Daily Papers

Deobfuscating binary code remains a fundamental challenge in reverse engineering, as obfuscation is widely used to hinder analysis and conceal program logic. Although large language models (LLMs) have shown promise in recovering semantics from obfuscated binaries, a systematic evaluation of their effectiveness is still lacking. In this work, we present BinDeObfBench, the first comprehensive benchmark for assessing LLM-based binary deobfuscation across diverse transformations spanning pre-compilation, compile-time, and post-compilation stages. Our evaluation shows that deobfuscation performance depends more on reasoning capability and domain expertise than on model scale, and that task-specific supervised fine-tuning consistently outperforms broad domain pre-training. Reasoning models can maintain robustness under severe obfuscation, generalize across different instruction set architectures (ISAs) and optimization levels. In-context learning benefits standard models but yields limited gains for reasoning models. Overall, our study highlights the importance of task-specific fine-tuning and reasoning-driven strategies, and positions BinDeObfBench as a basis for future work in binary deobfuscation.

Security experts reverse engineer (decompile) binary code to identify critical security vulnerabilities. The limited access to source code in vital systems - such as firmware, drivers, and proprietary software used in Critical Infrastructures (CI) - makes this analysis even more crucial on the binary level. Even with available source code, a semantic gap persists after compilation between the source and the binary code executed by the processor. This gap may hinder the detection of vulnerabilities in source code. That being said, current research on Large Language Models (LLMs) overlooks the significance of decompiled binaries in this area by focusing solely on source code. In this work, we are the first to empirically uncover the substantial semantic limitations of state-of-the-art LLMs when it comes to analyzing vulnerabilities in decompiled binaries, largely due to the absence of relevant datasets. To bridge the gap, we introduce DeBinVul, a novel decompiled binary code vulnerability dataset. Our dataset is multi-architecture and multi-optimization, focusing on C/C++ due to their wide usage in CI and association with numerous vulnerabilities. Specifically, we curate 150,872 samples of vulnerable and non-vulnerable decompiled binary code for the task of (i) identifying; (ii) classifying; (iii) describing vulnerabilities; and (iv) recovering function names in the domain of decompiled binaries. Subsequently, we fine-tune state-of-the-art LLMs using DeBinVul and report on a performance increase of 19%, 24%, and 21% in the capabilities of CodeLlama, Llama3, and CodeGen2 respectively, in detecting binary code vulnerabilities. Additionally, using DeBinVul, we report a high performance of 80-90% on the vulnerability classification task. Furthermore, we report improved performance in function name recovery and vulnerability description tasks.

Binary code is pervasive, and binary analysis is a key task in reverse engineering, malware classification, and vulnerability discovery. Unfortunately, while there exist large corpuses of malicious binaries, obtaining high-quality corpuses of benign binaries for modern systems has proven challenging (e.g., due to licensing issues). Consequently, machine learning based pipelines for binary analysis utilize either costly commercial corpuses (e.g., VirusTotal) or open-source binaries (e.g., coreutils) available in limited quantities. To address these issues, we present Assemblage: an extensible cloud-based distributed system that crawls, configures, and builds Windows PE binaries to obtain high-quality binary corpuses suitable for training state-of-the-art models in binary analysis. We have run Assemblage on AWS over the past year, producing 890k Windows PE and 428k Linux ELF binaries across 29 configurations. Assemblage is designed to be both reproducible and extensible, enabling users to publish "recipes" for their datasets, and facilitating the extraction of a wide array of features. We evaluated Assemblage by using its data to train modern learning-based pipelines for compiler provenance and binary function similarity. Our results illustrate the practical need for robust corpuses of high-quality Windows PE binaries in training modern learning-based binary analyses. Assemblage can be downloaded from https://assemblage-dataset.net

Decompilation is widely used in reverse engineering to recover high-level language code from binary executables. While recent approaches leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promising progress, they typically treat assembly code as a linear sequence of instructions, overlooking arbitrary jump patterns and isolated data segments inherent to binary files. This limitation significantly hinders their ability to correctly infer source code semantics from assembly code. To address this limitation, we propose \saltm, a novel binary decompilation method that abstracts stable logical features shared between binary and source code. The core idea of \saltm is to abstract selected binary-level operations, such as specific jumps, into a high-level logic framework that better guides LLMs in semantic recovery. Given a binary function, \saltm constructs a Source-level Abstract Logic Tree (\salt) from assembly code to approximate the logic structure of high-level language. It then fine-tunes an LLM using the reconstructed \salt to generate decompiled code. Finally, the output is refined through error correction and symbol recovery to improve readability and correctness. We compare \saltm to three categories of baselines (general-purpose LLMs, commercial decompilers, and decompilation methods) using three well-known datasets (Decompile-Eval, MBPP, Exebench). Our experimental results demonstrate that \saltm is highly effective in recovering the logic of the source code, significantly outperforming state-of-the-art methods (e.g., 70.4\% TCP rate on Decompile-Eval with a 10.6\% improvement). The results further validate its robustness against four commonly used obfuscation techniques. Additionally, analyses of real-world software and a user study confirm that our decompiled output offers superior assistance to human analysts in comprehending binary functions.

Binary code analysis plays a pivotal role in various software security applications, such as software maintenance, malware detection, software vulnerability discovery, patch analysis, etc. However, unlike source code, understanding binary code is challenging for reverse engineers due to the absence of semantic information. Therefore, automated tools are needed to assist human players in interpreting binary code. In recent years, two groups of technologies have shown promising prospects: (1) Deep learning-based technologies have demonstrated competitive results in tasks related to binary code understanding, furthermore, (2) Large Language Models (LLMs) have been extensively pre-trained at the source-code level for tasks such as code understanding and generation. This makes participants wonder about the ability of LLMs in binary code understanding. In this work, we propose a benchmark to evaluate the effectiveness of LLMs in real-world reverse engineering scenarios. The benchmark covers two key binary code understanding tasks, including function name recovery and binary code summarization. We gain valuable insights into their capabilities and limitations through extensive evaluations of popular LLMs using our benchmark. Our evaluations reveal that existing LLMs can understand binary code to a certain extent, thereby improving the efficiency of binary code analysis. Our results highlight the great potential of the LLMs in advancing the field of binary code understanding.

We study a basic question about cryptographic watermarking for generative models: how reliable can a watermark remain when an adversary is allowed to corrupt the encoded signal? To address this question, we introduce a minimal coding abstraction that we call a zero-bit tamper-detection code. This is a secret-key procedure that samples a pseudorandom codeword and, given a candidate word, decides whether it should be treated as unmarked content or as the result of tampering with a valid codeword. It captures the two core requirements of robust watermarking: soundness and tamper detection. Within this abstraction we prove a sharp unconditional limit on robustness to independent symbol corruption. For an alphabet of size q, there is a critical corruption rate of 1-1/q such that no scheme with soundness, even relaxed to allow a fixed constant false positive probability on random content, can reliably detect tampering once an adversary can change more than this fraction of symbols. In particular, in the binary case no cryptographic watermark can remain robust if more than half of the encoded bits are modified. We also show that this threshold is tight by giving simple information-theoretic constructions that achieve soundness and tamper detection for all strictly smaller corruption rates. We then test experimentally whether this limit appears in practice by looking at the recent watermarking for images of Gunn, Zhao, and Song (ICLR 2025). We show that a simple crop and resize operation reliably flipped about half of the latent signs and consistently prevented belief-propagation decoding from recovering the codeword, erasing the watermark while leaving the image visually intact.

Vulnerability prediction is valuable in identifying security issues more efficiently, even though it requires the source code of the target software system, which is a restrictive hypothesis. This paper presents an experimental study to predict vulnerabilities in binary code without source code or complex representations of the binary, leveraging the pivotal idea of decompiling the binary file through neural decompilation and predicting vulnerabilities through deep learning on the decompiled source code. The results outperform the state-of-the-art in both neural decompilation and vulnerability prediction, showing that it is possible to identify vulnerable programs with this approach concerning bi-class (vulnerable/non-vulnerable) and multi-class (type of vulnerability) analysis.

The widespread deployment of LLMs across enterprise services has created a critical security blind spot. Organizations operate multiple LLM services handling billions of queries daily, yet regulatory compliance boundaries prevent these services from sharing threat intelligence about prompt injection attacks, the top security risk for LLMs. When an attack is detected in one service, the same threat may persist undetected in others for months, as privacy regulations prohibit sharing user prompts across compliance boundaries. We present BinaryShield, the first privacy-preserving threat intelligence system that enables secure sharing of attack fingerprints across compliance boundaries. BinaryShield transforms suspicious prompts through a unique pipeline combining PII redaction, semantic embedding, binary quantization, and randomized response mechanism to potentially generate non-invertible fingerprints that preserve attack patterns while providing privacy. Our evaluations demonstrate that BinaryShield achieves an F1-score of 0.94, significantly outperforming SimHash (0.77), the privacy-preserving baseline, while achieving 64x storage reduction and 38x faster similarity search compared to dense embeddings.

While third-party libraries are extensively reused to enhance productivity during software development, they can also introduce potential security risks such as vulnerability propagation. Software composition analysis, proposed to identify reused TPLs for reducing such risks, has become an essential procedure within modern DevSecOps. As one of the mainstream SCA techniques, binary-to-source SCA identifies the third-party source projects contained in binary files via binary source code matching, which is a major challenge in reverse engineering since binary and source code exhibit substantial disparities after compilation. The existing binary-to-source SCA techniques leverage basic syntactic features that suffer from redundancy and lack robustness in the large-scale TPL dataset, leading to inevitable false positives and compromised recall. To mitigate these limitations, we introduce BinaryAI, a novel binary-to-source SCA technique with two-phase binary source code matching to capture both syntactic and semantic code features. First, BinaryAI trains a transformer-based model to produce function-level embeddings and obtain similar source functions for each binary function accordingly. Then by applying the link-time locality to facilitate function matching, BinaryAI detects the reused TPLs based on the ratio of matched source functions. Our experimental results demonstrate the superior performance of BinaryAI in terms of binary source code matching and the downstream SCA task. Specifically, our embedding model outperforms the state-of-the-art model CodeCMR, i.e., achieving 22.54% recall@1 and 0.34 MRR compared with 10.75% and 0.17 respectively. Additionally, BinaryAI outperforms all existing binary-to-source SCA tools in TPL detection, increasing the precision from 73.36% to 85.84% and recall from 59.81% to 64.98% compared with the well-recognized commercial SCA product.

Binary code analysis and comprehension is critical to applications in reverse engineering and computer security tasks where source code is not available. Unfortunately, unlike source code, binary code lacks semantics and is more difficult for human engineers to understand and analyze. In this paper, we present ContraBin, a contrastive learning technique that integrates source code and comment information along with binaries to create an embedding capable of aiding binary analysis and comprehension tasks. Specifically, we present three components in ContraBin: (1) a primary contrastive learning method for initial pre-training, (2) a simplex interpolation method to integrate source code, comments, and binary code, and (3) an intermediate representation learning algorithm to train a binary code embedding. We further analyze the impact of human-written and synthetic comments on binary code comprehension tasks, revealing a significant performance disparity. While synthetic comments provide substantial benefits, human-written comments are found to introduce noise, even resulting in performance drops compared to using no comments. These findings reshape the narrative around the role of comment types in binary code analysis. We evaluate the effectiveness of ContraBin through four indicative downstream tasks related to binary code: algorithmic functionality classification, function name recovery, code summarization, and reverse engineering. The results show that ContraBin considerably improves performance on all four tasks, measured by accuracy, mean of average precision, and BLEU scores as appropriate. ContraBin is the first language representation model to incorporate source code, binary code, and comments into contrastive code representation learning and is intended to contribute to the field of binary code analysis. The dataset used in this study is available for further research.

Deep learning research for binary analysis faces a critical infrastructure gap. Today, existing datasets target single platforms, require specialized tooling, or provide only hand-engineered features incompatible with modern neural architectures; no single dataset supports accessible research and pedagogy on realistic use cases. To solve this, we introduce Binary-30K, the first heterogeneous binary dataset designed for sequence-based models like transformers. Critically, Binary-30K covers Windows, Linux, macOS, and Android across 15+ CPU architectures. With 29,793 binaries and approximately 26.93% malware representation, Binary-30K enables research on platform-invariant detection, cross-target transfer learning, and long-context binary understanding. The dataset provides pre-computed byte-level BPE tokenization alongside comprehensive structural metadata, supporting both sequence modeling and structure-aware approaches. Platform-first stratified sampling ensures representative coverage across operating systems and architectures, while distribution via Hugging Face with official train/validation/test splits enables reproducible benchmarking. The dataset is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/mjbommar/binary-30k, providing an accessible resource for researchers, practitioners, and students alike.

LLMs now exhibit human-like skills in various fields, leading to worries about misuse. Thus, detecting generated text is crucial. However, passive detection methods are stuck in domain specificity and limited adversarial robustness. To achieve reliable detection, a watermark-based method was proposed for white-box LLMs, allowing them to embed watermarks during text generation. The method involves randomly dividing the model vocabulary to obtain a special list and adjusting the probability distribution to promote the selection of words in the list. A detection algorithm aware of the list can identify the watermarked text. However, this method is not applicable in many real-world scenarios where only black-box language models are available. For instance, third-parties that develop API-based vertical applications cannot watermark text themselves because API providers only supply generated text and withhold probability distributions to shield their commercial interests. To allow third-parties to autonomously inject watermarks into generated text, we develop a watermarking framework for black-box language model usage scenarios. Specifically, we first define a binary encoding function to compute a random binary encoding corresponding to a word. The encodings computed for non-watermarked text conform to a Bernoulli distribution, wherein the probability of a word representing bit-1 being approximately 0.5. To inject a watermark, we alter the distribution by selectively replacing words representing bit-0 with context-based synonyms that represent bit-1. A statistical test is then used to identify the watermark. Experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method on both Chinese and English datasets. Furthermore, results under re-translation, polishing, word deletion, and synonym substitution attacks reveal that it is arduous to remove the watermark without compromising the original semantics.

Sequence models for binary analysis are bottlenecked by byte-level tokenization: raw bytes waste precious context window capacity for transformers and other neural network architectures, and many existing text-oriented tokenizers fail on arbitrary 0x00--0xFF sequences. To address this issue, we introduce the Binary BPE tokenizer family, a set of cross-platform Byte Pair Encoding (BPE) tokenizers for executables trained on a large corpus of binaries spanning multiple platforms, architectures, and operating systems, including Linux, Windows, macOS, Android, and malware sources. We release trained tokenizers with vocabularies of 4K, 8K, 16K, 32K, and 64K tokens, enabling both systematic scaling studies and practical deployment from resource-constrained edge devices to high-throughput datacenters. These tokenizers discover interpretable patterns (ELF/PE headers, instruction sequences, cross-platform strings) while yielding multi-byte compression per token. On representative uncompressed executables (e.g., ELF/PE/Mach-O rather than compressed APKs), the Binary BPE tokenizers typically allow for roughly 2-3x more binary content per fixed-length transformer context window than raw bytes, enabling more efficient research and practical deployment for content identification, malware detection, reverse engineering, and optimization. We release the trained Binary BPE tokenizers on HuggingFace, providing a drop-in, open-source foundation for binary-focused language models and context-efficient agentic tools.

Image steganography is an information-hiding technique that involves the surreptitious concealment of covert informational content within digital images. In this paper, we introduce {rm SCR{small EED}S{small OLO}}, a novel framework for concealing arbitrary binary data within images. Our approach synergistically leverages Random Shuffling, Fernet Symmetric Encryption, and Reed-Solomon Error Correction Codes to encode the secret payload, which is then discretely embedded into the carrier image using LSB (Least Significant Bit) Steganography. The combination of these methods addresses the vulnerability vectors of both security and resilience against bit-level corruption in the resultant stego-images. We show that our framework achieves a data payload of 3 bits per pixel for an RGB image, and mathematically assess the probability of successful transmission for the amalgamated n message bits and k error correction bits. Additionally, we find that {rm SCR{small EED}S{small OLO}} yields good results upon being evaluated with multiple performance metrics, successfully eludes detection by various passive steganalysis tools, and is immune to simple active steganalysis attacks. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/Starscream-11813/SCReedSolo-Steganography.

Deobfuscating JavaScript (JS) code poses a significant challenge in web security, particularly as obfuscation techniques are frequently used to conceal malicious activities within scripts. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have recently shown promise in automating the deobfuscation process, transforming detection and mitigation strategies against these obfuscated threats, a systematic benchmark to quantify their effectiveness and limitations has been notably absent. To address this gap, we present JsDeObsBench, a dedicated benchmark designed to rigorously evaluate the effectiveness of LLMs in the context of JS deobfuscation. We detail our benchmarking methodology, which includes a wide range of obfuscation techniques ranging from basic variable renaming to sophisticated structure transformations, providing a robust framework for assessing LLM performance in real-world scenarios. Our extensive experimental analysis investigates the proficiency of cutting-edge LLMs, e.g., GPT-4o, Mixtral, Llama, and DeepSeek-Coder, revealing superior performance in code simplification despite challenges in maintaining syntax accuracy and execution reliability compared to baseline methods. We further evaluate the deobfuscation of JS malware to exhibit the potential of LLMs in security scenarios. The findings highlight the utility of LLMs in deobfuscation applications and pinpoint crucial areas for further improvement.

The goal of decompilation is to convert compiled low-level code (e.g., assembly code) back into high-level programming languages, enabling analysis in scenarios where source code is unavailable. This task supports various reverse engineering applications, such as vulnerability identification, malware analysis, and legacy software migration. The end-to-end decompile method based on large langauge models (LLMs) reduces reliance on additional tools and minimizes manual intervention due to its inherent properties. However, previous end-to-end methods often lose critical information necessary for reconstructing control flow structures and variables when processing binary files, making it challenging to accurately recover the program's logic. To address these issues, we propose the ReF Decompile method, which incorporates the following innovations: (1) The Relabelling strategy replaces jump target addresses with labels, preserving control flow clarity. (2) The Function Call strategy infers variable types and retrieves missing variable information from binary files. Experimental results on the Humaneval-Decompile Benchmark demonstrate that ReF Decompile surpasses comparable baselines and achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance of 61.43%.

Recent advances in LLM-based decompilers have been shown effective to convert low-level binaries into human-readable source code. However, there still lacks a comprehensive benchmark that provides large-scale binary-source function pairs, which is critical for advancing the LLM decompilation technology. Creating accurate binary-source mappings incurs severe issues caused by complex compilation settings and widespread function inlining that obscure the correspondence between binaries and their original source code. Previous efforts have either relied on used contest-style benchmarks, synthetic binary-source mappings that diverge significantly from the mappings in real world, or partially matched binaries with only code lines or variable names, compromising the effectiveness of analyzing the binary functionality. To alleviate these issues, we introduce Decompile-Bench, the first open-source dataset comprising two million binary-source function pairs condensed from 100 million collected function pairs, i.e., 450GB of binaries compiled from permissively licensed GitHub projects. For the evaluation purposes, we also developed a benchmark Decompile-Bench-Eval including manually crafted binaries from the well-established HumanEval and MBPP, alongside the compiled GitHub repositories released after 2025 to mitigate data leakage issues. We further explore commonly-used evaluation metrics to provide a thorough assessment of the studied LLM decompilers and find that fine-tuning with Decompile-Bench causes a 20% improvement over previous benchmarks in terms of the re-executability rate. Our code and data has been released in HuggingFace and Github. https://github.com/albertan017/LLM4Decompile

Disassembly is a crucial yet challenging step in binary analysis. While emerging neural disassemblers show promise for efficiency and accuracy, they frequently generate outputs violating fundamental structural constraints, which significantly compromise their practical usability. To address this critical problem, we regularize the disassembly solution space by formalizing and applying key structural constraints based on post-dominance relations. This approach systematically detects widespread errors in existing neural disassemblers' outputs. These errors often originate from models' limited context modeling and instruction-level decoding that neglect global structural integrity. We introduce Tady, a novel neural disassembler featuring an improved model architecture and a dedicated post-processing algorithm, specifically engineered to address these deficiencies. Comprehensive evaluations on diverse binaries demonstrate that Tady effectively eliminates structural constraint violations and functions with high efficiency, while maintaining instruction-level accuracy.

Existing binary corpora typically capture only one or two axes of binary variation: they either provide cross-compiler builds without a temporal axis, or CVE labels for single-build binaries. None combine cross-build diversity, cross-version history, and CVE labels into a queryable structure. We present ASSEMBLAGE-DEEPHISTORY, which consolidates these dimensions into a unified framework where every binary's compilation context, source code, vulnerable functions, and package version are stored as first-class metadata. ASSEMBLAGE-DEEPHISTORY comprises 73,610 binaries spanning 248 open-source projects, compiled across GCC, Clang, and MSVC at multiple optimization levels on Linux and Windows, with multi-year historical builds. Each binary is indexed in a database that links it to its source code, functions, debug info, variant builds, historical versions, and vulnerable functions. Three analyses demonstrate this structure's value: (1) a three-stage LLM benchmark (recognition, strategy-guided detection, and cross-build transfer) to test whether LLMs reason about binary vulnerabilities or pattern-match on build-specific artifacts; (2) a comparison of MalConv embeddings, jTrans function embeddings, and TLSH fuzzy hashes quantifying how same-package versions cluster in each space; and (3) a Bayesian regression decomposing binary similarity into contributions from temporal distance, file changes, and commits.

We propose a new defense mechanism against adversarial attacks inspired by an optical co-processor, providing robustness without compromising natural accuracy in both white-box and black-box settings. This hardware co-processor performs a nonlinear fixed random transformation, where the parameters are unknown and impossible to retrieve with sufficient precision for large enough dimensions. In the white-box setting, our defense works by obfuscating the parameters of the random projection. Unlike other defenses relying on obfuscated gradients, we find we are unable to build a reliable backward differentiable approximation for obfuscated parameters. Moreover, while our model reaches a good natural accuracy with a hybrid backpropagation - synthetic gradient method, the same approach is suboptimal if employed to generate adversarial examples. We find the combination of a random projection and binarization in the optical system also improves robustness against various types of black-box attacks. Finally, our hybrid training method builds robust features against transfer attacks. We demonstrate our approach on a VGG-like architecture, placing the defense on top of the convolutional features, on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100. Code is available at https://github.com/lightonai/adversarial-robustness-by-design.

In recent years, the rise of machine learning (ML) in cybersecurity has brought new challenges, including the increasing threat of backdoor poisoning attacks on ML malware classifiers. For instance, adversaries could inject malicious samples into public malware repositories, contaminating the training data and potentially misclassifying malware by the ML model. Current countermeasures predominantly focus on detecting poisoned samples by leveraging disagreements within the outputs of a diverse set of ensemble models on training data points. However, these methods are not suitable for scenarios where Machine Learning-as-a-Service (MLaaS) is used or when users aim to remove backdoors from a model after it has been trained. Addressing this scenario, we introduce PBP, a post-training defense for malware classifiers that mitigates various types of backdoor embeddings without assuming any specific backdoor embedding mechanism. Our method exploits the influence of backdoor attacks on the activation distribution of neural networks, independent of the trigger-embedding method. In the presence of a backdoor attack, the activation distribution of each layer is distorted into a mixture of distributions. By regulating the statistics of the batch normalization layers, we can guide a backdoored model to perform similarly to a clean one. Our method demonstrates substantial advantages over several state-of-the-art methods, as evidenced by experiments on two datasets, two types of backdoor methods, and various attack configurations. Notably, our approach requires only a small portion of the training data -- only 1\% -- to purify the backdoor and reduce the attack success rate from 100\% to almost 0\%, a 100-fold improvement over the baseline methods. Our code is available at https://github.com/judydnguyen/pbp-backdoor-purification-official.

Quantized neural networks employ reduced precision representations for both weights and activations. This quantization process significantly reduces the memory requirements and computational complexity of the network. Binary Neural Networks (BNNs) are the extreme quantization case, representing values with just one bit. Since the sign function is typically used to map real values to binary values, smooth approximations are introduced to mimic the gradients during error backpropagation. Thus, the mismatch between the forward and backward models corrupts the direction of the gradient, causing training inconsistency problems and performance degradation. In contrast to current BNN approaches, we propose to employ a binary periodic (BiPer) function during binarization. Specifically, we use a square wave for the forward pass to obtain the binary values and employ the trigonometric sine function with the same period of the square wave as a differentiable surrogate during the backward pass. We demonstrate that this approach can control the quantization error by using the frequency of the periodic function and improves network performance. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of BiPer in benchmark datasets and network architectures, with improvements of up to 1% and 0.69% with respect to state-of-the-art methods in the classification task over CIFAR-10 and ImageNet, respectively. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/edmav4/BiPer.

Binary Neural Network (BNN) represents convolution weights with 1-bit values, which enhances the efficiency of storage and computation. This paper is motivated by a previously revealed phenomenon that the binary kernels in successful BNNs are nearly power-law distributed: their values are mostly clustered into a small number of codewords. This phenomenon encourages us to compact typical BNNs and obtain further close performance through learning non-repetitive kernels within a binary kernel subspace. Specifically, we regard the binarization process as kernel grouping in terms of a binary codebook, and our task lies in learning to select a smaller subset of codewords from the full codebook. We then leverage the Gumbel-Sinkhorn technique to approximate the codeword selection process, and develop the Permutation Straight-Through Estimator (PSTE) that is able to not only optimize the selection process end-to-end but also maintain the non-repetitive occupancy of selected codewords. Experiments verify that our method reduces both the model size and bit-wise computational costs, and achieves accuracy improvements compared with state-of-the-art BNNs under comparable budgets.

The widespread lack of broad source code verification on blockchain explorers such as Etherscan, where despite 78,047,845 smart contracts deployed on Ethereum (as of May 26, 2025), a mere 767,520 (< 1%) are open source, presents a severe impediment to blockchain security. This opacity necessitates the automated semantic analysis of on-chain smart contract bytecode, a fundamental research challenge with direct implications for identifying vulnerabilities and understanding malicious behavior. Prevailing decompilers struggle to reverse bytecode in a readable manner, often yielding convoluted code that critically hampers vulnerability analysis and thwarts efforts to dissect contract functionalities for security auditing. This paper addresses this challenge by introducing a pioneering decompilation pipeline that, for the first time, successfully leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) to transform Ethereum Virtual Machine (EVM) bytecode into human-readable and semantically faithful Solidity code. Our novel methodology first employs rigorous static program analysis to convert bytecode into a structured three-address code (TAC) representation. This intermediate representation then guides a Llama-3.2-3B model, specifically fine-tuned on a comprehensive dataset of 238,446 TAC-to-Solidity function pairs, to generate high-quality Solidity. This approach uniquely recovers meaningful variable names, intricate control flow, and precise function signatures. Our extensive empirical evaluation demonstrates a significant leap beyond traditional decompilers, achieving an average semantic similarity of 0.82 with original source and markedly superior readability. The practical viability and effectiveness of our research are demonstrated through its implementation in a publicly accessible system, available at https://evmdecompiler.com.

Reverse engineering binaries is required to understand and analyse programs for which the source code is unavailable. Decompilers can transform the largely unreadable binaries into a more readable source code-like representation. However, reverse engineering is time-consuming, much of which is taken up by labelling the functions with semantic information. While the automated summarisation of decompiled code can help Reverse Engineers understand and analyse binaries, current work mainly focuses on summarising source code, and no suitable dataset exists for this task. In this work, we extend large pre-trained language models of source code to summarise decompiled binary functions. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of input and data properties on the performance of such models. Our approach consists of two main components; the data and the model. We first build CAPYBARA, a dataset of 214K decompiled function-documentation pairs across various compiler optimisations. We extend CAPYBARA further by generating synthetic datasets and deduplicating the data. Next, we fine-tune the CodeT5 base model with CAPYBARA to create BinT5. BinT5 achieves the state-of-the-art BLEU-4 score of 60.83, 58.82, and 44.21 for summarising source, decompiled, and synthetically stripped decompiled code, respectively. This indicates that these models can be extended to decompiled binaries successfully. Finally, we found that the performance of BinT5 is not heavily dependent on the dataset size and compiler optimisation level. We recommend future research to further investigate transferring knowledge when working with less expressive input formats such as stripped binaries.

Recently, Deep Learning (DL) models have been increasingly deployed on end-user devices as On-Device AI, offering improved efficiency and privacy. However, this deployment trend poses more serious Intellectual Property (IP) risks, as models are distributed on numerous local devices, making them vulnerable to theft and redistribution. Most existing ownership protection solutions (e.g., backdoor-based watermarking) are designed for cloud-based AI-as-a-Service (AIaaS) and are not directly applicable to large-scale distribution scenarios, where each user-specific model instance must carry a unique watermark. These methods typically embed a fixed watermark, and modifying the embedded watermark requires retraining the model. To address these challenges, we propose Hot-Swap MarkBoard, an efficient watermarking method. It encodes user-specific n-bit binary signatures by independently embedding multiple watermarks into a multi-branch Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) module, enabling efficient watermark customization without retraining through branch swapping. A parameter obfuscation mechanism further entangles the watermark weights with those of the base model, preventing removal without degrading model performance. The method supports black-box verification and is compatible with various model architectures and DL tasks, including classification, image generation, and text generation. Extensive experiments across three types of tasks and six backbone models demonstrate our method's superior efficiency and adaptability compared to existing approaches, achieving 100\% verification accuracy.

Binary code similarity detection (BCSD) has important applications in various fields such as vulnerability detection, software component analysis, and reverse engineering. Recent studies have shown that deep neural networks (DNNs) can comprehend instructions or control-flow graphs (CFG) of binary code and support BCSD. In this study, we propose a novel Transformer-based approach, namely jTrans, to learn representations of binary code. It is the first solution that embeds control flow information of binary code into Transformer-based language models, by using a novel jump-aware representation of the analyzed binaries and a newly-designed pre-training task. Additionally, we release to the community a newly-created large dataset of binaries, BinaryCorp, which is the most diverse to date. Evaluation results show that jTrans outperforms state-of-the-art (SOTA) approaches on this more challenging dataset by 30.5% (i.e., from 32.0% to 62.5%). In a real-world task of known vulnerability searching, jTrans achieves a recall that is 2X higher than existing SOTA baselines.

LLM-agent based binary code analysis has demonstrated significant potential across a wide range of software security scenarios, including vulnerability detection, malware analysis, etc. In agent workflow, however, retrieving the positive from thousands of stripped binary functions based on user query remains under-studied and challenging, as the absence of symbolic information distinguishes it from source code retrieval. In this paper, we introduce, BinSeek, the first two-stage cross-modal retrieval framework for stripped binary code analysis. It consists of two models: BinSeekEmbedding is trained on large-scale dataset to learn the semantic relevance of the binary code and the natural language description, furthermore, BinSeek-Reranker learns to carefully judge the relevance of the candidate code to the description with context augmentation. To this end, we built an LLM-based data synthesis pipeline to automate training construction, also deriving a domain benchmark for future research. Our evaluation results show that BinSeek achieved the state-of-the-art performance, surpassing the the same scale models by 31.42% in Rec@3 and 27.17% in MRR@3, as well as leading the advanced general-purpose models that have 16 times larger parameters.

Generating synthetic tabular data is critical in machine learning, especially when real data is limited or sensitive. Traditional generative models often face challenges due to the unique characteristics of tabular data, such as mixed data types and varied distributions, and require complex preprocessing or large pretrained models. In this paper, we introduce a novel, lossless binary transformation method that converts any tabular data into fixed-size binary representations, and a corresponding new generative model called Binary Diffusion, specifically designed for binary data. Binary Diffusion leverages the simplicity of XOR operations for noise addition and removal and employs binary cross-entropy loss for training. Our approach eliminates the need for extensive preprocessing, complex noise parameter tuning, and pretraining on large datasets. We evaluate our model on several popular tabular benchmark datasets, demonstrating that Binary Diffusion outperforms existing state-of-the-art models on Travel, Adult Income, and Diabetes datasets while being significantly smaller in size.

Digital image steganalysis, or the detection of image steganography, has been studied in depth for years and is driven by Advanced Persistent Threat (APT) groups', such as APT37 Reaper, utilization of steganographic techniques to transmit additional malware to perform further post-exploitation activity on a compromised host. However, many steganalysis algorithms are constrained to work with only a subset of all possible images in the wild or are known to produce a high false positive rate. This results in blocking any suspected image being an unreasonable policy. A more feasible policy is to filter suspicious images prior to reception by the host machine. However, how does one optimally filter specifically to obfuscate or remove image steganography while avoiding degradation of visual image quality in the case that detection of the image was a false positive? We propose the Deep Digital Steganography Purifier (DDSP), a Generative Adversarial Network (GAN) which is optimized to destroy steganographic content without compromising the perceptual quality of the original image. As verified by experimental results, our model is capable of providing a high rate of destruction of steganographic image content while maintaining a high visual quality in comparison to other state-of-the-art filtering methods. Additionally, we test the transfer learning capability of generalizing to to obfuscate real malware payloads embedded into different image file formats and types using an unseen steganographic algorithm and prove that our model can in fact be deployed to provide adequate results.

We question the current evaluation practice on diffusion-based purification methods. Diffusion-based purification methods aim to remove adversarial effects from an input data point at test time. The approach gains increasing attention as an alternative to adversarial training due to the disentangling between training and testing. Well-known white-box attacks are often employed to measure the robustness of the purification. However, it is unknown whether these attacks are the most effective for the diffusion-based purification since the attacks are often tailored for adversarial training. We analyze the current practices and provide a new guideline for measuring the robustness of purification methods against adversarial attacks. Based on our analysis, we further propose a new purification strategy improving robustness compared to the current diffusion-based purification methods.

Understanding properties of deep neural networks is an important challenge in deep learning. In this paper, we take a step in this direction by proposing a rigorous way of verifying properties of a popular class of neural networks, Binarized Neural Networks, using the well-developed means of Boolean satisfiability. Our main contribution is a construction that creates a representation of a binarized neural network as a Boolean formula. Our encoding is the first exact Boolean representation of a deep neural network. Using this encoding, we leverage the power of modern SAT solvers along with a proposed counterexample-guided search procedure to verify various properties of these networks. A particular focus will be on the critical property of robustness to adversarial perturbations. For this property, our experimental results demonstrate that our approach scales to medium-size deep neural networks used in image classification tasks. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work on verifying properties of deep neural networks using an exact Boolean encoding of the network.

This paper proposes LATTE, the first static binary taint analysis that is powered by a large language model (LLM). LATTE is superior to the state of the art (e.g., Emtaint, Arbiter, Karonte) in three aspects. First, LATTE is fully automated while prior static binary taint analyzers need rely on human expertise to manually customize taint propagation rules and vulnerability inspection rules. Second, LATTE is significantly effective in vulnerability detection, demonstrated by our comprehensive evaluations. For example, LATTE has found 37 new bugs in real-world firmware which the baselines failed to find, and 7 of them have been assigned CVE numbers. Lastly, LATTE incurs remarkably low engineering cost, making it a cost-efficient and scalable solution for security researchers and practitioners. We strongly believe that LATTE opens up a new direction to harness the recent advance in LLMs to improve vulnerability analysis for binary programs.

This paper proposes a simple method to distill and detect backdoor patterns within an image: Cognitive Distillation (CD). The idea is to extract the "minimal essence" from an input image responsible for the model's prediction. CD optimizes an input mask to extract a small pattern from the input image that can lead to the same model output (i.e., logits or deep features). The extracted pattern can help understand the cognitive mechanism of a model on clean vs. backdoor images and is thus called a Cognitive Pattern (CP). Using CD and the distilled CPs, we uncover an interesting phenomenon of backdoor attacks: despite the various forms and sizes of trigger patterns used by different attacks, the CPs of backdoor samples are all surprisingly and suspiciously small. One thus can leverage the learned mask to detect and remove backdoor examples from poisoned training datasets. We conduct extensive experiments to show that CD can robustly detect a wide range of advanced backdoor attacks. We also show that CD can potentially be applied to help detect potential biases from face datasets. Code is available at https://github.com/HanxunH/CognitiveDistillation.

As backdoor attacks become more stealthy and robust, they reveal critical weaknesses in current defense strategies: detection methods often rely on coarse-grained feature statistics, and purification methods typically require full retraining or additional clean models. To address these challenges, we propose DUP (Detection-guided Unlearning for Purification), a unified framework that integrates backdoor detection with unlearning-based purification. The detector captures feature-level anomalies by jointly leveraging class-agnostic distances and inter-layer transitions. These deviations are integrated through a weighted scheme to identify poisoned inputs, enabling more fine-grained analysis. Based on the detection results, we purify the model through a parameter-efficient unlearning mechanism that avoids full retraining and does not require any external clean model. Specifically, we innovatively repurpose knowledge distillation to guide the student model toward increasing its output divergence from the teacher on detected poisoned samples, effectively forcing it to unlearn the backdoor behavior. Extensive experiments across diverse attack methods and language model architectures demonstrate that DUP achieves superior defense performance in detection accuracy and purification efficacy. Our code is available at https://github.com/ManHu2025/DUP.

Binary neural networks utilize 1-bit quantized weights and activations to reduce both the model's storage demands and computational burden. However, advanced binary architectures still incorporate millions of inefficient and nonhardware-friendly full-precision multiplication operations. A&B BNN is proposed to directly remove part of the multiplication operations in a traditional BNN and replace the rest with an equal number of bit operations, introducing the mask layer and the quantized RPReLU structure based on the normalizer-free network architecture. The mask layer can be removed during inference by leveraging the intrinsic characteristics of BNN with straightforward mathematical transformations to avoid the associated multiplication operations. The quantized RPReLU structure enables more efficient bit operations by constraining its slope to be integer powers of 2. Experimental results achieved 92.30%, 69.35%, and 66.89% on the CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet datasets, respectively, which are competitive with the state-of-the-art. Ablation studies have verified the efficacy of the quantized RPReLU structure, leading to a 1.14% enhancement on the ImageNet compared to using a fixed slope RLeakyReLU. The proposed add&bit-operation-only BNN offers an innovative approach for hardware-friendly network architecture.

Deep Neural Networks (DNN) have achieved state-of-the-art results in a wide range of tasks, with the best results obtained with large training sets and large models. In the past, GPUs enabled these breakthroughs because of their greater computational speed. In the future, faster computation at both training and test time is likely to be crucial for further progress and for consumer applications on low-power devices. As a result, there is much interest in research and development of dedicated hardware for Deep Learning (DL). Binary weights, i.e., weights which are constrained to only two possible values (e.g. -1 or 1), would bring great benefits to specialized DL hardware by replacing many multiply-accumulate operations by simple accumulations, as multipliers are the most space and power-hungry components of the digital implementation of neural networks. We introduce BinaryConnect, a method which consists in training a DNN with binary weights during the forward and backward propagations, while retaining precision of the stored weights in which gradients are accumulated. Like other dropout schemes, we show that BinaryConnect acts as regularizer and we obtain near state-of-the-art results with BinaryConnect on the permutation-invariant MNIST, CIFAR-10 and SVHN.

With the advancement of diffusion models (DMs) and the substantially increased computational requirements, quantization emerges as a practical solution to obtain compact and efficient low-bit DMs. However, the highly discrete representation leads to severe accuracy degradation, hindering the quantization of diffusion models to ultra-low bit-widths. In this paper, we propose BinaryDM, a novel accurate quantization-aware training approach to push the weights of diffusion models towards the limit of 1-bit. Firstly, we present a Learnable Multi-basis Binarizer (LMB) to recover the representations generated by the binarized DM, which improves the information in details of representations crucial to the DM. Secondly, a Low-rank Representation Mimicking (LRM) is applied to enhance the binarization-aware optimization of the DM, alleviating the optimization direction ambiguity caused by fine-grained alignment. Moreover, a progressive initialization strategy is applied to training DMs to avoid convergence difficulties. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that BinaryDM achieves significant accuracy and efficiency gains compared to SOTA quantization methods of DMs under ultra-low bit-widths. As the first binarization method for diffusion models, BinaryDM achieves impressive 16.0 times FLOPs and 27.1 times storage savings with 1-bit weight and 4-bit activation, showcasing its substantial advantages and potential for deploying DMs on resource-limited scenarios.

Breakthroughs in machine learning (ML) and advances in quantum computing (QC) drive the interdisciplinary field of quantum machine learning to new levels. However, due to the susceptibility of ML models to adversarial attacks, practical use raises safety-critical concerns. Existing Randomized Smoothing (RS) certification methods for classical machine learning models are computationally intensive. In this paper, we propose the combination of QC and the concept of discrete randomized smoothing to speed up the stochastic certification of ML models for discrete data. We show how to encode all the perturbations of the input binary data in superposition and use Quantum Amplitude Estimation (QAE) to obtain a quadratic reduction in the number of calls to the model that are required compared to traditional randomized smoothing techniques. In addition, we propose a new binary threat model to allow for an extensive evaluation of our approach on images, graphs, and text.

Data de-identification makes it possible to glean insights from data while preserving user privacy. The use of Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) allow for the execution of de-identification applications on the cloud without the need for a user to trust the third-party application provider. In this paper, we present SPIDEr - Secure Pipeline for Information De-Identification with End-to-End Encryption, our implementation of an end-to-end encrypted data de-identification pipeline. SPIDEr supports classical anonymisation techniques such as suppression, pseudonymisation, generalisation, and aggregation, as well as techniques that offer a formal privacy guarantee such as k-anonymisation and differential privacy. To enable scalability and improve performance on constrained TEE hardware, we enable batch processing of data for differential privacy computations. We present our design of the control flows for end-to-end secure execution of de-identification operations within a TEE. As part of the control flow for running SPIDEr within the TEE, we perform attestation, a process that verifies that the software binaries were properly instantiated on a known, trusted platform.

Automatically generating function summaries for binaries is an extremely valuable but challenging task, since it involves translating the execution behavior and semantics of the low-level language (assembly code) into human-readable natural language. However, most current works on understanding assembly code are oriented towards generating function names, which involve numerous abbreviations that make them still confusing. To bridge this gap, we focus on generating complete summaries for binary functions, especially for stripped binary (no symbol table and debug information in reality). To fully exploit the semantics of assembly code, we present a control flow graph and pseudo code guided binary code summarization framework called CP-BCS. CP-BCS utilizes a bidirectional instruction-level control flow graph and pseudo code that incorporates expert knowledge to learn the comprehensive binary function execution behavior and logic semantics. We evaluate CP-BCS on 3 different binary optimization levels (O1, O2, and O3) for 3 different computer architectures (X86, X64, and ARM). The evaluation results demonstrate CP-BCS is superior and significantly improves the efficiency of reverse engineering.

The effectiveness of an AI model in accurately classifying novel malware hinges on the quality of the features it is trained on, which in turn depends on the effectiveness of the analysis tool used. Peekaboo, a Dynamic Binary Instrumentation (DBI) tool, defeats malware evasion techniques to capture authentic behavior at the Assembly (ASM) instruction level. This behavior exhibits patterns consistent with Zipf's law, a distribution commonly seen in natural languages, making Transformer models particularly effective for binary classification tasks. We introduce Alpha, a framework for zero day malware detection that leverages Transformer models and ASM language. Alpha is trained on malware and benign software data collected through Peekaboo, enabling it to identify entirely new samples with exceptional accuracy. Alpha eliminates any common functions from the test samples that are in the training dataset. This forces the model to rely on contextual patterns and novel ASM instruction combinations to detect malicious behavior, rather than memorizing familiar features. By combining the strengths of DBI, ASM analysis, and Transformer architectures, Alpha offers a powerful approach to proactively addressing the evolving threat of malware. Alpha demonstrates perfect accuracy for Ransomware, Worms and APTs with flawless classification for both malicious and benign samples. The results highlight the model's exceptional performance in detecting truly new malware samples.

Reverse engineering (RE) is central to software security, particularly for cryptographic programs that handle sensitive data and are highly prone to vulnerabilities. It supports critical tasks such as vulnerability discovery and malware analysis. Despite its importance, RE remains labor-intensive and requires substantial expertise, making large language models (LLMs) a potential solution for automating the process. However, their capabilities for RE remain systematically underexplored. To address this gap, we study the cryptographic binary RE capabilities of LLMs and introduce CREBench, a benchmark comprising 432 challenges built from 48 standard cryptographic algorithms, 3 insecure crypto key usage scenarios, and 3 difficulty levels. Each challenge follows a Capture-the-Flag (CTF) RE challenge, requiring the model to analyze the underlying cryptographic logic and recover the correct input. We design an evaluation framework comprising four sub-tasks, from algorithm identification to correct flag recovery. We evaluate eight frontier LLMs on CREBench. GPT-5.4, the best-performing model, achieves 64.03 out of 100 and recovers the flag in 59\% of challenges. We also establish a strong human expert baseline of 92.19 points, showing that humans maintain an advantage in cryptographic RE tasks. Our code and dataset are available at https://github.com/wangyu-ovo/CREBench.

We revisit watermarking techniques based on pre-trained deep networks, in the light of self-supervised approaches. We present a way to embed both marks and binary messages into their latent spaces, leveraging data augmentation at marking time. Our method can operate at any resolution and creates watermarks robust to a broad range of transformations (rotations, crops, JPEG, contrast, etc). It significantly outperforms the previous zero-bit methods, and its performance on multi-bit watermarking is on par with state-of-the-art encoder-decoder architectures trained end-to-end for watermarking. The code is available at github.com/facebookresearch/ssl_watermarking

Network binarization emerges as one of the most promising compression approaches offering extraordinary computation and memory savings by minimizing the bit-width. However, recent research has shown that applying existing binarization algorithms to diverse tasks, architectures, and hardware in realistic scenarios is still not straightforward. Common challenges of binarization, such as accuracy degradation and efficiency limitation, suggest that its attributes are not fully understood. To close this gap, we present BiBench, a rigorously designed benchmark with in-depth analysis for network binarization. We first carefully scrutinize the requirements of binarization in the actual production and define evaluation tracks and metrics for a comprehensive and fair investigation. Then, we evaluate and analyze a series of milestone binarization algorithms that function at the operator level and with extensive influence. Our benchmark reveals that 1) the binarized operator has a crucial impact on the performance and deployability of binarized networks; 2) the accuracy of binarization varies significantly across different learning tasks and neural architectures; 3) binarization has demonstrated promising efficiency potential on edge devices despite the limited hardware support. The results and analysis also lead to a promising paradigm for accurate and efficient binarization. We believe that BiBench will contribute to the broader adoption of binarization and serve as a foundation for future research. The code for our BiBench is released https://github.com/htqin/BiBench .

Binary analysis plays a pivotal role in security domains such as malware detection and vulnerability discovery, yet it remains labor-intensive and heavily reliant on expert knowledge. General-purpose large language models (LLMs) perform well in programming analysis on source code, while binaryspecific LLMs are underexplored. In this work, we present ReCopilot, an expert LLM designed for binary analysis tasks. ReCopilot integrates binary code knowledge through a meticulously constructed dataset, encompassing continue pretraining (CPT), supervised fine-tuning (SFT), and direct preference optimization (DPO) stages. It leverages variable data flow and call graph to enhance context awareness and employs test-time scaling to improve reasoning capabilities. Evaluations on a comprehensive binary analysis benchmark demonstrate that ReCopilot achieves state-of-the-art performance in tasks such as function name recovery and variable type inference on the decompiled pseudo code, outperforming both existing tools and LLMs by 13%. Our findings highlight the effectiveness of domain-specific training and context enhancement, while also revealing challenges in building super long chain-of-thought. ReCopilot represents a significant step toward automating binary analysis with interpretable and scalable AI assistance in this domain.

The rapid advancement of speech generation models has heightened privacy and security concerns related to voice cloning (VC). Recent studies have investigated disrupting unauthorized voice cloning by introducing adversarial perturbations. However, determined attackers can mitigate these protective perturbations and successfully execute VC. In this study, we conduct the first systematic evaluation of these protective perturbations against VC under realistic threat models that include perturbation purification. Our findings reveal that while existing purification methods can neutralize a considerable portion of the protective perturbations, they still lead to distortions in the feature space of VC models, which degrades the performance of VC. From this perspective, we propose a novel two-stage purification method: (1) Purify the perturbed speech; (2) Refine it using phoneme guidance to align it with the clean speech distribution. Experimental results demonstrate that our method outperforms state-of-the-art purification methods in disrupting VC defenses. Our study reveals the limitations of adversarial perturbation-based VC defenses and underscores the urgent need for more robust solutions to mitigate the security and privacy risks posed by VC. The code and audio samples are available at https://de-antifake.github.io.

Machine Learning (ML) models have been utilized for malware detection for over two decades. Consequently, this ignited an ongoing arms race between malware authors and antivirus systems, compelling researchers to propose defenses for malware-detection models against evasion attacks. However, most if not all existing defenses against evasion attacks suffer from sizable performance degradation and/or can defend against only specific attacks, which makes them less practical in real-world settings. In this work, we develop a certified defense, DRSM (De-Randomized Smoothed MalConv), by redesigning the de-randomized smoothing technique for the domain of malware detection. Specifically, we propose a window ablation scheme to provably limit the impact of adversarial bytes while maximally preserving local structures of the executables. After showing how DRSM is theoretically robust against attacks with contiguous adversarial bytes, we verify its performance and certified robustness experimentally, where we observe only marginal accuracy drops as the cost of robustness. To our knowledge, we are the first to offer certified robustness in the realm of static detection of malware executables. More surprisingly, through evaluating DRSM against 9 empirical attacks of different types, we observe that the proposed defense is empirically robust to some extent against a diverse set of attacks, some of which even fall out of the scope of its original threat model. In addition, we collected 15.5K recent benign raw executables from diverse sources, which will be made public as a dataset called PACE (Publicly Accessible Collection(s) of Executables) to alleviate the scarcity of publicly available benign datasets for studying malware detection and provide future research with more representative data of the time.

Recent studies show that diffusion models (DMs) are vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Existing backdoor attacks impose unconcealed triggers (e.g., a gray box and eyeglasses) that contain evident patterns, rendering remarkable attack effects yet easy detection upon human inspection and defensive algorithms. While it is possible to improve stealthiness by reducing the strength of the backdoor, doing so can significantly compromise its generality and effectiveness. In this paper, we propose UIBDiffusion, the universal imperceptible backdoor attack for diffusion models, which allows us to achieve superior attack and generation performance while evading state-of-the-art defenses. We propose a novel trigger generation approach based on universal adversarial perturbations (UAPs) and reveal that such perturbations, which are initially devised for fooling pre-trained discriminative models, can be adapted as potent imperceptible backdoor triggers for DMs. We evaluate UIBDiffusion on multiple types of DMs with different kinds of samplers across various datasets and targets. Experimental results demonstrate that UIBDiffusion brings three advantages: 1) Universality, the imperceptible trigger is universal (i.e., image and model agnostic) where a single trigger is effective to any images and all diffusion models with different samplers; 2) Utility, it achieves comparable generation quality (e.g., FID) and even better attack success rate (i.e., ASR) at low poison rates compared to the prior works; and 3) Undetectability, UIBDiffusion is plausible to human perception and can bypass Elijah and TERD, the SOTA defenses against backdoors for DMs. We will release our backdoor triggers and code.

Fully Homomorphic Encryption (FHE) is an encryption scheme that allows for computation to be performed directly on encrypted data, effectively closing the loop on secure and outsourced computing. Data is encrypted not only during rest and transit, but also during processing. However, FHE provides a limited instruction set: SIMD addition, SIMD multiplication, and cyclic rotation of 1-D vectors. This restriction makes performing multi-dimensional tensor operations challenging. Practitioners must pack these tensors into 1-D vectors and map tensor operations onto this one-dimensional layout rather than their traditional nested structure. And while prior systems have made significant strides in automating this process, they often hide critical packing decisions behind layers of abstraction, making debugging, optimizing, and building on top of these systems difficult. In this work, we approach multi-dimensional tensor operations in FHE through Einstein summation (einsum) notation. Einsum notation explicitly encodes dimensional structure and operations in its syntax, naturally exposing how tensors should be packed and transformed. We decompose einsum expressions into a fixed set of FHE-friendly operations. We implement our design and present EinHops, a minimalist system that factors einsum expressions into a fixed sequence of FHE operations. EinHops enables developers to perform encrypted tensor operations using FHE while maintaining full visibility into the underlying packing strategy. We evaluate EinHops on a range of tensor operations from a simple transpose to complex multi-dimensional contractions. We show that the explicit nature of einsum notation allows us to build an FHE tensor system that is simple, general, and interpretable. We open-source EinHops at the following repository: https://github.com/baahl-nyu/einhops.

We report a way to make a frozen small language model both more capable and dramatically cheaper at once, without changing any weights. Verified knowledge is deposited once as a byte-exact key-value (KV) state artifact and later restored, by graft, into a fresh inference context. The restore is bit-exact: under a pinned deterministic configuration, the grafted logits are byte-for-byte identical to a fresh computation (SHA-256 equality), with zero KL divergence and 100% argmax agreement over fifty samples. We show that own-position graft is the unique numerically exact operating point on a model with floating-point rotary encoding, and we verify byte-exactness on two model scales (12B, 31B) and two GPU targets, one through a pre-registered replay. On AIME 2025, a frozen Gemma-4-12B moves from 80.0% to 93.3% once a verified solution library is grafted, above its own 77.5% and its 31B sibling's 89.2% published anchors. On the recurring case, eight problems the base model never solves within a 401,026-token budget are answered from cached verified solutions in 61 total decode tokens, a factor of 6,574 fewer tokens and about 8,700x less energy; the capability claim proper rests on held-out transfer (7 of 7 at 31B). The same byte-exact store widens usable context from 32,768 to 2,854,766 tokens at zero extra accelerator memory, and moves byte-identical between machines of the same architecture. We describe the system at the behavior level; the engine is proprietary, and every reported number is backed by committed input and output hashes so the scoring can be re-checked without it.

Anonymized data is highly valuable to both businesses and researchers. A large body of research has however shown the strong limits of the de-identification release-and-forget model, where data is anonymized and shared. This has led to the development of privacy-preserving query-based systems. Based on the idea of "sticky noise", Diffix has been recently proposed as a novel query-based mechanism satisfying alone the EU Article~29 Working Party's definition of anonymization. According to its authors, Diffix adds less noise to answers than solutions based on differential privacy while allowing for an unlimited number of queries. This paper presents a new class of noise-exploitation attacks, exploiting the noise added by the system to infer private information about individuals in the dataset. Our first differential attack uses samples extracted from Diffix in a likelihood ratio test to discriminate between two probability distributions. We show that using this attack against a synthetic best-case dataset allows us to infer private information with 89.4% accuracy using only 5 attributes. Our second cloning attack uses dummy conditions that conditionally strongly affect the output of the query depending on the value of the private attribute. Using this attack on four real-world datasets, we show that we can infer private attributes of at least 93% of the users in the dataset with accuracy between 93.3% and 97.1%, issuing a median of 304 queries per user. We show how to optimize this attack, targeting 55.4% of the users and achieving 91.7% accuracy, using a maximum of only 32 queries per user. Our attacks demonstrate that adding data-dependent noise, as done by Diffix, is not sufficient to prevent inference of private attributes. We furthermore argue that Diffix alone fails to satisfy Art. 29 WP's definition of anonymization. [...]

Training against white-box deception detectors has been proposed as a way to make AI systems honest. However, such training risks models learning to obfuscate their deception to evade the detector. Prior work has studied obfuscation only in artificial settings where models were directly rewarded for harmful output. We construct a realistic coding environment where reward hacking via hardcoding test cases naturally occurs, and show that obfuscation emerges in this setting. We introduce a taxonomy of possible outcomes when training against a deception detector. The model either remains honest, or becomes deceptive via two possible obfuscation strategies. (i) Obfuscated activations: the model outputs deceptive text while modifying its internal representations to no longer trigger the detector. (ii) Obfuscated policy: the model outputs deceptive text that evades the detector, typically by including a justification for the reward hack. Empirically, obfuscated activations arise from representation drift during RL, with or without a detector penalty. The probe penalty only incentivizes obfuscated policies; we theoretically show this is expected for policy gradient methods. Sufficiently high KL regularization and detector penalty can yield honest policies, establishing white-box deception detectors as viable training signals for tasks prone to reward hacking.

Package confusion attacks such as typosquatting threaten software supply chains. Attackers make packages with names that syntactically or semantically resemble legitimate ones, tricking engineers into installing malware. While prior work has developed defenses against package confusions in some software package registries, notably NPM, PyPI, and RubyGems, gaps remain: high false-positive rates; generalization to more software package ecosystems; and insights from real-world deployment. In this work, we introduce ConfuGuard, a solution designed to address the challenges posed by package confusion threats. We begin by presenting the first empirical analysis of benign signals derived from prior package confusion data, uncovering their threat patterns, engineering practices, and measurable attributes. We observed that 13.3% of real package confusion attacks are initially stealthy, so we take that into consideration and refined the definitions. Building on state-of-the-art approaches, we extend support from three to six software package registries, and leverage package metadata to distinguish benign packages. Our approach significantly reduces 64% false-positive (from 77% to 13%), with acceptable additional overhead to filter out benign packages by analyzing the package metadata. ConfuGuard is in production at our industry partner, whose analysts have already confirmed 301 packages detected by ConfuGuard as real attacks. We share lessons learned from production and provide insights to researchers.

Backdoor inversion, the process of finding a backdoor trigger inserted into a machine learning model, has become the pillar of many backdoor detection and defense methods. Previous works on backdoor inversion often recover the backdoor through an optimization process to flip a support set of clean images into the target class. However, it is rarely studied and understood how large this support set should be to recover a successful backdoor. In this work, we show that one can reliably recover the backdoor trigger with as few as a single image. Specifically, we propose the SmoothInv method, which first constructs a robust smoothed version of the backdoored classifier and then performs guided image synthesis towards the target class to reveal the backdoor pattern. SmoothInv requires neither an explicit modeling of the backdoor via a mask variable, nor any complex regularization schemes, which has become the standard practice in backdoor inversion methods. We perform both quantitaive and qualitative study on backdoored classifiers from previous published backdoor attacks. We demonstrate that compared to existing methods, SmoothInv is able to recover successful backdoors from single images, while maintaining high fidelity to the original backdoor. We also show how we identify the target backdoored class from the backdoored classifier. Last, we propose and analyze two countermeasures to our approach and show that SmoothInv remains robust in the face of an adaptive attacker. Our code is available at https://github.com/locuslab/smoothinv .

Diffusion models have achieved remarkable progress in both image generation and editing. However, recent studies have revealed their vulnerability to backdoor attacks, in which specific patterns embedded in the input can manipulate the model's behavior. Most existing research in this area has proposed attack frameworks focused on the image generation pipeline, leaving backdoor attacks in image editing relatively unexplored. Among the few studies targeting image editing, most utilize visible triggers, which are impractical because they introduce noticeable alterations to the input image before editing. In this paper, we propose a novel attack framework that embeds invisible triggers into the image editing process via poisoned training data. We leverage off-the-shelf deep watermarking models to encode imperceptible watermarks as backdoor triggers. Our goal is to make the model produce the predefined backdoor target when it receives watermarked inputs, while editing clean images normally according to the given prompt. With extensive experiments across different watermarking models, the proposed method achieves promising attack success rates. In addition, the analysis results of the watermark characteristics in term of backdoor attack further support the effectiveness of our approach. The code is available at:https://github.com/aiiu-lab/BackdoorImageEditing

Binarization of neural networks is a dominant paradigm in neural networks compression. The pioneering work BinaryConnect uses Straight Through Estimator (STE) to mimic the gradients of the sign function, but it also causes the crucial inconsistency problem. Most of the previous methods design different estimators instead of STE to mitigate it. However, they ignore the fact that when reducing the estimating error, the gradient stability will decrease concomitantly. These highly divergent gradients will harm the model training and increase the risk of gradient vanishing and gradient exploding. To fully take the gradient stability into consideration, we present a new perspective to the BNNs training, regarding it as the equilibrium between the estimating error and the gradient stability. In this view, we firstly design two indicators to quantitatively demonstrate the equilibrium phenomenon. In addition, in order to balance the estimating error and the gradient stability well, we revise the original straight through estimator and propose a power function based estimator, Rectified Straight Through Estimator (ReSTE for short). Comparing to other estimators, ReSTE is rational and capable of flexibly balancing the estimating error with the gradient stability. Extensive experiments on CIFAR-10 and ImageNet datasets show that ReSTE has excellent performance and surpasses the state-of-the-art methods without any auxiliary modules or losses.

We propose an imperceptible multi-bit text watermark embedded by paraphrasing with LLMs. We fine-tune a pair of LLM paraphrasers that are designed to behave differently so that their paraphrasing difference reflected in the text semantics can be identified by a trained decoder. To embed our multi-bit watermark, we use two paraphrasers alternatively to encode the pre-defined binary code at the sentence level. Then we use a text classifier as the decoder to decode each bit of the watermark. Through extensive experiments, we show that our watermarks can achieve over 99.99\% detection AUC with small (1.1B) text paraphrasers while keeping the semantic information of the original sentence. More importantly, our pipeline is robust under word substitution and sentence paraphrasing perturbations and generalizes well to out-of-distributional data. We also show the stealthiness of our watermark with LLM-based evaluation. We open-source the code: https://github.com/xiaojunxu/multi-bit-text-watermark.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are widely deployed on real-world devices. Concerns regarding their security have gained great attention from researchers. Recently, a new weight modification attack called bit flip attack (BFA) was proposed, which exploits memory fault inject techniques such as row hammer to attack quantized models in the deployment stage. With only a few bit flips, the target model can be rendered useless as a random guesser or even be implanted with malicious functionalities. In this work, we seek to further reduce the number of bit flips. We propose a training-assisted bit flip attack, in which the adversary is involved in the training stage to build a high-risk model to release. This high-risk model, obtained coupled with a corresponding malicious model, behaves normally and can escape various detection methods. The results on benchmark datasets show that an adversary can easily convert this high-risk but normal model to a malicious one on victim's side by flipping only one critical bit on average in the deployment stage. Moreover, our attack still poses a significant threat even when defenses are employed. The codes for reproducing main experiments are available at https://github.com/jianshuod/TBA.

Malware classification is a contemporary and ongoing challenge in cyber-security: modern obfuscation techniques are able to evade traditional static analysis, while dynamic analysis is too resource intensive to be deployed at a large scale. One prominent line of research addresses these limitations by converting malware binaries into 2D images by heuristically reshaping them into a 2D grid before resizing using Lanczos resampling. These images can then be classified based on their textural information using computer vision approaches. While this approach can detect obfuscated malware more effectively than static analysis, the process of converting files into 2D images results in significant information loss due to both quantisation noise, caused by rounding to integer pixel values, and the introduction of 2D dependencies which do not exist in the original data. This loss of signal limits the classification performance of the downstream model. This work addresses these weaknesses by instead resizing the files into 1D signals which avoids the need for heuristic reshaping, and additionally these signals do not suffer from quantisation noise due to being stored in a floating-point format. It is shown that existing 2D CNN architectures can be readily adapted to classify these 1D signals for improved performance. Furthermore, a bespoke 1D convolutional neural network, based on the ResNet architecture and squeeze-and-excitation layers, was developed to classify these signals and evaluated on the MalNet dataset. It was found to achieve state-of-the-art performance on binary, type, and family level classification with F1 scores of 0.874, 0.503, and 0.507, respectively, paving the way for future models to operate on the proposed signal modality.

Language generation models have been an increasingly powerful enabler for many applications. Many such models offer free or affordable API access, which makes them potentially vulnerable to model extraction attacks through distillation. To protect intellectual property (IP) and ensure fair use of these models, various techniques such as lexical watermarking and synonym replacement have been proposed. However, these methods can be nullified by obvious countermeasures such as "synonym randomization". To address this issue, we propose GINSEW, a novel method to protect text generation models from being stolen through distillation. The key idea of our method is to inject secret signals into the probability vector of the decoding steps for each target token. We can then detect the secret message by probing a suspect model to tell if it is distilled from the protected one. Experimental results show that GINSEW can effectively identify instances of IP infringement with minimal impact on the generation quality of protected APIs. Our method demonstrates an absolute improvement of 19 to 29 points on mean average precision (mAP) in detecting suspects compared to previous methods against watermark removal attacks.

We present the first undetectable watermarking scheme for generative image models. Undetectability ensures that no efficient adversary can distinguish between watermarked and un-watermarked images, even after making many adaptive queries. In particular, an undetectable watermark does not degrade image quality under any efficiently computable metric. Our scheme works by selecting the initial latents of a diffusion model using a pseudorandom error-correcting code (Christ and Gunn, 2024), a strategy which guarantees undetectability and robustness. We experimentally demonstrate that our watermarks are quality-preserving and robust using Stable Diffusion 2.1. Our experiments verify that, in contrast to every prior scheme we tested, our watermark does not degrade image quality. Our experiments also demonstrate robustness: existing watermark removal attacks fail to remove our watermark from images without significantly degrading the quality of the images. Finally, we find that we can robustly encode 512 bits in our watermark, and up to 2500 bits when the images are not subjected to watermark removal attacks. Our code is available at https://github.com/XuandongZhao/PRC-Watermark.

Advanced diffusion models (DMs) perform impressively in image super-resolution (SR), but the high memory and computational costs hinder their deployment. Binarization, an ultra-compression algorithm, offers the potential for effectively accelerating DMs. Nonetheless, due to the model structure and the multi-step iterative attribute of DMs, existing binarization methods result in significant performance degradation. In this paper, we introduce a novel binarized diffusion model, BI-DiffSR, for image SR. First, for the model structure, we design a UNet architecture optimized for binarization. We propose the consistent-pixel-downsample (CP-Down) and consistent-pixel-upsample (CP-Up) to maintain dimension consistent and facilitate the full-precision information transfer. Meanwhile, we design the channel-shuffle-fusion (CS-Fusion) to enhance feature fusion in skip connection. Second, for the activation difference across timestep, we design the timestep-aware redistribution (TaR) and activation function (TaA). The TaR and TaA dynamically adjust the distribution of activations based on different timesteps, improving the flexibility and representation alability of the binarized module. Comprehensive experiments demonstrate that our BI-DiffSR outperforms existing binarization methods. Code is released at: https://github.com/zhengchen1999/BI-DiffSR.

Function association is a useful process for binary reverse engineers. Search tools exist to perform association at scale, but they do not utilize the full range of capabilities that AI-enabled search provides. Prior work has explored the development of embedding models for association between certain reverse engineering code representations, but that work does not cover bidirectional association between source code and decompiled, stripped code with standard preprocessing requirements. To bridge this gap, we formalize this function association problem and evaluate the extent to which embedding models can bidirectionally associate between these two representations. To improve model performance at this task, we fine-tune a Qwen3-Embedding model with contrastive learning. We find that our new model outperforms other models on all function association baselines by a substantial margin and generalizes to a constant-algorithm association task it is not explicitly trained on.

As recently demonstrated, Deep Neural Networks (DNN), usually trained using single precision IEEE 754 floating point numbers (binary32), can also work using lower precision. Therefore, 16-bit and 8-bit compressed format have attracted considerable attention. In this paper, we focused on two families of formats that have already achieved interesting results in compressing binary32 numbers in machine learning applications, without sensible degradation of the accuracy: bfloat and posit. Even if 16-bit and 8-bit bfloat/posit are routinely used for reducing the storage of the weights/biases of trained DNNs, the inference still often happens on the 32-bit FPU of the CPU (especially if GPUs are not available). In this paper we propose a way to decompress a tensor of bfloat/posits just before computations, i.e., after the compressed operands have been loaded within the vector registers of a vector capable CPU, in order to save bandwidth usage and increase cache efficiency. Finally, we show the architectural parameters and considerations under which this solution is advantageous with respect to the uncompressed one.

Recent latent-space monitoring techniques have shown promise as defenses against LLM attacks. These defenses act as scanners that seek to detect harmful activations before they lead to undesirable actions. This prompts the question: Can models execute harmful behavior via inconspicuous latent states? Here, we study such obfuscated activations. We show that state-of-the-art latent-space defenses -- including sparse autoencoders, representation probing, and latent OOD detection -- are all vulnerable to obfuscated activations. For example, against probes trained to classify harmfulness, our attacks can often reduce recall from 100% to 0% while retaining a 90% jailbreaking rate. However, obfuscation has limits: we find that on a complex task (writing SQL code), obfuscation reduces model performance. Together, our results demonstrate that neural activations are highly malleable: we can reshape activation patterns in a variety of ways, often while preserving a network's behavior. This poses a fundamental challenge to latent-space defenses.

Federated Language Model (FedLM) allows a collaborative learning without sharing raw data, yet it introduces a critical vulnerability, as every untrustworthy client may leak the received functional model instance. Current watermarking schemes for FedLM often require white-box access and client-side cooperation, providing only group-level proof of ownership rather than individual traceability. We propose EmbTracker, a server-side, traceable black-box watermarking framework specifically designed for FedLMs. EmbTracker achieves black-box verifiability by embedding a backdoor-based watermark detectable through simple API queries. Client-level traceability is realized by injecting unique identity-specific watermarks into the model distributed to each client. In this way, a leaked model can be attributed to a specific culprit, ensuring robustness even against non-cooperative participants. Extensive experiments on various language and vision-language models demonstrate that EmbTracker achieves robust traceability with verification rates near 100\%, high resilience against removal attacks (fine-tuning, pruning, quantization), and negligible impact on primary task performance (typically within 1-2\%).

This paper presents a novel method of executable steganography using the alpha transparency layer of ICO image files to embed and deliver self-decompressing JavaScript payloads within web browsers. By targeting the least significant bit (LSB) of non-transparent alpha layer image values, the proposed method successfully conceals compressed JavaScript code inside a favicon image without affecting visual fidelity. Global web traffic loads 294 billion favicons daily and consume 0.9 petabytes of network bandwidth. A proof-of-concept implementation demonstrates that a 64x64 ICO image can embed up to 512 bytes uncompressed, or 0.8 kilobyte when using lightweight two-fold compression. On page load, a browser fetches the favicon as part of standard behavior, allowing an embedded loader script to extract and execute the payload entirely in memory using native JavaScript APIs and canvas pixel access. This creates a two-stage covert channel requiring no additional network or user requests. Testing across multiple browsers in both desktop and mobile environments confirms successful and silent execution of the embedded script. We evaluate the threat model, relate it to polymorphic phishing attacks that evade favicon-based detection, and analyze evasion of content security policies and antivirus scanners. We map nine example MITRE ATT&CK Framework objectives to single line JavaScript to execute arbitrarily in ICO files. Existing steganalysis and sanitization defenses are discussed, highlighting limitations in detecting or neutralizing alpha-channel exploits. The results demonstrate a stealthy and reusable attack surface that blurs traditional boundaries between static images and executable content. Because modern browsers report silent errors when developers specifically fail to load ICO files, this attack surface offers an interesting example of required web behaviors that in turn compromise security.

The expansion of text-to-image diffusion models has raised concerns about harmful outputs, from fabricated depictions of public figures to sexually explicit imagery. To mitigate such risks, prior work has proposed concept erasure methods that aim to sever unwanted concepts from the model via fine-tuning, yet it remains unclear whether these approaches truly remove all links to the harmful concept or merely conceal superficial connections. In this work, we reveal a critical vulnerability, the Erasure Evasion Backdoor (EEB): an adversary binds a backdoor trigger to a concept slated for removal, and this malicious link survives subsequent erasure. We show that both black-box and white-box adversaries can instantiate this threat. Across six state-of-the-art erasure methods, including robust ones that explicitly search for alternative representations of the target concept, EEB consistently exposes harmful content: up to 82% success against celebrity-identity unlearning, up to 94% for object erasure, and up to 16 times amplification of explicit-content exposure. While EEB uncovers a blind spot in current erasure methods, it also provides a diagnostic tool for stress-testing future concept erasure techniques.

As valuable digital assets, deep neural networks necessitate robust ownership protection, positioning neural network watermarking (NNW) as a promising solution. Among various NNW approaches, weight-based methods are favored for their simplicity and practicality; however, they remain vulnerable to forging and overwriting attacks. To address those challenges, we propose NeuralMark, a robust method built around a hashed watermark filter. Specifically, we utilize a hash function to generate an irreversible binary watermark from a secret key, which is then used as a filter to select the model parameters for embedding. This design cleverly intertwines the embedding parameters with the hashed watermark, providing a robust defense against both forging and overwriting attacks. An average pooling is also incorporated to resist fine-tuning and pruning attacks. Furthermore, it can be seamlessly integrated into various neural network architectures, ensuring broad applicability. Theoretically, we analyze its security boundary. Empirically, we verify its effectiveness and robustness across 13 distinct Convolutional and Transformer architectures, covering five image classification tasks and one text generation task. The source codes are available at https://github.com/AIResearch-Group/NeuralMark.

User data confidentiality protection is becoming a rising challenge in the present deep learning research. Without access to data, conventional data-driven model compression faces a higher risk of performance degradation. Recently, some works propose to generate images from a specific pretrained model to serve as training data. However, the inversion process only utilizes biased feature statistics stored in one model and is from low-dimension to high-dimension. As a consequence, it inevitably encounters the difficulties of generalizability and inexact inversion, which leads to unsatisfactory performance. To address these problems, we propose MixMix based on two simple yet effective techniques: (1) Feature Mixing: utilizes various models to construct a universal feature space for generalized inversion; (2) Data Mixing: mixes the synthesized images and labels to generate exact label information. We prove the effectiveness of MixMix from both theoretical and empirical perspectives. Extensive experiments show that MixMix outperforms existing methods on the mainstream compression tasks, including quantization, knowledge distillation, and pruning. Specifically, MixMix achieves up to 4% and 20% accuracy uplift on quantization and pruning, respectively, compared to existing data-free compression work.

Diffusion models like Stable Diffusion have become prominent in visual synthesis tasks due to their powerful customization capabilities, which also introduce significant security risks, including deepfakes and copyright infringement. In response, a class of methods known as protective perturbation emerged, which mitigates image misuse by injecting imperceptible adversarial noise. However, purification can remove protective perturbations, thereby exposing images again to the risk of malicious forgery. In this work, we formalize the anti-purification task, highlighting challenges that hinder existing approaches, and propose a simple diagnostic protective perturbation named AntiPure. AntiPure exposes vulnerabilities of purification within the "purification-customization" workflow, owing to two guidance mechanisms: 1) Patch-wise Frequency Guidance, which reduces the model's influence over high-frequency components in the purified image, and 2) Erroneous Timestep Guidance, which disrupts the model's denoising strategy across different timesteps. With additional guidance, AntiPure embeds imperceptible perturbations that persist under representative purification settings, achieving effective post-customization distortion. Experiments show that, as a stress test for purification, AntiPure achieves minimal perceptual discrepancy and maximal distortion, outperforming other protective perturbation methods within the purification-customization workflow.

Toxic content has become an increasingly critical social issue with the rapid expansion of online communication. While numerous studies explored methods for detecting and detoxifying such content, most have focused primarily on English, leaving low-resource language underrepresented. Consequently, Large Language Models~(LLMs) often struggle to identify and neutralize toxic expressions in these languages. This challenge becomes even more pronounced when user employ obfuscation techniques to evade detection systems. Therefore, we propose a KOTOX: Korean Toxic Dataset for deobfuscation and detoxicification to address this issue. We categorize various obfuscation approaches based on linguistic characteristics of Korean and define a set of transformation rules grounded in real-word examples. Using these rules, we construct three dataset versions (easy, normal, and hard) representing different levels of obfuscation difficulty. This is the first dataset that simultaneously supports deobfuscation and detoxification for the Korean language. We expect it to facilitate better understanding and mitigating of obfuscated toxic content in LLM for low-resource languages. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/leeyejin1231/KOTOX.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly adopted for code vulnerability detection, their reliability and robustness across diverse vulnerability types have become a pressing concern. In traditional adversarial settings, code obfuscation has long been used as a general strategy to bypass auditing tools, preserving exploitability without tampering with the tools themselves. Numerous efforts have explored obfuscation methods and tools, yet their capabilities differ in terms of supported techniques, granularity, and programming languages, making it difficult to systematically assess their impact on LLM-based vulnerability detection. To address this gap, we provide a structured systematization of obfuscation techniques and evaluate them under a unified framework. Specifically, we categorize existing obfuscation methods into three major classes (layout, data flow, and control flow) covering 11 subcategories and 19 concrete techniques. We implement these techniques across four programming languages (Solidity, C, C++, and Python) using a consistent LLM-driven approach, and evaluate their effects on 15 LLMs spanning four model families (DeepSeek, OpenAI, Qwen, and LLaMA), as well as on two coding agents (GitHub Copilot and Codex). Our findings reveal both positive and negative impacts of code obfuscation on LLM-based vulnerability detection, highlighting conditions under which obfuscation leads to performance improvements or degradations. We further analyze these outcomes with respect to vulnerability characteristics, code properties, and model attributes. Finally, we outline several open problems and propose future directions to enhance the robustness of LLMs for real-world vulnerability detection.

Modern retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) systems convert sensitive content into high-dimensional embeddings and store them in vector databases that treat the resulting numerical artifacts as opaque. Major vector-store products do not provide native controls for embedding integrity, ingestion-time distributional anomaly detection, or cryptographic provenance attestation. We show this opens a class of steganographic exfiltration attacks: an attacker with write access to the ingestion pipeline can hide payload data inside embeddings using simple post-embedding perturbations (noise injection, rotation, scaling, offset, fragmentation, and combinations thereof) while preserving the surface-level retrieval behavior the RAG system exposes to legitimate users. We evaluate these techniques across a synthetic-PII corpus on text-embedding-3-large, four locally hosted open embedding models, a cross-corpus replication on BEIR NFCorpus and a Quora subset (over 26,000 chunks combined), seven vector-store configurations, an adaptive-attacker variant of the detector evaluation, and a paraphrased-query retrieval benchmark. Distribution-shifting perturbations are often caught by simple anomaly detectors; small-angle orthogonal rotation defeats distribution-based detection across every (model, corpus) pair tested. A disjoint-Givens rotation encoder gives a closed-form per-vector capacity ceiling of floor(d/2) * b bits, but real embedding manifolds impose a capacity-detectability trade-off, and the retrieval-preserving operating point sits well below it. We propose VectorPin, a cryptographic provenance protocol that pins each embedding to its source content and producing model via an Ed25519 signature over a canonical byte representation. Any post-embedding modification breaks signature verification. Embedding-level integrity is a deployable, standardizable control that closes this attack class.

While text-to-image diffusion models demonstrate impressive generation capabilities, they also exhibit vulnerability to backdoor attacks, which involve the manipulation of model outputs through malicious triggers. In this paper, for the first time, we propose a comprehensive defense method named T2IShield to detect, localize, and mitigate such attacks. Specifically, we find the "Assimilation Phenomenon" on the cross-attention maps caused by the backdoor trigger. Based on this key insight, we propose two effective backdoor detection methods: Frobenius Norm Threshold Truncation and Covariance Discriminant Analysis. Besides, we introduce a binary-search approach to localize the trigger within a backdoor sample and assess the efficacy of existing concept editing methods in mitigating backdoor attacks. Empirical evaluations on two advanced backdoor attack scenarios show the effectiveness of our proposed defense method. For backdoor sample detection, T2IShield achieves a detection F1 score of 88.9% with low computational cost. Furthermore, T2IShield achieves a localization F1 score of 86.4% and invalidates 99% poisoned samples. Codes are released at https://github.com/Robin-WZQ/T2IShield.

Optimization of Top-1 ImageNet promotes enormous networks that may be impractical in inference settings. Binary neural networks (BNNs) have the potential to significantly lower the compute intensity but existing models suffer from low quality. To overcome this deficiency, we propose PokeConv, a binary convolution block which improves quality of BNNs by techniques such as adding multiple residual paths, and tuning the activation function. We apply it to ResNet-50 and optimize ResNet's initial convolutional layer which is hard to binarize. We name the resulting network family PokeBNN. These techniques are chosen to yield favorable improvements in both top-1 accuracy and the network's cost. In order to enable joint optimization of the cost together with accuracy, we define arithmetic computation effort (ACE), a hardware- and energy-inspired cost metric for quantized and binarized networks. We also identify a need to optimize an under-explored hyper-parameter controlling the binarization gradient approximation. We establish a new, strong state-of-the-art (SOTA) on top-1 accuracy together with commonly-used CPU64 cost, ACE cost and network size metrics. ReActNet-Adam, the previous SOTA in BNNs, achieved a 70.5% top-1 accuracy with 7.9 ACE. A small variant of PokeBNN achieves 70.5% top-1 with 2.6 ACE, more than 3x reduction in cost; a larger PokeBNN achieves 75.6% top-1 with 7.8 ACE, more than 5% improvement in accuracy without increasing the cost. PokeBNN implementation in JAX/Flax and reproduction instructions are available in AQT repository: https://github.com/google/aqt

Adversarial purification refers to a class of defense methods that remove adversarial perturbations using a generative model. These methods do not make assumptions on the form of attack and the classification model, and thus can defend pre-existing classifiers against unseen threats. However, their performance currently falls behind adversarial training methods. In this work, we propose DiffPure that uses diffusion models for adversarial purification: Given an adversarial example, we first diffuse it with a small amount of noise following a forward diffusion process, and then recover the clean image through a reverse generative process. To evaluate our method against strong adaptive attacks in an efficient and scalable way, we propose to use the adjoint method to compute full gradients of the reverse generative process. Extensive experiments on three image datasets including CIFAR-10, ImageNet and CelebA-HQ with three classifier architectures including ResNet, WideResNet and ViT demonstrate that our method achieves the state-of-the-art results, outperforming current adversarial training and adversarial purification methods, often by a large margin. Project page: https://diffpure.github.io.

Decompilers are important tools for reverse engineers that help them analyze software at a higher level of abstraction than assembly. Unfortunately, because compilation is lossy, deterministic decompilers produce code that is missing many of the details that make source code readable in the first place, like variable names and types. Neural decompilers, on the other hand, offer the ability to statistically fill in these details. Existing work in neural decompilation, however, suffers from substantial drawbacks that limits its ability to handle real code: it is unable to handle user-defined composite types, which are essential to fully specifying many functions' semantics, or require test cases. In this work, we introduce a new training process to finetune any LLM into a neural decompiler capable of generating the appropriate user-defined types alongside the decompilation. We introduce a new dataset, Realtype, that includes substantially more complicated and realistic types than existing neural decompilation benchmarks. Motivated by the intuition that different parts of data structures can be operated upon by different parts of the program, we show that interprocedural context can help improve neural decompilers' ability to handle user-defined types. We show that our training process yields state-of-the-art results in neural decompilation. We also publicly release the Idioms series of finetuned neural decompilation models in support of open science. In summary, we identify the need for joint code and type prediction, show that it is a hard problem, and take the first steps towards solving it.

Black-Box Knowledge Distillation (B2KD) is a formulated problem for cloud-to-edge model compression with invisible data and models hosted on the server. B2KD faces challenges such as limited Internet exchange and edge-cloud disparity of data distributions. In this paper, we formalize a two-step workflow consisting of deprivatization and distillation, and theoretically provide a new optimization direction from logits to cell boundary different from direct logits alignment. With its guidance, we propose a new method Mapping-Emulation KD (MEKD) that distills a black-box cumbersome model into a lightweight one. Our method does not differentiate between treating soft or hard responses, and consists of: 1) deprivatization: emulating the inverse mapping of the teacher function with a generator, and 2) distillation: aligning low-dimensional logits of the teacher and student models by reducing the distance of high-dimensional image points. For different teacher-student pairs, our method yields inspiring distillation performance on various benchmarks, and outperforms the previous state-of-the-art approaches.

Multimodal contrastive learning models like CLIP have demonstrated remarkable vision-language alignment capabilities, yet their vulnerability to backdoor attacks poses critical security risks. Attackers can implant latent triggers that persist through downstream tasks, enabling malicious control of model behavior upon trigger presentation. Despite great success in recent defense mechanisms, they remain impractical due to strong assumptions about attacker knowledge or excessive clean data requirements. In this paper, we introduce InverTune, the first backdoor defense framework for multimodal models under minimal attacker assumptions, requiring neither prior knowledge of attack targets nor access to the poisoned dataset. Unlike existing defense methods that rely on the same dataset used in the poisoning stage, InverTune effectively identifies and removes backdoor artifacts through three key components, achieving robust protection against backdoor attacks. Specifically, InverTune first exposes attack signatures through adversarial simulation, probabilistically identifying the target label by analyzing model response patterns. Building on this, we develop a gradient inversion technique to reconstruct latent triggers through activation pattern analysis. Finally, a clustering-guided fine-tuning strategy is employed to erase the backdoor function with only a small amount of arbitrary clean data, while preserving the original model capabilities. Experimental results show that InverTune reduces the average attack success rate (ASR) by 97.87% against the state-of-the-art (SOTA) attacks while limiting clean accuracy (CA) degradation to just 3.07%. This work establishes a new paradigm for securing multimodal systems, advancing security in foundation model deployment without compromising performance.

WebAssembly (abbreviated Wasm) has emerged as a cornerstone of web development, offering a compact binary format that allows high-performance applications to run at near-native speeds in web browsers. Despite its advantages, Wasm's binary nature presents significant challenges for developers and researchers, particularly regarding readability when debugging or analyzing web applications. Therefore, effective decompilation becomes crucial. Unfortunately, traditional decompilers often struggle with producing readable outputs. While some large language model (LLM)-based decompilers have shown good compatibility with general binary files, they still face specific challenges when dealing with Wasm. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach, WaDec, which is the first use of a fine-tuned LLM to interpret and decompile Wasm binary code into a higher-level, more comprehensible source code representation. The LLM was meticulously fine-tuned using a specialized dataset of wat-c code snippets, employing self-supervised learning techniques. This enables WaDec to effectively decompile not only complete wat functions but also finer-grained wat code snippets. Our experiments demonstrate that WaDec markedly outperforms current state-of-the-art tools, offering substantial improvements across several metrics. It achieves a code inflation rate of only 3.34%, a dramatic 97% reduction compared to the state-of-the-art's 116.94%. Unlike baselines' output that cannot be directly compiled or executed, WaDec maintains a recompilability rate of 52.11%, a re-execution rate of 43.55%, and an output consistency of 27.15%. Additionally, it significantly exceeds state-of-the-art performance in AST edit distance similarity by 185%, cyclomatic complexity by 8%, and cosine similarity by 41%, achieving an average code similarity above 50%.

Data-free knowledge distillation (KD) helps transfer knowledge from a pre-trained model (known as the teacher model) to a smaller model (known as the student model) without access to the original training data used for training the teacher model. However, the security of the synthetic or out-of-distribution (OOD) data required in data-free KD is largely unknown and under-explored. In this work, we make the first effort to uncover the security risk of data-free KD w.r.t. untrusted pre-trained models. We then propose Anti-Backdoor Data-Free KD (ABD), the first plug-in defensive method for data-free KD methods to mitigate the chance of potential backdoors being transferred. We empirically evaluate the effectiveness of our proposed ABD in diminishing transferred backdoor knowledge while maintaining compatible downstream performances as the vanilla KD. We envision this work as a milestone for alarming and mitigating the potential backdoors in data-free KD. Codes are released at https://github.com/illidanlab/ABD.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are vulnerable to backdoor attack, which does not affect the network's performance on clean data but would manipulate the network behavior once a trigger pattern is added. Existing defense methods have greatly reduced attack success rate, but their prediction accuracy on clean data still lags behind a clean model by a large margin. Inspired by the stealthiness and effectiveness of backdoor attack, we propose a simple but highly effective defense framework which injects non-adversarial backdoors targeting poisoned samples. Following the general steps in backdoor attack, we detect a small set of suspected samples and then apply a poisoning strategy to them. The non-adversarial backdoor, once triggered, suppresses the attacker's backdoor on poisoned data, but has limited influence on clean data. The defense can be carried out during data preprocessing, without any modification to the standard end-to-end training pipeline. We conduct extensive experiments on multiple benchmarks with different architectures and representative attacks. Results demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art defense effectiveness with by far the lowest performance drop on clean data. Considering the surprising defense ability displayed by our framework, we call for more attention to utilizing backdoor for backdoor defense. Code is available at https://github.com/damianliumin/non-adversarial_backdoor.

Data poisoning attacks pose a significant threat to the integrity of machine learning models by leading to misclassification of target distribution data by injecting adversarial examples during training. Existing state-of-the-art (SoTA) defense methods suffer from limitations, such as significantly reduced generalization performance and significant overhead during training, making them impractical or limited for real-world applications. In response to this challenge, we introduce a universal data purification method that defends naturally trained classifiers from malicious white-, gray-, and black-box image poisons by applying a universal stochastic preprocessing step Psi_{T}(x), realized by iterative Langevin sampling of a convergent Energy Based Model (EBM) initialized with an image x. Mid-run dynamics of Psi_{T}(x) purify poison information with minimal impact on features important to the generalization of a classifier network. We show that EBMs remain universal purifiers, even in the presence of poisoned EBM training data, and achieve SoTA defense on leading triggered and triggerless poisons. This work is a subset of a larger framework introduced in \pgen with a more detailed focus on EBM purification and poison defense.

In this work, we consider an inversion attack on the obfuscated input embeddings sent to a language model on a server, where the adversary has no access to the language model or the obfuscation mechanism and sees only the obfuscated embeddings along with the model's embedding table. We propose BeamClean, an inversion attack that jointly estimates the noise parameters and decodes token sequences by integrating a language-model prior. Against Laplacian and Gaussian obfuscation mechanisms, BeamClean always surpasses naive distance-based attacks. This work highlights the necessity for and robustness of more advanced learned, input-dependent methods.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are susceptible to backdoor attacks, where adversaries poison datasets with adversary-specified triggers to implant hidden backdoors, enabling malicious manipulation of model predictions. Dataset purification serves as a proactive defense by removing malicious training samples to prevent backdoor injection at its source. We first reveal that the current advanced purification methods rely on a latent assumption that the backdoor connections between triggers and target labels in backdoor attacks are simpler to learn than the benign features. We demonstrate that this assumption, however, does not always hold, especially in all-to-all (A2A) and untargeted (UT) attacks. As a result, purification methods that analyze the separation between the poisoned and benign samples in the input-output space or the final hidden layer space are less effective. We observe that this separability is not confined to a single layer but varies across different hidden layers. Motivated by this understanding, we propose FLARE, a universal purification method to counter various backdoor attacks. FLARE aggregates abnormal activations from all hidden layers to construct representations for clustering. To enhance separation, FLARE develops an adaptive subspace selection algorithm to isolate the optimal space for dividing an entire dataset into two clusters. FLARE assesses the stability of each cluster and identifies the cluster with higher stability as poisoned. Extensive evaluations on benchmark datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of FLARE against 22 representative backdoor attacks, including all-to-one (A2O), all-to-all (A2A), and untargeted (UT) attacks, and its robustness to adaptive attacks. Codes are available at https://github.com/THUYimingLi/BackdoorBox{BackdoorBox} and https://github.com/vtu81/backdoor-toolbox{backdoor-toolbox}.

The proliferation of AI-generated images has intensified the need for robust content authentication methods. We present InvisMark, a novel watermarking technique designed for high-resolution AI-generated images. Our approach leverages advanced neural network architectures and training strategies to embed imperceptible yet highly robust watermarks. InvisMark achieves state-of-the-art performance in imperceptibility (PSNRsim51, SSIM sim 0.998) while maintaining over 97\% bit accuracy across various image manipulations. Notably, we demonstrate the successful encoding of 256-bit watermarks, significantly expanding payload capacity while preserving image quality. This enables the embedding of UUIDs with error correction codes, achieving near-perfect decoding success rates even under challenging image distortions. We also address potential vulnerabilities against advanced attacks and propose mitigation strategies. By combining high imperceptibility, extended payload capacity, and resilience to manipulations, InvisMark provides a robust foundation for ensuring media provenance in an era of increasingly sophisticated AI-generated content. Source code of this paper is available at: https://github.com/microsoft/InvisMark.

Leading large language model providers now conceal their models' step-by-step reasoning, or chain-of-thought, to protect intellectual property and limit information leakage. Rather than storing these traces server-side, providers return them to the client as blocks of encrypted text, which the client passes back with each subsequent request. Building on prior research, we identify an architectural vulnerability: these encrypted blocks are fully compatible and interchangeable across different sessions, users, and models within a provider's ecosystem. We exploit this compatibility to develop a scalable decryption jailbreak. By injecting an encrypted reasoning trace from a given model into a weaker, and less safeguarded model from the same provider, we force it to decode and output the trace verbatim in plaintext, without ever jailbreaking the more capable model directly. This vulnerability enables four distinct attack vectors. First, it circumvents anti-distillation mechanisms, allowing adversaries to extract a proprietary model's reasoning, as we demonstrate across Anthropic, OpenAI, and Google. Second, it allows for large-scale private data extraction. Developers frequently share session logs publicly, unaware of contents of the encrypted blocks. By decoding 315,320 reasoning blocks scraped from public repositories, we recovered 367 Personally Identifiable Information (PII) artifacts and 182 credentials. Third, it inadvertently reveals hazardous information hidden within the reasoning process, even in cases where the model's final, visible output safely rejects a malicious request. Fourth, attackers can leverage this flaw to execute invisible prompt injections, embedding malicious payloads entirely within encrypted blocks to poison public agentic rollouts. Following responsible disclosure, we propose concrete cryptographic and system-level mitigations to secure client-side reasoning.

Large scale deep learning model, such as modern language models and diffusion architectures, have revolutionized applications ranging from natural language processing to computer vision. However, their deployment in distributed or decentralized environments raises significant privacy concerns, as sensitive data may be exposed during inference. Traditional techniques like secure multi-party computation, homomorphic encryption, and differential privacy offer partial remedies but often incur substantial computational overhead, latency penalties, or limited compatibility with non-linear network operations. In this work, we introduce Equivariant Encryption (EE), a novel paradigm designed to enable secure, "blind" inference on encrypted data with near zero performance overhead. Unlike fully homomorphic approaches that encrypt the entire computational graph, EE selectively obfuscates critical internal representations within neural network layers while preserving the exact functionality of both linear and a prescribed set of non-linear operations. This targeted encryption ensures that raw inputs, intermediate activations, and outputs remain confidential, even when processed on untrusted infrastructure. We detail the theoretical foundations of EE, compare its performance and integration complexity against conventional privacy preserving techniques, and demonstrate its applicability across a range of architectures, from convolutional networks to large language models. Furthermore, our work provides a comprehensive threat analysis, outlining potential attack vectors and baseline strategies, and benchmarks EE against standard inference pipelines in decentralized settings. The results confirm that EE maintains high fidelity and throughput, effectively bridging the gap between robust data confidentiality and the stringent efficiency requirements of modern, large scale model inference.

Recently, Carlini et al. demonstrated the widely used model Stable Diffusion can regurgitate real training samples, which is troublesome from a copyright perspective. In this work, we provide an efficient extraction attack on par with the recent attack, with several order of magnitudes less network evaluations. In the process, we expose a new phenomena, which we dub template verbatims, wherein a diffusion model will regurgitate a training sample largely in tact. Template verbatims are harder to detect as they require retrieval and masking to correctly label. Furthermore, they are still generated by newer systems, even those which de-duplicate their training set, and we give insight into why they still appear during generation. We extract training images from several state of the art systems, including Stable Diffusion 2.0, Deep Image Floyd, and finally Midjourney v4. We release code to verify our extraction attack, perform the attack, as well as all extracted prompts at https://github.com/ryanwebster90/onestep-extraction.

Tasks such as solving arithmetic equations, evaluating truth tables, and completing syllogisms are handled well by large language models (LLMs) in their standard form, but they often fail when the same problems are posed in logically equivalent yet obfuscated formats. To study this vulnerability, we introduce Logifus, a structure-preserving logical obfuscation framework, and, utilizing this, we present LogiQAte, a first-of-its-kind diagnostic benchmark with 1,108 questions across four reasoning tasks: (i) Obfus FOL (first-order logic entailment under equivalence-preserving rewrites), (ii) Obfus Blood Relation (family-graph entailment under indirect relational chains), (iii) Obfus Number Series (pattern induction under symbolic substitutions), and (iv) Obfus Direction Sense (navigation reasoning under altered directions and reference frames). Across all the tasks, evaluating six state-of-the-art models, we find that obfuscation severely degrades zero-shot performance, with performance dropping on average by 47% for GPT-4o, 27% for GPT-5, and 22% for reasoning model, o4-mini. Our findings reveal that current LLMs parse questions without deep understanding, highlighting the urgency of building models that genuinely comprehend and preserve meaning beyond surface form.

In this paper, we present BitNet Distillation (BitDistill), a lightweight pipeline that fine-tunes off-the-shelf full-precision LLMs (e.g., Qwen) into 1.58-bit precision (i.e., ternary weights {-1, 0, 1}) for specific downstream tasks, achieving strong task-specific performance with minimal computational cost. Specifically, BitDistill incorporates three key techniques: the SubLN module, as introduced in BitNet; multi-head attention distillation, based on MiniLM; and continual pre-training, which serves as a crucial warm-up step to mitigate the scalability issue of the performance gap between finetuned full-precision and 1.58-bit LLMs on specific tasks. Experimental results show that BitDistill achieves performance comparable to the full-precision counterpart models across model size, while enabling up to 10x memory savings and 2.65x faster inference on CPUs. Code is available at https://github.com/microsoft/BitNet.

Understanding TTPs (Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures) in malware binaries is essential for security analysis and threat intelligence, yet remains challenging in practice. Real-world malware binaries are typically stripped of symbols, contain large numbers of functions, and distribute malicious behavior across multiple code regions, making TTP attribution difficult. Recent large language models (LLMs) offer strong code understanding capabilities, but applying them directly to this task faces challenges in identifying analysis entry points, reasoning under partial observability, and misalignment with TTP-specific decision logic. We present TTPDetect, the first LLM agent for recognizing TTPs in stripped malware binaries. TTPDetect combines dense retrieval with LLM-based neural retrieval to narrow the space of analysis entry points. TTPDetect further employs a function-level analyzing agent consisting of a Context Explorer that performs on-demand, incremental context retrieval and a TTP-Specific Reasoning Guideline that achieves inference-time alignment. We build a new dataset that labels decompiled functions with TTPs across diverse malware families and platforms. TTPDetect achieves 93.25% precision and 93.81% recall on function-level TTP recognition, outperforming baselines by 10.38% and 18.78%, respectively. When evaluated on real world malware samples, TTPDetect recognizes TTPs with a precision of 87.37%. For malware with expert-written reports, TTPDetect recovers 85.7% of the documented TTPs and further discovers, on average, 10.5 previously unreported TTPs per malware.

Recent deep neural networks (DNNs) have come to rely on vast amounts of training data, providing an opportunity for malicious attackers to exploit and contaminate the data to carry out backdoor attacks. These attacks significantly undermine the reliability of DNNs. However, existing backdoor attack methods make unrealistic assumptions, assuming that all training data comes from a single source and that attackers have full access to the training data. In this paper, we address this limitation by introducing a more realistic attack scenario where victims collect data from multiple sources, and attackers cannot access the complete training data. We refer to this scenario as data-constrained backdoor attacks. In such cases, previous attack methods suffer from severe efficiency degradation due to the entanglement between benign and poisoning features during the backdoor injection process. To tackle this problem, we propose a novel approach that leverages the pre-trained Contrastive Language-Image Pre-Training (CLIP) model. We introduce three CLIP-based technologies from two distinct streams: Clean Feature Suppression, which aims to suppress the influence of clean features to enhance the prominence of poisoning features, and Poisoning Feature Augmentation, which focuses on augmenting the presence and impact of poisoning features to effectively manipulate the model's behavior. To evaluate the effectiveness, harmlessness to benign accuracy, and stealthiness of our method, we conduct extensive experiments on 3 target models, 3 datasets, and over 15 different settings. The results demonstrate remarkable improvements, with some settings achieving over 100% improvement compared to existing attacks in data-constrained scenarios. Our research contributes to addressing the limitations of existing methods and provides a practical and effective solution for data-constrained backdoor attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced the field of natural language processing, while the expensive memory and computation consumption impede their practical deployment. Quantization emerges as one of the most effective methods for improving the computational efficiency of LLMs. However, existing ultra-low-bit quantization always causes severe accuracy drops. In this paper, we empirically relieve the micro and macro characteristics of ultra-low bit quantization and present a novel Dual-Binarization method for LLMs, namely DB-LLM. For the micro-level, we take both the accuracy advantage of 2-bit-width and the efficiency advantage of binarization into account, introducing Flexible Dual Binarization (FDB). By splitting 2-bit quantized weights into two independent sets of binaries, FDB ensures the accuracy of representations and introduces flexibility, utilizing the efficient bitwise operations of binarization while retaining the inherent high sparsity of ultra-low bit quantization. For the macro-level, we find the distortion that exists in the prediction of LLM after quantization, which is specified as the deviations related to the ambiguity of samples. We propose the Deviation-Aware Distillation (DAD) method, enabling the model to focus differently on various samples. Comprehensive experiments show that our DB-LLM not only significantly surpasses the current State-of-The-Art (SoTA) in ultra-low bit quantization (eg, perplexity decreased from 9.64 to 7.23), but also achieves an additional 20\% reduction in computational consumption compared to the SOTA method under the same bit-width. Our code will be released soon.

Lossy image compression aims to represent images in as few bits as possible while maintaining fidelity to the original. Theoretical results indicate that optimizing distortion metrics such as PSNR or MS-SSIM necessarily leads to a discrepancy in the statistics of original images from those of reconstructions, in particular at low bitrates, often manifested by the blurring of the compressed images. Previous work has leveraged adversarial discriminators to improve statistical fidelity. Yet these binary discriminators adopted from generative modeling tasks may not be ideal for image compression. In this paper, we introduce a non-binary discriminator that is conditioned on quantized local image representations obtained via VQ-VAE autoencoders. Our evaluations on the CLIC2020, DIV2K and Kodak datasets show that our discriminator is more effective for jointly optimizing distortion (e.g., PSNR) and statistical fidelity (e.g., FID) than the state-of-the-art HiFiC model. On the CLIC2020 test set, we obtain the same FID as HiFiC with 30-40% fewer bits.

Recent breakthroughs in zero-shot voice synthesis have enabled imitating a speaker's voice using just a few seconds of recording while maintaining a high level of realism. Alongside its potential benefits, this powerful technology introduces notable risks, including voice fraud and speaker impersonation. Unlike the conventional approach of solely relying on passive methods for detecting synthetic data, watermarking presents a proactive and robust defence mechanism against these looming risks. This paper introduces an innovative audio watermarking framework that encodes up to 32 bits of watermark within a mere 1-second audio snippet. The watermark is imperceptible to human senses and exhibits strong resilience against various attacks. It can serve as an effective identifier for synthesized voices and holds potential for broader applications in audio copyright protection. Moreover, this framework boasts high flexibility, allowing for the combination of multiple watermark segments to achieve heightened robustness and expanded capacity. Utilizing 10 to 20-second audio as the host, our approach demonstrates an average Bit Error Rate (BER) of 0.48\% across ten common attacks, a remarkable reduction of over 2800\% in BER compared to the state-of-the-art watermarking tool. See https://aka.ms/wavmark for demos of our work.

Training a high-performance deep neural network requires large amounts of data and computational resources. Protecting the intellectual property (IP) and commercial ownership of a deep model is challenging yet increasingly crucial. A major stream of watermarking strategies implants verifiable backdoor triggers by poisoning training samples, but these are often unrealistic due to data privacy and safety concerns and are vulnerable to minor model changes such as fine-tuning. To overcome these challenges, we propose a safe and robust backdoor-based watermark injection technique that leverages the diverse knowledge from a single out-of-distribution (OoD) image, which serves as a secret key for IP verification. The independence of training data makes it agnostic to third-party promises of IP security. We induce robustness via random perturbation of model parameters during watermark injection to defend against common watermark removal attacks, including fine-tuning, pruning, and model extraction. Our experimental results demonstrate that the proposed watermarking approach is not only time- and sample-efficient without training data, but also robust against the watermark removal attacks above.

As generative models enable rapid creation of high-fidelity images, societal concerns about misinformation and authenticity have intensified. A promising remedy is multi-bit image watermarking, which embeds a multi-bit message into an image so that a verifier can later detect whether the image is generated by someone and further identify the source by decoding the embedded message. Existing approaches often fall short in capacity, resilience to common image distortions, and theoretical justification. To address these limitations, we propose ADD (Add, Dot, Decode), a multi-bit image watermarking method with two stages: learning a watermark to be linearly combined with the multi-bit message and added to the image, and decoding through inner products between the watermarked image and the learned watermark. On the standard MS-COCO benchmark, we demonstrate that for the challenging task of 48-bit watermarking, ADD achieves 100\% decoding accuracy, with performance dropping by at most 2\% under a wide range of image distortions, substantially smaller than the 14\% average drop of state-of-the-art methods. In addition, ADD achieves substantial computational gains, with 2-fold faster embedding and 7.4-fold faster decoding than the fastest existing method. We further provide a theoretical analysis explaining why the learned watermark and the corresponding decoding rule are effective.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been found to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks, raising security concerns about their deployment in mission-critical applications. While existing defense methods have demonstrated promising results, it is still not clear how to effectively remove backdoor-associated neurons in backdoored DNNs. In this paper, we propose a novel defense called Reconstructive Neuron Pruning (RNP) to expose and prune backdoor neurons via an unlearning and then recovering process. Specifically, RNP first unlearns the neurons by maximizing the model's error on a small subset of clean samples and then recovers the neurons by minimizing the model's error on the same data. In RNP, unlearning is operated at the neuron level while recovering is operated at the filter level, forming an asymmetric reconstructive learning procedure. We show that such an asymmetric process on only a few clean samples can effectively expose and prune the backdoor neurons implanted by a wide range of attacks, achieving a new state-of-the-art defense performance. Moreover, the unlearned model at the intermediate step of our RNP can be directly used to improve other backdoor defense tasks including backdoor removal, trigger recovery, backdoor label detection, and backdoor sample detection. Code is available at https://github.com/bboylyg/RNP.

Invisible watermarks safeguard images' copyrights by embedding hidden messages only detectable by owners. They also prevent people from misusing images, especially those generated by AI models. We propose a family of regeneration attacks to remove these invisible watermarks. The proposed attack method first adds random noise to an image to destroy the watermark and then reconstructs the image. This approach is flexible and can be instantiated with many existing image-denoising algorithms and pre-trained generative models such as diffusion models. Through formal proofs and extensive empirical evaluations, we demonstrate that pixel-level invisible watermarks are vulnerable to this regeneration attack. Our results reveal that, across four different pixel-level watermarking schemes, the proposed method consistently achieves superior performance compared to existing attack techniques, with lower detection rates and higher image quality. However, watermarks that keep the image semantically similar can be an alternative defense against our attacks. Our finding underscores the need for a shift in research/industry emphasis from invisible watermarks to semantic-preserving watermarks. Code is available at https://github.com/XuandongZhao/WatermarkAttacker

In light of recent advancements in generative AI models, it has become essential to distinguish genuine content from AI-generated one to prevent the malicious usage of fake materials as authentic ones and vice versa. Various techniques have been introduced for identifying AI-generated images, with watermarking emerging as a promising approach. In this paper, we analyze the robustness of various AI-image detectors including watermarking and classifier-based deepfake detectors. For watermarking methods that introduce subtle image perturbations (i.e., low perturbation budget methods), we reveal a fundamental trade-off between the evasion error rate (i.e., the fraction of watermarked images detected as non-watermarked ones) and the spoofing error rate (i.e., the fraction of non-watermarked images detected as watermarked ones) upon an application of a diffusion purification attack. In this regime, we also empirically show that diffusion purification effectively removes watermarks with minimal changes to images. For high perturbation watermarking methods where notable changes are applied to images, the diffusion purification attack is not effective. In this case, we develop a model substitution adversarial attack that can successfully remove watermarks. Moreover, we show that watermarking methods are vulnerable to spoofing attacks where the attacker aims to have real images (potentially obscene) identified as watermarked ones, damaging the reputation of the developers. In particular, by just having black-box access to the watermarking method, we show that one can generate a watermarked noise image which can be added to the real images to have them falsely flagged as watermarked ones. Finally, we extend our theory to characterize a fundamental trade-off between the robustness and reliability of classifier-based deep fake detectors and demonstrate it through experiments.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are susceptible to jailbreak attacks where malicious prompts are disguised using ciphers and character-level encodings to bypass safety guardrails. While these guardrails often fail to interpret the encoded content, the underlying models can still process the harmful instructions. We introduce CPT-Filtering, a novel, model-agnostic with negligible-costs and near-perfect accuracy guardrail technique that aims to mitigate these attacks by leveraging the intrinsic behavior of Byte-Pair Encoding (BPE) tokenizers. Our method is based on the principle that tokenizers, trained on natural language, represent out-of-distribution text, such as ciphers, using a significantly higher number of shorter tokens. Our technique uses a simple yet powerful artifact of using language models: the average number of Characters Per Token (CPT) in the text. This approach is motivated by the high compute cost of modern methods - relying on added modules such as dedicated LLMs or perplexity models. We validate our approach across a large dataset of over 100,000 prompts, testing numerous encoding schemes with several popular tokenizers. Our experiments demonstrate that a simple CPT threshold robustly identifies encoded text with high accuracy, even for very short inputs. CPT-Filtering provides a practical defense layer that can be immediately deployed for real-time text filtering and offline data curation.

Modern deep learning approaches usually transform inputs into a modality-specific form. For example, the most common deep learning approach to image classification involves decoding image file bytes into an RGB tensor which is passed into a neural network. Instead, we investigate performing classification directly on file bytes, without the need for decoding files at inference time. Using file bytes as model inputs enables the development of models which can operate on multiple input modalities. Our model, ByteFormer, achieves an ImageNet Top-1 classification accuracy of 77.33% when training and testing directly on TIFF file bytes using a transformer backbone with configuration similar to DeiT-Ti (72.2% accuracy when operating on RGB images). Without modifications or hyperparameter tuning, ByteFormer achieves 95.42% classification accuracy when operating on WAV files from the Speech Commands v2 dataset (compared to state-of-the-art accuracy of 98.7%). Additionally, we demonstrate that ByteFormer has applications in privacy-preserving inference. ByteFormer is capable of performing inference on particular obfuscated input representations with no loss of accuracy. We also demonstrate ByteFormer's ability to perform inference with a hypothetical privacy-preserving camera which avoids forming full images by consistently masking 90% of pixel channels, while still achieving 71.35% accuracy on ImageNet. Our code will be made available at https://github.com/apple/ml-cvnets/tree/main/examples/byteformer.

Deepfake detection faces a critical generalization hurdle, with performance deteriorating when there is a mismatch between the distributions of training and testing data. A broadly received explanation is the tendency of these detectors to be overfitted to forgery-specific artifacts, rather than learning features that are widely applicable across various forgeries. To address this issue, we propose a simple yet effective detector called LSDA (Latent Space Data Augmentation), which is based on a heuristic idea: representations with a wider variety of forgeries should be able to learn a more generalizable decision boundary, thereby mitigating the overfitting of method-specific features (see Fig.~fig:toy). Following this idea, we propose to enlarge the forgery space by constructing and simulating variations within and across forgery features in the latent space. This approach encompasses the acquisition of enriched, domain-specific features and the facilitation of smoother transitions between different forgery types, effectively bridging domain gaps. Our approach culminates in refining a binary classifier that leverages the distilled knowledge from the enhanced features, striving for a generalizable deepfake detector. Comprehensive experiments show that our proposed method is surprisingly effective and transcends state-of-the-art detectors across several widely used benchmarks.

Recent studies have shown that deep learning models are vulnerable to specifically crafted adversarial inputs that are quasi-imperceptible to humans. In this letter, we propose a novel method to detect adversarial inputs, by augmenting the main classification network with multiple binary detectors (observer networks) which take inputs from the hidden layers of the original network (convolutional kernel outputs) and classify the input as clean or adversarial. During inference, the detectors are treated as a part of an ensemble network and the input is deemed adversarial if at least half of the detectors classify it as so. The proposed method addresses the trade-off between accuracy of classification on clean and adversarial samples, as the original classification network is not modified during the detection process. The use of multiple observer networks makes attacking the detection mechanism non-trivial even when the attacker is aware of the victim classifier. We achieve a 99.5% detection accuracy on the MNIST dataset and 97.5% on the CIFAR-10 dataset using the Fast Gradient Sign Attack in a semi-white box setup. The number of false positive detections is a mere 0.12% in the worst case scenario.

We investigate whether it is feasible to remove gendered information from resumes to mitigate potential bias in algorithmic resume screening. Using a corpus of 709k resumes from IT firms, we first train a series of models to classify the self-reported gender of the applicant, thereby measuring the extent and nature of gendered information encoded in resumes. We then conduct a series of gender obfuscation experiments, where we iteratively remove gendered information from resumes. Finally, we train a resume screening algorithm and investigate the trade-off between gender obfuscation and screening algorithm performance. Results show: (1) There is a significant amount of gendered information in resumes. (2) Lexicon-based gender obfuscation method (i.e. removing tokens that are predictive of gender) can reduce the amount of gendered information to a large extent. However, after a certain point, the performance of the resume screening algorithm starts suffering. (3) General-purpose gender debiasing methods for NLP models such as removing gender subspace from embeddings are not effective in obfuscating gender.

The inherent risk of generating harmful and unsafe content by Large Language Models (LLMs), has highlighted the need for their safety alignment. Various techniques like supervised fine-tuning, reinforcement learning from human feedback, and red-teaming were developed for ensuring the safety alignment of LLMs. However, the robustness of these aligned LLMs is always challenged by adversarial attacks that exploit unexplored and underlying vulnerabilities of the safety alignment. In this paper, we develop a novel black-box jailbreak attack, called BitBypass, that leverages hyphen-separated bitstream camouflage for jailbreaking aligned LLMs. This represents a new direction in jailbreaking by exploiting fundamental information representation of data as continuous bits, rather than leveraging prompt engineering or adversarial manipulations. Our evaluation of five state-of-the-art LLMs, namely GPT-4o, Gemini 1.5, Claude 3.5, Llama 3.1, and Mixtral, in adversarial perspective, revealed the capabilities of BitBypass in bypassing their safety alignment and tricking them into generating harmful and unsafe content. Further, we observed that BitBypass outperforms several state-of-the-art jailbreak attacks in terms of stealthiness and attack success. Overall, these results highlights the effectiveness and efficiency of BitBypass in jailbreaking these state-of-the-art LLMs.

Binary classical information is routinely encoded in the two metastable states of a dynamical system. Since these states may exhibit macroscopic lifetimes, the encoded information inherits a strong protection against bit-flips. A recent qubit - the cat-qubit - is encoded in the manifold of metastable states of a quantum dynamical system, thereby acquiring bit-flip protection. An outstanding challenge is to gain quantum control over such a system without breaking its protection. If this challenge is met, significant shortcuts in hardware overhead are forecast for quantum computing. In this experiment, we implement a cat-qubit with bit-flip times exceeding ten seconds. This is a four order of magnitude improvement over previous cat-qubit implementations, and six orders of magnitude enhancement over the single photon lifetime that compose this dynamical qubit. This was achieved by introducing a quantum tomography protocol that does not break bit-flip protection. We prepare and image quantum superposition states, and measure phase-flip times above 490 nanoseconds. Most importantly, we control the phase of these superpositions while maintaining the bit-flip time above ten seconds. This work demonstrates quantum operations that preserve macroscopic bit-flip times, a necessary step to scale these dynamical qubits into fully protected hardware-efficient architectures.

Given the computational cost and technical expertise required to train machine learning models, users may delegate the task of learning to a service provider. We show how a malicious learner can plant an undetectable backdoor into a classifier. On the surface, such a backdoored classifier behaves normally, but in reality, the learner maintains a mechanism for changing the classification of any input, with only a slight perturbation. Importantly, without the appropriate "backdoor key", the mechanism is hidden and cannot be detected by any computationally-bounded observer. We demonstrate two frameworks for planting undetectable backdoors, with incomparable guarantees. First, we show how to plant a backdoor in any model, using digital signature schemes. The construction guarantees that given black-box access to the original model and the backdoored version, it is computationally infeasible to find even a single input where they differ. This property implies that the backdoored model has generalization error comparable with the original model. Second, we demonstrate how to insert undetectable backdoors in models trained using the Random Fourier Features (RFF) learning paradigm or in Random ReLU networks. In this construction, undetectability holds against powerful white-box distinguishers: given a complete description of the network and the training data, no efficient distinguisher can guess whether the model is "clean" or contains a backdoor. Our construction of undetectable backdoors also sheds light on the related issue of robustness to adversarial examples. In particular, our construction can produce a classifier that is indistinguishable from an "adversarially robust" classifier, but where every input has an adversarial example! In summary, the existence of undetectable backdoors represent a significant theoretical roadblock to certifying adversarial robustness.

Supervised fine-tuning has become the predominant method for adapting large pretrained models to downstream tasks. However, recent studies have revealed that these models are vulnerable to backdoor attacks, where even a small number of malicious samples can successfully embed backdoor triggers into the model. While most existing defense methods focus on post-training backdoor defense, efficiently defending against backdoor attacks during training phase remains largely unexplored. To address this gap, we propose a novel defense method called Backdoor Token Unlearning (BTU), which proactively detects and neutralizes trigger tokens during the training stage. Our work is based on two key findings: 1) backdoor learning causes distinctive differences between backdoor token parameters and clean token parameters in word embedding layers, and 2) the success of backdoor attacks heavily depends on backdoor token parameters. The BTU defense leverages these properties to identify aberrant embedding parameters and subsequently removes backdoor behaviors using a fine-grained unlearning technique. Extensive evaluations across three datasets and four types of backdoor attacks demonstrate that BTU effectively defends against these threats while preserving the model's performance on primary tasks. Our code is available at https://github.com/XDJPH/BTU.

Watermarks for AI-generated images are meant to support downstream decisions about provenance, manipulation, and trust. In the settings that motivate watermark removal, therefore, success means more than causing the watermark test to fail. A successful remover must also preserve the utility of the image and make the output forensically indistinguishable from clean content, so that defeating the verifier restores deniability rather than merely replacing one detection signal with another. We show that current watermark removal attacks fail this stronger objective. Across six state-of-the-art removers spanning four attack families, independent forensic detectors distinguish removal-processed outputs from clean images at over 98% true-positive rate under a 1% false-positive budget. Thus, current removers often replace the watermark with a different detectable signal. Using UnMarker (IEEE S&P 2025) as a detailed case study, we show that this signal persists under common post-processing, exhibits a characteristic two-regime spectral deformation, and yields a three-way tension among removal success, image quality, and forensic stealth. These results show that existing removal benchmarks are incomplete: they reward verifier evasion and utility preservation while omitting forensic stealth. A workable watermark remover must satisfy all three conditions at once: watermark evasion, utility preservation, and forensic indistinguishability from clean content.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has found wide application, but also poses risks due to unintentional or malicious tampering during deployment. Regular checks are therefore necessary to detect and prevent such risks. Fragile watermarking is a technique used to identify tampering in AI models. However, previous methods have faced challenges including risks of omission, additional information transmission, and inability to locate tampering precisely. In this paper, we propose a method for detecting tampered parameters and bits, which can be used to detect, locate, and restore parameters that have been tampered with. We also propose an adaptive embedding method that maximizes information capacity while maintaining model accuracy. Our approach was tested on multiple neural networks subjected to attacks that modified weight parameters, and our results demonstrate that our method achieved great recovery performance when the modification rate was below 20%. Furthermore, for models where watermarking significantly affected accuracy, we utilized an adaptive bit technique to recover more than 15% of the accuracy loss of the model.

Recently, binary representation has been proposed as a novel representation that lies between continuous and discrete representations. It exhibits considerable information-preserving capability when being used to replace continuous input vectors. In this paper, we investigate the feasibility of further introducing it to the output side, aiming to allow models to output binary labels instead. To preserve the structural information on the output side along with label information, we extend the previous contrastive hashing method as structured contrastive hashing. More specifically, we upgrade CKY from label-level to bit-level, define a new similarity function with span marginal probabilities, and introduce a novel contrastive loss function with a carefully designed instance selection strategy. Our model achieves competitive performance on various structured prediction tasks, and demonstrates that binary representation can be considered a novel representation that further bridges the gap between the continuous nature of deep learning and the discrete intrinsic property of natural languages.

Machine unlearning for large language models often faces a privacy dilemma in which strict constraints prohibit sharing either the server's parameters or the client's forget set. To address this dual non-disclosure constraint, we propose MPU, an algorithm-agnostic privacy-preserving Multiple Perturbed Copies Unlearning framework that primarily introduces two server-side modules: Pre-Process for randomized copy generation and Post-Process for update aggregation. In Pre-Process, the server distributes multiple perturbed and reparameterized model instances, allowing the client to execute unlearning locally on its private forget set without accessing the server's exact original parameters. After local unlearning, the server performs Post-Process by inverting the reparameterization and aggregating updates with a harmonic denoising procedure to alleviate the impact of perturbation. Experiments with seven unlearning algorithms show that MPU achieves comparable unlearning performance to noise-free baselines, with most algorithms' average degradation well below 1% under 10% noise, and can even outperform the noise-free baseline for some algorithms under 1% noise. Code is available at https://github.com/Tristan-SHU/MPU.

A critical part of creating code suggestion systems is the pre-training of Large Language Models on vast amounts of source code and natural language text, often of questionable origin or quality. This may contribute to the presence of bugs and vulnerabilities in code generated by LLMs. While efforts to identify bugs at or after code generation exist, it is preferable to pre-train or fine-tune LLMs on curated, high-quality, and compliant datasets. The need for vast amounts of training data necessitates that such curation be automated, minimizing human intervention. We propose an automated source code autocuration technique that leverages the complete version history of open-source software projects to improve the quality of training data. This approach leverages the version history of all OSS projects to identify training data samples that have been modified or have undergone changes in at least one OSS project, and pinpoint a subset of samples that include fixes for bugs or vulnerabilities. We evaluate this method using The Stack v2 dataset, and find that 17% of the code versions in the dataset have newer versions, with 17% of those representing bug fixes, including 2.36% addressing known CVEs. The deduplicated version of Stack v2 still includes blobs vulnerable to 6,947 known CVEs. Furthermore, 58% of the blobs in the dataset were never modified after creation, suggesting they likely represent software with minimal or no use. Misidentified blob origins present an additional challenge, as they lead to the inclusion of non-permissively licensed code, raising serious compliance concerns. By addressing these issues, the training of new models can avoid perpetuating buggy code patterns or license violations. We expect our results to inspire process improvements for automated data curation, with the potential to enhance the reliability of outputs generated by AI tools.

As diffusion models (DMs) enable photorealistic image generation at unprecedented scale, watermarking techniques have become essential for provenance establishment and accountability. Existing methods face challenges: sampling-based approaches operate on frozen models but require costly N-step Denoising Diffusion Implicit Models (DDIM) inversion (typically N=50) for zero-bit-only detection; fine-tuning-based methods achieve fast multi-bit extraction but couple the watermark to a specific model checkpoint, requiring retraining for each architecture. We propose DiffMark, a plug-and-play watermarking method that offers three key advantages over existing approaches: single-pass multi-bit detection, per-image key flexibility, and cross-model transferability. Rather than encoding the watermark into the initial noise vector, DiffMark injects a persistent learned perturbation δ at every denoising step of a completely frozen DM. The watermark signal accumulates in the final denoised latent z_0 and is recovered in a single forward pass. The central challenge of backpropagating gradients through a frozen UNet without traversing the full denoising chain is addressed by employing Latent Consistency Models (LCM) as a differentiable training bridge. This reduces the number of gradient steps from 50 DDIM to 4 LCM and enables a single-pass detection at 16.4 ms, a 45x speedup over sampling-based methods. Moreover, by this design, the encoder learns to map any runtime secret to a unique perturbation at inference time, providing genuine per-image key flexibility and transferability to unseen diffusion-based architectures without per-model fine-tuning. Although achieving these advantages, DiffMark also maintains competitive watermark robustness against distortion, regeneration, and adversarial attacks.

Image compression-based approaches for defending against the adversarial-example attacks, which threaten the safety use of deep neural networks (DNN), have been investigated recently. However, prior works mainly rely on directly tuning parameters like compression rate, to blindly reduce image features, thereby lacking guarantee on both defense efficiency (i.e. accuracy of polluted images) and classification accuracy of benign images, after applying defense methods. To overcome these limitations, we propose a JPEG-based defensive compression framework, namely "feature distillation", to effectively rectify adversarial examples without impacting classification accuracy on benign data. Our framework significantly escalates the defense efficiency with marginal accuracy reduction using a two-step method: First, we maximize malicious features filtering of adversarial input perturbations by developing defensive quantization in frequency domain of JPEG compression or decompression, guided by a semi-analytical method; Second, we suppress the distortions of benign features to restore classification accuracy through a DNN-oriented quantization refine process. Our experimental results show that proposed "feature distillation" can significantly surpass the latest input-transformation based mitigations such as Quilting and TV Minimization in three aspects, including defense efficiency (improve classification accuracy from sim20% to sim90% on adversarial examples), accuracy of benign images after defense (le1% accuracy degradation), and processing time per image (sim259times Speedup). Moreover, our solution can also provide the best defense efficiency (sim60% accuracy) against the recent adaptive attack with least accuracy reduction (sim1%) on benign images when compared with other input-transformation based defense methods.

Watermarking has emerged as a promising way to detect LLM-generated text, by augmenting LLM generations with later detectable signals. Recent work has proposed multiple families of watermarking schemes, several of which focus on preserving the LLM distribution. This distribution-preservation property is motivated by the fact that it is a tractable proxy for retaining LLM capabilities, as well as the inherently implied undetectability of the watermark by downstream users. Yet, despite much discourse around undetectability, no prior work has investigated the practical detectability of any of the current watermarking schemes in a realistic black-box setting. In this work we tackle this for the first time, developing rigorous statistical tests to detect the presence, and estimate parameters, of all three popular watermarking scheme families, using only a limited number of black-box queries. We experimentally confirm the effectiveness of our methods on a range of schemes and a diverse set of open-source models. Further, we validate the feasibility of our tests on real-world APIs. Our findings indicate that current watermarking schemes are more detectable than previously believed.