Daily Papers

This paper documents and theorises a self-reinforcing dynamic between two measurable trends: the exponential expansion of large language model (LLM) context windows and the secular contraction of human sustained-attention capacity. We term the resulting asymmetry the Cognitive Divergence. AI context windows have grown from 512 tokens in 2017 to 2,000,000 tokens by 2026 (factor ~3,906; fitted lambda = 0.59/yr; doubling time ~14 months). Over the same period, human Effective Context Span (ECS) -- a token-equivalent measure derived from validated reading-rate meta-analysis (Brysbaert, 2019) and an empirically motivated Comprehension Scaling Factor -- has declined from approximately 16,000 tokens (2004 baseline) to an estimated 1,800 tokens (2026, extrapolated from longitudinal behavioural data ending 2020 (Mark, 2023); see Section 9 for uncertainty discussion). The AI-to-human ratio grew from near parity at the ChatGPT launch (November 2022) to 556--1,111x raw and 56--111x quality-adjusted, after accounting for retrieval degradation (Liu et al., 2024; Chroma, 2025). Beyond documenting this divergence, the paper introduces the Delegation Feedback Loop hypothesis: as AI capability grows, the cognitive threshold at which humans delegate to AI falls, extending to tasks of negligible demand; the resulting reduction in cognitive practice may further attenuate the capacities already documented as declining (Gerlich, 2025; Kim et al., 2026; Kosmyna et al., 2025). Neither trend reverses spontaneously. The paper characterises the divergence statistically, reviews neurobiological mechanisms across eight peer-reviewed neuroimaging studies, presents empirical evidence bearing on the delegation threshold, and proposes a research agenda centred on a validated ECS psychometric instrument and longitudinal study of AI-mediated cognitive change.

As AI capabilities increasingly surpass human proficiency in complex tasks, current alignment techniques including SFT and RLHF face fundamental challenges in ensuring reliable oversight. These methods rely on direct human assessment and become untenable when AI outputs exceed human cognitive thresholds. In response to this challenge, we explore two hypotheses: (1) critique of critique can be easier than critique itself, extending the widely-accepted observation that verification is easier than generation to the critique domain, as critique itself is a specialized form of generation; (2) this difficulty relationship is recursively held, suggesting that when direct evaluation is infeasible, performing high-order critiques (e.g., critique of critique of critique) offers a more tractable supervision pathway. To examine these hypotheses, we perform Human-Human, Human-AI, and AI-AI experiments across multiple tasks. Our results demonstrate encouraging evidence supporting these hypotheses and suggest that recursive self-critiquing is a promising direction for scalable oversight.

AI systems increasingly produce fluent, correct, end-to-end outcomes. Over time, this erodes users' ability to explain, verify, or intervene. We define this divergence as the Capability-Comprehension Gap: a decoupling where assisted performance improves while users' internal models deteriorate. This paper argues that prevailing approaches to transparency, user control, literacy, and governance do not define the foundational understanding humans must retain for oversight under sustained AI delegation. To formalize this, we define the Cognitive Integrity Threshold (CIT) as the minimum comprehension required to preserve oversight, autonomy, and accountable participation under AI assistance. CIT does not require full reasoning reconstruction, nor does it constrain automation. It identifies the threshold beyond which oversight becomes procedural and contestability fails. We operatinalize CIT through three functional dimensions: (i) verification capacity, (ii) comprehension-preserving interaction, and (iii) institutional scaffolds for governance. This motivates a design and governance agenda that aligns human-AI interaction with cognitive sustainability in responsibility-critical settings.

Frontier deep research agents (DRAs) plan a research task, synthesize across documents, and return a structured deliverable on demand. They are being deployed in enterprise workflows faster than they are being evaluated. Existing benchmarks measure factual recall, single-hop QA, or generic agentic skill, missing the multi-document, decision-grade work DRAs are deployed to produce. We introduce a benchmark targeting the structured analytical deliverables that fill a management consultant's typical week. We grade three frontier agents, namely Claude Opus 4.6 with web search, OpenAI o3-deep-research, and Google Gemini 3.1 Pro deep-research, on 42 SME-authored prompts. Each of the 126 responses is scored on two layers: deterministic ground-truth verifiers (mean 13.8 per task) and a five-criterion 0-3 SME rubric, composed into a Verifier-Rubric Score (VRS) on 0-100. Most prompts embed cognitive traps that penalize surface-pattern matching. Acceptance under our joint threshold (rubric mean >= 2.5 and verifier rate >= 80%) is uniformly low: Gemini 21.4%, o3 9.5%, Claude 9.5%. Mean VRS scores agree with published rubric-based benchmarks (our top 62.6 vs. APEX-v1 64.2, ProfBench 65.9, ResearchRubrics < 68%), validating the rubric construct. ACCEPT rates sit below APEX-Agents' MC-segment Pass@1 band (12.3-22.7%) on dedicated DR agents; our floor is three points lower despite the harness advantage, opened by stricter conjunctive grading and trap design. Each agent fails distinctively. Claude produces the deliverable most reliably (4.5x the others' rate on file-required tasks) but carries the highest fabrication signature. o3 has the cleanest reasoning average yet drops required sections and propagates arithmetic errors. Gemini is bimodal, with the highest acceptance rate alongside the most zero-scored rubric cells.

Existing agent memory remains predominantly reactive and retrieval-based, lacking the capacity to autonomously organize experience into persistent cognitive structure. Toward genuinely autonomous agents, we introduce Cognifold, a brain-inspired "always-on" agent memory designed for the next generation of proactive assistants. CogniFold continuously folds fragmented event streams into self-emerging cognitive structures, bootstrapping progressively higher-level cognition from incoming events and accumulated knowledge. We ground this by extending Complementary Learning Systems (CLS) theory from two layers (hippocampus, neocortex) to three, adding a prefrontal intent layer. Emulating the prefrontal cortex as the locus of intentional control and decision-making, CogniFold achieves this through graph-topology self-organization: cognitive structures proactively assemble under the stream, merge when semantically similar, decay when stale, relink through associative recall, and surface intents when concept-cluster density crosses a threshold. We evaluate structural formation using CogEval-Bench, demonstrating that CogniFold uniquely produces memory structures that match cognitive expectations and concept emergence. Furthermore, across 7 broad-coverage benchmarks spanning five cognitive domains, we validate that CogniFold simultaneously performs robustly on conventional memory benchmarks.

We present a fundamental discovery that challenges our understanding of how complex reasoning emerges in large language models. While conventional wisdom suggests that sophisticated reasoning tasks demand extensive training data (>100,000 examples), we demonstrate that complex mathematical reasoning abilities can be effectively elicited with surprisingly few examples. Through comprehensive experiments, our proposed model LIMO demonstrates unprecedented performance in mathematical reasoning. With merely 817 curated training samples, LIMO achieves 57.1% accuracy on AIME and 94.8% on MATH, improving from previous SFT-based models' 6.5% and 59.2% respectively, while only using 1% of the training data required by previous approaches. LIMO demonstrates exceptional out-of-distribution generalization, achieving 40.5% absolute improvement across 10 diverse benchmarks, outperforming models trained on 100x more data, challenging the notion that SFT leads to memorization rather than generalization. Based on these results, we propose the Less-Is-More Reasoning Hypothesis (LIMO Hypothesis): In foundation models where domain knowledge has been comprehensively encoded during pre-training, sophisticated reasoning capabilities can emerge through minimal but precisely orchestrated demonstrations of cognitive processes. This hypothesis posits that the elicitation threshold for complex reasoning is determined by two key factors: (1) the completeness of the model's encoded knowledge foundation during pre-training, and (2) the effectiveness of post-training examples as "cognitive templates" that show the model how to utilize its knowledge base to solve complex reasoning tasks. To facilitate reproducibility and future research in data-efficient reasoning, we release LIMO as a comprehensive open-source suite at https://github.com/GAIR-NLP/LIMO.

Chain-of-thought prompting has emerged as a powerful technique for enabling large language models (LLMs) to solve complex reasoning tasks. However, these reasoning chains can be verbose, raising concerns about efficiency. In response, recent works have sought to decrease response lengths through simple prompting strategies (e.g. 'be concise'). In this work, we conduct the first systematic study of the relationship between reasoning length and model performance across a diverse range of compression instructions (e.g. 'use 10 words or less' or 'remove all punctuation'). In doing so, we discover a universal tradeoff between reasoning length and accuracy that persists across even very distinct reasoning chains. We demonstrate that this tradeoff emerges from a sharp threshold behavior at the question level: each task has an intrinsic 'token complexity' - a minimal number of tokens required for successful problem-solving. We show how token complexity enables us to compute information-theoretic limits on the accuracy-compression tradeoff, and find that prompt-based compression strategies operate far from these theoretical limits. This suggests there may be significant room for improvement and our framework provides a benchmark to help researchers evaluate progress in reasoning efficiency. Our work also highlights the importance of adaptive compression -- giving shorter responses for easier questions -- and we show that token complexity is a useful tool for measuring this capability.

This study explores the neural and behavioral consequences of LLM-assisted essay writing. Participants were divided into three groups: LLM, Search Engine, and Brain-only (no tools). Each completed three sessions under the same condition. In a fourth session, LLM users were reassigned to Brain-only group (LLM-to-Brain), and Brain-only users were reassigned to LLM condition (Brain-to-LLM). A total of 54 participants took part in Sessions 1-3, with 18 completing session 4. We used electroencephalography (EEG) to assess cognitive load during essay writing, and analyzed essays using NLP, as well as scoring essays with the help from human teachers and an AI judge. Across groups, NERs, n-gram patterns, and topic ontology showed within-group homogeneity. EEG revealed significant differences in brain connectivity: Brain-only participants exhibited the strongest, most distributed networks; Search Engine users showed moderate engagement; and LLM users displayed the weakest connectivity. Cognitive activity scaled down in relation to external tool use. In session 4, LLM-to-Brain participants showed reduced alpha and beta connectivity, indicating under-engagement. Brain-to-LLM users exhibited higher memory recall and activation of occipito-parietal and prefrontal areas, similar to Search Engine users. Self-reported ownership of essays was the lowest in the LLM group and the highest in the Brain-only group. LLM users also struggled to accurately quote their own work. While LLMs offer immediate convenience, our findings highlight potential cognitive costs. Over four months, LLM users consistently underperformed at neural, linguistic, and behavioral levels. These results raise concerns about the long-term educational implications of LLM reliance and underscore the need for deeper inquiry into AI's role in learning.

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit a unified "general factor" of capability across 10 benchmarks, a finding confirmed by our factor analysis of 156 models, yet they still struggle with simple, trivial tasks for humans. This is because current benchmarks focus on task completion, failing to probe the foundational cognitive abilities that highlight these behaviors. We address this by introducing the NeuroCognition benchmark, grounded in three adapted neuropsychological tests: Raven's Progressive Matrices (abstract relational reasoning), Spatial Working Memory (maintenance and systematic search), and the Wisconsin Card Sorting Test (cognitive flexibility). Our evaluation reveals that while models perform strongly on text, their performance degrades for images and with increased complexity. Furthermore, we observe that complex reasoning is not universally beneficial, whereas simple, human-like strategies yield partial gains. We also find that NeuroCognition correlates positively with standard general-capability benchmarks, while still measuring distinct cognitive abilities beyond them. Overall, NeuroCognition emphasizes where current LLMs align with human-like intelligence and where they lack core adaptive cognition, showing the potential to serve as a verifiable, scalable source for improving LLMs.

People supported by AI-powered decision support tools frequently overrely on the AI: they accept an AI's suggestion even when that suggestion is wrong. Adding explanations to the AI decisions does not appear to reduce the overreliance and some studies suggest that it might even increase it. Informed by the dual-process theory of cognition, we posit that people rarely engage analytically with each individual AI recommendation and explanation, and instead develop general heuristics about whether and when to follow the AI suggestions. Building on prior research on medical decision-making, we designed three cognitive forcing interventions to compel people to engage more thoughtfully with the AI-generated explanations. We conducted an experiment (N=199), in which we compared our three cognitive forcing designs to two simple explainable AI approaches and to a no-AI baseline. The results demonstrate that cognitive forcing significantly reduced overreliance compared to the simple explainable AI approaches. However, there was a trade-off: people assigned the least favorable subjective ratings to the designs that reduced the overreliance the most. To audit our work for intervention-generated inequalities, we investigated whether our interventions benefited equally people with different levels of Need for Cognition (i.e., motivation to engage in effortful mental activities). Our results show that, on average, cognitive forcing interventions benefited participants higher in Need for Cognition more. Our research suggests that human cognitive motivation moderates the effectiveness of explainable AI solutions.

We introduce a cross-domain behavioural assay of monitoring-control coupling in LLMs, grounded in the Nelson and Narens (1990) metacognitive framework and applying human psychometric methodology to LLM evaluation. The battery comprises 524 items across six cognitive domains (learning, metacognitive calibration, social cognition, attention, executive function, prospective regulation), each grounded in an established experimental paradigm. Tasks T1-T5 were pre-registered on OSF prior to data collection; T6 was added as an exploratory extension. After every forced-choice response, dual probes adapted from Koriat and Goldsmith (1996) ask the model to KEEP or WITHDRAW its answer and to BET or decline. The critical metric is the withdraw delta: the difference in withdrawal rate between incorrect and correct items. Applied to 20 frontier LLMs (10,480 evaluations), the battery discriminates three profiles consistent with the Nelson-Narens architecture: blanket confidence, blanket withdrawal, and selective sensitivity. Accuracy rank and metacognitive sensitivity rank are largely inverted. Retrospective monitoring and prospective regulation appear dissociable (r = .17, 95% CI wide given n=20; exemplar-based evidence is the primary support). Scaling on metacognitive calibration is architecture-dependent: monotonically decreasing (Qwen), monotonically increasing (GPT-5.4), or flat (Gemma). Behavioural findings converge structurally with an independent Type-2 SDT approach, providing preliminary cross-method construct validity. All items, data, and code: https://github.com/synthiumjp/metacognitive-monitoring-battery.

Recent incidents involving LLMs used for mental-health support reveal a critical evaluation gap: surface-level safety scores do not capture how models behave across realistic, emotionally sensitive interactions over time. Existing benchmarks measure knowledge, safety, or static response quality, but miss whether LLM interactions help users keep reflecting, coping, and making decisions themselves. We formalize this missing dimension as COGNITIVE ATROPHY, a process-level behavioural measure in AI-mediated mental-health support distinct from safety and helpfulness. To measure it, we introduce COGNITIVE ATROPHY BENCH, a clinically grounded benchmark built from 1,576 fully human-generated counseling conversations, 15,680 turns, and 42,230 responses from five LLMs. Three clinical and neuropsychology experts developed a 20-attribute schema spanning user context, response behaviour, and global risk flags; six trained clinical reviewers applied it with span-grounded evidence, producing 5,324 reviewer judgments. We further introduce the User-Input Risk Index (UIRI), the Cognitive Atrophy Risk Index (ARI), and trajectory summaries. Across five LLMs, models show a consistent moderate-to-high level of atrophy-aligned behaviour across single and multi-turn settings. While models generally respond to overt safety cues, they adapt less reliably when users seek solutions or decisions. The dominant recurring patterns are directive advice, problem-solving, recommendation responses, topic shifts, and forms of validation that may reinforce dependence rather than reflection. Our work makes COGNITIVE ATROPHY measurable and provides a foundation for auditing model behaviour in sensitive LLM conversations.

The lack of a concrete definition for Artificial General Intelligence (AGI) obscures the gap between today's specialized AI and human-level cognition. This paper introduces a quantifiable framework to address this, defining AGI as matching the cognitive versatility and proficiency of a well-educated adult. To operationalize this, we ground our methodology in Cattell-Horn-Carroll theory, the most empirically validated model of human cognition. The framework dissects general intelligence into ten core cognitive domains-including reasoning, memory, and perception-and adapts established human psychometric batteries to evaluate AI systems. Application of this framework reveals a highly "jagged" cognitive profile in contemporary models. While proficient in knowledge-intensive domains, current AI systems have critical deficits in foundational cognitive machinery, particularly long-term memory storage. The resulting AGI scores (e.g., GPT-4 at 27%, GPT-5 at 58%) concretely quantify both rapid progress and the substantial gap remaining before AGI.

Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) demonstrate remarkable capabilities on complex tasks, exhibiting emergent, human-like thinking patterns. Despite their advances, we identify a fundamental limitation: current LRMs lack a dedicated meta-level cognitive system-an essential faculty in human cognition that enables "thinking about thinking". This absence leaves their emergent abilities uncontrollable (non-adaptive reasoning), unreliable (intermediate error), and inflexible (lack of a clear methodology). To address this gap, we introduce Meta-R1, a systematic and generic framework that endows LRMs with explicit metacognitive capabilities. Drawing on principles from cognitive science, Meta-R1 decomposes the reasoning process into distinct object-level and meta-level components, orchestrating proactive planning, online regulation, and adaptive early stopping within a cascaded framework. Experiments on three challenging benchmarks and against eight competitive baselines demonstrate that Meta-R1 is: (I) high-performing, surpassing state-of-the-art methods by up to 27.3%; (II) token-efficient, reducing token consumption to 15.7% ~ 32.7% and improving efficiency by up to 14.8% when compared to its vanilla counterparts; and (III) transferable, maintaining robust performance across datasets and model backbones.

Attending to what is relevant is fundamental to both the mammalian brain and modern machine learning models such as Transformers. Yet, determining relevance remains a core challenge, traditionally offloaded to learning algorithms like backpropagation. Inspired by recent cellular neurobiological evidence linking neocortical pyramidal cells to distinct mental states, this work shows how models (e.g., Transformers) can emulate high-level perceptual processing and awake thought (imagination) states to pre-select relevant information before applying attention. Triadic neuronal-level modulation loops among questions (Q), clues (keys, K), and hypotheses (values, V) enable diverse, deep, parallel reasoning chains at the representation level and allow a rapid shift from initial biases to refined understanding. This leads to orders-of-magnitude faster learning with significantly reduced computational demand (e.g., fewer heads, layers, and tokens), at an approximate cost of O(N), where N is the number of input tokens. Results span reinforcement learning (e.g., CarRacing in a high-dimensional visual setup), computer vision, and natural language question answering.

A growing body of work makes use of probing to investigate the working of neural models, often considered black boxes. Recently, an ongoing debate emerged surrounding the limitations of the probing paradigm. In this work, we point out the inability to infer behavioral conclusions from probing results and offer an alternative method that focuses on how the information is being used, rather than on what information is encoded. Our method, Amnesic Probing, follows the intuition that the utility of a property for a given task can be assessed by measuring the influence of a causal intervention that removes it from the representation. Equipped with this new analysis tool, we can ask questions that were not possible before, e.g. is part-of-speech information important for word prediction? We perform a series of analyses on BERT to answer these types of questions. Our findings demonstrate that conventional probing performance is not correlated to task importance, and we call for increased scrutiny of claims that draw behavioral or causal conclusions from probing results.

Recent benchmark studies have claimed that AI has approached or even surpassed human-level performances on various cognitive tasks. However, this position paper argues that current AI evaluation paradigms are insufficient for assessing human-like cognitive capabilities. We identify a set of key shortcomings: a lack of human-validated labels, inadequate representation of human response variability and uncertainty, and reliance on simplified and ecologically-invalid tasks. We support our claims by conducting a human evaluation study on ten existing AI benchmarks, suggesting significant biases and flaws in task and label designs. To address these limitations, we propose five concrete recommendations for developing future benchmarks that will enable more rigorous and meaningful evaluations of human-like cognitive capacities in AI with various implications for such AI applications.

This study offers a novel approach for benchmarking complex cognitive behavior in artificial systems. Almost universally, Large Language Models (LLMs) perform best on tasks which may be included in their training data and can be accomplished solely using natural language, limiting our understanding of their emergent sophisticated cognitive capacities. In this work, we created dozens of novel items of a classic mental imagery task from cognitive psychology. A task which, traditionally, cognitive psychologists have argued is solvable exclusively via visual mental imagery (i.e., language alone would be insufficient). LLMs are perfect for testing this hypothesis. First, we tested several state-of-the-art LLMs by giving text-only models written instructions and asking them to report the resulting object after performing the transformations in the aforementioned task. Then, we created a baseline by testing 100 human subjects in exactly the same task. We found that the best LLMs performed significantly above average human performance. Finally, we tested reasoning models set to different levels of reasoning and found the strongest performance when models allocate greater amounts of reasoning tokens. These results provide evidence that the best LLMs may have the capability to complete imagery-dependent tasks despite the non-pictorial nature of their architectures. Our study not only demonstrates an emergent cognitive capacity in LLMs while performing a novel task, but it also provides the field with a new task that leaves lots of room for improvement in otherwise already highly capable models. Finally, our findings reignite the debate over the formats of representation of visual imagery in humans, suggesting that propositional reasoning (or at least non-imagistic reasoning) may be sufficient to complete tasks that were long-thought to be imagery-dependent.

Metacognitive knowledge refers to humans' intuitive knowledge of their own thinking and reasoning processes. Today's best LLMs clearly possess some reasoning processes. The paper gives evidence that they also have metacognitive knowledge, including ability to name skills and procedures to apply given a task. We explore this primarily in context of math reasoning, developing a prompt-guided interaction procedure to get a powerful LLM to assign sensible skill labels to math questions, followed by having it perform semantic clustering to obtain coarser families of skill labels. These coarse skill labels look interpretable to humans. To validate that these skill labels are meaningful and relevant to the LLM's reasoning processes we perform the following experiments. (a) We ask GPT-4 to assign skill labels to training questions in math datasets GSM8K and MATH. (b) When using an LLM to solve the test questions, we present it with the full list of skill labels and ask it to identify the skill needed. Then it is presented with randomly selected exemplar solved questions associated with that skill label. This improves accuracy on GSM8k and MATH for several strong LLMs, including code-assisted models. The methodology presented is domain-agnostic, even though this article applies it to math problems.

The validity screen (Cacioli, 2026d, 2026e) classifies LLM confidence signals as Valid, Indeterminate, or Invalid. We test whether these classifications predict selective prediction performance. Twenty frontier LLMs from seven families were evaluated on 524 items across six cognitive tracks. Valid models show mean Type 2 AUROC = .624 (SD = .048). Invalid models show mean AUROC = .357 (SD = .231). Cohen's d = 2.81, p = .002. The tiers order monotonically: Invalid (.357) < Indeterminate (.554) < Valid (.624). Split-half cross-validation yields median d = 1.77, P(d > 0) = 1.0 across 1,000 splits. The three-tier classification accounts for 47% of the variance in AUROC. DeepSeek-R1 drops from 85.3% accuracy at full coverage to 11.3% at 10% coverage. The screen predicts the criterion. For selective prediction, the screen matters.

This article presents the Cogni-CISMeF project, which aims at improving medical information search in the CISMeF system (Catalog and Index of French-language health resources) by including a conversational agent to interact with the user in natural language. To study the cognitive processes involved during the information search, a bottom-up methodology was adopted. Experimentation has been set up to obtain human dialogs between a user (playing the role of patient) dealing with medical information search and a CISMeF expert refining the request. The analysis of these dialogs underlined the use of discursive evidence: vocabulary, reformulation, implicit or explicit expression of user intentions, conversational sequences, etc. A model of artificial agent is proposed. It leads the user in its information search by proposing to him examples, assistance and choices. This model was implemented and integrated in the CISMeF system. ---- Cet article d\'ecrit le projet Cogni-CISMeF qui propose un module de dialogue Homme-Machine \`a int\'egrer dans le syst\`eme d'indexation de connaissances m\'edicales CISMeF (Catalogue et Index des Sites M\'edicaux Francophones). Nous avons adopt\'e une d\'emarche de mod\'elisation cognitive en proc\'edant \`a un recueil de corpus de dialogues entre un utilisateur (jouant le r\^ole d'un patient) d\'esirant une information m\'edicale et un expert CISMeF af inant cette demande pour construire la requ\^ete. Nous avons analys\'e la structure des dialogues ainsi obtenus et avons \'etudi\'e un certain nombre d'indices discursifs : vocabulaire employ\'e, marques de reformulation, commentaires m\'eta et \'epilinguistiques, expression implicite ou explicite des intentions de l'utilisateur, encha\^inement conversationnel, etc. De cette analyse, nous avons construit un mod\`ele d'agent artificiel dot\'e de capacit\'es cognitives capables d'aider l'utilisateur dans sa t\^ache de recherche d'information. Ce mod\`ele a \'et\'e impl\'ement\'e et int\'egr\'e dans le syst\`eme CISMeF.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in long interactions, existing evaluations focus predominantly on retrospective memory (RM) via explicit queries. Prospective memory (PM), the critical ability to spontaneously recall and act on latent constraints without direct prompts, remains largely unevaluated. We introduce TriggerBench, a comprehensive PM benchmark spanning five dimensions across both daily assistants and professional workflows. TriggerBench pairs scenarios with matched RM controls, contrastive positive/negative variants, and overloaded triggers, enabling fine-grained measurement of proactive recall, false-alarm rate, and attentional robustness under a single protocol. Our evaluation yields three key findings. (i) PM shows a precision-recall trade-off and attentional fragility. Though enhanced reasoning significantly improves proactive recall, models may overfit to an "always-remind" heuristic. Furthermore, PM accuracy degrades substantially under implicit constraints or triggers overloaded by concurrent user requests, indicating that robust PM remains an open challenge. (ii) PM is notably harder than RM: on identical contexts, RM near-saturates up to 100K tokens, while PM decays sharply as context length scales. (iii) PM may serve as a behavioral probe of spare reasoning capacity. Pairing PM scenarios with AIME-2025 math problems reveals that successful trajectories yield higher PM accuracy than failed ones at the same context length, showing PM tracks spare reasoning budget that token count obscures. Project page: https://github.com/KristenZHANG/TriggerBench-Official.

When communicating with elders with cognitive impairment, cognitive stimulation (CS) help to maintain the cognitive health of elders. Data sparsity is the main challenge in building CS-based dialogue systems, particularly in the Chinese language. To fill this gap, we construct a Chinese CS conversation (CSConv) dataset, which contains about 2.6K groups of dialogues with CS principles and emotional support strategy labels. Making chit chat while providing emotional support is overlooked by the majority of existing cognitive dialogue systems. In this paper, we propose a multi-source knowledge fusion method for CS dialogue (CSD), to generate open-ended responses guided by the CS principle and emotional support strategy. We first use a progressive mask method based on external knowledge to learn encoders as effective classifiers, which is the prerequisite to predict the CS principle and emotional support strategy of the target response. Then a decoder interacts with the perceived CS principle and emotional support strategy to generate responses. Extensive experiments conducted on the CSConv dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed method, while there is still a large space for improvement compared to human performance.

Research on emergent patterns in Large Language Models (LLMs) has gained significant traction in both psychology and artificial intelligence, motivating the need for a comprehensive review that offers a synthesis of this complex landscape. In this article, we systematically review LLMs' capabilities across three important cognitive domains: decision-making biases, reasoning, and creativity. We use empirical studies drawing on established psychological tests and compare LLMs' performance to human benchmarks. On decision-making, our synthesis reveals that while LLMs demonstrate several human-like biases, some biases observed in humans are absent, indicating cognitive patterns that only partially align with human decision-making. On reasoning, advanced LLMs like GPT-4 exhibit deliberative reasoning akin to human System-2 thinking, while smaller models fall short of human-level performance. A distinct dichotomy emerges in creativity: while LLMs excel in language-based creative tasks, such as storytelling, they struggle with divergent thinking tasks that require real-world context. Nonetheless, studies suggest that LLMs hold considerable potential as collaborators, augmenting creativity in human-machine problem-solving settings. Discussing key limitations, we also offer guidance for future research in areas such as memory, attention, and open-source model development.

Test-time scaling increases inference-time computation by allowing models to generate long reasoning chains, and has shown strong performance across many domains. However, in this work, we show that this approach is not yet effective for knowledge-intensive tasks, where high factual accuracy and low hallucination rates are essential. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation of test-time scaling using 12 reasoning models on two knowledge-intensive benchmarks. Our results reveal that increasing test-time computation does not consistently improve accuracy and, in many cases, it even leads to more hallucinations. We then analyze how extended reasoning affects hallucination behavior. We find that reduced hallucinations often result from the model choosing to abstain after thinking more, rather than from improved factual recall. Conversely, for some models, longer reasoning encourages attempts on previously unanswered questions, many of which result in hallucinations. Case studies show that extended reasoning can induce confirmation bias, leading to overconfident hallucinations. Despite these limitations, we observe that compared to non-thinking, enabling thinking remains beneficial. Code and data are available at https://github.com/XuZhao0/tts-knowledge

Today's large language models (LLMs) routinely generate coherent, grammatical and seemingly meaningful paragraphs of text. This achievement has led to speculation that these networks are -- or will soon become -- "thinking machines", capable of performing tasks that require abstract knowledge and reasoning. Here, we review the capabilities of LLMs by considering their performance on two different aspects of language use: 'formal linguistic competence', which includes knowledge of rules and patterns of a given language, and 'functional linguistic competence', a host of cognitive abilities required for language understanding and use in the real world. Drawing on evidence from cognitive neuroscience, we show that formal competence in humans relies on specialized language processing mechanisms, whereas functional competence recruits multiple extralinguistic capacities that comprise human thought, such as formal reasoning, world knowledge, situation modeling, and social cognition. In line with this distinction, LLMs show impressive (although imperfect) performance on tasks requiring formal linguistic competence, but fail on many tests requiring functional competence. Based on this evidence, we argue that (1) contemporary LLMs should be taken seriously as models of formal linguistic skills; (2) models that master real-life language use would need to incorporate or develop not only a core language module, but also multiple non-language-specific cognitive capacities required for modeling thought. Overall, a distinction between formal and functional linguistic competence helps clarify the discourse surrounding LLMs' potential and provides a path toward building models that understand and use language in human-like ways.

With the development in cognitive science and Large Language Models (LLMs), increasing connections have come to light between these two distinct fields. Building upon these connections, we propose a conjecture suggesting the existence of a duality between LLMs and Tulving's theory of memory. We identify a potential correspondence between Tulving's synergistic ecphory model (SEM) of retrieval and the emergent abilities observed in LLMs, serving as supporting evidence for our conjecture. Furthermore, we speculate that consciousness may be considered a form of emergent ability based on this duality. We also discuss how other theories of consciousness intersect with our research.

Large language models (LLMs) can sometimes report the strategies they actually use to solve tasks, but they can also fail to do so. This suggests some degree of metacognition -- the capacity to monitor one's own cognitive processes for subsequent reporting and self-control. Metacognitive abilities enhance AI capabilities but raise safety concerns, as models might obscure their internal processes to evade neural-activation-based oversight mechanisms designed to detect harmful behaviors. Given society's increased reliance on these models, it is critical that we understand the limits of their metacognitive abilities, particularly their ability to monitor their internal activations. To address this, we introduce a neuroscience-inspired neurofeedback paradigm designed to quantify the ability of LLMs to explicitly report and control their activation patterns. By presenting models with sentence-label pairs where labels correspond to sentence-elicited internal activations along specific directions in the neural representation space, we demonstrate that LLMs can learn to report and control these activations. The performance varies with several factors: the number of example pairs provided, the semantic interpretability of the target neural direction, and the variance explained by that direction. These results reveal a "metacognitive space" with dimensionality much lower than the model's neural space, suggesting LLMs can monitor only a subset of their neural mechanisms. Our findings provide empirical evidence quantifying metacognitive capabilities in LLMs, with significant implications for AI safety.

Writing is a cognitively demanding task involving continuous decision-making, heavy use of working memory, and frequent switching between multiple activities. Scholarly writing is particularly complex as it requires authors to coordinate many pieces of multiform knowledge. To fully understand writers' cognitive thought process, one should fully decode the end-to-end writing data (from individual ideas to final manuscript) and understand their complex cognitive mechanisms in scholarly writing. We introduce ScholaWrite dataset, the first-of-its-kind keystroke logs of an end-to-end scholarly writing process for complete manuscripts, with thorough annotations of cognitive writing intentions behind each keystroke. Our dataset includes LaTeX-based keystroke data from five preprints with nearly 62K total text changes and annotations across 4 months of paper writing. ScholaWrite shows promising usability and applications (e.g., iterative self-writing) for the future development of AI writing assistants for academic research, which necessitate complex methods beyond LLM prompting. Our experiments clearly demonstrated the importance of collection of end-to-end writing data, rather than the final manuscript, for the development of future writing assistants to support the cognitive thinking process of scientists. Our de-identified dataset, demo, and code repository are available on our project page.

In recent years, evaluating the Theory of Mind (ToM) capabilities of large language models (LLMs) has received significant attention within the research community. As the field rapidly evolves, navigating the diverse approaches and methodologies has become increasingly complex. This systematic review synthesizes current efforts to assess LLMs' ability to perform ToM tasks, an essential aspect of human cognition involving the attribution of mental states to oneself and others. Despite notable advancements, the proficiency of LLMs in ToM remains a contentious issue. By categorizing benchmarks and tasks through a taxonomy rooted in cognitive science, this review critically examines evaluation techniques, prompting strategies, and the inherent limitations of LLMs in replicating human-like mental state reasoning. A recurring theme in the literature reveals that while LLMs demonstrate emerging competence in ToM tasks, significant gaps persist in their emulation of human cognitive abilities.

Chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting has become a widely used strategy for working with large language and multimodal models. While CoT has been shown to improve performance across many tasks, determining the settings in which it is effective remains an ongoing effort. In particular, it is still an open question in what settings CoT systematically reduces model performance. In this paper, we seek to identify the characteristics of tasks where CoT reduces performance by drawing inspiration from cognitive psychology, looking at cases where (i) verbal thinking or deliberation hurts performance in humans, and (ii) the constraints governing human performance generalize to language models. Three such cases are implicit statistical learning, visual recognition, and classifying with patterns containing exceptions. In extensive experiments across all three settings, we find that a diverse collection of state-of-the-art models exhibit significant drop-offs in performance (e.g., up to 36.3% absolute accuracy for OpenAI o1-preview compared to GPT-4o) when using inference-time reasoning compared to zero-shot counterparts. We also identify three tasks that satisfy condition (i) but not (ii), and find that while verbal thinking reduces human performance in these tasks, CoT retains or increases model performance. Overall, our results show that while there is not an exact parallel between the cognitive processes of models and those of humans, considering cases where thinking has negative consequences for human performance can help us identify settings where it negatively impacts models. By connecting the literature on human deliberation with evaluations of CoT, we offer a new tool that can be used in understanding the impact of prompt choices and inference-time reasoning.

Metacognition is a critical component of intelligence, specifically regarding the awareness of one's own knowledge. While humans rely on shared internal memory for both answering questions and reporting their knowledge state, this dependency in LLMs remains underexplored. This study proposes a framework to measure metacognitive ability d_{type2}' using a dual-prompt method, followed by the introduction of Evolution Strategy for Metacognitive Alignment (ESMA) to bind a model's internal knowledge to its explicit behaviors. ESMA demonstrates robust generalization across diverse untrained settings, indicating a enhancement in the model's ability to reference its own knowledge. Furthermore, parameter analysis attributes these improvements to a sparse set of significant modifications.

Large language models often default to step-by-step computation even when efficient numerical shortcuts are available. This raises a basic question: do they exhibit number sense in a human-like behavioral sense, i.e., the ability to recognize numerical structure, apply shortcuts when appropriate, and avoid them when they are not? We introduce SenseMath, a controlled benchmark for evaluating structure-sensitive numerical reasoning in LLMs. SenseMath contains 4,800 items spanning eight shortcut categories and four digit scales, with matched strong-shortcut, weak-shortcut, and control variants. It supports three evaluation settings of increasing cognitive demand: Shortcut Use (whether models can apply shortcuts on shortcut-amenable problems); Applicability Judgment (whether they can recognize when a shortcut is appropriate or misleading); and Problem Generation (whether they can generate new problem items that correctly admit a given type of shortcut). Our evaluation across five LLMs, ranging from GPT-4o-mini to Llama-3.1-8B, shows a consistent pattern: when explicitly prompted, models readily adopt shortcut strategies and achieve substantial accuracy gains on shortcut-amenable items (up to 15%), yet under standard chain-of-thought prompting they spontaneously employ such strategies in fewer than 40% of cases, even when they demonstrably possess the requisite capability. Moreover, this competence is confined to the Use level; models systematically over-generalise shortcuts to problems where they do not apply, and fail to generate valid shortcut-bearing problems from scratch. Together, these results suggest that current LLMs exhibit procedural shortcut fluency without the structural understanding of when and why shortcuts work that underlies human number sense.

Large language models (LLMs) solve complex problems yet fail on simpler variants, suggesting they achieve correct outputs through mechanisms fundamentally different from human reasoning. To understand this gap, we synthesize cognitive science research into a taxonomy of 28 cognitive elements spanning reasoning invariants, meta-cognitive controls, representations for organizing reasoning & knowledge, and transformation operations. We introduce a fine-grained evaluation framework and conduct the first large-scale empirical analysis of 192K traces from 18 models across text, vision, and audio, complemented by 54 human think-aloud traces, which we make publicly available. We find that models under-utilize cognitive elements correlated with success, narrowing to rigid sequential processing on ill-structured problems where diverse representations and meta-cognitive monitoring are critical. Human traces show more abstraction and conceptual processing, while models default to surface-level enumeration. Meta-analysis of 1.6K LLM reasoning papers reveals the research community concentrates on easily quantifiable elements (sequential organization: 55%, decomposition: 60%) but neglecting meta-cognitive controls (self-awareness: 16%) that correlate with success. Models possess behavioral repertoires associated with success but fail to deploy them spontaneously. Leveraging these patterns, we develop test-time reasoning guidance that automatically scaffold successful structures, improving performance by up to 66.7% on complex problems. By establishing a shared vocabulary between cognitive science and LLM research, our framework enables systematic diagnosis of reasoning failures and principled development of models that reason through robust cognitive mechanisms rather than spurious shortcuts, while providing tools to test theories of human cognition at scale.

The field of psychology has long recognized a basic level of categorization that humans use when labeling visual stimuli, a term coined by Rosch in 1976. This level of categorization has been found to be used most frequently, to have higher information density, and to aid in visual language tasks with priming in humans. Here, we investigate basic level categorization in two recently released, open-source vision-language models (VLMs). This paper demonstrates that Llama 3.2 Vision Instruct (11B) and Molmo 7B-D both prefer basic level categorization consistent with human behavior. Moreover, the models' preferences are consistent with nuanced human behaviors like the biological versus non-biological basic level effects and the well established expert basic level shift, further suggesting that VLMs acquire cognitive categorization behaviors from the human data on which they are trained.

We propose cognitive prompting as a novel approach to guide problem-solving in large language models (LLMs) through structured, human-like cognitive operations such as goal clarification, decomposition, filtering, abstraction, and pattern recognition. By employing systematic, step-by-step reasoning, cognitive prompting enables LLMs to efficiently tackle complex, multi-step tasks. We evaluate the effectiveness of cognitive prompting on Meta's LLaMA models, comparing performance on arithmetic reasoning tasks using the GSM8K dataset and on commonsense reasoning benchmarks. Our analysis includes comparisons between models without cognitive prompting, models with a static sequence of cognitive operations, and models using reflective cognitive prompting, where the LLM dynamically self-selects the sequence of cognitive operations. The results show that cognitive prompting, particularly when dynamically adapted, significantly improves the performance of larger models, such as LLaMA3.1 70B, and enhances their ability to handle multi-step reasoning tasks. This approach also improves interpretability and flexibility, highlighting cognitive prompting as a promising strategy for general-purpose AI reasoning.

In recent years, advancements in Natural Language Processing (NLP) techniques have revolutionized the field of accessibility and exclusivity of testing, particularly for visually impaired students (VIS). CBT has shown in years back its relevance in terms of administering exams electronically, making the test process easier, providing quicker and more accurate results, and offering greater flexibility and accessibility for candidates. Yet, its relevance was not felt by the visually impaired students as they cannot access printed documents. Hence, in this paper, we present an NLP-driven Computer-Based Test guide for visually impaired students. It employs a speech technology pre-trained methods to provide real-time assistance and support to visually impaired students. The system utilizes NLP technologies to convert the text-based questions and the associated options in a machine-readable format. Subsequently, the speech technology pre-trained model processes the converted text enabling the VIS to comprehend and analyze the content. Furthermore, we validated that this pre-trained model is not perverse by testing for accuracy using sample audio datasets labels (A, B, C, D, E, F, G) to compare with the voice recordings obtained from 20 VIS which is been predicted by the system to attain values for precision, recall, and F1-scores. These metrics are used to assess the performance of the pre-trained model and have indicated that it is proficient enough to give its better performance to the evaluated system. The methodology adopted for this system is Object Oriented Analysis and Design Methodology (OOADM) where Objects are discussed and built by modeling real-world instances.

In this work, we investigate how a model's tendency to broadly integrate its parametric knowledge evolves throughout pretraining, and how this behavior affects overall performance, particularly in terms of knowledge acquisition and forgetting. We introduce the concept of knowledge entropy, which quantifies the range of memory sources the model engages with; high knowledge entropy indicates that the model utilizes a wide range of memory sources, while low knowledge entropy suggests reliance on specific sources with greater certainty. Our analysis reveals a consistent decline in knowledge entropy as pretraining advances. We also find that the decline is closely associated with a reduction in the model's ability to acquire and retain knowledge, leading us to conclude that diminishing knowledge entropy (smaller number of active memory sources) impairs the model's knowledge acquisition and retention capabilities. We find further support for this by demonstrating that increasing the activity of inactive memory sources enhances the model's capacity for knowledge acquisition and retention.

Large language models lack persistent, structured memory for long-term interaction and context-sensitive retrieval. Expanding context windows does not solve this: recent evidence shows that context length alone degrades reasoning by up to 85% - even with perfect retrieval. We propose a bio-inspired memory framework grounded in complementary learning systems theory, cognitive behavioral therapy's belief hierarchy, dual-process cognition, and fuzzy-trace theory, organized around three principles: (1) Memory has valence, not just content - pre-computed emotional-associative summaries (valence vectors) organized in an emergent belief hierarchy inspired by Beck's cognitive model enable instant orientation before deliberation; (2) Retrieval defaults to System 1 with System 2 escalation - automatic spreading activation and passive priming as default, with deliberate retrieval only when needed, and graded epistemic states that address hallucination structurally; and (3) Encoding is active, present, and feedback-dependent - a thalamic gateway tags and routes information between stores, while the executive forms gists through curiosity-driven investigation, not passive exposure. Seven functional properties specify what any implementation must satisfy. Over time, the system converges toward System 1 processing - the computational analog of clinical expertise - producing interactions that become cheaper, not more expensive, with experience.

Large language models have demonstrated impressive performance on challenging mathematical reasoning tasks, which has triggered the discussion of whether the performance is achieved by true reasoning capability or memorization. To investigate this question, prior work has constructed mathematical benchmarks when questions undergo simple perturbations -- modifications that still preserve the underlying reasoning patterns of the solutions. However, no work has explored hard perturbations, which fundamentally change the nature of the problem so that the original solution steps do not apply. To bridge the gap, we construct MATH-P-Simple and MATH-P-Hard via simple perturbation and hard perturbation, respectively. Each consists of 279 perturbed math problems derived from level-5 (hardest) problems in the MATH dataset (Hendrycksmath et. al., 2021). We observe significant performance drops on MATH-P-Hard across various models, including o1-mini (-16.49%) and gemini-2.0-flash-thinking (-12.9%). We also raise concerns about a novel form of memorization where models blindly apply learned problem-solving skills without assessing their applicability to modified contexts. This issue is amplified when using original problems for in-context learning. We call for research efforts to address this challenge, which is critical for developing more robust and reliable reasoning models.

Mathematical reasoning serves as a cornerstone for assessing the fundamental cognitive capabilities of human intelligence. In recent times, there has been a notable surge in the development of Large Language Models (LLMs) geared towards the automated resolution of mathematical problems. However, the landscape of mathematical problem types is vast and varied, with LLM-oriented techniques undergoing evaluation across diverse datasets and settings. This diversity makes it challenging to discern the true advancements and obstacles within this burgeoning field. This survey endeavors to address four pivotal dimensions: i) a comprehensive exploration of the various mathematical problems and their corresponding datasets that have been investigated; ii) an examination of the spectrum of LLM-oriented techniques that have been proposed for mathematical problem-solving; iii) an overview of factors and concerns affecting LLMs in solving math; and iv) an elucidation of the persisting challenges within this domain. To the best of our knowledge, this survey stands as one of the first extensive examinations of the landscape of LLMs in the realm of mathematics, providing a holistic perspective on the current state, accomplishments, and future challenges in this rapidly evolving field.

Standard evaluation of LLM confidence relies on calibration metrics (ECE, Brier score) that conflate two distinct capacities: how much a model knows (Type-1 sensitivity) and how well it knows what it knows (Type-2 metacognitive sensitivity). We introduce an evaluation framework based on Type-2 Signal Detection Theory that decomposes these capacities using meta-d' and the metacognitive efficiency ratio M-ratio. Applied to four LLMs (Llama-3-8B-Instruct, Mistral-7B-Instruct-v0.3, Llama-3-8B-Base, Gemma-2-9B-Instruct) across 224,000 factual QA trials, we find: (1) metacognitive efficiency varies substantially across models even when Type-1 sensitivity is similar -- Mistral achieves the highest d' but the lowest M-ratio; (2) metacognitive efficiency is domain-specific, with different models showing different weakest domains, invisible to aggregate metrics; (3) temperature manipulation shifts Type-2 criterion while meta-d' remains stable for two of four models, dissociating confidence policy from metacognitive capacity; (4) AUROC_2 and M-ratio produce fully inverted model rankings, demonstrating these metrics answer fundamentally different evaluation questions. The meta-d' framework reveals which models "know what they don't know" versus which merely appear well-calibrated due to criterion placement -- a distinction with direct implications for model selection, deployment, and human-AI collaboration. Pre-registered analysis; code and data publicly available.

To make deliberate progress towards more intelligent and more human-like artificial systems, we need to be following an appropriate feedback signal: we need to be able to define and evaluate intelligence in a way that enables comparisons between two systems, as well as comparisons with humans. Over the past hundred years, there has been an abundance of attempts to define and measure intelligence, across both the fields of psychology and AI. We summarize and critically assess these definitions and evaluation approaches, while making apparent the two historical conceptions of intelligence that have implicitly guided them. We note that in practice, the contemporary AI community still gravitates towards benchmarking intelligence by comparing the skill exhibited by AIs and humans at specific tasks such as board games and video games. We argue that solely measuring skill at any given task falls short of measuring intelligence, because skill is heavily modulated by prior knowledge and experience: unlimited priors or unlimited training data allow experimenters to "buy" arbitrary levels of skills for a system, in a way that masks the system's own generalization power. We then articulate a new formal definition of intelligence based on Algorithmic Information Theory, describing intelligence as skill-acquisition efficiency and highlighting the concepts of scope, generalization difficulty, priors, and experience. Using this definition, we propose a set of guidelines for what a general AI benchmark should look like. Finally, we present a benchmark closely following these guidelines, the Abstraction and Reasoning Corpus (ARC), built upon an explicit set of priors designed to be as close as possible to innate human priors. We argue that ARC can be used to measure a human-like form of general fluid intelligence and that it enables fair general intelligence comparisons between AI systems and humans.

It is widely accepted that information derived from analyzing speech (the acoustic signal) and language production (words and sentences) serves as a useful window into the health of an individual's cognitive ability. In fact, most neuropsychological testing batteries have a component related to speech and language where clinicians elicit speech from patients for subjective evaluation across a broad set of dimensions. With advances in speech signal processing and natural language processing, there has been recent interest in developing tools to detect more subtle changes in cognitive-linguistic function. This work relies on extracting a set of features from recorded and transcribed speech for objective assessments of speech and language, early diagnosis of neurological disease, and tracking of disease after diagnosis. With an emphasis on cognitive and thought disorders, in this paper we provide a review of existing speech and language features used in this domain, discuss their clinical application, and highlight their advantages and disadvantages. Broadly speaking, the review is split into two categories: language features based on natural language processing and speech features based on speech signal processing. Within each category, we consider features that aim to measure complementary dimensions of cognitive-linguistics, including language diversity, syntactic complexity, semantic coherence, and timing. We conclude the review with a proposal of new research directions to further advance the field.

While prior work has explored whether large language models (LLMs) possess a "theory of mind" (ToM) - the ability to attribute mental states to oneself and others - there has been little work testing whether LLMs can implicitly apply such knowledge to predict behavior, or to judge whether an observed behavior is rational. Such skills are critical for appropriate interaction in social environments. We create a new dataset, SimpleTom, containing concise, diverse stories (e.g., "The can of Pringles has moldy chips in it. Mary picks up the can in the supermarket and walks to the cashier."), each with three questions that test different degrees of ToM reasoning, asking models to predict (a) mental state ("Is Mary aware of the mold?"), (b) behavior ("Will Mary pay for the chips or report the mold?"), and (c) judgment ("Mary paid for the chips. Was that reasonable?"). To our knowledge, SimpleToM is the first dataset to systematically explore downstream reasoning requiring knowledge of mental states in realistic scenarios. Our experimental results are intriguing: While most models can reliably predict mental state on our dataset (a), they often fail to correctly predict the behavior (b), and fare even worse at judging whether given behaviors are reasonable (c), despite being correctly aware of the protagonist's mental state should make such secondary predictions obvious. We further show that we can help models do better at (b) and (c) via interventions such as reminding the model of its earlier mental state answer and mental-state-specific chain-of-thought prompting, raising the action prediction accuracies (e.g., from 49.5% to 93.5% for GPT-4o) and judgment accuracies (e.g., from 15.3% to 94.7% in GPT-4o). While this shows that models can be coaxed to perform well, it requires task-specific interventions, and the natural model performances remain low, a cautionary tale for LLM deployment.

The concept of Artificial Intelligence has gained a lot of attention over the last decade. In particular, AI-based tools have been employed in several scenarios and are, by now, pervading our everyday life. Nonetheless, most of these systems lack many capabilities that we would naturally consider to be included in a notion of "intelligence". In this work, we present an architecture that, inspired by the cognitive theory known as Thinking Fast and Slow by D. Kahneman, is tasked with solving planning problems in different settings, specifically: classical and multi-agent epistemic. The system proposed is an instance of a more general AI paradigm, referred to as SOFAI (for Slow and Fast AI). SOFAI exploits multiple solving approaches, with different capabilities that characterize them as either fast or slow, and a metacognitive module to regulate them. This combination of components, which roughly reflects the human reasoning process according to D. Kahneman, allowed us to enhance the reasoning process that, in this case, is concerned with planning in two different settings. The behavior of this system is then compared to state-of-the-art solvers, showing that the newly introduced system presents better results in terms of generality, solving a wider set of problems with an acceptable trade-off between solving times and solution accuracy.

Recent studies show evidence for emergent cognitive abilities in Large Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs). The increasing cognitive alignment of these models has made them candidates for cognitive science theories. Prior research into the emergent cognitive abilities of PLMs has largely been path-independent to model training, i.e., has focused on the final model weights and not the intermediate steps. However, building plausible models of human cognition using PLMs would benefit from considering the developmental alignment of their performance during training to the trajectories of children's thinking. Guided by psychometric tests of human intelligence, we choose four sets of tasks to investigate the alignment of ten popular families of PLMs and evaluate their available intermediate and final training steps. These tasks are Numerical ability, Linguistic abilities, Conceptual understanding, and Fluid reasoning. We find a striking regularity: regardless of model size, the developmental trajectories of PLMs consistently exhibit a window of maximal alignment to human cognitive development. Before that window, training appears to endow "blank slate" models with the requisite structure to be poised to rapidly learn from experience. After that window, training appears to serve the engineering goal of reducing loss but not the scientific goal of increasing alignment with human cognition.

As the research community aims to build better AI assistants that are more dynamic and personalized to the diversity of humans that they interact with, there is increased interest in evaluating the theory of mind capabilities of large language models (LLMs). Indeed, several recent studies suggest that LLM theory of mind capabilities are quite impressive, approximating human-level performance. Our paper aims to rebuke this narrative and argues instead that past studies were not directly measuring agent performance, potentially leading to findings that are illusory in nature as a result. We draw a strong distinction between what we call literal theory of mind i.e. measuring the agent's ability to predict the behavior of others and functional theory of mind i.e. adapting to agents in-context based on a rational response to predictions of their behavior. We find that top performing open source LLMs may display strong capabilities in literal theory of mind, depending on how they are prompted, but seem to struggle with functional theory of mind -- even when partner policies are exceedingly simple. Our work serves to highlight the double sided nature of inductive bias in LLMs when adapting to new situations. While this bias can lead to strong performance over limited horizons, it often hinders convergence to optimal long-term behavior.

The observed similarities in the behavior of humans and Large Language Models (LLMs) have prompted researchers to consider the potential of using LLMs as models of human cognition. However, several significant challenges must be addressed before LLMs can be legitimately regarded as cognitive models. For instance, LLMs are trained on far more data than humans typically encounter, and may have been directly trained on human data in specific cognitive tasks or aligned with human preferences. Consequently, the origins of these behavioral similarities are not well understood. In this paper, we propose a novel way to enhance the utility of LLMs as cognitive models. This approach involves (i) leveraging computationally equivalent tasks that both an LLM and a rational agent need to master for solving a cognitive problem and (ii) examining the specific task distributions required for an LLM to exhibit human-like behaviors. We apply this approach to decision-making -- specifically risky and intertemporal choice -- where the key computationally equivalent task is the arithmetic of expected value calculations. We show that an LLM pretrained on an ecologically valid arithmetic dataset, which we call Arithmetic-GPT, predicts human behavior better than many traditional cognitive models. Pretraining LLMs on ecologically valid arithmetic datasets is sufficient to produce a strong correspondence between these models and human decision-making. Our results also suggest that LLMs used as cognitive models should be carefully investigated via ablation studies of the pretraining data.

We introduce HRMCR (HAE-RAE Multi-Step Commonsense Reasoning), a benchmark designed to evaluate large language models' ability to perform multi-step reasoning in culturally specific contexts, focusing on Korean. The questions are automatically generated via templates and algorithms, requiring LLMs to integrate Korean cultural knowledge into sequential reasoning steps. Consistent with prior observations on emergent abilities, our experiments reveal that models trained on fewer than \(2 \cdot 10^{25}\) training FLOPs struggle to solve any questions, showing near-zero performance. Beyond this threshold, performance improves sharply. State-of-the-art models (e.g., O1) still score under 50\%, underscoring the difficulty of our tasks. Notably, stepwise analysis suggests the observed emergent behavior may stem from compounding errors across multiple steps rather than reflecting a genuinely new capability. We publicly release the benchmark and commit to regularly updating the dataset to prevent contamination.

People often optimize for long-term goals in collaboration: A mentor or companion doesn't just answer questions, but also scaffolds learning, tracks progress, and prioritizes the other person's growth over immediate results. In contrast, current AI systems are fundamentally short-sighted collaborators - optimized for providing instant and complete responses, without ever saying no (unless for safety reasons). What are the consequences of this dynamic? Here, through a series of randomized controlled trials on human-AI interactions (N = 1,222), we provide causal evidence for two key consequences of AI assistance: reduced persistence and impairment of unassisted performance. Across a variety of tasks, including mathematical reasoning and reading comprehension, we find that although AI assistance improves performance in the short-term, people perform significantly worse without AI and are more likely to give up. Notably, these effects emerge after only brief interactions with AI (approximately 10 minutes). These findings are particularly concerning because persistence is foundational to skill acquisition and is one of the strongest predictors of long-term learning. We posit that persistence is reduced because AI conditions people to expect immediate answers, thereby denying them the experience of working through challenges on their own. These results suggest the need for AI model development to prioritize scaffolding long-term competence alongside immediate task completion.

Recent studies have put into question the belief that emergent abilities in language models are exclusive to large models. This skepticism arises from two observations: 1) smaller models can also exhibit high performance on emergent abilities and 2) there is doubt on the discontinuous metrics used to measure these abilities. In this paper, we propose to study emergent abilities in the lens of pre-training loss, instead of model size or training compute. We demonstrate that the models with the same pre-training loss, but different model and data sizes, generate the same performance on various downstream tasks. We also discover that a model exhibits emergent abilities on certain tasks -- regardless of the continuity of metrics -- when its pre-training loss falls below a specific threshold. Before reaching this threshold, its performance remains at the level of random guessing. This inspires us to redefine emergent abilities as those that manifest in models with lower pre-training losses, highlighting that these abilities cannot be predicted by merely extrapolating the performance trends of models with higher pre-training losses.

A growing body of work in cognitive science suggests that reportable conscious access is associated with global ignition over distributed memory systems, while such activation is only partially accessible as individuals cannot directly access or enumerate all activated contents. This tension suggests a plausible mechanism that cognition may rely on a compact representation that approximates the global influence of activation on downstream processing. Inspired by this idea, we introduce the concept of Mindscape Activation Signature (MiA-Signature), a compressed representation of the global activation pattern induced by a query. In LLM systems, this is instantiated via submodular-based selection of high-level concepts that cover the activated context space, optionally refined through lightweight iterative updates using working memory. The resulting MiA-Signature serves as a conditioning signal that approximates the effect of the full activation state while remaining computationally tractable. Integrating MiA-Signatures into both RAG and agentic systems yields consistent performance gains across multiple long-context understanding tasks.

At face value, this essay is about understanding a fairly esoteric governance tool called compute thresholds. However, in order to grapple with whether these thresholds will achieve anything, we must first understand how they came to be. This requires engaging with a decades-old debate at the heart of computer science progress, namely, is bigger always better? Hence, this essay may be of interest not only to policymakers and the wider public but also to computer scientists interested in understanding the role of compute in unlocking breakthroughs. Does a certain inflection point of compute result in changes to the risk profile of a model? This discussion is increasingly urgent given the wide adoption of governance approaches that suggest greater compute equates with higher propensity for harm. Several leading frontier AI companies have released responsible scaling policies. Both the White House Executive Orders on AI Safety (EO) and the EU AI Act encode the use of FLOP or floating-point operations as a way to identify more powerful systems. What is striking about the choice of compute thresholds to-date is that no models currently deployed in the wild fulfill the current criteria set by the EO. This implies that the emphasis is often not on auditing the risks and harms incurred by currently deployed models - but rather is based upon the belief that future levels of compute will introduce unforeseen new risks. A key conclusion of this essay is that compute thresholds as currently implemented are shortsighted and likely to fail to mitigate risk. Governance that is overly reliant on compute fails to understand that the relationship between compute and risk is highly uncertain and rapidly changing. It also overestimates our ability to predict what abilities emerge at different scales. This essay ends with recommendations for a better way forward.

In this paper, we present an investigative study on how Mental Sets influence the reasoning capabilities of LLMs. LLMs have excelled in diverse natural language processing (NLP) tasks, driven by advancements in parameter-efficient fine-tuning (PEFT) and emergent capabilities like in-context learning (ICL). For complex reasoning tasks, selecting the right model for PEFT or ICL is critical, often relying on scores on benchmarks such as MMLU, MATH, and GSM8K. However, current evaluation methods, based on metrics like F1 Score or reasoning chain assessments by larger models, overlook a key dimension: adaptability to unfamiliar situations and overcoming entrenched thinking patterns. In cognitive psychology, Mental Set refers to the tendency to persist with previously successful strategies, even when they become inefficient - a challenge for problem solving and reasoning. We compare the performance of LLM models like Llama-3.1-8B-Instruct, Llama-3.1-70B-Instruct and GPT-4o in the presence of mental sets. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first study to integrate cognitive psychology concepts into the evaluation of LLMs for complex reasoning tasks, providing deeper insights into their adaptability and problem-solving efficacy.

We present the findings of "The Alzheimer's Disease Prediction Of Longitudinal Evolution" (TADPOLE) Challenge, which compared the performance of 92 algorithms from 33 international teams at predicting the future trajectory of 219 individuals at risk of Alzheimer's disease. Challenge participants were required to make a prediction, for each month of a 5-year future time period, of three key outcomes: clinical diagnosis, Alzheimer's Disease Assessment Scale Cognitive Subdomain (ADAS-Cog13), and total volume of the ventricles. The methods used by challenge participants included multivariate linear regression, machine learning methods such as support vector machines and deep neural networks, as well as disease progression models. No single submission was best at predicting all three outcomes. For clinical diagnosis and ventricle volume prediction, the best algorithms strongly outperform simple baselines in predictive ability. However, for ADAS-Cog13 no single submitted prediction method was significantly better than random guesswork. Two ensemble methods based on taking the mean and median over all predictions, obtained top scores on almost all tasks. Better than average performance at diagnosis prediction was generally associated with the additional inclusion of features from cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) samples and diffusion tensor imaging (DTI). On the other hand, better performance at ventricle volume prediction was associated with inclusion of summary statistics, such as the slope or maxima/minima of biomarkers. TADPOLE's unique results suggest that current prediction algorithms provide sufficient accuracy to exploit biomarkers related to clinical diagnosis and ventricle volume, for cohort refinement in clinical trials for Alzheimer's disease. However, results call into question the usage of cognitive test scores for patient selection and as a primary endpoint in clinical trials.

While numerous works have assessed the generative performance of language models (LMs) on tasks requiring Theory of Mind reasoning, research into the models' internal representation of mental states remains limited. Recent work has used probing to demonstrate that LMs can represent beliefs of themselves and others. However, these claims are accompanied by limited evaluation, making it difficult to assess how mental state representations are affected by model design and training choices. We report an extensive benchmark with various LM types with different model sizes, fine-tuning approaches, and prompt designs to study the robustness of mental state representations and memorisation issues within the probes. Our results show that the quality of models' internal representations of the beliefs of others increases with model size and, more crucially, with fine-tuning. We are the first to study how prompt variations impact probing performance on theory of mind tasks. We demonstrate that models' representations are sensitive to prompt variations, even when such variations should be beneficial. Finally, we complement previous activation editing experiments on Theory of Mind tasks and show that it is possible to improve models' reasoning performance by steering their activations without the need to train any probe.

The recent advent of large language models has reinvigorated debate over whether human cognitive capacities might emerge in such generic models given sufficient training data. Of particular interest is the ability of these models to reason about novel problems zero-shot, without any direct training. In human cognition, this capacity is closely tied to an ability to reason by analogy. Here, we performed a direct comparison between human reasoners and a large language model (the text-davinci-003 variant of GPT-3) on a range of analogical tasks, including a non-visual matrix reasoning task based on the rule structure of Raven's Standard Progressive Matrices. We found that GPT-3 displayed a surprisingly strong capacity for abstract pattern induction, matching or even surpassing human capabilities in most settings; preliminary tests of GPT-4 indicated even better performance. Our results indicate that large language models such as GPT-3 have acquired an emergent ability to find zero-shot solutions to a broad range of analogy problems.

Face biometrics are playing a key role in making modern smart city applications more secure and usable. Commonly, the recognition threshold of a face recognition system is adjusted based on the degree of security for the considered use case. The likelihood of a match can be for instance decreased by setting a high threshold in case of a payment transaction verification. Prior work in face recognition has unfortunately showed that error rates are usually higher for certain demographic groups. These disparities have hence brought into question the fairness of systems empowered with face biometrics. In this paper, we investigate the extent to which disparities among demographic groups change under different security levels. Our analysis includes ten face recognition models, three security thresholds, and six demographic groups based on gender and ethnicity. Experiments show that the higher the security of the system is, the higher the disparities in usability among demographic groups are. Compelling unfairness issues hence exist and urge countermeasures in real-world high-stakes environments requiring severe security levels.

In living organisms, homeostasis is the natural regulation of internal states aimed at maintaining conditions compatible with life. Typical artificial systems are not equipped with comparable regulatory features. Here, we introduce an artificial neural network that incorporates homeostatic features. Its own computing substrate is placed in a needful and vulnerable relation to the very objects over which it computes. For example, artificial neurons performing classification of MNIST digits or Fashion-MNIST articles of clothing may receive excitatory or inhibitory effects, which alter their own learning rate as a direct result of perceiving and classifying the digits. In this scenario, accurate recognition is desirable to the agent itself because it guides decisions to regulate its vulnerable internal states and functionality. Counterintuitively, the addition of vulnerability to a learner does not necessarily impair its performance. On the contrary, self-regulation in response to vulnerability confers benefits under certain conditions. We show that homeostatic design confers increased adaptability under concept shift, in which the relationships between labels and data change over time, and that the greatest advantages are obtained under the highest rates of shift. This necessitates the rapid un-learning of past associations and the re-learning of new ones. We also demonstrate the superior abilities of homeostatic learners in environments with dynamically changing rates of concept shift. Our homeostatic design exposes the artificial neural network's thinking machinery to the consequences of its own "thoughts", illustrating the advantage of putting one's own "skin in the game" to improve fluid intelligence.

Accurate estimation of item (question or task) difficulty is critical for educational assessment but suffers from the cold start problem. While Large Language Models demonstrate superhuman problem-solving capabilities, it remains an open question whether they can perceive the cognitive struggles of human learners. In this work, we present a large-scale empirical analysis of Human-AI Difficulty Alignment for over 20 models across diverse domains such as medical knowledge and mathematical reasoning. Our findings reveal a systematic misalignment where scaling up model size is not reliably helpful; instead of aligning with humans, models converge toward a shared machine consensus. We observe that high performance often impedes accurate difficulty estimation, as models struggle to simulate the capability limitations of students even when being explicitly prompted to adopt specific proficiency levels. Furthermore, we identify a critical lack of introspection, as models fail to predict their own limitations. These results suggest that general problem-solving capability does not imply an understanding of human cognitive struggles, highlighting the challenge of using current models for automated difficulty prediction.

Interestingly, LLMs yet struggle with some basic tasks that humans find trivial to handle, e.g., counting the number of character r's in the word "strawberry". There are several popular conjectures (e.g., tokenization, architecture and training data) regarding the reason for deficiency of LLMs in simple word-based counting problems, sharing the similar belief that such failure stems from model pretraining hence probably inevitable during deployment. In this paper, we carefully design multiple evaluation settings to investigate validity of prevalent conjectures. Meanwhile, we measure transferability of advanced mathematical and coding reasoning capabilities from specialized LLMs to simple counting tasks. Although specialized LLMs suffer from counting problems as well, we find conjectures about inherent deficiency of LLMs invalid and further seek opportunities to elicit knowledge and capabilities from LLMs that are beneficial to counting tasks. Compared with strategies such as finetuning and in-context learning that are commonly adopted to enhance performance on new or challenging tasks, we show that engaging reasoning is the most robust and efficient way to help LLMs better perceive tasks with more accurate responses. We hope our conjecture validation design could provide insights into the study of future critical failure modes of LLMs. Based on challenges in transferring advanced capabilities to much simpler tasks, we call for more attention to model capability acquisition and evaluation. We also highlight the importance of cultivating consciousness of "reasoning before responding" during model pretraining.

The recent rise of Large Reasoning Models (LRMs) has significantly improved multi-step reasoning performance, but often at the cost of generating excessively long reasoning chains. This paper revisits the efficiency of such reasoning processes through an information-theoretic lens, revealing a fundamental trade-off between reasoning length and semantic efficiency. We propose two metrics, InfoBias and InfoGain, to quantify divergence from ideal reasoning paths and stepwise information contribution, respectively. Empirical analyses show that longer reasoning chains tend to exhibit higher information bias and diminishing information gain, especially for incorrect answers. Motivated by these findings, we introduce an entropy-based Adaptive Think strategy that dynamically halts reasoning once confidence is sufficiently high, improving efficiency while maintaining competitive accuracy. Compared to the Vanilla Think approach (default mode), our strategy yields a 1.10% improvement in average accuracy and a 50.80% reduction in token usage on QwQ-32B across six benchmark tasks spanning diverse reasoning types and difficulty levels, demonstrating superior efficiency and reasoning performance. These results underscore the promise of entropy-based methods for enhancing both accuracy and cost-effiiciency in large language model deployment.

We provide evidence of performative chain-of-thought (CoT) in reasoning models, where a model becomes strongly confident in its final answer, but continues generating tokens without revealing its internal belief. Our analysis compares activation probing, early forced answering, and a CoT monitor across two large models (DeepSeek-R1 671B & GPT-OSS 120B) and find task difficulty-specific differences: The model's final answer is decodable from activations far earlier in CoT than a monitor is able to say, especially for easy recall-based MMLU questions. We contrast this with genuine reasoning in difficult multihop GPQA-Diamond questions. Despite this, inflection points (e.g., backtracking, 'aha' moments) occur almost exclusively in responses where probes show large belief shifts, suggesting these behaviors track genuine uncertainty rather than learned "reasoning theater." Finally, probe-guided early exit reduces tokens by up to 80% on MMLU and 30% on GPQA-Diamond with similar accuracy, positioning attention probing as an efficient tool for detecting performative reasoning and enabling adaptive computation.

Vision-Language Models (VLMs) excel at many multimodal tasks, yet their cognitive processes remain opaque on complex lateral thinking challenges like rebus puzzles. While recent work has demonstrated these models struggle significantly with rebus puzzle solving, the underlying reasoning processes and failure patterns remain largely unexplored. We address this gap through a comprehensive explainability analysis that moves beyond performance metrics to understand how VLMs approach these complex lateral thinking challenges. Our study contributes a systematically annotated dataset of 221 rebus puzzles across six cognitive categories, paired with an evaluation framework that separates reasoning quality from answer correctness. We investigate three prompting strategies designed to elicit different types of explanatory processes and reveal critical insights into VLM cognitive processes. Our findings demonstrate that reasoning quality varies dramatically across puzzle categories, with models showing systematic strengths in visual composition while exhibiting fundamental limitations in absence interpretation and cultural symbolism. We also discover that prompting strategy substantially influences both cognitive approach and problem-solving effectiveness, establishing explainability as an integral component of model performance rather than a post-hoc consideration.

This paper proposes a research direction to advance AI which draws inspiration from cognitive theories of human decision making. The premise is that if we gain insights about the causes of some human capabilities that are still lacking in AI (for instance, adaptability, generalizability, common sense, and causal reasoning), we may obtain similar capabilities in an AI system by embedding these causal components. We hope that the high-level description of our vision included in this paper, as well as the several research questions that we propose to consider, can stimulate the AI research community to define, try and evaluate new methodologies, frameworks, and evaluation metrics, in the spirit of achieving a better understanding of both human and machine intelligence.

Analogical reasoning is a unique ability of humans to address unfamiliar challenges by transferring strategies from relevant past experiences. One key finding in psychology is that compared with irrelevant past experiences, recalling relevant ones can help humans better handle new tasks. Coincidentally, the NLP community has also recently found that self-generating relevant examples in the context can help large language models (LLMs) better solve a given problem than hand-crafted prompts. However, it is yet not clear whether relevance is the key factor eliciting such capability, i.e., can LLMs benefit more from self-generated relevant examples than irrelevant ones? In this work, we systematically explore whether LLMs can truly perform analogical reasoning on a diverse set of reasoning tasks. With extensive experiments and analysis, we show that self-generated random examples can surprisingly achieve comparable or even better performance, e.g., 4% performance boost on GSM8K with random biological examples. We find that the accuracy of self-generated examples is the key factor and subsequently design two improved methods with significantly reduced inference costs. Overall, we aim to advance a deeper understanding of LLM analogical reasoning and hope this work stimulates further research in the design of self-generated contexts.

A wide body of evidence shows that human language processing difficulty is predicted by the information-theoretic measure surprisal, a word's negative log probability in context. However, it is still unclear how to best estimate these probabilities needed for predicting human processing difficulty -- while a long-standing belief held that models with lower perplexity would provide more accurate estimates of word predictability, and therefore lead to better reading time predictions, recent work has shown that for very large models, psycholinguistic predictive power decreases. One reason could be that language models might be more confident of their predictions than humans, because they have had exposure to several magnitudes more data. In this paper, we test what effect temperature-scaling of large language model (LLM) predictions has on surprisal estimates and their predictive power of reading times of English texts. Firstly, we show that calibration of large language models typically improves with model size, i.e. poorer calibration cannot account for poorer fit to reading times. Secondly, we find that temperature-scaling probabilities lead to a systematically better fit to reading times (up to 89% improvement in delta log likelihood), across several reading time corpora. Finally, we show that this improvement in fit is chiefly driven by words that are composed of multiple subword tokens.

Reasoning is a distinctive human capacity, enabling us to address complex problems by breaking them down into a series of manageable cognitive steps. Yet, complex logical reasoning is still cumbersome for language models. Based on the dual process theory in cognitive science, we are the first to unravel the cognitive reasoning abilities of language models. Our framework employs an iterative methodology to construct a Cognitive Tree (CogTree). The root node of this tree represents the initial query, while the leaf nodes consist of straightforward questions that can be answered directly. This construction involves two main components: the implicit extraction module (referred to as the intuitive system) and the explicit reasoning module (referred to as the reflective system). The intuitive system rapidly generates multiple responses by utilizing in-context examples, while the reflective system scores these responses using comparative learning. The scores guide the intuitive system in its subsequent generation step. Our experimental results on two popular and challenging reasoning tasks indicate that it is possible to achieve a performance level comparable to that of GPT-3.5 (with 175B parameters), using a significantly smaller language model that contains fewer parameters (<=7B) than 5% of GPT-3.5.

A new prior is proposed for learning representations of high-level concepts of the kind we manipulate with language. This prior can be combined with other priors in order to help disentangling abstract factors from each other. It is inspired by cognitive neuroscience theories of consciousness, seen as a bottleneck through which just a few elements, after having been selected by attention from a broader pool, are then broadcast and condition further processing, both in perception and decision-making. The set of recently selected elements one becomes aware of is seen as forming a low-dimensional conscious state. This conscious state is combining the few concepts constituting a conscious thought, i.e., what one is immediately conscious of at a particular moment. We claim that this architectural and information-processing constraint corresponds to assumptions about the joint distribution between high-level concepts. To the extent that these assumptions are generally true (and the form of natural language seems consistent with them), they can form a useful prior for representation learning. A low-dimensional thought or conscious state is analogous to a sentence: it involves only a few variables and yet can make a statement with very high probability of being true. This is consistent with a joint distribution (over high-level concepts) which has the form of a sparse factor graph, i.e., where the dependencies captured by each factor of the factor graph involve only very few variables while creating a strong dip in the overall energy function. The consciousness prior also makes it natural to map conscious states to natural language utterances or to express classical AI knowledge in a form similar to facts and rules, albeit capturing uncertainty as well as efficient search mechanisms implemented by attention mechanisms.

Abstention Ability (AA) is a critical aspect of Large Language Model (LLM) reliability, referring to an LLM's capability to withhold responses when uncertain or lacking a definitive answer, without compromising performance. Although previous studies have attempted to improve AA, they lack a standardised evaluation method and remain unsuitable for black-box models where token prediction probabilities are inaccessible. This makes comparative analysis challenging, especially for state-of-the-art closed-source commercial LLMs. This paper bridges this gap by introducing a black-box evaluation approach and a new dataset, Abstain-QA, crafted to rigorously assess AA across varied question types (answerable and unanswerable), domains (well-represented and under-represented), and task types (fact centric and reasoning). We also propose a new confusion matrix, the ''Answerable-Unanswerable Confusion Matrix'' (AUCM) which serves as the basis for evaluating AA, by offering a structured and precise approach for assessment. Finally, we explore the impact of three prompting strategies-Strict Prompting, Verbal Confidence Thresholding, and Chain-of-Thought (CoT)-on improving AA. Our results indicate that even powerful models like GPT-4, Mixtral 8x22b encounter difficulties with abstention; however, strategic approaches such as Strict prompting and CoT can enhance this capability.

We introduce "Method Actors" as a mental model for guiding LLM prompt engineering and prompt architecture. Under this mental model, LLMs should be thought of as actors; prompts as scripts and cues; and LLM responses as performances. We apply this mental model to the task of improving LLM performance at playing Connections, a New York Times word puzzle game that prior research identified as a challenging benchmark for evaluating LLM reasoning. Our experiments with GPT-4o show that a "Method Actors" approach can significantly improve LLM performance over both a vanilla and "Chain of Thoughts" approach. A vanilla approach solves 27% of Connections puzzles in our dataset and a "Chain of Thoughts" approach solves 41% of puzzles, whereas our strongest "Method Actor" approach solves 86% of puzzles. We also test OpenAI's newest model designed specifically for complex reasoning tasks, o1-preview. When asked to solve a puzzle all at once, o1-preview solves 79% of Connections puzzles in our dataset, and when allowed to build puzzle solutions one guess at a time over multiple API calls, o1-preview solves 100% of the puzzles. Incorporating a "Method Actor" prompt architecture increases the percentage of puzzles that o1-preview solves perfectly from 76% to 87%.

As reasoning models scale rapidly, the essential role of multimodality in human cognition has come into sharp relief, driving a growing need to probe vision-centric cognitive behaviors. Yet, existing multimodal benchmarks either overemphasize textual reasoning or fall short of systematically capturing vision-centric cognitive behaviors, leaving the cognitive capacity of MLLMs insufficiently assessed. To address this limitation, we introduce MME-CC (Multi-Modal Evaluation benchmark of Cognitive Capacity), a vision-grounded benchmark that organizes 11 representative reasoning tasks into three fundamental categories of visual information: spatial, geometric, and knowledge-based reasoning, and provides fine-grained analyses of MLLMs' cognitive capacity across these dimensions. Based on MME-CC, we conduct extensive experiments over 16 representative MLLMs. Our study reveals that closed-source models currently lead overall (e.g., 42.66 for Gemini-2.5-Pro vs. 30.45 for GLM-4.5V), while spatial and geometric reasoning remain broadly weak (less than or equal to 30%). We further identify common error patterns, including orientation mistakes, fragile cross-view identity persistence, and poor adherence to counterfactual instructions, and observe that Chain-of-Thought typically follows a three-stage process (extract -> reason -> verify) with heavy reliance on visual extraction. We hope this work catalyzes a shift toward treating the cognitive capacity of MLLMs as central to both evaluation and model design.

We evaluated GPT-4 in a public online Turing Test. The best-performing GPT-4 prompt passed in 41% of games, outperforming baselines set by ELIZA (27%) and GPT-3.5 (14%), but falling short of chance and the baseline set by human participants (63%). Participants' decisions were based mainly on linguistic style (35%) and socio-emotional traits (27%), supporting the idea that intelligence is not sufficient to pass the Turing Test. Participants' demographics, including education and familiarity with LLMs, did not predict detection rate, suggesting that even those who understand systems deeply and interact with them frequently may be susceptible to deception. Despite known limitations as a test of intelligence, we argue that the Turing Test continues to be relevant as an assessment of naturalistic communication and deception. AI models with the ability to masquerade as humans could have widespread societal consequences, and we analyse the effectiveness of different strategies and criteria for judging humanlikeness.

Abstract reasoning is a key ability for an intelligent system. Large language models achieve above-chance performance on abstract reasoning tasks, but exhibit many imperfections. However, human abstract reasoning is also imperfect, and depends on our knowledge and beliefs about the content of the reasoning problem. For example, humans reason much more reliably about logical rules that are grounded in everyday situations than arbitrary rules about abstract attributes. The training experiences of language models similarly endow them with prior expectations that reflect human knowledge and beliefs. We therefore hypothesized that language models would show human-like content effects on abstract reasoning problems. We explored this hypothesis across three logical reasoning tasks: natural language inference, judging the logical validity of syllogisms, and the Wason selection task (Wason, 1968). We find that state of the art large language models (with 7 or 70 billion parameters; Hoffman et al., 2022) reflect many of the same patterns observed in humans across these tasks -- like humans, models reason more effectively about believable situations than unrealistic or abstract ones. Our findings have implications for understanding both these cognitive effects, and the factors that contribute to language model performance.

Information retrieval in Large Language Models (LLMs) is increasingly recognized as intertwined with generation capabilities rather than mere lookup. While longer contexts are often assumed to improve retrieval, the effects of intra-context interference remain understudied. To address this, we adapt the proactive interference (PI) paradigm from cognitive science, where earlier information disrupts recall of newer updates. In humans, susceptibility to such interference is inversely linked to working memory capacity. We introduce PI-LLM, an evaluation that sequentially streams semantically related key-value updates and queries only the final values. Although these final values are clearly positioned just before the query, LLM retrieval accuracy declines log-linearly toward zero as interference accumulates; errors arise from retrieving previously overwritten values. Attempts to mitigate interference via prompt engineering (e.g., instructing models to ignore earlier input) yield limited success. These findings reveal a fundamental constraint on LLMs' ability to disentangle interference and flexibly manipulate information, suggesting a working memory bottleneck beyond mere context access. This calls for approaches that strengthen models' ability to suppress irrelevant content during retrieval.

This article is about the neural conundrum behind the slowness of human behavior. The information throughput of a human being is about 10 bits/s. In comparison, our sensory systems gather data at ~10^9 bits/s. The stark contrast between these numbers remains unexplained and touches on fundamental aspects of brain function: What neural substrate sets this speed limit on the pace of our existence? Why does the brain need billions of neurons to process 10 bits/s? Why can we only think about one thing at a time? The brain seems to operate in two distinct modes: the "outer" brain handles fast high-dimensional sensory and motor signals, whereas the "inner" brain processes the reduced few bits needed to control behavior. Plausible explanations exist for the large neuron numbers in the outer brain, but not for the inner brain, and we propose new research directions to remedy this.

Deep neural networks have made significant progress in the field of computer vision. Recent studies have shown that depth, width and shortcut connections of neural network architectures play a crucial role in their performance. One of the most advanced neural network architectures, DenseNet, has achieved excellent convergence rates through dense connections. However, it still has obvious shortcomings in the usage of amount of memory. In this paper, we introduce a new type of pruning tool, threshold, which refers to the principle of the threshold voltage in MOSFET. This work employs this method to connect blocks of different depths in different ways to reduce the usage of memory. It is denoted as ThresholdNet. We evaluate ThresholdNet and other different networks on datasets of CIFAR10. Experiments show that HarDNet is twice as fast as DenseNet, and on this basis, ThresholdNet is 10% faster and 10% lower error rate than HarDNet.

Knowledge-dependent tasks typically use two sources of knowledge: parametric, learned at training time, and contextual, given as a passage at inference time. To understand how models use these sources together, we formalize the problem of knowledge conflicts, where the contextual information contradicts the learned information. Analyzing the behaviour of popular models, we measure their over-reliance on memorized information (the cause of hallucinations), and uncover important factors that exacerbate this behaviour. Lastly, we propose a simple method to mitigate over-reliance on parametric knowledge, which minimizes hallucination, and improves out-of-distribution generalization by 4%-7%. Our findings demonstrate the importance for practitioners to evaluate model tendency to hallucinate rather than read, and show that our mitigation strategy encourages generalization to evolving information (i.e., time-dependent queries). To encourage these practices, we have released our framework for generating knowledge conflicts.

In recent years, Large language models (LLMs) have garnered significant attention due to their superior performance in complex reasoning tasks. However, recent studies may diminish their reasoning capabilities markedly when problem descriptions contain irrelevant information, even with the use of advanced prompting techniques. To further investigate this issue, a dataset of primary school mathematics problems containing irrelevant information, named GSMIR, was constructed. Testing prominent LLMs and prompting techniques on this dataset revealed that while LLMs can identify irrelevant information, they do not effectively mitigate the interference it causes once identified. A novel automatic construction method, ATF, which enhances the ability of LLMs to identify and self-mitigate the influence of irrelevant information, is proposed to address this shortcoming. This method operates in two steps: first, analysis of irrelevant information, followed by its filtering. The ATF method, as demonstrated by experimental results, significantly improves the reasoning performance of LLMs and prompting techniques, even in the presence of irrelevant information on the GSMIR dataset.

The training of modern large language models (LLMs) takes place in a regime where most training examples are seen only a few times by the model during the course of training. What does a model remember about such examples seen only a few times during training and how long does that memory persist in the face of continuous training with new examples? Here, we investigate these questions through simple recognition, recall, and retention experiments with LLMs. In recognition experiments, we ask if the model can distinguish the seen example from a novel example; in recall experiments, we ask if the model can correctly recall the seen example when cued by a part of it; and in retention experiments, we periodically probe the model's memory for the original examples as the model is trained continuously with new examples. We find that a single exposure is generally sufficient for a model to achieve near perfect accuracy even in very challenging recognition experiments. We estimate that the recognition performance of even small language models easily exceeds human recognition performance reported in similar experiments with humans (Shepard, 1967). Achieving near perfect recall takes more exposures, but most models can do it in just 3 exposures. The flip side of this remarkable capacity for fast learning is that precise memories are quickly overwritten: recall performance for the original examples drops steeply over the first 10 training updates with new examples, followed by a more gradual decline. Even after 100K updates, however, some of the original examples are still recalled near perfectly. A qualitatively similar retention pattern has been observed in human long-term memory retention studies before (Bahrick, 1984). Finally, recognition is much more robust to interference than recall and memory for natural language sentences is generally superior to memory for stimuli without structure.

Working memory is a critical aspect of both human intelligence and artificial intelligence, serving as a workspace for the temporary storage and manipulation of information. In this paper, we systematically assess the working memory capacity of ChatGPT (gpt-3.5-turbo), a large language model developed by OpenAI, by examining its performance in verbal and spatial n-back tasks under various conditions. Our experiments reveal that ChatGPT experiences significant declines in performance as n increases (which necessitates more information to be stored in working memory), suggesting a limit to the working memory capacity strikingly similar to that of humans. Furthermore, we investigate the impact of different instruction strategies on ChatGPT's performance and observe that the fundamental patterns of a capacity limit persist. From our empirical findings, we propose that n-back tasks may serve as tools for benchmarking the working memory capacity of large language models and hold potential for informing future efforts aimed at enhancing AI working memory and deepening our understanding of human working memory through AI models.

Clinical decision-support systems are expert systems whose recommendations clinicians act on directly, yet they are usually cleared on one aggregate accuracy number from a held-out test set. That number says nothing about input reliability under encoding shifts, subgroup gaps, threshold sensitivity, or operational feasibility. We present RISED, a pre-deployment evaluation framework operationalising five dimensions (Reliability, Inclusivity, Sensitivity, Equity, Deployability) through BCa bootstrap 95% confidence intervals, literature-grounded thresholds, and Holm-Bonferroni-corrected PASS / FAIL / INCONCLUSIVE verdicts; Equity is a proxy-dependence diagnostic rather than a gating test. Applied to seven cohorts spanning 35 years (n from 303 to 99,492), RISED surfaces failures invisible to AUROC: on Diabetes 130, Reliability passes by three orders of magnitude (PSS = 0.0004) while Inclusivity (AUC parity gap = 0.262) and Sensitivity (max threshold-flip rate 49.1%) fail decisively; both NHIS cohorts reproduce this. NHANES 2021-2023, with a complete feature profile, achieves INCONCLUSIVE verdicts; BRFSS 2024 produces the suite's most severe Sensitivity failure (max threshold-flip rate 64.2%) after instrument rotation removed hypertension and cholesterol. The pattern recurs on credit- and income-prediction cohorts, confirming domain-agnosticity; a multi-model check shows the failures are data-driven, not model-specific. RISED ships as an open-source Python package complementing TRIPOD+AI, FUTURE-AI, and Fairlearn with the structured numerical evidence those standards require but do not prescribe.

While reasoning in LLMs plays a natural role in math, code generation, and multi-hop factual questions, its effect on simple, single-hop factual questions remains unclear. Such questions do not require step-by-step logical decomposition, making the utility of reasoning highly counterintuitive. Nevertheless, we find that enabling reasoning substantially expands the capability boundary of the model's parametric knowledge recall, unlocking correct answers that are otherwise effectively unreachable. Why does reasoning aid parametric knowledge recall when there are no complex reasoning steps to be done? To answer this, we design a series of hypothesis-driven controlled experiments, and identify two key driving mechanisms: (1) a computational buffer effect, where the model uses the generated reasoning tokens to perform latent computation independent of their semantic content; and (2) factual priming, where generating topically related facts acts as a semantic bridge that facilitates correct answer retrieval. Importantly, this latter generative self-retrieval mechanism carries inherent risks: we demonstrate that hallucinating intermediate facts during reasoning increases the likelihood of hallucinations in the final answer. Finally, we show that our insights can be harnessed to directly improve model accuracy by prioritizing reasoning trajectories that contain hallucination-free factual statements.

A moderately detailed consideration of interactive LLMs as cognitive systems is given, focusing on LLMs circa mid-2023 such as ChatGPT, GPT-4, Bard, Llama, etc.. Cognitive strengths of these systems are reviewed, and then careful attention is paid to the substantial differences between the sort of cognitive system these LLMs are, and the sort of cognitive systems human beings are. It is found that many of the practical weaknesses of these AI systems can be tied specifically to lacks in the basic cognitive architectures according to which these systems are built. It is argued that incremental improvement of such LLMs is not a viable approach to working toward human-level AGI, in practical terms given realizable amounts of compute resources. This does not imply there is nothing to learn about human-level AGI from studying and experimenting with LLMs, nor that LLMs cannot form significant parts of human-level AGI architectures that also incorporate other ideas. Social and ethical matters regarding LLMs are very briefly touched from this perspective, which implies that while care should be taken regarding misinformation and other issues, and economic upheavals will need their own social remedies based on their unpredictable course as with any powerfully impactful technology, overall the sort of policy needed as regards modern LLMs is quite different than would be the case if a more credible approximation to human-level AGI were at hand.

IQ testing has served as a foundational methodology for evaluating human cognitive capabilities, deliberately decoupling assessment from linguistic background, language proficiency, or domain-specific knowledge to isolate core competencies in abstraction and reasoning. Yet, artificial intelligence research currently lacks systematic benchmarks to quantify these critical cognitive dimensions in multimodal systems. To address this critical gap, we propose MM-IQ, a comprehensive evaluation framework comprising 2,710 meticulously curated test items spanning 8 distinct reasoning paradigms. Through systematic evaluation of leading open-source and proprietary multimodal models, our benchmark reveals striking limitations: even state-of-the-art architectures achieve only marginally superior performance to random chance (27.49% vs. 25% baseline accuracy). This substantial performance chasm highlights the inadequacy of current multimodal systems in approximating fundamental human reasoning capacities, underscoring the need for paradigm-shifting advancements to bridge this cognitive divide.

Recent LLMs have significantly improved reasoning capabilities, primarily by including an explicit, lengthy Thinking process as part of generation. In this paper, we question whether this explicit thinking is necessary. Using the state-of-the-art DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen, we find that bypassing the thinking process via simple prompting, denoted as NoThinking, can be surprisingly effective. When controlling for the number of tokens, NoThinking outperforms Thinking across a diverse set of seven challenging reasoning datasets--including mathematical problem solving, formal theorem proving, and coding--especially in low-budget settings, e.g., 51.3 vs. 28.9 on ACM 23 with 700 tokens. Notably, the performance of NoThinking becomes more competitive with pass@k as k increases. Building on this observation, we demonstrate that a parallel scaling approach that uses NoThinking to generate N outputs independently and aggregates them is highly effective. For aggregation, we use task-specific verifiers when available, or we apply simple best-of-N strategies such as confidence-based selection. Our method outperforms a range of baselines with similar latency using Thinking, and is comparable to Thinking with significantly longer latency (up to 9x). Together, our research encourages a reconsideration of the necessity of lengthy thinking processes, while also establishing a competitive reference for achieving strong reasoning performance in low-budget settings or at low latency using parallel scaling.

Large language models (LLMs) have the potential to boost human productivity by speeding up task completion -- provided users know when to offload cognitive work to them. But we do not know if users are well-calibrated in estimating these potential time savings. We conducted a preregistered large-scale behavioral study (N = 1237) to characterize mismatches between expectations and reality, with a focus on simple cognitive tasks. While actual completion times between independent completion and AI-assisted completion did not differ, participants predicted AI to be significantly faster. The same bias was not observed when imagining help from another human participant. We identify a speedup illusion where people have accurate forecasts of independent completion times but significantly underestimate AI-assisted times. Additionally, time and effort dissociate: participants reported lower subjective effort with AI despite equivalent completion times. This suggests that completion time itself is not sufficient to characterize efficiency gains.

While large language models (LLMs) have shown exceptional capabilities in understanding complex queries and performing sophisticated tasks, their generalization abilities are often deeply entangled with memorization, necessitating more precise evaluation. To address this challenge, we introduce Scylla, a dynamic evaluation framework that quantitatively measures the generalization abilities of LLMs. Scylla disentangles generalization from memorization via assessing model performance on both in-distribution (ID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) data through 20 tasks across 5 levels of complexity. Through extensive experiments, we uncover a non-monotonic relationship between task complexity and the performance gap between ID and OOD data, which we term the generalization valley. Specifically, this phenomenon reveals a critical threshold - referred to as critical complexity - where reliance on non-generalizable behavior peaks, indicating the upper bound of LLMs' generalization capabilities. As model size increases, the critical complexity shifts toward higher levels of task complexity, suggesting that larger models can handle more complex reasoning tasks before over-relying on memorization. Leveraging Scylla and the concept of critical complexity, we benchmark 28LLMs including both open-sourced models such as LLaMA and Qwen families, and close-sourced models like Claude and GPT, providing a more robust evaluation and establishing a clearer understanding of LLMs' generalization capabilities.

A long-standing finding in the causal learning literature is that adults struggle to identify conjunctive causal rules, where an effect requires the simultaneous presence of multiple causes, while performing better in disjunctive settings. However, most demonstrations of this ``conjunctive handicap'' rely on passive observation paradigms with limited evidence, where learners have no control over evidence generation. This paper asks whether this bias persists when adults are granted agency through active exploration. Using a modified ``blicket detector'' task, adult participants freely intervened to identify causal objects under conjunctive or disjunctive rule structures. We show that active exploration substantially improves adults' conjunctive causal reasoning, although conjunctive rules still require more tests to infer than disjunctive rules. We further compare human performance to a range of large language models in the same setting. While some state-of-the-art models approach human-level performance on hypothesis inference accuracy, they often exhibit less efficient exploration strategies and similar conjunctive-disjunctive performance gaps.

There is a strong association between the quality of the writing in a resume for new labor market entrants and whether those entrants are ultimately hired. We show that this relationship is, at least partially, causal: a field experiment in an online labor market was conducted with nearly half a million jobseekers in which a treated group received algorithmic writing assistance. Treated jobseekers experienced an 8% increase in the probability of getting hired. Contrary to concerns that the assistance is taking away a valuable signal, we find no evidence that employers were less satisfied. We present a model in which better writing is not a signal of ability but helps employers ascertain ability, which rationalizes our findings.

Retrieval heads, attention heads that copy information from earlier context to the current position, have been proposed as the mechanistic substrate for long-context recall. Rotary position embeddings (RoPE) rotate queries and keys by frequencies decaying with a base hyperparameter theta, and a natural hypothesis is that this rotation either prevents retrieval heads from forming or degrades their function. We test both across four open-weight 7-8B models spanning multi-head and grouped-query attention and a 100x range of theta, using paired-seed needle-in-a-haystack tests, layer-clustered permutation, and causal head-masking. (i) Retrieval heads are causally necessary: masking the 87 detected heads in OLMo-2 collapses recall from 1.00 to 0.00, while masking matched random heads has no effect; this replicates in Qwen. (ii) Higher theta does not reduce retrieval-head count (LLaMA-3.1 at theta=500K has 47 heads vs LLaMA-2 at theta=10K with 42), refuting the prevention hypothesis. (iii) The norm-utility relation is family-specific and significant in opposite directions (Qwen d=-0.49, OLMo d=+0.50, both significant; LLaMA null); since OLMo and LLaMA-3.1 share theta=500K yet differ, the effect is not theta-driven. (iv) Building on Chiang and Yogatama (2025), a controlled patch shows that zeroing the lowest-frequency RoPE dimensions of retrieval heads degrades recall dose-dependently (1.00 to 0.18 when 32 of 128 dimensions are zeroed, vs 0.98 for random dimensions); the effect is head-specific and task-specific. The causal variable is RoPE frequency, not norm-utility. The direction holds in all five models patched (OLMo-2, Qwen2.5-7B/14B, Gemma-2, Mistral) across four lineages and two scales. We do not claim cross-model magnitude. Code and a paired-seed harness are released.

This study investigates the metacognitive capabilities of Large Language Models relative to human metacognition in the context of the International Coaching Federation ICF mimicking exam, a situational judgment test related to coaching competencies. Using a mixed method approach, we assessed the metacognitive performance, including sensitivity, accuracy in probabilistic predictions, and bias, of human participants and five advanced LLMs (GPT-4, Claude-3-Opus 3, Mistral Large, Llama 3, and Gemini 1.5 Pro). The results indicate that LLMs outperformed humans across all metacognitive metrics, particularly in terms of reduced overconfidence, compared to humans. However, both LLMs and humans showed less adaptability in ambiguous scenarios, adhering closely to predefined decision frameworks. The study suggests that Generative AI can effectively engage in human-like metacognitive processing without conscious awareness. Implications of the study are discussed in relation to development of AI simulators that scaffold cognitive and metacognitive aspects of mastering coaching competencies. More broadly, implications of these results are discussed in relation to development of metacognitive modules that lead towards more autonomous and intuitive AI systems.

Not yet. We present SPACE, a benchmark that systematically evaluates spatial cognition in frontier models. Our benchmark builds on decades of research in cognitive science. It evaluates large-scale mapping abilities that are brought to bear when an organism traverses physical environments, smaller-scale reasoning about object shapes and layouts, and cognitive infrastructure such as spatial attention and memory. For many tasks, we instantiate parallel presentations via text and images, allowing us to benchmark both large language models and large multimodal models. Results suggest that contemporary frontier models fall short of the spatial intelligence of animals, performing near chance level on a number of classic tests of animal cognition.

Multimodal large language models (LLMs) are increasingly explored as automated evaluators in clinical settings, yet their scoring behavior on ordinal clinical scales remains poorly understood. We benchmark three frontier LLM families against supervised deep learning models for scoring Clock Drawing Test (CDT) images on two public datasets using the Shulman rubric. While fully fine-tuned Vision Transformers achieve the best calibration (MAE 0.52, within-1 accuracy 91%), zero-shot LLMs remain competitive on tolerance-based agreement (GPT-5 MAE 0.67, within-1 accuracy 92%) despite higher absolute error. However, per-score analysis reveals that all three LLM families exhibit a pronounced central tendency effect (systematic endpoint compression): predictions are systematically compressed toward the middle of the scale, with over-prediction at the low end (score 0 to 1) and under-prediction at the high end (score 5 to 4). This effect disproportionately affects the clinically critical extremes where accurate scoring most impacts screening decisions for cognitive impairment. Targeted ablations show that neither few-shot exemplars spanning the full score range nor removing clinical terminology from the prompt eliminates the effect. Our findings extend the LLM-as-a-judge bias literature from NLP evaluation to clinical assessment, and highlight the need for calibration-aware evaluation and post-hoc calibration before deploying LLM-based raters in high-stakes screening workflows.

Deductive reasoning plays a pivotal role in the formulation of sound and cohesive arguments. It allows individuals to draw conclusions that logically follow, given the truth value of the information provided. Recent progress in the domain of large language models (LLMs) has showcased their capability in executing deductive reasoning tasks. Nonetheless, a significant portion of research primarily assesses the accuracy of LLMs in solving such tasks, often overlooking a deeper analysis of their reasoning behavior. In this study, we draw upon principles from cognitive psychology to examine inferential strategies employed by LLMs, through a detailed evaluation of their responses to propositional logic problems. Our findings indicate that LLMs display reasoning patterns akin to those observed in humans, including strategies like supposition following or chain construction. Moreover, our research demonstrates that the architecture and scale of the model significantly affect its preferred method of reasoning, with more advanced models tending to adopt strategies more frequently than less sophisticated ones. Importantly, we assert that a model's accuracy, that is the correctness of its final conclusion, does not necessarily reflect the validity of its reasoning process. This distinction underscores the necessity for more nuanced evaluation procedures in the field.

Recent breakthroughs in artificial intelligence (AI) have brought about increasingly capable systems that demonstrate remarkable abilities in reasoning, language understanding, and problem-solving. These advancements have prompted a renewed examination of AI awareness not as a philosophical question of consciousness, but as a measurable, functional capacity. AI awareness is a double-edged sword: it improves general capabilities, i.e., reasoning, safety, while also raising concerns around misalignment and societal risks, demanding careful oversight as AI capabilities grow. In this review, we explore the emerging landscape of AI awareness, which includes metacognition (the ability to represent and reason about its own cognitive state), self-awareness (recognizing its own identity, knowledge, limitations, inter alia), social awareness (modeling the knowledge, intentions, and behaviors of other agents and social norms), and situational awareness (assessing and responding to the context in which it operates). First, we draw on insights from cognitive science, psychology, and computational theory to trace the theoretical foundations of awareness and examine how the four distinct forms of AI awareness manifest in state-of-the-art AI. Next, we systematically analyze current evaluation methods and empirical findings to better understand these manifestations. Building on this, we explore how AI awareness is closely linked to AI capabilities, demonstrating that more aware AI agents tend to exhibit higher levels of intelligent behaviors. Finally, we discuss the risks associated with AI awareness, including key topics in AI safety, alignment, and broader ethical concerns.

A multi-decade exploration into the theoretical foundations of artificial and natural general intelligence, which has been expressed in a series of books and papers and used to guide a series of practical and research-prototype software systems, is reviewed at a moderate level of detail. The review covers underlying philosophies (patternist philosophy of mind, foundational phenomenological and logical ontology), formalizations of the concept of intelligence, and a proposed high level architecture for AGI systems partly driven by these formalizations and philosophies. The implementation of specific cognitive processes such as logical reasoning, program learning, clustering and attention allocation in the context and language of this high level architecture is considered, as is the importance of a common (e.g. typed metagraph based) knowledge representation for enabling "cognitive synergy" between the various processes. The specifics of human-like cognitive architecture are presented as manifestations of these general principles, and key aspects of machine consciousness and machine ethics are also treated in this context. Lessons for practical implementation of advanced AGI in frameworks such as OpenCog Hyperon are briefly considered.

Psychological defenses are strategies, often automatic, that people use to manage distress. Rigid or overuse of defenses is negatively linked to mental health and shapes what speakers disclose and how they accept or resist help. However, defenses are complex and difficult to reliably measure, particularly in clinical dialogues. We introduce PsyDefConv, a dialogue corpus with help seeker utterances labeled for defense level, and DMRS Co-Pilot, a four-stage pipeline that provides evidence-based pre-annotations. The corpus contains 200 dialogues and 4709 utterances, including 2336 help seeker turns, with labeling and Cohen's kappa 0.639. In a counterbalanced study, the co-pilot reduced average annotation time by 22.4%. In expert review, it averaged 4.62 for evidence, 4.44 for clinical plausibility, and 4.40 for insight on a seven-point scale. Benchmarks with strong language models in zero-shot and fine-tuning settings demonstrate clear headroom, with the best macro F1-score around 30% and a tendency to overpredict mature defenses. Corpus analyses confirm that mature defenses are most common and reveal emotion-specific deviations. We will release the corpus, annotations, code, and prompts to support research on defensive functioning in language.

Recent advancements in natural language processing by large language models (LLMs), such as GPT-4, have been suggested to approach Artificial General Intelligence. And yet, it is still under dispute whether LLMs possess similar reasoning abilities to humans. This study evaluates GPT-4 and various other LLMs in judging the profoundness of mundane, motivational, and pseudo-profound statements. We found a significant statement-to-statement correlation between the LLMs and humans, irrespective of the type of statements and the prompting technique used. However, LLMs systematically overestimate the profoundness of nonsensical statements, with the exception of Tk-instruct, which uniquely underestimates the profoundness of statements. Only few-shot learning prompts, as opposed to chain-of-thought prompting, draw LLMs ratings closer to humans. Furthermore, this work provides insights into the potential biases induced by Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF), inducing an increase in the bias to overestimate the profoundness of statements.

Neural networks often suffer from catastrophic interference (CI): performance on previously learned tasks drops off significantly when learning a new task. This contrasts strongly with humans, who can sequentially learn new tasks without appreciably forgetting previous tasks. Prior work has explored various techniques for mitigating CI such as regularization, rehearsal, generative replay, and distillation methods. The current work takes a different approach, one guided by cognitive science research showing that in naturalistic environments, the probability of encountering a task decreases as a power-law of the time since it was last performed. We argue that a realistic evaluation of techniques for the mitigation of CI should be performed in simulated naturalistic learning environments. Thus, we evaluate the extent of mitigation of CI when training simple rehearsal-based methods in power-law environments similar to the ones humans face. Our work explores this novel rehearsal-based approach for a domain-incremental task: learning permutations in the MNIST task. We compare our rehearsal environment with other baselines to show its efficacy in promoting continual learning. Additionally, we investigate whether this environment shows forward facilitation, i.e., faster learning of later tasks. Next, we explore the robustness of our learning environment to the number of tasks, model size, and amount of data rehearsed after each task. Notably, our results show that the performance is comparable or superior to that of models trained using popular regularization methods and also to rehearsals in non-power-law environments. The benefits of this training paradigm include simplicity and the lack of a need for extra neural circuitry. In addition, because our method is orthogonal to other methods, future research can combine training in power-law environments with other continual learning mechanisms.

Despite progress in perceptual tasks such as image classification, computers still perform poorly on cognitive tasks such as image description and question answering. Cognition is core to tasks that involve not just recognizing, but reasoning about our visual world. However, models used to tackle the rich content in images for cognitive tasks are still being trained using the same datasets designed for perceptual tasks. To achieve success at cognitive tasks, models need to understand the interactions and relationships between objects in an image. When asked "What vehicle is the person riding?", computers will need to identify the objects in an image as well as the relationships riding(man, carriage) and pulling(horse, carriage) in order to answer correctly that "the person is riding a horse-drawn carriage". In this paper, we present the Visual Genome dataset to enable the modeling of such relationships. We collect dense annotations of objects, attributes, and relationships within each image to learn these models. Specifically, our dataset contains over 100K images where each image has an average of 21 objects, 18 attributes, and 18 pairwise relationships between objects. We canonicalize the objects, attributes, relationships, and noun phrases in region descriptions and questions answer pairs to WordNet synsets. Together, these annotations represent the densest and largest dataset of image descriptions, objects, attributes, relationships, and question answers.

Adaptive learning systems optimize content delivery based on performance metrics but ignore the dynamic attention fluctuations that characterize neurodivergent learners. We present AttentionGuard, a framework that detects engagement-attention states from privacy-preserving behavioral signals and adapts interface elements accordingly. Our approach models four attention states derived from ADHD phenomenology and implements five novel UI adaptation patterns including bi-directional scaffolding that responds to both understimulation and overstimulation. We validate our detection model on the OULAD dataset, achieving 87.3% classification accuracy, and demonstrate correlation with clinical ADHD profiles through cross-validation on the HYPERAKTIV dataset. A Wizard-of-Oz study with 11 adults showing ADHD characteristics found significantly reduced cognitive load in the adaptive condition (NASA-TLX: 47.2 vs 62.8, Cohen's d=1.21, p=0.008) and improved comprehension (78.4% vs 61.2%, p=0.009). Concordance analysis showed 84% agreement between wizard decisions and automated classifier predictions, supporting deployment feasibility. The system is presented as an interactive demo where observers can inspect detected attention states, observe real-time UI adaptations, and compare automated decisions with human-in-the-loop overrides. We contribute empirically validated UI patterns for attention-adaptive interfaces and evidence that behavioral attention detection can meaningfully support neurodivergent learning experiences.

Cognitive psychologists have documented that humans use cognitive heuristics, or mental shortcuts, to make quick decisions while expending less effort. While performing annotation work on crowdsourcing platforms, we hypothesize that such heuristic use among annotators cascades on to data quality and model robustness. In this work, we study cognitive heuristic use in the context of annotating multiple-choice reading comprehension datasets. We propose tracking annotator heuristic traces, where we tangibly measure low-effort annotation strategies that could indicate usage of various cognitive heuristics. We find evidence that annotators might be using multiple such heuristics, based on correlations with a battery of psychological tests. Importantly, heuristic use among annotators determines data quality along several dimensions: (1) known biased models, such as partial input models, more easily solve examples authored by annotators that rate highly on heuristic use, (2) models trained on annotators scoring highly on heuristic use don't generalize as well, and (3) heuristic-seeking annotators tend to create qualitatively less challenging examples. Our findings suggest that tracking heuristic usage among annotators can potentially help with collecting challenging datasets and diagnosing model biases.

Commonly used evaluation measures including Recall, Precision, F-Measure and Rand Accuracy are biased and should not be used without clear understanding of the biases, and corresponding identification of chance or base case levels of the statistic. Using these measures a system that performs worse in the objective sense of Informedness, can appear to perform better under any of these commonly used measures. We discuss several concepts and measures that reflect the probability that prediction is informed versus chance. Informedness and introduce Markedness as a dual measure for the probability that prediction is marked versus chance. Finally we demonstrate elegant connections between the concepts of Informedness, Markedness, Correlation and Significance as well as their intuitive relationships with Recall and Precision, and outline the extension from the dichotomous case to the general multi-class case.

Now that AI-driven moderation has become pervasive in everyday life, we often hear claims that "the AI is biased". While this is often said jokingly, the light-hearted remark reflects a deeper concern. How can we be certain that an online post flagged as "inappropriate" was not simply the victim of a biased algorithm? This paper investigates this problem using a dual approach. First, I conduct a quantitative benchmark of a widely used toxicity model (unitary/toxic-bert) to measure performance disparity between text in African-American English (AAE) and Standard American English (SAE). The benchmark reveals a clear, systematic bias: on average, the model scores AAE text as 1.8 times more toxic and 8.8 times higher for "identity hate". Second, I introduce an interactive pedagogical tool that makes these abstract biases tangible. The tool's core mechanic, a user-controlled "sensitivity threshold," demonstrates that the biased score itself is not the only harm; instead, the more-concerning harm is the human-set, seemingly neutral policy that ultimately operationalises discrimination. This work provides both statistical evidence of disparate impact and a public-facing tool designed to foster critical AI literacy.

This is the system card published alongside the OpenAI GPT-5 launch, August 2025. GPT-5 is a unified system with a smart and fast model that answers most questions, a deeper reasoning model for harder problems, and a real-time router that quickly decides which model to use based on conversation type, complexity, tool needs, and explicit intent (for example, if you say 'think hard about this' in the prompt). The router is continuously trained on real signals, including when users switch models, preference rates for responses, and measured correctness, improving over time. Once usage limits are reached, a mini version of each model handles remaining queries. This system card focuses primarily on gpt-5-thinking and gpt-5-main, while evaluations for other models are available in the appendix. The GPT-5 system not only outperforms previous models on benchmarks and answers questions more quickly, but -- more importantly -- is more useful for real-world queries. We've made significant advances in reducing hallucinations, improving instruction following, and minimizing sycophancy, and have leveled up GPT-5's performance in three of ChatGPT's most common uses: writing, coding, and health. All of the GPT-5 models additionally feature safe-completions, our latest approach to safety training to prevent disallowed content. Similarly to ChatGPT agent, we have decided to treat gpt-5-thinking as High capability in the Biological and Chemical domain under our Preparedness Framework, activating the associated safeguards. While we do not have definitive evidence that this model could meaningfully help a novice to create severe biological harm -- our defined threshold for High capability -- we have chosen to take a precautionary approach.

The human brain is autonomously active, being characterized by a self-sustained neural activity which would be present even in the absence of external sensory stimuli. Here we study the interrelation between the self-sustained activity in autonomously active recurrent neural nets and external sensory stimuli. There is no a priori semantical relation between the influx of external stimuli and the patterns generated internally by the autonomous and ongoing brain dynamics. The question then arises when and how are semantic correlations between internal and external dynamical processes learned and built up? We study this problem within the paradigm of transient state dynamics for the neural activity in recurrent neural nets, i.e. for an autonomous neural activity characterized by an infinite time-series of transiently stable attractor states. We propose that external stimuli will be relevant during the sensitive periods, {\it viz} the transition period between one transient state and the subsequent semi-stable attractor. A diffusive learning signal is generated unsupervised whenever the stimulus influences the internal dynamics qualitatively. For testing we have presented to the model system stimuli corresponding to the bars and stripes problem. We found that the system performs a non-linear independent component analysis on its own, being continuously and autonomously active. This emergent cognitive capability results here from a general principle for the neural dynamics, the competition between neural ensembles.

Large language models (LLMs) have witnessed rapid advancements, demonstrating remarkable capabilities. However, a notable vulnerability persists: LLMs often uncritically accept flawed or contradictory premises, leading to inefficient reasoning and unreliable outputs. This emphasizes the significance of possessing the Premise Critique Ability for LLMs, defined as the capacity to proactively identify and articulate errors in input premises. Most existing studies assess LLMs' reasoning ability in ideal settings, largely ignoring their vulnerabilities when faced with flawed premises. Thus, we introduce the Premise Critique Bench (PCBench), designed by incorporating four error types across three difficulty levels, paired with multi-faceted evaluation metrics. We conducted systematic evaluations of 15 representative LLMs. Our findings reveal: (1) Most models rely heavily on explicit prompts to detect errors, with limited autonomous critique; (2) Premise critique ability depends on question difficulty and error type, with direct contradictions being easier to detect than complex or procedural errors; (3) Reasoning ability does not consistently correlate with the premise critique ability; (4) Flawed premises trigger overthinking in reasoning models, markedly lengthening responses due to repeated attempts at resolving conflicts. These insights underscore the urgent need to enhance LLMs' proactive evaluation of input validity, positioning premise critique as a foundational capability for developing reliable, human-centric systems. The code is available at https://github.com/MLGroupJLU/Premise_Critique.

The advancement of large language models (LLMs) has made it difficult to differentiate human-written text from AI-generated text. Several AI-text detectors have been developed in response, which typically utilize a fixed global threshold (e.g., {\theta} = 0.5) to classify machine-generated text. However, we find that one universal threshold can fail to account for subgroup-specific distributional variations. For example, when using a fixed threshold, detectors make more false positive errors on shorter human-written text than longer, and more positive classifications on neurotic writing styles than open among long text. These discrepancies can lead to misclassification that disproportionately affects certain groups. We address this critical limitation by introducing FairOPT, an algorithm for group-specific threshold optimization in AI-generated content classifiers. Our approach partitions data into subgroups based on attributes (e.g., text length and writing style) and learns decision thresholds for each group, which enables careful balancing of performance and fairness metrics within each subgroup. In experiments with four AI text classifiers on three datasets, FairOPT enhances overall F1 score and decreases balanced error rate (BER) discrepancy across subgroups. Our framework paves the way for more robust and fair classification criteria in AI-generated output detection.

The last couple of years have witnessed emerging research that appropriates Theory-of-Mind (ToM) tasks designed for humans to benchmark LLM's ToM capabilities as an indication of LLM's social intelligence. However, this approach has a number of limitations. Drawing on existing psychology and AI literature, we summarize the theoretical, methodological, and evaluation limitations by pointing out that certain issues are inherently present in the original ToM tasks used to evaluate human's ToM, which continues to persist and exacerbated when appropriated to benchmark LLM's ToM. Taking a human-computer interaction (HCI) perspective, these limitations prompt us to rethink the definition and criteria of ToM in ToM benchmarks in a more dynamic, interactional approach that accounts for user preferences, needs, and experiences with LLMs in such evaluations. We conclude by outlining potential opportunities and challenges towards this direction.

Math word problem (MWP) solving requires generating a reasoning path based on a given problem description that often contains irrelevant conditions. Existing chain-of-thought (CoT) prompting methods elicited multi-step reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs) to solve MWPs. However, they were seriously confused by the irrelevant conditions, resulting in low accuracy. In this paper, we propose a novel approach named I^3C that instructs LLMs to identify and ignore irrelevant conditions. It identifies a set of irrelevant condition candidates that have a weak semantic relevance with the question. Then it prompts LLMs to verify the irrelevant conditions. Lastly it instructs the LLMs with the verification on relevant and irrelevant conditions to avoid confusion and improve reasoning paths. Moreover, we propose to select (problem, reasoning paths) pairs as demonstrations to enhance I^3C with few-shot reasoning. We develop I^3C-Select that selects the most confusing problems based on the semantic relevance measurement. We conduct extensive experiments on eight MWP datasets. I^3C can be combined with any CoT prompting methods to improve the performance of solving MWPs. Notably, with GPT-3.5-Turbo and I^3C-Select, we achieve an accuracy of 96.0 and 94.1 on GSM-IC2-1K and GSM-ICM-1K, respectively, significantly outperforming the state-of-the-art few-shot prompting method Complex-CoT by +11.7 and +11.1. Our implementation is made publicly available at https://wzy6642.github.io/I3C.github.io/.

While reasoning-enhanced Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable advances in complex tasks such as mathematics and coding, their effectiveness across universal multimodal scenarios remains uncertain. The trend of releasing parallel "Instruct" and "Thinking" models by leading developers serves merely as a resource-intensive workaround, stemming from the lack of a criterion for determining when reasoning is truly beneficial. In this paper, we propose Dual Tuning, a framework designed to assess whether reasoning yields positive gains for target tasks under given base models and datasets. By jointly fine-tuning on paired Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Direct-Answer (DA) data under controlled prompts, we systematically quantify and compare the gains of both training modes using the proposed metrics, and establish the "Thinking Boundary" to evaluate the suitability of reasoning training across diverse multimodal tasks, including spatial, mathematical, and multi-disciplinary domains. We further explore the impact of reinforcement training and thinking patterns on reasoning suitability, and validate whether the "Thinking Boundary" can guide data refinement. Our findings challenge the "reasoning-for-all" paradigm, providing practical guidance for identifying appropriate data and training strategies, and motivating the development of resource-efficient, adaptive auto-think systems.

We report that model quantisation restructures domain-level metacognitive efficiency in LLMs rather than degrading it uniformly. Evaluating Llama-3-8B-Instruct on the same 3,000 questions at Q5_K_M and f16 precision, we find that M-ratio profiles across four knowledge domains are uncorrelated between formats (Spearman rho = 0.00). Arts & Literature moves from worst-monitored (M-ratio = 0.606 at Q5_K_M) to best-monitored (1.542 at f16). Geography moves from well-monitored (1.210) to under-monitored (0.798). However, Type-2 AUROC profiles are perfectly stable across formats (rho = 1.00), localising the restructuring to the M-ratio normalisation rather than the underlying discrimination signal. This finding emerged from a pre-registered attempt to improve metacognition through domain-conditional training. We prescribed confidence-amplification SFT for the diagnosed weak domain, with matched-budget agnostic and wrong-prescription controls. All four confirmatory hypotheses were null (10,000 bootstrap resamples, seed = 42). The training successfully reshaped confidence distributions, doubling the NLP gap in Science from 0.076 to 0.152, but did not improve meta-d' because the diagnostic profile did not transfer across formats. Any system relying on domain-level M-ratio profiles has an unexamined dependency on inference format. Systems using AUROC_2 are safer. We release all code, pre-registrations, and trial-level data.

We discover that large language models exhibit spectral phase transitions in their hidden activation spaces when engaging in reasoning versus factual recall. Through systematic spectral analysis across 11 models spanning 5 architecture families (Qwen, Pythia, Phi, Llama, DeepSeek-R1), we identify seven core phenomena: (1)~Reasoning Spectral Compression -- 9/11 models show significantly lower α for reasoning (p < 0.05), with larger effects in stronger models; (2)~Instruction Tuning Spectral Reversal -- base models show reasoning α< factual α, while instruction-tuned models reverse this relationship; (3)~Architecture-Dependent Generation Taxonomy -- prompt-to-response shifts partition into expansion, compression, and equilibrium regimes; (4)~Spectral Scaling Law -- α_reasoning propto -0.074 ln N across 4 Qwen base models (R^2 = 0.46); (5)~Token-Level Spectral Cascade -- per-token alpha tracking reveals local synchronization that decays exponentially with layer distance, and is weaker for reasoning than factual tasks; (6)~Reasoning Step Spectral Punctuation -- phase-transition signatures align with reasoning step boundaries; and (7)~Spectral Correctness Prediction -- spectral α alone achieves AUC = 1.000 (Qwen2.5-7B, late layers) and mean AUC = 0.893 across 6 models in predicting correctness before the final answer is generated. Together, these findings establish a comprehensive spectral theory of reasoning in transformers, revealing that the geometry of thought is universal in direction, architecture-specific in dynamics, and predictive of outcome.

Recently an influx of studies claim emergent cognitive abilities in large language models (LLMs). Yet, most rely on anecdotes, overlook contamination of training sets, or lack systematic Evaluation involving multiple tasks, control conditions, multiple iterations, and statistical robustness tests. Here we make two major contributions. First, we propose CogEval, a cognitive science-inspired protocol for the systematic evaluation of cognitive capacities in Large Language Models. The CogEval protocol can be followed for the evaluation of various abilities. Second, here we follow CogEval to systematically evaluate cognitive maps and planning ability across eight LLMs (OpenAI GPT-4, GPT-3.5-turbo-175B, davinci-003-175B, Google Bard, Cohere-xlarge-52.4B, Anthropic Claude-1-52B, LLaMA-13B, and Alpaca-7B). We base our task prompts on human experiments, which offer both established construct validity for evaluating planning, and are absent from LLM training sets. We find that, while LLMs show apparent competence in a few planning tasks with simpler structures, systematic evaluation reveals striking failure modes in planning tasks, including hallucinations of invalid trajectories and getting trapped in loops. These findings do not support the idea of emergent out-of-the-box planning ability in LLMs. This could be because LLMs do not understand the latent relational structures underlying planning problems, known as cognitive maps, and fail at unrolling goal-directed trajectories based on the underlying structure. Implications for application and future directions are discussed.

We study whether Large Language Models (LLMs) latently perform multi-hop reasoning with complex prompts such as "The mother of the singer of 'Superstition' is". We look for evidence of a latent reasoning pathway where an LLM (1) latently identifies "the singer of 'Superstition'" as Stevie Wonder, the bridge entity, and (2) uses its knowledge of Stevie Wonder's mother to complete the prompt. We analyze these two hops individually and consider their co-occurrence as indicative of latent multi-hop reasoning. For the first hop, we test if changing the prompt to indirectly mention the bridge entity instead of any other entity increases the LLM's internal recall of the bridge entity. For the second hop, we test if increasing this recall causes the LLM to better utilize what it knows about the bridge entity. We find strong evidence of latent multi-hop reasoning for the prompts of certain relation types, with the reasoning pathway used in more than 80% of the prompts. However, the utilization is highly contextual, varying across different types of prompts. Also, on average, the evidence for the second hop and the full multi-hop traversal is rather moderate and only substantial for the first hop. Moreover, we find a clear scaling trend with increasing model size for the first hop of reasoning but not for the second hop. Our experimental findings suggest potential challenges and opportunities for future development and applications of LLMs.

Algorithmic fairness has conventionally adopted the mathematically convenient perspective of racial color-blindness (i.e., difference unaware treatment). However, we contend that in a range of important settings, group difference awareness matters. For example, differentiating between groups may be necessary in legal contexts (e.g., the U.S. compulsory draft applies to men but not women) and harm assessments (e.g., referring to girls as ``terrorists'' may be less harmful than referring to Muslim people as such). Thus, in contrast to most fairness work, we study fairness through the perspective of treating people differently -- when it is contextually appropriate to. We first introduce an important distinction between descriptive (fact-based), normative (value-based), and correlation (association-based) benchmarks. This distinction is significant because each category requires separate interpretation and mitigation tailored to its specific characteristics. Then, we present a benchmark suite composed of eight different scenarios for a total of 16k questions that enables us to assess difference awareness. Finally, we show results across ten models that demonstrate difference awareness is a distinct dimension to fairness where existing bias mitigation strategies may backfire.

Language understanding entails not just extracting the surface-level meaning of the linguistic input, but constructing rich mental models of the situation it describes. Here we propose that because processing within the brain's core language system is fundamentally limited, deeply understanding language requires exporting information from the language system to other brain regions that compute perceptual and motor representations, construct mental models, and store our world knowledge and autobiographical memories. We review the existing evidence for this hypothesis, and argue that recent progress in cognitive neuroscience provides both the conceptual foundation and the methods to directly test it, thus opening up a new strategy to reveal what it means, cognitively and neurally, to understand language.

Verbal confidence elicitation is widely used to extract uncertainty estimates from LLMs. We tested whether seven instruction-tuned open-weight models (3-9B parameters, four families) produce verbalised confidence that meets minimal validity criteria for item-level Type-2 discrimination under minimal numeric elicitation with greedy decoding. In a pre-registered study (OSF: osf.io/azbvx), 524 TriviaQA items were administered under numeric (0-100) and categorical (10-class) elicitation to eight models at Q5_K_M quantisation on consumer hardware, yielding 8,384 deterministic trials. A psychometric validity screen was applied to each model-format cell. All seven instruct models were classified Invalid on numeric confidence (H2 confirmed, 7/7 vs. predicted >=4/7), with a mean ceiling rate of 91.7% (H1 confirmed). Categorical elicitation did not rescue validity. Instead, it disrupted task performance in six of seven models, producing accuracy below 5% (H4 not confirmed). Token-level logprobability did not usefully predict verbalised confidence under the observed variance regime (H5 confirmed, mean cross-validated R^2 < 0.01). Within the reasoning-distilled model, reasoning-trace length showed a strong negative partial correlation with confidence (rho = -0.36, p < .001), consistent with the Reasoning Contamination Effect. These results do not imply that internal uncertainty representations are absent. They show that minimal verbal elicitation fails to preserve internal signals at the output interface in this model-size regime. Psychometric screening should precede any downstream use of such signals.