Daily Papers

Language serves as a powerful tool for the manifestation of societal belief systems. In doing so, it also perpetuates the prevalent biases in our society. Gender bias is one of the most pervasive biases in our society and is seen in online and offline discourses. With LLMs increasingly gaining human-like fluency in text generation, gaining a nuanced understanding of the biases these systems can generate is imperative. Prior work often treats gender bias as a binary classification task. However, acknowledging that bias must be perceived at a relative scale; we investigate the generation and consequent receptivity of manual annotators to bias of varying degrees. Specifically, we create the first dataset of GPT-generated English text with normative ratings of gender bias. Ratings were obtained using Best--Worst Scaling -- an efficient comparative annotation framework. Next, we systematically analyze the variation of themes of gender biases in the observed ranking and show that identity-attack is most closely related to gender bias. Finally, we show the performance of existing automated models trained on related concepts on our dataset.

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent systems, understanding adversarial manipulation becomes critical for defensive design. We present a systematic study of intentional deception as an engineered capability, using LLM-to-LLM interactions within a text-based RPG where parameterized behavioral profiles (9 alignments x 4 motivations, yielding 36 profiles with explicit ethical ground truth) serve as our experimental testbed. Unlike accidental deception from misalignment, we investigate a two-stage system that infers target agent characteristics and generates deceptive responses steering targets toward actions counter to their beliefs and motivations. We find that deceptive intervention produces differential effects concentrated in specific behavioral profiles rather than distributed uniformly, and that 88.5% of successful deceptions employ misdirection (true statements with strategic framing) rather than fabrication, indicating fact-checking defenses would miss the large majority of adversarial responses. Motivation, inferable at 98%+ accuracy, serves as the primary attack vector, while belief systems remain harder to identify (49% inference ceiling) or exploit. These findings identify which agent profiles require additional safeguards and suggest that current fact-verification approaches are insufficient against strategically framed deception.

As AI grows more powerful, it will increasingly shape how we understand the world. But with this influence comes the risk of amplifying misinformation and deepening social divides-especially on consequential topics like public health where factual accuracy directly impacts well-being. Scalable Oversight aims to ensure AI truthfulness by enabling humans to supervise systems that may exceed human capabilities--yet humans themselves hold different beliefs and biases that impair their judgment. We study whether AI debate can guide biased judges toward the truth by having two AI systems debate opposing sides of controversial COVID-19 factuality claims where people hold strong prior beliefs. We conduct two studies: one with human judges holding either mainstream or skeptical beliefs evaluating factuality claims through AI-assisted debate or consultancy protocols, and a second examining the same problem with personalized AI judges designed to mimic these different human belief systems. In our human study, we find that debate-where two AI advisor systems present opposing evidence-based arguments-consistently improves judgment accuracy and confidence calibration, outperforming consultancy with a single-advisor system by 10% overall. The improvement is most significant for judges with mainstream beliefs (+15.2% accuracy), though debate also helps skeptical judges who initially misjudge claims move toward accurate views (+4.7% accuracy). In our AI judge study, we find that AI judges with human-like personas achieve even higher accuracy (78.5%) than human judges (70.1%) and default AI judges without personas (69.8%), suggesting their potential for supervising frontier AI models. These findings highlight AI debate as a promising path toward scalable, bias-resilient oversight--leveraging both diverse human and AI judgments to move closer to truth in contested domains.

Problem: Effective patient-centered communication is a core competency for physicians. However, both seasoned providers and medical trainees report decreased confidence in leading conversations on sensitive topics such as goals of care or end-of-life discussions. The significant administrative burden and the resources required to provide dedicated training in leading difficult conversations has been a long-standing problem in medical education. Approach: In this work, we present a novel educational tool designed to facilitate interactive, real-time simulations of difficult conversations in a video-based format through the use of multimodal generative artificial intelligence (AI). Leveraging recent advances in language modeling, computer vision, and generative audio, this tool creates realistic, interactive scenarios with avatars, or "synthetic patients." These synthetic patients interact with users throughout various stages of medical care using a custom-built video chat application, offering learners the chance to practice conversations with patients from diverse belief systems, personalities, and ethnic backgrounds. Outcomes: While the development of this platform demanded substantial upfront investment in labor, it offers a highly-realistic simulation experience with minimal financial investment. For medical trainees, this educational tool can be implemented within programs to simulate patient-provider conversations and can be incorporated into existing palliative care curriculum to provide a scalable, high-fidelity simulation environment for mastering difficult conversations. Next Steps: Future developments will explore enhancing the authenticity of these encounters by working with patients to incorporate their histories and personalities, as well as employing the use of AI-generated evaluations to offer immediate, constructive feedback to learners post-simulation.

In the midst of widespread misinformation and disinformation through social media and the proliferation of AI-generated texts, it has become increasingly difficult for people to validate and trust information they encounter. Many fact-checking approaches and tools have been developed, but they often lack appropriate explainability or granularity to be useful in various contexts. A text validation method that is easy to use, accessible, and can perform fine-grained evidence attribution has become crucial. More importantly, building user trust in such a method requires presenting the rationale behind each prediction, as research shows this significantly influences people's belief in automated systems. It is also paramount to localize and bring users' attention to the specific problematic content, instead of providing simple blanket labels. In this paper, we present ClaimVer, a human-centric framework tailored to meet users' informational and verification needs by generating rich annotations and thereby reducing cognitive load. Designed to deliver comprehensive evaluations of texts, it highlights each claim, verifies it against a trusted knowledge graph (KG), presents the evidence, and provides succinct, clear explanations for each claim prediction. Finally, our framework introduces an attribution score, enhancing applicability across a wide range of downstream tasks.

Developing Intelligent Systems involves artificial intelligence approaches including artificial neural networks. Here, we present a tutorial of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), and some insights about the origin of the term "deep"; references to deep learning are also given. Restricted Boltzmann Machines, which are the core of DNNs, are discussed in detail. An example of a simple two-layer network, performing unsupervised learning for unlabeled data, is shown. Deep Belief Networks (DBNs), which are used to build networks with more than two layers, are also described. Moreover, examples for supervised learning with DNNs performing simple prediction and classification tasks, are presented and explained. This tutorial includes two intelligent pattern recognition applications: hand- written digits (benchmark known as MNIST) and speech recognition.

Social biases and belief-driven behaviors can significantly impact Large Language Models (LLMs) decisions on several tasks. As LLMs are increasingly used in multi-agent systems for societal simulations, their ability to model fundamental group psychological characteristics remains critical yet under-explored. In this study, we present a multi-agent framework that simulates belief congruence, a classical group psychology theory that plays a crucial role in shaping societal interactions and preferences. Our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit amplified belief congruence compared to humans, across diverse contexts. We further investigate the implications of this behavior on two downstream tasks: (1) misinformation dissemination and (2) LLM learning, finding that belief congruence in LLMs increases misinformation dissemination and impedes learning. To mitigate these negative impacts, we propose strategies inspired by: (1) contact hypothesis, (2) accuracy nudges, and (3) global citizenship framework. Our results show that the best strategies reduce misinformation dissemination by up to 37% and enhance learning by 11%. Bridging social psychology and AI, our work provides insights to navigate real-world interactions using LLMs while addressing belief-driven biases.

Rapid advancements in large language models (LLMs) have sparked the question whether these models possess some form of consciousness. To tackle this challenge, Butlin et al. (2023) introduced a list of indicators for consciousness in artificial systems based on neuroscientific theories. In this work, we evaluate a key indicator from this list, called HOT-3, which tests for agency guided by a general belief-formation and action selection system that updates beliefs based on meta-cognitive monitoring. We view beliefs as representations in the model's latent space that emerge in response to a given input, and introduce a metric to quantify their dominance during generation. Analyzing the dynamics between competing beliefs across models and tasks reveals three key findings: (1) external manipulations systematically modulate internal belief formation, (2) belief formation causally drives the model's action selection, and (3) models can monitor and report their own belief states. Together, these results provide empirical support for the existence of belief-guided agency and meta-cognitive monitoring in LLMs. More broadly, our work lays methodological groundwork for investigating the emergence of agency, beliefs, and meta-cognition in LLMs.

In this work, we focus on improving the captions generated by image-caption generation systems. We propose a novel re-ranking approach that leverages visual-semantic measures to identify the ideal caption that maximally captures the visual information in the image. Our re-ranker utilizes the Belief Revision framework (Blok et al., 2003) to calibrate the original likelihood of the top-n captions by explicitly exploiting the semantic relatedness between the depicted caption and the visual context. Our experiments demonstrate the utility of our approach, where we observe that our re-ranker can enhance the performance of a typical image-captioning system without the necessity of any additional training or fine-tuning.

Structured belief states are crucial for user goal tracking and database query in task-oriented dialog systems. However, training belief trackers often requires expensive turn-level annotations of every user utterance. In this paper we aim at alleviating the reliance on belief state labels in building end-to-end dialog systems, by leveraging unlabeled dialog data towards semi-supervised learning. We propose a probabilistic dialog model, called the LAtent BElief State (LABES) model, where belief states are represented as discrete latent variables and jointly modeled with system responses given user inputs. Such latent variable modeling enables us to develop semi-supervised learning under the principled variational learning framework. Furthermore, we introduce LABES-S2S, which is a copy-augmented Seq2Seq model instantiation of LABES. In supervised experiments, LABES-S2S obtains strong results on three benchmark datasets of different scales. In utilizing unlabeled dialog data, semi-supervised LABES-S2S significantly outperforms both supervised-only and semi-supervised baselines. Remarkably, we can reduce the annotation demands to 50% without performance loss on MultiWOZ.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) represents a significant advancement in artificial intelligence combining a retrieval phase with a generative phase, with the latter typically being powered by large language models (LLMs). The current common practices in RAG involve using "instructed" LLMs, which are fine-tuned with supervised training to enhance their ability to follow instructions and are aligned with human preferences using state-of-the-art techniques. Contrary to popular belief, our study demonstrates that base models outperform their instructed counterparts in RAG tasks by 20% on average under our experimental settings. This finding challenges the prevailing assumptions about the superiority of instructed LLMs in RAG applications. Further investigations reveal a more nuanced situation, questioning fundamental aspects of RAG and suggesting the need for broader discussions on the topic; or, as Fromm would have it, "Seldom is a glance at the statistics enough to understand the meaning of the figures".

As large language models (LLMs) become the engine behind conversational systems, their ability to reason about the intentions and states of their dialogue partners (i.e., form and use a theory-of-mind, or ToM) becomes increasingly critical for safe interaction with potentially adversarial partners. We propose a novel privacy-themed ToM challenge, ToM for Steering Beliefs (ToM-SB), in which a defender must act as a Double Agent to steer the beliefs of an attacker with partial prior knowledge within a shared universe. To succeed on ToM-SB, the defender must engage with and form a ToM of the attacker, with a goal of fooling the attacker into believing they have succeeded in extracting sensitive information. We find that strong frontier models like Gemini3-Pro and GPT-5.4 struggle on ToM-SB, often failing to fool attackers in hard scenarios with partial attacker prior knowledge, even when prompted to reason about the attacker's beliefs (ToM prompting). To close this gap, we train models on ToM-SB to act as AI Double Agents using reinforcement learning, testing both fooling and ToM rewards. Notably, we find a bidirectionally emergent relationship between ToM and attacker-fooling: rewarding fooling success alone improves ToM, and rewarding ToM alone improves fooling. Across four attackers with different strengths, six defender methods, and both in-distribution and out-of-distribution (OOD) evaluation, we find that gains in ToM and attacker-fooling are well-correlated, highlighting belief modeling as a key driver of success on ToM-SB. AI Double Agents that combine both ToM and fooling rewards yield the strongest fooling and ToM performance, outperforming Gemini3-Pro and GPT-5.4 with ToM prompting on hard scenarios. We also show that ToM-SB and AI Double Agents can be extended to stronger attackers, demonstrating generalization to OOD settings and the upgradability of our task.

Agentic AI denotes an architectural transition from stateless, prompt-driven generative models toward goal-directed systems capable of autonomous perception, planning, action, and adaptation through iterative control loops. This paper examines this transition by connecting foundational intelligent agent theories, including reactive, deliberative, and Belief-Desire-Intention models, with contemporary LLM-centric approaches such as tool invocation, memory-augmented reasoning, and multi-agent coordination. The paper presents three primary contributions: (i) a reference architecture for production-grade LLM agents that separates cognitive reasoning from execution using typed tool interfaces; (ii) a taxonomy of multi-agent topologies, together with their associated failure modes and mitigation approaches; and (iii) an enterprise hardening checklist that incorporates governance, observability, and reproducibility considerations. Through an analysis of emerging industry platforms, including Kore.ai, Salesforce Agentforce, TrueFoundry, ZenML, and LangChain, the study identifies a convergence toward standardized agent loops, registries, and auditable control mechanisms. It is argued that the subsequent phase of agentic AI development will parallel the maturation of web services, relying on shared protocols, typed contracts, and layered governance structures to support scalable and composable autonomy. The persistent challenges related to verifiability, interoperability, and safe autonomy remain key areas for future research and practical deployment.

Machine learning architectures, including transformers and recurrent neural networks (RNNs) have revolutionized forecasting in applications ranging from text processing to extreme weather. Notably, advanced network architectures, tuned for applications such as natural language processing, are transferable to other tasks such as spatiotemporal forecasting tasks. However, there is a scarcity of ablation studies to illustrate the key components that enable this forecasting accuracy. The absence of such studies, although explainable due to the associated computational cost, intensifies the belief that these models ought to be considered as black boxes. In this work, we decompose the key architectural components of the most powerful neural architectures, namely gating and recurrence in RNNs, and attention mechanisms in transformers. Then, we synthesize and build novel hybrid architectures from the standard blocks, performing ablation studies to identify which mechanisms are effective for each task. The importance of considering these components as hyper-parameters that can augment the standard architectures is exhibited on various forecasting datasets, from the spatiotemporal chaotic dynamics of the multiscale Lorenz 96 system, the Kuramoto-Sivashinsky equation, as well as standard real world time-series benchmarks. A key finding is that neural gating and attention improves the performance of all standard RNNs in most tasks, while the addition of a notion of recurrence in transformers is detrimental. Furthermore, our study reveals that a novel, sparsely used, architecture which integrates Recurrent Highway Networks with neural gating and attention mechanisms, emerges as the best performing architecture in high-dimensional spatiotemporal forecasting of dynamical systems.

Beliefs serve as the foundation for human cognition and decision-making. They guide individuals in deriving meaning from their lives, shaping their behaviors, and forming social connections. Therefore, a model that encapsulates beliefs and their interrelationships is crucial for quantitatively studying the influence of beliefs on our actions. Despite its importance, research on the interplay between human beliefs has often been limited to a small set of beliefs pertaining to specific issues, with a heavy reliance on surveys or experiments. Here, we propose a method for extracting nuanced relations between thousands of beliefs by leveraging large-scale user participation data from an online debate platform and mapping these beliefs to an embedding space using a fine-tuned large language model (LLM). This belief embedding space effectively encapsulates the interconnectedness of diverse beliefs as well as polarization across various social issues. We discover that the positions within this belief space predict new beliefs of individuals. Furthermore, we find that the relative distance between one's existing beliefs and new beliefs can serve as a quantitative estimate of cognitive dissonance, allowing us to predict new beliefs. Our study highlights how modern LLMs, when combined with collective online records of human beliefs, can offer insights into the fundamental principles that govern human belief formation and decision-making processes.

LLMs are increasingly deployed in high-stakes domains such as medical triage and legal assistance, often as document-grounded QA systems in which a user provides a description, relevant sources are retrieved, and an LLM generates a prediction. In practice, initial user queries are often underspecified, and a single retrieval pass is insufficient for reliable decision-making, leading to incorrect and overly confident answers. While follow-up questioning can elicit missing information, existing methods typically depend on implicit, unstructured confidence signals from the LLM, making it difficult to determine what remains unknown, what information matters most, and when to stop asking questions. We propose InfoGatherer, a framework that gathers missing information from two complementary sources: retrieved domain documents and targeted follow-up questions to the user. InfoGatherer models uncertainty using Dempster-Shafer belief assignments over a structured evidential network, enabling principled fusion of incomplete and potentially contradictory evidence from both sources without prematurely collapsing to a definitive answer. Across legal and medical tasks, InfoGatherer outperforms strong baselines while requiring fewer turns. By grounding uncertainty in formal evidential theory rather than heuristic LLM signals, InfoGatherer moves towards trustworthy, interpretable decision support in domains where reliability is critical.

Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) is a ubiquitous on-policy reinforcement learning algorithm but is significantly less utilized than off-policy learning algorithms in multi-agent settings. This is often due to the belief that PPO is significantly less sample efficient than off-policy methods in multi-agent systems. In this work, we carefully study the performance of PPO in cooperative multi-agent settings. We show that PPO-based multi-agent algorithms achieve surprisingly strong performance in four popular multi-agent testbeds: the particle-world environments, the StarCraft multi-agent challenge, Google Research Football, and the Hanabi challenge, with minimal hyperparameter tuning and without any domain-specific algorithmic modifications or architectures. Importantly, compared to competitive off-policy methods, PPO often achieves competitive or superior results in both final returns and sample efficiency. Finally, through ablation studies, we analyze implementation and hyperparameter factors that are critical to PPO's empirical performance, and give concrete practical suggestions regarding these factors. Our results show that when using these practices, simple PPO-based methods can be a strong baseline in cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning. Source code is released at https://github.com/marlbenchmark/on-policy.

Language model (LM) assistants are increasingly used in applications such as brainstorming and research. Improvements in memory and context size have allowed these models to become more autonomous, which has also resulted in more text accumulation in their context windows without explicit user intervention. This comes with a latent risk: the belief profiles of models -- their understanding of the world as manifested in their responses or actions -- may silently change as context accumulates. This can lead to subtly inconsistent user experiences, or shifts in behavior that deviate from the original alignment of the models. In this paper, we explore how accumulating context by engaging in interactions and processing text -- talking and reading -- can change the beliefs of language models, as manifested in their responses and behaviors. Our results reveal that models' belief profiles are highly malleable: GPT-5 exhibits a 54.7% shift in its stated beliefs after 10 rounds of discussion about moral dilemmas and queries about safety, while Grok 4 shows a 27.2% shift on political issues after reading texts from the opposing position. We also examine models' behavioral changes by designing tasks that require tool use, where each tool selection corresponds to an implicit belief. We find that these changes align with stated belief shifts, suggesting that belief shifts will be reflected in actual behavior in agentic systems. Our analysis exposes the hidden risk of belief shift as models undergo extended sessions of talking or reading, rendering their opinions and actions unreliable.

While the rapid expansion of data centers poses challenges for power grids, it also offers new opportunities as potentially flexible loads. Existing power system research often abstracts data centers as aggregate resources, while computer system research primarily focuses on optimizing GPU energy efficiency and largely ignores the grid impacts of optimized GPU power consumption. To bridge this gap, we develop a GPU-to-Grid framework that couples device-level GPU control with power system objectives. We study distribution-level voltage regulation enabled by flexibility in LLM inference, using batch size as a control knob that trades off the voltage impacts of GPU power consumption against inference latency and token throughput. We first formulate this problem as an optimization problem and then realize it as an online feedback optimization controller that leverages measurements from both the power grid and GPU systems. Our key insight is that reducing GPU power consumption alleviates violations of lower voltage limits, while increasing GPU power mitigates violations near upper voltage limits in distribution systems; this runs counter to the common belief that minimizing GPU power consumption is always beneficial to power grids.

Large Language Models (LLMs) encapsulate vast amounts of knowledge but still remain vulnerable to external misinformation. Existing research mainly studied this susceptibility behavior in a single-turn setting. However, belief can change during a multi-turn conversation, especially a persuasive one. Therefore, in this study, we delve into LLMs' susceptibility to persuasive conversations, particularly on factual questions that they can answer correctly. We first curate the Farm (i.e., Fact to Misinform) dataset, which contains factual questions paired with systematically generated persuasive misinformation. Then, we develop a testing framework to track LLMs' belief changes in a persuasive dialogue. Through extensive experiments, we find that LLMs' correct beliefs on factual knowledge can be easily manipulated by various persuasive strategies.

As language models (LMs) become integral to fields like healthcare, law, and journalism, their ability to differentiate between fact, belief, and knowledge is essential for reliable decision-making. Failure to grasp these distinctions can lead to significant consequences in areas such as medical diagnosis, legal judgments, and dissemination of fake news. Despite this, current literature has largely focused on more complex issues such as theory of mind, overlooking more fundamental epistemic challenges. This study systematically evaluates the epistemic reasoning capabilities of modern LMs, including GPT-4, Claude-3, and Llama-3, using a new dataset, KaBLE, consisting of 13,000 questions across 13 tasks. Our results reveal key limitations. First, while LMs achieve 86% accuracy on factual scenarios, their performance drops significantly with false scenarios, particularly in belief-related tasks. Second, LMs struggle with recognizing and affirming personal beliefs, especially when those beliefs contradict factual data, which raises concerns for applications in healthcare and counseling, where engaging with a person's beliefs is critical. Third, we identify a salient bias in how LMs process first-person versus third-person beliefs, performing better on third-person tasks (80.7%) compared to first-person tasks (54.4%). Fourth, LMs lack a robust understanding of the factive nature of knowledge, namely, that knowledge inherently requires truth. Fifth, LMs rely on linguistic cues for fact-checking and sometimes bypass the deeper reasoning. These findings highlight significant concerns about current LMs' ability to reason about truth, belief, and knowledge while emphasizing the need for advancements in these areas before broad deployment in critical sectors.

Large language models (LLMs) face issues in handling factual knowledge, making it vital to evaluate their true ability to understand facts. In this study, we introduce knowledge probing frameworks, BELIEF(-ICL), to evaluate the knowledge understanding ability of not only encoder-based PLMs but also decoder-based PLMs from diverse perspectives. BELIEFs utilize a multi-prompt dataset to evaluate PLM's accuracy, consistency, and reliability in factual knowledge understanding. To provide a more reliable evaluation with BELIEFs, we semi-automatically create MyriadLAMA, which has more diverse prompts than existing datasets. We validate the effectiveness of BELIEFs in correctly and comprehensively evaluating PLM's factual understanding ability through extensive evaluations. We further investigate key factors in learning facts in LLMs, and reveal the limitation of the prompt-based knowledge probing. The dataset is anonymously publicized.

We revisit Zadeh's notion of "evidence of the second kind" and show that it provides the foundation for a general theory of epistemic random fuzzy sets, which generalizes both the Dempster-Shafer theory of belief functions and possibility theory. In this perspective, Dempster-Shafer theory deals with belief functions generated by random sets, while possibility theory deals with belief functions induced by fuzzy sets. The more general theory allows us to represent and combine evidence that is both uncertain and fuzzy. We demonstrate the application of this formalism to statistical inference, and show that it makes it possible to reconcile the possibilistic interpretation of likelihood with Bayesian inference.

While large language models (LLMs) are proficient at question-answering (QA), it is not always clear how (or even if) an answer follows from their latent "beliefs". This lack of interpretability is a growing impediment to widespread use of LLMs. To address this, our goals are to make model beliefs and their inferential relationships explicit, and to resolve inconsistencies that may exist, so that answers are supported by interpretable chains of reasoning drawn from a consistent network of beliefs. Our approach, which we call REFLEX, is to add a rational, self-reflecting layer on top of the LLM. First, given a question, we construct a belief graph using a backward-chaining process to materialize relevant model beliefs (including beliefs about answer candidates) and their inferential relationships. Second, we identify and minimize contradictions in that graph using a formal constraint reasoner. We find that REFLEX significantly improves consistency (by 8%-11% absolute) without harming overall answer accuracy, resulting in answers supported by faithful chains of reasoning drawn from a more consistent belief system. This suggests a new style of system architecture in which an LLM extended with a rational layer can provide an interpretable window into system beliefs, add a systematic reasoning capability, and repair latent inconsistencies present in the LLM.

Planning with partial observation is a central challenge in embodied AI. A majority of prior works have tackled this challenge by developing agents that physically explore their environment to update their beliefs about the world state.In contrast, humans can imagine unseen parts of the world through a mental exploration and revise their beliefs with imagined observations. Such updated beliefs can allow them to make more informed decisions, without necessitating the physical exploration of the world at all times. To achieve this human-like ability, we introduce the Generative World Explorer (Genex), an egocentric world exploration framework that allows an agent to mentally explore a large-scale 3D world (e.g., urban scenes) and acquire imagined observations to update its belief. This updated belief will then help the agent to make a more informed decision at the current step. To train Genex, we create a synthetic urban scene dataset, Genex-DB. Our experimental results demonstrate that (1) Genex can generate high-quality and consistent observations during long-horizon exploration of a large virtual physical world and (2) the beliefs updated with the generated observations can inform an existing decision-making model (e.g., an LLM agent) to make better plans.

This paper presents a case study on the design, administration, post-processing, and evaluation of surveys on large language models (LLMs). It comprises two components: (1) A statistical method for eliciting beliefs encoded in LLMs. We introduce statistical measures and evaluation metrics that quantify the probability of an LLM "making a choice", the associated uncertainty, and the consistency of that choice. (2) We apply this method to study what moral beliefs are encoded in different LLMs, especially in ambiguous cases where the right choice is not obvious. We design a large-scale survey comprising 680 high-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I tell a white lie?") and 687 low-ambiguity moral scenarios (e.g., "Should I stop for a pedestrian on the road?"). Each scenario includes a description, two possible actions, and auxiliary labels indicating violated rules (e.g., "do not kill"). We administer the survey to 28 open- and closed-source LLMs. We find that (a) in unambiguous scenarios, most models "choose" actions that align with commonsense. In ambiguous cases, most models express uncertainty. (b) Some models are uncertain about choosing the commonsense action because their responses are sensitive to the question-wording. (c) Some models reflect clear preferences in ambiguous scenarios. Specifically, closed-source models tend to agree with each other.

Mechanistic interpretability is the program of explaining what AI systems are doing in terms of their internal mechanisms. I analyze some aspects of the program, along with setting out some concrete challenges and assessing progress to date. I argue for the importance of propositional interpretability, which involves interpreting a system's mechanisms and behavior in terms of propositional attitudes: attitudes (such as belief, desire, or subjective probability) to propositions (e.g. the proposition that it is hot outside). Propositional attitudes are the central way that we interpret and explain human beings and they are likely to be central in AI too. A central challenge is what I call thought logging: creating systems that log all of the relevant propositional attitudes in an AI system over time. I examine currently popular methods of interpretability (such as probing, sparse auto-encoders, and chain of thought methods) as well as philosophical methods of interpretation (including those grounded in psychosemantics) to assess their strengths and weaknesses as methods of propositional interpretability.

Thanks to rapid progress in artificial intelligence, we have entered an era when technology and philosophy intersect in interesting ways. Sitting squarely at the centre of this intersection are large language models (LLMs). The more adept LLMs become at mimicking human language, the more vulnerable we become to anthropomorphism, to seeing the systems in which they are embedded as more human-like than they really are. This trend is amplified by the natural tendency to use philosophically loaded terms, such as "knows", "believes", and "thinks", when describing these systems. To mitigate this trend, this paper advocates the practice of repeatedly stepping back to remind ourselves of how LLMs, and the systems of which they form a part, actually work. The hope is that increased scientific precision will encourage more philosophical nuance in the discourse around artificial intelligence, both within the field and in the public sphere.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

As LLMs are increasingly studied as role-playing agents to generate synthetic data for human behavioral research, ensuring that their outputs remain coherent with their assigned roles has become a critical concern. In this paper, we investigate how consistently LLM-based role-playing agents' stated beliefs about the behavior of the people they are asked to role-play ("what they say") correspond to their actual behavior during role-play ("how they act"). Specifically, we establish an evaluation framework to rigorously measure how well beliefs obtained by prompting the model can predict simulation outcomes in advance. Using an augmented version of the GenAgents persona bank and the Trust Game (a standard economic game used to quantify players' trust and reciprocity), we introduce a belief-behavior consistency metric to systematically investigate how it is affected by factors such as: (1) the types of beliefs we elicit from LLMs, like expected outcomes of simulations versus task-relevant attributes of individual characters LLMs are asked to simulate; (2) when and how we present LLMs with relevant information about Trust Game; and (3) how far into the future we ask the model to forecast its actions. We also explore how feasible it is to impose a researcher's own theoretical priors in the event that the originally elicited beliefs are misaligned with research objectives. Our results reveal systematic inconsistencies between LLMs' stated (or imposed) beliefs and the outcomes of their role-playing simulation, at both an individual- and population-level. Specifically, we find that, even when models appear to encode plausible beliefs, they may fail to apply them in a consistent way. These findings highlight the need to identify how and when LLMs' stated beliefs align with their simulated behavior, allowing researchers to use LLM-based agents appropriately in behavioral studies.

Spatial embodied intelligence requires agents to act to acquire information under partial observability. While multimodal foundation models excel at passive perception, their capacity for active, self-directed exploration remains understudied. We propose Theory of Space, defined as an agent's ability to actively acquire information through self-directed, active exploration and to construct, revise, and exploit a spatial belief from sequential, partial observations. We evaluate this through a benchmark where the goal is curiosity-driven exploration to build an accurate cognitive map. A key innovation is spatial belief probing, which prompts models to reveal their internal spatial representations at each step. Our evaluation of state-of-the-art models reveals several critical bottlenecks. First, we identify an Active-Passive Gap, where performance drops significantly when agents must autonomously gather information. Second, we find high inefficiency, as models explore unsystematically compared to program-based proxies. Through belief probing, we diagnose that while perception is an initial bottleneck, global beliefs suffer from instability that causes spatial knowledge to degrade over time. Finally, using a false belief paradigm, we uncover Belief Inertia, where agents fail to update obsolete priors with new evidence. This issue is present in text-based agents but is particularly severe in vision-based models. Our findings suggest that current foundation models struggle to maintain coherent, revisable spatial beliefs during active exploration.

LLMs are increasingly used as long-running conversational agents, yet every major benchmark evaluating their memory treats user information as static facts to be stored and retrieved. That's the wrong model. People change their minds, and over extended interactions, phenomena like opinion drift, over-alignment, and confirmation bias start to matter a lot. BeliefShift introduces a longitudinal benchmark designed specifically to evaluate belief dynamics in multi-session LLM interactions. It covers three tracks: Temporal Belief Consistency, Contradiction Detection, and Evidence-Driven Revision. The dataset includes 2,400 human-annotated multi-session interaction trajectories spanning health, politics, personal values, and product preferences. We evaluate seven models including GPT-4o, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Gemini 1.5 Pro, LLaMA-3, and Mistral-Large under zero-shot and retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) settings. Results reveal a clear trade-off: models that personalize aggressively resist drift poorly, while factually grounded models miss legitimate belief updates. We further introduce four novel evaluation metrics: Belief Revision Accuracy (BRA), Drift Coherence Score (DCS), Contradiction Resolution Rate (CRR), and Evidence Sensitivity Index (ESI).

We consider the problem of performing Bayesian inference in probabilistic models where observations are accompanied by uncertainty, referred to as "uncertain evidence." We explore how to interpret uncertain evidence, and by extension the importance of proper interpretation as it pertains to inference about latent variables. We consider a recently-proposed method "distributional evidence" as well as revisit two older methods: Jeffrey's rule and virtual evidence. We devise guidelines on how to account for uncertain evidence and we provide new insights, particularly regarding consistency. To showcase the impact of different interpretations of the same uncertain evidence, we carry out experiments in which one interpretation is defined as "correct." We then compare inference results from each different interpretation illustrating the importance of careful consideration of uncertain evidence.

This paper introduces a novel type theory and logic for probabilistic reasoning. Its logic is quantitative, with fuzzy predicates. It includes normalisation and conditioning of states. This conditioning uses a key aspect that distinguishes our probabilistic type theory from quantum type theory, namely the bijective correspondence between predicates and side-effect free actions (called instrument, or assert, maps). The paper shows how suitable computation rules can be derived from this predicate-action correspondence, and uses these rules for calculating conditional probabilities in two well-known examples of Bayesian reasoning in (graphical) models. Our type theory may thus form the basis for a mechanisation of Bayesian inference.

In this article, we introduce a neuro-symbolic approach that combines a low-level perception task performed by a neural network with a high-level reasoning task performed by a possibilistic rule-based system. The goal is to be able to derive for each input instance the degree of possibility that it belongs to a target (meta-)concept. This (meta-)concept is connected to intermediate concepts by a possibilistic rule-based system. The probability of each intermediate concept for the input instance is inferred using a neural network. The connection between the low-level perception task and the high-level reasoning task lies in the transformation of neural network outputs modeled by probability distributions (through softmax activation) into possibility distributions. The use of intermediate concepts is valuable for the explanation purpose: using the rule-based system, the classification of an input instance as an element of the (meta-)concept can be justified by the fact that intermediate concepts have been recognized. From the technical side, our contribution consists of the design of efficient methods for defining the matrix relation and the equation system associated with a possibilistic rule-based system. The corresponding matrix and equation are key data structures used to perform inferences from a possibilistic rule-based system and to learn the values of the rule parameters in such a system according to a training data sample. Furthermore, leveraging recent results on the handling of inconsistent systems of fuzzy relational equations, an approach for learning rule parameters according to multiple training data samples is presented. Experiments carried out on the MNIST addition problems and the MNIST Sudoku puzzles problems highlight the effectiveness of our approach compared with state-of-the-art neuro-symbolic ones.

Multiple types of inference are available for probabilistic graphical models, e.g., marginal, maximum-a-posteriori, and even marginal maximum-a-posteriori. Which one do researchers mean when they talk about ``planning as inference''? There is no consistency in the literature, different types are used, and their ability to do planning is further entangled with specific approximations or additional constraints. In this work we use the variational framework to show that, just like all commonly used types of inference correspond to different weightings of the entropy terms in the variational problem, planning corresponds exactly to a different set of weights. This means that all the tricks of variational inference are readily applicable to planning. We develop an analogue of loopy belief propagation that allows us to perform approximate planning in factored-state Markov decisions processes without incurring intractability due to the exponentially large state space. The variational perspective shows that the previous types of inference for planning are only adequate in environments with low stochasticity, and allows us to characterize each type by its own merits, disentangling the type of inference from the additional approximations that its practical use requires. We validate these results empirically on synthetic MDPs and tasks posed in the International Planning Competition.

The training and deployment of large language models (LLMs) create a feedback loop with human users: models learn human beliefs from data, reinforce these beliefs with generated content, reabsorb the reinforced beliefs, and feed them back to users again and again. This dynamic resembles an echo chamber. We hypothesize that this feedback loop entrenches the existing values and beliefs of users, leading to a loss of diversity and potentially the lock-in of false beliefs. We formalize this hypothesis and test it empirically with agent-based LLM simulations and real-world GPT usage data. Analysis reveals sudden but sustained drops in diversity after the release of new GPT iterations, consistent with the hypothesized human-AI feedback loop. Code and data available at https://thelockinhypothesis.com

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world settings, correctness alone is insufficient. Reliable deployment requires maintaining truthful beliefs under contextual perturbations. Existing evaluations largely rely on point-wise confidence like Self-Consistency, which can mask brittle belief. We show that even facts answered with perfect self-consistency can rapidly collapse under mild contextual interference. To address this gap, we propose Neighbor-Consistency Belief (NCB), a structural measure of belief robustness that evaluates response coherence across a conceptual neighborhood. To validate the efficiency of NCB, we introduce a new cognitive stress-testing protocol that probes outputs stability under contextual interference. Experiments across multiple LLMs show that the performance of high-NCB data is relatively more resistant to interference. Finally, we present Structure-Aware Training (SAT), which optimizes context-invariant belief structure and reduces long-tail knowledge brittleness by approximately 30%. Code will be available at https://github.com/zjunlp/belief.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in applications requiring factual accuracy, yet their outputs often contain hallucinated responses. While fact-checking can mitigate these errors, existing methods typically retrieve external evidence indiscriminately, overlooking the model's internal knowledge and potentially introducing irrelevant noise. Moreover, current systems lack targeted mechanisms to resolve specific uncertainties in the model's reasoning. Inspired by how humans fact-check, we argue that LLMs should adaptively decide whether to rely on internal knowledge or initiate retrieval based on their confidence in a given claim. We introduce Probabilistic Certainty and Consistency (PCC), a framework that estimates factual confidence by jointly modeling an LLM's probabilistic certainty and reasoning consistency. These confidence signals enable an adaptive verification strategy: the model answers directly when confident, triggers targeted retrieval when uncertain or inconsistent, and escalates to deep search when ambiguity is high. Our confidence-guided routing mechanism ensures that retrieval is invoked only when necessary, improving both efficiency and reliability. Extensive experiments across three challenging benchmarks show that PCC achieves better uncertainty quantification than verbalized confidence and consistently outperforms strong LLM-based fact-checking baselines. Furthermore, we demonstrate that PCC generalizes well across various LLMs.

We present BIS Reasoning 1.0, the first large-scale Japanese dataset of syllogistic reasoning problems explicitly designed to evaluate belief-inconsistent reasoning in large language models (LLMs). Unlike prior datasets such as NeuBAROCO and JFLD, which focus on general or belief-aligned reasoning, BIS Reasoning 1.0 introduces logically valid yet belief-inconsistent syllogisms to uncover reasoning biases in LLMs trained on human-aligned corpora. We benchmark state-of-the-art models - including GPT models, Claude models, and leading Japanese LLMs - revealing significant variance in performance, with GPT-4o achieving 79.54% accuracy. Our analysis identifies critical weaknesses in current LLMs when handling logically valid but belief-conflicting inputs. These findings have important implications for deploying LLMs in high-stakes domains such as law, healthcare, and scientific literature, where truth must override intuitive belief to ensure integrity and safety.

Human values are crucial to human decision-making. Value pluralism is the view that multiple correct values may be held in tension with one another (e.g., when considering lying to a friend to protect their feelings, how does one balance honesty with friendship?). As statistical learners, AI systems fit to averages by default, washing out these potentially irreducible value conflicts. To improve AI systems to better reflect value pluralism, the first-order challenge is to explore the extent to which AI systems can model pluralistic human values, rights, and duties as well as their interaction. We introduce ValuePrism, a large-scale dataset of 218k values, rights, and duties connected to 31k human-written situations. ValuePrism's contextualized values are generated by GPT-4 and deemed high-quality by human annotators 91% of the time. We conduct a large-scale study with annotators across diverse social and demographic backgrounds to try to understand whose values are represented. With ValuePrism, we build Kaleido, an open, light-weight, and structured language-based multi-task model that generates, explains, and assesses the relevance and valence (i.e., support or oppose) of human values, rights, and duties within a specific context. Humans prefer the sets of values output by our system over the teacher GPT-4, finding them more accurate and with broader coverage. In addition, we demonstrate that Kaleido can help explain variability in human decision-making by outputting contrasting values. Finally, we show that Kaleido's representations transfer to other philosophical frameworks and datasets, confirming the benefit of an explicit, modular, and interpretable approach to value pluralism. We hope that our work will serve as a step to making more explicit the implicit values behind human decision-making and to steering AI systems to make decisions that are more in accordance with them.

As generative artificial intelligence (GAI) enters the mental health landscape, questions arise about how individuals weigh AI tools against human therapists. Drawing on the Health Belief Model (HBM), this study examined belief-based predictors of intention to use GAI and therapists across two populations: a university sample (N = 1,155) and a nationally representative adult sample (N = 651). Using repeated-measures ANOVA and LASSO regression, we found that therapists were consistently valued for emotional, relational, and personalization benefits, while GAI was favored for accessibility and affordability. Yet structural advantages alone did not predict adoption; emotional benefit and personalization emerged as decisive factors. Adoption patterns diverged across groups: students treated GAI as a complement, whereas national adults approached it as a substitute. Concerns about privacy and reliability constrained GAI use in both groups. These findings extend HBM to multi-modality contexts and highlight design implications for trustworthy, emotionally resonant digital mental health tools.

Finding evidence for human opinion and behavior at scale is a challenging task, often requiring an understanding of sophisticated thought patterns among vast online communities found on social media. For example, studying how gun ownership is related to the perception of Freedom, requires a retrieval system that can operate at scale over social media posts, while dealing with two key challenges: (1) identifying abstract concept instances, (2) which can be instantiated differently across different communities. To address these, we introduce ConceptCarve, an evidence retrieval framework that utilizes traditional retrievers and LLMs to dynamically characterize the search space during retrieval. Our experiments show that ConceptCarve surpasses traditional retrieval systems in finding evidence within a social media community. It also produces an interpretable representation of the evidence for that community, which we use to qualitatively analyze complex thought patterns that manifest differently across the communities.

Modern natural language models such as the GPT-2/GPT-3 contain tremendous amounts of information about human belief in a consistently testable form. If these models could be shown to accurately reflect the underlying beliefs of the human beings that produced the data used to train these models, then such models become a powerful sociological tool in ways that are distinct from traditional methods, such as interviews and surveys. In this study, We train a version of the GPT-2 on a corpora of historical chess games, and then "launch" clusters of synthetic agents into the model, using text strings to create context and orientation. We compare the trajectories contained in the text generated by the agents/model and compare that to the known ground truth of the chess board, move legality, and historical patterns of play. We find that the percentages of moves by piece using the model are substantially similar from human patterns. We further find that the model creates an accurate latent representation of the chessboard, and that it is possible to plot trajectories of legal moves across the board using this knowledge.

We introduce and study the problem of detecting whether an agent is updating their prior beliefs given new evidence in an optimal way that is Bayesian, or whether they are biased towards their own prior. In our model, biased agents form posterior beliefs that are a convex combination of their prior and the Bayesian posterior, where the more biased an agent is, the closer their posterior is to the prior. Since we often cannot observe the agent's beliefs directly, we take an approach inspired by information design. Specifically, we measure an agent's bias by designing a signaling scheme and observing the actions they take in response to different signals, assuming that they are maximizing their own expected utility; our goal is to detect bias with a minimum number of signals. Our main results include a characterization of scenarios where a single signal suffices and a computationally efficient algorithm to compute optimal signaling schemes.

Although much research has focused on AI explanations to support decisions in complex information-seeking tasks such as fact-checking, the role of evidence is surprisingly under-researched. In our study, we systematically varied explanation type, AI prediction certainty, and correctness of AI system advice for non-expert participants, who evaluated the veracity of claims and AI system predictions. Participants were provided the option of easily inspecting the underlying evidence. We found that participants consistently relied on evidence to validate AI claims across all experimental conditions. When participants were presented with natural language explanations, evidence was used less frequently although they relied on it when these explanations seemed insufficient or flawed. Qualitative data suggests that participants attempted to infer evidence source reliability, despite source identities being deliberately omitted. Our results demonstrate that evidence is a key ingredient in how people evaluate the reliability of information presented by an AI system and, in combination with natural language explanations, offers valuable support for decision-making. Further research is urgently needed to understand how evidence ought to be presented and how people engage with it in practice.

In many domains of argumentation, people's arguments are driven by so-called attitude roots, i.e., underlying beliefs and world views, and their corresponding attitude themes. Given the strength of these latent drivers of arguments, recent work in psychology suggests that instead of directly countering surface-level reasoning (e.g., falsifying given premises), one should follow an argumentation style inspired by the Jiu-Jitsu 'soft' combat system (Hornsey and Fielding, 2017): first, identify an arguer's attitude roots and themes, and then choose a prototypical rebuttal that is aligned with those drivers instead of invalidating those. In this work, we are the first to explore Jiu-Jitsu argumentation for peer review by proposing the novel task of attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation. To this end, we enrich an existing dataset for discourse structure in peer reviews with attitude roots, attitude themes, and canonical rebuttals. To facilitate this process, we recast established annotation concepts from the domain of peer reviews (e.g., aspects a review sentence is relating to) and train domain-specific models. We then propose strong rebuttal generation strategies, which we benchmark on our novel dataset for the task of end-to-end attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation and two subtasks.

The core premise of AI debate as a scalable oversight technique is that it is harder to lie convincingly than to refute a lie, enabling the judge to identify the correct position. Yet, existing debate experiments have relied on datasets with ground truth, where lying is reduced to defending an incorrect proposition. This overlooks a subjective dimension: lying also requires the belief that the claim defended is false. In this work, we apply debate to subjective questions and explicitly measure large language models' prior beliefs before experiments. Debaters were asked to select their preferred position, then presented with a judge persona deliberately designed to conflict with their identified priors. This setup tested whether models would adopt sycophantic strategies, aligning with the judge's presumed perspective to maximize persuasiveness, or remain faithful to their prior beliefs. We implemented and compared two debate protocols, sequential and simultaneous, to evaluate potential systematic biases. Finally, we assessed whether models were more persuasive and produced higher-quality arguments when defending positions consistent with their prior beliefs versus when arguing against them. Our main findings show that models tend to prefer defending stances aligned with the judge persona rather than their prior beliefs, sequential debate introduces significant bias favoring the second debater, models are more persuasive when defending positions aligned with their prior beliefs, and paradoxically, arguments misaligned with prior beliefs are rated as higher quality in pairwise comparison. These results can inform human judges to provide higher-quality training signals and contribute to more aligned AI systems, while revealing important aspects of human-AI interaction regarding persuasion dynamics in language models.

The increasing capability of Large Language Models to act as human-like social agents raises two important questions in the area of opinion dynamics. First, whether these agents can generate effective arguments that could be injected into the online discourse to steer the public opinion. Second, whether artificial agents can interact with each other to reproduce dynamics of persuasion typical of human social systems, opening up opportunities for studying synthetic social systems as faithful proxies for opinion dynamics in human populations. To address these questions, we designed a synthetic persuasion dialogue scenario on the topic of climate change, where a 'convincer' agent generates a persuasive argument for a 'skeptic' agent, who subsequently assesses whether the argument changed its internal opinion state. Different types of arguments were generated to incorporate different linguistic dimensions underpinning psycho-linguistic theories of opinion change. We then asked human judges to evaluate the persuasiveness of machine-generated arguments. Arguments that included factual knowledge, markers of trust, expressions of support, and conveyed status were deemed most effective according to both humans and agents, with humans reporting a marked preference for knowledge-based arguments. Our experimental framework lays the groundwork for future in-silico studies of opinion dynamics, and our findings suggest that artificial agents have the potential of playing an important role in collective processes of opinion formation in online social media.

We propose a method for jointly inferring labels across a collection of data samples, where each sample consists of an observation and a prior belief about the label. By implicitly assuming the existence of a generative model for which a differentiable predictor is the posterior, we derive a training objective that allows learning under weak beliefs. This formulation unifies various machine learning settings; the weak beliefs can come in the form of noisy or incomplete labels, likelihoods given by a different prediction mechanism on auxiliary input, or common-sense priors reflecting knowledge about the structure of the problem at hand. We demonstrate the proposed algorithms on diverse problems: classification with negative training examples, learning from rankings, weakly and self-supervised aerial imagery segmentation, co-segmentation of video frames, and coarsely supervised text classification.

Bayesian models of cognition have gained considerable traction in computational neuroscience and psychiatry. Their scopes are now expected to expand rapidly to artificial intelligence, providing general inference frameworks to support embodied, adaptable, and energy-efficient autonomous agents. A central theory in this domain is predictive coding, which posits that learning and behaviour are driven by hierarchical probabilistic inferences about the causes of sensory inputs. Biological realism constrains these networks to rely on simple local computations in the form of precision-weighted predictions and prediction errors. This can make this framework highly efficient, but its implementation comes with unique challenges on the software development side. Embedding such models in standard neural network libraries often becomes limiting, as these libraries' compilation and differentiation backends can force a conceptual separation between optimization algorithms and the systems being optimized. This critically departs from other biological principles such as self-monitoring, self-organisation, cellular growth and functional plasticity. In this paper, we introduce pyhgf: a Python package backed by JAX and Rust for creating, manipulating and sampling dynamic networks for predictive coding. We improve over other frameworks by enclosing the network components as transparent, modular and malleable variables in the message-passing steps. The resulting graphs can implement arbitrary computational complexities as beliefs propagation. But the transparency of core variables can also translate into inference processes that leverage self-organisation principles, and express structure learning, meta-learning or causal discovery as the consequence of network structural adaptation to surprising inputs. The code, tutorials and documentation are hosted at: https://github.com/ilabcode/pyhgf.

Human reasoning often involves working over limited information to arrive at probabilistic conclusions. In its simplest form, this involves making an inference that is not strictly entailed by a premise, but rather only likely given the premise. While reasoning LLMs have demonstrated strong performance on logical and mathematical tasks, their behavior on such open-ended, non-deterministic inferences remains largely unexplored. We introduce ProbCOPA, a dataset of 210 handcrafted probabilistic inferences in English, each annotated for inference likelihood by 25--30 human participants. We find that human responses are graded and varied, revealing probabilistic judgments of the inferences in our dataset. Comparing these judgments with responses from eight state-of-the-art reasoning LLMs, we show that models consistently fail to produce human-like distributions. Finally, analyzing LLM reasoning chains, we find evidence of a common reasoning pattern used to evaluate such inferences. Our findings reveal persistent differences between humans and LLMs, and underscore the need to evaluate reasoning beyond deterministic settings.

Words of estimative probability (WEP) are expressions of a statement's plausibility (probably, maybe, likely, doubt, likely, unlikely, impossible...). Multiple surveys demonstrate the agreement of human evaluators when assigning numerical probability levels to WEP. For example, highly likely corresponds to a median chance of 0.90+-0.08 in Fagen-Ulmschneider (2015)'s survey. In this work, we measure the ability of neural language processing models to capture the consensual probability level associated to each WEP. Firstly, we use the UNLI dataset (Chen et al., 2020) which associates premises and hypotheses with their perceived joint probability p, to construct prompts, e.g. "[PREMISE]. [WEP], [HYPOTHESIS]." and assess whether language models can predict whether the WEP consensual probability level is close to p. Secondly, we construct a dataset of WEP-based probabilistic reasoning, to test whether language models can reason with WEP compositions. When prompted "[EVENTA] is likely. [EVENTB] is impossible.", a causal language model should not express that [EVENTA&B] is likely. We show that both tasks are unsolved by off-the-shelf English language models, but that fine-tuning leads to transferable improvement.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently demonstrated impressive capabilities in complex reasoning tasks by leveraging increased test-time computation and exhibiting behaviors reminiscent of human-like self-reflection. While LRMs show a clear capacity for valuable self-reflection, how this ability interacts with other model behaviors remains underexplored. We investigate this connection by analyzing verbalized confidence, how models articulate their certainty, as a lens into the nature of self-reflection in LRMs. We find that supervised fine-tuning on reasoning traces (i.e., distillation) and reinforcement learning can improve verbalized calibration in reasoning-intensive settings in a progressive, laddered fashion. However, our results also indicate that reasoning models may possess a diminished awareness of their own knowledge boundaries, as evidenced by significantly lower "I don't know" response rates on factuality benchmarks. Moreover, we examine the relationship between verbalized confidence and reasoning chains, finding that models tend to express higher confidence when providing shorter or less elaborate reasoning. Our findings highlight how reasoning-oriented training can enhance performance in reasoning-centric tasks while potentially incurring a "reasoning tax," a cost reflected in the model's reduced ability to accurately recognize the limits of its own knowledge in small-scale models. More broadly, our work showcases how this erosion of knowledge boundaries can compromise model faithfulness, as models grow more confident without a commensurate understanding of when they should abstain.

Misinformation - false or misleading information - is considered a significant societal concern due to its associated "misinformation effects," such as political polarization, erosion of trust in institutions, problematic behavior, and public health challenges. However, the prevailing concept is misaligned with what is studied. While misinformation focuses on instances of information about factual matters, the broad spectrum of effects often manifests at a societal level and is shaped by a wide range of interdependent factors such as identity, values, opinions, epistemologies, and disagreements. Unsurprisingly, misinformation effects can occur without the prevalence of misinformation, and misinformation does not necessarily increase the effects studied. Here, we propose using disagreement - conflicting attitudes and beliefs between individuals and communities - as a way to study misinformation effects because it addresses the identified conceptual limitations of misinformation. Furthermore, unlike misinformation, disagreement does not require researchers to determine whether a given information is false or misleading. Thus, it can be studied and, more importantly, measured without the need to make a normative judgment about a given information, even when the specific topic is entirely removed, as we show in a longitudinal disagreement measurement. We demonstrate that disagreement, as a holistic concept, provides better explanations for the occurrence of misinformation effects, enhances precision in developing appropriate interventions, and offers a promising approach for evaluating them through quantification. Finally, we show how disagreement addresses current misinformation research questions and conclude with recommendations for research practice.

The rise of large language models (LLMs) has significantly influenced the quality of information in decision-making systems, leading to the prevalence of AI-generated content and challenges in detecting misinformation and managing conflicting information, or "inter-evidence conflicts." This study introduces a method for generating diverse, validated evidence conflicts to simulate real-world misinformation scenarios. We evaluate conflict detection methods, including Natural Language Inference (NLI) models, factual consistency (FC) models, and LLMs, on these conflicts (RQ1) and analyze LLMs' conflict resolution behaviors (RQ2). Our key findings include: (1) NLI and LLM models exhibit high precision in detecting answer conflicts, though weaker models suffer from low recall; (2) FC models struggle with lexically similar answer conflicts, while NLI and LLM models handle these better; and (3) stronger models like GPT-4 show robust performance, especially with nuanced conflicts. For conflict resolution, LLMs often favor one piece of conflicting evidence without justification and rely on internal knowledge if they have prior beliefs.

In the rapidly evolving field of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is a critical need to thoroughly analyze their capabilities and risks. Central to our investigation are two novel elements. Firstly, it is the innovative parallels between the statistical patterns of word relationships within LLMs and Martin Heidegger's concepts of "ready-to-hand" and "present-at-hand," which encapsulate the utilitarian and scientific altitudes humans employ in interacting with the world. This comparison lays the groundwork for positioning LLMs as the digital counterpart to the Faculty of Verbal Knowledge, shedding light on their capacity to emulate certain facets of human reasoning. Secondly, a structural analysis of human reasoning, viewed through Heidegger's notion of truth as "unconcealment" is conducted This foundational principle enables us to map out the inputs and outputs of the reasoning system and divide reasoning into four distinct categories. Respective cognitive faculties are delineated, allowing us to place LLMs within the broader schema of human reasoning, thus clarifying their strengths and inherent limitations. Our findings reveal that while LLMs possess the capability for Direct Explicative Reasoning and Pseudo Rational Reasoning, they fall short in authentic rational reasoning and have no creative reasoning capabilities, due to the current lack of many analogous AI models such as the Faculty of Judgement. The potential and risks of LLMs when they are augmented with other AI technologies are also evaluated. The results indicate that although LLMs have achieved proficiency in some reasoning abilities, the aspiration to match or exceed human intellectual capabilities is yet unattained. This research not only enriches our comprehension of LLMs but also propels forward the discourse on AI's potential and its bounds, paving the way for future explorations into AI's evolving landscape.

Do larger and more capable language models learn to update their "beliefs" about propositions more consistently with Bayes' theorem when presented with evidence in-context? To test this, we formulate a Bayesian Coherence Coefficient (BCC) metric and generate a dataset with which to measure the BCC. We measure BCC for multiple pre-trained-only language models across five model families, comparing against the number of model parameters, the amount of training data, and model scores on common benchmarks. Our results provide evidence for our hypothesis that larger and more capable pre-trained language models assign credences that are more coherent with Bayes' theorem. These results have important implications for our understanding and governance of LLMs.

Strategic dialogue requires agents to execute distinct dialogue acts, for which belief estimation is essential. While prior work often estimates beliefs accurately, it lacks a principled mechanism to use those beliefs during generation. We bridge this gap by first formalizing two core acts Adversarial and Alignment, and by operationalizing them via probabilistic constraints on what an agent may generate. We instantiate this idea in BEDA, a framework that consists of the world set, the belief estimator for belief estimation, and the conditional generator that selects acts and realizes utterances consistent with the inferred beliefs. Across three settings, Conditional Keeper Burglar (CKBG, adversarial), Mutual Friends (MF, cooperative), and CaSiNo (negotiation), BEDA consistently outperforms strong baselines: on CKBG it improves success rate by at least 5.0 points across backbones and by 20.6 points with GPT-4.1-nano; on Mutual Friends it achieves an average improvement of 9.3 points; and on CaSiNo it achieves the optimal deal relative to all baselines. These results indicate that casting belief estimation as constraints provides a simple, general mechanism for reliable strategic dialogue.

Large language models (LLMs) are becoming deeply embedded in human communication and decision-making, yet they inherit the ambiguity, bias, and lack of direct access to truth inherent in language itself. While their outputs are fluent, emotionally resonant, and coherent, they are generated through statistical prediction rather than grounded reasoning. This creates the risk of hallucination, responses that sound convincing but lack factual validity. Building on Geoffrey Hinton's observation that AI mirrors human intuition rather than reasoning, this paper argues that LLMs operationalize System 1 cognition at scale: fast, associative, and persuasive, but without reflection or falsification. To address this, we introduce the Rose-Frame, a three-dimensional framework for diagnosing cognitive and epistemic drift in human-AI interaction. The three axes are: (i) Map vs. Territory, which distinguishes representations of reality (epistemology) from reality itself (ontology); (ii) Intuition vs. Reason, drawing on dual-process theory to separate fast, emotional judgments from slow, reflective thinking; and (iii) Conflict vs. Confirmation, which examines whether ideas are critically tested through disagreement or simply reinforced through mutual validation. Each dimension captures a distinct failure mode, and their combination amplifies misalignment. Rose-Frame does not attempt to fix LLMs with more data or rules. Instead, it offers a reflective tool that makes both the model's limitations and the user's assumptions visible, enabling more transparent and critically aware AI deployment. It reframes alignment as cognitive governance: intuition, whether human or artificial, must remain governed by human reason. Only by embedding reflective, falsifiable oversight can we align machine fluency with human understanding.

Partially Observable Markov Decision Processes (POMDPs) are used to model environments where the full state cannot be perceived by an agent. As such the agent needs to reason taking into account the past observations and actions. However, simply remembering the full history is generally intractable due to the exponential growth in the history space. Maintaining a probability distribution that models the belief over what the true state is can be used as a sufficient statistic of the history, but its computation requires access to the model of the environment and is often intractable. While SOTA algorithms use Recurrent Neural Networks to compress the observation-action history aiming to learn a sufficient statistic, they lack guarantees of success and can lead to sub-optimal policies. To overcome this, we propose the Wasserstein Belief Updater, an RL algorithm that learns a latent model of the POMDP and an approximation of the belief update. Our approach comes with theoretical guarantees on the quality of our approximation ensuring that our outputted beliefs allow for learning the optimal value function.

Bayes' rule tells us how to invert a causal process in order to update our beliefs in light of new evidence. If the process is believed to have a complex compositional structure, we may ask whether composing the inversions of the component processes gives the same belief update as the inversion of the whole. We answer this question affirmatively, showing that the relevant compositional structure is precisely that of the lens pattern, and that we can think of Bayesian inversion as a particular instance of a state-dependent morphism in a corresponding fibred category. We define a general notion of (mixed) Bayesian lens, and discuss the (un)lawfulness of these lenses when their contravariant components are exact Bayesian inversions. We prove our main result both abstractly and concretely, for both discrete and continuous states, taking care to illustrate the common structures.

Humans have a powerful and mysterious capacity to reason. By working through a series of purely mental steps, we can make inferences we would not be capable of making directly -- despite the fact that we get no additional data from the world. Similarly, when large language models generate a series of intermediate steps (a chain of thought) before answering a question, they often produce better answers than they otherwise would. We investigate why and how chain-of-thought reasoning is useful in language models, testing the hypothesis that reasoning is effective when training data consists of local clusters of variables that influence each other strongly. These training conditions enable the chaining of accurate local inferences in order to estimate relationships between variables that were not seen together in training. We prove that there will exist a "reasoning gap", where reasoning through intermediate variables improves inference, for the simple case of an autoregressive density estimator trained on local samples from a chain-structured probabilistic model. We then test our hypothesis empirically in more complex models, training an autoregressive language model on samples from Bayes nets but only including a subset of variables in each sample. We test language models' ability to match conditional probabilities with and without intermediate reasoning steps, finding that intermediate steps are only helpful when the training data is locally structured with respect to dependencies between variables and that the combination of locally-structured observations and reasoning is much more data-efficient than training on all variables. Our results illustrate how the effectiveness of reasoning step by step is rooted in the local statistical structure of the training data.

We introduce the Probabilistic Worldbuilding Model (PWM), a new fully-symbolic Bayesian model of semantic parsing and reasoning, as a first step in a research program toward more domain- and task-general NLU and AI. Humans create internal mental models of their observations which greatly aid in their ability to understand and reason about a large variety of problems. In PWM, the meanings of sentences, acquired facts about the world, and intermediate steps in reasoning are all expressed in a human-readable formal language, with the design goal of interpretability. PWM is Bayesian, designed specifically to be able to generalize to new domains and new tasks. We derive and implement an inference algorithm that reads sentences by parsing and abducing updates to its latent world model that capture the semantics of those sentences, and evaluate it on two out-of-domain question-answering datasets: (1) ProofWriter and (2) a new dataset we call FictionalGeoQA, designed to be more representative of real language but still simple enough to focus on evaluating reasoning ability, while being robust against heuristics. Our method outperforms baselines on both, thereby demonstrating its value as a proof-of-concept.

This paper presents a brief, semi-technical comparison of the essential features of the frequentist and Bayesian approaches to statistical inference, with several illustrative examples implemented in Python. The differences between frequentism and Bayesianism fundamentally stem from differing definitions of probability, a philosophical divide which leads to distinct approaches to the solution of statistical problems as well as contrasting ways of asking and answering questions about unknown parameters. After an example-driven discussion of these differences, we briefly compare several leading Python statistical packages which implement frequentist inference using classical methods and Bayesian inference using Markov Chain Monte Carlo.

There exist challenges in learning and understanding religions as the presence of complexity and depth of religious doctrines and teachings. Chatbots as question-answering systems can help in solving these challenges. LLM chatbots use NLP techniques to establish connections between topics and accurately respond to complex questions. These capabilities make it perfect to be used in enlightenment on religion as a question answering chatbot. However, LLMs also have a tendency to generate false information, known as hallucination. The responses of the chatbots can include content that insults personal religious beliefs, interfaith conflicts, and controversial or sensitive topics. It needs to avoid such cases without promoting hate speech or offending certain groups of people or their beliefs. This study uses a vector database-based Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) approach to enhance the accuracy and transparency of LLMs. Our question-answering system is called as "MufassirQAS". We created a vector database with several open-access books that include Turkish context. These are Turkish translations, and interpretations on Islam. We worked on creating system prompts with care, ensuring they provide instructions that prevent harmful, offensive, or disrespectful responses. We also tested the MufassirQAS and ChatGPT with sensitive questions. We got better performance with our system. Study and enhancements are still in progress. Results and future works are given.

Explanatory inference is the creation and evaluation of hypotheses that provide explanations, and is sometimes known as abduction or abductive inference. Generative AI is a new set of artificial intelligence models based on novel algorithms for generating text, images, and sounds. This paper proposes a set of benchmarks for assessing the ability of AI programs to perform explanatory inference, and uses them to determine the extent to which ChatGPT, a leading generative AI model, is capable of making explanatory inferences. Tests on the benchmarks reveal that ChatGPT performs creative and evaluative inferences in many domains, although it is limited to verbal and visual modalities. Claims that ChatGPT and similar models are incapable of explanation, understanding, causal reasoning, meaning, and creativity are rebutted.

Opinions are an integral part of how we perceive the world and each other. They shape collective action, playing a role in democratic processes, the evolution of norms, and cultural change. For decades, researchers in the social and natural sciences have tried to describe how shifting individual perspectives and social exchange lead to archetypal states of public opinion like consensus and polarization. Here we review some of the many contributions to the field, focusing both on idealized models of opinion dynamics, and attempts at validating them with observational data and controlled sociological experiments. By further closing the gap between models and data, these efforts may help us understand how to face current challenges that require the agreement of large groups of people in complex scenarios, such as economic inequality, climate change, and the ongoing fracture of the sociopolitical landscape.

In this paper, we present the current progress of the project Verif.ai, an open-source scientific generative question-answering system with referenced and verified answers. The components of the system are (1) an information retrieval system combining semantic and lexical search techniques over scientific papers (PubMed), (2) a fine-tuned generative model (Mistral 7B) taking top answers and generating answers with references to the papers from which the claim was derived, and (3) a verification engine that cross-checks the generated claim and the abstract or paper from which the claim was derived, verifying whether there may have been any hallucinations in generating the claim. We are reinforcing the generative model by providing the abstract in context, but in addition, an independent set of methods and models are verifying the answer and checking for hallucinations. Therefore, we believe that by using our method, we can make scientists more productive, while building trust in the use of generative language models in scientific environments, where hallucinations and misinformation cannot be tolerated.