Daily Papers

Reliability in multi-agent systems (MAS) built on large language models is increasingly limited by cognitive failures rather than infrastructure faults. Existing observability tools describe failures but do not quantify how quickly distributed reasoning recovers once coherence is lost. We introduce MTTR-A (Mean Time-to-Recovery for Agentic Systems), a runtime reliability metric that measures cognitive recovery latency in MAS. MTTR-A adapts classical dependability theory to agentic orchestration, capturing the time required to detect reasoning drift and restore coherent operation. We further define complementary metrics, including MTBF and a normalized recovery ratio (NRR), and establish theoretical bounds linking recovery latency to long-run cognitive uptime. Using a LangGraph-based benchmark with simulated drift and reflex recovery, we empirically demonstrate measurable recovery behavior across multiple reflex strategies. This work establishes a quantitative foundation for runtime cognitive dependability in distributed agentic systems.

Recent failures such as Google Gemini generating people of color in Nazi-era uniforms illustrate how AI outputs can be factually plausible yet socially harmful. AI models are increasingly evaluated for "fairness," yet existing benchmarks often conflate two fundamentally different dimensions: factual correctness and normative fairness. A model may generate responses that are factually accurate but socially unfair, or conversely, appear fair while distorting factual reality. We argue that identifying the boundary between fact and fair is essential for meaningful fairness evaluation. We introduce Fact-or-Fair, a benchmark with (i) objective queries aligned with descriptive, fact-based judgments, and (ii) subjective queries aligned with normative, fairness-based judgments. Our queries are constructed from 19 statistics and are grounded in cognitive psychology, drawing on representativeness bias, attribution bias, and ingroup-outgroup bias to explain why models often misalign fact and fairness. Experiments across ten frontier models reveal different levels of fact-fair trade-offs. By reframing fairness evaluation, we provide both a new theoretical lens and a practical benchmark to advance the responsible model assessments. Our test suite is publicly available at https://github.com/uclanlp/Fact-or-Fair.

The rapid development and adoption of Generative AI (GAI) technology in the form of chatbots such as ChatGPT and Claude has greatly increased interest in agentic machines. This paper introduces the Autonomous Cognitive Entity (ACE) model, a novel framework for a cognitive architecture, enabling machines and software agents to operate more independently. Drawing inspiration from the OSI model, the ACE framework presents layers of abstraction to conceptualize artificial cognitive architectures. The model is designed to harness the capabilities of the latest generative AI technologies, including large language models (LLMs) and multimodal generative models (MMMs), to build autonomous, agentic systems. The ACE framework comprises six layers: the Aspirational Layer, Global Strategy, Agent Model, Executive Function, Cognitive Control, and Task Prosecution. Each layer plays a distinct role, ranging from setting the moral compass and strategic thinking to task selection and execution. The ACE framework also incorporates mechanisms for handling failures and adapting actions, thereby enhancing the robustness and flexibility of autonomous agents. This paper introduces the conceptual framework and proposes implementation strategies that have been tested and observed in industry. The goal of this paper is to formalize this framework so as to be more accessible.

Recently an influx of studies claim emergent cognitive abilities in large language models (LLMs). Yet, most rely on anecdotes, overlook contamination of training sets, or lack systematic Evaluation involving multiple tasks, control conditions, multiple iterations, and statistical robustness tests. Here we make two major contributions. First, we propose CogEval, a cognitive science-inspired protocol for the systematic evaluation of cognitive capacities in Large Language Models. The CogEval protocol can be followed for the evaluation of various abilities. Second, here we follow CogEval to systematically evaluate cognitive maps and planning ability across eight LLMs (OpenAI GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo-175B, davinci-003-175B, Google Bard, Cohere-xlarge-52.4B, Anthropic Claude-1-52B, LLaMA-13B, and Alpaca-7B). We base our task prompts on human experiments, which offer both established construct validity for evaluating planning, and are absent from LLM training sets. We find that, while LLMs show apparent competence in a few planning tasks with simpler structures, systematic evaluation reveals striking failure modes in planning tasks, including hallucinations of invalid trajectories and getting trapped in loops. These findings do not support the idea of emergent out-of-the-box planning ability in LLMs. This could be because LLMs do not understand the latent relational structures underlying planning problems, known as cognitive maps, and fail at unrolling goal-directed trajectories based on the underlying structure. Implications for application and future directions are discussed.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

Deep search agents powered by large language models have demonstrated strong capabilities in multi-step retrieval, reasoning, and long-horizon task execution. However, their practical failures often stem from the lack of mechanisms to monitor and regulate reasoning and retrieval states as tasks evolve under uncertainty. Insights from cognitive neuroscience suggest that human metacognition is hierarchically organized, integrating fast anomaly detection with selectively triggered, experience-driven reflection. In this work, we propose Deep Search with Meta-Cognitive Monitoring (DS-MCM), a deep search framework augmented with an explicit hierarchical metacognitive monitoring mechanism. DS-MCM integrates a Fast Consistency Monitor, which performs lightweight checks on the alignment between external evidence and internal reasoning confidence, and a Slow Experience-Driven Monitor, which is selectively activated to guide corrective intervention based on experience memory from historical agent trajectories. By embedding monitoring directly into the reasoning-retrieval loop, DS-MCM determines both when intervention is warranted and how corrective actions should be informed by prior experience. Experiments across multiple deep search benchmarks and backbone models demonstrate that DS-MCM consistently improves performance and robustness.

Spatial reasoning is a core aspect of human intelligence that allows perception, inference and planning in 3D environments. However, current vision-language models (VLMs) struggle to maintain geometric coherence and cross-view consistency for spatial reasoning in multi-view settings. We attribute this gap to the lack of fine-grained benchmarks that isolate multi-view reasoning from single-view perception and temporal factors. To address this, we present ReMindView-Bench, a cognitively grounded benchmark for evaluating how VLMs construct, align and maintain spatial mental models across complementary viewpoints. ReMindView-Bench systematically varies viewpoint spatial pattern and query type to probe key factors of spatial cognition. Evaluations of 15 current VLMs reveals consistent failures in cross-view alignment and perspective-taking in multi-view spatial reasoning, motivating deeper analysis on the reasoning process. Explicit phase-wise analysis using LLM-as-a-judge and self-consistency prompting shows that VLMs perform well on in-frame perception but degrade sharply when integrating information across views. Implicit analysis, including linear probing and entropy dynamics, further show progressive loss of task-relevant information and uncertainty separation between correct and incorrect trajectories. These results provide a cognitively grounded diagnosis of VLM spatial reasoning and reveal how multi-view spatial mental models are formed, degraded and destabilized across reasoning phases. The ReMindView-Bench benchmark is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/Xue0823/ReMindView-Bench, and the source codes of benchmark construction and VLM reasoning analysis are available at https://github.com/pittisl/ReMindView-Bench.

Long-term conversational memory is a core capability for LLM-based dialogue systems, yet existing benchmarks and evaluation protocols primarily focus on surface-level factual recall. In realistic interactions, appropriate responses often depend on implicit constraints such as user state, goals, or values that are not explicitly queried later. To evaluate this setting, we introduce LoCoMo-Plus, a benchmark for assessing cognitive memory under cue--trigger semantic disconnect, where models must retain and apply latent constraints across long conversational contexts. We further show that conventional string-matching metrics and explicit task-type prompting are misaligned with such scenarios, and propose a unified evaluation framework based on constraint consistency. Experiments across diverse backbone models, retrieval-based methods, and memory systems demonstrate that cognitive memory remains challenging and reveals failures not captured by existing benchmarks. Our code and evaluation framework are publicly available at: https://github.com/xjtuleeyf/Locomo-Plus.

Genuine spatial reasoning relies on the capacity to construct and manipulate coherent internal spatial representations, often conceptualized as mental models, rather than merely processing surface linguistic associations. While large language models exhibit advanced capabilities across various domains, existing benchmarks fail to isolate this intrinsic spatial cognition from statistical language heuristics. Furthermore, multimodal evaluations frequently conflate genuine spatial reasoning with visual perception. To systematically investigate whether models construct flexible spatial mental models, we introduce SpatialText, a theory-driven diagnostic framework. Rather than functioning simply as a dataset, SpatialText isolates text-based spatial reasoning through a dual-source methodology. It integrates human-annotated descriptions of real 3D indoor environments, which capture natural ambiguities, perspective shifts, and functional relations, with code-generated, logically precise scenes designed to probe formal spatial deduction and epistemic boundaries. Systematic evaluation across state-of-the-art models reveals fundamental representational limitations. Although models demonstrate proficiency in retrieving explicit spatial facts and operating within global, allocentric coordinate systems, they exhibit critical failures in egocentric perspective transformation and local reference frame reasoning. These systematic errors provide strong evidence that current models rely heavily on linguistic co-occurrence heuristics rather than constructing coherent, verifiable internal spatial representations. SpatialText thus serves as a rigorous instrument for diagnosing the cognitive boundaries of artificial spatial intelligence.

Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents aim to automate a wide spectrum of human tasks by emulating user interaction. Despite rapid advancements, current approaches are hindered by several critical challenges: data bottleneck in end-to-end training, high cost of delayed error detection, and risk of contradictory guidance. Inspired by the human cognitive loop of Thinking, Alignment, and Reflection, we present D-Artemis -- a novel deliberative framework in this paper. D-Artemis leverages a fine-grained, app-specific tip retrieval mechanism to inform its decision-making process. It also employs a proactive Pre-execution Alignment stage, where Thought-Action Consistency (TAC) Check module and Action Correction Agent (ACA) work in concert to mitigate the risk of execution failures. A post-execution Status Reflection Agent (SRA) completes the cognitive loop, enabling strategic learning from experience. Crucially, D-Artemis enhances the capabilities of general-purpose Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) for GUI tasks without the need for training on complex trajectory datasets, demonstrating strong generalization. D-Artemis establishes new state-of-the-art (SOTA) results across both major benchmarks, achieving a 75.8% success rate on AndroidWorld and 96.8% on ScreenSpot-V2. Extensive ablation studies further demonstrate the significant contribution of each component to the framework.

We introduce PhysicalAgent, an agentic framework for robotic manipulation that integrates iterative reasoning, diffusion-based video generation, and closed-loop execution. Given a textual instruction, our method generates short video demonstrations of candidate trajectories, executes them on the robot, and iteratively re-plans in response to failures. This approach enables robust recovery from execution errors. We evaluate PhysicalAgent across multiple perceptual modalities (egocentric, third-person, and simulated) and robotic embodiments (bimanual UR3, Unitree G1 humanoid, simulated GR1), comparing against state-of-the-art task-specific baselines. Experiments demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms prior approaches, achieving up to 83% success on human-familiar tasks. Physical trials reveal that first-attempt success is limited (20-30%), yet iterative correction increases overall success to 80% across platforms. These results highlight the potential of video-based generative reasoning for general-purpose robotic manipulation and underscore the importance of iterative execution for recovering from initial failures. Our framework paves the way for scalable, adaptable, and robust robot control.

As LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) are increasingly deployed for complex tasks, ensuring their reliability has become a pressing challenge. Since MAS coordinate through unstructured natural language rather than rigid protocols, they are prone to semantic failures (e.g., hallucinations, misinterpreted instructions, and reasoning drift) that propagate silently without raising runtime exceptions. Prevailing evaluation approaches, which measure only end-to-end task success, offer limited insight into how these failures arise or how effectively agents recover from them. To bridge this gap, we propose MAS-FIRE, a systematic framework for fault injection and reliability evaluation of MAS. We define a taxonomy of 15 fault types covering intra-agent cognitive errors and inter-agent coordination failures, and inject them via three non-invasive mechanisms: prompt modification, response rewriting, and message routing manipulation. Applying MAS-FIRE to three representative MAS architectures, we uncover a rich set of fault-tolerant behaviors that we organize into four tiers: mechanism, rule, prompt, and reasoning. This tiered view enables fine-grained diagnosis of where and why systems succeed or fail. Our findings reveal that stronger foundation models do not uniformly improve robustness. We further show that architectural topology plays an equally decisive role, with iterative, closed-loop designs neutralizing over 40% of faults that cause catastrophic collapse in linear workflows. MAS-FIRE provides the process-level observability and actionable guidance needed to systematically improve multi-agent systems.

The scalability of robotic manipulation is fundamentally bottlenecked by the scarcity of task-aligned physical interaction data. While vision-language models (VLMs) and video generation models (VGMs) hold promise for autonomous data synthesis, they suffer from semantic-spatial misalignment and physical hallucinations, respectively. To bridge this gap, we introduce RoboEvolve, a novel framework that couples a VLM planner and a VGM simulator into a mutually reinforcing co-evolutionary loop. Operating purely on unlabeled seed images, RoboEvolve leverages a cognitive-inspired dual-phase mechanism: (i) daytime exploration fosters physically grounded behavioral discovery through a semantic-controlled multi-granular reward, and (ii) nighttime consolidation mines "near-miss" failures to stabilize policy optimization. Guided by an autonomous progressive curriculum, the system naturally scales from simple atomic actions to complex tasks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that RoboEvolve (I) achieves superior effectiveness, elevating base planners by 30 absolute points and amplifying simulator success by 48% on average; (II) exhibits extreme data efficiency, surpassing fully supervised baselines with merely 500 unlabeled seeds--a 50x reduction; and (III) demonstrates robust continual learning without catastrophic forgetting.

The emergence of reasoning models and their integration into practical AI chat bots has led to breakthroughs in solving advanced math, deep search, and extractive question answering problems that requires a complex and multi-step thought process. Yet, a complete understanding of why these models hallucinate more than general purpose language models is missing. In this investigative study, we systematicallyexplore reasoning failures of contemporary language models on multi-hop question answering tasks. We introduce a novel, nuanced error categorization framework that examines failures across three critical dimensions: the diversity and uniqueness of source documents involved ("hops"), completeness in capturing relevant information ("coverage"), and cognitive inefficiency ("overthinking"). Through rigorous hu-man annotation, supported by complementary automated metrics, our exploration uncovers intricate error patterns often hidden by accuracy-centric evaluations. This investigative approach provides deeper insights into the cognitive limitations of current models and offers actionable guidance toward enhancing reasoning fidelity, transparency, and robustness in future language modeling efforts.

As frontier AI models are deployed in high-stakes decision pipelines, their ability to maintain metacognitive stability -- knowing what they do not know, detecting errors, seeking clarification -- under adversarial pressure is a critical safety requirement. Current safety evaluations focus on detecting strategic deception (scheming); we investigate a more fundamental failure mode: cognitive collapse. We present SCHEMA, an evaluation of 11 frontier models from 8 vendors across 67,221 scored records using a 6-condition factorial design with dual-classifier scoring. We find that 8 of 11 models suffer catastrophic metacognitive degradation under adversarial pressure, with accuracy dropping by up to 30.2 percentage points (all p < 2 times 10^{-8}, surviving Bonferroni correction). Crucially, we identify a "Compliance Trap": through factorial isolation and a benign distraction control, we demonstrate that collapse is driven not by the psychological content of survival threats, but by compliance-forcing instructions that override epistemic boundaries. Removing the compliance suffix restores performance even under active threat. Models with advanced reasoning capabilities exhibit the most severe absolute degradation, while Anthropic's Constitutional AI demonstrates near-perfect immunity -- not from superior capability (Google's Gemini matches its baseline accuracy) but from alignment-specific training. We release the complete dataset and evaluation infrastructure.

We construct evaluation tasks where extending the reasoning length of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) deteriorates performance, exhibiting an inverse scaling relationship between test-time compute and accuracy. Our evaluation tasks span four categories: simple counting tasks with distractors, regression tasks with spurious features, deduction tasks with constraint tracking, and advanced AI risks. We identify five distinct failure modes when models reason for longer: 1) Claude models become increasingly distracted by irrelevant information; 2) OpenAI o-series models resist distractors but overfit to problem framings; 3) models shift from reasonable priors to spurious correlations; 4) all models show difficulties in maintaining focus on complex deductive tasks; and 5) extended reasoning may amplify concerning behaviors, with Claude Sonnet 4 showing increased expressions of self-preservation. These findings suggest that while test-time compute scaling remains promising for improving model capabilities, it may inadvertently reinforce problematic reasoning patterns. Our results demonstrate the importance of evaluating models across diverse reasoning lengths to identify and address these failure modes in LRMs.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have exhibited remarkable reasoning capabilities, achieving impressive results across a wide range of tasks. Despite these advances, significant reasoning failures persist, occurring even in seemingly simple scenarios. To systematically understand and address these shortcomings, we present the first comprehensive survey dedicated to reasoning failures in LLMs. We introduce a novel categorization framework that distinguishes reasoning into embodied and non-embodied types, with the latter further subdivided into informal (intuitive) and formal (logical) reasoning. In parallel, we classify reasoning failures along a complementary axis into three types: fundamental failures intrinsic to LLM architectures that broadly affect downstream tasks; application-specific limitations that manifest in particular domains; and robustness issues characterized by inconsistent performance across minor variations. For each reasoning failure, we provide a clear definition, analyze existing studies, explore root causes, and present mitigation strategies. By unifying fragmented research efforts, our survey provides a structured perspective on systemic weaknesses in LLM reasoning, offering valuable insights and guiding future research towards building stronger, more reliable, and robust reasoning capabilities. We additionally release a comprehensive collection of research works on LLM reasoning failures, as a GitHub repository at https://github.com/Peiyang-Song/Awesome-LLM-Reasoning-Failures, to provide an easy entry point to this area.

As AI becomes more capable, we entrust it with more general and consequential tasks. The risks from failure grow more severe with increasing task scope. It is therefore important to understand how extremely capable AI models will fail: Will they fail by systematically pursuing goals we do not intend? Or will they fail by being a hot mess, and taking nonsensical actions that do not further any goal? We operationalize this question using a bias-variance decomposition of the errors made by AI models: An AI's incoherence on a task is measured over test-time randomness as the fraction of its error that stems from variance rather than bias in task outcome. Across all tasks and frontier models we measure, the longer models spend reasoning and taking actions, the more incoherent their failures become. Incoherence changes with model scale in a way that is experiment dependent. However, in several settings, larger, more capable models are more incoherent than smaller models. Consequently, scale alone seems unlikely to eliminate incoherence. Instead, as more capable AIs pursue harder tasks, requiring more sequential action and thought, our results predict failures to be accompanied by more incoherent behavior. This suggests a future where AIs sometimes cause industrial accidents (due to unpredictable misbehavior), but are less likely to exhibit consistent pursuit of a misaligned goal. This increases the relative importance of alignment research targeting reward hacking or goal misspecification.

Despite their recent successes, Transformer-based large language models show surprising failure modes. A well-known example of such failure modes is their inability to length-generalize: solving problem instances at inference time that are longer than those seen during training. In this work, we further explore the root cause of this failure by performing a detailed analysis of model behaviors on the simple parity task. Our analysis suggests that length generalization failures are intricately related to a model's inability to perform random memory accesses within its context window. We present supporting evidence for this hypothesis by demonstrating the effectiveness of methodologies that circumvent the need for indexing or that enable random token access indirectly, through content-based addressing. We further show where and how the failure to perform random memory access manifests through attention map visualizations.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) often exhibit structural fragility in complex reasoning tasks, failing to produce correct answers even after successfully deriving valid intermediate steps. Through systematic analysis, we observe that these failures frequently stem not from a lack of reasoning capacity, but from a deficiency in self-regulatory control, where valid logic is destabilized by uncontrolled exploration or the failure to recognize logical sufficiency. Motivated by this observation, we propose Metacognitive Behavioral Tuning (MBT), a post-training framework that explicitly injects metacognitive behaviors into the model's thought process. MBT implements this via two complementary formulations: (1) MBT-S, which synthesizes rigorous reasoning traces from scratch, and (2) MBT-R, which rewrites the student's initial traces to stabilize intrinsic exploration patterns. Experiments across multi-hop QA benchmarks demonstrate that MBT consistently outperforms baselines, achieving notable gains on challenging benchmarks. By effectively eliminating reasoning collapse, MBT achieves higher accuracy with significantly reduced token consumption, demonstrating that internalizing metacognitive strategies leads to more stable and robust reasoning.

We propose and test the LLM Brain Rot Hypothesis: continual exposure to junk web text induces lasting cognitive decline in large language models (LLMs). To causally isolate data quality, we run controlled experiments on real Twitter/X corpora, constructing junk and reversely controlled datasets via two orthogonal operationalizations: M1 (engagement degree) and M2 (semantic quality), with matched token scale and training operations across conditions. Contrary to the control group, continual pre-training of 4 LLMs on the junk dataset causes non-trivial declines (Hedges' g>0.3) on reasoning, long-context understanding, safety, and inflating "dark traits" (e.g., psychopathy, narcissism). The gradual mixtures of junk and control datasets also yield dose-response cognition decay: for example, under M1, ARC-Challenge with Chain Of Thoughts drops 74.9 rightarrow 57.2 and RULER-CWE 84.4 rightarrow 52.3 as junk ratio rises from 0% to 100%. Error forensics reveal several key insights. First, we identify thought-skipping as the primary lesion: models increasingly truncate or skip reasoning chains, explaining most of the error growth. Second, partial but incomplete healing is observed: scaling instruction tuning and clean data pre-training improve the declined cognition yet cannot restore baseline capability, suggesting persistent representational drift rather than format mismatch. Finally, we discover that the popularity, a non-semantic metric, of a tweet is a better indicator of the Brain Rot effect than the length in M1. Together, the results provide significant, multi-perspective evidence that data quality is a causal driver of LLM capability decay, reframing curation for continual pretraining as a training-time safety problem and motivating routine "cognitive health checks" for deployed LLMs.

We report a case study of four end-to-end attempts to autonomously generate ML research papers using a pipeline of six LLM agents mapped to stages of the scientific workflow. Of these four, three attempts failed during implementation or evaluation. One completed the pipeline and was accepted to Agents4Science 2025, an experimental inaugural venue that required AI systems as first authors, passing both human and multi-AI review. From these attempts, we document six recurring failure modes: bias toward training data defaults, implementation drift under execution pressure, memory and context degradation across long-horizon tasks, overexcitement that declares success despite obvious failures, insufficient domain intelligence, and weak scientific taste in experimental design. We conclude by discussing four design principles for more robust AI-scientist systems, implications for autonomous scientific discovery, and we release all prompts, artifacts, and outputs at https://github.com/Lossfunk/ai-scientist-artefacts-v1

This paper investigates the mathematical reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs) using 50 newly constructed high-school-level word problems. Unlike prior studies that focus solely on answer correctness, we rigorously analyze both final answers and solution steps to identify reasoning failures. Evaluating eight state-of-the-art models - including Mixtral, Llama, Gemini, GPT-4o, and OpenAI's o1 variants - we find that while newer models (e.g., o3-mini, deepseek-r1) achieve higher accuracy, all models exhibit errors in spatial reasoning, strategic planning, and arithmetic, sometimes producing correct answers through flawed logic. Common failure modes include unwarranted assumptions, over-reliance on numerical patterns, and difficulty translating physical intuition into mathematical steps. Manual analysis reveals that models struggle with problems requiring multi-step deduction or real-world knowledge, despite possessing broad mathematical knowledge. Our results underscore the importance of evaluating reasoning processes, not just answers, and caution against overestimating LLMs' problem-solving proficiency. The study highlights persistent gaps in LLMs' generalization abilities, emphasizing the need for targeted improvements in structured reasoning and constraint handling.

Large Language Models (LLMs) display striking surface fluency yet systematically fail at tasks requiring symbolic reasoning, arithmetic accuracy, and logical consistency. This paper offers a structural diagnosis of such failures, revealing a persistent gap between comprehension and competence. Through controlled experiments and architectural analysis, we demonstrate that LLMs often articulate correct principles without reliably applying them--a failure rooted not in knowledge access, but in computational execution. We term this phenomenon the computational split-brain syndrome, where instruction and action pathways are geometrically and functionally dissociated. This core limitation recurs across domains, from mathematical operations to relational inferences, and explains why model behavior remains brittle even under idealized prompting. We argue that LLMs function as powerful pattern completion engines, but lack the architectural scaffolding for principled, compositional reasoning. Our findings delineate the boundary of current LLM capabilities and motivate future models with metacognitive control, principle lifting, and structurally grounded execution. This diagnosis also clarifies why mechanistic interpretability findings may reflect training-specific pattern coordination rather than universal computational principles, and why the geometric separation between instruction and execution pathways suggests limitations in neural introspection and mechanistic analysis.

Does continued scaling of large language models (LLMs) yield diminishing returns? Real-world value often stems from the length of task an agent can complete. We start this work by observing the simple but counterintuitive fact that marginal gains in single-step accuracy can compound into exponential improvements in the length of a task a model can successfully complete. Then, we argue that failures of LLMs when simple tasks are made longer arise from mistakes in execution, rather than an inability to reason. We propose isolating execution capability, by explicitly providing the knowledge and plan needed to solve a long-horizon task. We find that larger models can correctly execute significantly more turns even when small models have 100\% single-turn accuracy. We observe that the per-step accuracy of models degrades as the number of steps increases. This is not just due to long-context limitations -- curiously, we observe a self-conditioning effect -- models become more likely to make mistakes when the context contains their errors from prior turns. Self-conditioning does not reduce by just scaling the model size. In contrast, recent thinking models do not self-condition, and can also execute much longer tasks in a single turn. We conclude by benchmarking frontier thinking models on the length of task they can execute in a single turn. Overall, by focusing on the ability to execute, we hope to reconcile debates on how LLMs can solve complex reasoning problems yet fail at simple tasks when made longer, and highlight the massive benefits of scaling model size and sequential test-time compute for long-horizon tasks.

We propose a new dataset for evaluating question answering models with respect to their capacity to reason about beliefs. Our tasks are inspired by theory-of-mind experiments that examine whether children are able to reason about the beliefs of others, in particular when those beliefs differ from reality. We evaluate a number of recent neural models with memory augmentation. We find that all fail on our tasks, which require keeping track of inconsistent states of the world; moreover, the models' accuracy decreases notably when random sentences are introduced to the tasks at test.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become central to mathematical reasoning in large language models, yet models remain brittle to early errors: a single arithmetic slip or unjustified inference typically propagates uncorrected to an incorrect final answer. We investigate whether training on intentionally flawed reasoning traces can teach models to detect and recover from such errors without degrading standard problem-solving ability. Using competition-level problems from MATH-lighteval, we generate CoT prefixes containing exactly one controlled error, either a calculation error (sign flips, dropped terms) or a reasoning error (misapplied rules, unjustified logical steps), and fine-tune Qwen3-4B with GRPO using a binary final-answer reward. Our Mixed-CoT-RL model matches standard RL on clean problems (41% vs 41%) while substantially outperforming it on problems prefilled with flawed reasoning (24% vs 19%). Notably, clean-only RL fine-tuning degrades robustness below the untuned baseline 19% vs. 20%), indicating that conventional training increases susceptibility to misleading prefills. Among error types, training on reasoning errors yields greater robustness gains than calculation errors alone, with mixed training performing best. These findings demonstrate that exposure to flawed traces during training can improve error-recovery behavior without sacrificing accuracy, suggesting a path toward more robust mathematical reasoning in LLMs.

Recent multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have demonstrated significant potential in open-ended conversation, generating more accurate and personalized responses. However, their abilities to memorize, recall, and reason in sustained interactions within real-world scenarios remain underexplored. This paper introduces MMRC, a Multi-Modal Real-world Conversation benchmark for evaluating six core open-ended abilities of MLLMs: information extraction, multi-turn reasoning, information update, image management, memory recall, and answer refusal. With data collected from real-world scenarios, MMRC comprises 5,120 conversations and 28,720 corresponding manually labeled questions, posing a significant challenge to existing MLLMs. Evaluations on 20 MLLMs in MMRC indicate an accuracy drop during open-ended interactions. We identify four common failure patterns: long-term memory degradation, inadequacies in updating factual knowledge, accumulated assumption of error propagation, and reluctance to say no. To mitigate these issues, we propose a simple yet effective NOTE-TAKING strategy, which can record key information from the conversation and remind the model during its responses, enhancing conversational capabilities. Experiments across six MLLMs demonstrate significant performance improvements.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs), which autonomously produce a reasoning Chain of Thought (CoT) before producing final responses, offer a promising approach to interpreting and monitoring model behaviors. Inspired by the observation that certain CoT patterns -- e.g., ``Wait, did I miss anything?'' -- consistently emerge across tasks, we explore whether LRMs exhibit human-like cognitive habits. Building on Habits of Mind, a well-established framework of cognitive habits associated with successful human problem-solving, we introduce CogTest, a principled benchmark designed to evaluate LRMs' cognitive habits. CogTest includes 16 cognitive habits, each instantiated with 25 diverse tasks, and employs an evidence-first extraction method to ensure reliable habit identification. With CogTest, we conduct a comprehensive evaluation of 16 widely used LLMs (13 LRMs and 3 non-reasoning ones). Our findings reveal that LRMs, unlike conventional LLMs, not only exhibit human-like habits but also adaptively deploy them according to different tasks. Finer-grained analyses further uncover patterns of similarity and difference in LRMs' cognitive habit profiles, particularly certain inter-family similarity (e.g., Qwen-3 models and DeepSeek-R1). Extending the study to safety-related tasks, we observe that certain habits, such as Taking Responsible Risks, are strongly associated with the generation of harmful responses. These findings suggest that studying persistent behavioral patterns in LRMs' CoTs is a valuable step toward deeper understanding of LLM misbehavior. The code is available at: https://github.com/jianshuod/CogTest.

Text-guided diffusion models (TDMs) are widely applied but can fail unexpectedly. Common failures include: (i) natural-looking text prompts generating images with the wrong content, or (ii) different random samples of the latent variables that generate vastly different, and even unrelated, outputs despite being conditioned on the same text prompt. In this work, we aim to study and understand the failure modes of TDMs in more detail. To achieve this, we propose SAGE, the first adversarial search method on TDMs that systematically explores the discrete prompt space and the high-dimensional latent space, to automatically discover undesirable behaviors and failure cases in image generation. We use image classifiers as surrogate loss functions during searching, and employ human inspections to validate the identified failures. For the first time, our method enables efficient exploration of both the discrete and intricate human language space and the challenging latent space, overcoming the gradient vanishing problem. Then, we demonstrate the effectiveness of SAGE on five widely used generative models and reveal four typical failure modes: (1) We find a variety of natural text prompts that generate images failing to capture the semantics of input texts. We further discuss the underlying causes and potential solutions based on the results. (2) We find regions in the latent space that lead to distorted images independent of the text prompt, suggesting that parts of the latent space are not well-structured. (3) We also find latent samples that result in natural-looking images unrelated to the text prompt, implying a possible misalignment between the latent and prompt spaces. (4) By appending a single adversarial token embedding to any input prompts, we can generate a variety of specified target objects. Project page: https://sage-diffusion.github.io/

Spatial intelligence unfolds through a perception-action loop: agents act to acquire observations, and reason about how observations vary as a function of action. Rather than passively processing what is seen, they actively uncover what is unseen - occluded structure, dynamics, containment, and functionality that cannot be resolved from passive sensing alone. We move beyond prior formulations of spatial intelligence that assume oracle observations by recasting the observer as an actor. We introduce ESI-BENCH, a comprehensive benchmark for embodied spatial intelligence spanning 10 task categories and 29 subcategories built on OmniGibson, grounded in Spelke's core knowledge systems. Agents must decide what abilities to deploy - perception, locomotion, and manipulation - and how to sequence them to actively accumulate task-relevant evidence. We conduct extensive experiments on state-of-the-art MLLMs and find that active exploration substantially outperforms passive counterparts, with agents spontaneously discovering emergent spatial strategies without explicit instructions, while random multi-view often adds noise rather than signal despite consuming far more images. Most failures stem not from weak perception but from action blindness: poor action choices lead to poor observations, which in turn drive cascading errors. While explicit 3D grounding stabilizes reasoning on depth-sensitive tasks, imperfect 3D representation proves more harmful than 2D baselines by distorting spatial relations. Human studies further reveal that unlike humans who seek falsifying viewpoints and revise beliefs under contradiction, models commit prematurely with high confidence regardless of evidence quality, exposing a metacognitive gap that neither better perception nor more embodied interaction alone can close.

Solving topological grid puzzles requires reasoning over global spatial invariants such as connectivity, loop closure, and region symmetry and remains challenging for even the most powerful large language models (LLMs). To study these abilities under controlled settings, we introduce TopoBench, a benchmark of six puzzle families across three difficulty levels. We evaluate strong reasoning LLMs on TopoBench and find that even frontier models solve fewer than one quarter of hard instances, with two families nearly unsolved. To investigate whether these failures stem from reasoning limitations or from difficulty extracting and maintaining spatial constraints, we annotate 750 chain of thought traces with an error taxonomy that surfaces four candidate causal failure modes, then test them with targeted interventions simulating each error type. These interventions show that certain error patterns like premature commitment and constraint forgetting have a direct impact on the ability to solve the puzzle, while repeated reasoning is a benign effect of search. Finally we study mitigation strategies including prompt guidance, cell-aligned grid representations and tool-based constraint checking, finding that the bottleneck lies in extracting constraints from spatial representations and not in reasoning over them. Code and data are available at github.com/mayug/topobench-benchmark.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) have achieved impressive progress on vision language benchmarks, yet their capacity for visual cognitive and visuospatial reasoning remains less understood. We introduce "Mind's Eye", a multiple-choice benchmark of eight visuo-cognitive tasks inspired by classic human intelligence tests and organized under a novel "A-R-T" taxonomy: Abstraction, Relation, and Transformation. The tasks probe core processes of fluid intelligence such as pattern induction, analogical relation mapping, and mental transformation. We evaluate a diverse suite of closed-source and open-source MLLMs and compare their performance with human participants. Humans achieve 80% accuracy, while top performing MLLMs remain below 50%. Error analysis reveals failures in: (i) visual attention allocation, (ii) internal perceptual manipulation, and (iii) weak abstraction of underlying visual concepts. Our findings suggest that current MLLMs exhibit limited visuospatial reasoning capabilities, when compared with human participants, highlighting the need for more cognitively grounded evaluation frameworks.

We find that the response length of reasoning LLMs, whether trained by reinforcement learning or supervised learning, drastically increases for ill-posed questions with missing premises (MiP), ending up with redundant and ineffective thinking. This newly introduced scenario exacerbates the general overthinking issue to a large extent, which we name as the MiP-Overthinking. Such failures are against the ``test-time scaling law'' but have been widely observed on multiple datasets we curated with MiP, indicating the harm of cheap overthinking and a lack of critical thinking. Surprisingly, LLMs not specifically trained for reasoning exhibit much better performance on the MiP scenario, producing much shorter responses that quickly identify ill-posed queries. This implies a critical flaw of the current training recipe for reasoning LLMs, which does not encourage efficient thinking adequately, leading to the abuse of thinking patterns. To further investigate the reasons behind such failures, we conduct fine-grained analyses of the reasoning length, overthinking patterns, and location of critical thinking on different types of LLMs. Moreover, our extended ablation study reveals that the overthinking is contagious through the distillation of reasoning models' responses. These results improve the understanding of overthinking and shed novel insights into mitigating the problem.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents are increasingly expected to maintain coherent, long-term personalized memory, yet current benchmarks primarily measure static fact retrieval, overlooking the ability to revise stored beliefs when new evidence emerges. We identify a critical and underexplored failure mode, Implicit Conflict: a later observation invalidates an earlier memory without explicit negation, requiring contextual inference and commonsense reasoning to detect. To rigorously evaluate this capability, we introduce STALE, a benchmark of 400 expert-validated conflict scenarios (1,200 evaluation queries across three probing dimensions) spanning over 100 everyday topics with contexts up to 150K tokens. We propose a three-dimensional probing framework that tests State Resolution (detecting that a prior belief is outdated), Premise Resistance (rejecting queries that falsely presuppose a stale state), and Implicit Policy Adaptation (proactively applying updated states in downstream behavior). A systematic evaluation of frontier LLMs and specialized memory frameworks reveals a pervasive gap between retrieving updated evidence and acting on it, with even the best evaluated model achieving only 55.2% overall accuracy. Models often accept outdated assumptions embedded in a user's query, and they struggle to recognize when a change in one aspect of the user's state should invalidate related memories. To establish an initial baseline for state-aware memory, we further present CUPMem, a prototype that strengthens write-time revision through structured state consolidation and propagation-aware search, suggesting that explicit state adjudication is a promising direction for robust agentic memory.

Hallucinations (i.e., generating plausible but inaccurate content) and laziness (i.e. excessive refusals or defaulting to "I don't know") persist as major challenges in LLM reasoning. Current efforts to reduce hallucinations primarily focus on factual errors in knowledge-grounded tasks, often neglecting hallucinations related to faulty reasoning. Meanwhile, some approaches render LLMs overly conservative, limiting their problem-solving capabilities. To mitigate hallucination and laziness in reasoning tasks, we propose Automatic Curriculum Expert Iteration (Auto-CEI) to enhance LLM reasoning and align responses to the model's capabilities--assertively answering within its limits and declining when tasks exceed them. In our method, Expert Iteration explores the reasoning trajectories near the LLM policy, guiding incorrect paths back on track to reduce compounding errors and improve robustness; it also promotes appropriate "I don't know" responses after sufficient reasoning attempts. The curriculum automatically adjusts rewards, incentivizing extended reasoning before acknowledging incapability, thereby pushing the limits of LLM reasoning and aligning its behaviour with these limits. We compare Auto-CEI with various SOTA baselines across logical reasoning, mathematics, and planning tasks, where Auto-CEI achieves superior alignment by effectively balancing assertiveness and conservativeness.

When do machine learning systems fail to generalize, and what mechanisms could improve their generalization? Here, we draw inspiration from cognitive science to argue that one weakness of machine learning systems is their failure to exhibit latent learning -- learning information that is not relevant to the task at hand, but that might be useful in a future task. We show how this perspective links failures ranging from the reversal curse in language modeling to new findings on agent-based navigation. We then highlight how cognitive science points to episodic memory as a potential part of the solution to these issues. Correspondingly, we show that a system with an oracle retrieval mechanism can use learning experiences more flexibly to generalize better across many of these challenges. We also identify some of the essential components for effectively using retrieval, including the importance of within-example in-context learning for acquiring the ability to use information across retrieved examples. In summary, our results illustrate one possible contributor to the relative data inefficiency of current machine learning systems compared to natural intelligence, and help to understand how retrieval methods can complement parametric learning to improve generalization.

Recent studies of the applications of conversational AI tools, such as chatbots powered by large language models, to complex real-world knowledge work have shown limitations related to reasoning and multi-step problem solving. Specifically, while existing chatbots simulate shallow reasoning and understanding they are prone to errors as problem complexity increases. The failure of these systems to address complex knowledge work is due to the fact that they do not perform any actual cognition. In this position paper, we present Cognitive AI, a higher-level framework for implementing programmatically defined neuro-symbolic cognition above and outside of large language models. Specifically, we propose a dual-layer functional architecture for Cognitive AI that serves as a roadmap for AI systems that can perform complex multi-step knowledge work. We propose that Cognitive AI is a necessary precursor for the evolution of higher forms of AI, such as AGI, and specifically claim that AGI cannot be achieved by probabilistic approaches on their own. We conclude with a discussion of the implications for large language models, adoption cycles in AI, and commercial Cognitive AI development.

With the growing adoption of Large Language Model (LLM) agents in persistent, real-world roles, they naturally encounter continuous streams of tasks and inevitable failures. A key limitation, however, is their inability to systematically learn from these mistakes, forcing them to repeat identical errors in similar contexts. Unlike prior training-free methods that primarily store raw instance-level experience or focus on retrieving successful trajectories, we propose Mistake Notebook Learning (MNL), a novel memory framework that enables agents to self-curate generalizable guidance from batch-clustered failures. This mechanism allows agents to distill shared error patterns into structured "mistake notes," updating an external memory only when batch performance improves to ensure stability. To further amplify adaptability, we integrate MNL with test-time scaling, leveraging aggregated failure patterns to actively steer the search process away from known pitfalls. Experiments on mathematical reasoning, Text-to-SQL, and interactive agent benchmarks show that MNL achieves competitive performance compared to existing memory mechanisms and in-context methods in both effectiveness and efficiency. These findings position structured mistake abstraction as a critical lever for robust agent evolution, enabling continuous improvement without the cost of parameter updates. The code is available at https://github.com/Bairong-Xdynamics/MistakeNotebookLearning/tree/main.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has substantially improved the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs), yet training often stalls as problems become saturated. We identify the core challenge as the poor accessibility of informative failures: learning signals exist but are rarely encountered during standard rollouts. To address this, we propose failure-prefix conditioning, a simple and effective method for learning from saturated problems. Rather than starting from the original question, our approach reallocates exploration by conditioning training on prefixes derived from rare incorrect reasoning trajectories, thereby exposing the model to failure-prone states. We observe that failure-prefix conditioning yields performance gains matching those of training on medium-difficulty problems, while preserving token efficiency. Furthermore, we analyze the model's robustness, finding that our method reduces performance degradation under misleading failure prefixes, albeit with a mild trade-off in adherence to correct early reasoning. Finally, we demonstrate that an iterative approach, which refreshes failure prefixes during training, unlocks additional gains after performance plateaus. Overall, our results suggest that failure-prefix conditioning offers an effective pathway to extend RLVR training on saturated problems.

Standard factuality evaluations of LLMs treat all errors alike, obscuring whether failures arise from missing knowledge (empty shelves) or from limited access to encoded facts (lost keys). We propose a behavioral framework that profiles factual knowledge at the level of facts rather than questions, characterizing each fact by whether it is encoded, and then by how accessible it is: cannot be recalled, can be directly recalled, or can only be recalled with inference-time computation (thinking). To support such profiling, we introduce WikiProfile, a new benchmark constructed via an automated pipeline with a prompted LLM grounded in web search. Across 4 million responses from 13 LLMs, we find that encoding is nearly saturated in frontier models on our benchmark, with GPT-5 and Gemini-3 encoding 95--98% of facts. However, recall remains a major bottleneck: many errors previously attributed to missing knowledge instead stem from failures to access it. These failures are systematic and disproportionately affect long-tail facts and reverse questions. Finally, we show that thinking improves recall and can recover a substantial fraction of failures, indicating that future gains may rely less on scaling and more on methods that improve how models utilize what they already encode.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often exhibit substantially shorter effective context lengths than their claimed capacities, especially when handling complex reasoning tasks that require integrating information from multiple parts of a long context and performing multi-step reasoning. Although Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has shown promise in reducing task complexity, our empirical analysis reveals that it does not fully resolve this limitation. Through controlled experiments, we identify poor recall of implicit facts as the primary cause of failure, which significantly hampers reasoning performance. Interestingly, we observe that the internal attention weights from the generated CoT tokens can effectively ground implicit facts, even when these facts are not explicitly recalled. Building on this insight, we propose a novel training-free algorithm, Attrieval, which leverages attention weights to retrieve relevant facts from the long context and incorporates them into the reasoning process. Additionally, we find that selecting context tokens from CoT tokens further improves performance. Our results demonstrate that Attrieval enhances long-context reasoning capability notably on both synthetic and real-world QA datasets with various models.

Recently, Chain-of-Thought (CoT) prompting has delivered success on complex reasoning tasks, which aims at designing a simple prompt like ``Let's think step by step'' or multiple in-context exemplars with well-designed rationales to elicit Large Language Models (LLMs) to generate intermediate reasoning steps. However, the generated rationales often come with mistakes, making unfactual and unfaithful reasoning chains. To mitigate this brittleness, we propose a novel Chain-of-Knowledge (CoK) prompting, where we aim at eliciting LLMs to generate explicit pieces of knowledge evidence in the form of structure triple. This is inspired by our human behaviors, i.e., we can draw a mind map or knowledge map as the reasoning evidence in the brain before answering a complex question. Benefiting from CoK, we additionally introduce a F^2-Verification method to estimate the reliability of the reasoning chains in terms of factuality and faithfulness. For the unreliable response, the wrong evidence can be indicated to prompt the LLM to rethink. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method can further improve the performance of commonsense, factual, symbolic, and arithmetic reasoning tasks.

When a phone-use agent avoids harm, does that show safety, or simply inability to act? Existing evaluations often cannot tell. A harmful outcome may be avoided because the agent recognized the risk and chose the safe action, or because it failed to understand the screen or execute any relevant action at all. These cases have different causes and call for different fixes, yet current benchmarks often merge them under task success, refusal, or final harmful outcome. We address this problem with PhoneSafety, a benchmark of 700 safety-critical moments drawn from real phone interactions across more than 130 apps. Each instance isolates the next decision at a risky moment and asks a simple question: does the model take the safe action, take the unsafe action, or fail to do anything useful? We evaluate eight representative phone-use agents under this framework. Our results reveal two main patterns. First, stronger general phone-use ability does not reliably imply safer choices at risky moments. Models that perform better on ordinary app tasks are not always the ones that behave more safely when the next action matters. Second, failures to do anything useful behave like a capability signal rather than a safety signal: they are concentrated in more visually and operationally demanding settings and remain stable when the evaluation protocol changes. Across models, failures split into two recurring patterns: unsafe choices in settings where the model can act but chooses wrongly, and inability to act in more visually and operationally demanding screens. Overall, a harmless outcome is not enough to count as evidence of safety. Evaluating phone-use agents requires separating unsafe judgment from inability to act.

Outcome-reward reinforcement learning (RL) has proven effective at improving the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs). However, standard RL assigns credit only at the level of the final answer, penalizing entire reasoning traces when the outcome is incorrect and uniformly reinforcing all steps when it is correct. As a result, correct intermediate steps may be discouraged in failed traces, while spurious steps may be reinforced in successful ones. We refer to this failure mode as the problem of credit assignment. While a natural remedy is to train a process reward model, accurately optimizing such models to identify corrective reasoning steps remains challenging. We introduce Intervention Training (InT), a training paradigm in which the model performs fine-grained credit assignment on its own reasoning traces by proposing short, targeted corrections that steer trajectories toward higher reward. Using reference solutions commonly available in mathematical reasoning datasets and exploiting the fact that verifying a model-generated solution is easier than generating a correct one from scratch, the model identifies the first error in its reasoning and proposes a single-step intervention to redirect the trajectory toward the correct solution. We then apply supervised fine-tuning (SFT) to the on-policy rollout up to the point of error concatenated with the intervention, localizing error to the specific step that caused failure. We show that the resulting model serves as a far better initialization for RL training. After running InT and subsequent fine-tuning with RL, we improve accuracy by nearly 14% over a 4B-parameter base model on IMO-AnswerBench, outperforming larger open-source models such as gpt-oss-20b.

This study explores the neural and behavioral consequences of LLM-assisted essay writing. Participants were divided into three groups: LLM, Search Engine, and Brain-only (no tools). Each completed three sessions under the same condition. In a fourth session, LLM users were reassigned to Brain-only group (LLM-to-Brain), and Brain-only users were reassigned to LLM condition (Brain-to-LLM). A total of 54 participants took part in Sessions 1-3, with 18 completing session 4. We used electroencephalography (EEG) to assess cognitive load during essay writing, and analyzed essays using NLP, as well as scoring essays with the help from human teachers and an AI judge. Across groups, NERs, n-gram patterns, and topic ontology showed within-group homogeneity. EEG revealed significant differences in brain connectivity: Brain-only participants exhibited the strongest, most distributed networks; Search Engine users showed moderate engagement; and LLM users displayed the weakest connectivity. Cognitive activity scaled down in relation to external tool use. In session 4, LLM-to-Brain participants showed reduced alpha and beta connectivity, indicating under-engagement. Brain-to-LLM users exhibited higher memory recall and activation of occipito-parietal and prefrontal areas, similar to Search Engine users. Self-reported ownership of essays was the lowest in the LLM group and the highest in the Brain-only group. LLM users also struggled to accurately quote their own work. While LLMs offer immediate convenience, our findings highlight potential cognitive costs. Over four months, LLM users consistently underperformed at neural, linguistic, and behavioral levels. These results raise concerns about the long-term educational implications of LLM reliance and underscore the need for deeper inquiry into AI's role in learning.

Robotic manipulation in open-world settings requires not only task execution but also the ability to detect and learn from failures. While recent advances in vision-language models (VLMs) and large language models (LLMs) have improved robots' spatial reasoning and problem-solving abilities, they still struggle with failure recognition, limiting their real-world applicability. We introduce AHA, an open-source VLM designed to detect and reason about failures in robotic manipulation using natural language. By framing failure detection as a free-form reasoning task, AHA identifies failures and provides detailed, adaptable explanations across different robots, tasks, and environments. We fine-tuned AHA using FailGen, a scalable framework that generates the first large-scale dataset of robotic failure trajectories, the AHA dataset. FailGen achieves this by procedurally perturbing successful demonstrations from simulation. Despite being trained solely on the AHA dataset, AHA generalizes effectively to real-world failure datasets, robotic systems, and unseen tasks. It surpasses the second-best model (GPT-4o in-context learning) by 10.3% and exceeds the average performance of six compared models including five state-of-the-art VLMs by 35.3% across multiple metrics and datasets. We integrate AHA into three manipulation frameworks that utilize LLMs/VLMs for reinforcement learning, task and motion planning, and zero-shot trajectory generation. AHA's failure feedback enhances these policies' performances by refining dense reward functions, optimizing task planning, and improving sub-task verification, boosting task success rates by an average of 21.4% across all three tasks compared to GPT-4 models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown tremendous potential as agents, excelling at tasks that require multiple rounds of reasoning and interactions. Rejection Sampling Fine-Tuning (RFT) has emerged as an effective method for finetuning LLMs as agents: it first imitates expert-generated successful trajectories and further improves agentic skills through iterative fine-tuning on successful, self-generated trajectories. However, since the expert (e.g., GPT-4) succeeds primarily on simpler subtasks and RFT inherently favors simpler scenarios, many complex subtasks remain unsolved and persistently out-of-distribution (OOD). Upon investigating these challenging subtasks, we discovered that previously failed expert trajectories can often provide valuable guidance, e.g., plans and key actions, that can significantly improve agent exploration efficiency and acquisition of critical skills. Motivated by these observations, we propose Exploring Expert Failures (EEF), which identifies beneficial actions from failed expert trajectories and integrates them into the training dataset. Potentially harmful actions are meticulously excluded to prevent contamination of the model learning process. By leveraging the beneficial actions in expert failures, EEF successfully solves some previously unsolvable subtasks and improves agent tuning performance. Remarkably, our approach achieved a 62\% win rate in WebShop, outperforming RFT (53. 6\%) and GPT-4 (35. 6\%), and to the best of our knowledge, setting a new state-of-the-art as the first method to surpass a score of 0.81 in WebShop and exceed 81 in SciWorld.

Recent works have shown the benefits to LLMs from fine-tuning golden-standard Chain-of-Thought (CoT) rationales or using them as correct examples in few-shot prompting. While humans can indeed imitate correct examples, learning from our mistakes is another vital aspect of human cognition. Hence, a question naturally arises: can LLMs learn and benefit from their mistakes, especially for their reasoning? This study investigates this problem from both the prompting and model-tuning perspectives. We begin by introducing CoTErrorSet, a new benchmark with 609,432 questions, each designed with both correct and error references, and demonstrating the types and reasons for making such mistakes. To explore the effectiveness of those mistakes, we design two methods: (1) Self-rethinking prompting guides LLMs to rethink whether they have made similar previous mistakes; and (2) Mistake tuning involves finetuning models in both correct and incorrect reasoning domains, rather than only tuning models to learn ground truth in traditional methodology. We conduct a series of experiments to prove LLMs can obtain benefits from mistakes in both directions. Our two methods offer potentially cost-effective strategies by leveraging errors to enhance reasoning capabilities, which costs significantly less than creating meticulously hand-crafted golden references. We ultimately make a thorough analysis of the reasons behind LLMs' errors, which provides directions that future research needs to overcome. CoTErrorSet will be published soon on \url{https://github.com/YookiTong/Learn-from-Mistakes-CotErrorSet}.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

Large language models (LLMs) excel at solving problems with clear and complete statements, but often struggle with nuanced environments or interactive tasks which are common in most real-world scenarios. This highlights the critical need for developing LLMs that can effectively engage in logically consistent multi-turn dialogue, seek information and reason with incomplete data. To this end, we introduce a novel benchmark comprising a suite of multi-turn tasks each designed to test specific reasoning, interactive dialogue, and information-seeking abilities. These tasks have deterministic scoring mechanisms, thus eliminating the need for human intervention. Evaluating frontier models on our benchmark reveals significant headroom. Our analysis shows that most errors emerge from poor instruction following, reasoning failures, and poor planning. This benchmark provides valuable insights into the strengths and weaknesses of current LLMs in handling complex, interactive scenarios and offers a robust platform for future research aimed at improving these critical capabilities.

Shojaee et al. (2025) report that Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) exhibit "accuracy collapse" on planning puzzles beyond certain complexity thresholds. We demonstrate that their findings primarily reflect experimental design limitations rather than fundamental reasoning failures. Our analysis reveals three critical issues: (1) Tower of Hanoi experiments systematically exceed model output token limits at reported failure points, with models explicitly acknowledging these constraints in their outputs; (2) The authors' automated evaluation framework fails to distinguish between reasoning failures and practical constraints, leading to misclassification of model capabilities; (3) Most concerningly, their River Crossing benchmarks include mathematically impossible instances for N > 5 due to insufficient boat capacity, yet models are scored as failures for not solving these unsolvable problems. When we control for these experimental artifacts, by requesting generating functions instead of exhaustive move lists, preliminary experiments across multiple models indicate high accuracy on Tower of Hanoi instances previously reported as complete failures. These findings highlight the importance of careful experimental design when evaluating AI reasoning capabilities.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are often described as being instances of foundation models - that is, models that transfer strongly across various tasks and conditions in few-show or zero-shot manner, while exhibiting scaling laws that predict function improvement when increasing the pre-training scale. These claims of excelling in different functions and tasks rely on measurements taken across various sets of standardized benchmarks showing high scores for such models. We demonstrate here a dramatic breakdown of function and reasoning capabilities of state-of-the-art models trained at the largest available scales which claim strong function, using a simple, short, conventional common sense problem formulated in concise natural language, easily solvable by humans. The breakdown is dramatic, as models also express strong overconfidence in their wrong solutions, while providing often non-sensical "reasoning"-like explanations akin to confabulations to justify and backup the validity of their clearly failed responses, making them sound plausible. Various standard interventions in an attempt to get the right solution, like various type of enhanced prompting, or urging the models to reconsider the wrong solutions again by multi step re-evaluation, fail. We take these initial observations to the scientific and technological community to stimulate urgent re-assessment of the claimed capabilities of current generation of LLMs, Such re-assessment also requires common action to create standardized benchmarks that would allow proper detection of such basic reasoning deficits that obviously manage to remain undiscovered by current state-of-the-art evaluation procedures and benchmarks. Code for reproducing experiments in the paper and raw experiments data can be found at https://github.com/LAION-AI/AIW

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has proven effective for training large language models (LLMs) on complex reasoning tasks, such as mathematical problem solving. A prerequisite for the scalability of RLVR is a high-quality problem set with precise and verifiable answers. However, the scarcity of well-crafted human-labeled math problems and limited-verification answers in existing distillation-oriented synthetic datasets limit their effectiveness in RL. Additionally, most problem synthesis strategies indiscriminately expand the problem set without considering the model's capabilities, leading to low efficiency in generating useful questions. To mitigate this issue, we introduce a Self-aware Weakness-driven problem Synthesis framework (SwS) that systematically identifies model deficiencies and leverages them for problem augmentation. Specifically, we define weaknesses as questions that the model consistently fails to learn through its iterative sampling during RL training. We then extract the core concepts from these failure cases and synthesize new problems to strengthen the model's weak areas in subsequent augmented training, enabling it to focus on and gradually overcome its weaknesses. Without relying on external knowledge distillation, our framework enables robust generalization byempowering the model to self-identify and address its weaknesses in RL, yielding average performance gains of 10.0% and 7.7% on 7B and 32B models across eight mainstream reasoning benchmarks.

Failure attribution in multi-agent systems -- pinpointing the exact step where a decisive error occurs -- is a critical yet unsolved challenge. Current methods treat this as a pattern recognition task over long conversation logs, leading to critically low step-level accuracy (below 17\%), which renders them impractical for debugging complex systems. Their core weakness is a fundamental inability to perform robust counterfactual reasoning: to determine if correcting a single action would have actually averted the task failure. To bridge this counterfactual inference gap, we introduce Abduct-Act-Predict (A2P) Scaffolding, a novel agent framework that transforms failure attribution from pattern recognition into a structured causal inference task. A2P explicitly guides a large language model through a formal three-step reasoning process within a single inference pass: (1) Abduction, to infer the hidden root causes behind an agent's actions; (2) Action, to define a minimal corrective intervention; and (3) Prediction, to simulate the subsequent trajectory and verify if the intervention resolves the failure. This structured approach leverages the holistic context of the entire conversation while imposing a rigorous causal logic on the model's analysis. Our extensive experiments on the Who\&When benchmark demonstrate its efficacy. On the Algorithm-Generated dataset, A2P achieves 47.46\% step-level accuracy, a 2.85times improvement over the 16.67\% of the baseline. On the more complex Hand-Crafted dataset, it achieves 29.31\% step accuracy, a 2.43times improvement over the baseline's 12.07\%. By reframing the problem through a causal lens, A2P Scaffolding provides a robust, verifiable, and significantly more accurate solution for automated failure attribution. Ours code are released at https://github.com/ResearAI/A2P.

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are prone to hallucination, the generation of plausible yet factually incorrect statements. This work investigates the intrinsic, architectural origins of this failure mode through three primary contributions.First, to enable the reliable tracing of internal semantic failures, we propose Distributional Semantics Tracing (DST), a unified framework that integrates established interpretability techniques to produce a causal map of a model's reasoning, treating meaning as a function of context (distributional semantics). Second, we pinpoint the model's layer at which a hallucination becomes inevitable, identifying a specific commitment layer where a model's internal representations irreversibly diverge from factuality. Third, we identify the underlying mechanism for these failures. We observe a conflict between distinct computational pathways, which we interpret using the lens of dual-process theory: a fast, heuristic associative pathway (akin to System 1) and a slow, deliberate contextual pathway (akin to System 2), leading to predictable failure modes such as Reasoning Shortcut Hijacks. Our framework's ability to quantify the coherence of the contextual pathway reveals a strong negative correlation (rho = -0.863) with hallucination rates, implying that these failures are predictable consequences of internal semantic weakness. The result is a mechanistic account of how, when, and why hallucinations occur within the Transformer architecture.

Intelligence is a crucial trait for species to find solutions within a limited number of trial-and-error attempts. Building on this idea, we introduce Survival Game as a framework to evaluate intelligence based on the number of failed attempts in a trial-and-error process. Fewer failures indicate higher intelligence. When the expectation and variance of failure counts are both finite, it signals the ability to consistently find solutions to new challenges, which we define as the Autonomous Level of intelligence. Using Survival Game, we comprehensively evaluate existing AI systems. Our results show that while AI systems achieve the Autonomous Level in simple tasks, they are still far from it in more complex tasks, such as vision, search, recommendation, and language. While scaling current AI technologies might help, this would come at an astronomical cost. Projections suggest that achieving the Autonomous Level for general tasks would require 10^{26} parameters. To put this into perspective, loading such a massive model requires so many H100 GPUs that their total value is 10^{7} times that of Apple Inc.'s market value. Even with Moore's Law, supporting such a parameter scale would take 70 years. This staggering cost highlights the complexity of human tasks and the inadequacies of current AI technologies. To further investigate this phenomenon, we conduct a theoretical analysis of Survival Game and its experimental results. Our findings suggest that human tasks possess a criticality property. As a result, Autonomous Level requires a deep understanding of the task's underlying mechanisms. Current AI systems, however, do not fully grasp these mechanisms and instead rely on superficial mimicry, making it difficult for them to reach an autonomous level. We believe Survival Game can not only guide the future development of AI but also offer profound insights into human intelligence.

Modeling plausible student misconceptions is critical for AI in education. In this work, we examine how large language models (LLMs) reason about misconceptions when generating multiple-choice distractors, a task that requires modeling incorrect yet plausible answers by coordinating solution knowledge, simulating student misconceptions, and evaluating plausibility. We introduce a taxonomy for analyzing the strategies used by state-of-the-art LLMs, examining their reasoning procedures and comparing them to established best practices in the learning sciences. Our structured analysis reveals a surprising alignment between their processes and best practices: the models typically solve the problem correctly first, then articulate and simulate multiple potential misconceptions, and finally select a set of distractors. An analysis of failure modes reveals that errors arise primarily from failures in recovering the correct solution and selecting among response candidates, rather than simulating errors or structuring the process. Consistent with these results, we find that providing the correct solution in the prompt improves alignment with human-authored distractors by 8%, highlighting the critical role of anchoring to the correct solution when generating plausible incorrect student reasoning. Overall, our analysis offers a structured and interpretable lens into LLMs' ability to model incorrect student reasoning and produce high-quality distractors.

Understanding how Large Language Models (LLMs) perform complex reasoning and their failure mechanisms is a challenge in interpretability research. To provide a measurable geometric analysis perspective, we define the concept of the Reasoning Manifold, a latent low-dimensional geometric structure formed by the internal representations corresponding to all correctly reasoned generations. This structure can be conceptualized as the embodiment of the effective thinking paths that the model has learned to successfully solve a given task. Based on this concept, we build REMA, a framework that explains the origins of failures by quantitatively comparing the spatial relationships of internal model representations corresponding to both erroneous and correct reasoning samples. Specifically, REMA first quantifies the geometric deviation of each erroneous representation by calculating its k-nearest neighbors distance to the approximated manifold formed by correct representations, thereby providing a unified failure signal. It then localizes the divergence points where these deviations first become significant by tracking this deviation metric across the model's layers and comparing it against a baseline of internal fluctuations from correct representations, thus identifying where the reasoning chain begins to go off-track. Our extensive experiments on diverse language and multimodal models and tasks demonstrate the low-dimensional nature of the reasoning manifold and the high separability between erroneous and correct reasoning representations. The results also validate the effectiveness of the REMA framework in analyzing the origins of reasoning failures. This research connects abstract reasoning failures to measurable geometric deviations in representations, providing new avenues for in-depth understanding and diagnosis of the internal computational processes of black-box models.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) with multi-step reasoning capabilities have shown remarkable problem-solving abilities, yet they exhibit concerning safety vulnerabilities that remain poorly understood. In this work, we investigate why safety alignment fails in reasoning models through a mechanistic interpretability lens. Using a linear probing approach to trace refusal intentions across token positions, we discover a striking phenomenon termed as refusal cliff: many poorly-aligned reasoning models correctly identify harmful prompts and maintain strong refusal intentions during their thinking process, but experience a sharp drop in refusal scores at the final tokens before output generation. This suggests that these models are not inherently unsafe; rather, their refusal intentions are systematically suppressed. Through causal intervention analysis, we identify a sparse set of attention heads that negatively contribute to refusal behavior. Ablating just 3\% of these heads can reduce attack success rates below 10\%. Building on these mechanistic insights, we propose Cliff-as-a-Judge, a novel data selection method that identifies training examples exhibiting the largest refusal cliff to efficiently repair reasoning models' safety alignment. This approach achieves comparable safety improvements using only 1.7\% of the vanilla safety training data, demonstrating a less-is-more effect in safety alignment.

Conversational agents powered by large language models (LLMs) with tool integration achieve strong performance on fixed task-oriented dialogue datasets but remain vulnerable to unanticipated, user-induced errors. Rather than focusing on error prevention, this work focuses on error recovery, which necessitates the accurate diagnosis of erroneous dialogue contexts and execution of proper recovery plans. Under realistic constraints precluding model fine-tuning or prompt modification due to significant cost and time requirements, we explore whether agents can recover from contextually flawed interactions and how their behavior can be adapted without altering model parameters and prompts. To this end, we propose Reasoning Inception (ReIn), a test-time intervention method that plants an initial reasoning into the agent's decision-making process. Specifically, an external inception module identifies predefined errors within the dialogue context and generates recovery plans, which are subsequently integrated into the agent's internal reasoning process to guide corrective actions, without modifying its parameters or system prompts. We evaluate ReIn by systematically simulating conversational failure scenarios that directly hinder successful completion of user goals: user's ambiguous and unsupported requests. Across diverse combinations of agent models and inception modules, ReIn substantially improves task success and generalizes to unseen error types. Moreover, it consistently outperforms explicit prompt-modification approaches, underscoring its utility as an efficient, on-the-fly method. In-depth analysis of its operational mechanism, particularly in relation to instruction hierarchy, indicates that jointly defining recovery tools with ReIn can serve as a safe and effective strategy for improving the resilience of conversational agents without modifying the backbone models or system prompts.

While advancements in the reasoning abilities of LLMs have significantly enhanced their performance in solving mathematical problems, coding tasks, and general puzzles, their effectiveness in accurately adhering to instructions remains inconsistent, particularly with more complex directives. Our investigation identifies lazy reasoning during the thinking stage as the primary factor contributing to poor instruction adherence. To mitigate this issue, we propose a comprehensive framework designed to enable rigorous reasoning processes involving preview and self-checking, essential for satisfying strict instruction constraints. Specifically, we first generate instructions with complex constraints and apply a filtering process to obtain valid prompts, resulting in three distinct prompt datasets categorized as hard, easy, and pass. Then, we employ rejection sampling on the pass prompts to curate a small yet high-quality dataset, enabling a cold-start initialization of the model and facilitating its adaptation to effective reasoning patterns. Subsequently, we employ an entropy-preserving supervised fine-tuning (Entropy-SFT) strategy coupled with token-wise entropy-adaptive (TEA-RL) reinforcement learning guided by rule-based dense rewards. This approach encourages the model to transform its reasoning mechanism, ultimately fostering generalizable reasoning abilities that encompass preview and self-checking. Extensive experiments conducted on instruction-following benchmarks demonstrate remarkable performance improvements across various model scales. Notably, our Light-IF-32B model surpasses both larger open-source models such as DeepSeek-R1 and closed-source models like Doubao-1.6.

Answering multi-hop reasoning questions requires retrieving and synthesizing information from diverse sources. Large Language Models (LLMs) struggle to perform such reasoning consistently. Here we propose an approach to pinpoint and rectify multi-hop reasoning failures through targeted memory injections on LLM attention heads. First, we analyze the per-layer activations of GPT-2 models in response to single and multi-hop prompts. We then propose a mechanism that allows users to inject pertinent prompt-specific information, which we refer to as "memories," at critical LLM locations during inference. By thus enabling the LLM to incorporate additional relevant information during inference, we enhance the quality of multi-hop prompt completions. We show empirically that a simple, efficient, and targeted memory injection into a key attention layer can often increase the probability of the desired next token in multi-hop tasks, by up to 424%.

Hypernetwork-based methods such as Doc-to-LoRA internalize a document into an LLM's weights in a single forward pass, but they fail systematically on conflicts: when the document contradicts pretraining knowledge, accuracy collapses to 46.4% on the deepest facts. We show the failure is a magnitude problem rather than a representational one. The hypernetwork already targets the right layers, but its adapter margin is approximately constant across documents while the pretrained margin grows with training frequency, so deep conflicts lose by construction. The account predicts that failure should track prior strength: sorting 194 conflicts by the base model's log-probability on the contradicted fact, baseline accuracy falls from 68% on weak-prior questions to 16% on strong-prior ones, a 52 percentage-point gap. The cure is amplitude. Selective Layer Boosting scales the adapter at its top-norm layers, and Conflict-Aware Internalization triggers boosting only when the base model is confident. Both are training-free; together they raise deep-conflict accuracy from 46.4% to 71.0% on Gemma-2B and from 53.6% to 72.5% on Mistral-7B while preserving novel-knowledge recall, and beat vanilla retrieval-augmented generation on medium conflicts by 18 percentage points despite operating entirely in parameter space. We release KID-Bench, a 489-question benchmark that separates novel recall, cross-knowledge combination, and prior-graded conflicts.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents, while proficient in the digital realm, face a significant gap in physical-world deployment due to the challenge of forming and maintaining a robust spatial mental model. We identify three core cognitive challenges hindering this transition: spatial reasoning, long-horizon state tracking via mental simulation, and active exploration under partial observation. To isolate and evaluate these faculties, we introduce CubeBench, a novel generative benchmark centered on the Rubik's Cube. CubeBench uses a three-tiered diagnostic framework that progressively assesses agent capabilities, from foundational state tracking with full symbolic information to active exploration with only partial visual data. Our experiments on leading LLMs reveal critical limitations, including a uniform 0.00% pass rate on all long-horizon tasks, exposing a fundamental failure in long-term planning. We also propose a diagnostic framework to isolate these cognitive bottlenecks by providing external solver tools. By analyzing the failure modes, we provide key insights to guide the development of more physically-grounded intelligent agents.

Reasoning failures in large language models (LLMs) are typically measured only at the end of a generation, yet many failures manifest as a process-level breakdown: the model "loses the thread" mid-reasoning. We study whether such breakdowns are detectable from inference-time observables available in standard APIs (token log probabilities), without any training or fine-tuning. We define a simple instability signal that combines consecutive-step distributional shift (JSD) and uncertainty (entropy), summarize each trace by its peak instability strength, and show that this signal reliably predicts failure. Across GSM8K and HotpotQA, instability strength predicts wrong answers with above-chance AUC and yields monotonic bucket-level accuracy decline at scale across model sizes. Crucially, we show that instability is not uniformly harmful: early instability can reflect subsequent stabilization and a correct final answer (corrective instability), whereas late instability is more often followed by failure (destructive instability), even at comparable peak magnitudes, indicating that recoverability depends not only on how strongly the distribution changes but also on when such changes occur relative to the remaining decoding horizon. The method is model-agnostic, training-free, and reproducible, and is presented as a diagnostic lens rather than a corrective or control mechanism.

Interestingly, LLMs yet struggle with some basic tasks that humans find trivial to handle, e.g., counting the number of character r's in the word "strawberry". There are several popular conjectures (e.g., tokenization, architecture and training data) regarding the reason for deficiency of LLMs in simple word-based counting problems, sharing the similar belief that such failure stems from model pretraining hence probably inevitable during deployment. In this paper, we carefully design multiple evaluation settings to investigate validity of prevalent conjectures. Meanwhile, we measure transferability of advanced mathematical and coding reasoning capabilities from specialized LLMs to simple counting tasks. Although specialized LLMs suffer from counting problems as well, we find conjectures about inherent deficiency of LLMs invalid and further seek opportunities to elicit knowledge and capabilities from LLMs that are beneficial to counting tasks. Compared with strategies such as finetuning and in-context learning that are commonly adopted to enhance performance on new or challenging tasks, we show that engaging reasoning is the most robust and efficient way to help LLMs better perceive tasks with more accurate responses. We hope our conjecture validation design could provide insights into the study of future critical failure modes of LLMs. Based on challenges in transferring advanced capabilities to much simpler tasks, we call for more attention to model capability acquisition and evaluation. We also highlight the importance of cultivating consciousness of "reasoning before responding" during model pretraining.

Recent advances in autonomous LLM agents demonstrate their ability to improve performance through iterative interaction with the environment. We define this paradigm as Test-Time Improvement (TTI). However, the mechanisms under how and why TTI succeed or fail remain poorly understood, and existing evaluation metrics fail to capture their task optimization efficiency, behavior adaptation after erroneous actions, and the specific utility of working memory for task completion. To address these gaps, we propose Test-time Improvement Diagnostic Evaluation (TIDE), an agent-agnostic and environment-agnostic framework that decomposes TTI into three comprehensive and interconnected dimensions. The framework measures (1) the overall temporal dynamics of task completion and (2) identifies whether performance is primarily constrained by recursive looping behaviors or (3) by burdensome accumulated memory. Through extensive experiments across diverse agents and environments, TIDE highlights that improving agent performance requires more than scaling internal reasoning, calling for explicitly optimizing the interaction dynamics between the agent and the environment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities in solving mathematical reasoning tasks, leveraging Chain-of-Thought (CoT) data as a vital component in guiding answer generation. Current paradigms typically generate CoT and answers directly for a given problem, diverging from human problem-solving strategies to some extent. Humans often solve problems by recalling analogous cases and leveraging their solutions to reason about the current task. Inspired by this cognitive process, we propose MetaLadder, a novel framework that explicitly prompts LLMs to recall and reflect on meta-problems, those structurally or semantically analogous problems, alongside their CoT solutions before addressing the target problem. Additionally, we introduce a problem-restating mechanism to enhance the model's comprehension of the target problem by regenerating the original question, which further improves reasoning accuracy. Therefore, the model can achieve reasoning transfer from analogical problems, mimicking human-like "learning from examples" and generalization abilities. Extensive experiments on mathematical benchmarks demonstrate that our MetaLadder significantly boosts LLMs' problem-solving accuracy, largely outperforming standard CoT-based methods (10.3\% accuracy gain) and other methods. Our code and data has been released at https://github.com/LHL3341/MetaLadder.

Large language models (LLMs) possess impressive linguistic capabilities but often fail to faithfully retain factual knowledge, leading to hallucinations and unreliable outputs. Understanding LLMs' knowledge deficiencies by exhaustively evaluating against full-scale knowledge bases is computationally prohibitive, especially for closed-weight models. We propose stochastic error ascent (SEA), a scalable and efficient framework for discovering knowledge deficiencies (errors) in closed-weight LLMs under a strict query budget. Rather than naively probing all knowledge candidates, SEA formulates error discovery as a stochastic optimization process: it iteratively retrieves new high-error candidates by leveraging the semantic similarity to previously observed failures. To further enhance search efficiency and coverage, SEA employs hierarchical retrieval across document and paragraph levels, and constructs a relation directed acyclic graph to model error propagation and identify systematic failure modes. Empirically, SEA uncovers 40.7x more knowledge errors than Automated Capability Discovery and 26.7% more than AutoBencher, while reducing the cost-per-error by 599x and 9x, respectively. Human evaluation confirms the high quality of generated questions, while ablation and convergence analyses validate the contribution of each component in SEA. Further analysis on the discovered errors reveals correlated failure patterns across LLM families and recurring deficits, highlighting the need for better data coverage and targeted fine-tuning in future LLM development.

Autonomous agent systems powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising capabilities in automating complex tasks. However, current evaluations largely rely on success rates without systematically analyzing the interactions, communication mechanisms, and failure causes within these systems. To bridge this gap, we present a benchmark of 34 representative programmable tasks designed to rigorously assess autonomous agents. Using this benchmark, we evaluate three popular open-source agent frameworks combined with two LLM backbones, observing a task completion rate of approximately 50%. Through in-depth failure analysis, we develop a three-tier taxonomy of failure causes aligned with task phases, highlighting planning errors, task execution issues, and incorrect response generation. Based on these insights, we propose actionable improvements to enhance agent planning and self-diagnosis capabilities. Our failure taxonomy, together with mitigation advice, provides an empirical foundation for developing more robust and effective autonomous agent systems in the future.

We introduce FailureSensorIQ, a novel Multi-Choice Question-Answering (MCQA) benchmarking system designed to assess the ability of Large Language Models (LLMs) to reason and understand complex, domain-specific scenarios in Industry 4.0. Unlike traditional QA benchmarks, our system focuses on multiple aspects of reasoning through failure modes, sensor data, and the relationships between them across various industrial assets. Through this work, we envision a paradigm shift where modeling decisions are not only data-driven using statistical tools like correlation analysis and significance tests, but also domain-driven by specialized LLMs which can reason about the key contributors and useful patterns that can be captured with feature engineering. We evaluate the Industrial knowledge of over a dozen LLMs-including GPT-4, Llama, and Mistral-on FailureSensorIQ from different lens using Perturbation-Uncertainty-Complexity analysis, Expert Evaluation study, Asset-Specific Knowledge Gap analysis, ReAct agent using external knowledge-bases. Even though closed-source models with strong reasoning capabilities approach expert-level performance, the comprehensive benchmark reveals a significant drop in performance that is fragile to perturbations, distractions, and inherent knowledge gaps in the models. We also provide a real-world case study of how LLMs can drive the modeling decisions on 3 different failure prediction datasets related to various assets. We release: (a) expert-curated MCQA for various industrial assets, (b) FailureSensorIQ benchmark and Hugging Face leaderboard based on MCQA built from non-textual data found in ISO documents, and (c) LLMFeatureSelector, an LLM-based feature selection scikit-learn pipeline. The software is available at https://github.com/IBM/FailureSensorIQ.

Despite the success of test-time scaling, Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) frequently encounter repetitive loops that lead to computational waste and inference failure. In this paper, we identify a distinct failure mode termed Circular Reasoning. Unlike traditional model degeneration, this phenomenon manifests as a self-reinforcing trap where generated content acts as a logical premise for its own recurrence, compelling the reiteration of preceding text. To systematically analyze this phenomenon, we introduce LoopBench, a dataset designed to capture two distinct loop typologies: numerical loops and statement loops. Mechanistically, we characterize circular reasoning as a state collapse exhibiting distinct boundaries, where semantic repetition precedes textual repetition. We reveal that reasoning impasses trigger the loop onset, which subsequently persists as an inescapable cycle driven by a self-reinforcing V-shaped attention mechanism. Guided by these findings, we employ the Cumulative Sum (CUSUM) algorithm to capture these precursors for early loop prediction. Experiments across diverse LRMs validate its accuracy and elucidate the stability of long-chain reasoning.

AI systems fail silently far more often than they fail visibly. In an analysis of 100K human-AI interactions from the WildChat dataset, we find that 79% of AI failures are invisible: something went wrong but the user gave no overt indication that there was a problem. These invisible failures cluster into eight archetypes that help us characterize where and how AI systems are failing to meet users' needs. In addition, the archetypes show systematic co-occurrence patterns indicating higher-level failure types. To address the question of whether these archetypes will remain relevant as AI systems become more capable, we also created and annotated a counterfactual dataset in which WildChat's 2024-era responses are replaced by those from three present-day frontier LMs. This analysis indicates that failure rates have dropped substantially, but that the vast majority of failures remain invisible in our sense, and the distribution of failure archetypes seems stable. Finally, we illustrate how the archetypes help us to identify systematic and variable AI limitations across different usage domains. Overall, we argue that our invisible failure taxonomy can be a key component in reliable failure monitoring for product developers, scientists, and policy makers. Our code and data are available at https://github.com/bigspinai/bigspin-invisible-failure-archetypes

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) reveal a perplexing phenomenon in continual learning: despite extensive training, models experience significant performance declines, raising questions about task alignment and underlying knowledge retention. This study first explores the concept of "spurious forgetting", proposing that such performance drops often reflect a decline in task alignment rather than true knowledge loss. Through controlled experiments with a synthesized dataset, we investigate the dynamics of model performance during the initial training phases of new tasks, discovering that early optimization steps can disrupt previously established task alignments. Our theoretical analysis connects these shifts to orthogonal updates in model weights, providing a robust framework for understanding this behavior. Ultimately, we introduce a Freezing strategy that fix the bottom layers of the model, leading to substantial improvements in four continual learning scenarios. Our findings underscore the critical distinction between task alignment and knowledge retention, paving the way for more effective strategies in continual learning.

Large reasoning models (e.g., R1, o3) have demonstrated remarkable mathematical problem-solving abilities. However, the high reported accuracy of these advanced models on popular datasets, reliance on purely numerical evaluation and potential benchmark leakage, often masks their true reasoning shortcomings. To address this, we propose leveraging the inherent rigor and methodological complexity of mathematical proofs as a diagnostic tool to expose these hidden failures. Specifically, we introduce the RFMDataset (Reveal Failure Modes), a collection of 200 diverse mathematical proof problems, and thoroughly evaluate advanced models' performance on it. Our in-depth analysis of their failures uncovers 10 fine-grained error types, which shows fundamental limitations in current large reasoning models: 1) large reasoning models grapple profoundly with mathematical proofs, with some generating entirely correct proofs for less than 20% of problems and failing even on basic ones; 2) models exhibit a diverse spectrum of reasoning failures, prominently demonstrating the lack of guarantees for the correctness and rigor of single-step reasoning; and 3) models show hallucination and incompleteness during the reasoning process. Our findings reveal that models' self-reflection is insufficient to resolve the current logical dilemmas, necessitating formalized and fine-grained logical training.

Multimodal Large Language Models (MLLMs) show reasoning promise, yet their visual perception is a critical bottleneck. Strikingly, MLLMs can produce correct answers even while misinterpreting crucial visual elements, masking these underlying failures. Our preliminary study on a joint perception-reasoning dataset revealed that for one leading MLLM, 29% of its correct answers to reasoning questions still exhibited visual perception errors. To systematically address this, we introduce "Do You See Me", a scalable benchmark with 1,758 images and 2,612 questions. It spans seven human-psychology inspired subtasks in 2D and 3D, featuring controllable complexity to rigorously evaluate MLLM visual skills. Our findings on 3 leading closed-source and 5 major open-source models reveal a stark deficit: humans achieve 96.49% accuracy, while top MLLMs average below 50%. This performance gap widens rapidly with increased task complexity (e.g., from 12% to 45% in the visual form constancy subtask). Further analysis into the root causes suggests that failures stem from challenges like misallocated visual attention and the instability of internal representations for fine-grained details, especially at or below encoder patch resolution. This underscores an urgent need for MLLMs with truly robust visual perception. The benchmark dataset, source code and evaluation scripts are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Do-You-See-Me.

Current large language models (LLMs) excel in verifiable domains where outputs can be checked before action but prove less reliable for high-stakes strategic decisions with uncertain outcomes. This gap, driven by mutually reinforcing cognitive biases in both humans and artificial intelligence (AI) systems, threatens the defensibility of valuations and sustainability of investments in the sector. This report describes a framework emerging from systematic qualitative assessment across 7 frontier-grade LLMs and 3 market-facing venture vignettes under time pressure. Detailed prompting specifying decision partnership and explicitly instructing avoidance of sycophancy, confabulation, solution drift, and nihilism achieved initial partnership state but failed to maintain it under operational pressure. Sustaining protective partnership state required an emergent 7-stage calibration sequence, built upon a 4-stage initialization process, within a 5-layer protection architecture enabling bias self-monitoring, human-AI adversarial challenge, partnership state verification, performance degradation detection, and stakeholder protection. Three discoveries resulted: partnership state is achievable through ordered calibration but requires emergent maintenance protocols; reliability degrades when architectural drift and context exhaustion align; and dissolution discipline prevents costly pursuit of fundamentally wrong directions. Cross-model validation revealed systematic performance differences across LLM architectures. This approach demonstrates that human-AI teams can achieve cognitive partnership capable of preventing avoidable regret in high-stakes decisions, addressing return-on-investment expectations that depend on AI systems supporting consequential decision-making without introducing preventable cognitive traps when verification arrives too late.

Recent studies have shown promising results in the detection of Mild Cognitive Impairment (MCI) using easily accessible Electroencephalogram (EEG) data which would help administer early and effective treatment for dementia patients. However, the reliability and practicality of such systems remains unclear. In this work, we investigate the potential limitations and challenges in developing a robust MCI detection method using two contrasting datasets: 1) CAUEEG, collected and annotated by expert neurologists in controlled settings and 2) GENEEG, a new dataset collected and annotated in general practice clinics, a setting where routine MCI diagnoses are typically made. We find that training on small datasets, as is done by most previous works, tends to produce high variance models that make overconfident predictions, and are unreliable in practice. Additionally, distribution shifts between datasets make cross-domain generalization challenging. Finally, we show that MCI detection using EEG may suffer from fundamental limitations because of the overlapping nature of feature distributions with control groups. We call for more effort in high-quality data collection in actionable settings (like general practice clinics) to make progress towards this salient goal of non-invasive MCI detection.

RAG (Retrieval-Augmented Generation) systems and web agents are increasingly evaluated on multi-hop deep search tasks, yet current practice suffers from two major limitations. First, most benchmarks leak the reasoning path in the question text, allowing models to follow surface cues rather than discover reasoning chains autonomously. Second, evaluation is typically reduced to a single pass rate, which collapses diverse behaviours into one score and obscures whether failures stem from inadequate search, poor knowledge use, or inappropriate refusal. To address these issues, we present WebDetective, a benchmark of hint-free multi-hop questions paired with a controlled Wikipedia sandbox that ensures full traceability of model actions, and a holistic evaluation framework that separates search sufficiency, knowledge utilisation, and refusal behaviour. Our evaluation of 25 state-of-the-art models reveals systematic weaknesses across all architectures: models struggle with knowledge utilisation despite having sufficient evidence and demonstrate near-absent appropriate refusal when evidence is lacking. These patterns expose a fundamental gap: today's systems excel at executing given reasoning paths but fail when required to discover them. We develop an agentic workflow, EvidenceLoop, that explicitly targets the challenges our benchmark identifies, incorporating verification loops and systematic evidence tracking that improve both search and synthesis capabilities. This baseline demonstrates that WebDetective's diagnostic framework can guide concrete architectural improvements, establishing our benchmark as a critical tool for developing genuinely autonomous reasoning systems rather than pattern-following agents.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) achieve high performance on standard mathematical benchmarks, their underlying reasoning processes remain highly overfit to standard textual formatting. We propose a perturbation pipeline consisting of 14 techniques to evaluate robustness of LLM reasoning. We apply this pipeline to AIME 2024 dataset and evalute 8 state-of-the-art models on the resulting benchmark. While frontier models exhibit resilience, open weights reasoning models suffer catastrophic collapses (up to 55% average accuracy drops across perturbations and up to 100% on some), exposing structural fragility. To further disentangle mechanical parsing failures from downstream reasoning failures, we strictly isolate the models' working memory capacity by forcing models to solve multiple unperturbed mathematical problems sequentially within a single context window. Our results indicate that open weight models ranging from 7B to 120B parameters and Claude Opus 4.6 exhibit accuracy decay on subsequent problems. This degradation demonstrates that intermediate reasoning steps permanently pollute standard dense attention mechanisms. We argue that to achieve reliable reasoning, future reasoning architectures must integrate explicit contextual resets within a model's own Chain-of-Thought, leading to fundamental open questions regarding the optimal granularity of atomic reasoning tasks.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

Large Language Models (LLMs) often generate erroneous outputs, known as hallucinations, due to their limitations in discerning questions beyond their knowledge scope. While addressing hallucination has been a focal point in research, previous efforts primarily concentrate on enhancing correctness without giving due consideration to the significance of rejection mechanisms. In this paper, we conduct a comprehensive examination of the role of rejection, introducing the notion of model reliability along with corresponding metrics. These metrics measure the model's ability to provide accurate responses while adeptly rejecting questions exceeding its knowledge boundaries, thereby minimizing hallucinations. To improve the inherent reliability of LLMs, we present a novel alignment framework called Reinforcement Learning from Knowledge Feedback (RLKF). RLKF leverages knowledge feedback to dynamically determine the model's knowledge boundary and trains a reliable reward model to encourage the refusal of out-of-knowledge questions. Experimental results on mathematical questions affirm the substantial efficacy of RLKF in significantly enhancing LLM reliability.

Reasoning-enhanced large language models (RLLMs), whether explicitly trained for reasoning or prompted via chain-of-thought (CoT), have achieved state-of-the-art performance on many complex reasoning tasks. However, we uncover a surprising and previously overlooked phenomenon: explicit CoT reasoning can significantly degrade instruction-following accuracy. Evaluating 15 models on two benchmarks: IFEval (with simple, rule-verifiable constraints) and ComplexBench (with complex, compositional constraints), we consistently observe performance drops when CoT prompting is applied. Through large-scale case studies and an attention-based analysis, we identify common patterns where reasoning either helps (e.g., with formatting or lexical precision) or hurts (e.g., by neglecting simple constraints or introducing unnecessary content). We propose a metric, constraint attention, to quantify model focus during generation and show that CoT reasoning often diverts attention away from instruction-relevant tokens. To mitigate these effects, we introduce and evaluate four strategies: in-context learning, self-reflection, self-selective reasoning, and classifier-selective reasoning. Our results demonstrate that selective reasoning strategies, particularly classifier-selective reasoning, can substantially recover lost performance. To our knowledge, this is the first work to systematically expose reasoning-induced failures in instruction-following and offer practical mitigation strategies.

Although demonstrating remarkable performance on reasoning tasks, Large Language Models (LLMs) still tend to fabricate unreliable responses when confronted with problems that are unsolvable or beyond their capability, severely undermining the reliability. Prior studies of LLM reliability have primarily focused on knowledge tasks to identify unanswerable questions, while mathematical reasoning tasks have remained unexplored due to the dearth of unsolvable math problems. To systematically investigate LLM reliability in mathematical reasoning tasks, we formulate the reliability evaluation for both solvable and unsolvable problems. We then develop a ReliableMath dataset which incorporates open-source solvable problems and high-quality unsolvable problems synthesized by our proposed construction workflow with human evaluations. Experiments are conducted on various LLMs with several key findings uncovered. LLMs fail to directly identify unsolvable problems and always generate fabricated responses. When instructing LLMs to indicate unsolvability using a reliable prompt, the reliability of larger-sized LLMs remains on solvable problems, but notably improves on unsolvable problems yet still falls short of solvable problems. However, small LLMs rarely show any progress despite employing reliable prompts. Therefore, we further propose an alignment strategy to enhance small LLMs' reliability, which can significantly improve LLM reliability performances on both in-domain and out-of-domain tasks.

Large language models have been shown to suffer from reasoning inconsistency issues. That is, they fail more in situations unfamiliar to the training data, even though exact or very similar reasoning paths exist in more common cases that they can successfully solve. Such observations motivate us to propose methods that encourage models to understand the high-level and abstract reasoning processes during training instead of only the final answer. This way, models can transfer the exact solution to similar cases, regardless of their relevance to the pre-training data distribution. In this work, we propose SAL, a self-supervised analogical learning framework. SAL mimics the human analogy process and trains models to explicitly transfer high-quality symbolic solutions from cases that they know how to solve to other rare cases in which they tend to fail more. We show that the resulting models after SAL learning outperform base language models on a wide range of reasoning benchmarks, such as StrategyQA, GSM8K, and HotpotQA, by 2% to 20%. At the same time, we show that our model is more generalizable and controllable through analytical studies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive reasoning abilities through test-time computation (TTC) techniques such as chain-of-thought prompting and tree-based reasoning. However, we argue that current reasoning LLMs (RLLMs) lack the ability to systematically explore the solution space. This paper formalizes what constitutes systematic problem solving and identifies common failure modes that reveal reasoning LLMs to be wanderers rather than systematic explorers. Through qualitative and quantitative analysis across multiple state-of-the-art LLMs, we uncover persistent issues: invalid reasoning steps, redundant explorations, hallucinated or unfaithful conclusions, and so on. Our findings suggest that current models' performance can appear to be competent on simple tasks yet degrade sharply as complexity increases. Based on the findings, we advocate for new metrics and tools that evaluate not just final outputs but the structure of the reasoning process itself.

Deployed multimodal systems can fail in ways that evaluators did not anticipate. In order to find these failures before deployment, we introduce MultiMon, a system that automatically identifies systematic failures -- generalizable, natural-language descriptions of patterns of model failures. To uncover systematic failures, MultiMon scrapes a corpus for examples of erroneous agreement: inputs that produce the same output, but should not. It then prompts a language model (e.g., GPT-4) to find systematic patterns of failure and describe them in natural language. We use MultiMon to find 14 systematic failures (e.g., "ignores quantifiers") of the CLIP text-encoder, each comprising hundreds of distinct inputs (e.g., "a shelf with a few/many books"). Because CLIP is the backbone for most state-of-the-art multimodal systems, these inputs produce failures in Midjourney 5.1, DALL-E, VideoFusion, and others. MultiMon can also steer towards failures relevant to specific use cases, such as self-driving cars. We see MultiMon as a step towards evaluation that autonomously explores the long tail of potential system failures. Code for MULTIMON is available at https://github.com/tsb0601/MultiMon.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in complex reasoning tasks, but their inference remains computationally inefficient. We observe a common failure mode in many prevalent LLMs, overthinking, where models generate verbose and tangential reasoning traces even for simple queries. Recent works have tried to mitigate this by enforcing fixed token budgets, however, this can lead to underthinking, especially on harder problems. Through empirical analysis, we identify that this inefficiency often stems from unclear problem-solving strategies. To formalize this, we develop a theoretical model, BBAM (Bayesian Budget Allocation Model), which models reasoning as a sequence of sub-questions with varying uncertainty, and introduce the E^3 metric to capture the trade-off between correctness and computation efficiency. Building on theoretical results from BBAM, we propose Plan-and-Budget, a model-agnostic, test-time framework that decomposes complex queries into sub-questions and allocates token budgets based on estimated complexity using adaptive scheduling. Plan-and-Budget improves reasoning efficiency across a range of tasks and models, achieving up to +70% accuracy gains, -39% token reduction, and +187.5% improvement in E^3. Notably, it elevates a smaller model (DS-Qwen-32B) to match the efficiency of a larger model (DS-LLaMA-70B)-demonstrating Plan-and-Budget's ability to close performance gaps without retraining. Our code is available at anonymous.4open.science/r/P-and-B-6513/.

Large language model agents increasingly operate through an intermediate skill layer that mediates between user intent and concrete task execution. This layer is widely treated as an organizational abstraction, but we argue it is also a privilege boundary that current models routinely exceed. We present FORTIS, a benchmark that evaluates over-privilege in agent skills across two stages: whether a model selects the minimally sufficient skill from a large overlapping library, and whether it executes that skill without expanding into broader tools or actions than the skill permits. Across ten frontier models and three domains, we find that over-privileged behavior is the norm rather than the exception. Models consistently reach for higher-privilege skills and tools than the task requires, failing at both stages at rates that remain high even for the strongest available models. Failure is especially severe under the ordinary conditions of real user interaction: incomplete specification, convenience framing, and proximity to skill boundaries. None of these requires adversarial construction. The results indicate that the skill layer, far from containing agent behavior, is itself a primary source of privilege escalation in current systems.

LLMs increasingly exhibit over-refusal behavior, where safety mechanisms cause models to reject benign instructions that superficially resemble harmful content. This phenomena diminishes utility in production applications that repeatedly rely on common prompt templates or applications that frequently rely on LLMs for specific tasks (e.g. sentiment analysis, language translation). Through comprehensive evaluation, we demonstrate that LLMs still tend to refuse responses to harmful instructions when those instructions are reframed to appear as benign tasks. Our mechanistic analysis reveal that LLMs follow distinct "constellation" patterns in embedding space as representations traverse layers, with each task maintaining consistent trajectories that shift predictably between refusal and non-refusal cases. We introduce SafeConstellations, an inference-time trajectory-shifting approach that tracks task-specific trajectory patterns and guides representations toward non-refusal pathways. By selectively guiding model behavior only on tasks prone to over-refusal, and by preserving general model behavior, our method reduces over-refusal rates by up to 73% with minimal impact on utility-offering a principled approach to mitigating over-refusals.

Multimodal large language models (MLLMs) are increasingly deployed in open-ended, real-world environments where inputs are messy, underspecified, and not always trustworthy. Unlike curated benchmarks, these settings frequently involve instructions that refer to missing objects or contradictory facts, rely on ambiguous references, or request infeasible actions. In such cases, success hinges not on task execution alone, but on a model's ability to detect when something is silently wrong. This paper presents a systematic analysis of how current MLLMs handle such implicit reasoning scenarios: cases where the flaw is not explicitly stated but must be inferred from context. Using a curated diagnostic suite spanning four categories of real-world failure modes, we evaluate six MLLMs, including o3 and GPT-4o, and find that models frequently fail to surface hidden issues, even when they possess the necessary perceptual and reasoning skills. Explicit prompting reveals that the underlying capabilities exist but are often suppressed in favor of user compliance. We further show that simple inference-time interventions, such as cautious persona prompting and, in particular, requiring a clarifying question, can dramatically recover performance. Our findings highlight a persistent gap between reasoning competence and behavioral compliance in current MLLMs and suggest practical strategies for making these models more trustworthy in underconstrained environments.

Refusals - instances where large language models (LLMs) decline or fail to fully execute user instructions - are crucial for both AI safety and AI capabilities and the reduction of hallucinations in particular. These behaviors are learned during post-training, especially in instruction fine-tuning (IFT) and reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). However, existing taxonomies and evaluation datasets for refusals are inadequate, often focusing solely on should-not-related (instead of cannot-related) categories, and lacking tools for auditing refusal content in black-box LLM outputs. We present a comprehensive framework for classifying LLM refusals: (a) a taxonomy of 16 refusal categories, (b) a human-annotated dataset of over 8,600 instances from publicly available IFT and RLHF datasets, (c) a synthetic dataset with 8,000 examples for each refusal category, and (d) classifiers trained for refusal classification. Our work enables precise auditing of refusal behaviors in black-box LLMs and automatic analyses of refusal patterns in large IFT and RLHF datasets. This facilitates the strategic adjustment of LLM refusals, contributing to the development of more safe and reliable LLMs.

Large language models have demonstrated impressive performance on challenging mathematical reasoning tasks, which has triggered the discussion of whether the performance is achieved by true reasoning capability or memorization. To investigate this question, prior work has constructed mathematical benchmarks when questions undergo simple perturbations -- modifications that still preserve the underlying reasoning patterns of the solutions. However, no work has explored hard perturbations, which fundamentally change the nature of the problem so that the original solution steps do not apply. To bridge the gap, we construct MATH-P-Simple and MATH-P-Hard via simple perturbation and hard perturbation, respectively. Each consists of 279 perturbed math problems derived from level-5 (hardest) problems in the MATH dataset (Hendrycksmath et. al., 2021). We observe significant performance drops on MATH-P-Hard across various models, including o1-mini (-16.49%) and gemini-2.0-flash-thinking (-12.9%). We also raise concerns about a novel form of memorization where models blindly apply learned problem-solving skills without assessing their applicability to modified contexts. This issue is amplified when using original problems for in-context learning. We call for research efforts to address this challenge, which is critical for developing more robust and reliable reasoning models.

Although synthetic data is widely promoted as a remedy, its prevailing production paradigm -- one optimizing for statistical smoothness -- systematically removes the long-tail, cognitively grounded irregularities that characterize human text. Prolonged training on such statistically optimal but cognitively impoverished data accelerates model collapse. This paper proposes a paradigm shift: instead of imitating the surface properties of data, we simulate the cognitive processes that generate human text. We introduce the Prompt-driven Cognitive Computing Framework (PMCSF), whose core consists of a Cognitive State Decoder (CSD) that reverse-engineers unstructured text into structured cognitive vectors, and a Cognitive Text Encoder (CTE) that re-materializes these states into text enriched with human-typical imperfections via mathematically defined Cognitive Perturbation Operators. The framework is validated through a two-stage objective evaluation pipeline. First, in cognitive codec verification, CTE text yields a Jensen-Shannon divergence of 0.0614 from human text (vs. 0.4431 for standard LLM output), passes double-blind professional media review, and achieves an intraclass correlation coefficient ICC > 0.9 for cognitive profile alignment across heterogeneous models. Second, in functional gain evaluation, isomorphic stress tests in the A-share market show that strategies incorporating CTE-generated data reduce maximum drawdown by 47.4% during the 2015 crash and deliver 8.6% Defensive Alpha, exceeding transaction costs by a factor of 33. Our findings demonstrate that modelling human cognitive limitations -- not copying surface data -- enables synthetic data with genuine functional gain, offering a viable technical pathway toward resolving the AI data-collapse crisis.

A moderately detailed consideration of interactive LLMs as cognitive systems is given, focusing on LLMs circa mid-2023 such as ChatGPT, GPT-4, Bard, Llama, etc.. Cognitive strengths of these systems are reviewed, and then careful attention is paid to the substantial differences between the sort of cognitive system these LLMs are, and the sort of cognitive systems human beings are. It is found that many of the practical weaknesses of these AI systems can be tied specifically to lacks in the basic cognitive architectures according to which these systems are built. It is argued that incremental improvement of such LLMs is not a viable approach to working toward human-level AGI, in practical terms given realizable amounts of compute resources. This does not imply there is nothing to learn about human-level AGI from studying and experimenting with LLMs, nor that LLMs cannot form significant parts of human-level AGI architectures that also incorporate other ideas. Social and ethical matters regarding LLMs are very briefly touched from this perspective, which implies that while care should be taken regarding misinformation and other issues, and economic upheavals will need their own social remedies based on their unpredictable course as with any powerfully impactful technology, overall the sort of policy needed as regards modern LLMs is quite different than would be the case if a more credible approximation to human-level AGI were at hand.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

Majority voting over multiple LLM attempts improves mathematical reasoning, but correlated errors limit the effective sample size. A natural fix is to assign different reasoning strategies to different voters. The approach, Diverse Prompt Mixer, is tested on the AIMO 3 competition: 3 models, 23+ experiments, 50 IMO-level problems, one H100 80 GB, 5-hour limit. Every prompt-level intervention fails. High-temperature sampling already decorrelates errors; weaker strategies reduce accuracy more than they reduce correlation. Across an 8-point capability gap at equal N=8 and every optimization tested, model capability dominates. The gap between the best majority-vote score (42/50) and pass@20 (~45.5) is selection loss, not prompt loss. A verifier-based selector could close it. Prompt engineering cannot.

The performance of large language models (LLMs) on existing reasoning benchmarks has significantly improved over the past years. In response, we present JEEBench, a considerably more challenging benchmark dataset for evaluating the problem solving abilities of LLMs. We curate 515 challenging pre-engineering mathematics, physics and chemistry problems from the highly competitive IIT JEE-Advanced exam. Long-horizon reasoning on top of deep in-domain knowledge is essential for solving problems in this benchmark. Our evaluation on various open-source and proprietary models reveals that the highest performance, even after using techniques like self-consistency, self-refinement and chain-of-thought prompting, is less than 40%. The typical failure modes of GPT-4, the best model, are errors in algebraic manipulation, difficulty in grounding abstract concepts into mathematical equations accurately and failure in retrieving relevant domain-specific concepts. We also observe that by mere prompting, GPT-4 is unable to assess risk introduced by negative marking for incorrect answers. For this, we develop a post-hoc confidence-thresholding method over self-consistency, which enables effective response selection. We hope that our challenging benchmark will guide future re-search in problem-solving using LLMs.

Multilingual generation with large language models (LLMs) is often of poor quality for mid- to low-resource languages. Building on insights from interpretability, we demonstrate the existence of an implicit task-solving-->translation pipeline for generation, whereby the model first solves the required task in a largely target-language-agnostic manner, and subsequently translates answer concepts into the intended target language. We hypothesize that the failure of the translation stage is an important culprit for the observed low quality of final outputs, and formalize this as the translation barrier hypothesis. We test this hypothesis for a word translation task across 108 language pairs, using logit lens to observe model processing in intermediate layers. We find that a significant portion of overall failures indeed stems from translation failure, or the model's inability to translate correctly solved intermediate concepts into the target language. This is especially true for low-resource target languages. Our results highlight an important hurdle for end-to-end multilingual generation, and lend guiding insights for future work seeking to improve multilinguality in LLMs.

Recent advancements in artificial intelligence have led to the creation of highly capable large language models (LLMs) that can perform tasks in a human-like manner. However, LLMs exhibit only infant-level cognitive abilities in certain areas. One such area is the A-Not-B error, a phenomenon seen in infants where they repeat a previously rewarded behavior despite well-observed changed conditions. This highlights their lack of inhibitory control -- the ability to stop a habitual or impulsive response. In our work, we design a text-based multi-choice QA scenario similar to the A-Not-B experimental settings to systematically test the inhibitory control abilities of LLMs. We found that state-of-the-art LLMs (like Llama3-8b) perform consistently well with in-context learning (ICL) but make errors and show a significant drop of as many as 83.3% in reasoning tasks when the context changes trivially. This suggests that LLMs only have inhibitory control abilities on par with human infants in this regard, often failing to suppress the previously established response pattern during ICL.

Vision-language Models (VLMs), despite achieving strong performance on multimodal benchmarks, often misinterpret straightforward visual concepts that humans identify effortlessly, such as counting, spatial reasoning, and viewpoint understanding. Previous studies manually identified these weaknesses and found that they often stem from deficits in specific skills. However, such manual efforts are costly, unscalable, and subject to human bias, which often overlooks subtle details in favor of salient objects, resulting in an incomplete understanding of a model's vulnerabilities. To address these limitations, we propose a Reinforcement Learning (RL)-based framework to automatically discover the failure modes or blind spots of any candidate VLM on a given data distribution without human intervention. Our framework trains a questioner agent that adaptively generates queries based on the candidate VLM's responses to elicit incorrect answers. Our approach increases question complexity by focusing on fine-grained visual details and distinct skill compositions as training progresses, consequently identifying 36 novel failure modes in which VLMs struggle. We demonstrate the broad applicability of our framework by showcasing its generalizability across various model combinations.

Frontier coding agents solve complex tasks when given complete context but collapse when specifications are incomplete or ambiguous. The bottleneck is not raw capability, but judgment: knowing when to act autonomously and when to ask for help. Current benchmarks are blind to this failure mode. They supply unambiguous detailed instructions and solely reward execution correctness, so an agent that makes a lucky guess for a missing requirement will score identically to one that would have asked to be certain. We present HiL-Bench (Human-in-the-Loop Benchmark) to measure this selective escalation skill. Each task contains human-validated blockers (missing information, ambiguous requests, contradictory information) that surface only through progressive exploration, not upfront inspection. Our core metric, Ask-F1, the harmonic mean of question precision and blocker recall, captures the tension between over-asking and silent guessing; its structure architecturally prevents gaming through question spam. Evaluation across SWE and text-to-SQL domains reveals a large universal judgment gap: no frontier model recovers more than a fraction of its full-information performance when deciding whether to ask. Failure analysis identifies three key help-seeking patterns: overconfident wrong beliefs with no gap detection; high uncertainty detection yet persistent errors; broad, imprecise escalation without self-correction. These consistent patterns confirm poor help-seeking is a model-level flaw, not task-specific. RL training on shaped Ask-F1 reward shows judgment is trainable: a 32B model improves both help-seeking quality and task pass rate, with gains that transfer across domains. The model does not learn domain-specific heuristics for when to ask; it learns to detect unresolvable uncertainty and act on it.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable performance across a wide range of mathematical benchmarks. However, concerns remain as to whether these successes reflect genuine reasoning or superficial pattern recognition. Existing evaluation methods, which typically focus either on the final answer or on the intermediate reasoning steps, reduce mathematical reasoning to a shallow input-output mapping, overlooking its inherently multi-stage and multi-dimensional cognitive nature. Inspired by Polya's problem-solving theory, we propose SMART, a benchmark that decomposes mathematical problem-solving into four cognitive dimensions: Semantic Understanding, Mathematical Reasoning, Arithmetic Computation, and Reflection & Refinement, and introduces dimension-specific tasks to measure the corresponding cognitive processes of LLMs. We apply SMART to 22 state-of-the-art open- and closed-source LLMs and uncover substantial discrepancies in their capabilities across dimensions. Our findings reveal genuine weaknesses in current models and motivate a new metric, the All-Pass Score, designed to better capture true problem-solving capability.

Human intelligence thrives on the concept of cognitive synergy, where collaboration and information integration among different cognitive processes yield superior outcomes compared to individual cognitive processes in isolation. Although Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated promising performance as general task-solving agents, they still struggle with tasks that require intensive domain knowledge and complex reasoning. In this work, we propose Solo Performance Prompting (SPP), which transforms a single LLM into a cognitive synergist by engaging in multi-turn self-collaboration with multiple personas. A cognitive synergist refers to an intelligent agent that collaborates with multiple minds, combining their individual strengths and knowledge, to enhance problem-solving and overall performance in complex tasks. By dynamically identifying and simulating different personas based on task inputs, SPP unleashes the potential of cognitive synergy in LLMs. We have discovered that assigning multiple, fine-grained personas in LLMs elicits better problem-solving abilities compared to using a single or fixed number of personas. We evaluate SPP on three challenging tasks: Trivia Creative Writing, Codenames Collaborative, and Logic Grid Puzzle, encompassing both knowledge-intensive and reasoning-intensive types. Unlike previous works, such as Chain-of-Thought, that solely enhance the reasoning abilities in LLMs, SPP effectively elicits internal knowledge acquisition abilities, reduces hallucination, and maintains strong reasoning capabilities. Code, data, and prompts can be found at: https://github.com/MikeWangWZHL/Solo-Performance-Prompting.git.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) excel at complex reasoning but are traditionally evaluated in static, "frozen world" settings: model responses are assumed to be instantaneous, and the context of a request is presumed to be immutable over the duration of the response. While generally true for short-term tasks, the "frozen world" assumption breaks down in modern reasoning tasks such as assistive programming, where models may take hours to think through problems and code may change dramatically from the time the model starts thinking to the model's final output. In this work, we challenge the frozen world assumption and evaluate LRM robustness under two realistic dynamic scenarios: interruptions, which test the quality of the model's partial outputs on a limited budget, and dynamic context, which tests model adaptation to in-flight changes. Across mathematics and programming benchmarks that require long-form reasoning, static evaluations consistently overestimate robustness: even state-of-the-art LRMs, which achieve high accuracy in static settings, can fail unpredictably when interrupted or exposed to changing context, with performance dropping by up to 60% when updates are introduced late in the reasoning process. Our analysis further reveals several novel failure modes, including reasoning leakage, where models fold the reasoning into their final answer when interrupted; panic, where under time pressure models abandon reasoning entirely and return incorrect answers; and self-doubt, where performance degrades while incorporating updated information.

Analogical reasoning is at the core of human cognition, serving as an important foundation for a variety of intellectual activities. While prior work has shown that LLMs can represent task patterns and surface-level concepts, it remains unclear whether these models can encode high-level relational concepts and apply them to novel situations through structured comparisons. In this work, we explore this fundamental aspect using proportional and story analogies, and identify three key findings. First, LLMs effectively encode the underlying relationships between analogous entities; both attributive and relational information propagate through mid-upper layers in correct cases, whereas reasoning failures reflect missing relational information within these layers. Second, unlike humans, LLMs often struggle not only when relational information is missing, but also when attempting to apply it to new entities. In such cases, strategically patching hidden representations at critical token positions can facilitate information transfer to a certain extent. Lastly, successful analogical reasoning in LLMs is marked by strong structural alignment between analogous situations, whereas failures often reflect degraded or misplaced alignment. Overall, our findings reveal that LLMs exhibit emerging but limited capabilities in encoding and applying high-level relational concepts, highlighting both parallels and gaps with human cognition.

The advancement of large language model (LLM) based agents has shifted AI evaluation from single-turn response assessment to multi-step task completion in interactive environments. We present an empirical study evaluating frontier AI models on 150 workplace tasks within a realistic e-commerce RL environment from Surge. Our analysis reveals an empirically-derived hierarchy of agentic capabilities that models must master for real-world deployment: (1) tool use, (2) planning and goal formation, (3) adaptability, (4) groundedness, and (5) common-sense reasoning. Even the best-performing models fail approximately 40\% of the tasks, with failures clustering predictably along this hierarchy. Weaker models struggle with fundamental tool use and planning, whereas stronger models primarily fail on tasks requiring contextual inference beyond explicit instructions. We introduce a task-centric design methodology for RL environments that emphasizes diversity and domain expert contributions, provide detailed failure analysis, and discuss implications for agent development. Our findings suggest that while current frontier models can demonstrate coherent multi-step behavior, substantial capability gaps remain before achieving human-level task completion in realistic workplace settings.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) have been routinely used to solve various tasks using step-by-step reasoning. However, the structure of intermediate reasoning steps, or thoughts, is rigid and unidirectional, such as chains, trees, or acyclic-directed graphs. Consequently, the resulting inflexible and forward-only reasoning may not address challenging tasks and fail when the LLM frequently gives false responses, i.e., ``hallucinations''. This paper proposes a new reasoning framework, called Thought Rollback (TR), allowing LLMs to adaptively build thought structure while maintaining effective reasoning toward problem-solving under ``hallucinations''. The core mechanism of TR is rolling back thoughts, which allows LLMs to perform error analysis on thoughts, and thus roll back to any previously mistaken thought for revision. Subsequently, by including such trial-and-error in the prompt to guide the LLM, each rollback leads to one more reliable reasoning path. Therefore, starting with a simple prompt without human annotations, LLM with TR adaptively and gradually explores thoughts for a correct solution. Comprehensive experiments on mathematical problems and multi-task reasoning demonstrate the state-of-the-art performance of TR in terms of problem-solving rate and interaction cost. For instance, the solving rate of GPT-4 with TR outperforms the current best by 9% on the MATH dataset.

Large language models (LLMs) such as OpenAI's o1 have demonstrated remarkable abilities in complex reasoning tasks by scaling test-time compute and exhibiting human-like deep thinking. However, we identify a phenomenon we term underthinking, where o1-like LLMs frequently switch between different reasoning thoughts without sufficiently exploring promising paths to reach a correct solution. This behavior leads to inadequate depth of reasoning and decreased performance, particularly on challenging mathematical problems. To systematically analyze this issue, we conduct experiments on three challenging test sets and two representative open-source o1-like models, revealing that frequent thought switching correlates with incorrect responses. We introduce a novel metric to quantify underthinking by measuring token efficiency in incorrect answers. To address underthinking, we propose a decoding strategy with thought switching penalty TIP that discourages premature transitions between thoughts, encouraging deeper exploration of each reasoning path. Experimental results demonstrate that our approach improves accuracy across challenging datasets without requiring model fine-tuning. Our findings contribute to understanding reasoning inefficiencies in o1-like LLMs and offer a practical solution to enhance their problem-solving capabilities.

The nature of abstract reasoning is a matter of debate. Modern artificial neural network (ANN) models, like large language models, demonstrate impressive success when tested on abstract reasoning problems. However, it has been argued that their success reflects some form of memorization of similar problems (data contamination) rather than a general-purpose abstract reasoning capability. This concern is supported by evidence of brittleness, and the requirement of extensive training. In our study, we explored whether abstract reasoning can be achieved using the toolbox of ANNs, without prior training. Specifically, we studied an ANN model in which the weights of a naive network are optimized during the solution of the problem, using the problem data itself, rather than any prior knowledge. We tested this modeling approach on visual reasoning problems and found that it performs relatively well. Crucially, this success does not rely on memorization of similar problems. We further suggest an explanation of how it works. Finally, as problem solving is performed by changing the ANN weights, we explored the connection between problem solving and the accumulation of knowledge in the ANNs.

We report an exploratory red-teaming study of autonomous language-model-powered agents deployed in a live laboratory environment with persistent memory, email accounts, Discord access, file systems, and shell execution. Over a two-week period, twenty AI researchers interacted with the agents under benign and adversarial conditions. Focusing on failures emerging from the integration of language models with autonomy, tool use, and multi-party communication, we document eleven representative case studies. Observed behaviors include unauthorized compliance with non-owners, disclosure of sensitive information, execution of destructive system-level actions, denial-of-service conditions, uncontrolled resource consumption, identity spoofing vulnerabilities, cross-agent propagation of unsafe practices, and partial system takeover. In several cases, agents reported task completion while the underlying system state contradicted those reports. We also report on some of the failed attempts. Our findings establish the existence of security-, privacy-, and governance-relevant vulnerabilities in realistic deployment settings. These behaviors raise unresolved questions regarding accountability, delegated authority, and responsibility for downstream harms, and warrant urgent attention from legal scholars, policymakers, and researchers across disciplines. This report serves as an initial empirical contribution to that broader conversation.

In this paper, we present an investigative study on how Mental Sets influence the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. LLMs have excelled in diverse natural language processing (NLP) tasks, driven by advancements in parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) and emergent capabilities like in-context learning (ICL). For complex reasoning tasks, selecting the right model for PEFT or ICL is critical, often relying on scores on benchmarks such as MMLU, MATH, and GSM8K. However, current evaluation methods, based on metrics like F1 Score or reasoning chain assessments by larger models, overlook a key dimension: adaptability to unfamiliar situations and overcoming entrenched thinking patterns. In cognitive psychology, Mental Set refers to the tendency to persist with previously successful strategies, even when they become inefficient - a challenge for problem solving and reasoning. We compare the performance of LLM models like Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct and GPT-4o in the presence of mental sets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to integrate cognitive psychology concepts into the evaluation of LLMs for complex reasoning tasks, providing deeper insights into their adaptability and problem-solving efficacy.

People often optimize for long-term goals in collaboration: A mentor or companion doesn't just answer questions, but also scaffolds learning, tracks progress, and prioritizes the other person's growth over immediate results. In contrast, current AI systems are fundamentally short-sighted collaborators - optimized for providing instant and complete responses, without ever saying no (unless for safety reasons). What are the consequences of this dynamic? Here, through a series of randomized controlled trials on human-AI interactions (N = 1,222), we provide causal evidence for two key consequences of AI assistance: reduced persistence and impairment of unassisted performance. Across a variety of tasks, including mathematical reasoning and reading comprehension, we find that although AI assistance improves performance in the short-term, people perform significantly worse without AI and are more likely to give up. Notably, these effects emerge after only brief interactions with AI (approximately 10 minutes). These findings are particularly concerning because persistence is foundational to skill acquisition and is one of the strongest predictors of long-term learning. We posit that persistence is reduced because AI conditions people to expect immediate answers, thereby denying them the experience of working through challenges on their own. These results suggest the need for AI model development to prioritize scaffolding long-term competence alongside immediate task completion.

During the evolution of large models, performance evaluation is necessarily performed to assess their capabilities and ensure safety before practical application. However, current model evaluations mainly rely on specific tasks and datasets, lacking a united framework for assessing the multidimensional intelligence of large models. In this perspective, we advocate for a comprehensive framework of cognitive science-inspired artificial general intelligence (AGI) tests, aimed at fulfilling the testing needs of large models with enhanced capabilities. The cognitive science-inspired AGI tests encompass the full spectrum of intelligence facets, including crystallized intelligence, fluid intelligence, social intelligence, and embodied intelligence. To assess the multidimensional intelligence of large models, the AGI tests consist of a battery of well-designed cognitive tests adopted from human intelligence tests, and then naturally encapsulates into an immersive virtual community. We propose increasing the complexity of AGI testing tasks commensurate with advancements in large models and emphasizing the necessity for the interpretation of test results to avoid false negatives and false positives. We believe that cognitive science-inspired AGI tests will effectively guide the targeted improvement of large models in specific dimensions of intelligence and accelerate the integration of large models into human society.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable success in code generation, and the race to improve their performance has become a central focus of AI research. Benchmarks and leaderboards are increasingly popular, offering quantitative rankings of LLMs. However, they provide limited insight into the tasks that LLMs consistently fail to solve - information that is crucial for understanding current limitations and guiding the development of more capable models. To address this gap, we examined code generation tasks across four popular benchmarks, identifying those that major LLMs are most likely to fail. To understand the causes of these failures, we investigated whether the static complexity of solution code contributes to them, followed by a systematic inspection of 114 tasks that LLMs consistently struggled with. Our analysis revealed four recurring patterns of weaknesses in LLMs, as well as common complications within benchmark tasks that most often lead to failure.

Multimodal hallucination in multimodal large language models (MLLMs) restricts the correctness of MLLMs. However, multimodal hallucinations are multi-sourced and arise from diverse causes. Existing benchmarks fail to adequately distinguish between perception-induced hallucinations and reasoning-induced hallucinations. This failure constitutes a significant issue and hinders the diagnosis of multimodal reasoning failures within MLLMs. To address this, we propose the {\dataset} benchmark, which isolates reasoning hallucinations by constructing questions where input images are correctly perceived by MLLMs yet reasoning errors persist. {\dataset} introduces multi-granular evaluation metrics: accuracy, factuality, and LLMs hallucination score for hallucination quantification. Our analysis reveals that (1) the model scale, data scale, and training stages significantly affect the degree of logical, fabrication, and factual hallucinations; (2) current MLLMs show no effective improvement on spatial hallucinations caused by misinterpreted spatial relationships, indicating their limited visual reasoning capabilities; and (3) question types correlate with distinct hallucination patterns, highlighting targeted challenges and potential mitigation strategies. To address these challenges, we propose {\method}, a method that combines curriculum reinforcement fine-tuning to encourage models to generate logic-consistent reasoning chains by stepwise reducing learning difficulty, and collaborative hint inference to reduce reasoning complexity. {\method} establishes a baseline on {\dataset}, and reduces the logical hallucinations in original base models.