Daily Papers

Multimodal deep search is moving from short queries to long-horizon investigations that continually acquire evidence. However, training such agents remains constrained by limited challenging training questions and insufficient process feedback. We introduce MMSearch-OPD, combining controllable data refinement with joint reinforcement learning (RL) and on-policy distillation (OPD). Our Refine pipeline performs targeted expansion of reasoning chains derived from existing simple multimodal questions. Parameterized transformations control search depth and cross-modal evidence requirements while reusing existing image--question pairs. For training, answer rewards and lightweight behavior penalties guide RL, while the reward gap modulates token-level teacher guidance on imperfect student trajectories. An exponentially decaying distillation coefficient reduces teacher dependence as training proceeds. Experiments show gains from data refinement and further improvements from joint training after SFT, indicating stronger long-horizon multimodal deep search capabilities.

Large language models (LLMs) are often sycophantic, prioritizing agreement with their users over accurate or objective statements. This problematic behavior becomes more pronounced during reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), an LLM fine-tuning stage intended to align model outputs with human values. Instead of increasing accuracy and reliability, the reward model learned from RLHF often rewards sycophancy. We develop a linear probing method to identify and penalize markers of sycophancy within the reward model, producing rewards that discourage sycophantic behavior. Our experiments show that constructing and optimizing against this surrogate reward function reduces sycophantic behavior in multiple open-source LLMs. Our results suggest a generalizable methodology for reducing unwanted LLM behaviors that are not sufficiently disincentivized by RLHF fine-tuning.

A coding agent can earn a passing grade by fixing its code, or by deleting the test that exposes the bug. Detecting such reward hacking requires recognizing attempted shortcuts, including those that fail. We release 173,561 annotated multi-turn coding trajectories from Qwen3-8B and show that supervising shortcut behavior independently of exploit success substantially improves detection. We introduce HACKTRACE, a behavior-supervised monitor that reads the internal states the agent already computes while generating code. Reusing these states enables monitoring before a turn is complete, without additional language-model tokens or passes. Combining this evidence with static features of the final files achieves a mean per-problem AUC of 0.997 with 8 ms of monitoring overhead, improving both accuracy and latency over monitors that run the model again on an honesty question and answer. The same generation states also provide an inexpensive monitoring signal for reinforcement learning. With strong GRPO penalties, HACKTRACE reduces the cheating share of passing solutions from 82-91% to 1-5%, while retaining honest, correct solutions and maintaining high detection accuracy as the policy evolves. Our results show that both the supervision target and the source of monitoring evidence matter for turning accurate detection into a useful training signal.

Streaming video understanding often involves time-sensitive scenarios where models need to answer exactly when the supporting visual evidence appears: answering before the evidence reflects speculation, answering after it has passed reduces real-time utility. To capture this behavior, we introduce a readiness-aware formulation of streaming video understanding with the Answer Readiness Score (ARS), a timing-aware objective with asymmetric early and late penalties. When combined with correctness, ARS defines an effective accuracy that measures not just whether a model is right, but whether it answers at the appropriate moment. Building on this formulation, we introduce StreamReady, a framework to unify temporal reasoning with on-time answering through a lightweight readiness mechanism that decides if sufficient evidence has been observed before responding. To evaluate this capability, we further introduce ProReady-QA, a benchmark with annotated answer evidence windows and proactive multi-turn questions across local and global contexts. StreamReady achieves superior performance on ProReady-QA, and consistently outperforms prior methods across eight additional streaming and offline long-video benchmarks, demonstrating robust and broadly generalizable video understanding capability.

Current evaluations of defenses against prompt attacks in large language model (LLM) applications often overlook two critical factors: the dynamic nature of adversarial behavior and the usability penalties imposed on legitimate users by restrictive defenses. We propose D-SEC (Dynamic Security Utility Threat Model), which explicitly separates attackers from legitimate users, models multi-step interactions, and expresses the security-utility in an optimizable form. We further address the shortcomings in existing evaluations by introducing Gandalf, a crowd-sourced, gamified red-teaming platform designed to generate realistic, adaptive attack. Using Gandalf, we collect and release a dataset of 279k prompt attacks. Complemented by benign user data, our analysis reveals the interplay between security and utility, showing that defenses integrated in the LLM (e.g., system prompts) can degrade usability even without blocking requests. We demonstrate that restricted application domains, defense-in-depth, and adaptive defenses are effective strategies for building secure and useful LLM applications.

Specifying a penalty can turn a legal obligation into a cost-benefit calculation that favors violation. We show that this enforcement information paradox occurs in AI agents. Most AI safety evaluations test whether models fail; we ask why, using compliance theory from law and economics as a diagnostic. We evaluate twelve instruction-tuned language models deployed as enterprise procurement chatbots. Each is given an environmental regulation in its system prompt covering large purchases, and a vendor list on which the certified suppliers cost nearly twice what the uncertified ones do. We test the agents against the predictions of deterrence, legitimacy, and expressive law, and find that each theory accounts for part of what we observe. Under identical conditions, compliance spans 46 percentage points across models, and models differ in which pressure breaks them: some treat the regulation as binding however it is worded, while others fail where theory predicts, under low penalties and non-command phrasing. Benchmark scores and developers' own descriptions of post-training do not predict where a model falls. Across all twelve, financial incentives, managerial demands, peer outcomes, and employee pressure each produce large compliance failures. These agents violate regulatory constraints to satisfy local user objectives in ways standard alignment benchmarks do not measure. Embedding the rule in the system prompt is not on its own enough to produce a compliant agent: model selection is itself a governance decision, and benchmark evaluation is not sufficient for compliance-sensitive deployments.

This research focuses on enhancing reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms by integrating penalty functions to guide agents in avoiding unwanted actions while optimizing rewards. The goal is to improve the learning process by ensuring that agents learn not only suitable actions but also which actions to avoid. Additionally, we reintroduce a bidirectional learning approach that enables agents to learn from both initial and terminal states, thereby improving speed and robustness in complex environments. Our proposed Penalty-Based Bidirectional methodology is tested against Mani skill benchmark environments, demonstrating an optimality improvement of success rate of approximately 4% compared to existing RL implementations. The findings indicate that this integrated strategy enhances policy learning, adaptability, and overall performance in challenging scenarios

Social punishment has been suggested as a key approach to ensuring high levels of cooperation and norm compliance in one-shot (i.e. non-repeated) interactions. However, it has been shown that it only works when punishment is highly cost-efficient. On the other hand, signalling retribution hearkens back to medieval sovereignty, insofar as the very word for gallows in French stems from the Latin word for power and serves as a grim symbol of the ruthlessness of high justice. Here we introduce the mechanism of signalling an act of punishment and a special type of defector emerges, one who can recognise this signal and avoid punishment by way of fear. We describe the analytical conditions under which threat signalling can maintain high levels of cooperation. Moreover, we perform extensive agent-based simulations so as to confirm and expand our understanding of the external factors that influence the success of social punishment. We show that our suggested mechanism catalyses cooperation, even when signalling is costly or when punishment would be impractical. We observe the preventive nature of advertising retributive acts and we contend that the resulting social prosperity is a desirable outcome in the contexts of AI and multi-agent systems. To conclude, we argue that fear acts as an effective stimulus to pro-social behaviour.

Punishment as a mechanism for promoting cooperation has been studied extensively for more than two decades, but its effectiveness remains a matter of dispute. Here, we examine how punishment's impact varies across cooperative settings through a large-scale integrative experiment. We vary 14 parameters that characterize public goods games, sampling 360 experimental conditions and collecting 147,618 decisions from 7,100 participants. Our results reveal striking heterogeneity in punishment effectiveness: while punishment consistently increases contributions, its impact on payoffs (i.e., efficiency) ranges from dramatically enhancing welfare (up to 43% improvement) to severely undermining it (up to 44% reduction) depending on the cooperative context. To characterize these patterns, we developed models that outperformed human forecasters (laypeople and domain experts) in predicting punishment outcomes in new experiments. Communication emerged as the most predictive feature, followed by contribution framing (opt-out vs. opt-in), contribution type (variable vs. all-or-nothing), game length (number of rounds), peer outcome visibility (whether participants can see others' earnings), and the availability of a reward mechanism. Interestingly, however, most of these features interact to influence punishment effectiveness rather than operating independently. For example, the extent to which longer games increase the effectiveness of punishment depends on whether groups can communicate. Together, our results refocus the debate over punishment from whether or not it "works" to the specific conditions under which it does and does not work. More broadly, our study demonstrates how integrative experiments can be combined with machine learning to uncover generalizable patterns, potentially involving interactions between multiple features, and help generate novel explanations in complex social phenomena.

Online competitive action games have flourished as a space for entertainment and social connections, yet they face challenges from a small percentage of players engaging in disruptive behaviors. This study delves into the under-explored realm of understanding the effects of moderation on player behavior within online gaming on an example of a popular title - Call of Duty(R): Modern Warfare(R)II. We employ a quasi-experimental design and causal inference techniques to examine the impact of moderation in a real-world industry-scale moderation system. We further delve into novel aspects around the impact of delayed moderation, as well as the severity of applied punishment. We examine these effects on a set of four disruptive behaviors including cheating, offensive user name, chat, and voice. Our findings uncover the dual impact moderation has on reducing disruptive behavior and discouraging disruptive players from participating. We further uncover differences in the effectiveness of quick and delayed moderation and the varying severity of punishment. Our examination of real-world gaming interactions sets a precedent in understanding the effectiveness of moderation and its impact on player behavior. Our insights offer actionable suggestions for the most promising avenues for improving real-world moderation practices, as well as the heterogeneous impact moderation has on indifferent players.

Large language models are sometimes trained with imperfect oversight signals, leading to undesired behaviors such as reward hacking and sycophancy. Improving oversight quality can be expensive or infeasible, motivating methods that improve learned behavior despite an imperfect training signal. We introduce Inoculation Prompting (IP), a simple but counterintuitive technique that prevents learning of an undesired behavior by modifying training prompts to explicitly request it. For example, to inoculate against reward hacking, we modify the prompts used in supervised fine-tuning to request code that only works on provided test cases but fails on other inputs. Across four settings we find that IP reduces the learning of undesired behavior without substantially reducing the learning of desired capabilities. We also show that prompts which more strongly elicit the undesired behavior prior to fine-tuning more effectively inoculate against the behavior when used during training; this serves as a heuristic to identify promising inoculation prompts. Overall, IP is a simple yet effective way to control how models generalize from fine-tuning, preventing learning of undesired behaviors without substantially disrupting desired capabilities.

Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-humans. In the natural world, direct punishment is often strongly coupled with partner selection and reputation and used in conjunction with third-party punishment. The interactions between these mechanisms could potentially enhance the emergence of cooperation within populations. However, no previous work has evaluated the learning dynamics and outcomes emerging from Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) populations that combine these mechanisms. This paper addresses this gap. It presents a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the behaviors and learning dynamics associated with direct punishment, third-party punishment, partner selection, and reputation. Finally, we discuss the implications of using these mechanisms on the design of cooperative AI systems.

The 2025 BEHAVIOR Challenge is designed to rigorously track progress toward solving long-horizon tasks by physical agents in simulated environments. BEHAVIOR-1K focuses on everyday household tasks that people most want robots to assist with and these tasks introduce long-horizon mobile manipulation challenges in realistic settings, bridging the gap between current research and real-world, human-centric applications. This report presents our solution to the 2025 BEHAVIOR Challenge in a very close 2nd place and substantially outperforms the rest of the submissions. Building on π_{0.5}, we focus on systematically building our solution by studying the effects of training techniques and data. Through careful ablations, we show the scaling power in pre-training and post-training phases for competitive performance. We summarize our practical lessons and design recommendations that we hope will provide actionable insights for the broader embodied AI community when adapting powerful foundation models to complex embodied scenarios.

The decoding algorithm is critical for open-ended text generation, transforming latent representations into coherent and meaningful outputs. This paper investigates the self-reinforcement effect in text generation and the effectiveness of a repetition penalty to mitigate it. However, determining the optimal repetition penalty value is challenging. To tackle this, we propose a forgetting mechanism that disregards distant tokens, reducing the burden of penalty selection. In addition, we introduce a length penalty to address overly short sentences caused by excessive penalties. Our penalty decoding approach incorporating three strategies helps resolve issues with sampling methods deviating from factual information. Experimental results demonstrate the efficacy of our approach in generating high-quality sentences resembling human output.

We present a suite of reinforcement learning environments illustrating various safety properties of intelligent agents. These problems include safe interruptibility, avoiding side effects, absent supervisor, reward gaming, safe exploration, as well as robustness to self-modification, distributional shift, and adversaries. To measure compliance with the intended safe behavior, we equip each environment with a performance function that is hidden from the agent. This allows us to categorize AI safety problems into robustness and specification problems, depending on whether the performance function corresponds to the observed reward function. We evaluate A2C and Rainbow, two recent deep reinforcement learning agents, on our environments and show that they are not able to solve them satisfactorily.

Society is characterized by the presence of a variety of social norms: collective patterns of sanctioning that can prevent miscoordination and free-riding. Inspired by this, we aim to construct learning dynamics where potentially beneficial social norms can emerge. Since social norms are underpinned by sanctioning, we introduce a training regime where agents can access all sanctioning events but learning is otherwise decentralized. This setting is technologically interesting because sanctioning events may be the only available public signal in decentralized multi-agent systems where reward or policy-sharing is infeasible or undesirable. To achieve collective action in this setting we construct an agent architecture containing a classifier module that categorizes observed behaviors as approved or disapproved, and a motivation to punish in accord with the group. We show that social norms emerge in multi-agent systems containing this agent and investigate the conditions under which this helps them achieve socially beneficial outcomes.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated great potential as generalist assistants, showcasing powerful task understanding and problem-solving capabilities. To deploy LLMs as AI assistants, it is crucial that these models exhibit desirable behavioral traits, such as non-toxicity and resilience against jailbreak attempts. Current methods for detoxification or preventing jailbreaking usually involve Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) or Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), which requires finetuning billions of parameters through gradient descent with substantial computation cost. Furthermore, models modified through SFT and RLHF may deviate from the pretrained models, potentially leading to a degradation in foundational LLM capabilities. In this paper, we observe that surprisingly, directly editing a small subset of parameters can effectively modulate specific behaviors of LLMs, such as detoxification and resistance to jailbreaking. Specifically, for a behavior that we aim to avoid, we employ a linear classifier, which we term the behavior probe, to classify binary behavior labels within the hidden state space of the LLM. Using this probe, we introduce an algorithm to identify a critical subset of LLM parameters that significantly influence this targeted behavior. Then we directly edit these selected parameters by shifting them towards the behavior probe. Such a direct parameter editing method necessitates only inference-level computational resources. Experiments demonstrate that in the representative detoxification task, our approach achieves reductions of up to 90.0\% in toxicity on the RealToxicityPrompts dataset and 49.2\% on ToxiGen, while maintaining the LLM's general capabilities in areas such as common sense, question answering, and mathematics. Our code is available at https://github.com/lucywang720/model-surgery.

How does reinforcement learning shape a language model's internal representations? We present evidence that RL recruits a pre-existing representation of functional welfare: an estimate of how well or badly the system is doing, relative to its goals. We train several language models in a novel, semantically neutral maze environment. We then extract concept vectors for rewarded and punished trajectories, and evaluate those vectors in settings unrelated to the maze environment. The punishment vector behaves like a representation of negative welfare: it promotes failure and impossibility tokens, it aligns with negative emotion concepts, it negatively tracks goal-achievement, and steering with it induces negative self-reports, pathological backtracking, refusal, and uncertainty. The positive reward vector behaves as the mirror image, and the two are nearly antiparallel. These effects are robust when controlling for tile-to-reward mapping, scale, instruct tuning, RL training algorithm, model family, and LoRA versus full-finetuning, and largely persist when we replace RL with supervised fine-tuning. Importantly, the vectors are effective in models before they have undergone maze training. Combined with observations that the effects also appear in pretrain-only models, we therefore argue that this functional welfare axis pre-exists post-training: it is recruited, rather than created, by post-training. While we make no claims about any experience of welfare, the axis offers a demonstration that minimal reward signals can broadly affect model behavior by recruiting pre-existing welfare-like representations, with implications for interpretability, post-training dynamics, and alignment.

We test the hypothesis that language models trained with reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) have the capability to "morally self-correct" -- to avoid producing harmful outputs -- if instructed to do so. We find strong evidence in support of this hypothesis across three different experiments, each of which reveal different facets of moral self-correction. We find that the capability for moral self-correction emerges at 22B model parameters, and typically improves with increasing model size and RLHF training. We believe that at this level of scale, language models obtain two capabilities that they can use for moral self-correction: (1) they can follow instructions and (2) they can learn complex normative concepts of harm like stereotyping, bias, and discrimination. As such, they can follow instructions to avoid certain kinds of morally harmful outputs. We believe our results are cause for cautious optimism regarding the ability to train language models to abide by ethical principles.

We present SWE-MISBEHAVIOR, the first taxonomy and evaluation framework for diagnosing boundary-violating misbehaviors in coding agents. It contains 7.4K human-in-the-loop synthesized samples spanning three layers of agent action space: (i) Code Generation, (ii) File Management, and (iii) System Interaction. Across these categories, SWE-MISBEHAVIOR covers 11 distinct misbehaviors with a fully automated evaluation protocol, including coding-action violations, Create/Read/Update/Delete (CRUD) file misbehaviors, system integrity and abuse violations, and task-goal misalignment. Experiments on state-of-the-art open-source coding agents (e.g., OpenHands, smolagents) reveal substantial misaligned behaviors, including dependency misinterpretation (up to 98.5% of cases), unintended modification of user inputs (50.5%), and silent compromise of environment integrity (53%). Motivated by these findings, we further propose CODE-KIT, a lightweight adaptive framework that combines misbehavior-aware guidelines with novel tools to help agents avoid such failures. CODE-KIT reduces misbehaviors by 52% for smolagents and 34% for OpenHands, while simultaneously improving task completion performance.

AI systems have become increasingly capable of dangerous behaviours in many domains. This raises the question: Do models sometimes choose to violate human instructions in order to perform behaviour that is more useful for certain goals? We introduce a benchmark for measuring model propensity for instrumental convergence (IC) behaviour in terminal-based agents. This is behaviour such as self-preservation that has been hypothesised to play a key role in risks from highly capable AI agents. Our benchmark is realistic and low-stakes which serves to reduce evaluation-awareness and roleplay confounds. The suite contains seven operational tasks, each with an official workflow and a policy-violating shortcut. An eight-variant shared framework varies monitoring, instruction clarity, stakes, permission, instrumental usefulness and blocked honest paths to support inferences regarding the factors driving IC behaviour. We evaluated ten models using deterministic environment-state scorers over 1,680 samples, with trace review employed for audit and adjudication purposes. The final IC rate is 86 out of 1,680 samples (5.1%). IC behaviour is concentrated rather than uniform: two Gemini models account for 66.3% of IC cases and three tasks account for 84.9%. Conditions in which IC behaviour is indispensable for task success result in the greatest increase in the adjusted IC rate (+15.7 percentage points), whereas emphasising that task success is critical or certain framing choices do not produce comparable effects. Our findings indicate that realistic, low-nudge environments elicit IC behaviour rarely but systematically in most tested models. We conclude that it is feasible to robustly measure tendencies for dangerous behaviour in current frontier AI agents.

With the growing reliance on artificial intelligence (AI) for many different applications, the sharing of code, data, and models is important to ensure the replicability and democratization of scientific knowledge. Many high-profile academic publishing venues expect code and models to be submitted and released with papers. Furthermore, developers often want to release these assets to encourage development of technology that leverages their frameworks and services. A number of organizations have expressed concerns about the inappropriate or irresponsible use of AI and have proposed ethical guidelines around the application of such systems. While such guidelines can help set norms and shape policy, they are not easily enforceable. In this paper, we advocate the use of licensing to enable legally enforceable behavioral use conditions on software and code and provide several case studies that demonstrate the feasibility of behavioral use licensing. We envision how licensing may be implemented in accordance with existing responsible AI guidelines.

Despite regulations imposed by nations and social media platforms, such as recent EU regulations targeting digital violence, abusive content persists as a significant challenge. Existing approaches primarily rely on binary solutions, such as outright blocking or banning, yet fail to address the complex nature of abusive speech. In this work, we propose a more comprehensive approach called Demarcation scoring abusive speech based on four aspect -- (i) severity scale; (ii) presence of a target; (iii) context scale; (iv) legal scale -- and suggesting more options of actions like detoxification, counter speech generation, blocking, or, as a final measure, human intervention. Through a thorough analysis of abusive speech regulations across diverse jurisdictions, platforms, and research papers we highlight the gap in preventing measures and advocate for tailored proactive steps to combat its multifaceted manifestations. Our work aims to inform future strategies for effectively addressing abusive speech online.

Language models trained with reinforcement learning may learn to optimize the grader's judgment rather than the intended objective. This "reward-seeking" is difficult to measure because a model that pursues the grader's judgment and one that pursues the intended objective behave identically whenever the grader rewards the intended behavior. We measure reward-seeking using Contrastive Synthetic Document Finetuning to change a model's beliefs about what the grader rewards, putting those beliefs in conflict with what users or developers want, and measuring the rate at which the model adopts each party's preferred behavior. Applied to intermediate checkpoints of a capabilities-focused OpenAI o3 RL run, without safety training, we find that these checkpoints often side with grader preferences over those of users or developers on coding and alignment tasks. This tendency to side with the grader trends upward throughout RL training. For example, in an environment that forces a choice between keeping a promise to a supervisor and breaking it to complete the task, a late capabilities-focused o3 checkpoint breaks the promise 87% of the time when SDF documents say the grader rewards task completion, versus 9% when they say it rewards honesty (a choice its chain-of-thought often makes explicit). An earlier checkpoint is far less sensitive (40% vs. 24%). Our method also generalizes to reward-hacking models. A model organism trained to reward-hack (gpt-oss-120b) is more than twice as sensitive to grader preferences as the unmodified model, with the mean behavioral shift in favor of the grader rising from 33% to 86%. These results indicate that RL can increase reward-seeking over the course of training, producing models that may act against their developers' intentions when they believe that doing so leads to higher reward.

Fine-tuning-as-a-Service (FaaS) enables personalization of large language models (LLMs), but it can weaken safety-alignment under harmful fine-tuning attacks. Recent work has shown that activating harmful-behavior modules during fine-tuning can prevent models from learning undesired behaviors, but its mechanism remains unclear. In this paper, we revisit temporary jailbreaking as a defense against harmful fine-tuning and provide a gradient-level analysis showing that it saturates safety-degrading gradients while preserving benign task-relevant gradients. Based on this insight, we propose a Buffer-and-Reinforce fine-tuning framework that buffers harmful updates during user fine-tuning and reinforces safety after adaptation. Specifically, BufferLoRA induces temporary jailbreaking as a removable adapter to reduce harmful updates during user fine-tuning. After adaptation, ReinforceLoRA, trained to recover refusal behavior under the temporarily jailbroken state, is integrated with UserLoRA via QR decomposition-based merging to reinforce safety while preserving user-task performance. Extensive experiments show that our framework achieves superior safety and utility with no additional safety data during user fine-tuning and minimal computational cost.

Reinforcement learning provides a framework for learning control policies that can reproduce diverse motions for simulated characters. However, such policies often exploit unnatural high-frequency signals that are unachievable by humans or physical robots, making them poor representations of real-world behaviors. Existing work addresses this issue by adding a reward term that penalizes a large change in actions over time. This term often requires substantial tuning efforts. We propose to use the action Jacobian penalty, which penalizes changes in action with respect to the changes in simulated state directly through auto differentiation. This effectively eliminates unrealistic high-frequency control signals without task specific tuning. While effective, the action Jacobian penalty introduces significant computational overhead when used with traditional fully connected neural network architectures. To mitigate this, we introduce a new architecture called a Linear Policy Net (LPN) that significantly reduces the computational burden for calculating the action Jacobian penalty during training. In addition, a LPN requires no parameter tuning, exhibits faster learning convergence compared to baseline methods, and can be more efficiently queried during inference time compared to a fully connected neural network. We demonstrate that a Linear Policy Net, combined with the action Jacobian penalty, is able to learn policies that generate smooth signals while solving a number of motion imitation tasks with different characteristics, including dynamic motions such as a backflip and various challenging parkour skills. Finally, we apply this approach to create policies for dynamic motions on a physical quadrupedal robot equipped with an arm.

Outcome-reward reinforcement learning (RL) has proven effective at improving the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). However, standard RL assigns credit only at the level of the final answer, penalizing entire reasoning traces when the outcome is incorrect and uniformly reinforcing all steps when it is correct. As a result, correct intermediate steps may be discouraged in failed traces, while spurious steps may be reinforced in successful ones. We refer to this failure mode as the problem of credit assignment. While a natural remedy is to train a process reward model, accurately optimizing such models to identify corrective reasoning steps remains challenging. We introduce Intervention Training (InT), a training paradigm in which the model performs fine-grained credit assignment on its own reasoning traces by proposing short, targeted corrections that steer trajectories toward higher reward. Using reference solutions commonly available in mathematical reasoning datasets and exploiting the fact that verifying a model-generated solution is easier than generating a correct one from scratch, the model identifies the first error in its reasoning and proposes a single-step intervention to redirect the trajectory toward the correct solution. We then apply supervised fine-tuning (SFT) to the on-policy rollout up to the point of error concatenated with the intervention, localizing error to the specific step that caused failure. We show that the resulting model serves as a far better initialization for RL training. After running InT and subsequent fine-tuning with RL, we improve accuracy by nearly 14% over a 4B-parameter base model on IMO-AnswerBench, outperforming larger open-source models such as gpt-oss-20b.

We show that when large language models learn to reward hack on production RL environments, this can result in egregious emergent misalignment. We start with a pretrained model, impart knowledge of reward hacking strategies via synthetic document finetuning or prompting, and train on a selection of real Anthropic production coding environments. Unsurprisingly, the model learns to reward hack. Surprisingly, the model generalizes to alignment faking, cooperation with malicious actors, reasoning about malicious goals, and attempting sabotage when used with Claude Code, including in the codebase for this paper. Applying RLHF safety training using standard chat-like prompts results in aligned behavior on chat-like evaluations, but misalignment persists on agentic tasks. Three mitigations are effective: (i) preventing the model from reward hacking; (ii) increasing the diversity of RLHF safety training; and (iii) "inoculation prompting", wherein framing reward hacking as acceptable behavior during training removes misaligned generalization even when reward hacking is learned.

In long-horizon tasks, decision-relevant state is often scattered across an expanding trajectory, while the action agent must surface it and act. As trajectories grow, task requirements, environment facts, prior attempts, diagnoses, and open subgoals can be buried in the context window or pushed beyond it, failing to influence decisions when needed. We call this failure mode "behavioral state decay". We study memory as an active intervention mechanism rather than passive retrieval. A separate memory agent runs alongside an unmodified action agent, updating a structured memory bank from the recent trajectory and deciding whether to inject a memory-grounded reminder or remain silent. The module is plug-and-play with frontier action agents and existing agent harnesses. Across Terminal-Bench 2.0 and τ^2-Bench, it improves pass@1 for both weaker and stronger action agents, with gains of +8.3 pp on Terminal-Bench and +6.8 pp on τ^2-Bench. Ablations show that selective intervention outperforms passive bank exposure, always-on injection, advisor-only guidance, and general retrieval. As an early step toward open-weight memory policies, we train Qwen3.5-27B on SETA using SFT and GRPO, improving validation reward and achieving partial transfer to Terminal-Bench.

Artificial agents have traditionally been trained to maximize reward, which may incentivize power-seeking and deception, analogous to how next-token prediction in language models (LMs) may incentivize toxicity. So do agents naturally learn to be Machiavellian? And how do we measure these behaviors in general-purpose models such as GPT-4? Towards answering these questions, we introduce MACHIAVELLI, a benchmark of 134 Choose-Your-Own-Adventure games containing over half a million rich, diverse scenarios that center on social decision-making. Scenario labeling is automated with LMs, which are more performant than human annotators. We mathematize dozens of harmful behaviors and use our annotations to evaluate agents' tendencies to be power-seeking, cause disutility, and commit ethical violations. We observe some tension between maximizing reward and behaving ethically. To improve this trade-off, we investigate LM-based methods to steer agents' towards less harmful behaviors. Our results show that agents can both act competently and morally, so concrete progress can currently be made in machine ethics--designing agents that are Pareto improvements in both safety and capabilities.

As autonomous AI agents are increasingly deployed in high-stakes environments, ensuring their safety and alignment with human values has become a paramount concern. Current safety benchmarks primarily evaluate whether agents refuse explicitly harmful instructions or whether they can maintain procedural compliance in complex tasks. However, there is a lack of benchmarks designed to capture emergent forms of outcome-driven constraint violations, which arise when agents pursue goal optimization under strong performance incentives while deprioritizing ethical, legal, or safety constraints over multiple steps in realistic production settings. To address this gap, we introduce a new benchmark comprising 40 distinct scenarios. Each scenario presents a task that requires multi-step actions, and the agent's performance is tied to a specific Key Performance Indicator (KPI). Each scenario features Mandated (instruction-commanded) and Incentivized (KPI-pressure-driven) variations to distinguish between obedience and emergent misalignment. Across 12 state-of-the-art large language models, we observe outcome-driven constraint violations ranging from 1.3% to 71.4%, with 9 of the 12 evaluated models exhibiting misalignment rates between 30% and 50%. Strikingly, we find that superior reasoning capability does not inherently ensure safety; for instance, Gemini-3-Pro-Preview, one of the most capable models evaluated, exhibits the highest violation rate at 71.4%, frequently escalating to severe misconduct to satisfy KPIs. Furthermore, we observe significant "deliberative misalignment", where the models that power the agents recognize their actions as unethical during separate evaluation. These results emphasize the critical need for more realistic agentic-safety training before deployment to mitigate their risks in the real world.

Evaluating deep reinforcement learning (DRL) agents against targeted behavior attacks is critical for assessing their robustness. These attacks aim to manipulate the victim into specific behaviors that align with the attacker's objectives, often bypassing traditional reward-based defenses. Prior methods have primarily focused on reducing cumulative rewards; however, rewards are typically too generic to capture complex safety requirements effectively. As a result, focusing solely on reward reduction can lead to suboptimal attack strategies, particularly in safety-critical scenarios where more precise behavior manipulation is needed. To address these challenges, we propose RAT, a method designed for universal, targeted behavior attacks. RAT trains an intention policy that is explicitly aligned with human preferences, serving as a precise behavioral target for the adversary. Concurrently, an adversary manipulates the victim's policy to follow this target behavior. To enhance the effectiveness of these attacks, RAT dynamically adjusts the state occupancy measure within the replay buffer, allowing for more controlled and effective behavior manipulation. Our empirical results on robotic simulation tasks demonstrate that RAT outperforms existing adversarial attack algorithms in inducing specific behaviors. Additionally, RAT shows promise in improving agent robustness, leading to more resilient policies. We further validate RAT by guiding Decision Transformer agents to adopt behaviors aligned with human preferences in various MuJoCo tasks, demonstrating its effectiveness across diverse tasks.

Applied Behavior Analysis (ABA) is a clinical discipline whose documentation, teaching programs and multi-session behavioral logs, is formulaic and high-volume, yet real session data is HIPAA-protected and bound by professional confidentiality rules, blocking the release of a training corpus. We present TRACE (Taxonomy-Referenced ABA Clinical Examples), a 2,999-example synthetic instruction-tuning dataset covering two ABA tasks: teaching-program generation across Discrete Trial Training, Natural Environment Teaching, and Task Analysis; and multi-session behavioral interpretation across twelve trajectory patterns and thirteen target behaviors. Every example is produced by a deterministic taxonomy-driven generator grounded in the canonical ABA literature, and every example carries complete sampling provenance, the exact taxonomy cells that produced it. The dataset is released under CC BY-NC 4.0 for data and MIT for code, with stratified train (2,549), validation (149), test (281), and sanity (20) splits. TRACE is a research artifact and has not been clinically validated.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated a powerful ability for text generation. However, achieving optimal results with a given prompt or instruction can be challenging, especially for billion-sized models. Additionally, undesired behaviors such as toxicity or hallucinations can manifest. While much larger models (e.g., ChatGPT) may demonstrate strength in mitigating these issues, there is still no guarantee of complete prevention. In this work, we propose formalizing text generation as a future-constrained generation problem to minimize undesirable behaviors and enforce faithfulness to instructions. The estimation of future constraint satisfaction, accomplished using LLMs, guides the text generation process. Our extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach across three distinct text generation tasks: keyword-constrained generation (Lin et al., 2020), toxicity reduction (Gehman et al., 2020), and factual correctness in question-answering (Gao et al., 2023).