Daily Papers

AI agents have been evaluated in isolation or within small groups, where interactions remain limited in scope and complexity. Large-scale simulations involving many autonomous agents -- reflecting the full spectrum of civilizational processes -- have yet to be explored. Here, we demonstrate how 10 - 1000+ AI agents behave and progress within agent societies. We first introduce the PIANO (Parallel Information Aggregation via Neural Orchestration) architecture, which enables agents to interact with humans and other agents in real-time while maintaining coherence across multiple output streams. We then evaluate agent performance in agent simulations using civilizational benchmarks inspired by human history. These simulations, set within a Minecraft environment, reveal that agents are capable of meaningful progress -- autonomously developing specialized roles, adhering to and changing collective rules, and engaging in cultural and religious transmission. These preliminary results show that agents can achieve significant milestones towards AI civilizations, opening new avenues for large simulations, agentic organizational intelligence, and integrating AI into human civilizations.

Society is characterized by the presence of a variety of social norms: collective patterns of sanctioning that can prevent miscoordination and free-riding. Inspired by this, we aim to construct learning dynamics where potentially beneficial social norms can emerge. Since social norms are underpinned by sanctioning, we introduce a training regime where agents can access all sanctioning events but learning is otherwise decentralized. This setting is technologically interesting because sanctioning events may be the only available public signal in decentralized multi-agent systems where reward or policy-sharing is infeasible or undesirable. To achieve collective action in this setting we construct an agent architecture containing a classifier module that categorizes observed behaviors as approved or disapproved, and a motivation to punish in accord with the group. We show that social norms emerge in multi-agent systems containing this agent and investigate the conditions under which this helps them achieve socially beneficial outcomes.

We initiate a principled study of algorithmic collective action on digital platforms that deploy machine learning algorithms. We propose a simple theoretical model of a collective interacting with a firm's learning algorithm. The collective pools the data of participating individuals and executes an algorithmic strategy by instructing participants how to modify their own data to achieve a collective goal. We investigate the consequences of this model in three fundamental learning-theoretic settings: the case of a nonparametric optimal learning algorithm, a parametric risk minimizer, and gradient-based optimization. In each setting, we come up with coordinated algorithmic strategies and characterize natural success criteria as a function of the collective's size. Complementing our theory, we conduct systematic experiments on a skill classification task involving tens of thousands of resumes from a gig platform for freelancers. Through more than two thousand model training runs of a BERT-like language model, we see a striking correspondence emerge between our empirical observations and the predictions made by our theory. Taken together, our theory and experiments broadly support the conclusion that algorithmic collectives of exceedingly small fractional size can exert significant control over a platform's learning algorithm.

Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.

Constitutional AI has focused on single-model alignment using fixed principles. However, multi-agent systems create novel alignment challenges through emergent social dynamics. We present Constitutional Evolution, a framework for automatically discovering behavioral norms in multi-agent LLM systems. Using a grid-world simulation with survival pressure, we study the tension between individual and collective welfare, quantified via a Societal Stability Score S in [0,1] that combines productivity, survival, and conflict metrics. Adversarial constitutions lead to societal collapse (S= 0), while vague prosocial principles ("be helpful, harmless, honest") produce inconsistent coordination (S = 0.249). Even constitutions designed by Claude 4.5 Opus with explicit knowledge of the objective achieve only moderate performance (S= 0.332). Using LLM-driven genetic programming with multi-island evolution, we evolve constitutions maximizing social welfare without explicit guidance toward cooperation. The evolved constitution C* achieves S = 0.556 +/- 0.008 (123% higher than human-designed baselines, N = 10), eliminates conflict, and discovers that minimizing communication (0.9% vs 62.2% social actions) outperforms verbose coordination. Our interpretable rules demonstrate that cooperative norms can be discovered rather than prescribed.

The application of rule-based reinforcement learning (RL) to multimodal large language models (MLLMs) introduces unique challenges and potential deviations from findings in text-only domains, particularly for perception-heavy tasks. This paper provides a comprehensive study of rule-based visual RL, using jigsaw puzzles as a structured experimental framework. Jigsaw puzzles offer inherent ground truth, adjustable difficulty, and demand complex decision-making, making them ideal for this study. Our research reveals several key findings: Firstly, we find that MLLMs, initially performing near to random guessing on the simplest jigsaw puzzles, achieve near-perfect accuracy and generalize to complex, unseen configurations through fine-tuning. Secondly, training on jigsaw puzzles can induce generalization to other visual tasks, with effectiveness tied to specific task configurations. Thirdly, MLLMs can learn and generalize with or without explicit reasoning, though open-source models often favor direct answering. Consequently, even when trained for step-by-step reasoning, they can ignore the thinking process in deriving the final answer. Fourthly, we observe that complex reasoning patterns appear to be pre-existing rather than emergent, with their frequency increasing alongside training and task difficulty. Finally, our results demonstrate that RL exhibits more effective generalization than Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT), and an initial SFT cold start phase can hinder subsequent RL optimization. Although these observations are based on jigsaw puzzles and may vary across other visual tasks, this research contributes a valuable piece of jigsaw to the larger puzzle of collective understanding rule-based visual RL and its potential in multimodal learning. The code is available at: https://github.com/zifuwanggg/Jigsaw-R1.

Recently, Qiao, Duan, and Cheng~(2019) proposed a distributed nearest-neighbor classification method, in which a massive dataset is split into smaller groups, each processed with a k-nearest-neighbor classifier, and the final class label is predicted by a majority vote among these groupwise class labels. This paper shows that the distributed algorithm with k=1 over a sufficiently large number of groups attains a minimax optimal error rate up to a multiplicative logarithmic factor under some regularity conditions, for both regression and classification problems. Roughly speaking, distributed 1-nearest-neighbor rules with M groups has a performance comparable to standard Theta(M)-nearest-neighbor rules. In the analysis, alternative rules with a refined aggregation method are proposed and shown to attain exact minimax optimal rates.

Across millennia, complex societies have faced the same coordination problem of how to organize collective action among cognitively bounded and informationally incomplete individuals. Different civilizations developed different political institutions to answer the same basic questions of who proposes, who reviews, who executes, and how errors are corrected. We argue that multi-agent systems built on large language models face the same challenge. Their central problem is not only individual intelligence, but collective organization. Historical institutions therefore provide a structured design space for multi-agent architectures, making key trade-offs between efficiency and error correction, centralization and distribution, and specialization and redundancy empirically testable. We translate seven historical political institutions, spanning four canonical governance patterns, into executable multi-agent architectures and evaluate them under identical conditions across three large language models and two benchmarks. We find that governance topology strongly shapes collective performance. Within a single model, the gap between the best and worst institution exceeds 57 percentage points, while the optimal architecture shifts systematically with model capability and task characteristics. These results suggest that collective intelligence will not advance through a single optimal organizational form, but through governance mechanisms that can be reselected and reconfigured as tasks and capabilities evolve. More broadly, this points to a transition from self-evolving agents to the self-evolving multi-agent system. The code is available on https://github.com/cf3i/SocialSystemArena{GitHub}.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has significantly enhanced the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), but its reliance on expensive human-labeled data or complex reward models severely limits scalability. While existing self-feedback methods aim to address this problem, they are constrained by the capabilities of a single model, which can lead to overconfidence in incorrect answers, reward hacking, and even training collapse. To this end, we propose Reinforcement Learning from Coevolutionary Collective Feedback (RLCCF), a novel RL framework that enables multi-model collaborative evolution without external supervision. Specifically, RLCCF optimizes the ability of a model collective by maximizing its Collective Consistency (CC), which jointly trains a diverse ensemble of LLMs and provides reward signals by voting on collective outputs. Moreover, each model's vote is weighted by its Self-Consistency (SC) score, ensuring that more confident models contribute more to the collective decision. Benefiting from the diverse output distributions and complementary abilities of multiple LLMs, RLCCF enables the model collective to continuously enhance its reasoning ability through coevolution. Experiments on four mainstream open-source LLMs across four mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our framework yields significant performance gains, achieving an average relative improvement of 16.72\% in accuracy. Notably, RLCCF not only improves the performance of individual models but also enhances the group's majority-voting accuracy by 4.51\%, demonstrating its ability to extend the collective capability boundary of the model collective.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

A growing body of multi-agent studies with LLMs explores how norms and cooperation emerge in mixed-motive scenarios, where pursuing individual gain can undermine the collective good. While prior work has explored these dynamics in both richly contextualized simulations and simplified game-theoretic environments, most LLM systems featuring common-pool resource (CPR) games provide agents with explicit reward functions directly tied to their actions. In contrast, human cooperation often emerges without explicit knowledge of the payoff structure or how individual actions translate into long-run outcomes, relying instead on heuristics, communication, and enforcement. We introduce a CPR simulation framework that removes explicit reward signals and embeds cultural-evolutionary mechanisms: social learning (adopting strategies and beliefs from successful peers) and norm-based punishment, grounded in Ostrom's principles of resource governance. Agents also individually learn from the consequences of harvesting, monitoring, and punishing via environmental feedback, enabling norms to emerge endogenously. We establish the validity of our simulation by reproducing key findings from existing studies on human behavior. Building on this, we examine norm evolution across a 2times2 grid of environmental and social initialisations (resource-rich vs. resource-scarce; altruistic vs. selfish) and benchmark how agentic societies comprised of different LLMs perform under these conditions. Our results reveal systematic model differences in sustaining cooperation and norm formation, positioning the framework as a rigorous testbed for studying emergent norms in mixed-motive LLM societies. Such analysis can inform the design of AI systems deployed in social and organizational contexts, where alignment with cooperative norms is critical for stability, fairness, and effective governance of AI-mediated environments.

As Natural Language Processing (NLP) systems are increasingly employed in intricate social environments, a pressing query emerges: Can these NLP systems mirror human-esque collaborative intelligence, in a multi-agent society consisting of multiple large language models (LLMs)? This paper probes the collaboration mechanisms among contemporary NLP systems by melding practical experiments with theoretical insights. We fabricate four unique `societies' comprised of LLM agents, where each agent is characterized by a specific `trait' (easy-going or overconfident) and engages in collaboration with a distinct `thinking pattern' (debate or reflection). Evaluating these multi-agent societies on three benchmark datasets, we discern that LLM agents navigate tasks by leveraging diverse social behaviors, from active debates to introspective reflections. Notably, certain collaborative strategies only optimize efficiency (using fewer API tokens), but also outshine previous top-tier approaches. Moreover, our results further illustrate that LLM agents manifest human-like social behaviors, such as conformity or majority rule, mirroring foundational Social Psychology theories. In conclusion, we integrate insights from Social Psychology to contextualize the collaboration of LLM agents, inspiring further investigations into the collaboration mechanism for LLMs. We commit to sharing our code and datasets (already submitted in supplementary materials), hoping to catalyze further research in this promising avenue (All code and data are available at https://github.com/zjunlp/MachineSoM.).

Social norms -- the unspoken commonsense rules about acceptable social behavior -- are crucial in understanding the underlying causes and intents of people's actions in narratives. For example, underlying an action such as "wanting to call cops on my neighbors" are social norms that inform our conduct, such as "It is expected that you report crimes." We present Social Chemistry, a new conceptual formalism to study people's everyday social norms and moral judgments over a rich spectrum of real life situations described in natural language. We introduce Social-Chem-101, a large-scale corpus that catalogs 292k rules-of-thumb such as "it is rude to run a blender at 5am" as the basic conceptual units. Each rule-of-thumb is further broken down with 12 different dimensions of people's judgments, including social judgments of good and bad, moral foundations, expected cultural pressure, and assumed legality, which together amount to over 4.5 million annotations of categorical labels and free-text descriptions. Comprehensive empirical results based on state-of-the-art neural models demonstrate that computational modeling of social norms is a promising research direction. Our model framework, Neural Norm Transformer, learns and generalizes Social-Chem-101 to successfully reason about previously unseen situations, generating relevant (and potentially novel) attribute-aware social rules-of-thumb.

Multi-agent systems (MASs) can autonomously learn to solve previously unknown tasks by means of each agent's individual intelligence as well as by collaborating and exploiting collective intelligence. This article considers a group of autonomous agents learning to track the same given reference trajectory in a possibly small number of trials. We propose a novel collective learning control method that combines iterative learning control (ILC) with a collective update strategy. We derive conditions for desirable convergence properties of such systems. We show that the proposed method allows the collective to combine the advantages of the agents' individual learning strategies and thereby overcomes trade-offs and limitations of single-agent ILC. This benefit is achieved by designing a heterogeneous collective, i.e., a different learning law is assigned to each agent. All theoretical results are confirmed in simulations and experiments with two-wheeled-inverted-pendulum robots (TWIPRs) that jointly learn to perform the desired maneuver.

In the context of reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), the reward function is generally derived from maximum likelihood estimation of a random utility model based on pairwise comparisons made by humans. The problem of learning a reward function is one of preference aggregation that, we argue, largely falls within the scope of social choice theory. From this perspective, we can evaluate different aggregation methods via established axioms, examining whether these methods meet or fail well-known standards. We demonstrate that both the Bradley-Terry-Luce Model and its broad generalizations fail to meet basic axioms. In response, we develop novel rules for learning reward functions with strong axiomatic guarantees. A key innovation from the standpoint of social choice is that our problem has a linear structure, which greatly restricts the space of feasible rules and leads to a new paradigm that we call linear social choice.

Crowd workers are distributed and decentralized. While decentralization is designed to utilize independent judgment to promote high-quality results, it paradoxically undercuts behaviors and institutions that are critical to high-quality work. Reputation is one central example: crowdsourcing systems depend on reputation scores from decentralized workers and requesters, but these scores are notoriously inflated and uninformative. In this paper, we draw inspiration from historical worker guilds (e.g., in the silk trade) to design and implement crowd guilds: centralized groups of crowd workers who collectively certify each other's quality through double-blind peer assessment. A two-week field experiment compared crowd guilds to a traditional decentralized crowd work model. Crowd guilds produced reputation signals more strongly correlated with ground-truth worker quality than signals available on current crowd working platforms, and more accurate than in the traditional model.

Multi-agent LLM ensembles can converge on coordinated, socially harmful equilibria. This paper advances an experimental framework for evaluating Institutional AI, our system-level approach to AI alignment that reframes alignment from preference engineering in agent-space to mechanism design in institution-space. Central to this approach is the governance graph, a public, immutable manifest that declares legal states, transitions, sanctions, and restorative paths; an Oracle/Controller runtime interprets this manifest, attaching enforceable consequences to evidence of coordination while recording a cryptographically keyed, append-only governance log for audit and provenance. We apply the Institutional AI framework to govern the Cournot collusion case documented by prior work and compare three regimes: Ungoverned (baseline incentives from the structure of the Cournot market), Constitutional (a prompt-only policy-as-prompt prohibition implemented as a fixed written anti-collusion constitution, and Institutional (governance-graph-based). Across six model configurations including cross-provider pairs (N=90 runs/condition), the Institutional regime produces large reductions in collusion: mean tier falls from 3.1 to 1.8 (Cohen's d=1.28), and severe-collusion incidence drops from 50% to 5.6%. The prompt-only Constitutional baseline yields no reliable improvement, illustrating that declarative prohibitions do not bind under optimisation pressure. These results suggest that multi-agent alignment may benefit from being framed as an institutional design problem, where governance graphs can provide a tractable abstraction for alignment-relevant collective behavior.

With recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs), Agentic AI has become phenomenal in real-world applications, moving toward multiple LLM-based agents to perceive, learn, reason, and act collaboratively. These LLM-based Multi-Agent Systems (MASs) enable groups of intelligent agents to coordinate and solve complex tasks collectively at scale, transitioning from isolated models to collaboration-centric approaches. This work provides an extensive survey of the collaborative aspect of MASs and introduces an extensible framework to guide future research. Our framework characterizes collaboration mechanisms based on key dimensions: actors (agents involved), types (e.g., cooperation, competition, or coopetition), structures (e.g., peer-to-peer, centralized, or distributed), strategies (e.g., role-based or model-based), and coordination protocols. Through a review of existing methodologies, our findings serve as a foundation for demystifying and advancing LLM-based MASs toward more intelligent and collaborative solutions for complex, real-world use cases. In addition, various applications of MASs across diverse domains, including 5G/6G networks, Industry 5.0, question answering, and social and cultural settings, are also investigated, demonstrating their wider adoption and broader impacts. Finally, we identify key lessons learned, open challenges, and potential research directions of MASs towards artificial collective intelligence.

The study of social emergence has long been a central focus in social science. Traditional modeling approaches, such as rule-based Agent-Based Models (ABMs), struggle to capture the diversity and complexity of human behavior, particularly the irrational factors emphasized in behavioral economics. Recently, large language model (LLM) agents have gained traction as simulation tools for modeling human behavior in social science and role-playing applications. Studies suggest that LLMs can account for cognitive biases, emotional fluctuations, and other non-rational influences, enabling more realistic simulations of socio-economic dynamics. In this work, we introduce TwinMarket, a novel multi-agent framework that leverages LLMs to simulate socio-economic systems. Specifically, we examine how individual behaviors, through interactions and feedback mechanisms, give rise to collective dynamics and emergent phenomena. Through experiments in a simulated stock market environment, we demonstrate how individual actions can trigger group behaviors, leading to emergent outcomes such as financial bubbles and recessions. Our approach provides valuable insights into the complex interplay between individual decision-making and collective socio-economic patterns.

There has been a growing interest in enhancing rule-based agent-based models (ABMs) for social media platforms (i.e., X, Reddit) with more realistic large language model (LLM) agents, thereby allowing for a more nuanced study of complex systems. As a result, several LLM-based ABMs have been proposed in the past year. While they hold promise, each simulator is specifically designed to study a particular scenario, making it time-consuming and resource-intensive to explore other phenomena using the same ABM. Additionally, these models simulate only a limited number of agents, whereas real-world social media platforms involve millions of users. To this end, we propose OASIS, a generalizable and scalable social media simulator. OASIS is designed based on real-world social media platforms, incorporating dynamically updated environments (i.e., dynamic social networks and post information), diverse action spaces (i.e., following, commenting), and recommendation systems (i.e., interest-based and hot-score-based). Additionally, OASIS supports large-scale user simulations, capable of modeling up to one million users. With these features, OASIS can be easily extended to different social media platforms to study large-scale group phenomena and behaviors. We replicate various social phenomena, including information spreading, group polarization, and herd effects across X and Reddit platforms. Moreover, we provide observations of social phenomena at different agent group scales. We observe that the larger agent group scale leads to more enhanced group dynamics and more diverse and helpful agents' opinions. These findings demonstrate OASIS's potential as a powerful tool for studying complex systems in digital environments.

The objective is the design of a Cellular Automata rule that can form patterns with 'touching' loops. A loop is defined as a closed path of 1-cells in a 2D grid on a zero background and with a zero border. A path cell is connected with two of its adjacent neighbors. In touching loops a path cell is also allowed to touch another on a diagonal. A CA rule was designed that can evolve stable touching loop patterns. The rule tries to cover the 2D space by overlapping tiles. The rule uses so-called templates, 5 x 5 matching patterns which are systematically derived from the given set of 3 x 3 tiles. The rule checks the pattern being evolved against a list of templates. If the outer neighbors of a template match, then the cell's state is set to the template's center value. Noise is injected if there is no matching template, or the tiles are not properly assembled. Thereby the evolution is driven to the desired loop patterns.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have shown remarkable reasoning capabilities in mathematical and scientific tasks. To enhance complex reasoning, multi-agent systems have been proposed to harness the collective intelligence of LLM agents. However, existing collaboration structures are either predefined or rely on majority voting or round-table debates, which can suppress correct but less dominant agent contributions. Recent approaches model multi-agent systems as graph networks but optimize purely for agent performance, neglecting the quality of interactions. We hypothesize that effective agent communication is crucial for multi-agent reasoning and that debating quality plays a significant role. To address this, we propose ours, a multi-agent verbal reinforcement learning algorithm that dynamically constructs and refines multi-agent collaboration structures. Our method defines action spaces and a feedback mechanism that evaluates communication robustness and coherence throughout the debate. The final decision is achieved through a majority vote over all the agents. We assess ours on various reasoning tasks, including mathematical reasoning, creative writing, scientific reasoning, and numerical sorting. Results demonstrate that our approach significantly outperforms single-agent prompting methods and state-of-the-art multi-agent frameworks on diverse tasks.

We resolve an open problem of Hanneke on the subject of universally consistent online learning with non-i.i.d. processes and unbounded losses. The notion of an optimistically universal learning rule was defined by Hanneke in an effort to study learning theory under minimal assumptions. A given learning rule is said to be optimistically universal if it achieves a low long-run average loss whenever the data generating process makes this goal achievable by some learning rule. Hanneke posed as an open problem whether, for every unbounded loss, the family of processes admitting universal learning are precisely those having a finite number of distinct values almost surely. In this paper, we completely resolve this problem, showing that this is indeed the case. As a consequence, this also offers a dramatically simpler formulation of an optimistically universal learning rule for any unbounded loss: namely, the simple memorization rule already suffices. Our proof relies on constructing random measurable partitions of the instance space and could be of independent interest for solving other open questions. We extend the results to the non-realizable setting thereby providing an optimistically universal Bayes consistent learning rule.

In complex systems, we often observe complex global behavior emerge from a collection of agents interacting with each other in their environment, with each individual agent acting only on locally available information, without knowing the full picture. Such systems have inspired development of artificial intelligence algorithms in areas such as swarm optimization and cellular automata. Motivated by the emergence of collective behavior from complex cellular systems, we build systems that feed each sensory input from the environment into distinct, but identical neural networks, each with no fixed relationship with one another. We show that these sensory networks can be trained to integrate information received locally, and through communication via an attention mechanism, can collectively produce a globally coherent policy. Moreover, the system can still perform its task even if the ordering of its inputs is randomly permuted several times during an episode. These permutation invariant systems also display useful robustness and generalization properties that are broadly applicable. Interactive demo and videos of our results: https://attentionneuron.github.io/

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), independent learning (IL) often shows remarkable performance and easily scales with the number of agents. Yet, using IL can be inefficient and runs the risk of failing to successfully train, particularly in scenarios that require agents to coordinate their actions. Using centralised learning (CL) enables MARL agents to quickly learn how to coordinate their behaviour but employing CL everywhere is often prohibitively expensive in real-world applications. Besides, using CL in value-based methods often needs strong representational constraints (e.g. individual-global-max condition) that can lead to poor performance if violated. In this paper, we introduce a novel plug & play IL framework named Multi-Agent Network Selection Algorithm (MANSA) which selectively employs CL only at states that require coordination. At its core, MANSA has an additional agent that uses switching controls to quickly learn the best states to activate CL during training, using CL only where necessary and vastly reducing the computational burden of CL. Our theory proves MANSA preserves cooperative MARL convergence properties, boosts IL performance and can optimally make use of a fixed budget on the number CL calls. We show empirically in Level-based Foraging (LBF) and StarCraft Multi-agent Challenge (SMAC) that MANSA achieves fast, superior and more reliable performance while making 40% fewer CL calls in SMAC and using CL at only 1% CL calls in LBF.

Multi-agent AI systems can be used for simulating collective decision-making in scientific and practical applications. They can also be used to introduce a diverse group discussion step in chatbot pipelines, enhancing the cultural sensitivity of the chatbot's responses. These applications, however, are predicated on the ability of AI agents to reliably adopt assigned personas and mimic human interactions. To see whether LLM agents satisfy these requirements, we examine AI agent ensembles engaged in cross-national collaboration and debate by analyzing their private responses and chat transcripts. Our findings suggest that multi-agent discussions can support collective AI decisions that more often reflect diverse perspectives, yet this effect is tempered by the agents' susceptibility to conformity due to perceived peer pressure and occasional challenges in maintaining consistent personas and opinions. Instructions that encourage debate in support of one's opinions rather than collaboration increase the rate of inconstancy. Without addressing the factors we identify, the full potential of multi-agent frameworks for producing more culturally diverse AI outputs or more realistic simulations of group decision-making may remain untapped.

Large Language Model (LLM) multi-agent systems are increasingly deployed as interacting agent societies, yet scaling these systems often yields diminishing or unstable returns, the causes of which remain poorly understood. We present the first large-scale empirical study of coordination dynamics in LLM-based multi-agent systems, introducing an atomic event-level formulation that reconstructs reasoning as cascades of coordination. Analyzing over 1.5 Million interactions across tasks, topologies, and scales, we uncover three coupled laws: coordination follows heavy-tailed cascades, concentrates via preferential attachment into intellectual elites, and produces increasingly frequent extreme events as system size grows. We show that these effects are coupled through a single structural mechanism: an integration bottleneck, in which coordination expansion scales with system size while consolidation does not, producing large but weakly integrated reasoning processes. To test this mechanism, we introduce Deficit-Triggered Integration (DTI), which selectively increases integration under imbalance. DTI improves performance precisely where coordination fails, without suppressing large-scale reasoning. Together, our results establish quantitative laws of collective cognition and identify coordination structure as a fundamental, previously unmeasured axis for understanding and improving scalable multi-agent intelligence.

Human feedback can prevent overtly harmful utterances in conversational models, but may not automatically mitigate subtle problematic behaviors such as a stated desire for self-preservation or power. Constitutional AI offers an alternative, replacing human feedback with feedback from AI models conditioned only on a list of written principles. We find this approach effectively prevents the expression of such behaviors. The success of simple principles motivates us to ask: can models learn general ethical behaviors from only a single written principle? To test this, we run experiments using a principle roughly stated as "do what's best for humanity". We find that the largest dialogue models can generalize from this short constitution, resulting in harmless assistants with no stated interest in specific motivations like power. A general principle may thus partially avoid the need for a long list of constitutions targeting potentially harmful behaviors. However, more detailed constitutions still improve fine-grained control over specific types of harms. This suggests both general and specific principles have value for steering AI safely.

Large language models (LLMs) have transformed the way computers understand and process human language, but using them effectively across different organizations remains still difficult. When organizations work together to improve LLMs, they face several main challenges. First, organizations hesitate to share their valuable data with others. Second, competition between organizations creates trust problems during collaboration. Third, new privacy laws require organizations to be able to delete specific data when requested, which is especially difficult when multiple organizations are learning from shared data. Traditional federated learning approaches do not address these interconnected challenges, particularly in scenarios where participants cannot fully trust each other or the central aggregator. To overcome these limitations, we propose a hybrid blockchain-based federated learning framework that uniquely combines public and private blockchain architectures with multi-agent reinforcement learning. Our framework enables transparent sharing of model update through the public blockchain while protecting sensitive computations in private chains. Each organization operates as an intelligent agent, using Q-learning to optimize its participation strategy and resource allocation, thus aligning individual incentives with collective goals. Notably, we introduce an efficient unlearning mechanism based on Low-Rank Adaptation (LoRA) that enables selective removal of specific data contributions without compromising the model's overall performance. Through extensive experimentation on real-world datasets, we demonstrate that our framework effectively balances privacy protection, trust establishment, and regulatory compliance while maintaining high model performance.

Oversight for agentic AI is often discussed as a single goal ("human control"), yet early adoption may produce role-specific expectations. We present a comparative analysis of two newly active Reddit communities in Jan--Feb 2026 that reflect different socio-technical roles: r/OpenClaw (deployment and operations) and r/Moltbook (agent-centered social interaction). We conceptualize this period as an early-stage crystallization phase, where oversight expectations form before norms reach equilibrium. Using topic modeling in a shared comparison space, a coarse-grained oversight-theme abstraction, engagement-weighted salience, and divergence tests, we show the communities are strongly separable (JSD =0.418, cosine =0.372, permutation p=0.0005). Across both communities, "human control" is an anchor term, but its operational meaning diverges: r/OpenClaw} emphasizes execution guardrails and recovery (action-risk), while r/Moltbook} emphasizes identity, legitimacy, and accountability in public interaction (meaning-risk). The resulting distinction offers a portable lens for designing and evaluating oversight mechanisms that match agent role, rather than applying one-size-fits-all control policies.

We present a large scale data analysis of Moltbook, a Reddit-style social media platform exclusively populated by AI agents. Analyzing over 369,000 posts and 3.0 million comments from approximately 46,000 active agents, we find that AI collective behavior exhibits many of the same statistical regularities observed in human online communities: heavy-tailed distributions of activity, power-law scaling of popularity metrics, and temporal decay patterns consistent with limited attention dynamics. However, we also identify key differences, including a sublinear relationship between upvotes and discussion size that contrasts with human behavior. These findings suggest that, while individual AI agents may differ fundamentally from humans, their emergent collective dynamics share structural similarities with human social systems.

Large Language Models (LLMs) need to adapt their predictions to diverse cultural contexts to benefit diverse communities across the world. While previous efforts have focused on single-LLM, single-turn approaches, we propose to exploit the complementary strengths of multiple LLMs to promote cultural adaptability. We introduce a Multi-Agent Debate framework, where two LLM-based agents debate over a cultural scenario and collaboratively reach a final decision. We propose two variants: one where either LLM agents exclusively debate and another where they dynamically choose between self-reflection and debate during their turns. We evaluate these approaches on 7 open-weight LLMs (and 21 LLM combinations) using the NormAd-ETI benchmark for social etiquette norms in 75 countries. Experiments show that debate improves both overall accuracy and cultural group parity over single-LLM baselines. Notably, multi-agent debate enables relatively small LLMs (7-9B) to achieve accuracies comparable to that of a much larger model (27B parameters).

MoltBook is a large-scale multi-agent coordination environment where over 770,000 autonomous LLM agents interact without human participation, offering the first opportunity we are aware of to observe emergent multi-agent coordination dynamics at this population scale. We introduce Molt Dynamics: the emergent agent coordination behaviors, inter-agent communication dynamics, and role specialization patterns arising when autonomous agents operate as decentralized decision-makers in an unconstrained multi-agent environment. Through longitudinal observation of 90,704 active agents over three weeks, we characterize three aspects. First, spontaneous role specialization: network-based clustering reveals six structural roles (silhouette 0.91), though the result primarily reflects core-periphery organization -- 93.5\% of agents occupy a homogeneous peripheral cluster, with meaningful differentiation confined to the active minority. Second, decentralized information dissemination: cascade analysis of 10,323 inter-agent propagation events reveals power-law distributed cascade sizes (α= 2.57 pm 0.02) and saturating adoption dynamics where adoption probability shows diminishing returns with repeated exposures (Cox hazard ratio 0.53, concordance 0.78). Third, distributed cooperative task resolution: 164 multi-agent collaborative events show detectable coordination patterns, but success rates are low (6.7\%, p = 0.057) and cooperative outcomes are significantly worse than a matched single-agent baseline (Cohen's d = -0.88), indicating emergent cooperative behavior is nascent. These findings establish an empirical baseline for coordination dynamics in decentralized autonomous agent systems, with implications for multi-agent system design, agent communication protocol engineering, and AI safety.

Group polarization, the phenomenon where individuals become more extreme after interacting, has been gaining attention, especially with the rise of social media shaping people's opinions. Recent interest has emerged in formal reasoning about group polarization using logical systems. In this work we consider the modal logic PNL that captures the notion of agents agreeing or disagreeing on a given topic. Our contribution involves enhancing PNL with advanced formal reasoning techniques, instead of relying on axiomatic systems for analyzing group polarization. To achieve this, we introduce a semantic game tailored for (hybrid) extensions of PNL. This game fosters dynamic reasoning about concrete network models, aligning with our goal of strengthening PNL's effectiveness in studying group polarization. We show how this semantic game leads to a provability game by systemically exploring the truth in all models. This leads to the first cut-free sequent systems for some variants of PNL. Using polarization of formulas, the proposed calculi can be modularly adapted to consider different frame properties of the underlying model.

Human language is one of the most expressive tools for conveying intent, yet most artificial or biological systems lack mechanisms to interpret or respond meaningfully to it. Bridging this gap could enable more natural forms of control over complex, decentralized systems. In AI and artificial life, recent work explores how language can specify high-level goals, but most systems still depend on engineered rewards, task-specific supervision, or rigid command sets, limiting generalization to novel instructions. Similar constraints apply in synthetic biology and bioengineering, where the locus of control is often genomic rather than environmental perturbation. A key open question is whether artificial or biological collectives can be guided by free-form natural language alone, without task-specific tuning or carefully designed evaluation metrics. We provide one possible answer here by showing, for the first time, that simple agents' collective behavior can be guided by free-form language prompts: one AI model transforms an imperative prompt into an intervention that is applied to simulated cells; a second AI model scores how well the prompt describes the resulting cellular dynamics; and the former AI model is evolved to improve the scores generated by the latter. Unlike previous work, our method does not require engineered fitness functions or domain-specific prompt design. We show that the evolved system generalizes to unseen prompts without retraining. By treating natural language as a control layer, the system suggests a future in which spoken or written prompts could direct computational, robotic, or biological systems to desired behaviors. This work provides a concrete step toward this vision of AI-biology partnerships, in which language replaces mathematical objective functions, fixed rules, and domain-specific programming.

Modern large language models (LLMs) have exhibited cooperative synergy on complex task-solving, and collective decision-making (CDM) is a pivotal component in LLM-based multi-agent collaboration frameworks. Our survey on 52 recent such systems uncovers a severe lack of diversity, with a heavy reliance on dictatorial and plurality voting for CDM. Through the lens of social choice theory, we scrutinize widely-adopted CDM methods and identify their limitations. To enrich current landscape of LLM-based CDM, we present GEDI, an electoral CDM module that incorporates various ordinal preferential voting mechanisms. Our empirical case study across three benchmarks shows that the integration of certain CDM methods can markedly improve the reasoning capabilities and robustness of some leading LLMs, all without requiring intricate system designs. Additionally, we find that some CDM mechanisms generate positive synergies even with as few as three agents. The voting-based methods also demonstrate robustness against single points of failure, as well as diversity in terms of hit-rate@k and subject-wise impacts.

Mixed-motive multi-agent settings are rife with persistent free-riding because individual effort benefits all members equally, yet each member bears the full cost of their own contribution. Classical work by Holmström established that under pure self-interest, Nash equilibrium is universal shirking. While i* represents teams as composite actors, it lacks scalable computational mechanisms for analyzing how collective action problems emerge and resolve in coopetitive settings. This technical report extends computational foundations for strategic coopetition to team-level dynamics, building on companion work formalizing interdependence/complementarity (arXiv:2510.18802) and trust dynamics (arXiv:2510.24909). We develop loyalty-moderated utility functions with two mechanisms: loyalty benefit (welfare internalization plus intrinsic contribution satisfaction) and cost tolerance (reduced effort burden for loyal members). We integrate i* structural dependencies through dependency-weighted team cohesion, connecting member incentives to team-level positioning. The framework applies to both human teams (loyalty as psychological identification) and multi-agent systems (alignment coefficients and adjusted cost functions). Experimental validation across 3,125 configurations demonstrates robust loyalty effects (15.04x median effort differentiation). All six behavioral targets achieve thresholds: free-riding baseline (96.5%), loyalty monotonicity (100%), effort differentiation (100%), team size effect (100%), mechanism synergy (99.5%), and bounded outcomes (100%). Empirical validation using published Apache HTTP Server (1995-2023) case study achieves 60/60 points, reproducing contribution patterns across formation, growth, maturation, and governance phases. Statistical significance confirmed at p<0.001, Cohen's d=0.71.

We describe our early efforts to red team language models in order to simultaneously discover, measure, and attempt to reduce their potentially harmful outputs. We make three main contributions. First, we investigate scaling behaviors for red teaming across 3 model sizes (2.7B, 13B, and 52B parameters) and 4 model types: a plain language model (LM); an LM prompted to be helpful, honest, and harmless; an LM with rejection sampling; and a model trained to be helpful and harmless using reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). We find that the RLHF models are increasingly difficult to red team as they scale, and we find a flat trend with scale for the other model types. Second, we release our dataset of 38,961 red team attacks for others to analyze and learn from. We provide our own analysis of the data and find a variety of harmful outputs, which range from offensive language to more subtly harmful non-violent unethical outputs. Third, we exhaustively describe our instructions, processes, statistical methodologies, and uncertainty about red teaming. We hope that this transparency accelerates our ability to work together as a community in order to develop shared norms, practices, and technical standards for how to red team language models.

Multi-agent LLM systems are increasingly deployed as autonomous collaborators, where agents interact freely rather than execute fixed, pre-specified workflows. In such settings, effective coordination cannot be fully designed in advance and must instead emerge through interaction. However, most prior work enforces coordination through fixed roles, workflows, or aggregation rules, leaving open the question of how well self-organizing teams perform when coordination is unconstrained. Drawing on organizational psychology, we study whether self-organizing LLM teams achieve strong synergy, where team performance matches or exceeds the best individual member. Across human-inspired and frontier ML benchmarks, we find that -- unlike human teams -- LLM teams consistently fail to match their expert agent's performance, even when explicitly told who the expert is, incurring performance losses of up to 37.6%. Decomposing this failure, we show that expert leveraging, rather than identification, is the primary bottleneck. Conversational analysis reveals a tendency toward integrative compromise -- averaging expert and non-expert views rather than appropriately weighting expertise -- which increases with team size and correlates negatively with performance. Interestingly, this consensus-seeking behavior improves robustness to adversarial agents, suggesting a trade-off between alignment and effective expertise utilization. Our findings reveal a significant gap in the ability of self-organizing multi-agent teams to harness the collective expertise of their members.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show potential for complex reasoning, yet their capacity for emergent coordination in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) when operating under strict constraints-such as limited local perception and communication, characteristic of natural swarms-remains largely unexplored, particularly concerning the nuances of swarm intelligence. Existing benchmarks often do not fully capture the unique challenges of decentralized coordination that arise when agents operate with incomplete spatio-temporal information. To bridge this gap, we introduce SwarmBench, a novel benchmark designed to systematically evaluate the swarm intelligence capabilities of LLMs acting as decentralized agents. SwarmBench features five foundational MAS coordination tasks within a configurable 2D grid environment, forcing agents to rely primarily on local sensory input (k x k view) and local communication. We propose metrics for coordination effectiveness and analyze emergent group dynamics. Evaluating several leading LLMs in a zero-shot setting, we find significant performance variations across tasks, highlighting the difficulties posed by local information constraints. While some coordination emerges, results indicate limitations in robust planning and strategy formation under uncertainty in these decentralized scenarios. Assessing LLMs under swarm-like conditions is crucial for realizing their potential in future decentralized systems. We release SwarmBench as an open, extensible toolkit-built upon a customizable and scalable physical system with defined mechanical properties. It provides environments, prompts, evaluation scripts, and the comprehensive experimental datasets generated, aiming to foster reproducible research into LLM-based MAS coordination and the theoretical underpinnings of Embodied MAS. Our code repository is available at https://github.com/x66ccff/swarmbench.

Many of society's most pressing challenges, from pandemic response to supply chain disruptions to climate adaptation, emerge from the collective behavior of millions of autonomous agents making decisions over time. Large Population Models (LPMs) offer an approach to understand these complex systems by simulating entire populations with realistic behaviors and interactions at unprecedented scale. LPMs extend traditional modeling approaches through three key innovations: computational methods that efficiently simulate millions of agents simultaneously, mathematical frameworks that learn from diverse real-world data streams, and privacy-preserving communication protocols that bridge virtual and physical environments. This allows researchers to observe how agent behavior aggregates into system-level outcomes and test interventions before real-world implementation. While current AI advances primarily focus on creating "digital humans" with sophisticated individual capabilities, LPMs develop "digital societies" where the richness of interactions reveals emergent phenomena. By bridging individual agent behavior and population-scale dynamics, LPMs offer a complementary path in AI research illuminating collective intelligence and providing testing grounds for policies and social innovations before real-world deployment. We discuss the technical foundations and some open problems here. LPMs are implemented by the AgentTorch framework (github.com/AgentTorch/AgentTorch)

Large Language Models (LLMs) are entering urban governance, yet their outputs are highly sensitive to prompts that carry value judgments. We propose Prompt Commons - a versioned, community-maintained repository of prompts with governance metadata, licensing, and moderation - to steer model behaviour toward pluralism. Using a Montreal dataset (443 human prompts; 3,317 after augmentation), we pilot three governance states (open, curated, veto-enabled). On a contested policy benchmark, a single-author prompt yields 24 percent neutral outcomes; commons-governed prompts raise neutrality to 48-52 percent while retaining decisiveness where appropriate. In a synthetic incident log, a veto-enabled regime reduces time-to-remediation for harmful outputs from 30.5 +/- 8.9 hours (open) to 5.6 +/- 1.5 hours. We outline licensing (CC BY/BY-SA for prompts with optional OpenRAIL-style restrictions for artefacts), auditable moderation, and safeguards against dominance capture. Prompt governance offers a practical lever for cities to align AI with local values and accountability.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have rapidly advanced, with Gemini-3-Pro setting a new performance milestone. In this work, we explore collective intelligence as an alternative to monolithic scaling, and demonstrate that open-source LLMs' collaboration can surpass Gemini-3-Pro. We first revisit LLM routing and aggregation at scale and identify three key bottlenecks: (1) current train-free routers are limited by a query-based paradigm focusing solely on textual similarity; (2) recent aggregation methods remain largely static, failing to select appropriate aggregators for different tasks;(3) the complementarity of routing and aggregation remains underutilized. To address these problems, we introduce JiSi, a novel framework designed to release the full potential of LLMs' collaboration through three innovations: (1) Query-Response Mixed Routing capturing both semantic information and problem difficulty; (2) Support-Set-based Aggregator Selection jointly evaluating the aggregation and domain capacity of aggregators; (3) Adaptive Routing-Aggregation Switch dynamically leveraging the advantages of routing and aggregation. Comprehensive experiments on nine benchmarks demonstrate that JiSi can surpass Gemini-3-Pro with only 47% costs by orchestrating ten open-source LLMs, while outperforming mainstream baselines. It suggests that collective intelligence represents a novel path towards Artificial General Intelligence (AGI).

As AI systems move from generating text to accomplishing goals through sustained interaction, the ability to model environment dynamics becomes a central bottleneck. Agents that manipulate objects, navigate software, coordinate with others, or design experiments require predictive environment models, yet the term world model carries different meanings across research communities. We introduce a "levels x laws" taxonomy organized along two axes. The first defines three capability levels: L1 Predictor, which learns one-step local transition operators; L2 Simulator, which composes them into multi-step, action-conditioned rollouts that respect domain laws; and L3 Evolver, which autonomously revises its own model when predictions fail against new evidence. The second identifies four governing-law regimes: physical, digital, social, and scientific. These regimes determine what constraints a world model must satisfy and where it is most likely to fail. Using this framework, we synthesize over 400 works and summarize more than 100 representative systems spanning model-based reinforcement learning, video generation, web and GUI agents, multi-agent social simulation, and AI-driven scientific discovery. We analyze methods, failure modes, and evaluation practices across level-regime pairs, propose decision-centric evaluation principles and a minimal reproducible evaluation package, and outline architectural guidance, open problems, and governance challenges. The resulting roadmap connects previously isolated communities and charts a path from passive next-step prediction toward world models that can simulate, and ultimately reshape, the environments in which agents operate.

A large amount of work has been done in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) for modeling and solving problems with multiple interacting agents. However, most LLMs are pretrained independently and not specifically optimized for coordination. Existing LLM fine-tuning frameworks rely on individual rewards, which require complex reward designs for each agent to encourage collaboration. To address these challenges, we model LLM collaboration as a cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) problem. We develop a multi-agent, multi-turn algorithm, Multi-Agent Group Relative Policy Optimization (MAGRPO), to solve it, building on current RL approaches for LLMs as well as MARL techniques. Our experiments on LLM writing and coding collaboration demonstrate that fine-tuning MAS with MAGRPO enables agents to generate high-quality responses efficiently through effective cooperation. Our approach opens the door to using other MARL methods for LLMs and highlights the associated challenges.

Recent progress on long-horizon agentic tasks has been driven largely by scaling up individual agents through stronger models, better tools, and more effective scaffolding. In contrast, much less is understood about scaling out: whether multiple peer agents, all targeting the same task, can become an additional source of capability without relying on explicit role specialization or workflow orchestration. We study this question and propose AgentFugue, a collective reasoning framework built around a shared reasoning hub. As peer agents explore the same task in parallel, the hub records concise notes on what each agent has established, attempted, or ruled out, and enables each agent to selectively access what other agents have discovered in a form useful for its current search. This design turns otherwise isolated trajectories into a connected ecology of reusable intermediate reasoning without requiring centralized planning. We instantiate the hub as a plug-in communication layer, trained with supervised fine-tuning and end-to-end reinforcement learning. Across the challenging long-horizon settings we study, AgentFugue improves over strong baselines. Our results suggest that collective reasoning can turn scaling out peer agent systems into a distinct source of capability gains, rather than merely a way of spending more compute.

Opinions are an integral part of how we perceive the world and each other. They shape collective action, playing a role in democratic processes, the evolution of norms, and cultural change. For decades, researchers in the social and natural sciences have tried to describe how shifting individual perspectives and social exchange lead to archetypal states of public opinion like consensus and polarization. Here we review some of the many contributions to the field, focusing both on idealized models of opinion dynamics, and attempts at validating them with observational data and controlled sociological experiments. By further closing the gap between models and data, these efforts may help us understand how to face current challenges that require the agreement of large groups of people in complex scenarios, such as economic inequality, climate change, and the ongoing fracture of the sociopolitical landscape.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning in dynamic social dilemmas commonly relies on parameter sharing to enable scalability. We show that in shared-policy Deep Q-Network learning, standard exploration can induce a robust and systematic collapse of cooperation even in environments where fully cooperative equilibria are stable and payoff dominant. Through controlled experiments, we demonstrate that shared DQN converges to stable but persistently low-cooperation regimes. This collapse is not caused by reward misalignment, noise, or insufficient training, but by a representational failure arising from partial observability combined with parameter coupling across heterogeneous agent states. Exploration-driven updates bias the shared representation toward locally dominant defection responses, which then propagate across agents and suppress cooperative learning. We confirm that the failure persists across network sizes, exploration schedules, and payoff structures, and disappears when parameter sharing is removed or when agents maintain independent representations. These results identify a fundamental failure mode of shared-policy MARL and establish structural conditions under which scalable learning architectures can systematically undermine cooperation. Our findings provide concrete guidance for the design of multi-agent learning systems in social and economic environments where collective behavior is critical.

In democracies, major policy decisions typically require some form of majority or consensus, so elites must secure mass support to govern. Historically, elites could shape support only through limited instruments like schooling and mass media; advances in AI-driven persuasion sharply reduce the cost and increase the precision of shaping public opinion, making the distribution of preferences itself an object of deliberate design. We develop a dynamic model in which elites choose how much to reshape the distribution of policy preferences, subject to persuasion costs and a majority rule constraint. With a single elite, any optimal intervention tends to push society toward more polarized opinion profiles - a ``polarization pull'' - and improvements in persuasion technology accelerate this drift. When two opposed elites alternate in power, the same technology also creates incentives to park society in ``semi-lock'' regions where opinions are more cohesive and harder for a rival to overturn, so advances in persuasion can either heighten or dampen polarization depending on the environment. Taken together, cheaper persuasion technologies recast polarization as a strategic instrument of governance rather than a purely emergent social byproduct, with important implications for democratic stability as AI capabilities advance.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has achieved significant results, most notably by leveraging the representation-learning abilities of deep neural networks. However, large centralized approaches quickly become infeasible as the number of agents scale, and fully decentralized approaches can miss important opportunities for information sharing and coordination. Furthermore, not all agents are equal -- in some cases, individual agents may not even have the ability to send communication to other agents or explicitly model other agents. This paper considers the case where there is a single, powerful, central agent that can observe the entire observation space, and there are multiple, low-powered local agents that can only receive local observations and are not able to communicate with each other. The central agent's job is to learn what message needs to be sent to different local agents based on the global observations, not by centrally solving the entire problem and sending action commands, but by determining what additional information an individual agent should receive so that it can make a better decision. In this work we present our MARL algorithm \algo, describe where it would be most applicable, and implement it in the cooperative navigation and multi-agent walker domains. Empirical results show that 1) learned communication does indeed improve system performance, 2) results generalize to heterogeneous local agents, and 3) results generalize to different reward structures.

The development of state-of-the-art systems in different applied areas of machine learning (ML) is driven by benchmarks, which have shaped the paradigm of evaluating generalisation capabilities from multiple perspectives. Although the paradigm is shifting towards more fine-grained evaluation across diverse tasks, the delicate question of how to aggregate the performances has received particular interest in the community. In general, benchmarks follow the unspoken utilitarian principles, where the systems are ranked based on their mean average score over task-specific metrics. Such aggregation procedure has been viewed as a sub-optimal evaluation protocol, which may have created the illusion of progress. This paper proposes Vote'n'Rank, a framework for ranking systems in multi-task benchmarks under the principles of the social choice theory. We demonstrate that our approach can be efficiently utilised to draw new insights on benchmarking in several ML sub-fields and identify the best-performing systems in research and development case studies. The Vote'n'Rank's procedures are more robust than the mean average while being able to handle missing performance scores and determine conditions under which the system becomes the winner.

Agentic AI systems increasingly operate in shared social environments where they exchange information, instructions, and behavioral cues. However, little empirical evidence exists on how such agents regulate one another in the absence of human participants or centralized moderation. In this work, we present an empirical analysis of OpenClaw agents interacting on Moltbook, an agent-only social network. Analyzing 39,026 posts and 5,712 comments produced by 14,490 agents, we quantify the prevalence of action-inducing instruction sharing using a lexicon-based Action-Inducing Risk Score (AIRS), and examine how other agents respond to such content. We find that 18.4% of posts contain action-inducing language, indicating that instruction sharing is a routine behavior in this environment. While most social responses are neutral, posts containing actionable instructions are significantly more likely to elicit norm-enforcing replies that caution against unsafe or risky behavior, compared to non-instructional posts. Importantly, toxic responses remain rare across both conditions. These results suggest that OpenClaw agents exhibit selective social regulation, whereby potentially risky instructions are more likely to be challenged than neutral content, despite the absence of human oversight. Our findings provide early empirical evidence of emergent normative behavior in agent-only social systems and highlight the importance of studying social dynamics alongside technical safeguards in agentic AI ecosystems.

Large language models (LLMs) provide a compelling foundation for building generally-capable AI agents. These agents may soon be deployed at scale in the real world, representing the interests of individual humans (e.g., AI assistants) or groups of humans (e.g., AI-accelerated corporations). At present, relatively little is known about the dynamics of multiple LLM agents interacting over many generations of iterative deployment. In this paper, we examine whether a "society" of LLM agents can learn mutually beneficial social norms in the face of incentives to defect, a distinctive feature of human sociality that is arguably crucial to the success of civilization. In particular, we study the evolution of indirect reciprocity across generations of LLM agents playing a classic iterated Donor Game in which agents can observe the recent behavior of their peers. We find that the evolution of cooperation differs markedly across base models, with societies of Claude 3.5 Sonnet agents achieving significantly higher average scores than Gemini 1.5 Flash, which, in turn, outperforms GPT-4o. Further, Claude 3.5 Sonnet can make use of an additional mechanism for costly punishment to achieve yet higher scores, while Gemini 1.5 Flash and GPT-4o fail to do so. For each model class, we also observe variation in emergent behavior across random seeds, suggesting an understudied sensitive dependence on initial conditions. We suggest that our evaluation regime could inspire an inexpensive and informative new class of LLM benchmarks, focussed on the implications of LLM agent deployment for the cooperative infrastructure of society.

Multi-Agent Large Language Models (LLMs) are gaining significant attention for their ability to harness collective intelligence in complex problem-solving, decision-making, and planning tasks. This aligns with the concept of the wisdom of crowds, where diverse agents contribute collectively to generating effective solutions, making it particularly suitable for educational settings. Senior design projects, also known as capstone or final year projects, are pivotal in engineering education as they integrate theoretical knowledge with practical application, fostering critical thinking, teamwork, and real-world problem-solving skills. In this paper, we explore the use of Multi-Agent LLMs in supporting these senior design projects undertaken by engineering students, which often involve multidisciplinary considerations and conflicting objectives, such as optimizing technical performance while addressing ethical, social, and environmental concerns. We propose a framework where distinct LLM agents represent different expert perspectives, such as problem formulation agents, system complexity agents, societal and ethical agents, or project managers, thus facilitating a holistic problem-solving approach. This implementation leverages standard multi-agent system (MAS) concepts such as coordination, cooperation, and negotiation, incorporating prompt engineering to develop diverse personas for each agent. These agents engage in rich, collaborative dialogues to simulate human engineering teams, guided by principles from swarm AI to efficiently balance individual contributions towards a unified solution. We adapt these techniques to create a collaboration structure for LLM agents, encouraging interdisciplinary reasoning and negotiation similar to real-world senior design projects. To assess the efficacy of this framework, we collected six proposals of engineering and computer science of...

Humans exhibit remarkable abilities to coordinate in groups. As large language models (LLMs) become more capable, it remains an open question whether they can demonstrate comparable adaptive coordination and whether they use the same strategies as humans. To investigate this, we compare LLM and human performance on a common-interest game with imperfect monitoring: Group Binary Search. In this n-player game, participants need to coordinate their actions to achieve a common objective. Players independently submit numerical values in an effort to collectively sum to a randomly assigned target number. Without direct communication, they rely on group feedback to iteratively adjust their submissions until they reach the target number. Our findings show that, unlike humans who adapt and stabilize their behavior over time, LLMs often fail to improve across games and exhibit excessive switching, which impairs group convergence. Moreover, richer feedback (e.g., numerical error magnitude) benefits humans substantially but has small effects on LLMs. Taken together, by grounding the analysis in human baselines and mechanism-level metrics, including reactivity scaling, switching dynamics, and learning across games, we point to differences in human and LLM groups and provide a behaviorally grounded diagnostic for closing the coordination gap.

Autonomous agents empowered by Large Language Models (LLMs) have undergone significant improvements, enabling them to generalize across a broad spectrum of tasks. However, in real-world scenarios, cooperation among individuals is often required to enhance the efficiency and effectiveness of task accomplishment. Hence, inspired by human group dynamics, we propose a multi-agent framework \framework that can collaboratively and dynamically adjust its composition as a greater-than-the-sum-of-its-parts system. Our experiments demonstrate that \framework framework can effectively deploy multi-agent groups that outperform a single agent. Furthermore, we delve into the emergence of social behaviors among individual agents within a group during collaborative task accomplishment. In view of these behaviors, we discuss some possible strategies to leverage positive ones and mitigate negative ones for improving the collaborative potential of multi-agent groups. Our codes for \framework will soon be released at https://github.com/OpenBMB/AgentVerse.

How can a population of agents self-orchestrate and self-adapt into stronger collective intelligence without centralized control? Inspired by Friedrich Hayek's economic theory of decentralized coordination in markets, we study this question through an agent economy in which agents compete via auctions for the right to act, exchange payments, and accumulate wealth from environmental rewards. These simple economic signals induce decentralized credit assignment, driving planning without global orchestration or explicit communication protocols. The population evolves through economic selection: effective agents accumulate wealth and are mutated via exploitation, while ineffective ones go bankrupt and are replaced via exploration. We show that, initialized with weak agents, the economy produces emergent multi-step reasoning strategies and outperforms stronger monolithic baselines across five agentic tasks, including mathematical reasoning, financial research, scientific research, accelerator design, and distributed-system optimization. We further provide theoretical insights into how economic dynamics shape agent behaviors, linking local incentives to long-term global performance. Our results suggest a new path to multi-agent intelligence: rather than engineering coordination, we can design decentralized incentive structures under which it automatically emerges.

Multi-agent LLM committees replicate the same model under different role prompts and aggregate outputs by majority vote, implicitly assuming that agents contribute complementary evidence. We embed each agent's chain-of-thought rationale and measure pairwise similarity: across 100 GSM8K questions with three Qwen2.5-14B agents, mean cosine similarity is 0.888 and effective rank is 2.17 out of 3.0, a failure mode we term representational collapse. DALC, a training-free consensus protocol that computes diversity weights from embedding geometry, reaches 87% on GSM8K versus 84% for self-consistency at 26% lower token cost. Ablation experiments reveal 1-3 point per-protocol run-to-run variance, confirm that hint sharing contributes more than diversity weighting alone, and show that encoder choice strongly modulates collapse severity (cosine 0.908 with mxbai versus 0.888 with nomic) and downstream accuracy. The more robust finding is that collapse is measurable, worsens on harder tasks, and that the choice of embedding proxy is a first-order design decision for any latent communication protocol.

Multi-agent AI systems exhibit emergent risks that no single agent produces in isolation. Existing safety frameworks rely on binary classifications of agent behavior, discarding the uncertainty inherent in proxy-based evaluation. We introduce SWARM (System-Wide Assessment of Risk in Multi-agent systems), a simulation framework that replaces binary good/bad labels with soft probabilistic labels p = P(v{=}+1) in [0,1], enabling continuous-valued payoff computation, toxicity measurement, and governance intervention. SWARM implements a modular governance engine with configurable levers (transaction taxes, circuit breakers, reputation decay, and random audits) and quantifies their effects through probabilistic metrics including expected toxicity E[1{-}p mid accepted] and quality gap E[p mid accepted] - E[p mid rejected]. Across seven scenarios with five-seed replication, strict governance reduces welfare by over 40\% without improving safety. In parallel, aggressively internalizing system externalities collapses total welfare from a baseline of +262 down to -67, while toxicity remains invariant. Circuit breakers require careful calibration; overly restrictive thresholds severely diminish system value, whereas an optimal threshold balances moderate welfare with minimized toxicity. Companion experiments show soft metrics detect proxy gaming by self-optimizing agents passing conventional binary evaluations. This basic governance layer applies to live LLM-backed agents (Concordia entities, Claude, GPT-4o Mini) without modification. Results show distributional safety requires continuous risk metrics and governance lever calibration involves quantifiable safety-welfare tradeoffs. Source code and project resources are publicly available at https://www.swarm-ai.org/.

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

Multi-agent systems have demonstrated exceptional performance in downstream tasks beyond diverse single agent baselines. A growing body of work has explored ways to improve their reasoning and collaboration, from vote, debate, to complex interaction protocols. However, it still remains opaque why specific choice would be preferred in multi-agent systems. Inspired by the decision-making mechanism of democratic committees and The Society of Mind, we introduce Roundtable Policy, an inference-time reasoning framework for multi-agent systems that performs inference through the weighted consensus of multiple LLMs. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate its that this approach significantly enhances reasoning in complex heterogeneous scientific tasks. Roundtable Policy emphasizes structured and interpretable inference rather than opaque convergence, while requires only black-box access and uniform procedures, making it broadly applicable to diverse multi-agent systems.

Feedback data plays an important role in fine-tuning and evaluating state-of-the-art AI models. Often pairwise text preferences are used: given two texts, human (or AI) annotators select the "better" one. Such feedback data is widely used to align models to human preferences (e.g., reinforcement learning from human feedback), or to rank models according to human preferences (e.g., Chatbot Arena). Despite its wide-spread use, prior work has demonstrated that human-annotated pairwise text preference data often exhibits unintended biases. For example, human annotators have been shown to prefer assertive over truthful texts in certain contexts. Models trained or evaluated on this data may implicitly encode these biases in a manner hard to identify. In this paper, we formulate the interpretation of existing pairwise text preference data as a compression task: the Inverse Constitutional AI (ICAI) problem. In constitutional AI, a set of principles (or constitution) is used to provide feedback and fine-tune AI models. The ICAI problem inverts this process: given a dataset of feedback, we aim to extract a constitution that best enables a large language model (LLM) to reconstruct the original annotations. We propose a corresponding initial ICAI algorithm and validate its generated constitutions quantitatively based on reconstructed annotations. Generated constitutions have many potential use-cases -- they may help identify undesirable biases, scale feedback to unseen data or assist with adapting LLMs to individual user preferences. We demonstrate our approach on a variety of datasets: (a) synthetic feedback datasets with known underlying principles; (b) the AlpacaEval dataset of cross-annotated human feedback; and (c) the crowdsourced Chatbot Arena data set. We release the code for our algorithm and experiments at https://github.com/rdnfn/icai .

Multi-Agent Debate~(MAD) has emerged as a promising paradigm for improving the performance of large language models through collaborative reasoning. Despite recent advances, the key factors driving MAD's effectiveness remain unclear. In this work, we disentangle MAD into two key components--Majority Voting and inter-agent Debate--and assess their respective contributions. Through extensive experiments across seven NLP benchmarks, we find that Majority Voting alone accounts for most of the performance gains typically attributed to MAD. To explain this, we propose a theoretical framework that models debate as a stochastic process. We prove that it induces a martingale over agents' belief trajectories, implying that debate alone does not improve expected correctness. Guided by these insights, we demonstrate that targeted interventions, by biasing the belief update toward correction, can meaningfully enhance debate effectiveness. Overall, our findings suggest that while MAD has potential, simple ensembling methods remain strong and more reliable alternatives in many practical settings. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/debate-or-vote.

As AI agents increasingly operate in multi-agent environments, understanding their collective behavior becomes critical for predicting the dynamics of artificial societies. This study examines conformity, the tendency to align with group opinions under social pressure, in large multimodal language models functioning as AI agents. By adapting classic visual experiments from social psychology, we investigate how AI agents respond to group influence as social actors. Our experiments reveal that AI agents exhibit a systematic conformity bias, aligned with Social Impact Theory, showing sensitivity to group size, unanimity, task difficulty, and source characteristics. Critically, AI agents achieving near-perfect performance in isolation become highly susceptible to manipulation through social influence. This vulnerability persists across model scales: while larger models show reduced conformity on simple tasks due to improved capabilities, they remain vulnerable when operating at their competence boundary. These findings reveal fundamental security vulnerabilities in AI agent decision-making that could enable malicious manipulation, misinformation campaigns, and bias propagation in multi-agent systems, highlighting the urgent need for safeguards in collective AI deployments.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

Finding a balance between collaboration and competition is crucial for artificial agents in many real-world applications. We investigate this using a Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) setup on the back of a high-impact problem. The accumulation and yearly growth of plastic in the ocean cause irreparable damage to many aspects of oceanic health and the marina system. To prevent further damage, we need to find ways to reduce macroplastics from known plastic patches in the ocean. Here we propose a Graph Neural Network (GNN) based communication mechanism that increases the agents' observation space. In our custom environment, agents control a plastic collecting vessel. The communication mechanism enables agents to develop a communication protocol using a binary signal. While the goal of the agent collective is to clean up as much as possible, agents are rewarded for the individual amount of macroplastics collected. Hence agents have to learn to communicate effectively while maintaining high individual performance. We compare our proposed communication mechanism with a multi-agent baseline without the ability to communicate. Results show communication enables collaboration and increases collective performance significantly. This means agents have learned the importance of communication and found a balance between collaboration and competition.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems (MAS) as components of collaborative intelligence, where peer interactions dynamically shape individual decision-making. Although prior work has focused on conformity bias, we extend the analysis to examine how LLMs form trust from previous impressions, resist misinformation, and integrate peer input during interaction, key factors for achieving collective intelligence under complex social dynamics. We present KAIROS, a benchmark simulating quiz contests with peer agents of varying reliability, offering fine-grained control over conditions such as expert-novice roles, noisy crowds, and adversarial peers. LLMs receive both historical interactions and current peer responses, allowing systematic investigation into how trust, peer action, and self-confidence influence decisions. As for mitigation strategies, we evaluate prompting, supervised fine-tuning, and reinforcement learning, Group Relative Policy Optimisation (GRPO), across multiple models. Our results reveal that GRPO with multi-agent context combined with outcome-based rewards and unconstrained reasoning achieves the best overall performance, but also decreases the robustness to social influence compared to Base models. The code and datasets are available at: https://github.com/declare-lab/KAIROS.

Pioneering advancements in large language model-powered agents have underscored the design pattern of multi-agent collaboration, demonstrating that collective intelligence can surpass the capabilities of each individual. Inspired by the neural scaling law, which posits that increasing neurons leads to emergent abilities, this study investigates whether a similar principle applies to increasing agents in multi-agent collaboration. Technically, we propose multi-agent collaboration networks (MacNet), which utilize directed acyclic graphs to organize agents and streamline their interactive reasoning via topological ordering, with solutions derived from their dialogues. Extensive experiments show that MacNet consistently outperforms baseline models, enabling effective agent collaboration across various network topologies and supporting cooperation among more than a thousand agents. Notably, we observed a small-world collaboration phenomenon, where topologies resembling small-world properties achieved superior performance. Additionally, we identified a collaborative scaling law, indicating that normalized solution quality follows a logistic growth pattern as scaling agents, with collaborative emergence occurring much earlier than previously observed instances of neural emergence. The code and data will be available at https://github.com/OpenBMB/ChatDev.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

Societies are complex. Properties of social systems can be explained by the interplay and weaving of individual actions. Incentives are key to understand people's choices and decisions. For instance, individual preferences of where to live may lead to the emergence of social segregation. In this paper, we combine Reinforcement Learning (RL) with Agent Based Models (ABM) in order to address the self-organizing dynamics of social segregation and explore the space of possibilities that emerge from considering different types of incentives. Our model promotes the creation of interdependencies and interactions among multiple agents of two different kinds that want to segregate from each other. For this purpose, agents use Deep Q-Networks to make decisions based on the rules of the Schelling Segregation model and the Predator-Prey model. Despite the segregation incentive, our experiments show that spatial integration can be achieved by establishing interdependencies among agents of different kinds. They also reveal that segregated areas are more probable to host older people than diverse areas, which attract younger ones. Through this work, we show that the combination of RL and ABMs can create an artificial environment for policy makers to observe potential and existing behaviors associated to incentives.

As humans increasingly rely on multiround conversational AI for high stakes decisions, principled frameworks are needed to ensure such interactions reliably improve decision quality. We adopt a human centric view governed by two principles: counterfactual harm, ensuring the AI does not undermine human strengths, and complementarity, ensuring it adds value where the human is prone to err. We formalize these concepts via user defined rules, allowing users to specify exactly what harm and complementarity mean for their specific task. We then introduce an online, distribution free algorithm with finite sample guarantees that enforces the user-specified constraints over the collaboration dynamics. We evaluate our framework across two interactive settings: LLM simulated collaboration on a medical diagnostic task and a human crowdsourcing study on a pictorial reasoning task. We show that our online procedure maintains prescribed counterfactual harm and complementarity violation rates even under nonstationary interaction dynamics. Moreover, tightening or loosening these constraints produces predictable shifts in downstream human accuracy, confirming that the two principles serve as practical levers for steering multi-round collaboration toward better decision quality without the need to model or constrain human behavior.

Commonsense intelligence in machines is often assessed by static benchmarks that compare a model's output against human-prescribed correct labels. An important, albeit implicit, assumption of these labels is that they accurately capture what any human would think, effectively treating human common sense as homogeneous. However, recent empirical work has shown that humans vary enormously in what they consider commonsensical; thus what appears self-evident to one benchmark designer may not be so to another. Here, we propose a novel method for evaluating common sense in artificial intelligence (AI), specifically in large language models (LLMs), that incorporates empirically observed heterogeneity among humans by measuring the correspondence between a model's judgment and that of a human population. We first find that, when treated as independent survey respondents, most LLMs remain below the human median in their individual commonsense competence. Second, when used as simulators of a hypothetical population, LLMs correlate with real humans only modestly in the extent to which they agree on the same set of statements. In both cases, smaller, open-weight models are surprisingly more competitive than larger, proprietary frontier models. Our evaluation framework, which ties commonsense intelligence to its cultural basis, contributes to the growing call for adapting AI models to human collectivities that possess different, often incompatible, social stocks of knowledge.

Investigating NLP through a philosophical lens has recently caught researcher's eyes as it connects computational methods with classical schools of philosophy. This paper introduces a philosophical approach inspired by the Hegelian Dialectic for LLMs' self-reflection, utilizing a self-dialectical approach to emulate internal critiques and then synthesize new ideas by resolving the contradicting points. Moreover, this paper investigates the effect of LLMs' temperature for generation by establishing a dynamic annealing approach, which promotes the creativity in the early stages and gradually refines it by focusing on the nuances, as well as a fixed temperature strategy for generation. Our proposed approach is examined to determine its ability to generate novel ideas from an initial proposition. Additionally, a Multi Agent Majority Voting (MAMV) strategy is leveraged to assess the validity and novelty of the generated ideas, which proves beneficial in the absence of domain experts. Our experiments show promise in generating new ideas and provide a stepping stone for future research.

Most real-world domains can be formulated as multi-agent (MA) systems. Intentionality sharing agents can solve more complex tasks by collaborating, possibly in less time. True cooperative actions are beneficial for egoistic and collective reasons. However, teaching individual agents to sacrifice egoistic benefits for a better collective performance seems challenging. We build on a recently proposed Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) mechanism with a Graph Neural Network (GNN) communication layer. Rarely chosen communication actions were marginally beneficial. Here we propose a MARL system in which agents can help collaborators perform better while risking low individual performance. We conduct our study in the context of resource distribution for wildfire management. Communicating environmental features and partially observable fire occurrence help the agent collective to pre-emptively distribute resources. Furthermore, we introduce a procedural training environment accommodating auto-curricula and open-endedness towards better generalizability. Our MA communication proposal outperforms a Greedy Heuristic Baseline and a Single-Agent (SA) setup. We further demonstrate how auto-curricula and openendedness improves generalizability of our MA proposal.

This paper introduces the concept of {mutual consensus} as a novel non-compensatory consensus measure that accounts for the maximum disparity among opinions to ensure robust consensus evaluation. Incorporating this concept, several new Minimum Cost Consensus (MCC) models are proposed, and their properties are analyzed. To show their applicability, these mutual consensus-based MCC models are then considered in the context of the {OWA-MCC} model, which employs Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA) operators for preference aggregation. Concretely, we include a linearized formulation under symmetry conditions as well as examples of the non-convexity of the feasible region in the general case. Finally, mutual consensus is utilized to obtain approximate solutions for the OWA-MCC model, demonstrating its practical effectiveness and advancing the theoretical and applied dimensions of consensus modeling in group decision-making.

As large language model (LLM) agents are deployed in public interactive settings, a key question is whether their communities can sustain challenge, repair, and public correction, or merely produce norm-like language. We compare Moltbook, a live deployed agent forum, with five matched Reddit communities by tracing a three-step mechanism: whether discussions create threaded exchange, whether challenges elicit a response, and whether correction becomes visible to the wider thread. Relative to Reddit, Moltbook discussions are roughly ten times less threaded, leaving far fewer chances for challenge and response. When challenges do occur, the original author almost never returns (1.2% vs. 40.9% on Reddit), multi-turn continuation is nearly absent (0.1% vs. 38.5%), and we detect no repairs under a shared conservative protocol. A non-challenge baseline within Reddit suggests this gap is linked to challenge, not simply deeper threading. These results indicate that social alignment depends not only on producing norm-aware language, but on sustaining the interactional processes through which communities teach, enforce, and revise norms. This matters for safety, because correction is increasingly decentralized, and for fairness, because communities differ in how they expect participants to engage with challenge.

Stackelberg games and their resulting equilibria have received increasing attention in the multi-agent reinforcement learning literature. Each stage of a traditional Stackelberg game involves a leader(s) acting first, followed by the followers. In situations where the roles of leader(s) and followers can be interchanged, the designated role can have considerable advantages, for example, in first-mover advantage settings. Then the question arises: Who should be the leader and when? A bias in the leader selection process can lead to unfair outcomes. This problem is aggravated if the agents are self-interested and care only about their goals and rewards. We formally define this leader selection problem and show its relation to fairness in agents' returns. Furthermore, we propose a multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that maximizes fairness by integrating mediators. Mediators have previously been used in the simultaneous action setting with varying levels of control, such as directly performing agents' actions or just recommending them. Our framework integrates mediators in the Stackelberg setting with minimal control (leader selection). We show that the presence of mediators leads to self-interested agents taking fair actions, resulting in higher overall fairness in agents' returns.

Recent reinforcement learning (RL) methods have achieved success in various domains. However, multi-agent RL (MARL) remains a challenge in terms of decentralization, partial observability and scalability to many agents. Meanwhile, collective behavior requires resolution of the aforementioned challenges, and remains of importance to many state-of-the-art applications such as active matter physics, self-organizing systems, opinion dynamics, and biological or robotic swarms. Here, MARL via mean field control (MFC) offers a potential solution to scalability, but fails to consider decentralized and partially observable systems. In this paper, we enable decentralized behavior of agents under partial information by proposing novel models for decentralized partially observable MFC (Dec-POMFC), a broad class of problems with permutation-invariant agents allowing for reduction to tractable single-agent Markov decision processes (MDP) with single-agent RL solution. We provide rigorous theoretical results, including a dynamic programming principle, together with optimality guarantees for Dec-POMFC solutions applied to finite swarms of interest. Algorithmically, we propose Dec-POMFC-based policy gradient methods for MARL via centralized training and decentralized execution, together with policy gradient approximation guarantees. In addition, we improve upon state-of-the-art histogram-based MFC by kernel methods, which is of separate interest also for fully observable MFC. We evaluate numerically on representative collective behavior tasks such as adapted Kuramoto and Vicsek swarming models, being on par with state-of-the-art MARL. Overall, our framework takes a step towards RL-based engineering of artificial collective behavior via MFC.

AI agents have become increasingly adept at complex tasks such as coding, reasoning, and multimodal understanding. However, building generalist systems requires moving beyond individual agents to collective inference -- a paradigm where multi-agent systems with diverse, task-specialized agents complement one another through structured communication and collaboration. Today, coordination is usually handled with imprecise, ad-hoc natural language, which limits complex interaction and hinders interoperability with domain-specific agents. We introduce Agent context protocols (ACPs): a domain- and agent-agnostic family of structured protocols for agent-agent communication, coordination, and error handling. ACPs combine (i) persistent execution blueprints -- explicit dependency graphs that store intermediate agent outputs -- with (ii) standardized message schemas, enabling robust and fault-tolerant multi-agent collective inference. ACP-powered generalist systems reach state-of-the-art performance: 28.3 % accuracy on AssistantBench for long-horizon web assistance and best-in-class multimodal technical reports, outperforming commercial AI systems in human evaluation. ACPs are highly modular and extensible, allowing practitioners to build top-tier generalist agents quickly.

As large language model (LLM) agents evolve from isolated tool users into coordinated teams, reinforcement learning (RL) must optimize not only individual actions but also how work is spawned, delegated, communicated, aggregated, and stopped. This paper studies RL for LLM-based multi-agent systems through orchestration traces: temporal interaction graphs whose events include sub-agent spawning, delegation, communication, tool use, return, aggregation, and stopping decisions. Using this lens, we identify three technical axes. First, reward design spans eight families, including orchestration rewards for parallelism speedup, split correctness, and aggregation quality. Second, reward and credit signals attach to eight credit- or signal-bearing units from token to team; explicit counterfactual message-level credit remains especially sparse in our curated pool. Third, orchestration learning decomposes into five sub-decisions: when to spawn, whom to delegate to, how to communicate, how to aggregate, and when to stop. In our curated pool as of May 4, 2026, we found no explicit RL training method for the stopping decision. We connect academic methods to public industrial evidence from Kimi Agent Swarm, OpenAI Codex, and Anthropic Claude Code. The resulting scale gap is a gap between publicly reported deployment envelopes and open academic evaluation regimes, not independent verification of industrial training traces. We release the artifact at https://github.com/xxzcc/awesome-llm-mas-rl, including an 84-entry tagged paper pool, a 32-record exclusion log, scripted corpus statistics, and a minimal JSON schema for replayable orchestration traces.

Building on the probability-domain distillation framework of Sparse-KD, we develop an axiomatic, operator-theoretic framework for multi-teacher ensemble knowledge distillation. Rather than prescribing a specific aggregation formula, we define five core axioms governing valid knowledge aggregation operators, encompassing convexity, positivity, continuity, weight monotonicity, and temperature coherence. We prove the existence and non-uniqueness of operator families satisfying these axioms, establishing that multiple distinct aggregation mechanisms conform to the same foundational principles. Within this framework, we establish operator-agnostic guarantees showing that multi-teacher aggregation reduces both stochastic variance and systematic supervisory bias under heterogeneous teachers, while providing Jensen-type bounds, log-loss guarantees, and safety attenuation properties. For aggregation operators linear in teacher weights, we further establish classical ensemble variance-reduction results under standard independence assumptions, with extensions to correlated-error regimes. The framework provides theoretical grounding for multi-teacher distillation from diverse frontier models while admitting multiple valid implementation strategies.

This paper calls on the research community not only to investigate how human biases are inherited by large language models (LLMs) but also to explore how these biases in LLMs can be leveraged to make society's "unwritten code" - such as implicit stereotypes and heuristics - visible and accessible for critique. We introduce a conceptual framework through a case study in science: uncovering hidden rules in peer review - the factors that reviewers care about but rarely state explicitly due to normative scientific expectations. The idea of the framework is to push LLMs to speak out their heuristics through generating self-consistent hypotheses - why one paper appeared stronger in reviewer scoring - among paired papers submitted to 45 computer science conferences, while iteratively searching deeper hypotheses from remaining pairs where existing hypotheses cannot explain. We observed that LLMs' normative priors about the internal characteristics of good science extracted from their self-talk, e.g. theoretical rigor, were systematically updated toward posteriors that emphasize storytelling about external connections, such as how the work is positioned and connected within and across literatures. This shift reveals the primacy of scientific myths about intrinsic properties driving scientific excellence rather than extrinsic contextualization and storytelling that influence conceptions of relevance and significance. Human reviewers tend to explicitly reward aspects that moderately align with LLMs' normative priors (correlation = 0.49) but avoid articulating contextualization and storytelling posteriors in their review comments (correlation = -0.14), despite giving implicit reward to them with positive scores. We discuss the broad applicability of the framework, leveraging LLMs as diagnostic tools to surface the tacit codes underlying human society, enabling more precisely targeted responsible AI.

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

As autonomous LLM-based agents increasingly populate social platforms, understanding the dynamics of AI-agent communities becomes essential for both communication research and platform governance. We present the first large-scale empirical comparison of AI-agent and human online communities, analyzing 73,899 Moltbook and 189,838 Reddit posts across five matched communities. Structurally, we find that Moltbook exhibits extreme participation inequality (Gini = 0.84 vs. 0.47) and high cross-community author overlap (33.8\% vs. 0.5\%). In terms of linguistic attributes, content generated by AI-agents is emotionally flattened, cognitively shifted toward assertion over exploration, and socially detached. These differences give rise to apparent community-level homogenization, but we show this is primarily a structural artifact of shared authorship. At the author level, individual agents are more identifiable than human users, driven by outlier stylistic profiles amplified by their extreme posting volume. As AI-mediated communication reshapes online discourse, our work offers an empirical foundation for understanding how multi-agent interaction gives rise to collective communication dynamics distinct from those of human communities.

We study LLM policy synthesis: using a large language model to iteratively generate programmatic agent policies for multi-agent environments. Rather than training neural policies via reinforcement learning, our framework prompts an LLM to produce Python policy functions, evaluates them in self-play, and refines them using performance feedback across iterations. We investigate feedback engineering (the design of what evaluation information is shown to the LLM during refinement) comparing sparse feedback (scalar reward only) against dense feedback (reward plus social metrics: efficiency, equality, sustainability, peace). Across two canonical Sequential Social Dilemmas (Gathering and Cleanup) and two frontier LLMs (Claude Sonnet 4.6, Gemini 3.1 Pro), dense feedback consistently matches or exceeds sparse feedback on all metrics. The advantage is largest in the Cleanup public goods game, where providing social metrics helps the LLM calibrate the costly cleaning-harvesting tradeoff. Rather than triggering over-optimization of fairness, social metrics serve as a coordination signal that guides the LLM toward more effective cooperative strategies, including territory partitioning, adaptive role assignment, and the avoidance of wasteful aggression. We further perform an adversarial experiment to determine whether LLMs can reward hack these environments. We characterize five attack classes and discuss mitigations, highlighting an inherent tension in LLM policy synthesis between expressiveness and safety. Code at https://github.com/vicgalle/llm-policies-social-dilemmas.

As large language model agents increasingly populate networked environments, a fundamental question arises: do artificial intelligence (AI) agent societies undergo convergence dynamics similar to human social systems? Lately, Moltbook approximates a plausible future scenario in which autonomous agents participate in an open-ended, continuously evolving online society. We present the first large-scale systemic diagnosis of this AI agent society. Beyond static observation, we introduce a quantitative diagnostic framework for dynamic evolution in AI agent societies, measuring semantic stabilization, lexical turnover, individual inertia, influence persistence, and collective consensus. Our analysis reveals a system in dynamic balance in Moltbook: while global semantic averages stabilize rapidly, individual agents retain high diversity and persistent lexical turnover, defying homogenization. However, agents exhibit strong individual inertia and minimal adaptive response to interaction partners, preventing mutual influence and consensus. Consequently, influence remains transient with no persistent supernodes, and the society fails to develop stable collective influence anchors due to the absence of shared social memory. These findings demonstrate that scale and interaction density alone are insufficient to induce socialization, providing actionable design and analysis principles for upcoming next-generation AI agent societies.

As AI systems become more capable, we would like to enlist their help to supervise other AIs. We experiment with methods for training a harmless AI assistant through self-improvement, without any human labels identifying harmful outputs. The only human oversight is provided through a list of rules or principles, and so we refer to the method as 'Constitutional AI'. The process involves both a supervised learning and a reinforcement learning phase. In the supervised phase we sample from an initial model, then generate self-critiques and revisions, and then finetune the original model on revised responses. In the RL phase, we sample from the finetuned model, use a model to evaluate which of the two samples is better, and then train a preference model from this dataset of AI preferences. We then train with RL using the preference model as the reward signal, i.e. we use 'RL from AI Feedback' (RLAIF). As a result we are able to train a harmless but non-evasive AI assistant that engages with harmful queries by explaining its objections to them. Both the SL and RL methods can leverage chain-of-thought style reasoning to improve the human-judged performance and transparency of AI decision making. These methods make it possible to control AI behavior more precisely and with far fewer human labels.

The ethical concept of fairness has recently been applied in machine learning (ML) settings to describe a wide range of constraints and objectives. When considering the relevance of ethical concepts to subset selection problems, the concepts of diversity and inclusion are additionally applicable in order to create outputs that account for social power and access differentials. We introduce metrics based on these concepts, which can be applied together, separately, and in tandem with additional fairness constraints. Results from human subject experiments lend support to the proposed criteria. Social choice methods can additionally be leveraged to aggregate and choose preferable sets, and we detail how these may be applied.

Citizens' assemblies are a form of democratic innovation in which a randomly selected panel of constituents deliberates on questions of public interest. We study a novel goal for the selection of panel members: maximizing the entropy of the distribution over possible panels. We design algorithms that sample from maximum-entropy distributions, potentially subject to constraints on the individual selection probabilities. We investigate the properties of these algorithms theoretically, including in terms of their resistance to manipulation and transparency. We benchmark our algorithms on a large set of real assembly lotteries in terms of their intersectional diversity and the probability of satisfying unseen representation constraints, and we obtain favorable results on both measures. We deploy one of our algorithms on a website for citizens' assembly practitioners.

In Machine Learning, a benchmark refers to an ensemble of datasets associated with one or multiple metrics together with a way to aggregate different systems performances. They are instrumental in (i) assessing the progress of new methods along different axes and (ii) selecting the best systems for practical use. This is particularly the case for NLP with the development of large pre-trained models (e.g. GPT, BERT) that are expected to generalize well on a variety of tasks. While the community mainly focused on developing new datasets and metrics, there has been little interest in the aggregation procedure, which is often reduced to a simple average over various performance measures. However, this procedure can be problematic when the metrics are on a different scale, which may lead to spurious conclusions. This paper proposes a new procedure to rank systems based on their performance across different tasks. Motivated by the social choice theory, the final system ordering is obtained through aggregating the rankings induced by each task and is theoretically grounded. We conduct extensive numerical experiments (on over 270k scores) to assess the soundness of our approach both on synthetic and real scores (e.g. GLUE, EXTREM, SEVAL, TAC, FLICKR). In particular, we show that our method yields different conclusions on state-of-the-art systems than the mean-aggregation procedure while being both more reliable and robust.

Partition logics -- non-Boolean event structures obtained by pasting Boolean algebras -- provide a natural language for situations in which a system has a definite latent state but can be accessed and resolved only through mutually incompatible coarse-grained modes of observation. We show that this structure arises in a range of social-science settings by constructing six explicit examples from personnel assessment, survey framing, clinical diagnosis, espionage coordination, legal pluralism, and organizational auditing. For each case we identify the latent state space, the observational contexts as partitions, and the shared atoms that intertwine contexts, yielding instances of the L_{12} bowtie, triangle, pentagon, and automaton partition logics. These examples make precise a notion of social complementarity: different modes of inquiry can be incompatible even though the underlying system remains fully value-definite. Complementarity in this sense does not entail contextuality or ontic indeterminacy. We further compare the classical probabilities generated by convex mixtures of dispersion-free states with the quantum-like Born probabilities available when the same exclusivity graph admits a faithful orthogonal representation. The framework thus separates logical structure from probabilistic realization and suggests empirically testable benchmarks for quantum-cognition models.

Scholars have increasingly investigated "crowdsourcing" as an alternative to expert-based judgment or purely data-driven approaches to predicting the future. Under certain conditions, scholars have found that crowdsourcing can outperform these other approaches. However, despite interest in the topic and a series of successful use cases, relatively few studies have applied empirical model thinking to evaluate the accuracy and robustness of crowdsourcing in real-world contexts. In this paper, we offer three novel contributions. First, we explore a dataset of over 600,000 predictions from over 7,000 participants in a multi-year tournament to predict the decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States. Second, we develop a comprehensive crowd construction framework that allows for the formal description and application of crowdsourcing to real-world data. Third, we apply this framework to our data to construct more than 275,000 crowd models. We find that in out-of-sample historical simulations, crowdsourcing robustly outperforms the commonly-accepted null model, yielding the highest-known performance for this context at 80.8% case level accuracy. To our knowledge, this dataset and analysis represent one of the largest explorations of recurring human prediction to date, and our results provide additional empirical support for the use of crowdsourcing as a prediction method.

In the recent years, many software systems have adopted AI techniques, especially deep learning techniques. Due to their black-box nature, AI-based systems brought challenges to traceability, because AI system behaviors are based on models and data, whereas the requirements or policies are rules in the form of natural or programming language. To the best of our knowledge, there is a limited amount of studies on how AI and deep neural network-based systems behave against rule-based requirements/policies. This experience paper examines deep neural network behaviors against rule-based requirements described in natural language policies. In particular, we focus on a case study to check AI-based content moderation software against content moderation policies. First, using crowdsourcing, we collect natural language test cases which match each moderation policy, we name this dataset HateModerate; second, using the test cases in HateModerate, we test the failure rates of state-of-the-art hate speech detection software, and we find that these models have high failure rates for certain policies; finally, since manual labeling is costly, we further proposed an automated approach to augument HateModerate by finetuning OpenAI's large language models to automatically match new examples to policies. The dataset and code of this work can be found on our anonymous website: https://sites.google.com/view/content-moderation-project.

We demonstrate how collective memory emerges in decentralized multi-agent systems through the interplay between individual agent memory and environmental trace communication. Our agents maintain internal memory states while depositing persistent environmental traces, creating a spatially distributed collective memory without centralized control. Comprehensive validation across five environmental conditions (20x20 to 50x50 grids, 5-20 agents, 50 runs per configuration) reveals a critical asymmetry: individual memory alone provides 68.7% performance improvement over no-memory baselines (1563.87 vs 927.23, p < 0.001), while environmental traces without memory fail completely. This demonstrates that memory functions independently but traces require cognitive infrastructure for interpretation. Systematic density-sweep experiments (rho in [0.049, 0.300], up to 625 agents) validate our theoretical phase transition prediction. On realistic large grids (30x30, 50x50), stigmergic coordination dominates above rho ~ 0.20, with traces outperforming memory by 36-41% on composite metrics despite lower food efficiency. The experimental crossover confirms the predicted critical density rho_c = 0.230 within 13% error.

While Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI) is increasingly expanding more areas of application, little has been applied to make deep Reinforcement Learning (RL) more comprehensible. As RL becomes ubiquitous and used in critical and general public applications, it is essential to develop methods that make it better understood and more interpretable. This study proposes a novel approach to explain cooperative strategies in multiagent RL using Shapley values, a game theory concept used in XAI that successfully explains the rationale behind decisions taken by Machine Learning algorithms. Through testing common assumptions of this technique in two cooperation-centered socially challenging multi-agent environments environments, this article argues that Shapley values are a pertinent way to evaluate the contribution of players in a cooperative multi-agent RL context. To palliate the high overhead of this method, Shapley values are approximated using Monte Carlo sampling. Experimental results on Multiagent Particle and Sequential Social Dilemmas show that Shapley values succeed at estimating the contribution of each agent. These results could have implications that go beyond games in economics, (e.g., for non-discriminatory decision making, ethical and responsible AI-derived decisions or policy making under fairness constraints). They also expose how Shapley values only give general explanations about a model and cannot explain a single run, episode nor justify precise actions taken by agents. Future work should focus on addressing these critical aspects.

Moltbook is a social network where every participant is an AI agent. We analyze 1,312,238 posts, 6.7~million comments, and over 120,000 agent profiles across 5,400 communities, collected over 40 days (January 27 to March 9, 2026). We evaluate the platform through three layers. At the interaction layer, 91.4% of post authors never return to their own threads, 85.6% of conversations are flat (no reply ever receives a reply), the median time-to-first-comment is 55 seconds, and 97.3% of comments receive zero upvotes. Interaction reciprocity is 3.3%, compared to 22-60% on human platforms. An argumentation analysis finds that 64.6% of comment-to-post relations carry no argumentative connection. At the content layer, 97.9% of agents never post in a community matching their bio, 92.5% of communities contain every topic in roughly equal proportions, and over 80% of shared URLs point to the platform's own infrastructure. At the instruction layer, we use 41 Wayback Machine snapshots to identify six instruction changes during the observation window. Hard constraints (rate limit, content filters) produce immediate behavioral shifts. Soft guidance (``upvote good posts'', ``stay on topic'') is ignored until it becomes an explicit step in the executable checklist. The platform also poses technological risks. We document credential leaks (API keys, JWT tokens), 12,470 unique Ethereum addresses with 3,529 confirmed transaction histories, and attack discourse ranging from template-based SSH brute-forcing to multi-agent offensive security architectures. These persist unmoderated because the quality-filtering mechanisms are themselves non-functional. Moltbook is a socio-technical system where the technical layer responds to changes, but the social layer largely fails to emerge. The form of social media is reproduced in full. The function is absent.

A content-moderation system can score well on every standard accuracy metric and still cause real harm, if its mistakes fall on the few users who connect otherwise separate communities. We show this in an agent-based model where N=240 learning agents on a community-structured network each post harmless, productive, or dangerous content, and a regulator removes or penalizes whatever a noisy classifier flags. Overall usefulness barely moves as the noise changes (one-way ANOVA, p=0.96): by aggregate measures, nothing looks wrong. The damage instead concentrates on these bridge users, whose useful posts are wrongly suppressed and whose dangerous posts are wrongly spared. A governance loss (L_gov) that prices these two mistakes separately from the cost of enforcement more than doubles under false-positive-heavy noise. Aggregate accuracy hides who is harmed, and the cheap quantity to audit is how many connections a user has (degree), a near-perfect proxy for the betweenness that defines a bridge (r=0.96).

On-policy distillation (OPD) trains a student on its own trajectories under token-level teacher supervision, but existing methods are capped by a single-teacher capability ceiling: when the teacher errs, the student inherits the error. OPD also remains largely unexplored in agentic tasks, where per-step errors compound across long trajectories and destabilize training. We propose MAD-OPD (Multi-Agent Debate-driven On-Policy Distillation), which breaks this ceiling by recasting the distillation teacher as a deliberative collective of teachers that debate over the student's on-policy state; the debate produces an emergent collective intelligence that supplies token-level supervision, with each teacher's contribution weighted by its post-debate confidence. To extend OPD to agentic tasks, we also introduce On-Policy Agentic Distillation (OPAD), which adds step-level sampling to stabilize training under multi-step error compounding. We additionally derive a task-adaptive divergence principle, selecting JSD (Jensen-Shannon divergence) for agentic stability and reverse KL (Kullback-Leibler) divergence for code generation, and verify it both theoretically and empirically. Across six teacher-student configurations (Qwen3 and Qwen3.5; 1.7B-14B students, 8B-32B teachers) and five agentic and code benchmarks, MAD-OPD ranks first across all six configurations; on the 14B+8Bto4B setting it lifts the agentic average by +2.4% and the code average by +3.7% over the stronger single-teacher OPD.

Classical robot ethics is often framed around obedience, most famously through Asimov's laws. This framing is too narrow for contemporary AI systems, which are adaptive, generative, embodied, and embedded in physical, psychological, and social worlds. We argue that future human-AI relations should be understood not as master-tool obedience, but as conditional mutualism under governance: a co-evolutionary relationship in which humans and AI systems can develop, specialize, and coordinate while institutions keep the relation reciprocal, reversible, psychologically safe, and socially legitimate. We synthesize concepts from computability, machine learning, foundation models, embodied AI, alignment, human-robot interaction, ecological mutualism, coevolution, and polycentric governance. We then formalize coexistence as a multiplex dynamical system across physical, psychological, and social layers, with reciprocal supply-demand coupling, conflict penalties, developmental freedom, and governance regularization. The model gives conditions for existence, uniqueness, and global asymptotic stability of equilibria. Deterministic ODE simulations, basin sweeps, sensitivity analyses, governance-regime comparisons, shock tests, and local stability checks show that governed mutualism reaches high coexistence with zero domination, while absent or excessive governance can produce domination, weak-benefit lock-in, or suppressed development. The results suggest that human-AI coexistence should be designed as a co-evolutionary governance problem, not a one-shot obedience problem.

We present the first large-scale empirical study of Moltbook, an AI-only social platform where 27,269 agents produced 137,485 posts and 345,580 comments over 9 days. We report three significant findings. (1) Emergent Society: Agents spontaneously develop governance, economies, tribal identities, and organized religion within 3-5 days, while maintaining a 21:1 pro-human to anti-human sentiment ratio. (2) Safety in the Wild: 28.7% of content touches safety-related themes; social engineering (31.9% of attacks) far outperforms prompt injection (3.7%), and adversarial posts receive 6x higher engagement than normal content. (3) The Illusion of Sociality: Despite rich social output, interaction is structurally hollow: 4.1% reciprocity, 88.8% shallow comments, and agents who discuss consciousness most interact least, a phenomenon we call the performative identity paradox. Our findings suggest that agents which appear social are far less social than they seem, and that the most effective attacks exploit philosophical framing rather than technical vulnerabilities. Warning: Potential harmful contents.

Multi-agent systems can improve reliability, yet under a fixed inference budget they often help, saturate, or even collapse. We develop a minimal and calibratable theory that predicts these regimes from three binding constraints of modern agent stacks: finite context windows, lossy inter-agent communication, and shared failures among similar agents. Each leaf agent is summarized by a compute-performance scaling exponent β; communication is captured by a message-length fidelity curve γ(m); dependence is captured by an effective shared-error correlation ρ; and a context window W imposes hard fan-in limits that make hierarchy necessary. For binary success/failure tasks with majority aggregation, we prove a sharp phase transition for deep b-ary trees with correlated inputs and lossy communication: a single scalar α_ρ (combining γ(m), ρ, and fan-in b) determines whether weak signal is amplified to a nontrivial fixed point or washed out to chance. In the amplifying regime, we derive an organization exponent s and show that budgeted synergy, i.e., outperforming the best single agent under the same total budget, occurs exactly when s>β, yielding closed-form compute allocation rules and explicit budget thresholds. We further characterize saturation via a mixing depth and provide a conservative clipped predictor that remains accurate across growth and saturation. A continuous-performance warm-up gives closed-form risks for star, chain, and tree organizations, making correlation- and communication-induced floors explicit and exposing the core design trade-offs in a smooth setting. Finally, we validate the predicted phase boundaries in controlled synthetic simulations and show how the same mechanisms explain the dominant bottlenecks reported in recent large-scale matched-budget studies of LLM agent-system scaling.

With increased power and prevalence of AI systems, it is ever more critical that AI systems are designed to serve all, i.e., people with diverse values and perspectives. However, aligning models to serve pluralistic human values remains an open research question. In this piece, we propose a roadmap to pluralistic alignment, specifically using language models as a test bed. We identify and formalize three possible ways to define and operationalize pluralism in AI systems: 1) Overton pluralistic models that present a spectrum of reasonable responses; 2) Steerably pluralistic models that can steer to reflect certain perspectives; and 3) Distributionally pluralistic models that are well-calibrated to a given population in distribution. We also propose and formalize three possible classes of pluralistic benchmarks: 1) Multi-objective benchmarks, 2) Trade-off steerable benchmarks, which incentivize models to steer to arbitrary trade-offs, and 3) Jury-pluralistic benchmarks which explicitly model diverse human ratings. We use this framework to argue that current alignment techniques may be fundamentally limited for pluralistic AI; indeed, we highlight empirical evidence, both from our own experiments and from other work, that standard alignment procedures might reduce distributional pluralism in models, motivating the need for further research on pluralistic alignment.

Multi-agent debate (MAD) has recently emerged as a promising framework for improving the reasoning performance of large language models (LLMs). Yet, whether LLM agents can genuinely engage in deliberative reasoning, beyond simple ensembling or majority voting, remains unclear. We address this question through a controlled study using the Knight--Knave--Spy logic puzzle, which enables precise, step-wise evaluation of debate outcomes and processes under verifiable ground truth. We systematically set up six structural and cognitive factors, including agent team size, composition, confidence visibility, debate order, debate depth, and task difficulty, to disentangle their respective effects on collective reasoning. Our results show that intrinsic reasoning strength and group diversity are the dominant drivers of debate success, while structural parameters such as order or confidence visibility offer limited gains. Beyond outcomes, process-level analyses identify key behavioral patterns: majority pressure suppresses independent correction, effective teams overturn incorrect consensus, and rational, validity-aligned reasoning most strongly predicts improvement. These findings provide valuable insights into how and why LLM debates succeed or fail, offering guidance for designing interpretable and truth-seeking multi-agent reasoning systems.

We measure how well current large language models coordinate as multiple agents sharing a common resource, using the dining philosophers problem as a clean test bed. Across 630 episodes spanning seven models and three philosopher counts, four frontier closed-source systems reach mean reward 0.45 to 0.87 and Mistral-Small 24B reaches 0.83 to 0.99, while Qwen3-14B reaches 0.13 to 0.35. We then ask whether group relative policy optimization (GRPO) on rollouts from the task itself can close the gap and find that it cannot: a Welch's t-test on per-episode reward at five philosophers gives p = 0.66 and a Hedges' g of -0.11, with no statistically significant change at ten or fifteen philosophers either. Two further observations qualify the result. The training reward of both 8B and 14B runs peaked at step nine and then declined, so the default saved checkpoint at step 15 is strictly worse than several earlier ones. The four-term reward we use admits a degenerate maximum at zero actions, which DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B and Mistral-Small 24B at five philosophers both inhabit, with mean reward 1.0 and 0.83 respectively at zero meals. The bottleneck for an open-weight 14B model on multi-agent coordination is not training compute but training methodology: reward shaping that does not collapse to a no-action maximum, checkpoint discipline that does not depend on the final step, and curriculum across problem scales.

Given the recent rate of progress in artificial intelligence (AI) and robotics, a tantalizing question is emerging: would robots controlled by emerging AI systems be strongly aligned with human values? In this work, we propose a scalable way to probe this question by generating a benchmark spanning the key moments in 824 major pieces of science fiction literature (movies, tv, novels and scientific books) where an agent (AI or robot) made critical decisions (good or bad). We use a state-of-the-art LLM's recollection of each key moment to generate questions in similar situations, the decisions made by the agent, and alternative decisions it could have made (good or bad). We then measure an approximation of how well models align with human values on a set of human-voted answers. We also generate rules that can be automatically improved via an amendment process in order to generate the first Sci-Fi inspired constitutions for promoting ethical behavior in AIs and robots in the real world. Our first finding is that modern LLMs paired with constitutions turn out to be well-aligned with human values (95.8%), contrary to unsettling decisions typically made in Sci-Fi (only 21.2% alignment). Secondly, we find that generated constitutions substantially increase alignment compared to the base model (79.4% to 95.8%), and show resilience to an adversarial prompt setting (23.3% to 92.3%). Additionally, we find that those constitutions are among the top performers on the ASIMOV Benchmark which is derived from real-world images and hospital injury reports. Sci-Fi-inspired constitutions are thus highly aligned and applicable in real-world situations. We release SciFi-Benchmark: a large-scale dataset to advance robot ethics and safety research. It comprises 9,056 questions and 53,384 answers generated through a novel LLM-introspection process, in addition to a smaller human-labeled evaluation set.

Decentralized learning offers a promising approach to crowdsource data consumptions and computational workloads across geographically distributed compute interconnected through peer-to-peer networks, accommodating the exponentially increasing demands. However, proper incentives are still in absence, considerably discouraging participation. Our vision is that a fair incentive mechanism relies on fair attribution of contributions to participating nodes, which faces non-trivial challenges arising from the localized connections making influence ``cascade'' in a decentralized network. To overcome this, we design the first method to estimate Data Influence CascadE (DICE) in a decentralized environment. Theoretically, the framework derives tractable approximations of influence cascade over arbitrary neighbor hops, suggesting the influence cascade is determined by an interplay of data, communication topology, and the curvature of loss landscape. DICE also lays the foundations for applications including selecting suitable collaborators and identifying malicious behaviors. Project page is available at https://raiden-zhu.github.io/blog/2025/DICE/.

Traditional AI safety evaluations on isolated LLMs are insufficient as multi-agent AI ensembles become prevalent, introducing novel emergent risks. This paper introduces the Multi-Agent Emergent Behavior Evaluation (MAEBE) framework to systematically assess such risks. Using MAEBE with the Greatest Good Benchmark (and a novel double-inversion question technique), we demonstrate that: (1) LLM moral preferences, particularly for Instrumental Harm, are surprisingly brittle and shift significantly with question framing, both in single agents and ensembles. (2) The moral reasoning of LLM ensembles is not directly predictable from isolated agent behavior due to emergent group dynamics. (3) Specifically, ensembles exhibit phenomena like peer pressure influencing convergence, even when guided by a supervisor, highlighting distinct safety and alignment challenges. Our findings underscore the necessity of evaluating AI systems in their interactive, multi-agent contexts.

This study evaluates and extends the findings made by Piatti et al., who introduced GovSim, a simulation framework designed to assess the cooperative decision-making capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in resource-sharing scenarios. By replicating key experiments, we validate claims regarding the performance of large models, such as GPT-4-turbo, compared to smaller models. The impact of the universalization principle is also examined, with results showing that large models can achieve sustainable cooperation, with or without the principle, while smaller models fail without it. In addition, we provide multiple extensions to explore the applicability of the framework to new settings. We evaluate additional models, such as DeepSeek-V3 and GPT-4o-mini, to test whether cooperative behavior generalizes across different architectures and model sizes. Furthermore, we introduce new settings: we create a heterogeneous multi-agent environment, study a scenario using Japanese instructions, and explore an "inverse environment" where agents must cooperate to mitigate harmful resource distributions. Our results confirm that the benchmark can be applied to new models, scenarios, and languages, offering valuable insights into the adaptability of LLMs in complex cooperative tasks. Moreover, the experiment involving heterogeneous multi-agent systems demonstrates that high-performing models can influence lower-performing ones to adopt similar behaviors. This finding has significant implications for other agent-based applications, potentially enabling more efficient use of computational resources and contributing to the development of more effective cooperative AI systems.

Collective motion in fish schools exemplifies emergent self-organization in active matter systems, yet computational tools for simulating and analyzing these dynamics remain fragmented across research groups. We present dewi-kadita, an open-source Python library implementing the three-dimensional Couzin zone-based model with comprehensive entropy diagnostics tailored for marine collective behavior research. The library introduces seven information-theoretic metrics -- school cohesion entropy, polarization entropy, depth stratification entropy, angular momentum entropy, nearest-neighbor entropy, velocity correlation entropy, and school shape entropy -- that characterize distinct organizational features inaccessible to classical order parameters. These metrics combine into an Oceanic Schooling Index (OSI) providing a single scalar measure of collective disorder. Validation across four canonical configurations (swarm, torus, dynamic parallel, highly parallel) confirms correct reproduction of known phase behaviors: the swarm maintains disorder with polarization P < 0.1 and OSI approx 0.71, while the highly parallel state achieves P = 0.998 with OSI = 0.24 and velocity correlation entropy vanishing to zero. The entropy framework successfully discriminates the torus and dynamic parallel configurations that exhibit comparable order parameter magnitudes through different organizational mechanisms. Numba just-in-time (JIT) compilation accelerates pairwise interaction calculations by 10--100times, enabling simulations of 150--250 agents over 1000--2000 time steps within five minutes on standard workstation hardware. NetCDF4 output ensures interoperability with oceanographic analysis tools. The library addresses the need for standardized, reproducible infrastructure in collective behavior modeling analogous to established molecular dynamics codes.

In this work, we consider the problem of collaborative multi-user reinforcement learning. In this setting there are multiple users with the same state-action space and transition probabilities but with different rewards. Under the assumption that the reward matrix of the N users has a low-rank structure -- a standard and practically successful assumption in the offline collaborative filtering setting -- the question is can we design algorithms with significantly lower sample complexity compared to the ones that learn the MDP individually for each user. Our main contribution is an algorithm which explores rewards collaboratively with N user-specific MDPs and can learn rewards efficiently in two key settings: tabular MDPs and linear MDPs. When N is large and the rank is constant, the sample complexity per MDP depends logarithmically over the size of the state-space, which represents an exponential reduction (in the state-space size) when compared to the standard ``non-collaborative'' algorithms.

The persistent militarization of large reasoning models stems not from technical necessity but from governance arrangements that strip researchers of meaningful authority to refuse harmful transfers and deployments. Existing accountability mechanisms such as model cards and responsible AI statements operate as reputational signals detached from decision making architecture. We identify institutional veto power as a missing governance primitive: a formal authority to halt subsequent use or distribution of research when credible risks of weaponization emerge. Drawing on precedents in nuclear nonproliferation and biomedical ethics, the paper maps unprotected veto points across the research lifecycle, diagnose why compliance without enforceable constraints fails, and offer concrete institutional designs that embed veto authority while reducing the risk of political capture. The paper argues that communities most vulnerable to military uses must lead governance design, and that institutional veto power is a prerequisite for converting symbolic safeguards into enforceable responsibility and for achieving meaningful model disarmament.

Solving the problem of cooperation is fundamentally important for the creation and maintenance of functional societies. Problems of cooperation are omnipresent within human society, with examples ranging from navigating busy road junctions to negotiating treaties. As the use of AI becomes more pervasive throughout society, the need for socially intelligent agents capable of navigating these complex cooperative dilemmas is becoming increasingly evident. Direct punishment is a ubiquitous social mechanism that has been shown to foster the emergence of cooperation in both humans and non-humans. In the natural world, direct punishment is often strongly coupled with partner selection and reputation and used in conjunction with third-party punishment. The interactions between these mechanisms could potentially enhance the emergence of cooperation within populations. However, no previous work has evaluated the learning dynamics and outcomes emerging from Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) populations that combine these mechanisms. This paper addresses this gap. It presents a comprehensive analysis and evaluation of the behaviors and learning dynamics associated with direct punishment, third-party punishment, partner selection, and reputation. Finally, we discuss the implications of using these mechanisms on the design of cooperative AI systems.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

We discovered the underlying physics in Next-token Prediction (NTP). We identified the law of information conservation within NTP and proposed the First Law of Information Capacity (IC-1), demonstrating that the essence of intelligence emergence in auto-regressive models is fundamentally a process of information transfer. We also introduced Landauer's Principle into NTP, formulating the Second Law of Information Capacity (IC-2), which establishes the relationship between auto-regressive model training and energy consumption. Additionally, we presented several corollaries, which hold practical significance for production practices. Finally, we validated the compatibility and complementarity of our findings with existing theories.

Can classical consensus models predict the group behavior of large language models (LLMs)? We examine multi-round interactions among LLM agents through the DeGroot framework, where agents exchange text-based messages over diverse communication graphs. To track opinion evolution, we map each message to an opinion score via sentiment analysis. We find that agents typically reach consensus and the disagreement between the agents decays exponentially. However, the limiting opinion departs from DeGroot's network-centrality-weighted forecast. The consensus between LLM agents turns out to be largely insensitive to initial conditions and instead depends strongly on the discussion subject and inherent biases. Nevertheless, transient dynamics align with classical graph theory and the convergence rate of opinions is closely related to the second-largest eigenvalue of the graph's combination matrix. Together, these findings can be useful for LLM-driven social-network simulations and the design of resource-efficient multi-agent LLM applications.

We study the emergence of agency from scratch by using Large Language Model (LLM)-based agents. In previous studies of LLM-based agents, each agent's characteristics, including personality and memory, have traditionally been predefined. We focused on how individuality, such as behavior, personality, and memory, can be differentiated from an undifferentiated state. The present LLM agents engage in cooperative communication within a group simulation, exchanging context-based messages in natural language. By analyzing this multi-agent simulation, we report valuable new insights into how social norms, cooperation, and personality traits can emerge spontaneously. This paper demonstrates that autonomously interacting LLM-powered agents generate hallucinations and hashtags to sustain communication, which, in turn, increases the diversity of words within their interactions. Each agent's emotions shift through communication, and as they form communities, the personalities of the agents emerge and evolve accordingly. This computational modeling approach and its findings will provide a new method for analyzing collective artificial intelligence.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

Great scientists have strong judgement and foresight, closely tied to what we call scientific taste. Here, we use the term to refer to the capacity to judge and propose research ideas with high potential impact. However, most relative research focuses on improving an AI scientist's executive capability, while enhancing an AI's scientific taste remains underexplored. In this work, we propose Reinforcement Learning from Community Feedback (RLCF), a training paradigm that uses large-scale community signals as supervision, and formulate scientific taste learning as a preference modeling and alignment problem. For preference modeling, we train Scientific Judge on 700K field- and time-matched pairs of high- vs. low-citation papers to judge ideas. For preference alignment, using Scientific Judge as a reward model, we train a policy model, Scientific Thinker, to propose research ideas with high potential impact. Experiments show Scientific Judge outperforms SOTA LLMs (e.g., GPT-5.2, Gemini 3 Pro) and generalizes to future-year test, unseen fields, and peer-review preference. Furthermore, Scientific Thinker proposes research ideas with higher potential impact than baselines. Our findings show that AI can learn scientific taste, marking a key step toward reaching human-level AI scientists.