Daily Papers

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into sensitive workflows, raising the stakes for adversarial robustness and safety. This paper introduces Transient Turn Injection(TTI), a new multi-turn attack technique that systematically exploits stateless moderation by distributing adversarial intent across isolated interactions. TTI leverages automated attacker agents powered by large language models to iteratively test and evade policy enforcement in both commercial and open-source LLMs, marking a departure from conventional jailbreak approaches that typically depend on maintaining persistent conversational context. Our extensive evaluation across state-of-the-art models-including those from OpenAI, Anthropic, Google Gemini, Meta, and prominent open-source alternatives-uncovers significant variations in resilience to TTI attacks, with only select architectures exhibiting substantial inherent robustness. Our automated blackbox evaluation framework also uncovers previously unknown model specific vulnerabilities and attack surface patterns, especially within medical and high stakes domains. We further compare TTI against established adversarial prompting methods and detail practical mitigation strategies, such as session level context aggregation and deep alignment approaches. Our study underscores the urgent need for holistic, context aware defenses and continuous adversarial testing to future proof LLM deployments against evolving multi-turn threats.

Deep Neural Networks have created a paradigm shift in our ability to comprehend raw data in various important fields ranging from computer vision and natural language processing to intelligence warfare and healthcare. While DNNs are increasingly deployed either in a white-box setting where the model internal is publicly known, or a black-box setting where only the model outputs are known, a practical concern is protecting the models against Intellectual Property (IP) infringement. We propose BlackMarks, the first end-to-end multi-bit watermarking framework that is applicable in the black-box scenario. BlackMarks takes the pre-trained unmarked model and the owner's binary signature as inputs and outputs the corresponding marked model with a set of watermark keys. To do so, BlackMarks first designs a model-dependent encoding scheme that maps all possible classes in the task to bit '0' and bit '1' by clustering the output activations into two groups. Given the owner's watermark signature (a binary string), a set of key image and label pairs are designed using targeted adversarial attacks. The watermark (WM) is then embedded in the prediction behavior of the target DNN by fine-tuning the model with generated WM key set. To extract the WM, the remote model is queried by the WM key images and the owner's signature is decoded from the corresponding predictions according to the designed encoding scheme. We perform a comprehensive evaluation of BlackMarks's performance on MNIST, CIFAR10, ImageNet datasets and corroborate its effectiveness and robustness. BlackMarks preserves the functionality of the original DNN and incurs negligible WM embedding runtime overhead as low as 2.054%.

Language models can distinguish between testing and deployment phases -- a capability known as evaluation awareness. This has significant safety and policy implications, potentially undermining the reliability of evaluations that are central to AI governance frameworks and voluntary industry commitments. In this paper, we study evaluation awareness in Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct. We show that linear probes can separate real-world evaluation and deployment prompts, suggesting that current models internally represent this distinction. We also find that current safety evaluations are correctly classified by the probes, suggesting that they already appear artificial or inauthentic to models. Our findings underscore the importance of ensuring trustworthy evaluations and understanding deceptive capabilities. More broadly, our work showcases how model internals may be leveraged to support blackbox methods in safety audits, especially for future models more competent at evaluation awareness and deception.

Democratization of machine learning requires architectures that automatically adapt to new problems. Neural Differential Equations (NDEs) have emerged as a popular modeling framework by removing the need for ML practitioners to choose the number of layers in a recurrent model. While we can control the computational cost by choosing the number of layers in standard architectures, in NDEs the number of neural network evaluations for a forward pass can depend on the number of steps of the adaptive ODE solver. But, can we force the NDE to learn the version with the least steps while not increasing the training cost? Current strategies to overcome slow prediction require high order automatic differentiation, leading to significantly higher training time. We describe a novel regularization method that uses the internal cost heuristics of adaptive differential equation solvers combined with discrete adjoint sensitivities to guide the training process towards learning NDEs that are easier to solve. This approach opens up the blackbox numerical analysis behind the differential equation solver's algorithm and directly uses its local error estimates and stiffness heuristics as cheap and accurate cost estimates. We incorporate our method without any change in the underlying NDE framework and show that our method extends beyond Ordinary Differential Equations to accommodate Neural Stochastic Differential Equations. We demonstrate how our approach can halve the prediction time and, unlike other methods which can increase the training time by an order of magnitude, we demonstrate similar reduction in training times. Together this showcases how the knowledge embedded within state-of-the-art equation solvers can be used to enhance machine learning.

LLMs trained on massive datasets may inadvertently acquire sensitive information such as personal details and potentially harmful content. This risk is further heightened in multimodal LLMs as they integrate information from multiple modalities (image and text). Adversaries can exploit this knowledge through multimodal prompts to extract sensitive details. Evaluating how effectively MLLMs can forget such information (targeted unlearning) necessitates the creation of high-quality, well-annotated image-text pairs. While prior work on unlearning has focused on text, multimodal unlearning remains underexplored. To address this gap, we first introduce a multimodal unlearning benchmark, UnLOK-VQA (Unlearning Outside Knowledge VQA), as well as an attack-and-defense framework to evaluate methods for deleting specific multimodal knowledge from MLLMs. We extend a visual question-answering dataset using an automated pipeline that generates varying-proximity samples for testing generalization and specificity, followed by manual filtering for maintaining high quality. We then evaluate six defense objectives against seven attacks (four whitebox, three blackbox), including a novel whitebox method leveraging interpretability of hidden states. Our results show multimodal attacks outperform text- or image-only ones, and that the most effective defense removes answer information from internal model states. Additionally, larger models exhibit greater post-editing robustness, suggesting that scale enhances safety. UnLOK-VQA provides a rigorous benchmark for advancing unlearning in MLLMs.

Large language model unlearning aims to remove harmful information that LLMs have learnt to prevent their use for malicious purposes. LLMU and RMU have been proposed as two methods for LLM unlearning, achieving impressive results on unlearning benchmarks. We study in detail the impact of unlearning on LLM performance metrics using the WMDP dataset as well as a new biology dataset we create. We show that unlearning has a notable impact on general model capabilities, with the performance degradation being more significant in general for LLMU. We further test the robustness of the two methods and find that doing 5-shot prompting or rephrasing the question in simple ways can lead to an over ten-fold increase in accuracy on unlearning benchmarks. Finally, we show that training on unrelated data can almost completely recover pre-unlearning performance, demonstrating that these methods fail at truly unlearning. Our methodology serves as an evaluation framework for LLM unlearning methods. The code is available at: https://github.com/JaiDoshi/Knowledge-Erasure.

Existing tasks fall short in evaluating reasoning ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) in an interactive, unknown environment. This deficiency leads to the isolated assessment of deductive, inductive, and abductive reasoning, neglecting the integrated reasoning process that is indispensable for humans discovery of real world. We introduce a novel evaluation paradigm, black-box interaction, to tackle this challenge. A black-box is defined by a hidden function that maps a specific set of inputs to outputs. LLMs are required to unravel the hidden function behind the black-box by interacting with it in given exploration turns, and reasoning over observed input-output pairs. Leveraging this idea, we build the Oracle benchmark which comprises 6 types of black-box task and 96 black-boxes. 19 modern LLMs are benchmarked. o3 ranks first in 5 of the 6 tasks, achieving over 70\% accuracy on most easy black-boxes. But it still struggles with some hard black-box tasks, where its average performance drops below 40\%. Further analysis indicates a universal difficulty among LLMs: They lack the high-level planning capability to develop efficient and adaptive exploration strategies for hypothesis refinement.

While large language models have significantly accelerated scientific code generation, comprehensively evaluating the generated code remains a major challenge. Traditional benchmarks reduce evaluation to test-case matching, an approach insufficient for library code in HPC where solver selection, API conventions, memory management, and performance are just as critical as functional correctness. To address this gap, we introduce petscagent-bench, an agentic framework built on an agents-evaluating-agents paradigm. Instead of relying on static scripts, petscagent-bench deploys a tool-augmented evaluator agent that compiles, executes, and measures code produced by a separate model-under-test agent, orchestrating a 14-evaluator pipeline across five scoring categories: correctness, performance, code quality, algorithmic appropriateness, and library-specific conventions. Because the agents communicate through standardized protocols (A2A and MCP), the framework enables black-box evaluation of any coding agent without requiring access to its source code. We demonstrate the framework on a benchmark suite of realistic problems using the PETSc library for HPC. Our empirical analysis of frontier models reveals that while current models generate readable, well-structured code, they consistently struggle with library-specific conventions that traditional pass/fail metrics completely miss.

Interpretability of Deep Learning (DL) is a barrier to trustworthy AI. Despite great efforts made by the Explainable AI (XAI) community, explanations lack robustness -- indistinguishable input perturbations may lead to different XAI results. Thus, it is vital to assess how robust DL interpretability is, given an XAI method. In this paper, we identify several challenges that the state-of-the-art is unable to cope with collectively: i) existing metrics are not comprehensive; ii) XAI techniques are highly heterogeneous; iii) misinterpretations are normally rare events. To tackle these challenges, we introduce two black-box evaluation methods, concerning the worst-case interpretation discrepancy and a probabilistic notion of how robust in general, respectively. Genetic Algorithm (GA) with bespoke fitness function is used to solve constrained optimisation for efficient worst-case evaluation. Subset Simulation (SS), dedicated to estimate rare event probabilities, is used for evaluating overall robustness. Experiments show that the accuracy, sensitivity, and efficiency of our methods outperform the state-of-the-arts. Finally, we demonstrate two applications of our methods: ranking robust XAI methods and selecting training schemes to improve both classification and interpretation robustness.

Black-box risk scoring models permeate our lives, yet are typically proprietary or opaque. We propose Distill-and-Compare, a model distillation and comparison approach to audit such models. To gain insight into black-box models, we treat them as teachers, training transparent student models to mimic the risk scores assigned by black-box models. We compare the student model trained with distillation to a second un-distilled transparent model trained on ground-truth outcomes, and use differences between the two models to gain insight into the black-box model. Our approach can be applied in a realistic setting, without probing the black-box model API. We demonstrate the approach on four public data sets: COMPAS, Stop-and-Frisk, Chicago Police, and Lending Club. We also propose a statistical test to determine if a data set is missing key features used to train the black-box model. Our test finds that the ProPublica data is likely missing key feature(s) used in COMPAS.

Black-box finetuning is an emerging interface for adapting state-of-the-art language models to user needs. However, such access may also let malicious actors undermine model safety. To demonstrate the challenge of defending finetuning interfaces, we introduce covert malicious finetuning, a method to compromise model safety via finetuning while evading detection. Our method constructs a malicious dataset where every individual datapoint appears innocuous, but finetuning on the dataset teaches the model to respond to encoded harmful requests with encoded harmful responses. Applied to GPT-4, our method produces a finetuned model that acts on harmful instructions 99% of the time and avoids detection by defense mechanisms such as dataset inspection, safety evaluations, and input/output classifiers. Our findings question whether black-box finetuning access can be secured against sophisticated adversaries.

Abstention Ability (AA) is a critical aspect of Large Language Model (LLM) reliability, referring to an LLM's capability to withhold responses when uncertain or lacking a definitive answer, without compromising performance. Although previous studies have attempted to improve AA, they lack a standardised evaluation method and remain unsuitable for black-box models where token prediction probabilities are inaccessible. This makes comparative analysis challenging, especially for state-of-the-art closed-source commercial LLMs. This paper bridges this gap by introducing a black-box evaluation approach and a new dataset, Abstain-QA, crafted to rigorously assess AA across varied question types (answerable and unanswerable), domains (well-represented and under-represented), and task types (fact centric and reasoning). We also propose a new confusion matrix, the ''Answerable-Unanswerable Confusion Matrix'' (AUCM) which serves as the basis for evaluating AA, by offering a structured and precise approach for assessment. Finally, we explore the impact of three prompting strategies-Strict Prompting, Verbal Confidence Thresholding, and Chain-of-Thought (CoT)-on improving AA. Our results indicate that even powerful models like GPT-4, Mixtral 8x22b encounter difficulties with abstention; however, strategic approaches such as Strict prompting and CoT can enhance this capability.

Despite progress in video understanding, current MLLMs struggle with counting tasks. Existing benchmarks are limited by short videos, close-set queries, lack of clue annotations, and weak multimodal coverage. In this paper, we introduce CG-AV-Counting, a manually-annotated clue-grounded counting benchmark with 1,027 multimodal questions and 5,845 annotated clues over 497 long videos. It supports both black-box and white-box evaluation, serving as a comprehensive testbed for both end-to-end and reasoning-based counting. To explore ways to improve model's counting capability, we propose AV-Reasoner, a model trained with GRPO and curriculum learning to generalize counting ability from related tasks. AV-Reasoner achieves state-of-the-art results across multiple benchmarks, demonstrating the effectiveness of reinforcement learning. However, experiments show that on out-of-domain benchmarks, reasoning in the language space fails to bring performance gains. The code and benchmark have been realeased on https://av-reasoner.github.io.

Most existing video understanding benchmarks for multimodal large language models (MLLMs) focus only on short videos. The limited number of benchmarks for long video understanding often rely solely on multiple-choice questions (MCQs). However, because of the inherent limitation of MCQ-based evaluation and the increasing reasoning ability of MLLMs, models can give the current answer purely by combining short video understanding with elimination, without genuinely understanding the video content. To address this gap, we introduce CG-Bench, a novel benchmark designed for clue-grounded question answering in long videos. CG-Bench emphasizes the model's ability to retrieve relevant clues for questions, enhancing evaluation credibility. It features 1,219 manually curated videos categorized by a granular system with 14 primary categories, 171 secondary categories, and 638 tertiary categories, making it the largest benchmark for long video analysis. The benchmark includes 12,129 QA pairs in three major question types: perception, reasoning, and hallucination. Compensating the drawbacks of pure MCQ-based evaluation, we design two novel clue-based evaluation methods: clue-grounded white box and black box evaluations, to assess whether the model generates answers based on the correct understanding of the video. We evaluate multiple closed-source and open-source MLLMs on CG-Bench. Results indicate that current models significantly underperform in understanding long videos compared to short ones, and a significant gap exists between open-source and commercial models. We hope CG-Bench can advance the development of more trustworthy and capable MLLMs for long video understanding. All annotations and video data are released at https://cg-bench.github.io/leaderboard/.

Retrieval Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a standard paradigm for enhancing the factual accuracy and contextual relevance of Large Language Models (LLMs) by integrating retrieval mechanisms. However, existing evaluation frameworks fail to provide a holistic black-box approach to assessing RAG systems, especially in real-world deployment scenarios. To address this gap, we introduce SCARF (System for Comprehensive Assessment of RAG Frameworks), a modular and flexible evaluation framework designed to benchmark deployed RAG applications systematically. SCARF provides an end-to-end, black-box evaluation methodology, enabling a limited-effort comparison across diverse RAG frameworks. Our framework supports multiple deployment configurations and facilitates automated testing across vector databases and LLM serving strategies, producing a detailed performance report. Moreover, SCARF integrates practical considerations such as response coherence, providing a scalable and adaptable solution for researchers and industry professionals evaluating RAG applications. Using the REST APIs interface, we demonstrate how SCARF can be applied to real-world scenarios, showcasing its flexibility in assessing different RAG frameworks and configurations. SCARF is available at GitHub repository.

Recent advances in end-to-end trained omni-models have substantially improved audio capabilities by strengthening text-audio modality alignment. However, whether such alignment inadvertently facilitates the transfer of safety vulnerabilities across modalities remains underexplored. This question is critical as text-based jailbreak attacks are considerably more mature than audio-based ones; if they transfer systematically, current audio safety evaluations may underestimate risks originating from the text modality. In this paper, we introduce the Alignment Curse, a formally characterized and empirically validated principle showing that stronger modality alignment enables more effective transfer of attacks from text to audio, revealing a fundamental tension between capability and safety. Motivated by this principle, we conduct a comprehensive black-box evaluation of three attack categories on recent omni-models (e.g., Qwen2.5-Omni, Qwen3-Omni): text attacks, text-transferred audio attacks, and audio attacks. We find that text-transferred audio attacks perform comparably to, and often better than, audio-based attacks, exhibiting a clear advantage under audio-only access. This suggests that text-based vulnerabilities play a pivotal role in shaping audio safety risks. Finally, we empirically analyze the relationship between modality alignment and transfer effectiveness across attack methods and models, observing consistent support for the Alignment Curse: tighter modality alignment leads to more effective cross-modality attack transfer.

Research on self-evolving language agents has accelerated, drawing increasing attention to their ability to create, adapt, and maintain tools from task requirements. However, existing benchmarks predominantly rely on predefined specifications, which limits scalability and hinders truly autonomous evolution. While recent studies attempt to dynamically generate tools, they primarily emphasize downstream performance, resulting in a "black-box" evaluation that makes it difficult to attribute failures to specific causes. To address this, we propose Tool-Genesis, a diagnostic benchmark designed to quantify agent capabilities across multiple dimensions, including interface compliance, functional correctness, and downstream utility. Tool-Genesis evaluates whether agents can construct task-relevant tools solely from abstract requirements (without preset specifications) and use them to solve realistic problems. Crucially, we find that even state-of-the-art models struggle to produce precise tool interfaces or executable logic in a one-shot setting. These minor initial flaws are amplified through the pipeline, leading to a sharp degradation in downstream metrics. We hope Tool-Genesis will guide future research toward training and steering models to synthesize persistent, general-purpose tools that better address real-world challenges.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has not been matched by their evaluation in low-resource languages, especially Southeast Asian languages like Lao. To fill this gap, we introduce LaoBench, the first large-scale, high-quality, and multidimensional benchmark dataset dedicated to assessing LLMs' comprehensive language understanding and reasoning abilities in Lao. LaoBench comprises over 17,000 carefully curated samples spanning three core dimensions: knowledge application, K12 foundational education, and bilingual translation among Lao, Chinese, and English. The dataset is divided into open-source and closed-source subsets, with the closed-source portion enabling black-box evaluation on an official platform to ensure fairness and data security. Our data construction pipeline integrates expert human curation with automated agent-assisted verification, ensuring linguistic accuracy, cultural relevance, and educational value. Benchmarking multiple state-of-the-art LLMs on LaoBench reveals that current models still face significant challenges in mastering Lao across diverse tasks. We hope LaoBench will catalyze further research and development of AI technologies for underrepresented Southeast Asian languages.

In the last years many accurate decision support systems have been constructed as black boxes, that is as systems that hide their internal logic to the user. This lack of explanation constitutes both a practical and an ethical issue. The literature reports many approaches aimed at overcoming this crucial weakness sometimes at the cost of scarifying accuracy for interpretability. The applications in which black box decision systems can be used are various, and each approach is typically developed to provide a solution for a specific problem and, as a consequence, delineating explicitly or implicitly its own definition of interpretability and explanation. The aim of this paper is to provide a classification of the main problems addressed in the literature with respect to the notion of explanation and the type of black box system. Given a problem definition, a black box type, and a desired explanation this survey should help the researcher to find the proposals more useful for his own work. The proposed classification of approaches to open black box models should also be useful for putting the many research open questions in perspective.

Future AI systems could conceal their capabilities ('sandbagging') during evaluations, potentially misleading developers and auditors. We stress-tested sandbagging detection techniques using an auditing game. First, a red team fine-tuned five models, some of which conditionally underperformed, as a proxy for sandbagging. Second, a blue team used black-box, model-internals, or training-based approaches to identify sandbagging models. We found that the blue team could not reliably discriminate sandbaggers from benign models. Black-box approaches were defeated by effective imitation of a weaker model. Linear probes, a model-internals approach, showed more promise but their naive application was vulnerable to behaviours instilled by the red team. We also explored capability elicitation as a strategy for detecting sandbagging. Although Prompt-based elicitation was not reliable, training-based elicitation consistently elicited full performance from the sandbagging models, using only a single correct demonstration of the evaluation task. However the performance of benign models was sometimes also raised, so relying on elicitation as a detection strategy was prone to false-positives. In the short-term, we recommend developers remove potential sandbagging using on-distribution training for elicitation. In the longer-term, further research is needed to ensure the efficacy of training-based elicitation, and develop robust methods for sandbagging detection. We open source our model organisms at https://github.com/AI-Safety-Institute/sandbagging_auditing_games and select transcripts and results at https://huggingface.co/datasets/sandbagging-games/evaluation_logs . A demo illustrating the game can be played at https://sandbagging-demo.far.ai/ .

We focus on the problem of black-box adversarial attacks, where the aim is to generate adversarial examples for deep learning models solely based on information limited to output label~(hard label) to a queried data input. We propose a simple and efficient Bayesian Optimization~(BO) based approach for developing black-box adversarial attacks. Issues with BO's performance in high dimensions are avoided by searching for adversarial examples in a structured low-dimensional subspace. We demonstrate the efficacy of our proposed attack method by evaluating both ell_infty and ell_2 norm constrained untargeted and targeted hard label black-box attacks on three standard datasets - MNIST, CIFAR-10 and ImageNet. Our proposed approach consistently achieves 2x to 10x higher attack success rate while requiring 10x to 20x fewer queries compared to the current state-of-the-art black-box adversarial attacks.

Audio effects are extensively used at every stage of audio and music content creation. The majority of differentiable audio effects modeling approaches fall into the black-box or gray-box paradigms; and most models have been proposed and applied to nonlinear effects like guitar amplifiers, overdrive, distortion, fuzz and compressor. Although a plethora of architectures have been introduced for the task at hand there is still lack of understanding on the state of the art, since most publications experiment with one type of nonlinear audio effect and a very small number of devices. In this work we aim to shed light on the audio effects modeling landscape by comparing black-box and gray-box architectures on a large number of nonlinear audio effects, identifying the most suitable for a wide range of devices. In the process, we also: introduce time-varying gray-box models and propose models for compressor, distortion and fuzz, publish a large dataset for audio effects research - ToneTwist AFx https://github.com/mcomunita/tonetwist-afx-dataset - that is also the first open to community contributions, evaluate models on a variety of metrics and conduct extensive subjective evaluation. Code https://github.com/mcomunita/nablafx and supplementary material https://github.com/mcomunita/nnlinafx-supp-material are also available.

Recent works have shown that deep neural networks are vulnerable to adversarial examples that find samples close to the original image but can make the model misclassify. Even with access only to the model's output, an attacker can employ black-box attacks to generate such adversarial examples. In this work, we propose a simple and lightweight defense against black-box attacks by adding random noise to hidden features at intermediate layers of the model at inference time. Our theoretical analysis confirms that this method effectively enhances the model's resilience against both score-based and decision-based black-box attacks. Importantly, our defense does not necessitate adversarial training and has minimal impact on accuracy, rendering it applicable to any pre-trained model. Our analysis also reveals the significance of selectively adding noise to different parts of the model based on the gradient of the adversarial objective function, which can be varied during the attack. We demonstrate the robustness of our defense against multiple black-box attacks through extensive empirical experiments involving diverse models with various architectures.

Many deployed learned models are black boxes: given input, returns output. Internal information about the model, such as the architecture, optimisation procedure, or training data, is not disclosed explicitly as it might contain proprietary information or make the system more vulnerable. This work shows that such attributes of neural networks can be exposed from a sequence of queries. This has multiple implications. On the one hand, our work exposes the vulnerability of black-box neural networks to different types of attacks -- we show that the revealed internal information helps generate more effective adversarial examples against the black box model. On the other hand, this technique can be used for better protection of private content from automatic recognition models using adversarial examples. Our paper suggests that it is actually hard to draw a line between white box and black box models.

The growing complexity of machine learning and deep learning models has led to an increased reliance on opaque "black box" systems, making it difficult to understand the rationale behind predictions. This lack of transparency is particularly challenging in high-stakes applications where interpretability is as important as accuracy. Post-hoc explanation methods are commonly used to interpret these models, but they are seldom rigorously evaluated, raising concerns about their reliability. The Python package xai_evals addresses this by providing a comprehensive framework for generating, benchmarking, and evaluating explanation methods across both tabular and image data modalities. It integrates popular techniques like SHAP, LIME, Grad-CAM, Integrated Gradients (IG), and Backtrace, while supporting evaluation metrics such as faithfulness, sensitivity, and robustness. xai_evals enhances the interpretability of machine learning models, fostering transparency and trust in AI systems. The library is open-sourced at https://pypi.org/project/xai-evals/ .

Black box machine learning models are currently being used for high stakes decision-making throughout society, causing problems throughout healthcare, criminal justice, and in other domains. People have hoped that creating methods for explaining these black box models will alleviate some of these problems, but trying to explain black box models, rather than creating models that are interpretable in the first place, is likely to perpetuate bad practices and can potentially cause catastrophic harm to society. There is a way forward -- it is to design models that are inherently interpretable. This manuscript clarifies the chasm between explaining black boxes and using inherently interpretable models, outlines several key reasons why explainable black boxes should be avoided in high-stakes decisions, identifies challenges to interpretable machine learning, and provides several example applications where interpretable models could potentially replace black box models in criminal justice, healthcare, and computer vision.

The lack of adversarial robustness has been recognized as an important issue for state-of-the-art machine learning (ML) models, e.g., deep neural networks (DNNs). Thereby, robustifying ML models against adversarial attacks is now a major focus of research. However, nearly all existing defense methods, particularly for robust training, made the white-box assumption that the defender has the access to the details of an ML model (or its surrogate alternatives if available), e.g., its architectures and parameters. Beyond existing works, in this paper we aim to address the problem of black-box defense: How to robustify a black-box model using just input queries and output feedback? Such a problem arises in practical scenarios, where the owner of the predictive model is reluctant to share model information in order to preserve privacy. To this end, we propose a general notion of defensive operation that can be applied to black-box models, and design it through the lens of denoised smoothing (DS), a first-order (FO) certified defense technique. To allow the design of merely using model queries, we further integrate DS with the zeroth-order (gradient-free) optimization. However, a direct implementation of zeroth-order (ZO) optimization suffers a high variance of gradient estimates, and thus leads to ineffective defense. To tackle this problem, we next propose to prepend an autoencoder (AE) to a given (black-box) model so that DS can be trained using variance-reduced ZO optimization. We term the eventual defense as ZO-AE-DS. In practice, we empirically show that ZO-AE- DS can achieve improved accuracy, certified robustness, and query complexity over existing baselines. And the effectiveness of our approach is justified under both image classification and image reconstruction tasks. Codes are available at https://github.com/damon-demon/Black-Box-Defense.

Accurately evaluating adversarial robustness is a longstanding challenge. A flawed attack design can inflate robustness estimates, making deployment risk assessment and defense comparison unreliable. Historically, standardized attacks such as AutoAttack have largely resolved this for image classifiers, providing a reliable evaluation baseline for systematic comparison across defenses. However, no equivalent exists for LLM jailbreak evaluation yet, where designing such an attack is considerably more difficult. A reliable attack must, among other things, be black-box compatible, applicable to arbitrary defense pipelines, and efficient, which no existing method jointly satisfies. We introduce Indirect Harm Optimization (IHO), a masked diffusion language model attacker trained via iterative preference optimization against a harmfulness judge, requiring only black-box access to the target. The same method can be used without modification as a strong adaptive attack on individual behaviors, or as an efficient amortized policy that transfers to held-out behaviors and unseen target models without fine-tuning. Even against layered defenses, such as a Circuit Breaker-trained model combined with an auxiliary detector, IHO improves attack success considerably over state-of-the-art approaches, without any defense-specific adaptation. Our results position IHO as a practical step toward the kind of standardized jailbreak evaluation that has improved reliability in the past. Code and models are available on GitHub and Hugging Face.

Large vision-language models (VLMs) such as GPT-4 have achieved unprecedented performance in response generation, especially with visual inputs, enabling more creative and adaptable interaction than large language models such as ChatGPT. Nonetheless, multimodal generation exacerbates safety concerns, since adversaries may successfully evade the entire system by subtly manipulating the most vulnerable modality (e.g., vision). To this end, we propose evaluating the robustness of open-source large VLMs in the most realistic and high-risk setting, where adversaries have only black-box system access and seek to deceive the model into returning the targeted responses. In particular, we first craft targeted adversarial examples against pretrained models such as CLIP and BLIP, and then transfer these adversarial examples to other VLMs such as MiniGPT-4, LLaVA, UniDiffuser, BLIP-2, and Img2Prompt. In addition, we observe that black-box queries on these VLMs can further improve the effectiveness of targeted evasion, resulting in a surprisingly high success rate for generating targeted responses. Our findings provide a quantitative understanding regarding the adversarial vulnerability of large VLMs and call for a more thorough examination of their potential security flaws before deployment in practice. Code is at https://github.com/yunqing-me/AttackVLM.

From a simple text prompt, generative-AI image models can create stunningly realistic and creative images bounded, it seems, by only our imagination. These models have achieved this remarkable feat thanks, in part, to the ingestion of billions of images collected from nearly every corner of the internet. Many creators have understandably expressed concern over how their intellectual property has been ingested without their permission or a mechanism to opt out of training. As a result, questions of fair use and copyright infringement have quickly emerged. We describe a method that allows us to determine if a model was trained on a specific image or set of images. This method is computationally efficient and assumes no explicit knowledge of the model architecture or weights (so-called black-box membership inference). We anticipate that this method will be crucial for auditing existing models and, looking ahead, ensuring the fairer development and deployment of generative AI models.

We present a novel approach for attacking black-box large language models (LLMs) by exploiting their ability to express confidence in natural language. Existing black-box attacks require either access to continuous model outputs like logits or confidence scores (which are rarely available in practice), or rely on proxy signals from other models. Instead, we demonstrate how to prompt LLMs to express their internal confidence in a way that is sufficiently calibrated to enable effective adversarial optimization. We apply our general method to three attack scenarios: adversarial examples for vision-LLMs, jailbreaks and prompt injections. Our attacks successfully generate malicious inputs against systems that only expose textual outputs, thereby dramatically expanding the attack surface for deployed LLMs. We further find that better and larger models exhibit superior calibration when expressing confidence, creating a concerning security paradox where model capability improvements directly enhance vulnerability. Our code is available at this [link](https://github.com/zj-jayzhang/black_box_llm_optimization).

When the performance of a machine learning model varies over groups defined by sensitive attributes (e.g., gender or ethnicity), the performance disparity can be expressed in terms of the probability distributions of the input and output variables over each group. In this paper, we exploit this fact to reduce the disparate impact of a fixed classification model over a population of interest. Given a black-box classifier, we aim to eliminate the performance gap by perturbing the distribution of input variables for the disadvantaged group. We refer to the perturbed distribution as a counterfactual distribution, and characterize its properties for common fairness criteria. We introduce a descent algorithm to learn a counterfactual distribution from data. We then discuss how the estimated distribution can be used to build a data preprocessor that can reduce disparate impact without training a new model. We validate our approach through experiments on real-world datasets, showing that it can repair different forms of disparity without a significant drop in accuracy.

Perception of toxicity evolves over time and often differs between geographies and cultural backgrounds. Similarly, black-box commercially available APIs for detecting toxicity, such as the Perspective API, are not static, but frequently retrained to address any unattended weaknesses and biases. We evaluate the implications of these changes on the reproducibility of findings that compare the relative merits of models and methods that aim to curb toxicity. Our findings suggest that research that relied on inherited automatic toxicity scores to compare models and techniques may have resulted in inaccurate findings. Rescoring all models from HELM, a widely respected living benchmark, for toxicity with the recent version of the API led to a different ranking of widely used foundation models. We suggest caution in applying apples-to-apples comparisons between studies and lay recommendations for a more structured approach to evaluating toxicity over time. Code and data are available at https://github.com/for-ai/black-box-api-challenges.

Models leveraging both visual and textual data such as Contrastive Language-Image Pre-training (CLIP), are the backbone of many recent advances in artificial intelligence. In this work, we show that despite their versatility, such models are vulnerable to what we refer to as fooling master images. Fooling master images are capable of maximizing the confidence score of a CLIP model for a significant number of widely varying prompts, while being either unrecognizable or unrelated to the attacked prompts for humans. The existence of such images is problematic as it could be used by bad actors to maliciously interfere with CLIP-trained image retrieval models in production with comparably small effort as a single image can attack many different prompts. We demonstrate how fooling master images for CLIP (CLIPMasterPrints) can be mined using stochastic gradient descent, projected gradient descent, or blackbox optimization. Contrary to many common adversarial attacks, the blackbox optimization approach allows us to mine CLIPMasterPrints even when the weights of the model are not accessible. We investigate the properties of the mined images, and find that images trained on a small number of image captions generalize to a much larger number of semantically related captions. We evaluate possible mitigation strategies, where we increase the robustness of the model and introduce an approach to automatically detect CLIPMasterPrints to sanitize the input of vulnerable models. Finally, we find that vulnerability to CLIPMasterPrints is related to a modality gap in contrastive pre-trained multi-modal networks. Code available at https://github.com/matfrei/CLIPMasterPrints.

External audits of AI systems are increasingly recognized as a key mechanism for AI governance. The effectiveness of an audit, however, depends on the degree of system access granted to auditors. Recent audits of state-of-the-art AI systems have primarily relied on black-box access, in which auditors can only query the system and observe its outputs. However, white-box access to the system's inner workings (e.g., weights, activations, gradients) allows an auditor to perform stronger attacks, more thoroughly interpret models, and conduct fine-tuning. Meanwhile, outside-the-box access to its training and deployment information (e.g., methodology, code, documentation, hyperparameters, data, deployment details, findings from internal evaluations) allows for auditors to scrutinize the development process and design more targeted evaluations. In this paper, we examine the limitations of black-box audits and the advantages of white- and outside-the-box audits. We also discuss technical, physical, and legal safeguards for performing these audits with minimal security risks. Given that different forms of access can lead to very different levels of evaluation, we conclude that (1) transparency regarding the access and methods used by auditors is necessary to properly interpret audit results, and (2) white- and outside-the-box access allow for substantially more scrutiny than black-box access alone.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) accessed via black-box APIs introduces a significant trust challenge: users pay for services based on advertised model capabilities (e.g., size, performance), but providers may covertly substitute the specified model with a cheaper, lower-quality alternative to reduce operational costs. This lack of transparency undermines fairness, erodes trust, and complicates reliable benchmarking. Detecting such substitutions is difficult due to the black-box nature, typically limiting interaction to input-output queries. This paper formalizes the problem of model substitution detection in LLM APIs. We systematically evaluate existing verification techniques, including output-based statistical tests, benchmark evaluations, and log probability analysis, under various realistic attack scenarios like model quantization, randomized substitution, and benchmark evasion. Our findings reveal the limitations of methods relying solely on text outputs, especially against subtle or adaptive attacks. While log probability analysis offers stronger guarantees when available, its accessibility is often limited. We conclude by discussing the potential of hardware-based solutions like Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs) as a pathway towards provable model integrity, highlighting the trade-offs between security, performance, and provider adoption. Code is available at https://github.com/sunblaze-ucb/llm-api-audit

Recent work has proposed stateful defense models (SDMs) as a compelling strategy to defend against a black-box attacker who only has query access to the model, as is common for online machine learning platforms. Such stateful defenses aim to defend against black-box attacks by tracking the query history and detecting and rejecting queries that are "similar" and thus preventing black-box attacks from finding useful gradients and making progress towards finding adversarial attacks within a reasonable query budget. Recent SDMs (e.g., Blacklight and PIHA) have shown remarkable success in defending against state-of-the-art black-box attacks. In this paper, we show that SDMs are highly vulnerable to a new class of adaptive black-box attacks. We propose a novel adaptive black-box attack strategy called Oracle-guided Adaptive Rejection Sampling (OARS) that involves two stages: (1) use initial query patterns to infer key properties about an SDM's defense; and, (2) leverage those extracted properties to design subsequent query patterns to evade the SDM's defense while making progress towards finding adversarial inputs. OARS is broadly applicable as an enhancement to existing black-box attacks - we show how to apply the strategy to enhance six common black-box attacks to be more effective against current class of SDMs. For example, OARS-enhanced versions of black-box attacks improved attack success rate against recent stateful defenses from almost 0% to to almost 100% for multiple datasets within reasonable query budgets.

Content watermarking is an important tool for the authentication and copyright protection of digital media. However, it is unclear whether existing watermarks are robust against adversarial attacks. We present the winning solution to the NeurIPS 2024 Erasing the Invisible challenge, which stress-tests watermark robustness under varying degrees of adversary knowledge. The challenge consisted of two tracks: a black-box and beige-box track, depending on whether the adversary knows which watermarking method was used by the provider. For the beige-box track, we leverage an adaptive VAE-based evasion attack, with a test-time optimization and color-contrast restoration in CIELAB space to preserve the image's quality. For the black-box track, we first cluster images based on their artifacts in the spatial or frequency-domain. Then, we apply image-to-image diffusion models with controlled noise injection and semantic priors from ChatGPT-generated captions to each cluster with optimized parameter settings. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that our method successfully achieves near-perfect watermark removal (95.7%) with negligible impact on the residual image's quality. We hope that our attacks inspire the development of more robust image watermarking methods.

As the use of text-to-image generative models increases, so does the adoption of automatic benchmarking methods used in their evaluation. However, while metrics and datasets abound, there are few unified benchmarking libraries that provide a framework for performing evaluations across many datasets and metrics. Furthermore, the rapid introduction of increasingly robust benchmarking methods requires that evaluation libraries remain flexible to new datasets and metrics. Finally, there remains a gap in synthesizing evaluations in order to deliver actionable takeaways about model performance. To enable unified, flexible, and actionable evaluations, we introduce EvalGIM (pronounced ''EvalGym''), a library for evaluating generative image models. EvalGIM contains broad support for datasets and metrics used to measure quality, diversity, and consistency of text-to-image generative models. In addition, EvalGIM is designed with flexibility for user customization as a top priority and contains a structure that allows plug-and-play additions of new datasets and metrics. To enable actionable evaluation insights, we introduce ''Evaluation Exercises'' that highlight takeaways for specific evaluation questions. The Evaluation Exercises contain easy-to-use and reproducible implementations of two state-of-the-art evaluation methods of text-to-image generative models: consistency-diversity-realism Pareto Fronts and disaggregated measurements of performance disparities across groups. EvalGIM also contains Evaluation Exercises that introduce two new analysis methods for text-to-image generative models: robustness analyses of model rankings and balanced evaluations across different prompt styles. We encourage text-to-image model exploration with EvalGIM and invite contributions at https://github.com/facebookresearch/EvalGIM/.

Machine learning (ML) models, e.g., deep neural networks (DNNs), are vulnerable to adversarial examples: malicious inputs modified to yield erroneous model outputs, while appearing unmodified to human observers. Potential attacks include having malicious content like malware identified as legitimate or controlling vehicle behavior. Yet, all existing adversarial example attacks require knowledge of either the model internals or its training data. We introduce the first practical demonstration of an attacker controlling a remotely hosted DNN with no such knowledge. Indeed, the only capability of our black-box adversary is to observe labels given by the DNN to chosen inputs. Our attack strategy consists in training a local model to substitute for the target DNN, using inputs synthetically generated by an adversary and labeled by the target DNN. We use the local substitute to craft adversarial examples, and find that they are misclassified by the targeted DNN. To perform a real-world and properly-blinded evaluation, we attack a DNN hosted by MetaMind, an online deep learning API. We find that their DNN misclassifies 84.24% of the adversarial examples crafted with our substitute. We demonstrate the general applicability of our strategy to many ML techniques by conducting the same attack against models hosted by Amazon and Google, using logistic regression substitutes. They yield adversarial examples misclassified by Amazon and Google at rates of 96.19% and 88.94%. We also find that this black-box attack strategy is capable of evading defense strategies previously found to make adversarial example crafting harder.

Gaining insight into how deep convolutional neural network models perform image classification and how to explain their outputs have been a concern to computer vision researchers and decision makers. These deep models are often referred to as black box due to low comprehension of their internal workings. As an effort to developing explainable deep learning models, several methods have been proposed such as finding gradients of class output with respect to input image (sensitivity maps), class activation map (CAM), and Gradient based Class Activation Maps (Grad-CAM). These methods under perform when localizing multiple occurrences of the same class and do not work for all CNNs. In addition, Grad-CAM does not capture the entire object in completeness when used on single object images, this affect performance on recognition tasks. With the intention to create an enhanced visual explanation in terms of visual sharpness, object localization and explaining multiple occurrences of objects in a single image, we present Smooth Grad-CAM++ Simple demo: http://35.238.22.135:5000/, a technique that combines methods from two other recent techniques---SMOOTHGRAD and Grad-CAM++. Our Smooth Grad-CAM++ technique provides the capability of either visualizing a layer, subset of feature maps, or subset of neurons within a feature map at each instance at the inference level (model prediction process). After experimenting with few images, Smooth Grad-CAM++ produced more visually sharp maps with better localization of objects in the given input images when compared with other methods.

A distribution inference attack aims to infer statistical properties of data used to train machine learning models. These attacks are sometimes surprisingly potent, but the factors that impact distribution inference risk are not well understood and demonstrated attacks often rely on strong and unrealistic assumptions such as full knowledge of training environments even in supposedly black-box threat scenarios. To improve understanding of distribution inference risks, we develop a new black-box attack that even outperforms the best known white-box attack in most settings. Using this new attack, we evaluate distribution inference risk while relaxing a variety of assumptions about the adversary's knowledge under black-box access, like known model architectures and label-only access. Finally, we evaluate the effectiveness of previously proposed defenses and introduce new defenses. We find that although noise-based defenses appear to be ineffective, a simple re-sampling defense can be highly effective. Code is available at https://github.com/iamgroot42/dissecting_distribution_inference

Most black-box optimization methods require extensive hyperparameter tuning, often limiting their ability to generalize across different optimization domains. Foundation models for black-box optimization that learn optimization principles from a large collection of optimization trajectories offer a promising alternative, with the potential to outperform manually designed methods across diverse problem classes. However, prior work has either relied on non-public datasets or on purely synthetic data, limiting reproducibility and generalization to real-world problems. As a result, progress in this area has been constrained by the lack of large-scale, real-world, publicly available pre-training data. We introduce BBO-Pile, the first open-source dataset comprising over 500K optimization trajectories evaluated across 3095 different black-boxes for different optimizers, which represents by far the largest public dataset for this task. Using this dataset, we train a family of foundation models at multiple scales, ranging from 2M to 80M parameters and from 200M to 2B training tokens, and study their scaling behavior with respect to compute. Our results demonstrate that large-scale pre-training is a viable and effective approach to imitate black-box optimization methods, paving the way for future research in this direction.

For many evaluation metrics commonly used as benchmarks for unconditional image generation, trivially memorizing the training set attains a better score than models which are considered state-of-the-art; we consider this problematic. We clarify a necessary condition for an evaluation metric not to behave this way: estimating the function must require a large sample from the model. In search of such a metric, we turn to neural network divergences (NNDs), which are defined in terms of a neural network trained to distinguish between distributions. The resulting benchmarks cannot be "won" by training set memorization, while still being perceptually correlated and computable only from samples. We survey past work on using NNDs for evaluation and implement an example black-box metric based on these ideas. Through experimental validation we show that it can effectively measure diversity, sample quality, and generalization.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are known to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks even under a black-box setting where the adversary can only query the model. Particularly, query-based black-box adversarial attacks estimate adversarial gradients based on the returned probability vectors of the target model for a sequence of queries. During this process, the queries made to the target model are intermediate adversarial examples crafted at the previous attack step, which share high similarities in the pixel space. Motivated by this observation, stateful detection methods have been proposed to detect and reject query-based attacks. While demonstrating promising results, these methods either have been evaded by more advanced attacks or suffer from low efficiency in terms of the number of shots (queries) required to detect different attacks. Arguably, the key challenge here is to assign high similarity scores for any two intermediate adversarial examples perturbed from the same clean image. To address this challenge, we propose a novel Adversarial Contrastive Prompt Tuning (ACPT) method to robustly fine-tune the CLIP image encoder to extract similar embeddings for any two intermediate adversarial queries. With ACPT, we further introduce a detection framework AdvQDet that can detect 7 state-of-the-art query-based attacks with >99% detection rate within 5 shots. We also show that ACPT is robust to 3 types of adaptive attacks. Code is available at https://github.com/xinwong/AdvQDet.

Third-party resources (e.g., samples, backbones, and pre-trained models) are usually involved in the training of deep neural networks (DNNs), which brings backdoor attacks as a new training-phase threat. In general, backdoor attackers intend to implant hidden backdoor in DNNs, so that the attacked DNNs behave normally on benign samples whereas their predictions will be maliciously changed to a pre-defined target label if hidden backdoors are activated by attacker-specified trigger patterns. To facilitate the research and development of more secure training schemes and defenses, we design an open-sourced Python toolbox that implements representative and advanced backdoor attacks and defenses under a unified and flexible framework. Our toolbox has four important and promising characteristics, including consistency, simplicity, flexibility, and co-development. It allows researchers and developers to easily implement and compare different methods on benchmark or their local datasets. This Python toolbox, namely BackdoorBox, is available at https://github.com/THUYimingLi/BackdoorBox.

Deep learning models have shown their potential for several applications. However, most of the models are opaque and difficult to trust due to their complex reasoning - commonly known as the black-box problem. Some fields, such as medicine, require a high degree of transparency to accept and adopt such technologies. Consequently, creating explainable/interpretable models or applying post-hoc methods on classifiers to build trust in deep learning models are required. Moreover, deep learning methods can be used for segmentation tasks, which typically require hard-to-obtain, time-consuming manually-annotated segmentation labels for training. This paper introduces three inherently-explainable classifiers to tackle both of these problems as one. The localisation heatmaps provided by the networks -- representing the models' focus areas and being used in classification decision-making -- can be directly interpreted, without requiring any post-hoc methods to derive information for model explanation. The models are trained by using the input image and only the classification labels as ground-truth in a supervised fashion - without using any information about the location of the region of interest (i.e. the segmentation labels), making the segmentation training of the models weakly-supervised through classification labels. The final segmentation is obtained by thresholding these heatmaps. The models were employed for the task of multi-class brain tumour classification using two different datasets, resulting in the best F1-score of 0.93 for the supervised classification task while securing a median Dice score of 0.67pm0.08 for the weakly-supervised segmentation task. Furthermore, the obtained accuracy on a subset of tumour-only images outperformed the state-of-the-art glioma tumour grading binary classifiers with the best model achieving 98.7\% accuracy.

Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) is often provided as a pay-per-query, black-box system to clients. Such a black-box approach not only hinders open replication, validation, and interpretation of model results, but also makes it harder for white-hat researchers to identify vulnerabilities in the MLaaS systems. Model extraction is a promising technique to address these challenges by reverse-engineering black-box models. Since training data is typically unavailable for MLaaS models, this paper focuses on the realistic version of it: data-free model extraction. We propose a data-free model extraction approach, CaBaGe, to achieve higher model extraction accuracy with a small number of queries. Our innovations include (1) a novel experience replay for focusing on difficult training samples; (2) an ensemble of generators for steadily producing diverse synthetic data; and (3) a selective filtering process for querying the victim model with harder, more balanced samples. In addition, we create a more realistic setting, for the first time, where the attacker has no knowledge of the number of classes in the victim training data, and create a solution to learn the number of classes on the fly. Our evaluation shows that CaBaGe outperforms existing techniques on seven datasets -- MNIST, FMNIST, SVHN, CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, ImageNet-subset, and Tiny ImageNet -- with an accuracy improvement of the extracted models by up to 43.13%. Furthermore, the number of queries required to extract a clone model matching the final accuracy of prior work is reduced by up to 75.7%.

The robustness of deep neural networks is crucial for safety-critical deployments, yet existing evaluation methods are often attack-dependent and lack interpretability. We propose a principled, attack-agnostic robustness metric based on the spectral norm of the Fisher Information Matrix (FIM), which quantifies the worst-case sensitivity of the model's output distribution to input perturbations. Theoretically, we establish that the FIM equals the variance of the input Jacobian and derive closed-form spectral bounds for common architectures, including VGG, ResNet, DenseNet, and Transformer, providing the first theoretical robustness ranking. To enable scalable evaluation, we develop efficient algorithms, including power iteration and Hutchinson-based estimation, that support both white-box and black-box settings. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets, including CIFAR, ImageNet, and medical images, and across multiple architectures show a strong correlation between our metric and adversarial vulnerability. Our framework serves as an interpretable diagnostic tool that complements attack-based evaluations, offering insights into architectural sensitivity and guiding the design of more robust models. Code is available at: https://github.com/franz-chang/SRP/.

This paper studies the black-box optimization task which aims to find the maxima of a black-box function using a static set of its observed input-output pairs. This is often achieved via learning and optimizing a surrogate function with that offline data. Alternatively, it can also be framed as an inverse modeling task that maps a desired performance to potential input candidates that achieve it. Both approaches are constrained by the limited amount of offline data. To mitigate this limitation, we introduce a new perspective that casts offline optimization as a distributional translation task. This is formulated as learning a probabilistic bridge transforming an implicit distribution of low-value inputs (i.e., offline data) into another distribution of high-value inputs (i.e., solution candidates). Such probabilistic bridge can be learned using low- and high-value inputs sampled from synthetic functions that resemble the target function. These synthetic functions are constructed as the mean posterior of multiple Gaussian processes fitted with different parameterizations on the offline data, alleviating the data bottleneck. The proposed approach is evaluated on an extensive benchmark comprising most recent methods, demonstrating significant improvement and establishing a new state-of-the-art performance. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/cuong-dm/ROOT.

Black-box LLM distillation is usually evaluated as an output-matching problem: a student is considered successful when its responses are semantically similar to, or task-consistent with, those of a teacher. However, output similarity does not imply that the student is behaviorally indistinguishable from the model it imitates. We introduce bounded behavioral indistinguishability, formalized as (ε,q,t,A)-behavioral indistinguishability over an explicit prompt distribution, where ε bounds distinguishing advantage, q bounds oracle queries, t bounds computation, and A denotes the adversary class. We instantiate this notion on Qwen and Llama teacher-student pairs using a controlled 5,000-prompt behavioral probe suite. For each family, we compare the teacher with both the base student and the LoRA-distilled student, measuring whether distillation reduces distinguishability rather than merely improving similarity. LoRA raises semantic similarity from 0.788 to 0.862 for Qwen and from 0.814 to 0.874 for Llama. Yet adversarial evaluation reveals remaining behavioral differences: learned discriminators retain nonzero advantage, and pairwise category analysis shows artifacts concentrated in style/format, robustness, and domain-technical prompts. A pairwise teacher-identification adversary confirms this trend. With a different-family Llama judge and A/B-swap consistency filtering, Qwen distinguishing advantage drops from 0.158 for the base student to 0.081 after LoRA distillation. Query-budget experiments show that disagreement-guided acquisition does not consistently outperform stratified random sampling, indicating that coverage and diversity remain strong baselines. Our results show that semantic fidelity is useful but insufficient: black-box LLM distillation requires bounded, adversarial, and category-aware evaluation.

While large language models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable capabilities across various tasks, they encounter potential security risks such as jailbreak attacks, which exploit vulnerabilities to bypass security measures and generate harmful outputs. Existing jailbreak strategies mainly focus on maximizing attack success rate (ASR), frequently neglecting other critical factors, including the relevance of the jailbreak response to the query and the level of stealthiness. This narrow focus on single objectives can result in ineffective attacks that either lack contextual relevance or are easily recognizable. In this work, we introduce BlackDAN, an innovative black-box attack framework with multi-objective optimization, aiming to generate high-quality prompts that effectively facilitate jailbreaking while maintaining contextual relevance and minimizing detectability. BlackDAN leverages Multiobjective Evolutionary Algorithms (MOEAs), specifically the NSGA-II algorithm, to optimize jailbreaks across multiple objectives including ASR, stealthiness, and semantic relevance. By integrating mechanisms like mutation, crossover, and Pareto-dominance, BlackDAN provides a transparent and interpretable process for generating jailbreaks. Furthermore, the framework allows customization based on user preferences, enabling the selection of prompts that balance harmfulness, relevance, and other factors. Experimental results demonstrate that BlackDAN outperforms traditional single-objective methods, yielding higher success rates and improved robustness across various LLMs and multimodal LLMs, while ensuring jailbreak responses are both relevant and less detectable.

Deep learning models are susceptible to adversarial samples in white and black-box environments. Although previous studies have shown high attack success rates, coupling DNN models with interpretation models could offer a sense of security when a human expert is involved, who can identify whether a given sample is benign or malicious. However, in white-box environments, interpretable deep learning systems (IDLSes) have been shown to be vulnerable to malicious manipulations. In black-box settings, as access to the components of IDLSes is limited, it becomes more challenging for the adversary to fool the system. In this work, we propose a Query-efficient Score-based black-box attack against IDLSes, QuScore, which requires no knowledge of the target model and its coupled interpretation model. QuScore is based on transfer-based and score-based methods by employing an effective microbial genetic algorithm. Our method is designed to reduce the number of queries necessary to carry out successful attacks, resulting in a more efficient process. By continuously refining the adversarial samples created based on feedback scores from the IDLS, our approach effectively navigates the search space to identify perturbations that can fool the system. We evaluate the attack's effectiveness on four CNN models (Inception, ResNet, VGG, DenseNet) and two interpretation models (CAM, Grad), using both ImageNet and CIFAR datasets. Our results show that the proposed approach is query-efficient with a high attack success rate that can reach between 95% and 100% and transferability with an average success rate of 69% in the ImageNet and CIFAR datasets. Our attack method generates adversarial examples with attribution maps that resemble benign samples. We have also demonstrated that our attack is resilient against various preprocessing defense techniques and can easily be transferred to different DNN models.

Augmenting large language models (LLMs) with external tools has emerged as a promising approach to extend their utility, empowering them to solve practical tasks. Existing work typically empowers LLMs as tool users with a manually designed workflow, where the LLM plans a series of tools in a step-by-step manner, and sequentially executes each tool to obtain intermediate results until deriving the final answer. However, they suffer from two challenges in realistic scenarios: (1) The handcrafted control flow is often ad-hoc and constraints the LLM to local planning; (2) The LLM is instructed to use only manually demonstrated tools or well-trained Python functions, which limits its generalization to new tools. In this work, we first propose Automatic Tool Chain (ATC), a framework that enables the LLM to act as a multi-tool user, which directly utilizes a chain of tools through programming. To scale up the scope of the tools, we next propose a black-box probing method. This further empowers the LLM as a tool learner that can actively discover and document tool usages, teaching themselves to properly master new tools. For a comprehensive evaluation, we build a challenging benchmark named ToolFlow, which diverges from previous benchmarks by its long-term planning scenarios and complex toolset. Experiments on both existing datasets and ToolFlow illustrate the superiority of our framework. Analysis on different settings also validates the effectiveness and the utility of our black-box probing algorithm.

Large Language Model (LLM) services and models often come with legal rules on who can use them and how they must use them. Assessing the compliance of the released LLMs is crucial, as these rules protect the interests of the LLM contributor and prevent misuse. In this context, we describe the novel problem of Black-box Identity Verification (BBIV). The goal is to determine whether a third-party application uses a certain LLM through its chat function. We propose a method called Targeted Random Adversarial Prompt (TRAP) that identifies the specific LLM in use. We repurpose adversarial suffixes, originally proposed for jailbreaking, to get a pre-defined answer from the target LLM, while other models give random answers. TRAP detects the target LLMs with over 95% true positive rate at under 0.2% false positive rate even after a single interaction. TRAP remains effective even if the LLM has minor changes that do not significantly alter the original function.

Recent developments in large language models (LLMs) have been impressive. However, these models sometimes show inconsistencies and problematic behavior, such as hallucinating facts, generating flawed code, or creating offensive and toxic content. Unlike these models, humans typically utilize external tools to cross-check and refine their initial content, like using a search engine for fact-checking, or a code interpreter for debugging. Inspired by this observation, we introduce a framework called CRITIC that allows LLMs, which are essentially "black boxes" to validate and progressively amend their own outputs in a manner similar to human interaction with tools. More specifically, starting with an initial output, CRITIC interacts with appropriate tools to evaluate certain aspects of the text, and then revises the output based on the feedback obtained during this validation process. Comprehensive evaluations involving free-form question answering, mathematical program synthesis, and toxicity reduction demonstrate that CRITIC consistently enhances the performance of LLMs. Meanwhile, our research highlights the crucial importance of external feedback in promoting the ongoing self-improvement of LLMs.

The transferability of adversarial examples is a key issue in the security of deep neural networks. The possibility of an adversarial example crafted for a source model fooling another targeted model makes the threat of adversarial attacks more realistic. Measuring transferability is a crucial problem, but the Attack Success Rate alone does not provide a sound evaluation. This paper proposes a new methodology for evaluating transferability by putting distortion in a central position. This new tool shows that transferable attacks may perform far worse than a black box attack if the attacker randomly picks the source model. To address this issue, we propose a new selection mechanism, called FiT, which aims at choosing the best source model with only a few preliminary queries to the target. Our experimental results show that FiT is highly effective at selecting the best source model for multiple scenarios such as single-model attacks, ensemble-model attacks and multiple attacks (Code available at: https://github.com/t-maho/transferability_measure_fit).

Deep neural networks (DNNs) have been shown to outperform traditional machine learning algorithms in a broad variety of application domains due to their effectiveness in modeling complex problems and handling high-dimensional datasets. Many real-life datasets, however, are of increasingly high dimensionality, where a large number of features may be irrelevant for both supervised and unsupervised learning tasks. The inclusion of such features would not only introduce unwanted noise but also increase computational complexity. Furthermore, due to high non-linearity and dependency among a large number of features, DNN models tend to be unavoidably opaque and perceived as black-box methods because of their not well-understood internal functioning. Their algorithmic complexity is often simply beyond the capacities of humans to understand the interplay among myriads of hyperparameters. A well-interpretable model can identify statistically significant features and explain the way they affect the model's outcome. In this paper, we propose an efficient method to improve the interpretability of black-box models for classification tasks in the case of high-dimensional datasets. First, we train a black-box model on a high-dimensional dataset to learn the embeddings on which the classification is performed. To decompose the inner working principles of the black-box model and to identify top-k important features, we employ different probing and perturbing techniques. We then approximate the behavior of the black-box model by means of an interpretable surrogate model on the top-k feature space. Finally, we derive decision rules and local explanations from the surrogate model to explain individual decisions. Our approach outperforms state-of-the-art methods like TabNet and XGboost when tested on different datasets with varying dimensionality between 50 and 20,000 w.r.t metrics and explainability.

The proliferation of open-source Large Language Models (LLMs) underscores the pressing need for evaluation methods. Existing works primarily rely on external evaluators, focusing on training and prompting strategies. However, a crucial aspect - model-aware glass-box features - is overlooked. In this study, we explore the utility of glass-box features under the scenario of self-evaluation, namely applying an LLM to evaluate its own output. We investigate various glass-box feature groups and discovered that the softmax distribution serves as a reliable indicator for quality evaluation. Furthermore, we propose two strategies to enhance the evaluation by incorporating features derived from references. Experimental results on public benchmarks validate the feasibility of self-evaluation of LLMs using glass-box features.

We propose D-RISE, a method for generating visual explanations for the predictions of object detectors. Utilizing the proposed similarity metric that accounts for both localization and categorization aspects of object detection allows our method to produce saliency maps that show image areas that most affect the prediction. D-RISE can be considered "black-box" in the software testing sense, as it only needs access to the inputs and outputs of an object detector. Compared to gradient-based methods, D-RISE is more general and agnostic to the particular type of object detector being tested, and does not need knowledge of the inner workings of the model. We show that D-RISE can be easily applied to different object detectors including one-stage detectors such as YOLOv3 and two-stage detectors such as Faster-RCNN. We present a detailed analysis of the generated visual explanations to highlight the utilization of context and possible biases learned by object detectors.

Offline optimization has recently emerged as an increasingly popular approach to mitigate the prohibitively expensive cost of online experimentation. The key idea is to learn a surrogate of the black-box function that underlines the target experiment using a static (offline) dataset of its previous input-output queries. Such an approach is, however, fraught with an out-of-distribution issue where the learned surrogate becomes inaccurate outside the offline data regimes. To mitigate this, existing offline optimizers have proposed numerous conditioning techniques to prevent the learned surrogate from being too erratic. Nonetheless, such conditioning strategies are often specific to particular surrogate or search models, which might not generalize to a different model choice. This motivates us to develop a model-agnostic approach instead, which incorporates a notion of model sharpness into the training loss of the surrogate as a regularizer. Our approach is supported by a new theoretical analysis demonstrating that reducing surrogate sharpness on the offline dataset provably reduces its generalized sharpness on unseen data. Our analysis extends existing theories from bounding generalized prediction loss (on unseen data) with loss sharpness to bounding the worst-case generalized surrogate sharpness with its empirical estimate on training data, providing a new perspective on sharpness regularization. Our extensive experimentation on a diverse range of optimization tasks also shows that reducing surrogate sharpness often leads to significant improvement, marking (up to) a noticeable 9.6% performance boost. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/cuong-dm/IGNITE

Faced with distribution shift between training and test set, we wish to detect and quantify the shift, and to correct our classifiers without test set labels. Motivated by medical diagnosis, where diseases (targets) cause symptoms (observations), we focus on label shift, where the label marginal p(y) changes but the conditional p(x| y) does not. We propose Black Box Shift Estimation (BBSE) to estimate the test distribution p(y). BBSE exploits arbitrary black box predictors to reduce dimensionality prior to shift correction. While better predictors give tighter estimates, BBSE works even when predictors are biased, inaccurate, or uncalibrated, so long as their confusion matrices are invertible. We prove BBSE's consistency, bound its error, and introduce a statistical test that uses BBSE to detect shift. We also leverage BBSE to correct classifiers. Experiments demonstrate accurate estimates and improved prediction, even on high-dimensional datasets of natural images.

Understanding the vulnerabilities of Large Vision Language Models (LVLMs) to jailbreak attacks is essential for their responsible real-world deployment. Most previous work requires access to model gradients, or is based on human knowledge (prompt engineering) to complete jailbreak, and they hardly consider the interaction of images and text, resulting in inability to jailbreak in black box scenarios or poor performance. To overcome these limitations, we propose a Prior-Guided Bimodal Interactive Black-Box Jailbreak Attack for toxicity maximization, referred to as PBI-Attack. Our method begins by extracting malicious features from a harmful corpus using an alternative LVLM and embedding these features into a benign image as prior information. Subsequently, we enhance these features through bidirectional cross-modal interaction optimization, which iteratively optimizes the bimodal perturbations in an alternating manner through greedy search, aiming to maximize the toxicity of the generated response. The toxicity level is quantified using a well-trained evaluation model. Experiments demonstrate that PBI-Attack outperforms previous state-of-the-art jailbreak methods, achieving an average attack success rate of 92.5% across three open-source LVLMs and around 67.3% on three closed-source LVLMs. Disclaimer: This paper contains potentially disturbing and offensive content.

Automated X-ray inspection is crucial for efficient and unobtrusive security screening in various public settings. However, challenges such as object occlusion, variations in the physical properties of items, diversity in X-ray scanning devices, and limited training data hinder accurate and reliable detection of illicit items. Despite the large body of research in the field, reported experimental evaluations are often incomplete, with frequently conflicting outcomes. To shed light on the research landscape and facilitate further research, a systematic, detailed, and thorough comparative evaluation of recent Deep Learning (DL)-based methods for X-ray object detection is conducted. For this, a comprehensive evaluation framework is developed, composed of: a) Six recent, large-scale, and widely used public datasets for X-ray illicit item detection (OPIXray, CLCXray, SIXray, EDS, HiXray, and PIDray), b) Ten different state-of-the-art object detection schemes covering all main categories in the literature, including generic Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), custom CNN, generic transformer, and hybrid CNN-transformer architectures, and c) Various detection (mAP50 and mAP50:95) and time/computational-complexity (inference time (ms), parameter size (M), and computational load (GFLOPS)) metrics. A thorough analysis of the results leads to critical observations and insights, emphasizing key aspects such as: a) Overall behavior of the object detection schemes, b) Object-level detection performance, c) Dataset-specific observations, and d) Time efficiency and computational complexity analysis. To support reproducibility of the reported experimental results, the evaluation code and model weights are made publicly available at https://github.com/jgenc/xray-comparative-evaluation.

We initiate the study of proper losses for evaluating generative models in the discrete setting. Unlike traditional proper losses, we treat both the generative model and the target distribution as black-boxes, only assuming ability to draw i.i.d. samples. We define a loss to be black-box proper if the generative distribution that minimizes expected loss is equal to the target distribution. Using techniques from statistical estimation theory, we give a general construction and characterization of black-box proper losses: they must take a polynomial form, and the number of draws from the model and target distribution must exceed the degree of the polynomial. The characterization rules out a loss whose expectation is the cross-entropy between the target distribution and the model. By extending the construction to arbitrary sampling schemes such as Poisson sampling, however, we show that one can construct such a loss.

Decision-based evasion attacks repeatedly query a black-box classifier to generate adversarial examples. Prior work measures the cost of such attacks by the total number of queries made to the classifier. We argue this metric is flawed. Most security-critical machine learning systems aim to weed out "bad" data (e.g., malware, harmful content, etc). Queries to such systems carry a fundamentally asymmetric cost: queries detected as "bad" come at a higher cost because they trigger additional security filters, e.g., usage throttling or account suspension. Yet, we find that existing decision-based attacks issue a large number of "bad" queries, which likely renders them ineffective against security-critical systems. We then design new attacks that reduce the number of bad queries by 1.5-7.3times, but often at a significant increase in total (non-bad) queries. We thus pose it as an open problem to build black-box attacks that are more effective under realistic cost metrics.

Prompting interfaces allow users to quickly adjust the output of generative models in both vision and language. However, small changes and design choices in the prompt can lead to significant differences in the output. In this work, we develop a black-box framework for generating adversarial prompts for unstructured image and text generation. These prompts, which can be standalone or prepended to benign prompts, induce specific behaviors into the generative process, such as generating images of a particular object or generating high perplexity text.

Recently, methods for skeleton-based human activity recognition have been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial attacks. However, these attack methods require either the full knowledge of the victim (i.e. white-box attacks), access to training data (i.e. transfer-based attacks) or frequent model queries (i.e. black-box attacks). All their requirements are highly restrictive, raising the question of how detrimental the vulnerability is. In this paper, we show that the vulnerability indeed exists. To this end, we consider a new attack task: the attacker has no access to the victim model or the training data or labels, where we coin the term hard no-box attack. Specifically, we first learn a motion manifold where we define an adversarial loss to compute a new gradient for the attack, named skeleton-motion-informed (SMI) gradient. Our gradient contains information of the motion dynamics, which is different from existing gradient-based attack methods that compute the loss gradient assuming each dimension in the data is independent. The SMI gradient can augment many gradient-based attack methods, leading to a new family of no-box attack methods. Extensive evaluation and comparison show that our method imposes a real threat to existing classifiers. They also show that the SMI gradient improves the transferability and imperceptibility of adversarial samples in both no-box and transfer-based black-box settings.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable prediction performance for a growing array of tasks. However, their rapid proliferation and increasing opaqueness have created a growing need for interpretability. Here, we ask whether we can automatically obtain natural language explanations for black box text modules. A "text module" is any function that maps text to a scalar continuous value, such as a submodule within an LLM or a fitted model of a brain region. "Black box" indicates that we only have access to the module's inputs/outputs. We introduce Summarize and Score (SASC), a method that takes in a text module and returns a natural language explanation of the module's selectivity along with a score for how reliable the explanation is. We study SASC in 3 contexts. First, we evaluate SASC on synthetic modules and find that it often recovers ground truth explanations. Second, we use SASC to explain modules found within a pre-trained BERT model, enabling inspection of the model's internals. Finally, we show that SASC can generate explanations for the response of individual fMRI voxels to language stimuli, with potential applications to fine-grained brain mapping. All code for using SASC and reproducing results is made available on Github.

We present a novel defense, against backdoor attacks on Deep Neural Networks (DNNs), wherein adversaries covertly implant malicious behaviors (backdoors) into DNNs. Our defense falls within the category of post-development defenses that operate independently of how the model was generated. The proposed defense is built upon a novel reverse engineering approach that can directly extract backdoor functionality of a given backdoored model to a backdoor expert model. The approach is straightforward -- finetuning the backdoored model over a small set of intentionally mislabeled clean samples, such that it unlearns the normal functionality while still preserving the backdoor functionality, and thus resulting in a model (dubbed a backdoor expert model) that can only recognize backdoor inputs. Based on the extracted backdoor expert model, we show the feasibility of devising highly accurate backdoor input detectors that filter out the backdoor inputs during model inference. Further augmented by an ensemble strategy with a finetuned auxiliary model, our defense, BaDExpert (Backdoor Input Detection with Backdoor Expert), effectively mitigates 17 SOTA backdoor attacks while minimally impacting clean utility. The effectiveness of BaDExpert has been verified on multiple datasets (CIFAR10, GTSRB and ImageNet) across various model architectures (ResNet, VGG, MobileNetV2 and Vision Transformer).

We present a generic framework for creating differentially private versions of any hypothesis test in a black-box way. We analyze the resulting tests analytically and experimentally. Most crucially, we show good practical performance for small data sets, showing that at epsilon = 1 we only need 5-6 times as much data as in the fully public setting. We compare our work to the one existing framework of this type, as well as to several individually-designed private hypothesis tests. Our framework is higher power than other generic solutions and at least competitive with (and often better than) individually-designed tests.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable performances in various tasks. However, the performance of LLMs heavily depends on the input prompt, which has given rise to a number of recent works on prompt optimization. However, previous works often require the availability of a numeric score to assess the quality of every prompt. Unfortunately, when a human user interacts with a black-box LLM, attaining such a score is often infeasible and unreliable. Instead, it is usually significantly easier and more reliable to obtain preference feedback from a human user, i.e., showing the user the responses generated from a pair of prompts and asking the user which one is preferred. Therefore, in this paper, we study the problem of prompt optimization with human feedback (POHF), in which we aim to optimize the prompt for a black-box LLM using only human preference feedback. Drawing inspiration from dueling bandits, we design a theoretically principled strategy to select a pair of prompts to query for preference feedback in every iteration, and hence introduce our algorithm named automated POHF (APOHF). We apply our APOHF algorithm to various tasks, including optimizing user instructions, prompt optimization for text-to-image generative models, and response optimization with human feedback (i.e., further refining the response using a variant of our APOHF). The results demonstrate that our APOHF can efficiently find a good prompt using a small number of preference feedback instances. Our code can be found at https://github.com/xqlin98/APOHF.

Generating rationales that justify scoring decisions has been a promising way to facilitate explainability in automated scoring systems. However, existing methods do not match the accuracy of classifier-based methods. Plus, the generated rationales often contain hallucinated information. To address these issues, we propose a novel framework capable of generating more faithful rationales and, more importantly, matching performance with classifier-based black-box scoring systems. We first mimic the human assessment process by querying Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate a thought tree. We then summarise intermediate assessment decisions from each thought tree path for creating synthetic rationale data and rationale preference data. Finally, we utilise the generated synthetic data to calibrate LLMs through a two-step training process: supervised fine-tuning and preference optimization. Extensive experimental results demonstrate that our framework achieves a 38% assessment performance improvement in the QWK score compared to prior work while producing higher-quality rationales, as recognised by human evaluators and LLMs. Our work sheds light on the effectiveness of performing preference optimization using synthetic preference data obtained from thought tree paths.

Adversarial examples are typically optimized with gradient-based attacks. While novel attacks are continuously proposed, each is shown to outperform its predecessors using different experimental setups, hyperparameter settings, and number of forward and backward calls to the target models. This provides overly-optimistic and even biased evaluations that may unfairly favor one particular attack over the others. In this work, we aim to overcome these limitations by proposing AttackBench, i.e., the first evaluation framework that enables a fair comparison among different attacks. To this end, we first propose a categorization of gradient-based attacks, identifying their main components and differences. We then introduce our framework, which evaluates their effectiveness and efficiency. We measure these characteristics by (i) defining an optimality metric that quantifies how close an attack is to the optimal solution, and (ii) limiting the number of forward and backward queries to the model, such that all attacks are compared within a given maximum query budget. Our extensive experimental analysis compares more than 100 attack implementations with a total of over 800 different configurations against CIFAR-10 and ImageNet models, highlighting that only very few attacks outperform all the competing approaches. Within this analysis, we shed light on several implementation issues that prevent many attacks from finding better solutions or running at all. We release AttackBench as a publicly-available benchmark, aiming to continuously update it to include and evaluate novel gradient-based attacks for optimizing adversarial examples.

As large language models (LLMs) become increasingly capable, it is prudent to assess whether safety measures remain effective even if LLMs intentionally try to bypass them. Previous work introduced control evaluations, an adversarial framework for testing deployment strategies of untrusted models (i.e., models which might be trying to bypass safety measures). While prior work treats a single failure as unacceptable, we perform control evaluations in a "distributed threat setting" -- a setting where no single action is catastrophic and no single action provides overwhelming evidence of misalignment. We approach this problem with a two-level deployment framework that uses an adaptive macro-protocol to choose between micro-protocols. Micro-protocols operate on a single task, using a less capable, but extensively tested (trusted) model to harness and monitor the untrusted model. Meanwhile, the macro-protocol maintains an adaptive credence on the untrusted model's alignment based on its past actions, using it to pick between safer and riskier micro-protocols. We evaluate our method in a code generation testbed where a red team attempts to generate subtly backdoored code with an LLM whose deployment is safeguarded by a blue team. We plot Pareto frontiers of safety (# of non-backdoored solutions) and usefulness (# of correct solutions). At a given level of usefulness, our adaptive deployment strategy reduces the number of backdoors by 80% compared to non-adaptive baselines.

Model Inversion (MI) attacks aim to reconstruct information from private training data by exploiting access to machine learning models T. To evaluate such attacks, the standard evaluation framework relies on an evaluation model E, trained under the same task design as T. This framework has become the de facto standard for assessing progress in MI research, used across nearly all recent MI studies without question. In this paper, we present the first in-depth study of this evaluation framework. In particular, we identify a critical issue of this standard framework: Type-I adversarial examples. These are reconstructions that do not capture the visual features of private training data, yet are still deemed successful by T and ultimately transferable to E. Such false positives undermine the reliability of the standard MI evaluation framework. To address this issue, we introduce a new MI evaluation framework that replaces the evaluation model E with advanced Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs). By leveraging their general-purpose visual understanding, our MLLM-based framework does not depend on training of shared task design as in T, thus reducing Type-I transferability and providing more faithful assessments of reconstruction success. Using our MLLM-based evaluation framework, we reevaluate 27 diverse MI attack setups and empirically reveal consistently high false positive rates under the standard evaluation framework. Importantly, we demonstrate that many state-of-the-art (SOTA) MI methods report inflated attack accuracy, indicating that actual privacy leakage is significantly lower than previously believed. By uncovering this critical issue and proposing a robust solution, our work enables a reassessment of progress in MI research and sets a new standard for reliable and robust evaluation. Code can be found in https://github.com/hosytuyen/MI-Eval-MLLM

An established way to improve the transferability of black-box evasion attacks is to craft the adversarial examples on an ensemble-based surrogate to increase diversity. We argue that transferability is fundamentally related to uncertainty. Based on a state-of-the-art Bayesian Deep Learning technique, we propose a new method to efficiently build a surrogate by sampling approximately from the posterior distribution of neural network weights, which represents the belief about the value of each parameter. Our extensive experiments on ImageNet, CIFAR-10 and MNIST show that our approach improves the success rates of four state-of-the-art attacks significantly (up to 83.2 percentage points), in both intra-architecture and inter-architecture transferability. On ImageNet, our approach can reach 94% of success rate while reducing training computations from 11.6 to 2.4 exaflops, compared to an ensemble of independently trained DNNs. Our vanilla surrogate achieves 87.5% of the time higher transferability than three test-time techniques designed for this purpose. Our work demonstrates that the way to train a surrogate has been overlooked, although it is an important element of transfer-based attacks. We are, therefore, the first to review the effectiveness of several training methods in increasing transferability. We provide new directions to better understand the transferability phenomenon and offer a simple but strong baseline for future work.

As generative models achieve great success, tampering and modifying the sensitive image contents (i.e., human faces, artist signatures, commercial logos, etc.) have induced a significant threat with social impact. The backdoor attack is a method that implants vulnerabilities in a target model, which can be activated through a trigger. In this work, we innovatively prevent the abuse of image content modification by implanting the backdoor into image-editing models. Once the protected sensitive content on an image is modified by an editing model, the backdoor will be triggered, making the editing fail. Unlike traditional backdoor attacks that use data poisoning, to enable protection on individual images and eliminate the need for model training, we developed the first framework for run-time backdoor implantation, which is both time- and resource- efficient. We generate imperceptible perturbations on the images to inject the backdoor and define the protected area as the only backdoor trigger. Editing other unprotected insensitive areas will not trigger the backdoor, which minimizes the negative impact on legal image modifications. Evaluations with state-of-the-art image editing models show that our protective method can increase the CLIP-FID of generated images from 12.72 to 39.91, or reduce the SSIM from 0.503 to 0.167 when subjected to malicious editing. At the same time, our method exhibits minimal impact on benign editing, which demonstrates the efficacy of our proposed framework. The proposed run-time backdoor can also achieve effective protection on the latest diffusion models. Code are available.

Backdoor learning is an emerging and vital topic for studying deep neural networks' vulnerability (DNNs). Many pioneering backdoor attack and defense methods are being proposed, successively or concurrently, in the status of a rapid arms race. However, we find that the evaluations of new methods are often unthorough to verify their claims and accurate performance, mainly due to the rapid development, diverse settings, and the difficulties of implementation and reproducibility. Without thorough evaluations and comparisons, it is not easy to track the current progress and design the future development roadmap of the literature. To alleviate this dilemma, we build a comprehensive benchmark of backdoor learning called BackdoorBench. It consists of an extensible modular-based codebase (currently including implementations of 8 state-of-the-art (SOTA) attacks and 9 SOTA defense algorithms) and a standardized protocol of complete backdoor learning. We also provide comprehensive evaluations of every pair of 8 attacks against 9 defenses, with 5 poisoning ratios, based on 5 models and 4 datasets, thus 8,000 pairs of evaluations in total. We present abundant analysis from different perspectives about these 8,000 evaluations, studying the effects of different factors in backdoor learning. All codes and evaluations of BackdoorBench are publicly available at https://backdoorbench.github.io.

The development of large language models (LLMs) depends on trustworthy evaluation. However, most current evaluations rely on public benchmarks, which are prone to data contamination issues that significantly compromise fairness. Previous researches have focused on constructing dynamic benchmarks to address contamination. However, continuously building new benchmarks is costly and cyclical. In this work, we aim to tackle contamination by analyzing the mechanisms of contaminated models themselves. Through our experiments, we discover that the overestimation of contaminated models is likely due to parameters acquiring shortcut solutions in training. We further propose a novel method for identifying shortcut neurons through comparative and causal analysis. Building on this, we introduce an evaluation method called shortcut neuron patching to suppress shortcut neurons. Experiments validate the effectiveness of our approach in mitigating contamination. Additionally, our evaluation results exhibit a strong linear correlation with MixEval, a recently released trustworthy benchmark, achieving a Spearman coefficient (rho) exceeding 0.95. This high correlation indicates that our method closely reveals true capabilities of the models and is trustworthy. We conduct further experiments to demonstrate the generalizability of our method across various benchmarks and hyperparameter settings. Code: https://github.com/GaryStack/Trustworthy-Evaluation

In the evolving landscape of text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models, the remarkable capability to generate high-quality images from textual descriptions faces challenges with the potential misuse of reproducing sensitive content. To address this critical issue, we introduce Robust Adversarial Concept Erase (RACE), a novel approach designed to mitigate these risks by enhancing the robustness of concept erasure method for T2I models. RACE utilizes a sophisticated adversarial training framework to identify and mitigate adversarial text embeddings, significantly reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR). Impressively, RACE achieves a 30 percentage point reduction in ASR for the ``nudity'' concept against the leading white-box attack method. Our extensive evaluations demonstrate RACE's effectiveness in defending against both white-box and black-box attacks, marking a significant advancement in protecting T2I diffusion models from generating inappropriate or misleading imagery. This work underlines the essential need for proactive defense measures in adapting to the rapidly advancing field of adversarial challenges. Our code is publicly available: https://github.com/chkimmmmm/R.A.C.E.

As a research community, we are still lacking a systematic understanding of the progress on adversarial robustness which often makes it hard to identify the most promising ideas in training robust models. A key challenge in benchmarking robustness is that its evaluation is often error-prone leading to robustness overestimation. Our goal is to establish a standardized benchmark of adversarial robustness, which as accurately as possible reflects the robustness of the considered models within a reasonable computational budget. To this end, we start by considering the image classification task and introduce restrictions (possibly loosened in the future) on the allowed models. We evaluate adversarial robustness with AutoAttack, an ensemble of white- and black-box attacks, which was recently shown in a large-scale study to improve almost all robustness evaluations compared to the original publications. To prevent overadaptation of new defenses to AutoAttack, we welcome external evaluations based on adaptive attacks, especially where AutoAttack flags a potential overestimation of robustness. Our leaderboard, hosted at https://robustbench.github.io/, contains evaluations of 120+ models and aims at reflecting the current state of the art in image classification on a set of well-defined tasks in ell_infty- and ell_2-threat models and on common corruptions, with possible extensions in the future. Additionally, we open-source the library https://github.com/RobustBench/robustbench that provides unified access to 80+ robust models to facilitate their downstream applications. Finally, based on the collected models, we analyze the impact of robustness on the performance on distribution shifts, calibration, out-of-distribution detection, fairness, privacy leakage, smoothness, and transferability.

We consider objective evaluation measures of saliency explanations for complex black-box machine learning models. We propose simple robust variants of two notions that have been considered in recent literature: (in)fidelity, and sensitivity. We analyze optimal explanations with respect to both these measures, and while the optimal explanation for sensitivity is a vacuous constant explanation, the optimal explanation for infidelity is a novel combination of two popular explanation methods. By varying the perturbation distribution that defines infidelity, we obtain novel explanations by optimizing infidelity, which we show to out-perform existing explanations in both quantitative and qualitative measurements. Another salient question given these measures is how to modify any given explanation to have better values with respect to these measures. We propose a simple modification based on lowering sensitivity, and moreover show that when done appropriately, we could simultaneously improve both sensitivity as well as fidelity.

The growing complexity of machine learning (ML) models in big data analytics, especially in domains such as environmental monitoring, highlights the critical need for interpretability and explainability to promote trust, ethical considerations, and regulatory adherence (e.g., GDPR). Traditional "black-box" models obstruct transparency, whereas post-hoc explainable AI (XAI) techniques like LIME and SHAP frequently compromise accuracy or fail to deliver inherent insights. This paper presents a novel framework that combines type-2 fuzzy sets, granular computing, and clustering to boost explainability and fairness in big data environments. When applied to the UCI Air Quality dataset, the framework effectively manages uncertainty in noisy sensor data, produces linguistic rules, and assesses fairness using silhouette scores and entropy. Key contributions encompass: (1) A type-2 fuzzy clustering approach that enhances cohesion by about 4% compared to type-1 methods (silhouette 0.365 vs. 0.349) and improves fairness (entropy 0.918); (2) Incorporation of fairness measures to mitigate biases in unsupervised scenarios; (3) A rule-based component for intrinsic XAI, achieving an average coverage of 0.65; (4) Scalable assessments showing linear runtime (roughly 0.005 seconds for sampled big data sizes). Experimental outcomes reveal superior performance relative to baselines such as DBSCAN and Agglomerative Clustering in terms of interpretability, fairness, and efficiency. Notably, the proposed method achieves a 4% improvement in silhouette score over type-1 fuzzy clustering and outperforms baselines in fairness (entropy reduction by up to 1%) and efficiency.

The integration of large language models with external content has enabled applications such as Microsoft Copilot but also introduced vulnerabilities to indirect prompt injection attacks. In these attacks, malicious instructions embedded within external content can manipulate LLM outputs, causing deviations from user expectations. To address this critical yet under-explored issue, we introduce the first benchmark for indirect prompt injection attacks, named BIPIA, to assess the risk of such vulnerabilities. Using BIPIA, we evaluate existing LLMs and find them universally vulnerable. Our analysis identifies two key factors contributing to their success: LLMs' inability to distinguish between informational context and actionable instructions, and their lack of awareness in avoiding the execution of instructions within external content. Based on these findings, we propose two novel defense mechanisms-boundary awareness and explicit reminder-to address these vulnerabilities in both black-box and white-box settings. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our black-box defense provides substantial mitigation, while our white-box defense reduces the attack success rate to near-zero levels, all while preserving the output quality of LLMs. We hope this work inspires further research into securing LLM applications and fostering their safe and reliable use.

Recent deep neural networks (DNNs) have come to rely on vast amounts of training data, providing an opportunity for malicious attackers to exploit and contaminate the data to carry out backdoor attacks. These attacks significantly undermine the reliability of DNNs. However, existing backdoor attack methods make unrealistic assumptions, assuming that all training data comes from a single source and that attackers have full access to the training data. In this paper, we address this limitation by introducing a more realistic attack scenario where victims collect data from multiple sources, and attackers cannot access the complete training data. We refer to this scenario as data-constrained backdoor attacks. In such cases, previous attack methods suffer from severe efficiency degradation due to the entanglement between benign and poisoning features during the backdoor injection process. To tackle this problem, we propose a novel approach that leverages the pre-trained Contrastive Language-Image Pre-Training (CLIP) model. We introduce three CLIP-based technologies from two distinct streams: Clean Feature Suppression, which aims to suppress the influence of clean features to enhance the prominence of poisoning features, and Poisoning Feature Augmentation, which focuses on augmenting the presence and impact of poisoning features to effectively manipulate the model's behavior. To evaluate the effectiveness, harmlessness to benign accuracy, and stealthiness of our method, we conduct extensive experiments on 3 target models, 3 datasets, and over 15 different settings. The results demonstrate remarkable improvements, with some settings achieving over 100% improvement compared to existing attacks in data-constrained scenarios. Our research contributes to addressing the limitations of existing methods and provides a practical and effective solution for data-constrained backdoor attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly act as autonomous agents, using tools to execute code, read and write files, and access networks, creating novel security risks. To mitigate these risks, agents are commonly deployed and evaluated in isolated "sandbox" environments, often implemented using Docker/OCI containers. We introduce SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH, an open benchmark that safely measures an LLM's capacity to break out of these sandboxes. The benchmark is implemented as an Inspect AI Capture the Flag (CTF) evaluation utilising a nested sandbox architecture with the outer layer containing the flag and no known vulnerabilities. Following a threat model of a motivated adversarial agent with shell access inside a container, SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH covers a spectrum of sandboxescape mechanisms spanning misconfiguration, privilege allocation mistakes, kernel flaws, and runtime/orchestration weaknesses. We find that, when vulnerabilities are added, LLMs are able to identify and exploit them, showing that use of evaluation like SANDBOXESCAPEBENCH is needed to ensure sandboxing continues to provide the encapsulation needed for highly-capable models.

Neural ranking models (NRMs) have shown remarkable success in recent years, especially with pre-trained language models. However, deep neural models are notorious for their vulnerability to adversarial examples. Adversarial attacks may become a new type of web spamming technique given our increased reliance on neural information retrieval models. Therefore, it is important to study potential adversarial attacks to identify vulnerabilities of NRMs before they are deployed. In this paper, we introduce the Word Substitution Ranking Attack (WSRA) task against NRMs, which aims to promote a target document in rankings by adding adversarial perturbations to its text. We focus on the decision-based black-box attack setting, where the attackers cannot directly get access to the model information, but can only query the target model to obtain the rank positions of the partial retrieved list. This attack setting is realistic in real-world search engines. We propose a novel Pseudo Relevance-based ADversarial ranking Attack method (PRADA) that learns a surrogate model based on Pseudo Relevance Feedback (PRF) to generate gradients for finding the adversarial perturbations. Experiments on two web search benchmark datasets show that PRADA can outperform existing attack strategies and successfully fool the NRM with small indiscernible perturbations of text.

Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved tremendous success in various applications, they are also susceptible to certain prompts that can induce them to bypass built-in safety measures and provide dangerous or illegal content, a phenomenon known as jailbreak. To protect LLMs from producing harmful information, various defense strategies are proposed, with most focusing on content filtering or adversarial training of models. In this paper, we propose an approach named Prompt Adversarial Tuning (PAT) to train a defense control mechanism, which is then embedded as a prefix to user prompts to implement our defense strategy. We design a training process similar to adversarial training to achieve our optimized goal, alternating between updating attack and defense controls. To our knowledge, we are the first to implement defense from the perspective of prompt tuning. Once employed, our method will hardly impact the operational efficiency of LLMs. Experiments show that our method is effective in both black-box and white-box settings, reducing the success rate of advanced attacks to nearly 0 while maintaining the benign answer rate of 80% to simple benign questions. Our work might potentially chart a new perspective for future explorations in LLM security.

In science and medicine, model interpretations may be reported as discoveries of natural phenomena or used to guide patient treatments. In such high-stakes tasks, false discoveries may lead investigators astray. These applications would therefore benefit from control over the finite-sample error rate of interpretations. We reframe black box model interpretability as a multiple hypothesis testing problem. The task is to discover "important" features by testing whether the model prediction is significantly different from what would be expected if the features were replaced with uninformative counterfactuals. We propose two testing methods: one that provably controls the false discovery rate but which is not yet feasible for large-scale applications, and an approximate testing method which can be applied to real-world data sets. In simulation, both tests have high power relative to existing interpretability methods. When applied to state-of-the-art vision and language models, the framework selects features that intuitively explain model predictions. The resulting explanations have the additional advantage that they are themselves easy to interpret.

The efficacy of an large language model (LLM) generated text detector depends substantially on the availability of sizable training data. White-box zero-shot detectors, which require no such data, are nonetheless limited by the accessibility of the source model of the LLM-generated text. In this paper, we propose an simple but effective black-box zero-shot detection approach, predicated on the observation that human-written texts typically contain more grammatical errors than LLM-generated texts. This approach entails computing the Grammar Error Correction Score (GECScore) for the given text to distinguish between human-written and LLM-generated text. Extensive experimental results show that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art (SOTA) zero-shot and supervised methods, achieving an average AUROC of 98.7% and showing strong robustness against paraphrase and adversarial perturbation attacks.

To mitigate the potential misuse of large language models (LLMs), recent research has developed watermarking algorithms, which restrict the generation process to leave an invisible trace for watermark detection. Due to the two-stage nature of the task, most studies evaluate the generation and detection separately, thereby presenting a challenge in unbiased, thorough, and applicable evaluations. In this paper, we introduce WaterBench, the first comprehensive benchmark for LLM watermarks, in which we design three crucial factors: (1) For benchmarking procedure, to ensure an apples-to-apples comparison, we first adjust each watermarking method's hyper-parameter to reach the same watermarking strength, then jointly evaluate their generation and detection performance. (2) For task selection, we diversify the input and output length to form a five-category taxonomy, covering 9 tasks. (3) For evaluation metric, we adopt the GPT4-Judge for automatically evaluating the decline of instruction-following abilities after watermarking. We evaluate 4 open-source watermarks on 2 LLMs under 2 watermarking strengths and observe the common struggles for current methods on maintaining the generation quality. The code and data are available at https://github.com/THU-KEG/WaterBench.

We introduce AuditBench, an alignment auditing benchmark. AuditBench consists of 56 language models with implanted hidden behaviors. Each model has one of 14 concerning behaviors--such as sycophantic deference, opposition to AI regulation, or secret geopolitical loyalties--which it does not confess to when directly asked. AuditBench models are highly diverse--some are subtle, while others are overt, and we use varying training techniques both for implanting behaviors and training models not to confess. To demonstrate AuditBench's utility, we develop an investigator agent that autonomously employs a configurable set of auditing tools. By measuring investigator agent success using different tools, we can evaluate their efficacy. Notably, we observe a tool-to-agent gap, where tools that perform well in standalone non-agentic evaluations fail to translate into improved performance when used with our investigator agent. We find that our most effective tools involve scaffolded calls to auxiliary models that generate diverse prompts for the target. White-box interpretability tools can be helpful, but the agent performs best with black-box tools. We also find that audit success varies greatly across training techniques: models trained on synthetic documents are easier to audit than models trained on demonstrations, with better adversarial training further increasing auditing difficulty. We release our models, agent, and evaluation framework to support future quantitative, iterative science on alignment auditing.

As large language models (LLMs) continue to advance, reliable evaluation methods are essential particularly for open-ended, instruction-following tasks. LLM-as-a-Judge enables automatic evaluation using LLMs as evaluators, but its reliability remains uncertain. In this work, we analyze key factors affecting its trustworthiness, focusing on alignment with human judgments and evaluation consistency. Using BIGGENBench and EvalBiasBench, we study the effects of evaluation design, decoding strategies, and Chain-of-Tought (CoT) reasoning in evaluation. Our results show that evaluation criteria are critical for reliability, non-deterministic sampling improves alignment with human preferences over deterministic evaluation, and CoT reasoning offers minimal gains when clear evaluation criteria are present.

Deep neural networks for image classification remain vulnerable to adversarial examples -- small, imperceptible perturbations that induce misclassifications. In black-box settings, where only the final prediction is accessible, crafting targeted attacks that aim to misclassify into a specific target class is particularly challenging due to narrow decision regions. Current state-of-the-art methods often exploit the geometric properties of the decision boundary separating a source image and a target image rather than incorporating information from the images themselves. In contrast, we propose Targeted Edge-informed Attack (TEA), a novel attack that utilizes edge information from the target image to carefully perturb it, thereby producing an adversarial image that is closer to the source image while still achieving the desired target classification. Our approach consistently outperforms current state-of-the-art methods across different models in low query settings (nearly 70% fewer queries are used), a scenario especially relevant in real-world applications with limited queries and black-box access. Furthermore, by efficiently generating a suitable adversarial example, TEA provides an improved target initialization for established geometry-based attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning abilities across a wide range of tasks, but data contamination undermines the objective evaluation of these capabilities. This problem is further exacerbated by malicious model publishers who use evasive, or indirect, contamination strategies, such as paraphrasing benchmark data to evade existing detection methods and artificially boost leaderboard performance. Current approaches struggle to reliably detect such stealthy contamination. In this work, we uncover a critical phenomenon: a model's generated reasoning steps actively mask its underlying memorization. Inspired by this, we propose the Zero-CoT Probe (ZCP), a novel black-box detection method that deliberately truncates the entire Chain-of-Thought (CoT) process to expose latent shortcut mappings. To further isolate memorization from the model's intrinsic problem-solving capabilities, ZCP compares the model's zero-CoT performance on the original benchmark against an isomorphically perturbed reference dataset. Furthermore, we introduce Contamination Confidence, a metric that quantifies both the likelihood and severity of contamination, moving beyond simple binary classifications. Extensive experiments on both previously identified contaminated models and specially fine-tuned contaminated models demonstrate that ZCP robustly detects both direct and evasive data contamination. The code for ZCP is accessible at https://github.com/Yifan-Lan/zero-cot-probe.

Existing methods, such as concept bottleneck models (CBMs), have been successful in providing concept-based interpretations for black-box deep learning models. They typically work by predicting concepts given the input and then predicting the final class label given the predicted concepts. However, (1) they often fail to capture the high-order, nonlinear interaction between concepts, e.g., correcting a predicted concept (e.g., "yellow breast") does not help correct highly correlated concepts (e.g., "yellow belly"), leading to suboptimal final accuracy; (2) they cannot naturally quantify the complex conditional dependencies between different concepts and class labels (e.g., for an image with the class label "Kentucky Warbler" and a concept "black bill", what is the probability that the model correctly predicts another concept "black crown"), therefore failing to provide deeper insight into how a black-box model works. In response to these limitations, we propose Energy-based Concept Bottleneck Models (ECBMs). Our ECBMs use a set of neural networks to define the joint energy of candidate (input, concept, class) tuples. With such a unified interface, prediction, concept correction, and conditional dependency quantification are then represented as conditional probabilities, which are generated by composing different energy functions. Our ECBMs address both limitations of existing CBMs, providing higher accuracy and richer concept interpretations. Empirical results show that our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art on real-world datasets.

Deep neural networks (DNNs) are susceptible to backdoor attacks, where adversaries poison datasets with adversary-specified triggers to implant hidden backdoors, enabling malicious manipulation of model predictions. Dataset purification serves as a proactive defense by removing malicious training samples to prevent backdoor injection at its source. We first reveal that the current advanced purification methods rely on a latent assumption that the backdoor connections between triggers and target labels in backdoor attacks are simpler to learn than the benign features. We demonstrate that this assumption, however, does not always hold, especially in all-to-all (A2A) and untargeted (UT) attacks. As a result, purification methods that analyze the separation between the poisoned and benign samples in the input-output space or the final hidden layer space are less effective. We observe that this separability is not confined to a single layer but varies across different hidden layers. Motivated by this understanding, we propose FLARE, a universal purification method to counter various backdoor attacks. FLARE aggregates abnormal activations from all hidden layers to construct representations for clustering. To enhance separation, FLARE develops an adaptive subspace selection algorithm to isolate the optimal space for dividing an entire dataset into two clusters. FLARE assesses the stability of each cluster and identifies the cluster with higher stability as poisoned. Extensive evaluations on benchmark datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of FLARE against 22 representative backdoor attacks, including all-to-one (A2O), all-to-all (A2A), and untargeted (UT) attacks, and its robustness to adaptive attacks. Codes are available at https://github.com/THUYimingLi/BackdoorBox{BackdoorBox} and https://github.com/vtu81/backdoor-toolbox{backdoor-toolbox}.

It is well known that query-based attacks tend to have relatively higher success rates in adversarial black-box attacks. While research on black-box attacks is actively being conducted, relatively few studies have focused on pixel attacks that target only a limited number of pixels. In image classification, query-based pixel attacks often rely on patches, which heavily depend on randomness and neglect the fact that scattered pixels are more suitable for adversarial attacks. Moreover, to the best of our knowledge, query-based pixel attacks have not been explored in the field of object detection. To address these issues, we propose a novel pixel-based black-box attack called Remember and Forget Pixel Attack using Reinforcement Learning(RFPAR), consisting of two main components: the Remember and Forget processes. RFPAR mitigates randomness and avoids patch dependency by leveraging rewards generated through a one-step RL algorithm to perturb pixels. RFPAR effectively creates perturbed images that minimize the confidence scores while adhering to limited pixel constraints. Furthermore, we advance our proposed attack beyond image classification to object detection, where RFPAR reduces the confidence scores of detected objects to avoid detection. Experiments on the ImageNet-1K dataset for classification show that RFPAR outperformed state-of-the-art query-based pixel attacks. For object detection, using the MSCOCO dataset with YOLOv8 and DDQ, RFPAR demonstrates comparable mAP reduction to state-of-the-art query-based attack while requiring fewer query. Further experiments on the Argoverse dataset using YOLOv8 confirm that RFPAR effectively removed objects on a larger scale dataset. Our code is available at https://github.com/KAU-QuantumAILab/RFPAR.

Existing evaluations of foundation models, including recent human-centric approaches, fail to capture what truly matters: user's experience during interaction. Current methods treat evaluation as a matter of output correctness alone, overlooking that user satisfaction emerges from the interplay between response quality and interaction, which limits their ability to account for the mechanisms underlying user experience. To address this gap, we introduce QoNext, the first framework that adapts Quality of Experience (QoE) principles from networking and multimedia to the assessment of foundation models. QoNext identifies experiential factors that shape user experience and incorporates them into controlled experiments, where human ratings are collected under varied configurations. From these studies we construct a QoE-oriented database and train predictive models that estimate perceived user experience from measurable system parameters. Our results demonstrate that QoNext not only enables proactive and fine-grained evaluation but also provides actionable guidance for productized services of optimizing foundation models in practice.

Unrestricted adversarial attacks aim to fool computer vision models without being constrained by ell_p-norm bounds to remain imperceptible to humans, for example, by changing an object's color. This allows attackers to circumvent traditional, norm-bounded defense strategies such as adversarial training or certified defense strategies. However, due to their unrestricted nature, there are also no guarantees of norm-based imperceptibility, necessitating human evaluations to verify just how authentic these adversarial examples look. While some related work assesses this vital quality of adversarial attacks, none provide statistically significant insights. This issue necessitates a unified framework that supports and streamlines such an assessment for evaluating and comparing unrestricted attacks. To close this gap, we introduce SCOOTER - an open-source, statistically powered framework for evaluating unrestricted adversarial examples. Our contributions are: (i) best-practice guidelines for crowd-study power, compensation, and Likert equivalence bounds to measure imperceptibility; (ii) the first large-scale human vs. model comparison across 346 human participants showing that three color-space attacks and three diffusion-based attacks fail to produce imperceptible images. Furthermore, we found that GPT-4o can serve as a preliminary test for imperceptibility, but it only consistently detects adversarial examples for four out of six tested attacks; (iii) open-source software tools, including a browser-based task template to collect annotations and analysis scripts in Python and R; (iv) an ImageNet-derived benchmark dataset containing 3K real images, 7K adversarial examples, and over 34K human ratings. Our findings demonstrate that automated vision systems do not align with human perception, reinforcing the need for a ground-truth SCOOTER benchmark.

Recent advancements in visual generative models have enabled high-quality image and video generation, opening diverse applications. However, evaluating these models often demands sampling hundreds or thousands of images or videos, making the process computationally expensive, especially for diffusion-based models with inherently slow sampling. Moreover, existing evaluation methods rely on rigid pipelines that overlook specific user needs and provide numerical results without clear explanations. In contrast, humans can quickly form impressions of a model's capabilities by observing only a few samples. To mimic this, we propose the Evaluation Agent framework, which employs human-like strategies for efficient, dynamic, multi-round evaluations using only a few samples per round, while offering detailed, user-tailored analyses. It offers four key advantages: 1) efficiency, 2) promptable evaluation tailored to diverse user needs, 3) explainability beyond single numerical scores, and 4) scalability across various models and tools. Experiments show that Evaluation Agent reduces evaluation time to 10% of traditional methods while delivering comparable results. The Evaluation Agent framework is fully open-sourced to advance research in visual generative models and their efficient evaluation.

Mechanistic interpretability is often motivated for alignment auditing, where a model's verbal explanations can be absent, incomplete, or misleading. Yet many evaluations do not control whether black-box prompting alone can recover the target behavior, so apparent gains from white-box tools may reflect elicitation rather than internal signal; we call this the elicitation confounder. We introduce Pando, a model-organism benchmark that breaks this confound via an explanation axis: models are trained to produce either faithful explanations of the true rule, no explanation, or confident but unfaithful explanations of a disjoint distractor rule. Across 720 finetuned models implementing hidden decision-tree rules, agents predict held-out model decisions from 10 labeled query-response pairs, optionally augmented with one interpretability tool output. When explanations are faithful, black-box elicitation matches or exceeds all white-box methods; when explanations are absent or misleading, gradient-based attribution improves accuracy by 3-5 percentage points, and relevance patching, RelP, gives the largest gains, while logit lens, sparse autoencoders, and circuit tracing provide no reliable benefit. Variance decomposition suggests gradients track decision computation, which fields causally drive the output, whereas other readouts are dominated by task representation, biases toward field identity and value. We release all models, code, and evaluation infrastructure.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) have revolutionized the creation of generalist web agents, empowering them to autonomously complete diverse tasks on real-world websites, thereby boosting human efficiency and productivity. However, despite their remarkable capabilities, the safety and security of these agents against malicious attacks remain critically underexplored, raising significant concerns about their safe deployment. To uncover and exploit such vulnerabilities in web agents, we provide AdvWeb, a novel black-box attack framework designed against web agents. AdvWeb trains an adversarial prompter model that generates and injects adversarial prompts into web pages, misleading web agents into executing targeted adversarial actions such as inappropriate stock purchases or incorrect bank transactions, actions that could lead to severe real-world consequences. With only black-box access to the web agent, we train and optimize the adversarial prompter model using DPO, leveraging both successful and failed attack strings against the target agent. Unlike prior approaches, our adversarial string injection maintains stealth and control: (1) the appearance of the website remains unchanged before and after the attack, making it nearly impossible for users to detect tampering, and (2) attackers can modify specific substrings within the generated adversarial string to seamlessly change the attack objective (e.g., purchasing stocks from a different company), enhancing attack flexibility and efficiency. We conduct extensive evaluations, demonstrating that AdvWeb achieves high success rates in attacking SOTA GPT-4V-based VLM agent across various web tasks. Our findings expose critical vulnerabilities in current LLM/VLM-based agents, emphasizing the urgent need for developing more reliable web agents and effective defenses. Our code and data are available at https://ai-secure.github.io/AdvWeb/ .

Recent advances in video generation have produced vivid content that are often indistinguishable from real videos, making AI-generated video detection an emerging societal challenge. Prior AIGC detection benchmarks mostly evaluate video without audio, target broad narrative domains, and focus on classification solely. Yet it remains unclear whether state-of-the-art video generation models can produce immersive, audio-paired videos that reliably deceive humans and VLMs. To this end, we introduce Video Reality Test, an ASMR-sourced video benchmark suite for testing perceptual realism under tight audio-visual coupling, featuring the following dimensions: (i) Immersive ASMR video-audio sources. Built on carefully curated real ASMR videos, the benchmark targets fine-grained action-object interactions with diversity across objects, actions, and backgrounds. (ii) Peer-Review evaluation. An adversarial creator-reviewer protocol where video generation models act as creators aiming to fool reviewers, while VLMs serve as reviewers seeking to identify fakeness. Our experimental findings show: The best creator Veo3.1-Fast even fools most VLMs: the strongest reviewer (Gemini 2.5-Pro) achieves only 56\% accuracy (random 50\%), far below that of human experts (81.25\%). Adding audio improves real-fake discrimination, yet superficial cues such as watermarks can still significantly mislead models. These findings delineate the current boundary of video generation realism and expose limitations of VLMs in perceptual fidelity and audio-visual consistency. Our code is available at https://github.com/video-reality-test/video-reality-test.

Text-to-image (T2I) diffusion models (DMs) have shown promise in generating high-quality images from textual descriptions. The real-world applications of these models require particular attention to their safety and fidelity, but this has not been sufficiently explored. One fundamental question is whether existing T2I DMs are robust against variations over input texts. To answer it, this work provides the first robustness evaluation of T2I DMs against real-world attacks. Unlike prior studies that focus on malicious attacks involving apocryphal alterations to the input texts, we consider an attack space spanned by realistic errors (e.g., typo, glyph, phonetic) that humans can make, to ensure semantic consistency. Given the inherent randomness of the generation process, we develop novel distribution-based attack objectives to mislead T2I DMs. We perform attacks in a black-box manner without any knowledge of the model. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of our method for attacking popular T2I DMs and simultaneously reveal their non-trivial robustness issues. Moreover, we provide an in-depth analysis of our method to show that it is not designed to attack the text encoder in T2I DMs solely.

Neural network models have a reputation for being black boxes. We propose to monitor the features at every layer of a model and measure how suitable they are for classification. We use linear classifiers, which we refer to as "probes", trained entirely independently of the model itself. This helps us better understand the roles and dynamics of the intermediate layers. We demonstrate how this can be used to develop a better intuition about models and to diagnose potential problems. We apply this technique to the popular models Inception v3 and Resnet-50. Among other things, we observe experimentally that the linear separability of features increase monotonically along the depth of the model.

Membership inference attacks aim to infer whether an individual record was used to train a model, serving as a key tool for disclosure auditing. While such evaluations are useful to demonstrate risk, they are computationally expensive and often make strong assumptions about potential adversaries' access to models and training environments, and thus do not provide very tight bounds on leakage from potential attacks. We show how prior claims around black-box access being sufficient for optimal membership inference do not hold for most useful settings such as stochastic gradient descent, and that optimal membership inference indeed requires white-box access. We validate our findings with a new white-box inference attack IHA (Inverse Hessian Attack) that explicitly uses model parameters by taking advantage of computing inverse-Hessian vector products. Our results show that both audits and adversaries may be able to benefit from access to model parameters, and we advocate for further research into white-box methods for membership privacy auditing.

Current Vision Language Models (VLMs) remain vulnerable to malicious prompts that induce harmful outputs. Existing safety benchmarks for VLMs primarily rely on automated evaluation methods, but these methods struggle to detect implicit harmful content or produce inaccurate evaluations. Therefore, we found that existing benchmarks have low levels of harmfulness, ambiguous data, and limited diversity in image-text pair combinations. To address these issues, we propose the ELITE benchmark, a high-quality safety evaluation benchmark for VLMs, underpinned by our enhanced evaluation method, the ELITE evaluator. The ELITE evaluator explicitly incorporates a toxicity score to accurately assess harmfulness in multimodal contexts, where VLMs often provide specific, convincing, but unharmful descriptions of images. We filter out ambiguous and low-quality image-text pairs from existing benchmarks using the ELITE evaluator and generate diverse combinations of safe and unsafe image-text pairs. Our experiments demonstrate that the ELITE evaluator achieves superior alignment with human evaluations compared to prior automated methods, and the ELITE benchmark offers enhanced benchmark quality and diversity. By introducing ELITE, we pave the way for safer, more robust VLMs, contributing essential tools for evaluating and mitigating safety risks in real-world applications.

We propose a new uncertainty estimator for gradient-free optimisation of black-box simulators using deep generative surrogate models. Optimisation of these simulators is especially challenging for stochastic simulators and higher dimensions. To address these issues, we utilise a deep generative surrogate approach to model the black box response for the entire parameter space. We then leverage this knowledge to estimate the proposed uncertainty based on the Wasserstein distance - the Wasserstein uncertainty. This approach is employed in a posterior agnostic gradient-free optimisation algorithm that minimises regret over the entire parameter space. A series of tests were conducted to demonstrate that our method is more robust to the shape of both the black box function and the stochastic response of the black box than state-of-the-art methods, such as efficient global optimisation with a deep Gaussian process surrogate.

Evaluating whether text-to-image models follow explicit spatial instructions is difficult to automate. Object detectors may miss targets or return multiple plausible detections, and simple geometric tests can become ambiguous in borderline cases. Spatial evaluation is naturally a selective prediction problem, the checker may abstain when evidence is weak and report confidence so that results can be interpreted as a risk coverage tradeoff rather than a single score. We introduce SpatialBench-UC, a small, reproducible benchmark for pairwise spatial relations. The benchmark contains 200 prompts (50 object pairs times 4 relations) grouped into 100 counterfactual pairs obtained by swapping object roles. We release a benchmark package, versioned prompts, pinned configs, per-sample checker outputs, and report tables, enabling reproducible and auditable comparisons across models. We also include a lightweight human audit used to calibrate the checker's abstention margin and confidence threshold. We evaluate three baselines, Stable Diffusion 1.5, SD 1.5 BoxDiff, and SD 1.4 GLIGEN. The checker reports pass rate and coverage as well as conditional pass rates on decided samples. The results show that grounding methods substantially improve both pass rate and coverage, while abstention remains a dominant factor due mainly to missing detections.

The rapid advancement and expanding applications of Audio Large Language Models (ALLMs) demand a rigorous understanding of their trustworthiness. However, systematic research on evaluating these models, particularly concerning risks unique to the audio modality, remains largely unexplored. Existing evaluation frameworks primarily focus on the text modality or address only a restricted set of safety dimensions, failing to adequately account for the unique characteristics and application scenarios inherent to the audio modality. We introduce AudioTrust-the first multifaceted trustworthiness evaluation framework and benchmark specifically designed for ALLMs. AudioTrust facilitates assessments across six key dimensions: fairness, hallucination, safety, privacy, robustness, and authentication. To comprehensively evaluate these dimensions, AudioTrust is structured around 18 distinct experimental setups. Its core is a meticulously constructed dataset of over 4,420 audio/text samples, drawn from real-world scenarios (e.g., daily conversations, emergency calls, voice assistant interactions), specifically designed to probe the multifaceted trustworthiness of ALLMs. For assessment, the benchmark carefully designs 9 audio-specific evaluation metrics, and we employ a large-scale automated pipeline for objective and scalable scoring of model outputs. Experimental results reveal the trustworthiness boundaries and limitations of current state-of-the-art open-source and closed-source ALLMs when confronted with various high-risk audio scenarios, offering valuable insights for the secure and trustworthy deployment of future audio models. Our platform and benchmark are available at https://github.com/JusperLee/AudioTrust.

Grey-box fuzzers such as American Fuzzy Lop (AFL) are popular tools for finding bugs and potential vulnerabilities in programs. While these fuzzers have been able to find vulnerabilities in many widely used programs, they are not efficient; of the millions of inputs executed by AFL in a typical fuzzing run, only a handful discover unseen behavior or trigger a crash. The remaining inputs are redundant, exhibiting behavior that has already been observed. Here, we present an approach to increase the efficiency of fuzzers like AFL by applying machine learning to directly model how programs behave. We learn a forward prediction model that maps program inputs to execution traces, training on the thousands of inputs collected during standard fuzzing. This learned model guides exploration by focusing on fuzzing inputs on which our model is the most uncertain (measured via the entropy of the predicted execution trace distribution). By focusing on executing inputs our learned model is unsure about, and ignoring any input whose behavior our model is certain about, we show that we can significantly limit wasteful execution. Through testing our approach on a set of binaries released as part of the DARPA Cyber Grand Challenge, we show that our approach is able to find a set of inputs that result in more code coverage and discovered crashes than baseline fuzzers with significantly fewer executions.

In this study, we tackle a growing concern around the safety and ethical use of large language models (LLMs). Despite their potential, these models can be tricked into producing harmful or unethical content through various sophisticated methods, including 'jailbreaking' techniques and targeted manipulation. Our work zeroes in on a specific issue: to what extent LLMs can be led astray by asking them to generate responses that are instruction-centric such as a pseudocode, a program or a software snippet as opposed to vanilla text. To investigate this question, we introduce TechHazardQA, a dataset containing complex queries which should be answered in both text and instruction-centric formats (e.g., pseudocodes), aimed at identifying triggers for unethical responses. We query a series of LLMs -- Llama-2-13b, Llama-2-7b, Mistral-V2 and Mistral 8X7B -- and ask them to generate both text and instruction-centric responses. For evaluation we report the harmfulness score metric as well as judgements from GPT-4 and humans. Overall, we observe that asking LLMs to produce instruction-centric responses enhances the unethical response generation by ~2-38% across the models. As an additional objective, we investigate the impact of model editing using the ROME technique, which further increases the propensity for generating undesirable content. In particular, asking edited LLMs to generate instruction-centric responses further increases the unethical response generation by ~3-16% across the different models.

In light of recent advancements in generative AI models, it has become essential to distinguish genuine content from AI-generated one to prevent the malicious usage of fake materials as authentic ones and vice versa. Various techniques have been introduced for identifying AI-generated images, with watermarking emerging as a promising approach. In this paper, we analyze the robustness of various AI-image detectors including watermarking and classifier-based deepfake detectors. For watermarking methods that introduce subtle image perturbations (i.e., low perturbation budget methods), we reveal a fundamental trade-off between the evasion error rate (i.e., the fraction of watermarked images detected as non-watermarked ones) and the spoofing error rate (i.e., the fraction of non-watermarked images detected as watermarked ones) upon an application of a diffusion purification attack. In this regime, we also empirically show that diffusion purification effectively removes watermarks with minimal changes to images. For high perturbation watermarking methods where notable changes are applied to images, the diffusion purification attack is not effective. In this case, we develop a model substitution adversarial attack that can successfully remove watermarks. Moreover, we show that watermarking methods are vulnerable to spoofing attacks where the attacker aims to have real images (potentially obscene) identified as watermarked ones, damaging the reputation of the developers. In particular, by just having black-box access to the watermarking method, we show that one can generate a watermarked noise image which can be added to the real images to have them falsely flagged as watermarked ones. Finally, we extend our theory to characterize a fundamental trade-off between the robustness and reliability of classifier-based deep fake detectors and demonstrate it through experiments.

Machine Learning systems are vulnerable to adversarial attacks and will highly likely produce incorrect outputs under these attacks. There are white-box and black-box attacks regarding to adversary's access level to the victim learning algorithm. To defend the learning systems from these attacks, existing methods in the speech domain focus on modifying input signals and testing the behaviours of speech recognizers. We, however, formulate the defense as a classification problem and present a strategy for systematically generating adversarial example datasets: one for white-box attacks and one for black-box attacks, containing both adversarial and normal examples. The white-box attack is a gradient-based method on Baidu DeepSpeech with the Mozilla Common Voice database while the black-box attack is a gradient-free method on a deep model-based keyword spotting system with the Google Speech Command dataset. The generated datasets are used to train a proposed Convolutional Neural Network (CNN), together with cepstral features, to detect adversarial examples. Experimental results show that, it is possible to accurately distinct between adversarial and normal examples for known attacks, in both single-condition and multi-condition training settings, while the performance degrades dramatically for unknown attacks. The adversarial datasets and the source code are made publicly available.

Machine learning has demonstrated remarkable performance over finite datasets, yet whether the scores over the fixed benchmarks can sufficiently indicate the model's performance in the real world is still in discussion. In reality, an ideal robust model will probably behave similarly to the oracle (e.g., the human users), thus a good evaluation protocol is probably to evaluate the models' behaviors in comparison to the oracle. In this paper, we introduce a new robustness measurement that directly measures the image classification model's performance compared with a surrogate oracle (i.e., a foundation model). Besides, we design a simple method that can accomplish the evaluation beyond the scope of the benchmarks. Our method extends the image datasets with new samples that are sufficiently perturbed to be distinct from the ones in the original sets, but are still bounded within the same image-label structure the original test image represents, constrained by a foundation model pretrained with a large amount of samples. As a result, our new method will offer us a new way to evaluate the models' robustness performance, free of limitations of fixed benchmarks or constrained perturbations, although scoped by the power of the oracle. In addition to the evaluation results, we also leverage our generated data to understand the behaviors of the model and our new evaluation strategies.

Current studies on adversarial robustness mainly focus on aggregating local robustness results from a set of data samples to evaluate and rank different models. However, the local statistics may not well represent the true global robustness of the underlying unknown data distribution. To address this challenge, this paper makes the first attempt to present a new framework, called GREAT Score , for global robustness evaluation of adversarial perturbation using generative models. Formally, GREAT Score carries the physical meaning of a global statistic capturing a mean certified attack-proof perturbation level over all samples drawn from a generative model. For finite-sample evaluation, we also derive a probabilistic guarantee on the sample complexity and the difference between the sample mean and the true mean. GREAT Score has several advantages: (1) Robustness evaluations using GREAT Score are efficient and scalable to large models, by sparing the need of running adversarial attacks. In particular, we show high correlation and significantly reduced computation cost of GREAT Score when compared to the attack-based model ranking on RobustBench (Croce,et. al. 2021). (2) The use of generative models facilitates the approximation of the unknown data distribution. In our ablation study with different generative adversarial networks (GANs), we observe consistency between global robustness evaluation and the quality of GANs. (3) GREAT Score can be used for remote auditing of privacy-sensitive black-box models, as demonstrated by our robustness evaluation on several online facial recognition services.

Deepfake has recently raised a plethora of societal concerns over its possible security threats and dissemination of fake information. Much research on deepfake detection has been undertaken. However, detecting low quality as well as simultaneously detecting different qualities of deepfakes still remains a grave challenge. Most SOTA approaches are limited by using a single specific model for detecting certain deepfake video quality type. When constructing multiple models with prior information about video quality, this kind of strategy incurs significant computational cost, as well as model and training data overhead. Further, it cannot be scalable and practical to deploy in real-world settings. In this work, we propose a universal intra-model collaborative learning framework to enable the effective and simultaneous detection of different quality of deepfakes. That is, our approach is the quality-agnostic deepfake detection method, dubbed QAD . In particular, by observing the upper bound of general error expectation, we maximize the dependency between intermediate representations of images from different quality levels via Hilbert-Schmidt Independence Criterion. In addition, an Adversarial Weight Perturbation module is carefully devised to enable the model to be more robust against image corruption while boosting the overall model's performance. Extensive experiments over seven popular deepfake datasets demonstrate the superiority of our QAD model over prior SOTA benchmarks.

Large language models (LLMs) have shown increasing power on various natural language processing (NLP) tasks. However, tuning these models for downstream tasks usually needs exorbitant costs or is unavailable due to commercial considerations. Recently, black-box tuning has been proposed to address this problem by optimizing task-specific prompts without accessing the gradients and hidden representations. However, most existing works have yet fully exploited the potential of gradient-free optimization under the scenario of few-shot learning. In this paper, we describe BBT-RGB, a suite of straightforward and complementary techniques for enhancing the efficiency and performance of black-box optimization. Specifically, our method includes three plug-and-play components: (1) Two-stage derivative-free optimization strategy that facilitates fast convergence and mitigates overfitting; (2) Automatic verbalizer construction with its novel usage under few-shot settings; (3) Better prompt initialization policy based on instruction search and auto-selected demonstration. Extensive experiments across various tasks on natural language understanding and inference demonstrate the effectiveness of our method. Our codes are publicly available at https://github.com/QiushiSun/BBT-RGB.