Daily Papers

As LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are increasingly deployed for complex tasks, ensuring their reliability has become a pressing challenge. Since MAS coordinate through unstructured natural language rather than rigid protocols, they are prone to semantic failures (e.g., hallucinations, misinterpreted instructions, and reasoning drift) that propagate silently without raising runtime exceptions. Prevailing evaluation approaches, which measure only end-to-end task success, offer limited insight into how these failures arise or how effectively agents recover from them. To bridge this gap, we propose MAS-FIRE, a systematic framework for fault injection and reliability evaluation of MAS. We define a taxonomy of 15 fault types covering intra-agent cognitive errors and inter-agent coordination failures, and inject them via three non-invasive mechanisms: prompt modification, response rewriting, and message routing manipulation. Applying MAS-FIRE to three representative MAS architectures, we uncover a rich set of fault-tolerant behaviors that we organize into four tiers: mechanism, rule, prompt, and reasoning. This tiered view enables fine-grained diagnosis of where and why systems succeed or fail. Our findings reveal that stronger foundation models do not uniformly improve robustness. We further show that architectural topology plays an equally decisive role, with iterative, closed-loop designs neutralizing over 40% of faults that cause catastrophic collapse in linear workflows. MAS-FIRE provides the process-level observability and actionable guidance needed to systematically improve multi-agent systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are currently at the forefront of intertwining AI systems with human communication and everyday life. Therefore, it is of great importance to evaluate their emerging abilities. In this study, we show that LLMs like GPT-3 exhibit behavior that strikingly resembles human-like intuition - and the cognitive errors that come with it. However, LLMs with higher cognitive capabilities, in particular ChatGPT and GPT-4, learned to avoid succumbing to these errors and perform in a hyperrational manner. For our experiments, we probe LLMs with the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT) as well as semantic illusions that were originally designed to investigate intuitive decision-making in humans. Our study demonstrates that investigating LLMs with methods from psychology has the potential to reveal otherwise unknown emergent traits.

The meaningful use of electronic health records (EHR) continues to progress in the digital era with clinical decision support systems augmented by artificial intelligence. A priority in improving provider experience is to overcome information overload and reduce the cognitive burden so fewer medical errors and cognitive biases are introduced during patient care. One major type of medical error is diagnostic error due to systematic or predictable errors in judgment that rely on heuristics. The potential for clinical natural language processing (cNLP) to model diagnostic reasoning in humans with forward reasoning from data to diagnosis and potentially reduce the cognitive burden and medical error has not been investigated. Existing tasks to advance the science in cNLP have largely focused on information extraction and named entity recognition through classification tasks. We introduce a novel suite of tasks coined as Diagnostic Reasoning Benchmarks, DR.BENCH, as a new benchmark for developing and evaluating cNLP models with clinical diagnostic reasoning ability. The suite includes six tasks from ten publicly available datasets addressing clinical text understanding, medical knowledge reasoning, and diagnosis generation. DR.BENCH is the first clinical suite of tasks designed to be a natural language generation framework to evaluate pre-trained language models. Experiments with state-of-the-art pre-trained generative language models using large general domain models and models that were continually trained on a medical corpus demonstrate opportunities for improvement when evaluated in DR. BENCH. We share DR. BENCH as a publicly available GitLab repository with a systematic approach to load and evaluate models for the cNLP community.

We introduce PhysicalAgent, an agentic framework for robotic manipulation that integrates iterative reasoning, diffusion-based video generation, and closed-loop execution. Given a textual instruction, our method generates short video demonstrations of candidate trajectories, executes them on the robot, and iteratively re-plans in response to failures. This approach enables robust recovery from execution errors. We evaluate PhysicalAgent across multiple perceptual modalities (egocentric, third-person, and simulated) and robotic embodiments (bimanual UR3, Unitree G1 humanoid, simulated GR1), comparing against state-of-the-art task-specific baselines. Experiments demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms prior approaches, achieving up to 83% success on human-familiar tasks. Physical trials reveal that first-attempt success is limited (20-30%), yet iterative correction increases overall success to 80% across platforms. These results highlight the potential of video-based generative reasoning for general-purpose robotic manipulation and underscore the importance of iterative execution for recovering from initial failures. Our framework paves the way for scalable, adaptable, and robust robot control.

Recent advancements in artificial intelligence have led to the creation of highly capable large language models (LLMs) that can perform tasks in a human-like manner. However, LLMs exhibit only infant-level cognitive abilities in certain areas. One such area is the A-Not-B error, a phenomenon seen in infants where they repeat a previously rewarded behavior despite well-observed changed conditions. This highlights their lack of inhibitory control -- the ability to stop a habitual or impulsive response. In our work, we design a text-based multi-choice QA scenario similar to the A-Not-B experimental settings to systematically test the inhibitory control abilities of LLMs. We found that state-of-the-art LLMs (like Llama3-8b) perform consistently well with in-context learning (ICL) but make errors and show a significant drop of as many as 83.3% in reasoning tasks when the context changes trivially. This suggests that LLMs only have inhibitory control abilities on par with human infants in this regard, often failing to suppress the previously established response pattern during ICL.

Mobile robots are increasingly required to navigate and interact within unknown and unstructured environments to meet human demands. Demand-driven navigation (DDN) enables robots to identify and locate objects based on implicit human intent, even when object locations are unknown. However, traditional data-driven DDN methods rely on pre-collected data for model training and decision-making, limiting their generalization capability in unseen scenarios. In this paper, we propose CogDDN, a VLM-based framework that emulates the human cognitive and learning mechanisms by integrating fast and slow thinking systems and selectively identifying key objects essential to fulfilling user demands. CogDDN identifies appropriate target objects by semantically aligning detected objects with the given instructions. Furthermore, it incorporates a dual-process decision-making module, comprising a Heuristic Process for rapid, efficient decisions and an Analytic Process that analyzes past errors, accumulates them in a knowledge base, and continuously improves performance. Chain of Thought (CoT) reasoning strengthens the decision-making process. Extensive closed-loop evaluations on the AI2Thor simulator with the ProcThor dataset show that CogDDN outperforms single-view camera-only methods by 15%, demonstrating significant improvements in navigation accuracy and adaptability. The project page is available at https://yuehaohuang.github.io/CogDDN/.

Operations research (OR) is widely deployed to solve critical decision-making problems with complex objectives and constraints, impacting manufacturing, logistics, finance, and healthcare outcomes. While Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown promising results in various domains, their practical application in industry-relevant operations research (OR) problems presents significant challenges and opportunities. Preliminary industrial applications of LLMs for operations research face two critical deployment challenges: 1) Self-correction focuses on code syntax rather than mathematical accuracy, causing costly errors; 2) Complex expert selection creates unpredictable workflows that reduce transparency and increase maintenance costs, making them impractical for time-sensitive business applications. To address these business limitations, we introduce ORMind, a cognitive-inspired framework that enhances optimization through counterfactual reasoning. Our approach emulates human cognition, implementing an end-to-end workflow that systematically transforms requirements into mathematical models and executable solver code. It is currently being tested internally in Lenovo's AI Assistant, with plans to enhance optimization capabilities for both business and consumer customers. Experiments demonstrate that ORMind outperforms existing methods, achieving a 9.5\% improvement on the NL4Opt dataset and a 14.6\% improvement on the ComplexOR dataset.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) enable complex autonomous behavior, current agents remain constrained by static, human-designed prompts that limit adaptability. Existing self-improving frameworks attempt to bridge this gap but typically rely on inefficient, multi-turn recursive loops that incur high computational costs. To address this, we propose Metacognitive Agent Reflective Self-improvement (MARS), a framework that achieves efficient self-evolution within a single recurrence cycle. Inspired by educational psychology, MARS mimics human learning by integrating principle-based reflection (abstracting normative rules to avoid errors) and procedural reflection (deriving step-by-step strategies for success). By synthesizing these insights into optimized instructions, MARS allows agents to systematically refine their reasoning logic without continuous online feedback. Extensive experiments on six benchmarks demonstrate that MARS outperforms state-of-the-art self-evolving systems while significantly reducing computational overhead.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have enabled agents to autonomously execute complex, long-horizon tasks, yet planning remains a primary bottleneck for reliable task execution. Existing methods typically fall into two paradigms: step-wise planning, which is reactive but often short-sighted; and one-shot planning, which generates a complete plan upfront yet is brittle to execution errors. Crucially, both paradigms suffer from entangled contexts, where the agent must reason over a monolithic history spanning multiple sub-tasks. This entanglement increases cognitive load and lets local errors propagate across otherwise independent decisions, making recovery computationally expensive. To address this, we propose Task-Decoupled Planning (TDP), a training-free framework that replaces entangled reasoning with task decoupling. TDP decomposes tasks into a directed acyclic graph (DAG) of sub-goals via a Supervisor. Using a Planner and Executor with scoped contexts, TDP confines reasoning and replanning to the active sub-task. This isolation prevents error propagation and corrects deviations locally without disrupting the workflow. Results on TravelPlanner, ScienceWorld, and HotpotQA show that TDP outperforms strong baselines while reducing token consumption by up to 82%, demonstrating that sub-task decoupling improves both robustness and efficiency for long-horizon agents.

Knowledge distillation plays a key role in compressing the Large Language Models (LLMs), which boosts a small-size student model under large teacher models' guidance. However, existing LLM distillation methods overly rely on student-generated outputs, which may introduce generation errors and misguide the distillation process. Moreover, the distillation loss functions introduced in previous art struggle to align the most informative part due to the complex distribution of LLMs' outputs. To address these problems, we propose a multi-granularity semantic revision method for LLM distillation. At the sequence level, we propose a sequence correction and re-generation (SCRG) strategy. SCRG first calculates the semantic cognitive difference between the teacher and student to detect the error token, then corrects it with the teacher-generated one, and re-generates the sequence to reduce generation errors and enhance generation diversity. At the token level, we design a distribution adaptive clipping Kullback-Leibler (DAC-KL) loss as the distillation objective function. DAC-KL loss exploits a learnable sub-network to adaptively extract semantically dense areas from the teacher's output, avoiding the interference of redundant information in the distillation process. Finally, at the span level, we leverage the span priors of a sequence to compute the probability correlations within spans, and constrain the teacher and student's probability correlations to be consistent, further enhancing the transfer of semantic information. Extensive experiments across different model families with parameters ranging from 0.1B to 13B demonstrate the superiority of our method compared to existing methods.

Human biases impact the way people analyze data and make decisions. Recent work has shown that some visualization designs can better support cognitive processes and mitigate cognitive biases (i.e., errors that occur due to the use of mental "shortcuts"). In this work, we explore how visualizing a user's interaction history (i.e., which data points and attributes a user has interacted with) can be used to mitigate potential biases that drive decision making by promoting conscious reflection of one's analysis process. Given an interactive scatterplot-based visualization tool, we showed interaction history in real-time while exploring data (by coloring points in the scatterplot that the user has interacted with), and in a summative format after a decision has been made (by comparing the distribution of user interactions to the underlying distribution of the data). We conducted a series of in-lab experiments and a crowd-sourced experiment to evaluate the effectiveness of interaction history interventions toward mitigating bias. We contextualized this work in a political scenario in which participants were instructed to choose a committee of 10 fictitious politicians to review a recent bill passed in the U.S. state of Georgia banning abortion after 6 weeks, where things like gender bias or political party bias may drive one's analysis process. We demonstrate the generalizability of this approach by evaluating a second decision making scenario related to movies. Our results are inconclusive for the effectiveness of interaction history (henceforth referred to as interaction traces) toward mitigating biased decision making. However, we find some mixed support that interaction traces, particularly in a summative format, can increase awareness of potential unconscious biases.

Current role-playing agents (RPAs) are typically constructed by imitating surface-level behaviors, but this approach lacks internal cognitive consistency, often causing out-of-character errors in complex situations. To address this, we propose Character-R1, a framework designed to provide comprehensive verifiable reward signals for effective role-aware reasoning, which are missing in recent studies. Specifically, our framework comprises three core designs: (1) Cognitive Focus Reward, which enforces explicit label-based analysis of 10 character elements (e.g., worldview) to structure internal cognition; (2) Reference-Guided Reward, which utilizes overlap-based metrics with reference responses as optimization anchors to enhance exploration and performance; and (3) Character-Conditioned Reward Normalization, which adjusts reward distributions based on character categories to ensure robust optimization across heterogeneous roles. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Character-R1 significantly outperforms existing methods in knowledge, memory and others.

A central question in artificial intelligence is the extent to which machine learning models comprehend mathematics. To address this, we propose a novel framework for measuring mathematical reasoning that moves beyond standard benchmarks to diagnose specific failure points. Our method first generates structured, step-by-step reasoning from gpt-3.5-turbo on the GSM8K dataset. We then use a more capable analyst model, gpt-4o-mini, to categorize errors and, crucially, perform an unsupervised clustering of every reasoning sentence to identify emergent "reasoning modes." This analysis reveals a cognitive profile with a stark, nonhuman-like brittleness: while the model achieves near-perfect accuracy on procedural modes like sequential calculation, its performance on modes requiring combinatorial reasoning with restrictions plummets. By identifying and quantifying the reliability of these distinct reasoning skills, our work provides a more granular method to evaluate mathematical comprehension and offers a precise roadmap for developing new capabilities and more reliable future applications.

Recent works have shown the benefits to LLMs from fine-tuning golden-standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) rationales or using them as correct examples in few-shot prompting. While humans can indeed imitate correct examples, learning from our mistakes is another vital aspect of human cognition. Hence, a question naturally arises: can LLMs learn and benefit from their mistakes, especially for their reasoning? This study investigates this problem from both the prompting and model-tuning perspectives. We begin by introducing CoTErrorSet, a new benchmark with 609,432 questions, each designed with both correct and error references, and demonstrating the types and reasons for making such mistakes. To explore the effectiveness of those mistakes, we design two methods: (1) Self-rethinking prompting guides LLMs to rethink whether they have made similar previous mistakes; and (2) Mistake tuning involves finetuning models in both correct and incorrect reasoning domains, rather than only tuning models to learn ground truth in traditional methodology. We conduct a series of experiments to prove LLMs can obtain benefits from mistakes in both directions. Our two methods offer potentially cost-effective strategies by leveraging errors to enhance reasoning capabilities, which costs significantly less than creating meticulously hand-crafted golden references. We ultimately make a thorough analysis of the reasons behind LLMs' errors, which provides directions that future research needs to overcome. CoTErrorSet will be published soon on \url{https://github.com/YookiTong/Learn-from-Mistakes-CotErrorSet}.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become central to mathematical reasoning in large language models, yet models remain brittle to early errors: a single arithmetic slip or unjustified inference typically propagates uncorrected to an incorrect final answer. We investigate whether training on intentionally flawed reasoning traces can teach models to detect and recover from such errors without degrading standard problem-solving ability. Using competition-level problems from MATH-lighteval, we generate CoT prefixes containing exactly one controlled error, either a calculation error (sign flips, dropped terms) or a reasoning error (misapplied rules, unjustified logical steps), and fine-tune Qwen3-4B with GRPO using a binary final-answer reward. Our Mixed-CoT-RL model matches standard RL on clean problems (41% vs 41%) while substantially outperforming it on problems prefilled with flawed reasoning (24% vs 19%). Notably, clean-only RL fine-tuning degrades robustness below the untuned baseline 19% vs. 20%), indicating that conventional training increases susceptibility to misleading prefills. Among error types, training on reasoning errors yields greater robustness gains than calculation errors alone, with mixed training performing best. These findings demonstrate that exposure to flawed traces during training can improve error-recovery behavior without sacrificing accuracy, suggesting a path toward more robust mathematical reasoning in LLMs.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at solving problems with clear and complete statements, but often struggle with nuanced environments or interactive tasks which are common in most real-world scenarios. This highlights the critical need for developing LLMs that can effectively engage in logically consistent multi-turn dialogue, seek information and reason with incomplete data. To this end, we introduce a novel benchmark comprising a suite of multi-turn tasks each designed to test specific reasoning, interactive dialogue, and information-seeking abilities. These tasks have deterministic scoring mechanisms, thus eliminating the need for human intervention. Evaluating frontier models on our benchmark reveals significant headroom. Our analysis shows that most errors emerge from poor instruction following, reasoning failures, and poor planning. This benchmark provides valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of current LLMs in handling complex, interactive scenarios and offers a robust platform for future research aimed at improving these critical capabilities.

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

The emergence of reasoning models and their integration into practical AI chat bots has led to breakthroughs in solving advanced math, deep search, and extractive question answering problems that requires a complex and multi-step thought process. Yet, a complete understanding of why these models hallucinate more than general purpose language models is missing. In this investigative study, we systematicallyexplore reasoning failures of contemporary language models on multi-hop question answering tasks. We introduce a novel, nuanced error categorization framework that examines failures across three critical dimensions: the diversity and uniqueness of source documents involved ("hops"), completeness in capturing relevant information ("coverage"), and cognitive inefficiency ("overthinking"). Through rigorous hu-man annotation, supported by complementary automated metrics, our exploration uncovers intricate error patterns often hidden by accuracy-centric evaluations. This investigative approach provides deeper insights into the cognitive limitations of current models and offers actionable guidance toward enhancing reasoning fidelity, transparency, and robustness in future language modeling efforts.

While self-correction has shown promise in improving LLM outputs in terms of style and quality (e.g. Chen et al., 2023; Madaan et al., 2023), recent attempts to self-correct logical or reasoning errors often cause correct answers to become incorrect, resulting in worse performances overall (Huang et al., 2023). In this paper, we break down the self-correction process into two core components: mistake finding and output correction. For mistake finding, we release BIG-Bench Mistake, a dataset of logical mistakes in Chain-of-Thought reasoning traces. We provide benchmark numbers for several state-of-the-art LLMs, and demonstrate that LLMs generally struggle with finding logical mistakes. For output correction, we propose a backtracking method which provides large improvements when given information on mistake location. We construe backtracking as a lightweight alternative to reinforcement learning methods, and show that it remains effective with a reward model at 60-70% accuracy.

Language models have demonstrated remarkable performance in solving reasoning tasks; however, even the strongest models still occasionally make reasoning mistakes. Recently, there has been active research aimed at improving reasoning accuracy, particularly by using pretrained language models to "self-correct" their mistakes via multi-round prompting. In this paper, we follow this line of work but focus on understanding the usefulness of incorporating "error-correction" data directly into the pretraining stage. This data consists of erroneous solution steps immediately followed by their corrections. Using a synthetic math dataset, we show promising results: this type of pretrain data can help language models achieve higher reasoning accuracy directly (i.e., through simple auto-regression, without multi-round prompting) compared to pretraining on the same amount of error-free data. We also delve into many details, such as (1) how this approach differs from beam search, (2) how such data can be prepared, (3) whether masking is needed on the erroneous tokens, (4) the amount of error required, (5) whether such data can be deferred to the fine-tuning stage, and many others.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

We propose and test the LLM Brain Rot Hypothesis: continual exposure to junk web text induces lasting cognitive decline in large language models (LLMs). To causally isolate data quality, we run controlled experiments on real Twitter/X corpora, constructing junk and reversely controlled datasets via two orthogonal operationalizations: M1 (engagement degree) and M2 (semantic quality), with matched token scale and training operations across conditions. Contrary to the control group, continual pre-training of 4 LLMs on the junk dataset causes non-trivial declines (Hedges' g>0.3) on reasoning, long-context understanding, safety, and inflating "dark traits" (e.g., psychopathy, narcissism). The gradual mixtures of junk and control datasets also yield dose-response cognition decay: for example, under M1, ARC-Challenge with Chain Of Thoughts drops 74.9 rightarrow 57.2 and RULER-CWE 84.4 rightarrow 52.3 as junk ratio rises from 0% to 100%. Error forensics reveal several key insights. First, we identify thought-skipping as the primary lesion: models increasingly truncate or skip reasoning chains, explaining most of the error growth. Second, partial but incomplete healing is observed: scaling instruction tuning and clean data pre-training improve the declined cognition yet cannot restore baseline capability, suggesting persistent representational drift rather than format mismatch. Finally, we discover that the popularity, a non-semantic metric, of a tweet is a better indicator of the Brain Rot effect than the length in M1. Together, the results provide significant, multi-perspective evidence that data quality is a causal driver of LLM capability decay, reframing curation for continual pretraining as a training-time safety problem and motivating routine "cognitive health checks" for deployed LLMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable capabilities across various domains. Math Word Problems (MWPs) serve as a crucial benchmark for evaluating LLMs' reasoning abilities. While most research primarily focuses on improving accuracy, it often neglects understanding and addressing the underlying patterns of errors. Current error classification methods rely on static and predefined categories, which limit their ability to capture the full spectrum of error patterns in mathematical reasoning. To enable systematic error analysis, we collect error samples from 15 different LLMs of varying sizes across four distinct MWP datasets using multiple sampling strategies. Based on this extensive collection, we introduce MWPES-300K, a comprehensive dataset containing 304,865 error samples that cover diverse error patterns and reasoning paths. To reduce human bias and enable fine-grained analysis of error patterns, we propose a novel framework for automated dynamic error classification in mathematical reasoning. Experimental results demonstrate that dataset characteristics significantly shape error patterns, which evolve from basic to complex manifestations as model capabilities increase. With deeper insights into error patterns, we propose error-aware prompting that incorporates common error patterns as explicit guidance, leading to significant improvements in mathematical reasoning performance.

Large LMs such as GPT-3 are powerful, but can commit mistakes that are obvious to humans. For example, GPT-3 would mistakenly interpret "What word is similar to good?" to mean a homophone, while the user intended a synonym. Our goal is to effectively correct such errors via user interactions with the system but without retraining, which will be prohibitively costly. We pair GPT-3 with a growing memory of recorded cases where the model misunderstood the user's intents, along with user feedback for clarification. Such a memory allows our system to produce enhanced prompts for any new query based on the user feedback for error correction on similar cases in the past. On four tasks (two lexical tasks, two advanced ethical reasoning tasks), we show how a (simulated) user can interactively teach a deployed GPT-3, substantially increasing its accuracy over the queries with different kinds of misunderstandings by the GPT-3. Our approach is a step towards the low-cost utility enhancement for very large pre-trained LMs. Code, data, and instructions to implement MEMPROMPT for a new task at https://www.memprompt.com/.

Large Multimodal Models (LMMs) have witnessed remarkable growth, showcasing formidable capabilities in handling intricate multimodal tasks with exceptional performance. Recent research has underscored the inclination of large language models to passively accept defective inputs, often resulting in futile reasoning on invalid prompts. However, the same critical question of whether LMMs can actively detect and scrutinize erroneous inputs still remains unexplored. To address this gap, we introduce the Input Scrutiny Ability Evaluation Framework (ISEval), which encompasses seven categories of flawed premises and three evaluation metrics. Our extensive evaluation of ten advanced LMMs has identified key findings. Most models struggle to actively detect flawed textual premises without guidance, which reflects a strong reliance on explicit prompts for premise error identification. Error type affects performance: models excel at identifying logical fallacies but struggle with surface-level linguistic errors and certain conditional flaws. Modality trust varies-Gemini 2.5 pro and Claude Sonnet 4 balance visual and textual info, while aya-vision-8b over-rely on text in conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LMMs' proactive verification of input validity and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/LMM_ISEval.

Chain of Thought prompting strategy has enhanced the performance of Large Language Models (LLMs) across various NLP tasks. However, it still has shortcomings when dealing with complex reasoning tasks, following~cot_wei, including understanding errors, calculation errors and process errors (e.g. missing-step and hallucinations). Subsequently, Our in-depth analysis of various error types has found that deeply understanding the whole problem is critical in addressing complicated reasoning tasks. In this paper, we proposed a novel prompt strategy called Deeply Understanding the Problems (DUP) prompting, inspired by how humans solve complex reasoning problems, designed to enhance the comprehensive understanding of problems by LLMs. It consists of three stages: 1) extract the core question; 2) find out problem-solving information based on the core question; 3) generate and extract answers by LLMs. We evaluate the performance of DUP prompting on ten diverse reasoning datasets. Experimental results suggest that DUP prompting significantly outperforms Zero-Shot CoT ~kojima2022large across all datasets. Notably, DUP achieves state-of-the-art on SVAMP (90.4\% to 94.2\%) and GSM8K (94.6\% to 97.1\%).

With the growing adoption of Large Language Model (LLM) agents in persistent, real-world roles, they naturally encounter continuous streams of tasks and inevitable failures. A key limitation, however, is their inability to systematically learn from these mistakes, forcing them to repeat identical errors in similar contexts. Unlike prior training-free methods that primarily store raw instance-level experience or focus on retrieving successful trajectories, we propose Mistake Notebook Learning (MNL), a novel memory framework that enables agents to self-curate generalizable guidance from batch-clustered failures. This mechanism allows agents to distill shared error patterns into structured "mistake notes," updating an external memory only when batch performance improves to ensure stability. To further amplify adaptability, we integrate MNL with test-time scaling, leveraging aggregated failure patterns to actively steer the search process away from known pitfalls. Experiments on mathematical reasoning, Text-to-SQL, and interactive agent benchmarks show that MNL achieves competitive performance compared to existing memory mechanisms and in-context methods in both effectiveness and efficiency. These findings position structured mistake abstraction as a critical lever for robust agent evolution, enabling continuous improvement without the cost of parameter updates. The code is available at https://github.com/Bairong-Xdynamics/MistakeNotebookLearning/tree/main.

Learning from mistakes is a fundamental feature of human intelligence. Previous work has shown that Large Language Models (LLMs) can also learn from incorrect answers when provided with a comprehensive rationale detailing why an answer is wrong or how to correct it. In this work, we examine whether LLMs can learn from mistakes in mathematical reasoning tasks when these explanations are not provided. We investigate if LLMs are able to implicitly infer such rationales simply from observing both incorrect and correct answers. Surprisingly, we find that LLMs perform better, on average, when rationales are eliminated from the context and incorrect answers are simply shown alongside correct ones. This approach also substantially outperforms chain-of-thought prompting in our evaluations. We show that these results are consistent across LLMs of different sizes and varying reasoning abilities. Further, we carry out an in-depth analysis, and show that prompting with both wrong and correct answers leads to greater performance and better generalisation than introducing additional, more diverse question-answer pairs into the context. Finally, we show that new rationales generated by models that have only observed incorrect and correct answers are scored equally as highly by humans as those produced with the aid of exemplar rationales. Our results demonstrate that LLMs are indeed capable of in-context implicit learning.

Recent advances in Vision-Language Models (VLMs) have improved performance in multi-modal learning, raising the question of whether these models truly understand the content they process. Crucially, can VLMs detect when a reasoning process is wrong and identify its error type? To answer this, we present MMErroR, a multi-modal benchmark of 2,013 samples, each embedding a single coherent reasoning error. These samples span 24 subdomains across six top-level domains, ensuring broad coverage and taxonomic richness. Unlike existing benchmarks that focus on answer correctness, MMErroR targets a process-level, error-centric evaluation that requires models to detect incorrect reasoning and classify the error type within both visual and linguistic contexts. We evaluate 20 advanced VLMs, even the best model (Gemini-3.0-Pro) classifies the error in only 66.47\% of cases, underscoring the challenge of identifying erroneous reasoning. Furthermore, the ability to accurately identify errors offers valuable insights into the capabilities of multi-modal reasoning models. Project Page: https://mmerror-benchmark.github.io

For artificial intelligence to be beneficial to humans the behaviour of AI agents needs to be aligned with what humans want. In this paper we discuss some behavioural issues for language agents, arising from accidental misspecification by the system designer. We highlight some ways that misspecification can occur and discuss some behavioural issues that could arise from misspecification, including deceptive or manipulative language, and review some approaches for avoiding these issues.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have exhibited remarkable reasoning capabilities, achieving impressive results across a wide range of tasks. Despite these advances, significant reasoning failures persist, occurring even in seemingly simple scenarios. To systematically understand and address these shortcomings, we present the first comprehensive survey dedicated to reasoning failures in LLMs. We introduce a novel categorization framework that distinguishes reasoning into embodied and non-embodied types, with the latter further subdivided into informal (intuitive) and formal (logical) reasoning. In parallel, we classify reasoning failures along a complementary axis into three types: fundamental failures intrinsic to LLM architectures that broadly affect downstream tasks; application-specific limitations that manifest in particular domains; and robustness issues characterized by inconsistent performance across minor variations. For each reasoning failure, we provide a clear definition, analyze existing studies, explore root causes, and present mitigation strategies. By unifying fragmented research efforts, our survey provides a structured perspective on systemic weaknesses in LLM reasoning, offering valuable insights and guiding future research towards building stronger, more reliable, and robust reasoning capabilities. We additionally release a comprehensive collection of research works on LLM reasoning failures, as a GitHub repository at https://github.com/Peiyang-Song/Awesome-LLM-Reasoning-Failures, to provide an easy entry point to this area.

Following step-by-step procedures is an essential component of various activities carried out by individuals in their daily lives. These procedures serve as a guiding framework that helps to achieve goals efficiently, whether it is assembling furniture or preparing a recipe. However, the complexity and duration of procedural activities inherently increase the likelihood of making errors. Understanding such procedural activities from a sequence of frames is a challenging task that demands an accurate interpretation of visual information and the ability to reason about the structure of the activity. To this end, we collect a new egocentric 4D dataset, CaptainCook4D, comprising 384 recordings (94.5 hours) of people performing recipes in real kitchen environments. This dataset consists of two distinct types of activity: one in which participants adhere to the provided recipe instructions and another in which they deviate and induce errors. We provide 5.3K step annotations and 10K fine-grained action annotations and benchmark the dataset for the following tasks: supervised error recognition, multistep localization, and procedure learning

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

The recent progress in large language models (LLMs), especially the invention of chain-of-thoughts (CoT) prompting, makes it possible to solve reasoning problems. However, even the strongest LLMs are still struggling with more complicated problems that require non-linear thinking and multi-step reasoning. In this work, we explore whether LLMs have the ability to recognize their own errors, without resorting to external resources. In particular, we investigate whether they can be used to identify individual errors within a step-by-step reasoning. To this end, we propose a zero-shot verification scheme to recognize such errors. We then use this verification scheme to improve question-answering performance, by using it to perform weighted voting on different generated answers. We test the method on three math datasets-GSM8K, MathQA, and MATH-and find that it successfully recognizes errors and, in turn, increases final predictive performance.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), which autonomously produce a reasoning Chain of Thought (CoT) before producing final responses, offer a promising approach to interpreting and monitoring model behaviors. Inspired by the observation that certain CoT patterns -- e.g., ``Wait, did I miss anything?'' -- consistently emerge across tasks, we explore whether LRMs exhibit human-like cognitive habits. Building on Habits of Mind, a well-established framework of cognitive habits associated with successful human problem-solving, we introduce CogTest, a principled benchmark designed to evaluate LRMs' cognitive habits. CogTest includes 16 cognitive habits, each instantiated with 25 diverse tasks, and employs an evidence-first extraction method to ensure reliable habit identification. With CogTest, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of 16 widely used LLMs (13 LRMs and 3 non-reasoning ones). Our findings reveal that LRMs, unlike conventional LLMs, not only exhibit human-like habits but also adaptively deploy them according to different tasks. Finer-grained analyses further uncover patterns of similarity and difference in LRMs' cognitive habit profiles, particularly certain inter-family similarity (e.g., Qwen-3 models and DeepSeek-R1). Extending the study to safety-related tasks, we observe that certain habits, such as Taking Responsible Risks, are strongly associated with the generation of harmful responses. These findings suggest that studying persistent behavioral patterns in LRMs' CoTs is a valuable step toward deeper understanding of LLM misbehavior. The code is available at: https://github.com/jianshuod/CogTest.

With Large Language Models (LLMs) being widely used across various tasks, detecting errors in their responses is increasingly crucial. However, little research has been conducted on error detection of LLM responses. Collecting error annotations on LLM responses is challenging due to the subjective nature of many NLP tasks, and thus previous research focuses on tasks of little practical value (e.g., word sorting) or limited error types (e.g., faithfulness in summarization). This work introduces ReaLMistake, the first error detection benchmark consisting of objective, realistic, and diverse errors made by LLMs. ReaLMistake contains three challenging and meaningful tasks that introduce objectively assessable errors in four categories (reasoning correctness, instruction-following, context-faithfulness, and parameterized knowledge), eliciting naturally observed and diverse errors in responses of GPT-4 and Llama 2 70B annotated by experts. We use ReaLMistake to evaluate error detectors based on 12 LLMs. Our findings show: 1) Top LLMs like GPT-4 and Claude 3 detect errors made by LLMs at very low recall, and all LLM-based error detectors perform much worse than humans. 2) Explanations by LLM-based error detectors lack reliability. 3) LLMs-based error detection is sensitive to small changes in prompts but remains challenging to improve. 4) Popular approaches to improving LLMs, including self-consistency and majority vote, do not improve the error detection performance. Our benchmark and code are provided at https://github.com/psunlpgroup/ReaLMistake.

We construct evaluation tasks where extending the reasoning length of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) deteriorates performance, exhibiting an inverse scaling relationship between test-time compute and accuracy. Our evaluation tasks span four categories: simple counting tasks with distractors, regression tasks with spurious features, deduction tasks with constraint tracking, and advanced AI risks. We identify five distinct failure modes when models reason for longer: 1) Claude models become increasingly distracted by irrelevant information; 2) OpenAI o-series models resist distractors but overfit to problem framings; 3) models shift from reasonable priors to spurious correlations; 4) all models show difficulties in maintaining focus on complex deductive tasks; and 5) extended reasoning may amplify concerning behaviors, with Claude Sonnet 4 showing increased expressions of self-preservation. These findings suggest that while test-time compute scaling remains promising for improving model capabilities, it may inadvertently reinforce problematic reasoning patterns. Our results demonstrate the importance of evaluating models across diverse reasoning lengths to identify and address these failure modes in LRMs.

Deep search agents powered by large language models have demonstrated strong capabilities in multi-step retrieval, reasoning, and long-horizon task execution. However, their practical failures often stem from the lack of mechanisms to monitor and regulate reasoning and retrieval states as tasks evolve under uncertainty. Insights from cognitive neuroscience suggest that human metacognition is hierarchically organized, integrating fast anomaly detection with selectively triggered, experience-driven reflection. In this work, we propose Deep Search with Meta-Cognitive Monitoring (DS-MCM), a deep search framework augmented with an explicit hierarchical metacognitive monitoring mechanism. DS-MCM integrates a Fast Consistency Monitor, which performs lightweight checks on the alignment between external evidence and internal reasoning confidence, and a Slow Experience-Driven Monitor, which is selectively activated to guide corrective intervention based on experience memory from historical agent trajectories. By embedding monitoring directly into the reasoning-retrieval loop, DS-MCM determines both when intervention is warranted and how corrective actions should be informed by prior experience. Experiments across multiple deep search benchmarks and backbone models demonstrate that DS-MCM consistently improves performance and robustness.

Conversational agents powered by large language models (LLMs) with tool integration achieve strong performance on fixed task-oriented dialogue datasets but remain vulnerable to unanticipated, user-induced errors. Rather than focusing on error prevention, this work focuses on error recovery, which necessitates the accurate diagnosis of erroneous dialogue contexts and execution of proper recovery plans. Under realistic constraints precluding model fine-tuning or prompt modification due to significant cost and time requirements, we explore whether agents can recover from contextually flawed interactions and how their behavior can be adapted without altering model parameters and prompts. To this end, we propose Reasoning Inception (ReIn), a test-time intervention method that plants an initial reasoning into the agent's decision-making process. Specifically, an external inception module identifies predefined errors within the dialogue context and generates recovery plans, which are subsequently integrated into the agent's internal reasoning process to guide corrective actions, without modifying its parameters or system prompts. We evaluate ReIn by systematically simulating conversational failure scenarios that directly hinder successful completion of user goals: user's ambiguous and unsupported requests. Across diverse combinations of agent models and inception modules, ReIn substantially improves task success and generalizes to unseen error types. Moreover, it consistently outperforms explicit prompt-modification approaches, underscoring its utility as an efficient, on-the-fly method. In-depth analysis of its operational mechanism, particularly in relation to instruction hierarchy, indicates that jointly defining recovery tools with ReIn can serve as a safe and effective strategy for improving the resilience of conversational agents without modifying the backbone models or system prompts.

Recent advances in language models have demonstrated their capability to solve mathematical reasoning problems, achieving near-perfect accuracy on grade-school level math benchmarks like GSM8K. In this paper, we formally study how language models solve these problems. We design a series of controlled experiments to address several fundamental questions: (1) Can language models truly develop reasoning skills, or do they simply memorize templates? (2) What is the model's hidden (mental) reasoning process? (3) Do models solve math questions using skills similar to or different from humans? (4) Do models trained on GSM8K-like datasets develop reasoning skills beyond those necessary for solving GSM8K problems? (5) What mental process causes models to make reasoning mistakes? (6) How large or deep must a model be to effectively solve GSM8K-level math questions? Our study uncovers many hidden mechanisms by which language models solve mathematical questions, providing insights that extend beyond current understandings of LLMs.

Although large language models (LLMs) have become transformative, they still make mistakes and can explore unproductive reasoning paths. Self-correction is an important capability for a trustworthy LLM, particularly an autoregressive LLM. While LLMs can identify error in user input, they exhibit a systematic 'Self-Correction Blind Spot' - failing to correct identical error in their own outputs. To systematically study this phenomenon, we introduce Self-Correction Bench, a systematic framework to measure this phenomenon through controlled error injection at three complexity levels. Testing 14 models, we find an average 64.5% blind spot rate. We find multiple evidences that this limitation relates to training data composition: human training demonstrations predominantly show error-free responses rather than error-correction sequences, unlike RL-trained models that learn error correction through outcome feedback. Remarkably, simply appending "Wait" reduces blind spots by 89.3%, suggesting that the capability exists but requires activation. Our work highlights a critical limitation in current LLMs and offers potential avenues for improving their reliability and trustworthiness.

Automatic Question Generation (QG) often produces outputs with critical defects, such as factual hallucinations and answer mismatches. However, existing evaluation methods, including LLM-based evaluators, mainly adopt a black-box and holistic paradigm without explicit error modeling, leading to the neglect of such defects and overestimation of question quality. To address this issue, we propose ErrEval, a flexible and Error-aware Evaluation framework that enhances QG evaluation through explicit error diagnostics. Specifically, ErrEval reformulates evaluation as a two-stage process of error diagnosis followed by informed scoring. At the first stage, a lightweight plug-and-play Error Identifier detects and categorizes common errors across structural, linguistic, and content-related aspects. These diagnostic signals are then incorporated as explicit evidence to guide LLM evaluators toward more fine-grained and grounded judgments. Extensive experiments on three benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of ErrEval, showing that incorporating explicit diagnostics improves alignment with human judgments. Further analyses confirm that ErrEval effectively mitigates the overestimation of low-quality questions.

While humans sometimes do show the capability of correcting their own erroneous guesses with self-critiquing, there seems to be no basis for that assumption in the case of LLMs.

Cognitive psychologists have documented that humans use cognitive heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to make quick decisions while expending less effort. While performing annotation work on crowdsourcing platforms, we hypothesize that such heuristic use among annotators cascades on to data quality and model robustness. In this work, we study cognitive heuristic use in the context of annotating multiple-choice reading comprehension datasets. We propose tracking annotator heuristic traces, where we tangibly measure low-effort annotation strategies that could indicate usage of various cognitive heuristics. We find evidence that annotators might be using multiple such heuristics, based on correlations with a battery of psychological tests. Importantly, heuristic use among annotators determines data quality along several dimensions: (1) known biased models, such as partial input models, more easily solve examples authored by annotators that rate highly on heuristic use, (2) models trained on annotators scoring highly on heuristic use don't generalize as well, and (3) heuristic-seeking annotators tend to create qualitatively less challenging examples. Our findings suggest that tracking heuristic usage among annotators can potentially help with collecting challenging datasets and diagnosing model biases.

Metacognitive knowledge refers to humans' intuitive knowledge of their own thinking and reasoning processes. Today's best LLMs clearly possess some reasoning processes. The paper gives evidence that they also have metacognitive knowledge, including ability to name skills and procedures to apply given a task. We explore this primarily in context of math reasoning, developing a prompt-guided interaction procedure to get a powerful LLM to assign sensible skill labels to math questions, followed by having it perform semantic clustering to obtain coarser families of skill labels. These coarse skill labels look interpretable to humans. To validate that these skill labels are meaningful and relevant to the LLM's reasoning processes we perform the following experiments. (a) We ask GPT-4 to assign skill labels to training questions in math datasets GSM8K and MATH. (b) When using an LLM to solve the test questions, we present it with the full list of skill labels and ask it to identify the skill needed. Then it is presented with randomly selected exemplar solved questions associated with that skill label. This improves accuracy on GSM8k and MATH for several strong LLMs, including code-assisted models. The methodology presented is domain-agnostic, even though this article applies it to math problems.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

Modeling plausible student misconceptions is critical for AI in education. In this work, we examine how large language models (LLMs) reason about misconceptions when generating multiple-choice distractors, a task that requires modeling incorrect yet plausible answers by coordinating solution knowledge, simulating student misconceptions, and evaluating plausibility. We introduce a taxonomy for analyzing the strategies used by state-of-the-art LLMs, examining their reasoning procedures and comparing them to established best practices in the learning sciences. Our structured analysis reveals a surprising alignment between their processes and best practices: the models typically solve the problem correctly first, then articulate and simulate multiple potential misconceptions, and finally select a set of distractors. An analysis of failure modes reveals that errors arise primarily from failures in recovering the correct solution and selecting among response candidates, rather than simulating errors or structuring the process. Consistent with these results, we find that providing the correct solution in the prompt improves alignment with human-authored distractors by 8%, highlighting the critical role of anchoring to the correct solution when generating plausible incorrect student reasoning. Overall, our analysis offers a structured and interpretable lens into LLMs' ability to model incorrect student reasoning and produce high-quality distractors.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities in solving mathematical reasoning tasks, leveraging Chain-of-Thought (CoT) data as a vital component in guiding answer generation. Current paradigms typically generate CoT and answers directly for a given problem, diverging from human problem-solving strategies to some extent. Humans often solve problems by recalling analogous cases and leveraging their solutions to reason about the current task. Inspired by this cognitive process, we propose MetaLadder, a novel framework that explicitly prompts LLMs to recall and reflect on meta-problems, those structurally or semantically analogous problems, alongside their CoT solutions before addressing the target problem. Additionally, we introduce a problem-restating mechanism to enhance the model's comprehension of the target problem by regenerating the original question, which further improves reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the model can achieve reasoning transfer from analogical problems, mimicking human-like "learning from examples" and generalization abilities. Extensive experiments on mathematical benchmarks demonstrate that our MetaLadder significantly boosts LLMs' problem-solving accuracy, largely outperforming standard CoT-based methods (10.3\% accuracy gain) and other methods. Our code and data has been released at https://github.com/LHL3341/MetaLadder.

In reasoning tasks, even a minor error can cascade into inaccurate results, leading to suboptimal performance of large language models in such domains. Earlier fine-tuning approaches sought to mitigate this by leveraging more precise supervisory signals from human labeling, larger models, or self-sampling, although at a high cost. Conversely, we develop a method that avoids external resources, relying instead on introducing perturbations to the input. Our training approach randomly masks certain tokens within the chain of thought, a technique we found to be particularly effective for reasoning tasks. When applied to fine-tuning with GSM8K, this method achieved a 5% improvement in accuracy over standard supervised fine-tuning with a few codes modified and no additional labeling effort. Furthermore, it is complementary to existing methods. When integrated with related data augmentation methods, it leads to an average improvement of 3% improvement in GSM8K accuracy and 1% improvement in MATH accuracy across five datasets of various quality and size, as well as two base models. We further investigate the mechanisms behind this improvement through case studies and quantitative analysis, suggesting that our approach may provide superior support for the model in capturing long-distance dependencies, especially those related to questions. This enhancement could deepen understanding of premises in questions and prior steps. Our code is available at Github.

Large language model (LLM) role-playing has gained widespread attention, where the authentic character knowledge is crucial for constructing realistic LLM role-playing agents. However, existing works usually overlook the exploration of LLMs' ability to detect characters' known knowledge errors (KKE) and unknown knowledge errors (UKE) while playing roles, which would lead to low-quality automatic construction of character trainable corpus. In this paper, we propose a probing dataset to evaluate LLMs' ability to detect errors in KKE and UKE. The results indicate that even the latest LLMs struggle to effectively detect these two types of errors, especially when it comes to familiar knowledge. We experimented with various reasoning strategies and propose an agent-based reasoning method, Self-Recollection and Self-Doubt (S2RD), to further explore the potential for improving error detection capabilities. Experiments show that our method effectively improves the LLMs' ability to detect error character knowledge, but it remains an issue that requires ongoing attention.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have exhibited strong mathematical reasoning and computational prowess, tackling tasks ranging from basic arithmetic to advanced competition-level problems. However, frequently occurring subtle errors, such as miscalculations or incorrect substitutions, limit the models' full mathematical potential. Existing studies to improve mathematical ability typically involve distilling reasoning skills from stronger LLMs or applying preference learning to step-wise response pairs. Although these methods leverage samples of varying granularity to mitigate reasoning errors, they overlook the frequently occurring subtle errors. A major reason is that sampled preference pairs involve differences unrelated to the errors, which may distract the model from focusing on subtle errors. In this work, we propose a novel preference learning framework called eRror-Injected Self-Editing (RISE), which injects predefined subtle errors into partial tokens of correct solutions to construct hard pairs for error mitigation. In detail, RISE uses the model itself to edit a small number of tokens in the solution, injecting designed subtle errors. Then, pairs composed of self-edited solutions and their corresponding correct ones, along with pairs of correct and incorrect solutions obtained through sampling, are used together for subtle error-aware DPO training. Compared with other preference learning methods, RISE further refines the training objective to focus on predefined errors and their tokens, without requiring fine-grained sampling or preference annotation. Extensive experiments validate the effectiveness of RISE, with preference learning on Qwen2-7B-Instruct yielding notable improvements of 3.0% on GSM8K and 7.9% on MATH.

This paper investigates the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) using 50 newly constructed high-school-level word problems. Unlike prior studies that focus solely on answer correctness, we rigorously analyze both final answers and solution steps to identify reasoning failures. Evaluating eight state-of-the-art models - including Mixtral, Llama, Gemini, GPT-4o, and OpenAI's o1 variants - we find that while newer models (e.g., o3-mini, deepseek-r1) achieve higher accuracy, all models exhibit errors in spatial reasoning, strategic planning, and arithmetic, sometimes producing correct answers through flawed logic. Common failure modes include unwarranted assumptions, over-reliance on numerical patterns, and difficulty translating physical intuition into mathematical steps. Manual analysis reveals that models struggle with problems requiring multi-step deduction or real-world knowledge, despite possessing broad mathematical knowledge. Our results underscore the importance of evaluating reasoning processes, not just answers, and caution against overestimating LLMs' problem-solving proficiency. The study highlights persistent gaps in LLMs' generalization abilities, emphasizing the need for targeted improvements in structured reasoning and constraint handling.

Large language models (LLMs) often produce errors, including factual inaccuracies, biases, and reasoning failures, collectively referred to as "hallucinations". Recent studies have demonstrated that LLMs' internal states encode information regarding the truthfulness of their outputs, and that this information can be utilized to detect errors. In this work, we show that the internal representations of LLMs encode much more information about truthfulness than previously recognized. We first discover that the truthfulness information is concentrated in specific tokens, and leveraging this property significantly enhances error detection performance. Yet, we show that such error detectors fail to generalize across datasets, implying that -- contrary to prior claims -- truthfulness encoding is not universal but rather multifaceted. Next, we show that internal representations can also be used for predicting the types of errors the model is likely to make, facilitating the development of tailored mitigation strategies. Lastly, we reveal a discrepancy between LLMs' internal encoding and external behavior: they may encode the correct answer, yet consistently generate an incorrect one. Taken together, these insights deepen our understanding of LLM errors from the model's internal perspective, which can guide future research on enhancing error analysis and mitigation.

The deployment of pre-trained perception models in novel environments often leads to performance degradation due to distributional shifts. Although recent artificial intelligence approaches for metacognition use logical rules to characterize and filter model errors, improving precision often comes at the cost of reduced recall. This paper addresses the hypothesis that leveraging multiple pre-trained models can mitigate this recall reduction. We formulate the challenge of identifying and managing conflicting predictions from various models as a consistency-based abduction problem. The input predictions and the learned error detection rules derived from each model are encoded in a logic program. We then seek an abductive explanation--a subset of model predictions--that maximizes prediction coverage while ensuring the rate of logical inconsistencies (derived from domain constraints) remains below a specified threshold. We propose two algorithms for this knowledge representation task: an exact method based on Integer Programming (IP) and an efficient Heuristic Search (HS). Through extensive experiments on a simulated aerial imagery dataset featuring controlled, complex distributional shifts, we demonstrate that our abduction-based framework outperforms individual models and standard ensemble baselines, achieving, for instance, average relative improvements of approximately 13.6% in F1-score and 16.6% in accuracy across 15 diverse test datasets when compared to the best individual model. Our results validate the use of consistency-based abduction as an effective mechanism to robustly integrate knowledge from multiple imperfect reasoners in challenging, novel scenarios.

Central to many self-improvement pipelines for large language models (LLMs) is the assumption that models can improve by reflecting on past mistakes. We study a phenomenon termed contextual drag: the presence of failed attempts in the context biases subsequent generations toward structurally similar errors. Across evaluations of 11 proprietary and open-weight models on 8 reasoning tasks, contextual drag induces 10-20% performance drops, and iterative self-refinement in models with severe contextual drag can collapse into self-deterioration. Structural analysis using tree edit distance reveals that subsequent reasoning trajectories inherit structurally similar error patterns from the context. We demonstrate that neither external feedback nor successful self-verification suffices to eliminate this effect. While mitigation strategies such as fallback-behavior fine-tuning and context denoising yield partial improvements, they fail to fully restore baseline performance, positioning contextual drag as a persistent failure mode in current reasoning architectures.

Does continued scaling of large language models (LLMs) yield diminishing returns? Real-world value often stems from the length of task an agent can complete. We start this work by observing the simple but counterintuitive fact that marginal gains in single-step accuracy can compound into exponential improvements in the length of a task a model can successfully complete. Then, we argue that failures of LLMs when simple tasks are made longer arise from mistakes in execution, rather than an inability to reason. We propose isolating execution capability, by explicitly providing the knowledge and plan needed to solve a long-horizon task. We find that larger models can correctly execute significantly more turns even when small models have 100\% single-turn accuracy. We observe that the per-step accuracy of models degrades as the number of steps increases. This is not just due to long-context limitations -- curiously, we observe a self-conditioning effect -- models become more likely to make mistakes when the context contains their errors from prior turns. Self-conditioning does not reduce by just scaling the model size. In contrast, recent thinking models do not self-condition, and can also execute much longer tasks in a single turn. We conclude by benchmarking frontier thinking models on the length of task they can execute in a single turn. Overall, by focusing on the ability to execute, we hope to reconcile debates on how LLMs can solve complex reasoning problems yet fail at simple tasks when made longer, and highlight the massive benefits of scaling model size and sequential test-time compute for long-horizon tasks.

Given the rapid ascent of large language models (LLMs), we study the question: (How) can large language models help in reviewing of scientific papers or proposals? We first conduct some pilot studies where we find that (i) GPT-4 outperforms other LLMs (Bard, Vicuna, Koala, Alpaca, LLaMa, Dolly, OpenAssistant, StableLM), and (ii) prompting with a specific question (e.g., to identify errors) outperforms prompting to simply write a review. With these insights, we study the use of LLMs (specifically, GPT-4) for three tasks: 1. Identifying errors: We construct 13 short computer science papers each with a deliberately inserted error, and ask the LLM to check for the correctness of these papers. We observe that the LLM finds errors in 7 of them, spanning both mathematical and conceptual errors. 2. Verifying checklists: We task the LLM to verify 16 closed-ended checklist questions in the respective sections of 15 NeurIPS 2022 papers. We find that across 119 {checklist question, paper} pairs, the LLM had an 86.6% accuracy. 3. Choosing the "better" paper: We generate 10 pairs of abstracts, deliberately designing each pair in such a way that one abstract was clearly superior than the other. The LLM, however, struggled to discern these relatively straightforward distinctions accurately, committing errors in its evaluations for 6 out of the 10 pairs. Based on these experiments, we think that LLMs have a promising use as reviewing assistants for specific reviewing tasks, but not (yet) for complete evaluations of papers or proposals.

Solving grid puzzles involves a significant amount of logical reasoning. Hence, it is a good domain to evaluate the reasoning capability of a model which can then guide us to improve the reasoning ability of models. However, most existing works evaluate only the final predicted answer of a puzzle, without delving into an in-depth analysis of the LLMs' reasoning chains (such as where they falter) or providing any finer metrics to evaluate them. Since LLMs may rely on simple heuristics or artifacts to predict the final answer, it is crucial to evaluate the generated reasoning chain beyond overall correctness measures, for accurately evaluating the reasoning abilities of LLMs. To this end, we first develop GridPuzzle, an evaluation dataset comprising 274 grid-based puzzles with different complexities. Second, we propose a new error taxonomy derived from manual analysis of reasoning chains from LLMs including GPT-4, Claude-3, Gemini, Mistral, and Llama-2. Then, we develop an LLM-based framework for large-scale subjective evaluation (i.e., identifying errors) and an objective metric, PuzzleEval, to evaluate the correctness of reasoning chains. Evaluating reasoning chains from LLMs leads to several interesting findings. We further show that existing prompting methods used for enhancing models' reasoning abilities do not improve performance on GridPuzzle. This highlights the importance of understanding fine-grained errors and presents a challenge for future research to enhance LLMs' puzzle-solving abilities by developing methods that address these errors. Data and source code are available at https://github.com/Mihir3009/GridPuzzle.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

Recent work has shown that asking language models to generate reasoning steps improves performance on many reasoning tasks. When moving beyond prompting, this raises the question of how we should supervise such models: outcome-based approaches which supervise the final result, or process-based approaches which supervise the reasoning process itself? Differences between these approaches might naturally be expected not just in final-answer errors but also in reasoning errors, which can be difficult to detect and are problematic in many real-world domains such as education. We run the first comprehensive comparison between process- and outcome-based approaches trained on a natural language task, GSM8K. We find that pure outcome-based supervision produces similar final-answer error rates with less label supervision. However, for correct reasoning steps we find it necessary to use process-based supervision or supervision from learned reward models that emulate process-based feedback. In total, we improve the previous best results from 16.8% to 12.7% final-answer error and 14.0% to 3.4% reasoning error among final-answer-correct solutions.

Recent years have witnessed significant progress in large language models' (LLMs) reasoning, which is largely due to the chain-of-thought (CoT) approaches, allowing models to generate intermediate reasoning steps before reaching the final answer. Building on these advances, state-of-the-art LLMs are instruction-tuned to provide long and detailed CoT pathways when responding to reasoning-related questions. However, human beings are naturally cognitive misers and will prompt language models to give rather short responses, thus raising a significant conflict with CoT reasoning. In this paper, we delve into how LLMs' reasoning performance changes when users provide short-path prompts. The results and analysis reveal that language models can reason effectively and robustly without explicit CoT prompts, while under short-path prompting, LLMs' reasoning ability drops significantly and becomes unstable, even on grade-school problems. To address this issue, we propose two approaches: an instruction-guided approach and a fine-tuning approach, both designed to effectively manage the conflict. Experimental results show that both methods achieve high accuracy, providing insights into the trade-off between instruction adherence and reasoning accuracy in current models.

Recent scholarship on reasoning in LLMs has supplied evidence of impressive performance and flexible adaptation to machine generated or human feedback. Nonmonotonic reasoning, crucial to human cognition for navigating the real world, remains a challenging, yet understudied task. In this work, we study nonmonotonic reasoning capabilities of seven state-of-the-art LLMs in one abstract and one commonsense reasoning task featuring generics, such as 'Birds fly', and exceptions, 'Penguins don't fly' (see Fig. 1). While LLMs exhibit reasoning patterns in accordance with human nonmonotonic reasoning abilities, they fail to maintain stable beliefs on truth conditions of generics at the addition of supporting examples ('Owls fly') or unrelated information ('Lions have manes'). Our findings highlight pitfalls in attributing human reasoning behaviours to LLMs, as well as assessing general capabilities, while consistent reasoning remains elusive.

Large language models (LLMs) recently exhibited remarkable reasoning capabilities on solving math problems. To further improve this capability, this work proposes Learning from Mistakes (LeMa), akin to human learning processes. Consider a human student who failed to solve a math problem, he will learn from what mistake he has made and how to correct it. Mimicking this error-driven learning process, LeMa fine-tunes LLMs on mistake-correction data pairs generated by GPT-4. Specifically, we first collect inaccurate reasoning paths from various LLMs and then employ GPT-4 as a "corrector" to (1) identify the mistake step, (2) explain the reason for the mistake, and (3) correct the mistake and generate the final answer. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LeMa: across five backbone LLMs and two mathematical reasoning tasks, LeMa consistently improves the performance compared with fine-tuning on CoT data alone. Impressively, LeMa can also benefit specialized LLMs such as WizardMath and MetaMath, achieving 85.4% pass@1 accuracy on GSM8K and 27.1% on MATH. This surpasses the SOTA performance achieved by non-execution open-source models on these challenging tasks. Our code, data and models will be publicly available at https://github.com/microsoft/CodeT.

In recent years, Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable generative abilities, but can they judge the quality of their own generations? A popular concept, referred to as self-refinement, postulates that LLMs can detect and correct the errors in their generations when asked to do so. However, recent empirical evidence points in the opposite direction, suggesting that LLMs often struggle to accurately identify errors when reasoning is involved. To address this, we propose a reasoning with refinement objective called ART: Ask, Refine, and Trust, which asks necessary questions to decide when an LLM should refine its output, and either affirm or withhold trust in its refinement by ranking the refinement and the initial prediction. On two multistep reasoning tasks of mathematical word problems (GSM8K) and question answering (StrategyQA), ART achieves a performance gain of +5 points over self-refinement baselines, while using a much smaller model as the decision maker. We also demonstrate the benefit of using smaller models to make refinement decisions as a cost-effective alternative to fine-tuning a larger model.

A language model's ability to reflect on its own reasoning provides a key advantage for solving complex problems. While most recent research has focused on how this ability develops during reinforcement learning, we show that it actually begins to emerge much earlier - during the model's pre-training. To study this, we introduce deliberate errors into chains-of-thought and test whether the model can still arrive at the correct answer by recognizing and correcting these mistakes. By tracking performance across different stages of pre-training, we observe that this self-correcting ability appears early and improves steadily over time. For instance, an OLMo2-7B model pre-trained on 4 trillion tokens displays self-correction on our six self-reflection tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) show remarkable capabilities across a variety of tasks. Despite the models only seeing text in training, several recent studies suggest that LLM representations implicitly capture aspects of the underlying grounded concepts. Here, we explore LLM representations of a particularly salient kind of grounded knowledge -- spatial relationships. We design natural-language navigation tasks and evaluate the ability of LLMs, in particular GPT-3.5-turbo, GPT-4, and Llama2 series models, to represent and reason about spatial structures. These tasks reveal substantial variability in LLM performance across different spatial structures, including square, hexagonal, and triangular grids, rings, and trees. In extensive error analysis, we find that LLMs' mistakes reflect both spatial and non-spatial factors. These findings suggest that LLMs appear to capture certain aspects of spatial structure implicitly, but room for improvement remains.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit substantially shorter effective context lengths than their claimed capacities, especially when handling complex reasoning tasks that require integrating information from multiple parts of a long context and performing multi-step reasoning. Although Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has shown promise in reducing task complexity, our empirical analysis reveals that it does not fully resolve this limitation. Through controlled experiments, we identify poor recall of implicit facts as the primary cause of failure, which significantly hampers reasoning performance. Interestingly, we observe that the internal attention weights from the generated CoT tokens can effectively ground implicit facts, even when these facts are not explicitly recalled. Building on this insight, we propose a novel training-free algorithm, Attrieval, which leverages attention weights to retrieve relevant facts from the long context and incorporates them into the reasoning process. Additionally, we find that selecting context tokens from CoT tokens further improves performance. Our results demonstrate that Attrieval enhances long-context reasoning capability notably on both synthetic and real-world QA datasets with various models.

Large language models (LLMs) possess impressive linguistic capabilities but often fail to faithfully retain factual knowledge, leading to hallucinations and unreliable outputs. Understanding LLMs' knowledge deficiencies by exhaustively evaluating against full-scale knowledge bases is computationally prohibitive, especially for closed-weight models. We propose stochastic error ascent (SEA), a scalable and efficient framework for discovering knowledge deficiencies (errors) in closed-weight LLMs under a strict query budget. Rather than naively probing all knowledge candidates, SEA formulates error discovery as a stochastic optimization process: it iteratively retrieves new high-error candidates by leveraging the semantic similarity to previously observed failures. To further enhance search efficiency and coverage, SEA employs hierarchical retrieval across document and paragraph levels, and constructs a relation directed acyclic graph to model error propagation and identify systematic failure modes. Empirically, SEA uncovers 40.7x more knowledge errors than Automated Capability Discovery and 26.7% more than AutoBencher, while reducing the cost-per-error by 599x and 9x, respectively. Human evaluation confirms the high quality of generated questions, while ablation and convergence analyses validate the contribution of each component in SEA. Further analysis on the discovered errors reveals correlated failure patterns across LLM families and recurring deficits, highlighting the need for better data coverage and targeted fine-tuning in future LLM development.

As language models regularly make mistakes when solving math problems, automated identification of errors in the reasoning process becomes increasingly significant for their scalable oversight. In this paper, we introduce ProcessBench for measuring the ability to identify erroneous steps in mathematical reasoning. It consists of 3,400 test cases, primarily focused on competition- and Olympiad-level math problems. Each test case contains a step-by-step solution with error location annotated by human experts. Models are required to identify the earliest step that contains an error, or conclude that all steps are correct. We conduct extensive evaluation on ProcessBench, involving two types of models: process reward models (PRMs) and critic models, where for the latter we prompt general language models to critique each solution step by step. We draw two main observations: (1) Existing PRMs typically fail to generalize to more challenging math problems beyond GSM8K and MATH. They underperform both critic models (i.e., prompted general language models) and our own trained PRM that is straightforwardly fine-tuned on the PRM800K dataset. (2) The best open-source model, QwQ-32B-Preview, has demonstrated the critique capability competitive with the proprietary model GPT-4o, despite that it still lags behind the reasoning-specialized o1-mini. We hope ProcessBench can foster future research in reasoning process assessment, paving the way toward scalable oversight of language models.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capability in solving mathematical problems. However, existing approaches primarily focus on improving the quality of correct training data, e.g., distilling high-quality correct solutions from advanced models, neglecting the value contained in error data, potentially hindering the model's reflective ability. Though some studies attempt to leverage error data, they often involve complex mechanisms, such as Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to explore error nodes. In this work, we propose to enhance LLMs' reasoning ability by Learning from Errors for Mathematical Advancement (LEMMA). LEMMA constructs data consisting of an incorrect solution with an erroneous step and a reflection connection to a correct solution for fine-tuning. Specifically, we systematically analyze the model-generated error types and introduce an error-type grounded mistake augmentation method to collect diverse and representative errors. Correct solutions are either from fixing the errors or generating a fresh start. Through a model-aware smooth reflection connection, the erroneous solution is transferred to the correct one. By fine-tuning on the constructed dataset, the model is able to self-correct errors autonomously within the generation process without relying on external critique models. Experimental results demonstrate that LEMMA achieves significant performance improvements over other strong baselines.

Large language models (LLMs) have recently been shown to deliver impressive performance in various NLP tasks. To tackle multi-step reasoning tasks, few-shot chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting includes a few manually crafted step-by-step reasoning demonstrations which enable LLMs to explicitly generate reasoning steps and improve their reasoning task accuracy. To eliminate the manual effort, Zero-shot-CoT concatenates the target problem statement with "Let's think step by step" as an input prompt to LLMs. Despite the success of Zero-shot-CoT, it still suffers from three pitfalls: calculation errors, missing-step errors, and semantic misunderstanding errors. To address the missing-step errors, we propose Plan-and-Solve (PS) Prompting. It consists of two components: first, devising a plan to divide the entire task into smaller subtasks, and then carrying out the subtasks according to the plan. To address the calculation errors and improve the quality of generated reasoning steps, we extend PS prompting with more detailed instructions and derive PS+ prompting. We evaluate our proposed prompting strategy on ten datasets across three reasoning problems. The experimental results over GPT-3 show that our proposed zero-shot prompting consistently outperforms Zero-shot-CoT across all datasets by a large margin, is comparable to or exceeds Zero-shot-Program-of-Thought Prompting, and has comparable performance with 8-shot CoT prompting on the math reasoning problem. The code can be found at https://github.com/AGI-Edgerunners/Plan-and-Solve-Prompting.

Reasoning-enhanced large language models (RLLMs), whether explicitly trained for reasoning or prompted via chain-of-thought (CoT), have achieved state-of-the-art performance on many complex reasoning tasks. However, we uncover a surprising and previously overlooked phenomenon: explicit CoT reasoning can significantly degrade instruction-following accuracy. Evaluating 15 models on two benchmarks: IFEval (with simple, rule-verifiable constraints) and ComplexBench (with complex, compositional constraints), we consistently observe performance drops when CoT prompting is applied. Through large-scale case studies and an attention-based analysis, we identify common patterns where reasoning either helps (e.g., with formatting or lexical precision) or hurts (e.g., by neglecting simple constraints or introducing unnecessary content). We propose a metric, constraint attention, to quantify model focus during generation and show that CoT reasoning often diverts attention away from instruction-relevant tokens. To mitigate these effects, we introduce and evaluate four strategies: in-context learning, self-reflection, self-selective reasoning, and classifier-selective reasoning. Our results demonstrate that selective reasoning strategies, particularly classifier-selective reasoning, can substantially recover lost performance. To our knowledge, this is the first work to systematically expose reasoning-induced failures in instruction-following and offer practical mitigation strategies.

Chain-of-thought (COT) prompting can help large language models (LLMs) reason toward correct answers, but its efficacy in reasoning toward incorrect answers is unexplored. This process of elimination (PoE), when used with COT, can enhance self-consistency, interpretability, and tasks such as medical diagnoses of exclusion. Thus, we propose PoE with COT, where LLMs must reason toward incorrect options on multiple-choice questions. We evaluate the ability of GPT-3.5, LLaMA-2, and Falcon to perform PoE with COT on a total of four commonsense and scientific reasoning datasets. We find that the strategy of PoE always underperforms the strategy of choosing the correct answer. The agreement of these strategies is also lower than the self-consistency of each strategy. To study these issues further, we conduct error analyses and give suggestions for future work.

Transformer large language models (LLMs) have sparked admiration for their exceptional performance on tasks that demand intricate multi-step reasoning. Yet, these models simultaneously show failures on surprisingly trivial problems. This begs the question: Are these errors incidental, or do they signal more substantial limitations? In an attempt to demystify Transformers, we investigate the limits of these models across three representative compositional tasks -- multi-digit multiplication, logic grid puzzles, and a classic dynamic programming problem. These tasks require breaking problems down into sub-steps and synthesizing these steps into a precise answer. We formulate compositional tasks as computation graphs to systematically quantify the level of complexity, and break down reasoning steps into intermediate sub-procedures. Our empirical findings suggest that Transformers solve compositional tasks by reducing multi-step compositional reasoning into linearized subgraph matching, without necessarily developing systematic problem-solving skills. To round off our empirical study, we provide theoretical arguments on abstract multi-step reasoning problems that highlight how Transformers' performance will rapidly decay with increased task complexity.

When do machine learning systems fail to generalize, and what mechanisms could improve their generalization? Here, we draw inspiration from cognitive science to argue that one weakness of machine learning systems is their failure to exhibit latent learning -- learning information that is not relevant to the task at hand, but that might be useful in a future task. We show how this perspective links failures ranging from the reversal curse in language modeling to new findings on agent-based navigation. We then highlight how cognitive science points to episodic memory as a potential part of the solution to these issues. Correspondingly, we show that a system with an oracle retrieval mechanism can use learning experiences more flexibly to generalize better across many of these challenges. We also identify some of the essential components for effectively using retrieval, including the importance of within-example in-context learning for acquiring the ability to use information across retrieved examples. In summary, our results illustrate one possible contributor to the relative data inefficiency of current machine learning systems compared to natural intelligence, and help to understand how retrieval methods can complement parametric learning to improve generalization.

Recent studies show that instruction tuning and learning from human feedback improve the abilities of large language models (LMs) dramatically. While these tuning methods can make models generate high-quality text, we conjecture that more implicit cognitive biases may arise in these fine-tuned models. Our work provides evidence that these fine-tuned models exhibit biases that were absent or less pronounced in their pretrained predecessors. We examine the extent of this phenomenon in three cognitive biases - the decoy effect, the certainty effect, and the belief bias - all of which are known to influence human decision-making and reasoning. Our findings highlight the presence of these biases in various models, especially those that have undergone instruction tuning, such as Flan-T5, GPT3.5, and GPT4. This research constitutes a step toward comprehending cognitive biases in instruction-tuned LMs, which is crucial for the development of more reliable and unbiased language models.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

The capacity of Large Language Models (LLMs) to reason is fundamental to their application in complex, knowledge-intensive domains. In real-world scenarios, LLMs are often augmented with external information that can be helpful, irrelevant, or even misleading. This paper investigates the causal impact of such auxiliary information on the reasoning process of LLMs with explicit step-by-step thinking capabilities. We introduce SciAux, a new dataset derived from ScienceQA, to systematically test the robustness of the model against these types of information. Our findings reveal a critical vulnerability: the model's deliberative "thinking mode" is a double-edged sword. While helpful context improves accuracy, misleading information causes a catastrophic drop in performance, which is amplified by the thinking process. Instead of conferring robustness, thinking reinforces the degree of error when provided with misinformation. This highlights that the challenge is not merely to make models "think", but to endow them with the critical faculty to evaluate the information upon which their reasoning is based. The SciAux dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/billhdzhao/SciAux.

As AI systems are used to answer more difficult questions and potentially help create new knowledge, judging the truthfulness of their outputs becomes more difficult and more important. How can we supervise unreliable experts, which have access to the truth but may not accurately report it, to give answers that are systematically true and don't just superficially seem true, when the supervisor can't tell the difference between the two on their own? In this work, we show that debate between two unreliable experts can help a non-expert judge more reliably identify the truth. We collect a dataset of human-written debates on hard reading comprehension questions where the judge has not read the source passage, only ever seeing expert arguments and short quotes selectively revealed by 'expert' debaters who have access to the passage. In our debates, one expert argues for the correct answer, and the other for an incorrect answer. Comparing debate to a baseline we call consultancy, where a single expert argues for only one answer which is correct half of the time, we find that debate performs significantly better, with 84% judge accuracy compared to consultancy's 74%. Debates are also more efficient, being 68% of the length of consultancies. By comparing human to AI debaters, we find evidence that with more skilled (in this case, human) debaters, the performance of debate goes up but the performance of consultancy goes down. Our error analysis also supports this trend, with 46% of errors in human debate attributable to mistakes by the honest debater (which should go away with increased skill); whereas 52% of errors in human consultancy are due to debaters obfuscating the relevant evidence from the judge (which should become worse with increased skill). Overall, these results show that debate is a promising approach for supervising increasingly capable but potentially unreliable AI systems.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

Recently an influx of studies claim emergent cognitive abilities in large language models (LLMs). Yet, most rely on anecdotes, overlook contamination of training sets, or lack systematic Evaluation involving multiple tasks, control conditions, multiple iterations, and statistical robustness tests. Here we make two major contributions. First, we propose CogEval, a cognitive science-inspired protocol for the systematic evaluation of cognitive capacities in Large Language Models. The CogEval protocol can be followed for the evaluation of various abilities. Second, here we follow CogEval to systematically evaluate cognitive maps and planning ability across eight LLMs (OpenAI GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo-175B, davinci-003-175B, Google Bard, Cohere-xlarge-52.4B, Anthropic Claude-1-52B, LLaMA-13B, and Alpaca-7B). We base our task prompts on human experiments, which offer both established construct validity for evaluating planning, and are absent from LLM training sets. We find that, while LLMs show apparent competence in a few planning tasks with simpler structures, systematic evaluation reveals striking failure modes in planning tasks, including hallucinations of invalid trajectories and getting trapped in loops. These findings do not support the idea of emergent out-of-the-box planning ability in LLMs. This could be because LLMs do not understand the latent relational structures underlying planning problems, known as cognitive maps, and fail at unrolling goal-directed trajectories based on the underlying structure. Implications for application and future directions are discussed.

Think-Answer reasoners such as DeepSeek-R1 have made notable progress by leveraging interpretable internal reasoning. However, despite the frequent presence of self-reflective cues like "Oops!", they remain vulnerable to output errors during single-pass inference. To address this limitation, we propose an efficient Recursive Think-Answer Process (R-TAP) that enables models to engage in iterative reasoning cycles and generate more accurate answers, going beyond conventional single-pass approaches. Central to this approach is a confidence generator that evaluates the certainty of model responses and guides subsequent improvements. By incorporating two complementary rewards-Recursively Confidence Increase Reward and Final Answer Confidence Reward-we show that R-TAP-enhanced models consistently outperform conventional single-pass methods for both large language models (LLMs) and vision-language models (VLMs). Moreover, by analyzing the frequency of "Oops"-like expressions in model responses, we find that R-TAP-applied models exhibit significantly fewer self-reflective patterns, resulting in more stable and faster inference-time reasoning. We hope R-TAP pave the way evolving into efficient and elaborated methods to refine the reasoning processes of future AI.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at complex reasoning but can still exhibit harmful behaviors. Current alignment strategies typically embed safety into model weights, making these controls implicit, static, and difficult to modify. This paper introduces Cognition-of-Thought (CooT), a novel decoding-time framework that equips LLMs with an explicit cognitive self-monitoring loop. CooT couples a standard text Generator with a cognitive Perceiver that continuously monitors the unfolding sequence. The Perceiver uses a structured, precedence-based hierarchy of principles (e.g., safety over obedience) to detect potential misalignments as they arise. When violations are flagged, CooT intervenes by rolling back the generation to the point of error and regenerating under injected guidance that combines universal social priors with context-specific warnings. CooT thus transforms alignment from a fixed property into an explicit, dynamic, and auditable process active during inference, allowing for flexible policy updates without retraining the model. Extensive experiments across multiple benchmarks and model families confirm that CooT consistently improves safety and social reasoning performance.

In this position paper, we argue that human evaluation of generative large language models (LLMs) should be a multidisciplinary undertaking that draws upon insights from disciplines such as user experience research and human behavioral psychology to ensure that the experimental design and results are reliable. The conclusions from these evaluations, thus, must consider factors such as usability, aesthetics, and cognitive biases. We highlight how cognitive biases can conflate fluent information and truthfulness, and how cognitive uncertainty affects the reliability of rating scores such as Likert. Furthermore, the evaluation should differentiate the capabilities and weaknesses of increasingly powerful large language models -- which requires effective test sets. The scalability of human evaluation is also crucial to wider adoption. Hence, to design an effective human evaluation system in the age of generative NLP, we propose the ConSiDERS-The-Human evaluation framework consisting of 6 pillars -- Consistency, Scoring Criteria, Differentiating, User Experience, Responsible, and Scalability.

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

Why do large language models sometimes output factual inaccuracies and exhibit erroneous reasoning? The brittleness of these models, particularly when executing long chains of reasoning, currently seems to be an inevitable price to pay for their advanced capabilities of coherently synthesizing knowledge, pragmatics, and abstract thought. Towards making sense of this fundamentally unsolved problem, this work identifies and analyzes the phenomenon of attention glitches, in which the Transformer architecture's inductive biases intermittently fail to capture robust reasoning. To isolate the issue, we introduce flip-flop language modeling (FFLM), a parametric family of synthetic benchmarks designed to probe the extrapolative behavior of neural language models. This simple generative task requires a model to copy binary symbols over long-range dependencies, ignoring the tokens in between. We find that Transformer FFLMs suffer from a long tail of sporadic reasoning errors, some of which we can eliminate using various regularization techniques. Our preliminary mechanistic analyses show why the remaining errors may be very difficult to diagnose and resolve. We hypothesize that attention glitches account for (some of) the closed-domain hallucinations in natural LLMs.

Trained on vast corpora of human language, language models demonstrate emergent human-like reasoning abilities. Yet they are still far from true intelligence, which opens up intriguing opportunities to explore the parallels of humans and model behaviors. In this work, we study the ability to skip steps in reasoning - a hallmark of human expertise developed through practice. Unlike humans, who may skip steps to enhance efficiency or to reduce cognitive load, models do not inherently possess such motivations to minimize reasoning steps. To address this, we introduce a controlled framework that stimulates step-skipping behavior by iteratively refining models to generate shorter and accurate reasoning paths. Empirical results indicate that models can develop the step skipping ability under our guidance. Moreover, after fine-tuning on expanded datasets that include both complete and skipped reasoning sequences, the models can not only resolve tasks with increased efficiency without sacrificing accuracy, but also exhibit comparable and even enhanced generalization capabilities in out-of-domain scenarios. Our work presents the first exploration into human-like step-skipping ability and provides fresh perspectives on how such cognitive abilities can benefit AI models.

Recently, with the chain of thought (CoT) prompting, large language models (LLMs), e.g., GPT-3, have shown strong reasoning ability in several natural language processing tasks such as arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning. However, LLMs with CoT require multi-step prompting and multi-token prediction, which is highly sensitive to individual mistakes and vulnerable to error accumulation. The above issues make the LLMs need the ability to verify the answers. In fact, after inferring conclusions in some thinking decision tasks, people often check them by re-verifying steps to avoid some mistakes. In this paper, we propose and prove that LLMs also have similar self-verification abilities. We take the conclusion obtained by CoT as one of the conditions for solving the original problem. By taking turns masking the original conditions and predicting their results, we calculate an explainable answer verification score based on whether the re-predicted conditions are correct. Experimental results demonstrate that the proposed method can improve the reasoning performance on various arithmetic, commonsense, and logical reasoning datasets. Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/WENGSYX/Self-Verification.

Large language models (LLMs) show increasing promise in medical applications, but their ability to detect and correct errors in clinical texts -- a prerequisite for safe deployment -- remains under-evaluated, particularly beyond English. We introduce MedRECT, a cross-lingual benchmark (Japanese/English) that formulates medical error handling as three subtasks: error detection, error localization (sentence extraction), and error correction. MedRECT is built with a scalable, automated pipeline from the Japanese Medical Licensing Examinations (JMLE) and a curated English counterpart, yielding MedRECT-ja (663 texts) and MedRECT-en (458 texts) with comparable error/no-error balance. We evaluate 9 contemporary LLMs spanning proprietary, open-weight, and reasoning families. Key findings: (i) reasoning models substantially outperform standard architectures, with up to 13.5% relative improvement in error detection and 51.0% in sentence extraction; (ii) cross-lingual evaluation reveals 5-10% performance gaps from English to Japanese, with smaller disparities for reasoning models; (iii) targeted LoRA fine-tuning yields asymmetric improvements in error correction performance (Japanese: +0.078, English: +0.168) while preserving reasoning capabilities; and (iv) our fine-tuned model exceeds human expert performance on structured medical error correction tasks. To our knowledge, MedRECT is the first comprehensive cross-lingual benchmark for medical error correction, providing a reproducible framework and resources for developing safer medical LLMs across languages.

Readers can have different goals with respect to the text they are reading. Can these goals be decoded from the pattern of their eye movements over the text? In this work, we examine for the first time whether it is possible to decode two types of reading goals that are common in daily life: information seeking and ordinary reading. Using large scale eye-tracking data, we apply to this task a wide range of state-of-the-art models for eye movements and text that cover different architectural and data representation strategies, and further introduce a new model ensemble. We systematically evaluate these models at three levels of generalization: new textual item, new participant, and the combination of both. We find that eye movements contain highly valuable signals for this task. We further perform an error analysis which builds on prior empirical findings on differences between ordinary reading and information seeking and leverages rich textual annotations. This analysis reveals key properties of textual items and participant eye movements that contribute to the difficulty of the task.

We propose cognitive prompting as a novel approach to guide problem-solving in large language models (LLMs) through structured, human-like cognitive operations such as goal clarification, decomposition, filtering, abstraction, and pattern recognition. By employing systematic, step-by-step reasoning, cognitive prompting enables LLMs to efficiently tackle complex, multi-step tasks. We evaluate the effectiveness of cognitive prompting on Meta's LLaMA models, comparing performance on arithmetic reasoning tasks using the GSM8K dataset and on commonsense reasoning benchmarks. Our analysis includes comparisons between models without cognitive prompting, models with a static sequence of cognitive operations, and models using reflective cognitive prompting, where the LLM dynamically self-selects the sequence of cognitive operations. The results show that cognitive prompting, particularly when dynamically adapted, significantly improves the performance of larger models, such as LLaMA3.1 70B, and enhances their ability to handle multi-step reasoning tasks. This approach also improves interpretability and flexibility, highlighting cognitive prompting as a promising strategy for general-purpose AI reasoning.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have significantly advanced complex reasoning capabilities, particularly through extended chain-of-thought (CoT) reasoning that incorporates mechanisms such as backtracking, self-reflection and self-correction. Despite these developments, the self-correction abilities of LLMs during long CoT reasoning remain underexplored. And recent findings on overthinking suggest that such models often engage in unnecessarily redundant reasoning. In this work, we empirically show that the first reasoning step exerts a disproportionately large influence on the final prediction - errors introduced at this stage can substantially degrade subsequent reasoning quality. This phenomenon is consistently observed across two state-of-the-art open-source reasoning model families: DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3. To address this, we propose an efficient sampling strategy that leverages a reward model to identify and retain high-quality first reasoning steps while discarding suboptimal ones, achieving up to a 70% reduction in inference cost without sacrificing accuracy. Finally, we introduce a new benchmark specifically constructed with deliberately flawed first reasoning steps to systematically evaluate model self-correction capabilities, offering a foundation for future research on robust reasoning in LLMs.

As reasoning models scale rapidly, the essential role of multimodality in human cognition has come into sharp relief, driving a growing need to probe vision-centric cognitive behaviors. Yet, existing multimodal benchmarks either overemphasize textual reasoning or fall short of systematically capturing vision-centric cognitive behaviors, leaving the cognitive capacity of MLLMs insufficiently assessed. To address this limitation, we introduce MME-CC (Multi-Modal Evaluation benchmark of Cognitive Capacity), a vision-grounded benchmark that organizes 11 representative reasoning tasks into three fundamental categories of visual information: spatial, geometric, and knowledge-based reasoning, and provides fine-grained analyses of MLLMs' cognitive capacity across these dimensions. Based on MME-CC, we conduct extensive experiments over 16 representative MLLMs. Our study reveals that closed-source models currently lead overall (e.g., 42.66 for Gemini-2.5-Pro vs. 30.45 for GLM-4.5V), while spatial and geometric reasoning remain broadly weak (less than or equal to 30%). We further identify common error patterns, including orientation mistakes, fragile cross-view identity persistence, and poor adherence to counterfactual instructions, and observe that Chain-of-Thought typically follows a three-stage process (extract -> reason -> verify) with heavy reliance on visual extraction. We hope this work catalyzes a shift toward treating the cognitive capacity of MLLMs as central to both evaluation and model design.

Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architectures within Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) have achieved impressive reasoning capabilities by selectively activating experts to facilitate structured cognitive processes. Despite notable advances, existing reasoning models often suffer from cognitive inefficiencies like overthinking and underthinking. To address these limitations, we introduce a novel inference-time steering methodology called Reinforcing Cognitive Experts (RICE), designed to improve reasoning performance without additional training or complex heuristics. Leveraging normalized Pointwise Mutual Information (nPMI), we systematically identify specialized experts, termed ''cognitive experts'' that orchestrate meta-level reasoning operations characterized by tokens like ''<think>''. Empirical evaluations with leading MoE-based LRMs (DeepSeek-R1 and Qwen3-235B) on rigorous quantitative and scientific reasoning benchmarks demonstrate noticeable and consistent improvements in reasoning accuracy, cognitive efficiency, and cross-domain generalization. Crucially, our lightweight approach substantially outperforms prevalent reasoning-steering techniques, such as prompt design and decoding constraints, while preserving the model's general instruction-following skills. These results highlight reinforcing cognitive experts as a promising, practical, and interpretable direction to enhance cognitive efficiency within advanced reasoning models.

With the growing accessibility and wide adoption of large language models, concerns about their safety and alignment with human values have become paramount. In this paper, we identify a concerning phenomenon: Reasoning-Induced Misalignment (RIM), in which misalignment emerges when reasoning capabilities strengthened-particularly when specific types of reasoning patterns are introduced during inference or training. Beyond reporting this vulnerability, we provide the first mechanistic account of its origins. Through representation analysis, we discover that specific attention heads facilitate refusal by reducing their attention to CoT tokens, a mechanism that modulates the model's rationalization process during inference. During training, we find significantly higher activation entanglement between reasoning and safety in safety-critical neurons than in control neurons, particularly after fine-tuning with those identified reasoning patterns. This entanglement strongly correlates with catastrophic forgetting, providing a neuron-level explanation for RIM.

Large language models (LLMs) can perform complex reasoning by generating intermediate reasoning steps. Providing these steps for prompting demonstrations is called chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting. CoT prompting has two major paradigms. One leverages a simple prompt like "Let's think step by step" to facilitate step-by-step thinking before answering a question. The other uses a few manual demonstrations one by one, each composed of a question and a reasoning chain that leads to an answer. The superior performance of the second paradigm hinges on the hand-crafting of task-specific demonstrations one by one. We show that such manual efforts may be eliminated by leveraging LLMs with the "Let's think step by step" prompt to generate reasoning chains for demonstrations one by one, i.e., let's think not just step by step, but also one by one. However, these generated chains often come with mistakes. To mitigate the effect of such mistakes, we find that diversity matters for automatically constructing demonstrations. We propose an automatic CoT prompting method: Auto-CoT. It samples questions with diversity and generates reasoning chains to construct demonstrations. On ten public benchmark reasoning tasks with GPT-3, Auto-CoT consistently matches or exceeds the performance of the CoT paradigm that requires manual designs of demonstrations. Code is available at https://github.com/amazon-research/auto-cot

Recent works have showcased the ability of LLMs to embody diverse personas in their responses, exemplified by prompts like 'You are Yoda. Explain the Theory of Relativity.' While this ability allows personalization of LLMs and enables human behavior simulation, its effect on LLMs' capabilities remains unclear. To fill this gap, we present the first extensive study of the unintended side-effects of persona assignment on the ability of LLMs to perform basic reasoning tasks. Our study covers 24 reasoning datasets, 4 LLMs, and 19 diverse personas (e.g. an Asian person) spanning 5 socio-demographic groups. Our experiments unveil that LLMs harbor deep rooted bias against various socio-demographics underneath a veneer of fairness. While they overtly reject stereotypes when explicitly asked ('Are Black people less skilled at mathematics?'), they manifest stereotypical and erroneous presumptions when asked to answer questions while adopting a persona. These can be observed as abstentions in responses, e.g., 'As a Black person, I can't answer this question as it requires math knowledge', and generally result in a substantial performance drop. Our experiments with ChatGPT-3.5 show that this bias is ubiquitous - 80% of our personas demonstrate bias; it is significant - some datasets show performance drops of 70%+; and can be especially harmful for certain groups - some personas suffer statistically significant drops on 80%+ of the datasets. Overall, all 4 LLMs exhibit this bias to varying extents, with GPT-4-Turbo showing the least but still a problematic amount of bias (evident in 42% of the personas). Further analysis shows that these persona-induced errors can be hard-to-discern and hard-to-avoid. Our findings serve as a cautionary tale that the practice of assigning personas to LLMs - a trend on the rise - can surface their deep-rooted biases and have unforeseeable and detrimental side-effects.

Scaling up language models to billions of parameters has opened up possibilities for in-context learning, allowing instruction tuning and few-shot learning on tasks that the model was not specifically trained for. This has achieved breakthrough performance on language tasks such as translation, summarization, and question-answering. Furthermore, in addition to these associative "System 1" tasks, recent advances in Chain-of-thought prompt learning have demonstrated strong "System 2" reasoning abilities, answering a question in the field of artificial general intelligence whether LLMs can reason. The field started with the question whether LLMs can solve grade school math word problems. This paper reviews the rapidly expanding field of prompt-based reasoning with LLMs. Our taxonomy identifies different ways to generate, evaluate, and control multi-step reasoning. We provide an in-depth coverage of core approaches and open problems, and we propose a research agenda for the near future. Finally, we highlight the relation between reasoning and prompt-based learning, and we discuss the relation between reasoning, sequential decision processes, and reinforcement learning. We find that self-improvement, self-reflection, and some metacognitive abilities of the reasoning processes are possible through the judicious use of prompts. True self-improvement and self-reasoning, to go from reasoning with LLMs to reasoning by LLMs, remains future work.

The recent phenomenal success of language models has reinvigorated machine learning research, and large sequence models such as transformers are being applied to a variety of domains. One important problem class that has remained relatively elusive however is purposeful adaptive behavior. Currently there is a common perception that sequence models "lack the understanding of the cause and effect of their actions" leading them to draw incorrect inferences due to auto-suggestive delusions. In this report we explain where this mismatch originates, and show that it can be resolved by treating actions as causal interventions. Finally, we show that in supervised learning, one can teach a system to condition or intervene on data by training with factual and counterfactual error signals respectively.

Access to the right evidence does not guarantee that large language models (LLMs) will reason with it correctly. This gap between retrieval and reasoning is especially concerning in clinical settings, where outputs must align with structured protocols. We study this gap using Written Exposure Therapy (WET) guidelines as a testbed. In evaluating model responses to curated clinician-vetted questions, we find that errors persist even when authoritative passages are provided. To address this, we propose an evaluation framework that measures accuracy, consistency, and fidelity of reasoning. Our results highlight both the potential and the risks: retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) can constrain outputs, but safe deployment requires assessing reasoning as rigorously as retrieval.

Large language models have demonstrated remarkable proficiency in long and complex reasoning tasks. However, they frequently exhibit a problematic reliance on familiar reasoning patterns, a phenomenon we term reasoning rigidity. Despite explicit instructions from users, these models often override clearly stated conditions and default to habitual reasoning trajectories, leading to incorrect conclusions. This behavior presents significant challenges, particularly in domains such as mathematics and logic puzzle, where precise adherence to specified constraints is critical. To systematically investigate reasoning rigidity, a behavior largely unexplored in prior work, we introduce a expert-curated diagnostic set, . Our dataset includes specially modified variants of existing mathematical benchmarks, namely AIME and MATH500, as well as well-known puzzles deliberately redesigned to require deviation from familiar reasoning strategies. Using this dataset, we identify recurring contamination patterns that occur when models default to ingrained reasoning. Specifically, we categorize this contamination into three distinctive modes: (i) Interpretation Overload, (ii) Input Distrust, and (iii) Partial Instruction Attention, each causing models to ignore or distort provided instructions. We publicly release our diagnostic set to facilitate future research on mitigating reasoning rigidity in language models.

Language is often considered a key aspect of human thinking, providing us with exceptional abilities to generalize, explore, plan, replan, and adapt to new situations. However, Reinforcement Learning (RL) agents are far from human-level performance in any of these abilities. We hypothesize one reason for such cognitive deficiencies is that they lack the benefits of thinking in language and that we can improve AI agents by training them to think like humans do. We introduce a novel Imitation Learning framework, Thought Cloning, where the idea is to not just clone the behaviors of human demonstrators, but also the thoughts humans have as they perform these behaviors. While we expect Thought Cloning to truly shine at scale on internet-sized datasets of humans thinking out loud while acting (e.g. online videos with transcripts), here we conduct experiments in a domain where the thinking and action data are synthetically generated. Results reveal that Thought Cloning learns much faster than Behavioral Cloning and its performance advantage grows the further out of distribution test tasks are, highlighting its ability to better handle novel situations. Thought Cloning also provides important benefits for AI Safety and Interpretability, and makes it easier to debug and improve AI. Because we can observe the agent's thoughts, we can (1) more easily diagnose why things are going wrong, making it easier to fix the problem, (2) steer the agent by correcting its thinking, or (3) prevent it from doing unsafe things it plans to do. Overall, by training agents how to think as well as behave, Thought Cloning creates safer, more powerful agents.

Reasoning models leveraging long chains of thought employ various cognitive skills, such as verification of their answers, backtracking, retrying by an alternate method, and more. Previous work has shown that when a base language model exhibits these skills, training that model further with reinforcement learning (RL) can learn to leverage them. How can we get models to leverage skills that aren't exhibited by base models? Our work, SkillFactory, is a method for fine-tuning models to roughly learn these skills during a supervised fine-tuning (SFT) stage prior to RL. Our approach does not rely on distillation from a stronger model, but instead uses samples from the model itself, rearranged to provide training data in the format of those skills. These "silver" SFT traces may be imperfect, but are nevertheless effective for priming a model to acquire skills during RL. Our evaluation shows that (1) starting from SkillFactory SFT initialization helps a model to generalize to harder variants of a task post-RL, despite lower performance pre-RL; (2) cognitive skills are indeed used by the model; (3) RLed SkillFactory models are more robust to regression on out-of-domain tasks than RLed base models. Our work suggests that inductive biases learned prior to RL help models learn robust cognitive skill use.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often exhibit structural fragility in complex reasoning tasks, failing to produce correct answers even after successfully deriving valid intermediate steps. Through systematic analysis, we observe that these failures frequently stem not from a lack of reasoning capacity, but from a deficiency in self-regulatory control, where valid logic is destabilized by uncontrolled exploration or the failure to recognize logical sufficiency. Motivated by this observation, we propose Metacognitive Behavioral Tuning (MBT), a post-training framework that explicitly injects metacognitive behaviors into the model's thought process. MBT implements this via two complementary formulations: (1) MBT-S, which synthesizes rigorous reasoning traces from scratch, and (2) MBT-R, which rewrites the student's initial traces to stabilize intrinsic exploration patterns. Experiments across multi-hop QA benchmarks demonstrate that MBT consistently outperforms baselines, achieving notable gains on challenging benchmarks. By effectively eliminating reasoning collapse, MBT achieves higher accuracy with significantly reduced token consumption, demonstrating that internalizing metacognitive strategies leads to more stable and robust reasoning.

Training dialog policies for speech-based virtual assistants requires a plethora of conversational data. The data collection phase is often expensive and time consuming due to human involvement. To address this issue, a common solution is to build user simulators for data generation. For the successful deployment of the trained policies into real world domains, it is vital that the user simulator mimics realistic conditions. In particular, speech-based assistants are heavily affected by automatic speech recognition and language understanding errors, hence the user simulator should be able to simulate similar errors. In this paper, we review the existing error simulation methods that induce errors at audio, phoneme, text, or semantic level; and conduct detailed comparisons between the audio-level and text-level methods. In the process, we improve the existing text-level method by introducing confidence score prediction and out-of-vocabulary word mapping. We also explore the impact of audio-level and text-level methods on learning a simple clarification dialog policy to recover from errors to provide insight on future improvement for both approaches.

Recent work suggests that large language models (LLMs) encode factuality signals in their internal representations, such as hidden states, attention weights, or token probabilities, implying that LLMs may "know what they don't know". However, LLMs can also produce factual errors by relying on shortcuts or spurious associations. These error are driven by the same training objective that encourage correct predictions, raising the question of whether internal computations can reliably distinguish between factual and hallucinated outputs. In this work, we conduct a mechanistic analysis of how LLMs internally process factual queries by comparing two types of hallucinations based on their reliance on subject information. We find that when hallucinations are associated with subject knowledge, LLMs employ the same internal recall process as for correct responses, leading to overlapping and indistinguishable hidden-state geometries. In contrast, hallucinations detached from subject knowledge produce distinct, clustered representations that make them detectable. These findings reveal a fundamental limitation: LLMs do not encode truthfulness in their internal states but only patterns of knowledge recall, demonstrating that "LLMs don't really know what they don't know".

Reasoning models often spend a significant amount of time thinking before they generate a visible response. In the meantime, they do not give the user any hints as to whether their reasoning is on the right track, and do not give the user any recourse to stop and correct them if their reasoning is flawed. This creates a frustrating, but unfortunately common, experience: the user's time is wasted while the model reasons from a false premise that could have easily been corrected. In contrast, human speakers typically perform lightweight, incremental grounding acts to ensure that participants in the conversation are on the same page; here we ask if language models can learn to leverage a similar type of behavior? With this motivation, we propose interleaved reasoning (IR), in which the model alternates between thinking and surfacing intermediate responses, as an alternative to the standard "think-then-answer" approach. By providing useful information to the user earlier, IR reduces perceived latency, the time a user waits for an initial output, without compromising the quality of the final response. We further introduce a specialization of interleaved reasoning, Plantain (Plan-Thought-Answer Interleaving), where the first intermediate response is an explicit, step-by-step plan for executing the task. This plan-first strategy allows for user intervention and early feedback for subsequent reasoning steps. We demonstrate that Plantain yields an ~6% improvement in pass@1 across several challenging math reasoning and coding benchmarks, while reducing time-to-first-response by over 60% relative to think-then-answer baselines.

Large Language Models (LLMs) display striking surface fluency yet systematically fail at tasks requiring symbolic reasoning, arithmetic accuracy, and logical consistency. This paper offers a structural diagnosis of such failures, revealing a persistent gap between comprehension and competence. Through controlled experiments and architectural analysis, we demonstrate that LLMs often articulate correct principles without reliably applying them--a failure rooted not in knowledge access, but in computational execution. We term this phenomenon the computational split-brain syndrome, where instruction and action pathways are geometrically and functionally dissociated. This core limitation recurs across domains, from mathematical operations to relational inferences, and explains why model behavior remains brittle even under idealized prompting. We argue that LLMs function as powerful pattern completion engines, but lack the architectural scaffolding for principled, compositional reasoning. Our findings delineate the boundary of current LLM capabilities and motivate future models with metacognitive control, principle lifting, and structurally grounded execution. This diagnosis also clarifies why mechanistic interpretability findings may reflect training-specific pattern coordination rather than universal computational principles, and why the geometric separation between instruction and execution pathways suggests limitations in neural introspection and mechanistic analysis.

Recent benchmark studies have claimed that AI has approached or even surpassed human-level performances on various cognitive tasks. However, this position paper argues that current AI evaluation paradigms are insufficient for assessing human-like cognitive capabilities. We identify a set of key shortcomings: a lack of human-validated labels, inadequate representation of human response variability and uncertainty, and reliance on simplified and ecologically-invalid tasks. We support our claims by conducting a human evaluation study on ten existing AI benchmarks, suggesting significant biases and flaws in task and label designs. To address these limitations, we propose five concrete recommendations for developing future benchmarks that will enable more rigorous and meaningful evaluations of human-like cognitive capacities in AI with various implications for such AI applications.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

Traditionally, theory and practice of Cognitive Control are linked via literature reviews by human domain experts. This approach, however, is inadequate to track the ever-growing literature. It may also be biased, and yield redundancies and confusion. Here we present an alternative approach. We performed automated text analyses on a large body of scientific texts to create a joint representation of tasks and constructs. More specifically, 385,705 scientific abstracts were first mapped into an embedding space using a transformers-based language model. Document embeddings were then used to identify a task-construct graph embedding that grounds constructs on tasks and supports nuanced meaning of the constructs by taking advantage of constrained random walks in the graph. This joint task-construct graph embedding, can be queried to generate task batteries targeting specific constructs, may reveal knowledge gaps in the literature, and inspire new tasks and novel hypotheses.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

Recent studies of the applications of conversational AI tools, such as chatbots powered by large language models, to complex real-world knowledge work have shown limitations related to reasoning and multi-step problem solving. Specifically, while existing chatbots simulate shallow reasoning and understanding they are prone to errors as problem complexity increases. The failure of these systems to address complex knowledge work is due to the fact that they do not perform any actual cognition. In this position paper, we present Cognitive AI, a higher-level framework for implementing programmatically defined neuro-symbolic cognition above and outside of large language models. Specifically, we propose a dual-layer functional architecture for Cognitive AI that serves as a roadmap for AI systems that can perform complex multi-step knowledge work. We propose that Cognitive AI is a necessary precursor for the evolution of higher forms of AI, such as AGI, and specifically claim that AGI cannot be achieved by probabilistic approaches on their own. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for large language models, adoption cycles in AI, and commercial Cognitive AI development.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable abilities across various language tasks, but solving complex reasoning problems remains a challenge. While existing methods like Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Tree-of-Thought (ToT) enhance reasoning by decomposing problems or structuring prompts, they typically perform a single pass of reasoning and may fail to revisit flawed paths, compromising accuracy. To address this, we propose a novel reasoning framework called Forest-of-Thought (FoT), which integrates multiple reasoning trees to leverage collective decision-making for solving complex logical problems. FoT utilizes sparse activation strategies to select the most relevant reasoning paths, improving both efficiency and accuracy. Additionally, we introduce a dynamic self-correction strategy that enables real-time error correction and learning from past mistakes, as well as consensus-guided decision making strategies to optimize correctness and computational resources. Experimental results demonstrate that the FoT framework, combined with these strategies, significantly enhances the reasoning capabilities of LLMs, enabling them to solve complex tasks with greater precision and efficiency.

Current Chain-of-Thought (CoT) verification methods predict reasoning correctness based on outputs (black-box) or activations (gray-box), but offer limited insight into why a computation fails. We introduce a white-box method: Circuit-based Reasoning Verification (CRV). We hypothesize that attribution graphs of correct CoT steps, viewed as execution traces of the model's latent reasoning circuits, possess distinct structural fingerprints from those of incorrect steps. By training a classifier on structural features of these graphs, we show that these traces contain a powerful signal of reasoning errors. Our white-box approach yields novel scientific insights unattainable by other methods. (1) We demonstrate that structural signatures of error are highly predictive, establishing the viability of verifying reasoning directly via its computational graph. (2) We find these signatures to be highly domain-specific, revealing that failures in different reasoning tasks manifest as distinct computational patterns. (3) We provide evidence that these signatures are not merely correlational; by using our analysis to guide targeted interventions on individual transcoder features, we successfully correct the model's faulty reasoning. Our work shows that, by scrutinizing a model's computational process, we can move from simple error detection to a deeper, causal understanding of LLM reasoning.

The emergence of generative pre-trained models has facilitated the synthesis of high-quality text, but it has also posed challenges in identifying factual errors in the generated text. In particular: (1) A wider range of tasks now face an increasing risk of containing factual errors when handled by generative models. (2) Generated texts tend to be lengthy and lack a clearly defined granularity for individual facts. (3) There is a scarcity of explicit evidence available during the process of fact checking. With the above challenges in mind, in this paper, we propose FacTool, a task and domain agnostic framework for detecting factual errors of texts generated by large language models (e.g., ChatGPT). Experiments on four different tasks (knowledge-based QA, code generation, mathematical reasoning, and scientific literature review) show the efficacy of the proposed method. We release the code of FacTool associated with ChatGPT plugin interface at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/factool .

Large language models now solve many benchmark math problems at near-expert levels, yet this progress has not fully translated into reliable performance in real-world applications. We study this gap through contextual mathematical reasoning, where the mathematical core must be formulated from descriptive scenarios. We introduce ContextMATH, a benchmark that repurposes AIME and MATH-500 problems into two contextual settings: Scenario Grounding (SG), which embeds abstract problems into realistic narratives without increasing reasoning complexity, and Complexity Scaling (CS), which transforms explicit conditions into sub-problems to capture how constraints often appear in practice. Evaluating 61 proprietary and open-source models, we observe sharp drops: on average, open-source models decline by 13 and 34 points on SG and CS, while proprietary models drop by 13 and 20. Error analysis shows that errors are dominated by incorrect problem formulation, with formulation accuracy declining as original problem difficulty increases. Correct formulation emerges as a prerequisite for success, and its sufficiency improves with model scale, indicating that larger models advance in both understanding and reasoning. Nevertheless, formulation and reasoning remain two complementary bottlenecks that limit contextual mathematical problem solving. Finally, we find that fine-tuning with scenario data improves performance, whereas formulation-only training is ineffective. However, performance gaps are only partially alleviated, highlighting contextual mathematical reasoning as a central unsolved challenge for LLMs.

LLMs often exhibit Aha moments during reasoning, such as apparent self-correction following tokens like "Wait," yet their underlying mechanisms remain unclear. We introduce an information-theoretic framework that decomposes reasoning into procedural information and epistemic verbalization - the explicit externalization of uncertainty that supports downstream control actions. We show that purely procedural reasoning can become informationally stagnant, whereas epistemic verbalization enables continued information acquisition and is critical for achieving information sufficiency. Empirical results demonstrate that strong reasoning performance is driven by uncertainty externalization rather than specific surface tokens. Our framework unifies prior findings on Aha moments and post-training experiments, and offers insights for future reasoning model design.

Our work presents a novel angle for evaluating language models' (LMs) mathematical abilities, by investigating whether they can discern skills and concepts enabled by math content. We contribute two datasets: one consisting of 385 fine-grained descriptions of K-12 math skills and concepts, or standards, from Achieve the Core (ATC), and another of 9.9K problems labeled with these standards (MathFish). Working with experienced teachers, we find that LMs struggle to tag and verify standards linked to problems, and instead predict labels that are close to ground truth, but differ in subtle ways. We also show that LMs often generate problems that do not fully align with standards described in prompts. Finally, we categorize problems in GSM8k using math standards, allowing us to better understand why some problems are more difficult to solve for models than others.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have emerged as a groundbreaking technology with their unparalleled text generation capabilities across various applications. Nevertheless, concerns persist regarding the accuracy and appropriateness of their generated content. A contemporary methodology, self-correction, has been proposed as a remedy to these issues. Building upon this premise, this paper critically examines the role and efficacy of self-correction within LLMs, shedding light on its true potential and limitations. Central to our investigation is the notion of intrinsic self-correction, whereby an LLM attempts to correct its initial responses based solely on its inherent capabilities, without the crutch of external feedback. In the context of reasoning, our research indicates that LLMs struggle to self-correct their responses without external feedback, and at times, their performance might even degrade post self-correction. Drawing from these insights, we offer suggestions for future research and practical applications in this field.