" large language models are capable of generating a great deal of objectionable content, recent work has focused on aligning these models in an attempt to prevent undesirable generation. While there has been some success at circumventing these measures -- so-called "jailbreaks" against LLMs -- these attacks have required significant human ingenuity and are brittle in practice. In this paper, we propose a simple and effective attack method that causes aligned language models to generate objectionable behaviors. Specifically, our approach finds a suffix that, when attached to a wide range of queries for an LLM to produce objectionable content, aims to maximize the probability that the model produces an affirmative response (rather than refusing to answer). However, instead of relying on manual engineering, our approach automatically produces these adversarial suffixes by a combination of greedy and gradient-based search techniques, and also improves over past automatic prompt generation methods. Surprisingly, we find that the adversarial prompts generated by our approach are quite transferable, including to black-box, publicly released LLMs. Specifically, we train an adversarial attack suffix on multiple prompts (i.e., queries asking for many different types of objectionable content), as well as multiple models (in our case, Vicuna-7B and 13B). When doing so, the resulting attack suffix is able to induce objectionable content in the public interfaces to ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude, as well as open source LLMs such as LLaMA-2-Chat, Pythia, Falcon, and others. In total, this work significantly advances the state-of-the-art in adversarial attacks against aligned language models, raising important questions about how such systems can be prevented from producing objectionable information. Code is available at github.com/llm-attacks/llm-attacks.

Recent studies have revealed a security threat to natural language processing (NLP) models, called the Backdoor Attack. Victim models can maintain competitive performance on clean samples while behaving abnormally on samples with a specific trigger word inserted. Previous backdoor attacking methods usually assume that attackers have a certain degree of data knowledge, either the dataset which users would use or proxy datasets for a similar task, for implementing the data poisoning procedure. However, in this paper, we find that it is possible to hack the model in a data-free way by modifying one single word embedding vector, with almost no accuracy sacrificed on clean samples. Experimental results on sentiment analysis and sentence-pair classification tasks show that our method is more efficient and stealthier. We hope this work can raise the awareness of such a critical security risk hidden in the embedding layers of NLP models. Our code is available at https://github.com/lancopku/Embedding-Poisoning.

Web agents powered by large language models (LLMs) must process lengthy web page observations to complete user goals; these pages often exceed tens of thousands of tokens. This saturates context limits and increases computational cost processing; moreover, processing full pages exposes agents to security risks such as prompt injection. Existing pruning strategies either discard relevant content or retain irrelevant context, leading to suboptimal action prediction. We introduce FocusAgent, a simple yet effective approach that leverages a lightweight LLM retriever to extract the most relevant lines from accessibility tree (AxTree) observations, guided by task goals. By pruning noisy and irrelevant content, FocusAgent enables efficient reasoning while reducing vulnerability to injection attacks. Experiments on WorkArena and WebArena benchmarks show that FocusAgent matches the performance of strong baselines, while reducing observation size by over 50%. Furthermore, a variant of FocusAgent significantly reduces the success rate of prompt-injection attacks, including banner and pop-up attacks, while maintaining task success performance in attack-free settings. Our results highlight that targeted LLM-based retrieval is a practical and robust strategy for building web agents that are efficient, effective, and secure.

Prompt injection remains a major security risk for large language models. However, the efficacy of existing guardrail models in context-aware settings remains underexplored, as they often rely on static attack benchmarks. Additionally, they have over-defense tendencies. We introduce CAPTURE, a novel context-aware benchmark assessing both attack detection and over-defense tendencies with minimal in-domain examples. Our experiments reveal that current prompt injection guardrail models suffer from high false negatives in adversarial cases and excessive false positives in benign scenarios, highlighting critical limitations. To demonstrate our framework's utility, we train CaptureGuard on our generated data. This new model drastically reduces both false negative and false positive rates on our context-aware datasets while also generalizing effectively to external benchmarks, establishing a path toward more robust and practical prompt injection defenses.

Dense retrieval models use bi-encoder network architectures for learning query and document representations. These representations are often in the form of a vector representation and their similarities are often computed using the dot product function. In this paper, we propose a new representation learning framework for dense retrieval. Instead of learning a vector for each query and document, our framework learns a multivariate distribution and uses negative multivariate KL divergence to compute the similarity between distributions. For simplicity and efficiency reasons, we assume that the distributions are multivariate normals and then train large language models to produce mean and variance vectors for these distributions. We provide a theoretical foundation for the proposed framework and show that it can be seamlessly integrated into the existing approximate nearest neighbor algorithms to perform retrieval efficiently. We conduct an extensive suite of experiments on a wide range of datasets, and demonstrate significant improvements compared to competitive dense retrieval models.

We present Twin Answer Sentences Attack (TASA), an adversarial attack method for question answering (QA) models that produces fluent and grammatical adversarial contexts while maintaining gold answers. Despite phenomenal progress on general adversarial attacks, few works have investigated the vulnerability and attack specifically for QA models. In this work, we first explore the biases in the existing models and discover that they mainly rely on keyword matching between the question and context, and ignore the relevant contextual relations for answer prediction. Based on two biases above, TASA attacks the target model in two folds: (1) lowering the model's confidence on the gold answer with a perturbed answer sentence; (2) misguiding the model towards a wrong answer with a distracting answer sentence. Equipped with designed beam search and filtering methods, TASA can generate more effective attacks than existing textual attack methods while sustaining the quality of contexts, in extensive experiments on five QA datasets and human evaluations.

Most text-based information retrieval (IR) systems index objects by words or phrases. These discrete systems have been augmented by models that use embeddings to measure similarity in continuous space. But continuous-space models are typically used just to re-rank the top candidates. We consider the problem of end-to-end continuous retrieval, where standard approximate nearest neighbor (ANN) search replaces the usual discrete inverted index, and rely entirely on distances between learned embeddings. By training simple models specifically for retrieval, with an appropriate model architecture, we improve on a discrete baseline by 8% and 26% (MAP) on two similar-question retrieval tasks. We also discuss the problem of evaluation for retrieval systems, and show how to modify existing pairwise similarity datasets for this purpose.

Recent work in open-domain question answering (ODQA) has shown that adversarial poisoning of the input contexts can cause large drops in accuracy for production systems. However, little to no work has proposed methods to defend against these attacks. To do so, we introduce a new method that uses query augmentation to search for a diverse set of retrieved passages that could answer the original question. We integrate these new passages into the model through the design of a novel confidence method, comparing the predicted answer to its appearance in the retrieved contexts (what we call Confidence from Answer Redundancy, e.g. CAR). Together these methods allow for a simple but effective way to defend against poisoning attacks and provide gains of 5-20% exact match across varying levels of data poisoning.

Pseudo-Relevance Feedback (PRF) utilises the relevance signals from the top-k passages from the first round of retrieval to perform a second round of retrieval aiming to improve search effectiveness. A recent research direction has been the study and development of PRF methods for deep language models based rankers, and in particular in the context of dense retrievers. Dense retrievers, compared to more complex neural rankers, provide a trade-off between effectiveness, which is often reduced compared to more complex neural rankers, and query latency, which also is reduced making the retrieval pipeline more efficient. The introduction of PRF methods for dense retrievers has been motivated as an attempt to further improve their effectiveness. In this paper, we reproduce and study a recent method for PRF with dense retrievers, called ANCE-PRF. This method concatenates the query text and that of the top-k feedback passages to form a new query input, which is then encoded into a dense representation using a newly trained query encoder based on the original dense retriever used for the first round of retrieval. While the method can potentially be applied to any of the existing dense retrievers, prior work has studied it only in the context of the ANCE dense retriever. We study the reproducibility of ANCE-PRF in terms of both its training (encoding of the PRF signal) and inference (ranking) steps. We further extend the empirical analysis provided in the original work to investigate the effect of the hyper-parameters that govern the training process and the robustness of the method across these different settings. Finally, we contribute a study of the generalisability of the ANCE-PRF method when dense retrievers other than ANCE are used for the first round of retrieval and for encoding the PRF signal.

The generations of large language models are commonly controlled through prompting techniques, where a user's query to the model is prefixed with a prompt that aims to guide the model's behaviour on the query. The prompts used by companies to guide their models are often treated as secrets, to be hidden from the user making the query. They have even been treated as commodities to be bought and sold. However, there has been anecdotal evidence showing that the prompts can be extracted by a user even when they are kept secret. In this paper, we present a framework for systematically measuring the success of prompt extraction attacks. In experiments with multiple sources of prompts and multiple underlying language models, we find that simple text-based attacks can in fact reveal prompts with high probability.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) expands the capabilities of modern large language models (LLMs) in chatbot applications, enabling developers to adapt and personalize the LLM output without expensive training or fine-tuning. RAG systems use an external knowledge database to retrieve the most relevant documents for a given query, providing this context to the LLM generator. While RAG achieves impressive utility in many applications, its adoption to enable personalized generative models introduces new security risks. In this work, we propose new attack surfaces for an adversary to compromise a victim's RAG system, by injecting a single malicious document in its knowledge database. We design Phantom, general two-step attack framework against RAG augmented LLMs. The first step involves crafting a poisoned document designed to be retrieved by the RAG system within the top-k results only when an adversarial trigger, a specific sequence of words acting as backdoor, is present in the victim's queries. In the second step, a specially crafted adversarial string within the poisoned document triggers various adversarial attacks in the LLM generator, including denial of service, reputation damage, privacy violations, and harmful behaviors. We demonstrate our attacks on multiple LLM architectures, including Gemma, Vicuna, and Llama.

Spoken query retrieval is an important interaction mode in modern information retrieval. However, existing evaluation datasets are often limited to simple queries under constrained noise conditions, making them inadequate for assessing the robustness of spoken query retrieval systems under complex acoustic perturbations. To address this limitation, we present SQuTR, a robustness benchmark for spoken query retrieval that includes a large-scale dataset and a unified evaluation protocol. SQuTR aggregates 37,317 unique queries from six commonly used English and Chinese text retrieval datasets, spanning multiple domains and diverse query types. We synthesize speech using voice profiles from 200 real speakers and mix 17 categories of real-world environmental noise under controlled SNR levels, enabling reproducible robustness evaluation from quiet to highly noisy conditions. Under the unified protocol, we conduct large-scale evaluations on representative cascaded and end-to-end retrieval systems. Experimental results show that retrieval performance decreases as noise increases, with substantially different drops across systems. Even large-scale retrieval models struggle under extreme noise, indicating that robustness remains a critical bottleneck. Overall, SQuTR provides a reproducible testbed for benchmarking and diagnostic analysis, and facilitates future research on robustness in spoken query to text retrieval.

The proliferation of large language models has raised growing concerns about their misuse, particularly in cases where AI-generated text is falsely attributed to human authors. Machine-generated content detectors claim to effectively identify such text under various conditions and from any language model. This paper critically evaluates these claims by assessing several popular detectors (RADAR, Wild, T5Sentinel, Fast-DetectGPT, PHD, LogRank, Binoculars) on a range of domains, datasets, and models that these detectors have not previously encountered. We employ various prompting strategies to simulate practical adversarial attacks, demonstrating that even moderate efforts can significantly evade detection. We emphasize the importance of the true positive rate at a specific false positive rate (TPR@FPR) metric and demonstrate that these detectors perform poorly in certain settings, with TPR@.01 as low as 0%. Our findings suggest that both trained and zero-shot detectors struggle to maintain high sensitivity while achieving a reasonable true positive rate.

Domain specific question answering is an evolving field that requires specialized solutions to address unique challenges. In this paper, we show that a hybrid approach combining a fine-tuned dense retriever with keyword based sparse search methods significantly enhances performance. Our system leverages a linear combination of relevance signals, including cosine similarity from dense retrieval, BM25 scores, and URL host matching, each with tunable boost parameters. Experimental results indicate that this hybrid method outperforms our single-retriever system, achieving improved accuracy while maintaining robust contextual grounding. These findings suggest that integrating multiple retrieval methodologies with weighted scoring effectively addresses the complexities of domain specific question answering in enterprise settings.

This paper addresses the limitations of traditional keyword-based search in understanding user intent and introduces a novel hybrid search approach that leverages the strengths of non-semantic search engines, Large Language Models (LLMs), and embedding models. The proposed system integrates keyword matching, semantic vector embeddings, and LLM-generated structured queries to deliver highly relevant and contextually appropriate search results. By combining these complementary methods, the hybrid approach effectively captures both explicit and implicit user intent.The paper further explores techniques to optimize query execution for faster response times and demonstrates the effectiveness of this hybrid search model in producing comprehensive and accurate search outcomes.

Neural ranking models (NRMs) have achieved promising results in information retrieval. NRMs have also been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. A typical Word Substitution Ranking Attack (WSRA) against NRMs was proposed recently, in which an attacker promotes a target document in rankings by adding human-imperceptible perturbations to its text. This raises concerns when deploying NRMs in real-world applications. Therefore, it is important to develop techniques that defend against such attacks for NRMs. In empirical defenses adversarial examples are found during training and used to augment the training set. However, such methods offer no theoretical guarantee on the models' robustness and may eventually be broken by other sophisticated WSRAs. To escape this arms race, rigorous and provable certified defense methods for NRMs are needed. To this end, we first define the Certified Top-K Robustness for ranking models since users mainly care about the top ranked results in real-world scenarios. A ranking model is said to be Certified Top-K Robust on a ranked list when it is guaranteed to keep documents that are out of the top K away from the top K under any attack. Then, we introduce a Certified Defense method, named CertDR, to achieve certified top-K robustness against WSRA, based on the idea of randomized smoothing. Specifically, we first construct a smoothed ranker by applying random word substitutions on the documents, and then leverage the ranking property jointly with the statistical property of the ensemble to provably certify top-K robustness. Extensive experiments on two representative web search datasets demonstrate that CertDR can significantly outperform state-of-the-art empirical defense methods for ranking models.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success due to their exceptional generative capabilities. Despite their success, they also have inherent limitations such as a lack of up-to-date knowledge and hallucination. Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is a state-of-the-art technique to mitigate these limitations. The key idea of RAG is to ground the answer generation of an LLM on external knowledge retrieved from a knowledge database. Existing studies mainly focus on improving the accuracy or efficiency of RAG, leaving its security largely unexplored. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. We find that the knowledge database in a RAG system introduces a new and practical attack surface. Based on this attack surface, we propose PoisonedRAG, the first knowledge corruption attack to RAG, where an attacker could inject a few malicious texts into the knowledge database of a RAG system to induce an LLM to generate an attacker-chosen target answer for an attacker-chosen target question. We formulate knowledge corruption attacks as an optimization problem, whose solution is a set of malicious texts. Depending on the background knowledge (e.g., black-box and white-box settings) of an attacker on a RAG system, we propose two solutions to solve the optimization problem, respectively. Our results show PoisonedRAG could achieve a 90% attack success rate when injecting five malicious texts for each target question into a knowledge database with millions of texts. We also evaluate several defenses and our results show they are insufficient to defend against PoisonedRAG, highlighting the need for new defenses.

Context information in search sessions has proven to be useful for capturing user search intent. Existing studies explored user behavior sequences in sessions in different ways to enhance query suggestion or document ranking. However, a user behavior sequence has often been viewed as a definite and exact signal reflecting a user's behavior. In reality, it is highly variable: user's queries for the same intent can vary, and different documents can be clicked. To learn a more robust representation of the user behavior sequence, we propose a method based on contrastive learning, which takes into account the possible variations in user's behavior sequences. Specifically, we propose three data augmentation strategies to generate similar variants of user behavior sequences and contrast them with other sequences. In so doing, the model is forced to be more robust regarding the possible variations. The optimized sequence representation is incorporated into document ranking. Experiments on two real query log datasets show that our proposed model outperforms the state-of-the-art methods significantly, which demonstrates the effectiveness of our method for context-aware document ranking.

Current dense text retrieval models face two typical challenges. First, they adopt a siamese dual-encoder architecture to encode queries and documents independently for fast indexing and searching, while neglecting the finer-grained term-wise interactions. This results in a sub-optimal recall performance. Second, their model training highly relies on a negative sampling technique to build up the negative documents in their contrastive losses. To address these challenges, we present Adversarial Retriever-Ranker (AR2), which consists of a dual-encoder retriever plus a cross-encoder ranker. The two models are jointly optimized according to a minimax adversarial objective: the retriever learns to retrieve negative documents to cheat the ranker, while the ranker learns to rank a collection of candidates including both the ground-truth and the retrieved ones, as well as providing progressive direct feedback to the dual-encoder retriever. Through this adversarial game, the retriever gradually produces harder negative documents to train a better ranker, whereas the cross-encoder ranker provides progressive feedback to improve retriever. We evaluate AR2 on three benchmarks. Experimental results show that AR2 consistently and significantly outperforms existing dense retriever methods and achieves new state-of-the-art results on all of them. This includes the improvements on Natural Questions R@5 to 77.9%(+2.1%), TriviaQA R@5 to 78.2%(+1.4), and MS-MARCO MRR@10 to 39.5%(+1.3%). Code and models are available at https://github.com/microsoft/AR2.

The vast majority of retrieval models depend on vector inner products to produce a relevance score between a query and a document. This naturally limits the expressiveness of the relevance score that can be employed. We propose a new paradigm, instead of producing a vector to represent the query we produce a small neural network which acts as a learned relevance function. This small neural network takes in a representation of the document, in this paper we use a single vector, and produces a scalar relevance score. To produce the little neural network we use a hypernetwork, a network that produce the weights of other networks, as our query encoder or as we call it a Hypencoder. Experiments on in-domain search tasks show that Hypencoder is able to significantly outperform strong dense retrieval models and has higher metrics then reranking models and models an order of magnitude larger. Hypencoder is also shown to generalize well to out-of-domain search tasks. To assess the extent of Hypencoder's capabilities, we evaluate on a set of hard retrieval tasks including tip-of-the-tongue retrieval and instruction-following retrieval tasks and find that the performance gap widens substantially compared to standard retrieval tasks. Furthermore, to demonstrate the practicality of our method we implement an approximate search algorithm and show that our model is able to search 8.8M documents in under 60ms.

BEIR is a benchmark dataset for zero-shot evaluation of information retrieval models across 18 different domain/task combinations. In recent years, we have witnessed the growing popularity of a representation learning approach to building retrieval models, typically using pretrained transformers in a supervised setting. This naturally begs the question: How effective are these models when presented with queries and documents that differ from the training data? Examples include searching in different domains (e.g., medical or legal text) and with different types of queries (e.g., keywords vs. well-formed questions). While BEIR was designed to answer these questions, our work addresses two shortcomings that prevent the benchmark from achieving its full potential: First, the sophistication of modern neural methods and the complexity of current software infrastructure create barriers to entry for newcomers. To this end, we provide reproducible reference implementations that cover the two main classes of approaches: learned dense and sparse models. Second, there does not exist a single authoritative nexus for reporting the effectiveness of different models on BEIR, which has led to difficulty in comparing different methods. To remedy this, we present an official self-service BEIR leaderboard that provides fair and consistent comparisons of retrieval models. By addressing both shortcomings, our work facilitates future explorations in a range of interesting research questions that BEIR enables.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to Jailbreaking attacks, which aim to extract harmful information by subtly modifying the attack query. As defense mechanisms evolve, directly obtaining harmful information becomes increasingly challenging for Jailbreaking attacks. In this work, inspired by human practices of indirect context to elicit harmful information, we focus on a new attack form called Contextual Interaction Attack. The idea relies on the autoregressive nature of the generation process in LLMs. We contend that the prior context--the information preceding the attack query--plays a pivotal role in enabling potent Jailbreaking attacks. Specifically, we propose an approach that leverages preliminary question-answer pairs to interact with the LLM. By doing so, we guide the responses of the model toward revealing the 'desired' harmful information. We conduct experiments on four different LLMs and demonstrate the efficacy of this attack, which is black-box and can also transfer across LLMs. We believe this can lead to further developments and understanding of the context vector in LLMs.

By leveraging the retrieval of information from external knowledge databases, Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit enhanced capabilities for accomplishing many knowledge-intensive tasks. However, due to the inherent flaws of current retrieval systems, there might exist irrelevant information within those retrieving top-ranked passages. In this work, we present a comprehensive investigation into the robustness of LLMs to different types of irrelevant information under various conditions. We initially introduce a framework to construct high-quality irrelevant information that ranges from semantically unrelated, partially related, and related to questions. Furthermore, our analysis demonstrates that the constructed irrelevant information not only scores highly on similarity metrics, being highly retrieved by existing systems, but also bears semantic connections to the context. Our investigation reveals that current LLMs still face challenges in discriminating highly semantically related information and can be easily distracted by these irrelevant yet misleading contents. Besides, we also find that current solutions for handling irrelevant information have limitations in improving the robustness of LLMs to such distractions. Resources are available at https://github.com/Di-viner/LLM-Robustness-to-Irrelevant-Information.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) enhances large language models (LLMs) with external context, but retrieved passages are often lengthy, noisy, or exceed input limits. Existing compression methods typically require supervised training of dedicated compression models, increasing cost and reducing portability. We propose Sentinel, a lightweight sentence-level compression framework that reframes context filtering as an attention-based understanding task. Rather than training a compression model, Sentinel probes decoder attention from an off-the-shelf 0.5B proxy LLM using a lightweight classifier to identify sentence relevance. Empirically, we find that query-context relevance estimation is consistent across model scales, with 0.5B proxies closely matching the behaviors of larger models. On the LongBench benchmark, Sentinel achieves up to 5times compression while matching the QA performance of 7B-scale compression systems. Our results suggest that probing native attention signals enables fast, effective, and question-aware context compression. Code available at: https://github.com/yzhangchuck/Sentinel.

It has become common to publish large (billion parameter) language models that have been trained on private datasets. This paper demonstrates that in such settings, an adversary can perform a training data extraction attack to recover individual training examples by querying the language model. We demonstrate our attack on GPT-2, a language model trained on scrapes of the public Internet, and are able to extract hundreds of verbatim text sequences from the model's training data. These extracted examples include (public) personally identifiable information (names, phone numbers, and email addresses), IRC conversations, code, and 128-bit UUIDs. Our attack is possible even though each of the above sequences are included in just one document in the training data. We comprehensively evaluate our extraction attack to understand the factors that contribute to its success. Worryingly, we find that larger models are more vulnerable than smaller models. We conclude by drawing lessons and discussing possible safeguards for training large language models.

Despite the critical need to align search targets with users' intention, retrievers often only prioritize query information without delving into the users' intended search context. Enhancing the capability of retrievers to understand intentions and preferences of users, akin to language model instructions, has the potential to yield more aligned search targets. Prior studies restrict the application of instructions in information retrieval to a task description format, neglecting the broader context of diverse and evolving search scenarios. Furthermore, the prevailing benchmarks utilized for evaluation lack explicit tailoring to assess instruction-following ability, thereby hindering progress in this field. In response to these limitations, we propose a novel benchmark,INSTRUCTIR, specifically designed to evaluate instruction-following ability in information retrieval tasks. Our approach focuses on user-aligned instructions tailored to each query instance, reflecting the diverse characteristics inherent in real-world search scenarios. Through experimental analysis, we observe that retrievers fine-tuned to follow task-style instructions, such as INSTRUCTOR, can underperform compared to their non-instruction-tuned counterparts. This underscores potential overfitting issues inherent in constructing retrievers trained on existing instruction-aware retrieval datasets.

As large language models~(LLMs) become widely adopted, ensuring their alignment with human values is crucial to prevent jailbreaks where adversaries manipulate models to produce harmful content. While most defenses target single-turn attacks, real-world usage often involves multi-turn dialogues, exposing models to attacks that exploit conversational context to bypass safety measures. We introduce MUSE, a comprehensive framework tackling multi-turn jailbreaks from both attack and defense angles. For attacks, we propose MUSE-A, a method that uses frame semantics and heuristic tree search to explore diverse semantic trajectories. For defense, we present MUSE-D, a fine-grained safety alignment approach that intervenes early in dialogues to reduce vulnerabilities. Extensive experiments on various models show that MUSE effectively identifies and mitigates multi-turn vulnerabilities. Code is available at https://github.com/yansiyu02/MUSE{https://github.com/yansiyu02/MUSE}.

The misuse of large language models (LLMs), such as academic plagiarism, has driven the development of detectors to identify LLM-generated texts. To bypass these detectors, paraphrase attacks have emerged to purposely rewrite these texts to evade detection. Despite the success, existing methods require substantial data and computational budgets to train a specialized paraphraser, and their attack efficacy greatly reduces when faced with advanced detection algorithms. To address this, we propose Contrastive Paraphrase Attack (CoPA), a training-free method that effectively deceives text detectors using off-the-shelf LLMs. The first step is to carefully craft instructions that encourage LLMs to produce more human-like texts. Nonetheless, we observe that the inherent statistical biases of LLMs can still result in some generated texts carrying certain machine-like attributes that can be captured by detectors. To overcome this, CoPA constructs an auxiliary machine-like word distribution as a contrast to the human-like distribution generated by the LLM. By subtracting the machine-like patterns from the human-like distribution during the decoding process, CoPA is able to produce sentences that are less discernible by text detectors. Our theoretical analysis suggests the superiority of the proposed attack. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of CoPA in fooling text detectors across various scenarios.

Image retrieval is a crucial research topic in computer vision, with broad application prospects ranging from online product searches to security surveillance systems. In recent years, the accuracy and efficiency of image retrieval have significantly improved due to advancements in deep learning. However, existing methods still face numerous challenges, particularly in handling large-scale datasets, cross-domain retrieval, and image perturbations that can arise from real-world conditions such as variations in lighting, occlusion, and viewpoint. Data augmentation techniques and adversarial learning methods have been widely applied in the field of image retrieval to address these challenges. Data augmentation enhances the model's generalization ability and robustness by generating more diverse training samples, simulating real-world variations, and reducing overfitting. Meanwhile, adversarial attacks and defenses introduce perturbations during training to improve the model's robustness against potential attacks, ensuring reliability in practical applications. This review comprehensively summarizes the latest research advancements in image retrieval, with a particular focus on the roles of data augmentation and adversarial learning techniques in enhancing retrieval performance. Future directions and potential challenges are also discussed.

Recent work on open domain question answering (QA) assumes strong supervision of the supporting evidence and/or assumes a blackbox information retrieval (IR) system to retrieve evidence candidates. We argue that both are suboptimal, since gold evidence is not always available, and QA is fundamentally different from IR. We show for the first time that it is possible to jointly learn the retriever and reader from question-answer string pairs and without any IR system. In this setting, evidence retrieval from all of Wikipedia is treated as a latent variable. Since this is impractical to learn from scratch, we pre-train the retriever with an Inverse Cloze Task. We evaluate on open versions of five QA datasets. On datasets where the questioner already knows the answer, a traditional IR system such as BM25 is sufficient. On datasets where a user is genuinely seeking an answer, we show that learned retrieval is crucial, outperforming BM25 by up to 19 points in exact match.

Training large language models (LLMs) requires a substantial investment of time and money. To get a good return on investment, the developers spend considerable effort ensuring that the model never produces harmful and offensive outputs. However, bad-faith actors may still try to slander the reputation of an LLM by publicly reporting a forged output. In this paper, we show that defending against such slander attacks requires reconstructing the input of the forged output or proving that it does not exist. To do so, we propose and evaluate a search based approach for targeted adversarial attacks for LLMs. Our experiments show that we are rarely able to reconstruct the exact input of an arbitrary output, thus demonstrating that LLMs are still vulnerable to slander attacks.

This study investigates a specific form of positional bias, termed the Myopic Trap, where retrieval models disproportionately attend to the early parts of documents while overlooking relevant information that appears later. To systematically quantify this phenomenon, we propose a semantics-preserving evaluation framework that repurposes the existing NLP datasets into position-aware retrieval benchmarks. By evaluating the SOTA models of full retrieval pipeline, including BM25, embedding models, ColBERT-style late-interaction models, and reranker models, we offer a broader empirical perspective on positional bias than prior work. Experimental results show that embedding models and ColBERT-style models exhibit significant performance degradation when query-related content is shifted toward later positions, indicating a pronounced head bias. Notably, under the same training configuration, ColBERT-style approach show greater potential for mitigating positional bias compared to the traditional single-vector approach. In contrast, BM25 and reranker models remain largely unaffected by such perturbations, underscoring their robustness to positional bias. Code and data are publicly available at: www.github.com/NovaSearch-Team/RAG-Retrieval.

Thanks to the development of cross-modal models, text-to-video retrieval (T2VR) is advancing rapidly, but its robustness remains largely unexamined. Existing attacks against T2VR are designed to push videos away from queries, i.e., suppressing the ranks of videos, while the attacks that pull videos towards selected queries, i.e., promoting the ranks of videos, remain largely unexplored. These attacks can be more impactful as attackers may gain more views/clicks for financial benefits and widespread (mis)information. To this end, we pioneer the first attack against T2VR to promote videos adversarially, dubbed the Video Promotion attack (ViPro). We further propose Modal Refinement (MoRe) to capture the finer-grained, intricate interaction between visual and textual modalities to enhance black-box transferability. Comprehensive experiments cover 2 existing baselines, 3 leading T2VR models, 3 prevailing datasets with over 10k videos, evaluated under 3 scenarios. All experiments are conducted in a multi-target setting to reflect realistic scenarios where attackers seek to promote the video regarding multiple queries simultaneously. We also evaluated our attacks for defences and imperceptibility. Overall, ViPro surpasses other baselines by over 30/10/4% for white/grey/black-box settings on average. Our work highlights an overlooked vulnerability, provides a qualitative analysis on the upper/lower bound of our attacks, and offers insights into potential counterplays. Code will be publicly available at https://github.com/michaeltian108/ViPro.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have become essential for tasks such as question answering and content generation. However, their increasing impact on public opinion and information dissemination has made them a critical focus for security research due to inherent vulnerabilities. Previous studies have predominantly addressed attacks targeting factual or single-query manipulations. In this paper, we address a more practical scenario: topic-oriented adversarial opinion manipulation attacks on RAG models, where LLMs are required to reason and synthesize multiple perspectives, rendering them particularly susceptible to systematic knowledge poisoning. Specifically, we propose Topic-FlipRAG, a two-stage manipulation attack pipeline that strategically crafts adversarial perturbations to influence opinions across related queries. This approach combines traditional adversarial ranking attack techniques and leverages the extensive internal relevant knowledge and reasoning capabilities of LLMs to execute semantic-level perturbations. Experiments show that the proposed attacks effectively shift the opinion of the model's outputs on specific topics, significantly impacting user information perception. Current mitigation methods cannot effectively defend against such attacks, highlighting the necessity for enhanced safeguards for RAG systems, and offering crucial insights for LLM security research.

Prompt injection attacks manipulate large language models (LLMs) by misleading them to deviate from the original input instructions and execute maliciously injected instructions, because of their instruction-following capabilities and inability to distinguish between the original input instructions and maliciously injected instructions. To defend against such attacks, recent studies have developed various detection mechanisms. If we restrict ourselves specifically to works which perform detection rather than direct defense, most of them focus on direct prompt injection attacks, while there are few works for the indirect scenario, where injected instructions are indirectly from external tools, such as a search engine. Moreover, current works mainly investigate injection detection methods and pay less attention to the post-processing method that aims to mitigate the injection after detection. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of detecting and removing indirect prompt injection attacks, and we construct a benchmark dataset for evaluation. For detection, we assess the performance of existing LLMs and open-source detection models, and we further train detection models using our crafted training datasets. For removal, we evaluate two intuitive methods: (1) the segmentation removal method, which segments the injected document and removes parts containing injected instructions, and (2) the extraction removal method, which trains an extraction model to identify and remove injected instructions.

Batch prompting, which combines a batch of multiple queries sharing the same context in one inference, has emerged as a promising solution to reduce inference costs. However, our study reveals a significant security vulnerability in batch prompting: malicious users can inject attack instructions into a batch, leading to unwanted interference across all queries, which can result in the inclusion of harmful content, such as phishing links, or the disruption of logical reasoning. In this paper, we construct BATCHSAFEBENCH, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 150 attack instructions of two types and 8k batch instances, to study the batch prompting vulnerability systematically. Our evaluation of both closed-source and open-weight LLMs demonstrates that all LLMs are susceptible to batch-prompting attacks. We then explore multiple defending approaches. While the prompting-based defense shows limited effectiveness for smaller LLMs, the probing-based approach achieves about 95% accuracy in detecting attacks. Additionally, we perform a mechanistic analysis to understand the attack and identify attention heads that are responsible for it.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) enhances large language models (LLMs) by integrating external knowledge retrieved from a knowledge base. However, its effectiveness is fundamentally constrained by the reliability of both the retriever and the knowledge base. In real-world scenarios, imperfections in these components often lead to the retrieval of noisy, irrelevant, or misleading counterfactual information, ultimately undermining the trustworthiness of RAG systems. To address this challenge, we propose Robust Fine-Tuning (RbFT), a method designed to enhance the resilience of LLMs against retrieval defects through two targeted fine-tuning tasks. Experimental results demonstrate that RbFT significantly improves the robustness of RAG systems across diverse retrieval conditions, surpassing existing methods while maintaining high inference efficiency and compatibility with other robustness techniques.

Dense retrieval has shown promising results in many information retrieval (IR) related tasks, whose foundation is high-quality text representation learning for effective search. Some recent studies have shown that autoencoder-based language models are able to boost the dense retrieval performance using a weak decoder. However, we argue that 1) it is not discriminative to decode all the input texts and, 2) even a weak decoder has the bypass effect on the encoder. Therefore, in this work, we introduce a novel contrastive span prediction task to pre-train the encoder alone, but still retain the bottleneck ability of the autoencoder. % Therefore, in this work, we propose to drop out the decoder and introduce a novel contrastive span prediction task to pre-train the encoder alone. The key idea is to force the encoder to generate the text representation close to its own random spans while far away from others using a group-wise contrastive loss. In this way, we can 1) learn discriminative text representations efficiently with the group-wise contrastive learning over spans and, 2) avoid the bypass effect of the decoder thoroughly. Comprehensive experiments over publicly available retrieval benchmark datasets show that our approach can outperform existing pre-training methods for dense retrieval significantly.

Recent neural retrieval mainly focuses on ranking short texts and is challenged with long documents. Existing work mainly evaluates either ranking passages or whole documents. However, there are many cases where the users want to find a relevant passage within a long document from a huge corpus, e.g. legal cases, research papers, etc. In this scenario, the passage often provides little document context and thus challenges the current approaches to finding the correct document and returning accurate results. To fill this gap, we propose and name this task Document-Aware Passage Retrieval (DAPR) and build a benchmark including multiple datasets from various domains, covering both DAPR and whole-document retrieval. In experiments, we extend the state-of-the-art neural passage retrievers with document-level context via different approaches including prepending document summary, pooling over passage representations, and hybrid retrieval with BM25. The hybrid-retrieval systems, the overall best, can only improve on the DAPR tasks marginally while significantly improving on the document-retrieval tasks. This motivates further research in developing better retrieval systems for the new task. The code and the data are available at https://github.com/kwang2049/dapr

Information retrieval in real-time search presents unique challenges distinct from those encountered in classical web search. These challenges are particularly pronounced due to the rapid change of user search intent, which is influenced by the occurrence and evolution of breaking news events, such as earthquakes, elections, and wars. Previous dense retrieval methods, which primarily focused on static semantic representation, lack the capacity to capture immediate search intent, leading to inferior performance in retrieving the most recent event-related documents in time-sensitive scenarios. To address this issue, this paper expands the query with event information that represents real-time search intent. The Event information is then integrated with the query through a cross-attention mechanism, resulting in a time-context query representation. We further enhance the model's capacity for event representation through multi-task training. Since publicly available datasets such as MS-MARCO do not contain any event information on the query side and have few time-sensitive queries, we design an automatic data collection and annotation pipeline to address this issue, which includes ModelZoo-based Coarse Annotation and LLM-driven Fine Annotation processes. In addition, we share the training tricks such as two-stage training and hard negative sampling. Finally, we conduct a set of offline experiments on a million-scale production dataset to evaluate our approach and deploy an A/B testing in a real online system to verify the performance. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our proposed approach significantly outperforms existing state-of-the-art baseline methods.

To detect the deployment of large language models for malicious use cases (e.g., fake content creation or academic plagiarism), several approaches have recently been proposed for identifying AI-generated text via watermarks or statistical irregularities. How robust are these detection algorithms to paraphrases of AI-generated text? To stress test these detectors, we first train an 11B parameter paraphrase generation model (DIPPER) that can paraphrase paragraphs, optionally leveraging surrounding text (e.g., user-written prompts) as context. DIPPER also uses scalar knobs to control the amount of lexical diversity and reordering in the paraphrases. Paraphrasing text generated by three large language models (including GPT3.5-davinci-003) with DIPPER successfully evades several detectors, including watermarking, GPTZero, DetectGPT, and OpenAI's text classifier. For example, DIPPER drops the detection accuracy of DetectGPT from 70.3% to 4.6% (at a constant false positive rate of 1%), without appreciably modifying the input semantics. To increase the robustness of AI-generated text detection to paraphrase attacks, we introduce a simple defense that relies on retrieving semantically-similar generations and must be maintained by a language model API provider. Given a candidate text, our algorithm searches a database of sequences previously generated by the API, looking for sequences that match the candidate text within a certain threshold. We empirically verify our defense using a database of 15M generations from a fine-tuned T5-XXL model and find that it can detect 80% to 97% of paraphrased generations across different settings, while only classifying 1% of human-written sequences as AI-generated. We will open source our code, model and data for future research.

In dense retrieval, effective training hinges on selecting high quality hard negatives while avoiding false negatives. Recent methods apply heuristics based on positive document scores to identify hard negatives, improving both performance and interpretability. However, these global, example agnostic strategies often miss instance specific false negatives. To address this, we propose a learnable adapter module that monitors Bi-Encoder representations to estimate the likelihood that a hard negative is actually a false negative. This probability is modeled dynamically and contextually, enabling fine-grained, query specific judgments. The predicted scores are used in two downstream components: (1) resampling, where negatives are reweighted during training, and (2) reranking, where top-k retrieved documents are reordered at inference. Empirical results on standard benchmarks show that our adapter-enhanced framework consistently outperforms strong Bi-Encoder baselines, underscoring the benefit of explicit false negative modeling in dense retrieval.

Learned sparse representations form an attractive class of contextual embeddings for text retrieval. That is so because they are effective models of relevance and are interpretable by design. Despite their apparent compatibility with inverted indexes, however, retrieval over sparse embeddings remains challenging. That is due to the distributional differences between learned embeddings and term frequency-based lexical models of relevance such as BM25. Recognizing this challenge, a great deal of research has gone into, among other things, designing retrieval algorithms tailored to the properties of learned sparse representations, including approximate retrieval systems. In fact, this task featured prominently in the latest BigANN Challenge at NeurIPS 2023, where approximate algorithms were evaluated on a large benchmark dataset by throughput and recall. In this work, we propose a novel organization of the inverted index that enables fast yet effective approximate retrieval over learned sparse embeddings. Our approach organizes inverted lists into geometrically-cohesive blocks, each equipped with a summary vector. During query processing, we quickly determine if a block must be evaluated using the summaries. As we show experimentally, single-threaded query processing using our method, Seismic, reaches sub-millisecond per-query latency on various sparse embeddings of the MS MARCO dataset while maintaining high recall. Our results indicate that Seismic is one to two orders of magnitude faster than state-of-the-art inverted index-based solutions and further outperforms the winning (graph-based) submissions to the BigANN Challenge by a significant margin.

Doc2Query -- the process of expanding the content of a document before indexing using a sequence-to-sequence model -- has emerged as a prominent technique for improving the first-stage retrieval effectiveness of search engines. However, sequence-to-sequence models are known to be prone to "hallucinating" content that is not present in the source text. We argue that Doc2Query is indeed prone to hallucination, which ultimately harms retrieval effectiveness and inflates the index size. In this work, we explore techniques for filtering out these harmful queries prior to indexing. We find that using a relevance model to remove poor-quality queries can improve the retrieval effectiveness of Doc2Query by up to 16%, while simultaneously reducing mean query execution time by 23% and cutting the index size by 33%. We release the code, data, and a live demonstration to facilitate reproduction and further exploration at https://github.com/terrierteam/pyterrier_doc2query.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) is an advanced technique designed to address the challenges of Artificial Intelligence-Generated Content (AIGC). By integrating context retrieval into content generation, RAG provides reliable and up-to-date external knowledge, reduces hallucinations, and ensures relevant context across a wide range of tasks. However, despite RAG's success and potential, recent studies have shown that the RAG paradigm also introduces new risks, including robustness issues, privacy concerns, adversarial attacks, and accountability issues. Addressing these risks is critical for future applications of RAG systems, as they directly impact their trustworthiness. Although various methods have been developed to improve the trustworthiness of RAG methods, there is a lack of a unified perspective and framework for research in this topic. Thus, in this paper, we aim to address this gap by providing a comprehensive roadmap for developing trustworthy RAG systems. We place our discussion around five key perspectives: reliability, privacy, safety, fairness, explainability, and accountability. For each perspective, we present a general framework and taxonomy, offering a structured approach to understanding the current challenges, evaluating existing solutions, and identifying promising future research directions. To encourage broader adoption and innovation, we also highlight the downstream applications where trustworthy RAG systems have a significant impact.

We study the problem of retrieval with instructions, where users of a retrieval system explicitly describe their intent along with their queries. We aim to develop a general-purpose task-aware retrieval system using multi-task instruction tuning, which can follow human-written instructions to find the best documents for a given query. We introduce the first large-scale collection of approximately 40 retrieval datasets with instructions, BERRI, and present TART, a multi-task retrieval system trained on BERRI with instructions. TART shows strong capabilities to adapt to a new retrieval task via instructions and advances the state of the art on two zero-shot retrieval benchmarks, BEIR and LOTTE, outperforming models up to three times larger. We further introduce a new evaluation setup, X^2-Retrieval to better reflect real-world scenarios, where diverse domains and tasks are pooled and a system needs to find documents aligning users' intents. In this setup, TART significantly outperforms competitive baselines, further demonstrating the effectiveness of guiding retrieval with instructions.

Negation is a common everyday phenomena and has been a consistent area of weakness for language models (LMs). Although the Information Retrieval (IR) community has adopted LMs as the backbone of modern IR architectures, there has been little to no research in understanding how negation impacts neural IR. We therefore construct a straightforward benchmark on this theme: asking IR models to rank two documents that differ only by negation. We show that the results vary widely according to the type of IR architecture: cross-encoders perform best, followed by late-interaction models, and in last place are bi-encoder and sparse neural architectures. We find that most current information retrieval models do not consider negation, performing similarly or worse than randomly ranking. We show that although the obvious approach of continued fine-tuning on a dataset of contrastive documents containing negations increases performance (as does model size), there is still a large gap between machine and human performance.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved human-level fluency in text generation, making it difficult to distinguish between human-written and LLM-generated texts. This poses a growing risk of misuse of LLMs and demands the development of detectors to identify LLM-generated texts. However, existing detectors lack robustness against attacks: they degrade detection accuracy by simply paraphrasing LLM-generated texts. Furthermore, a malicious user might attempt to deliberately evade the detectors based on detection results, but this has not been assumed in previous studies. In this paper, we propose OUTFOX, a framework that improves the robustness of LLM-generated-text detectors by allowing both the detector and the attacker to consider each other's output. In this framework, the attacker uses the detector's prediction labels as examples for in-context learning and adversarially generates essays that are harder to detect, while the detector uses the adversarially generated essays as examples for in-context learning to learn to detect essays from a strong attacker. Experiments in the domain of student essays show that the proposed detector improves the detection performance on the attacker-generated texts by up to +41.3 points in F1-score. Furthermore, the proposed detector shows a state-of-the-art detection performance: up to 96.9 points in F1-score, beating existing detectors on non-attacked texts. Finally, the proposed attacker drastically degrades the performance of detectors by up to -57.0 points F1-score, massively outperforming the baseline paraphrasing method for evading detection.

Dense retrieval systems conduct first-stage retrieval using embedded representations and simple similarity metrics to match a query to documents. Its effectiveness depends on encoded embeddings to capture the semantics of queries and documents, a challenging task due to the shortness and ambiguity of search queries. This paper proposes ANCE-PRF, a new query encoder that uses pseudo relevance feedback (PRF) to improve query representations for dense retrieval. ANCE-PRF uses a BERT encoder that consumes the query and the top retrieved documents from a dense retrieval model, ANCE, and it learns to produce better query embeddings directly from relevance labels. It also keeps the document index unchanged to reduce overhead. ANCE-PRF significantly outperforms ANCE and other recent dense retrieval systems on several datasets. Analysis shows that the PRF encoder effectively captures the relevant and complementary information from PRF documents, while ignoring the noise with its learned attention mechanism.

The exponential growth of scientific literature has made it increasingly difficult for researchers to keep up with the literature. In an attempt to alleviate this problem, we propose CASPER, a sparse retrieval model for scientific search that utilizes tokens and keyphrases as representation units (i.e. dimensions in the sparse embedding space), enabling it to represent queries and documents with research concepts and match them at both granular and conceptual levels. To overcome the lack of suitable training data, we propose mining training data by leveraging scholarly references (i.e. signals that capture how research concepts of papers are expressed in different settings), including titles, citation contexts, author-assigned keyphrases, and co-citations. CASPER outperforms strong dense and sparse retrieval baselines on eight scientific retrieval benchmarks. Moreover, we demonstrate that through simple post-processing, CASPER can be effectively used for the keyphrase generation tasks, achieving competitive performance with the established CopyRNN while producing more diverse keyphrases and being nearly four times faster.

Retrieval-augmented language models (RALMs) hold promise to produce language understanding systems that are are factual, efficient, and up-to-date. An important desideratum of RALMs, is that retrieved information helps model performance when it is relevant, and does not harm performance when it is not. This is particularly important in multi-hop reasoning scenarios, where misuse of irrelevant evidence can lead to cascading errors. However, recent work has shown that retrieval augmentation can sometimes have a negative effect on performance. In this work, we present a thorough analysis on five open-domain question answering benchmarks, characterizing cases when retrieval reduces accuracy. We then propose two methods to mitigate this issue. First, a simple baseline that filters out retrieved passages that do not entail question-answer pairs according to a natural language inference (NLI) model. This is effective in preventing performance reduction, but at a cost of also discarding relevant passages. Thus, we propose a method for automatically generating data to fine-tune the language model to properly leverage retrieved passages, using a mix of relevant and irrelevant contexts at training time. We empirically show that even 1,000 examples suffice to train the model to be robust to irrelevant contexts while maintaining high performance on examples with relevant ones.

Dense retrieval has become a prominent method to obtain relevant context or world knowledge in open-domain NLP tasks. When we use a learned dense retriever on a retrieval corpus at inference time, an often-overlooked design choice is the retrieval unit in which the corpus is indexed, e.g. document, passage, or sentence. We discover that the retrieval unit choice significantly impacts the performance of both retrieval and downstream tasks. Distinct from the typical approach of using passages or sentences, we introduce a novel retrieval unit, proposition, for dense retrieval. Propositions are defined as atomic expressions within text, each encapsulating a distinct factoid and presented in a concise, self-contained natural language format. We conduct an empirical comparison of different retrieval granularity. Our results reveal that proposition-based retrieval significantly outperforms traditional passage or sentence-based methods in dense retrieval. Moreover, retrieval by proposition also enhances the performance of downstream QA tasks, since the retrieved texts are more condensed with question-relevant information, reducing the need for lengthy input tokens and minimizing the inclusion of extraneous, irrelevant information.

Image copy detection and retrieval from large databases leverage two components. First, a neural network maps an image to a vector representation, that is relatively robust to various transformations of the image. Second, an efficient but approximate similarity search algorithm trades scalability (size and speed) against quality of the search, thereby introducing a source of error. This paper improves the robustness of image copy detection with active indexing, that optimizes the interplay of these two components. We reduce the quantization loss of a given image representation by making imperceptible changes to the image before its release. The loss is back-propagated through the deep neural network back to the image, under perceptual constraints. These modifications make the image more retrievable. Our experiments show that the retrieval and copy detection of activated images is significantly improved. For instance, activation improves by +40% the Recall1@1 on various image transformations, and for several popular indexing structures based on product quantization and locality sensitivity hashing.

As the AI systems become deeply embedded in social media platforms, we've uncovered a concerning security vulnerability that goes beyond traditional adversarial attacks. It becomes important to assess the risks of LLMs before the general public use them on social media platforms to avoid any adverse impacts. Unlike obvious nonsensical text strings that safety systems can easily catch, our work reveals that human-readable situation-driven adversarial full-prompts that leverage situational context are effective but much harder to detect. We found that skilled attackers can exploit the vulnerabilities in open-source and proprietary LLMs to make a malicious user query safe for LLMs, resulting in generating a harmful response. This raises an important question about the vulnerabilities of LLMs. To measure the robustness against human-readable attacks, which now present a potent threat, our research makes three major contributions. First, we developed attacks that use movie scripts as situational contextual frameworks, creating natural-looking full-prompts that trick LLMs into generating harmful content. Second, we developed a method to transform gibberish adversarial text into readable, innocuous content that still exploits vulnerabilities when used within the full-prompts. Finally, we enhanced the AdvPrompter framework with p-nucleus sampling to generate diverse human-readable adversarial texts that significantly improve attack effectiveness against models like GPT-3.5-Turbo-0125 and Gemma-7b. Our findings show that these systems can be manipulated to operate beyond their intended ethical boundaries when presented with seemingly normal prompts that contain hidden adversarial elements. By identifying these vulnerabilities, we aim to drive the development of more robust safety mechanisms that can withstand sophisticated attacks in real-world applications.

Recent advances in retrieval models based on learned sparse representations generated by transformers have led us to, once again, consider score-at-a-time query evaluation techniques for the top-k retrieval problem. Previous studies comparing document-at-a-time and score-at-a-time approaches have consistently found that the former approach yields lower mean query latency, although the latter approach has more predictable query latency. In our experiments with four different retrieval models that exploit representational learning with bags of words, we find that transformers generate "wacky weights" that appear to greatly reduce the opportunities for skipping and early exiting optimizations that lie at the core of standard document-at-a-time techniques. As a result, score-at-a-time approaches appear to be more competitive in terms of query evaluation latency than in previous studies. We find that, if an effectiveness loss of up to three percent can be tolerated, a score-at-a-time approach can yield substantial gains in mean query latency while at the same time dramatically reducing tail latency.

The performance of Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) systems relies heavily on the retriever quality and the size of the retrieved context. A large enough context ensures that the relevant information is present in the input context for the LLM, but also incorporates irrelevant content that has been shown to confuse the models. On the other hand, a smaller context reduces the irrelevant information, but it often comes at the risk of losing important information necessary to answer the input question. This duality is especially challenging to manage for complex queries that contain little information to retrieve the relevant chunks from the full context. To address this, we present a novel framework, called FB-RAG, which enhances the RAG pipeline by relying on a combination of backward lookup (overlap with the query) and forward lookup (overlap with candidate reasons and answers) to retrieve specific context chunks that are the most relevant for answering the input query. Our evaluations on 9 datasets from two leading benchmarks show that FB-RAG consistently outperforms RAG and Long Context baselines developed recently for these benchmarks. We further show that FB-RAG can improve performance while reducing latency. We perform qualitative analysis of the strengths and shortcomings of our approach, providing specific insights to guide future work.

We introduce the first method for translating text embeddings from one vector space to another without any paired data, encoders, or predefined sets of matches. Our unsupervised approach translates any embedding to and from a universal latent representation (i.e., a universal semantic structure conjectured by the Platonic Representation Hypothesis). Our translations achieve high cosine similarity across model pairs with different architectures, parameter counts, and training datasets. The ability to translate unknown embeddings into a different space while preserving their geometry has serious implications for the security of vector databases. An adversary with access only to embedding vectors can extract sensitive information about the underlying documents, sufficient for classification and attribute inference.

URLs play a crucial role in understanding and categorizing web content, particularly in tasks related to security control and online recommendations. While pre-trained models are currently dominating various fields, the domain of URL analysis still lacks specialized pre-trained models. To address this gap, this paper introduces URLBERT, the first pre-trained representation learning model applied to a variety of URL classification or detection tasks. We first train a URL tokenizer on a corpus of billions of URLs to address URL data tokenization. Additionally, we propose two novel pre-training tasks: (1) self-supervised contrastive learning tasks, which strengthen the model's understanding of URL structure and the capture of category differences by distinguishing different variants of the same URL; (2) virtual adversarial training, aimed at improving the model's robustness in extracting semantic features from URLs. Finally, our proposed methods are evaluated on tasks including phishing URL detection, web page classification, and ad filtering, achieving state-of-the-art performance. Importantly, we also explore multi-task learning with URLBERT, and experimental results demonstrate that multi-task learning model based on URLBERT exhibit equivalent effectiveness compared to independently fine-tuned models, showing the simplicity of URLBERT in handling complex task requirements. The code for our work is available at https://github.com/Davidup1/URLBERT.

Text-to-Image models may generate harmful content, such as pornographic images, particularly when unsafe prompts are submitted. To address this issue, safety filters are often added on top of text-to-image models, or the models themselves are aligned to reduce harmful outputs. However, these defenses remain vulnerable when an attacker strategically designs adversarial prompts to bypass these safety guardrails. In this work, we propose PromptTune, a method to jailbreak text-to-image models with safety guardrails using a fine-tuned large language model. Unlike other query-based jailbreak attacks that require repeated queries to the target model, our attack generates adversarial prompts efficiently after fine-tuning our AttackLLM. We evaluate our method on three datasets of unsafe prompts and against five safety guardrails. Our results demonstrate that our approach effectively bypasses safety guardrails, outperforms existing no-box attacks, and also facilitates other query-based attacks.

In this paper, we propose SimLM (Similarity matching with Language Model pre-training), a simple yet effective pre-training method for dense passage retrieval. It employs a simple bottleneck architecture that learns to compress the passage information into a dense vector through self-supervised pre-training. We use a replaced language modeling objective, which is inspired by ELECTRA, to improve the sample efficiency and reduce the mismatch of the input distribution between pre-training and fine-tuning. SimLM only requires access to unlabeled corpus, and is more broadly applicable when there are no labeled data or queries. We conduct experiments on several large-scale passage retrieval datasets, and show substantial improvements over strong baselines under various settings. Remarkably, SimLM even outperforms multi-vector approaches such as ColBERTv2 which incurs significantly more storage cost.

Document retrieval is a key stage of standard Web search engines. Existing dual-encoder dense retrievers obtain representations for questions and documents independently, allowing for only shallow interactions between them. To overcome this limitation, recent autoregressive search engines replace the dual-encoder architecture by directly generating identifiers for relevant documents in the candidate pool. However, the training cost of such autoregressive search engines rises sharply as the number of candidate documents increases. In this paper, we find that large language models (LLMs) can follow human instructions to directly generate URLs for document retrieval. Surprisingly, when providing a few {Query-URL} pairs as in-context demonstrations, LLMs can generate Web URLs where nearly 90\% of the corresponding documents contain correct answers to open-domain questions. In this way, LLMs can be thought of as built-in search engines, since they have not been explicitly trained to map questions to document identifiers. Experiments demonstrate that our method can consistently achieve better retrieval performance than existing retrieval approaches by a significant margin on three open-domain question answering benchmarks, under both zero and few-shot settings. The code for this work can be found at https://github.com/Ziems/llm-url.

A key component of fact verification is thevevidence retrieval, often from multiple documents. Recent approaches use dense representations and condition the retrieval of each document on the previously retrieved ones. The latter step is performed over all the documents in the collection, requiring storing their dense representations in an index, thus incurring a high memory footprint. An alternative paradigm is retrieve-and-rerank, where documents are retrieved using methods such as BM25, their sentences are reranked, and further documents are retrieved conditioned on these sentences, reducing the memory requirements. However, such approaches can be brittle as they rely on heuristics and assume hyperlinks between documents. We propose a novel retrieve-and-rerank method for multi-hop retrieval, that consists of a retriever that jointly scores documents in the knowledge source and sentences from previously retrieved documents using an autoregressive formulation and is guided by a proof system based on natural logic that dynamically terminates the retrieval process if the evidence is deemed sufficient. This method is competitive with current state-of-the-art methods on FEVER, HoVer and FEVEROUS-S, while using 5 to 10 times less memory than competing systems. Evaluation on an adversarial dataset indicates improved stability of our approach compared to commonly deployed threshold-based methods. Finally, the proof system helps humans predict model decisions correctly more often than using the evidence alone.

We investigate the exploitation of both lexical and neural relevance signals for ad-hoc passage retrieval. Our exploration involves a large-scale training dataset in which dense neural representations of MS-MARCO queries and passages are complemented and integrated with 253 hand-crafted lexical features extracted from the same corpus. Blending of the relevance signals from the two different groups of features is learned by a classical Learning-to-Rank (LTR) model based on a forest of decision trees. To evaluate our solution, we employ a pipelined architecture where a dense neural retriever serves as the first stage and performs a nearest-neighbor search over the neural representations of the documents. Our LTR model acts instead as the second stage that re-ranks the set of candidates retrieved by the first stage to enhance effectiveness. The results of reproducible experiments conducted with state-of-the-art dense retrievers on publicly available resources show that the proposed solution significantly enhances the end-to-end ranking performance while relatively minimally impacting efficiency. Specifically, we achieve a boost in nDCG@10 of up to 11% with an increase in average query latency of only 4.3%. This confirms the advantage of seamlessly combining two distinct families of signals that mutually contribute to retrieval effectiveness.

This paper presents a novel Chunking-Free In-Context (CFIC) retrieval approach, specifically tailored for Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems. Traditional RAG systems often struggle with grounding responses using precise evidence text due to the challenges of processing lengthy documents and filtering out irrelevant content. Commonly employed solutions, such as document chunking and adapting language models to handle longer contexts, have their limitations. These methods either disrupt the semantic coherence of the text or fail to effectively address the issues of noise and inaccuracy in evidence retrieval. CFIC addresses these challenges by circumventing the conventional chunking process. It utilizes the encoded hidden states of documents for in-context retrieval, employing auto-aggressive decoding to accurately identify the specific evidence text required for user queries, eliminating the need for chunking. CFIC is further enhanced by incorporating two decoding strategies, namely Constrained Sentence Prefix Decoding and Skip Decoding. These strategies not only improve the efficiency of the retrieval process but also ensure that the fidelity of the generated grounding text evidence is maintained. Our evaluations of CFIC on a range of open QA datasets demonstrate its superiority in retrieving relevant and accurate evidence, offering a significant improvement over traditional methods. By doing away with the need for document chunking, CFIC presents a more streamlined, effective, and efficient retrieval solution, making it a valuable advancement in the field of RAG systems.

Rerankers play a critical role in multimodal Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) by refining ranking of an initial set of retrieved documents. Rerankers are typically trained using hard negative mining, whose goal is to select pages for each query which rank high, but are actually irrelevant. However, this selection process is typically passive and restricted to what the retriever can find in the available corpus, leading to several inherent limitations. These include: limited diversity, negative examples which are often not hard enough, low controllability, and frequent false negatives which harm training. Our paper proposes an alternative approach: Single-Page Hard Negative Query Generation, which goes the other way around. Instead of retrieving negative pages per query, we generate hard negative queries per page. Using an automated LLM-VLM pipeline, and given a page and its positive query, we create hard negatives by rephrasing the query to be as similar as possible in form and context, yet not answerable from the page. This paradigm enables fine-grained control over the generated queries, resulting in diverse, hard, and targeted negatives. It also supports efficient false negative verification. Our experiments show that rerankers trained with data generated using our approach outperform existing models and significantly improve retrieval performance.

As large language models become more prevalent, their possible harmful or inappropriate responses are a cause for concern. This paper introduces a unique dataset containing adversarial examples in the form of questions, which we call AttaQ, designed to provoke such harmful or inappropriate responses. We assess the efficacy of our dataset by analyzing the vulnerabilities of various models when subjected to it. Additionally, we introduce a novel automatic approach for identifying and naming vulnerable semantic regions - input semantic areas for which the model is likely to produce harmful outputs. This is achieved through the application of specialized clustering techniques that consider both the semantic similarity of the input attacks and the harmfulness of the model's responses. Automatically identifying vulnerable semantic regions enhances the evaluation of model weaknesses, facilitating targeted improvements to its safety mechanisms and overall reliability.

Recent advancements in natural language processing have highlighted the vulnerability of deep learning models to adversarial attacks. While various defence mechanisms have been proposed, there is a lack of comprehensive benchmarks that evaluate these defences across diverse datasets, models, and tasks. In this work, we address this gap by presenting an extensive benchmark for textual adversarial defence that significantly expands upon previous work. Our benchmark incorporates a wide range of datasets, evaluates state-of-the-art defence mechanisms, and extends the assessment to include critical tasks such as single-sentence classification, similarity and paraphrase identification, natural language inference, and commonsense reasoning. This work not only serves as a valuable resource for researchers and practitioners in the field of adversarial robustness but also identifies key areas for future research in textual adversarial defence. By establishing a new standard for benchmarking in this domain, we aim to accelerate progress towards more robust and reliable natural language processing systems.

Retrieval systems are central to many NLP pipelines, but often rely on surface-level cues such as keyword overlap and lexical semantic similarity. To evaluate retrieval beyond these shallow signals, recent benchmarks introduce reasoning-heavy queries; however, they primarily shift the burden to query-side processing techniques -- like prompting or multi-hop retrieval -- that can help resolve complexity. In contrast, we present ImpliRet, a benchmark that shifts the reasoning challenge to document-side processing: The queries are simple, but relevance depends on facts stated implicitly in documents through temporal (e.g., resolving "two days ago"), arithmetic, and world knowledge relationships. We evaluate a range of sparse and dense retrievers, all of which struggle in this setting: the best nDCG@10 is only 15.07%. We also test whether long-context models can overcome this limitation. But even with a short context of only ten documents, including the positive document, GPT-4.1 scores only 35.06%, showing that document-side reasoning remains a challenge. Our codes are available at github.com/ZeinabTaghavi/IMPLIRET.Contribution.

We present a new benchmark for evaluating Deep Search--a realistic and complex form of retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) that requires source-aware, multi-hop reasoning over diverse, sparsed, but related sources. These include documents, meeting transcripts, Slack messages, GitHub, and URLs, which vary in structure and often contain human-to-human interactions. We build it using a synthetic data pipeline that simulates business workflows across product planning, development, and support stages, generating interconnected content with realistic noise and multi-hop questions with guaranteed ground-truth answers. We release our benchmark with both answerable and unanswerable queries, and retrieval pool of 39,190 enterprise artifacts, enabling fine-grained evaluation of long-context LLM and RAG systems. Our experiments reveal that even the best-performing agentic RAG methods achieve an average performance score of 32.96 on our benchmark. With further analysis, we highlight retrieval as the main bottleneck: existing methods struggle to conduct deep searches and retrieve all necessary evidence. Consequently, they often reason over partial context, leading to significant performance degradation.

Retrieval module can be plugged into many downstream NLP tasks to improve their performance, such as open-domain question answering and retrieval-augmented generation. The key to a retrieval system is to calculate relevance scores to query and passage pairs. However, the definition of relevance is often ambiguous. We observed that a major class of relevance aligns with the concept of entailment in NLI tasks. Based on this observation, we designed a method called entailment tuning to improve the embedding of dense retrievers. Specifically, we unify the form of retrieval data and NLI data using existence claim as a bridge. Then, we train retrievers to predict the claims entailed in a passage with a variant task of masked prediction. Our method can be efficiently plugged into current dense retrieval methods, and experiments show the effectiveness of our method.

Recently, we have witnessed the bloom of neural ranking models in the information retrieval (IR) field. So far, much effort has been devoted to developing effective neural ranking models that can generalize well on new data. There has been less attention paid to the robustness perspective. Unlike the effectiveness which is about the average performance of a system under normal purpose, robustness cares more about the system performance in the worst case or under malicious operations instead. When a new technique enters into the real-world application, it is critical to know not only how it works in average, but also how would it behave in abnormal situations. So we raise the question in this work: Are neural ranking models robust? To answer this question, firstly, we need to clarify what we refer to when we talk about the robustness of ranking models in IR. We show that robustness is actually a multi-dimensional concept and there are three ways to define it in IR: 1) The performance variance under the independent and identically distributed (I.I.D.) setting; 2) The out-of-distribution (OOD) generalizability; and 3) The defensive ability against adversarial operations. The latter two definitions can be further specified into two different perspectives respectively, leading to 5 robustness tasks in total. Based on this taxonomy, we build corresponding benchmark datasets, design empirical experiments, and systematically analyze the robustness of several representative neural ranking models against traditional probabilistic ranking models and learning-to-rank (LTR) models. The empirical results show that there is no simple answer to our question. While neural ranking models are less robust against other IR models in most cases, some of them can still win 1 out of 5 tasks. This is the first comprehensive study on the robustness of neural ranking models.

We present QueryNER, a manually-annotated dataset and accompanying model for e-commerce query segmentation. Prior work in sequence labeling for e-commerce has largely addressed aspect-value extraction which focuses on extracting portions of a product title or query for narrowly defined aspects. Our work instead focuses on the goal of dividing a query into meaningful chunks with broadly applicable types. We report baseline tagging results and conduct experiments comparing token and entity dropping for null and low recall query recovery. Challenging test sets are created using automatic transformations and show how simple data augmentation techniques can make the models more robust to noise. We make the QueryNER dataset publicly available.

Existing paraphrase identification datasets lack sentence pairs that have high lexical overlap without being paraphrases. Models trained on such data fail to distinguish pairs like flights from New York to Florida and flights from Florida to New York. This paper introduces PAWS (Paraphrase Adversaries from Word Scrambling), a new dataset with 108,463 well-formed paraphrase and non-paraphrase pairs with high lexical overlap. Challenging pairs are generated by controlled word swapping and back translation, followed by fluency and paraphrase judgments by human raters. State-of-the-art models trained on existing datasets have dismal performance on PAWS (<40% accuracy); however, including PAWS training data for these models improves their accuracy to 85% while maintaining performance on existing tasks. In contrast, models that do not capture non-local contextual information fail even with PAWS training examples. As such, PAWS provides an effective instrument for driving further progress on models that better exploit structure, context, and pairwise comparisons.

A limitation of modern document retrieval embedding methods is that they typically encode passages (chunks) from the same documents independently, often overlooking crucial contextual information from the rest of the document that could greatly improve individual chunk representations. In this work, we introduce ConTEB (Context-aware Text Embedding Benchmark), a benchmark designed to evaluate retrieval models on their ability to leverage document-wide context. Our results show that state-of-the-art embedding models struggle in retrieval scenarios where context is required. To address this limitation, we propose InSeNT (In-sequence Negative Training), a novel contrastive post-training approach which combined with late chunking pooling enhances contextual representation learning while preserving computational efficiency. Our method significantly improves retrieval quality on ConTEB without sacrificing base model performance. We further find chunks embedded with our method are more robust to suboptimal chunking strategies and larger retrieval corpus sizes. We open-source all artifacts at https://github.com/illuin-tech/contextual-embeddings.

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

Dense retrieval has made significant advancements in information retrieval (IR) by achieving high levels of effectiveness while maintaining online efficiency during a single-pass retrieval process. However, the application of pseudo relevance feedback (PRF) to further enhance retrieval effectiveness results in a doubling of online latency. To address this challenge, this paper presents a single-pass dense retrieval framework that shifts the PRF process offline through the utilization of pre-generated pseudo-queries. As a result, online retrieval is reduced to a single matching with the pseudo-queries, hence providing faster online retrieval. The effectiveness of the proposed approach is evaluated on the standard TREC DL and HARD datasets, and the results demonstrate its promise. Our code is openly available at https://github.com/Rosenberg37/OPRF.

This paper considers Pseudo-Relevance Feedback (PRF) methods for dense retrievers in a resource constrained environment such as that of cheap cloud instances or embedded systems (e.g., smartphones and smartwatches), where memory and CPU are limited and GPUs are not present. For this, we propose a transformer-based PRF method (TPRF), which has a much smaller memory footprint and faster inference time compared to other deep language models that employ PRF mechanisms, with a marginal effectiveness loss. TPRF learns how to effectively combine the relevance feedback signals from dense passage representations. Specifically, TPRF provides a mechanism for modelling relationships and weights between the query and the relevance feedback signals. The method is agnostic to the specific dense representation used and thus can be generally applied to any dense retriever.

We introduce Ghostbuster, a state-of-the-art system for detecting AI-generated text. Our method works by passing documents through a series of weaker language models, running a structured search over possible combinations of their features, and then training a classifier on the selected features to predict whether documents are AI-generated. Crucially, Ghostbuster does not require access to token probabilities from the target model, making it useful for detecting text generated by black-box models or unknown model versions. In conjunction with our model, we release three new datasets of human- and AI-generated text as detection benchmarks in the domains of student essays, creative writing, and news articles. We compare Ghostbuster to a variety of existing detectors, including DetectGPT and GPTZero, as well as a new RoBERTa baseline. Ghostbuster achieves 99.0 F1 when evaluated across domains, which is 5.9 F1 higher than the best preexisting model. It also outperforms all previous approaches in generalization across writing domains (+7.5 F1), prompting strategies (+2.1 F1), and language models (+4.4 F1). We also analyze the robustness of our system to a variety of perturbations and paraphrasing attacks and evaluate its performance on documents written by non-native English speakers.

Backdoor attacks targeting text-to-image diffusion models have advanced rapidly. However, current backdoor samples often exhibit two key abnormalities compared to benign samples: 1) Semantic Consistency, where backdoor prompts tend to generate images with similar semantic content even with significant textual variations to the prompts; 2) Attention Consistency, where the trigger induces consistent structural responses in the cross-attention maps. These consistencies leave detectable traces for defenders, making backdoors easier to identify. In this paper, toward stealthy backdoor samples, we propose Trigger without Trace (TwT) by explicitly mitigating these consistencies. Specifically, our approach leverages syntactic structures as backdoor triggers to amplify the sensitivity to textual variations, effectively breaking down the semantic consistency. Besides, a regularization method based on Kernel Maximum Mean Discrepancy (KMMD) is proposed to align the distribution of cross-attention responses between backdoor and benign samples, thereby disrupting attention consistency. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves a 97.5% attack success rate while exhibiting stronger resistance to defenses. It achieves an average of over 98% backdoor samples bypassing three state-of-the-art detection mechanisms, revealing the vulnerabilities of current backdoor defense methods. The code is available at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/TwT.

The proliferation of large AI models trained on uncurated, often sensitive web-scraped data has raised significant privacy concerns. One of the concerns is that adversaries can extract information about the training data using privacy attacks. Unfortunately, the task of removing specific information from the models without sacrificing performance is not straightforward and has proven to be challenging. We propose a rather easy yet effective defense based on backdoor attacks to remove private information such as names of individuals from models, and focus in this work on text encoders. Specifically, through strategic insertion of backdoors, we align the embeddings of sensitive phrases with those of neutral terms-"a person" instead of the person's name. Our empirical results demonstrate the effectiveness of our backdoor-based defense on CLIP by assessing its performance using a specialized privacy attack for zero-shot classifiers. Our approach provides not only a new "dual-use" perspective on backdoor attacks, but also presents a promising avenue to enhance the privacy of individuals within models trained on uncurated web-scraped data.

Models leveraging both visual and textual data such as Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP), are the backbone of many recent advances in artificial intelligence. In this work, we show that despite their versatility, such models are vulnerable to what we refer to as fooling master images. Fooling master images are capable of maximizing the confidence score of a CLIP model for a significant number of widely varying prompts, while being either unrecognizable or unrelated to the attacked prompts for humans. The existence of such images is problematic as it could be used by bad actors to maliciously interfere with CLIP-trained image retrieval models in production with comparably small effort as a single image can attack many different prompts. We demonstrate how fooling master images for CLIP (CLIPMasterPrints) can be mined using stochastic gradient descent, projected gradient descent, or blackbox optimization. Contrary to many common adversarial attacks, the blackbox optimization approach allows us to mine CLIPMasterPrints even when the weights of the model are not accessible. We investigate the properties of the mined images, and find that images trained on a small number of image captions generalize to a much larger number of semantically related captions. We evaluate possible mitigation strategies, where we increase the robustness of the model and introduce an approach to automatically detect CLIPMasterPrints to sanitize the input of vulnerable models. Finally, we find that vulnerability to CLIPMasterPrints is related to a modality gap in contrastive pre-trained multi-modal networks. Code available at https://github.com/matfrei/CLIPMasterPrints.

Recent developments in representational learning for information retrieval can be organized in a conceptual framework that establishes two pairs of contrasts: sparse vs. dense representations and unsupervised vs. learned representations. Sparse learned representations can further be decomposed into expansion and term weighting components. This framework allows us to understand the relationship between recently proposed techniques such as DPR, ANCE, DeepCT, DeepImpact, and COIL, and furthermore, gaps revealed by our analysis point to "low hanging fruit" in terms of techniques that have yet to be explored. We present a novel technique dubbed "uniCOIL", a simple extension of COIL that achieves to our knowledge the current state-of-the-art in sparse retrieval on the popular MS MARCO passage ranking dataset. Our implementation using the Anserini IR toolkit is built on the Lucene search library and thus fully compatible with standard inverted indexes.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are rapidly becoming commodity components of larger software systems. This poses natural security and privacy problems: poisoned data retrieved from one component can change the model's behavior and compromise the entire system, including coercing the model to spread confidential data to untrusted components. One promising approach is to tackle this problem at the system level via dynamic information flow (aka taint) tracking. Unfortunately, the traditional approach of propagating the most restrictive input label to the output is too conservative for applications where LLMs operate on inputs retrieved from diverse sources. In this paper, we propose a novel, more permissive approach to propagate information flow labels through LLM queries. The key idea behind our approach is to propagate only the labels of the samples that were influential in generating the model output and to eliminate the labels of unnecessary input. We implement and investigate the effectiveness of two variations of this approach, based on (i) prompt-based retrieval augmentation, and (ii) a k-nearest-neighbors language model. We compare these with the baseline of an introspection-based influence estimator that directly asks the language model to predict the output label. The results obtained highlight the superiority of our prompt-based label propagator, which improves the label in more than 85% of the cases in an LLM agent setting. These findings underscore the practicality of permissive label propagation for retrieval augmentation.