Daily Papers

Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) is a powerful approach to designing game-playing bots or solving sequential decision problems. The method relies on intelligent tree search that balances exploration and exploitation. MCTS performs random sampling in the form of simulations and stores statistics of actions to make more educated choices in each subsequent iteration. The method has become a state-of-the-art technique for combinatorial games, however, in more complex games (e.g. those with high branching factor or real-time ones), as well as in various practical domains (e.g. transportation, scheduling or security) an efficient MCTS application often requires its problem-dependent modification or integration with other techniques. Such domain-specific modifications and hybrid approaches are the main focus of this survey. The last major MCTS survey has been published in 2012. Contributions that appeared since its release are of particular interest for this review.

Bayesian optimization (BO) is a powerful framework to optimize black-box expensive-to-evaluate functions via sequential interactions. In several important problems (e.g. drug discovery, circuit design, neural architecture search, etc.), though, such functions are defined over large combinatorial and unstructured spaces. This makes existing BO algorithms not feasible due to the intractable maximization of the acquisition function over these domains. To address this issue, we propose GameOpt, a novel game-theoretical approach to combinatorial BO. GameOpt establishes a cooperative game between the different optimization variables, and selects points that are game equilibria of an upper confidence bound acquisition function. These are stable configurations from which no variable has an incentive to deviate- analog to local optima in continuous domains. Crucially, this allows us to efficiently break down the complexity of the combinatorial domain into individual decision sets, making GameOpt scalable to large combinatorial spaces. We demonstrate the application of GameOpt to the challenging protein design problem and validate its performance on four real-world protein datasets. Each protein can take up to 20^{X} possible configurations, where X is the length of a protein, making standard BO methods infeasible. Instead, our approach iteratively selects informative protein configurations and very quickly discovers highly active protein variants compared to other baselines.

A hallmark of human intelligence is the ability to understand and communicate with language. Interactive Fiction games are fully text-based simulation environments where a player issues text commands to effect change in the environment and progress through the story. We argue that IF games are an excellent testbed for studying language-based autonomous agents. In particular, IF games combine challenges of combinatorial action spaces, language understanding, and commonsense reasoning. To facilitate rapid development of language-based agents, we introduce Jericho, a learning environment for man-made IF games and conduct a comprehensive study of text-agents across a rich set of games, highlighting directions in which agents can improve.

We consider learning to play multiplayer imperfect-information games with simultaneous moves and large state-action spaces. Previous attempts to tackle such challenging games have largely focused on model-free learning methods, often requiring hundreds of years of experience to produce competitive agents. Our approach is based on model-based planning. We tackle the problem of partial observability by first building an (oracle) planner that has access to the full state of the environment and then distilling the knowledge of the oracle to a (follower) agent which is trained to play the imperfect-information game by imitating the oracle's choices. We experimentally show that planning with naive Monte Carlo tree search does not perform very well in large combinatorial action spaces. We therefore propose planning with a fixed-depth tree search and decoupled Thompson sampling for action selection. We show that the planner is able to discover efficient playing strategies in the games of Clash Royale and Pommerman and the follower policy successfully learns to implement them by training on a few hundred battles.

We study the Levine hat problem, a classic combinatorial puzzle introduced by Lionel Levine in 2010. This problem involves a game in which n geq 2 players, each seeing an infinite stack of hats on each of their teammates' heads but not on their own, must simultaneously guess the index of a black hat on their own stack. If one of the players fails to do so, the team loses collectively. The players must therefore come up with a good strategy before the game starts. While the optimal winning probability V_{n} remains unknown even for n=2, we make three key advances. First, we develop a novel geometric framework for representing strategies through measurable functions, providing a new expression of V_{n} and a unified treatment of the game for finite and for infinite stacks via integral formulations. Secondly, we construct a new strategy K_{5} that reaches the conjectured optimal probability of victory : 0.35. We also show that K_{5} is part of a larger class of strategies that allow us to improve current bounds and resolve conjectured inequalities. Finally, we introduce and entirely solve a continuous generalization of the problem, demonstrating that extending to uncountable hat stacks increases the optimal winning probability to exactly 1/2. This generalization naturally leads to a broader and smoother strategic framework, within which we also describe how to compute optimal responses to a range of strategies.

Combinatorics is central to Olympiad-level mathematical problem solving, requiring deep discrete reasoning, creative constructions, and rigorous structural insight. Recent evidence suggests that even today's strongest frontier models remain uneven on Olympiad combinatorics, revealing a gap in creative mathematical reasoning. We introduce ComBench, an Olympiad-level combinatorics benchmark for evaluating and diagnosing the combinatorial reasoning capabilities of large language models. ComBench contains 100 human-annotated competition-level problems organized around two complementary settings: analysis-centric problems, which primarily require rigorous mathematical arguments, and construction-centric problems, which require explicit constructions in addition to correctness justifications. The evaluation protocol combines rubric-guided proof grading with deterministic construction verification, exposing cases where proof quality and construction validity diverge. Experiments on frontier open- and closed-source models show that ComBench is far from saturated: the strongest model reaches 65.4% overall Avg. and 75.3% overall Best@4. We further find that Rigorous Proof Reasoning and Constructive Realization are distinct capabilities: Kimi-K2.6 trails GPT-5.5 on analysis-centric proof grading but surpasses it on construction-centric Best@4, while Existence and Construction problems remain consistently hardest across representative frontier models.

Neurosymbolic approaches integrating large language models with formal reasoning have recently achieved human-level performance on mathematics competition problems in algebra, geometry and number theory. In comparison, combinatorics remains a challenging domain, characterized by a lack of appropriate benchmarks and theorem libraries. To address this gap, we introduce CombiBench, a comprehensive benchmark comprising 100 combinatorial problems, each formalized in Lean~4 and paired with its corresponding informal statement. The problem set covers a wide spectrum of difficulty levels, ranging from middle school to IMO and university level, and span over ten combinatorial topics. CombiBench is suitable for testing IMO solving capabilities since it includes all IMO combinatorial problems since 2000 (except IMO 2004 P3 as its statement contain an images). Furthermore, we provide a comprehensive and standardized evaluation framework, dubbed Fine-Eval (for Fill-in-the-blank in Lean Evaluation), for formal mathematics. It accommodates not only proof-based problems but also, for the first time, the evaluation of fill-in-the-blank questions. Using Fine-Eval as the evaluation method and Kimina Lean Server as the backend, we benchmark several LLMs on CombiBench and observe that their capabilities for formally solving combinatorial problems remain limited. Among all models tested (none of which has been trained for this particular task), Kimina-Prover attains the best results, solving 7 problems (out of 100) under both ``with solution'' and ``without solution'' scenarios. We open source the benchmark dataset alongside with the code of the proposed evaluation method at https://github.com/MoonshotAI/CombiBench/.

This paper generalises the treatment of compositional game theory as introduced by the second and third authors with Ghani and Winschel, where games are modelled as morphisms of a symmetric monoidal category. From an economic modelling perspective, the existing notion of an open game is not expressive enough for many applications. This includes stochastic environments, stochastic choices by players, as well as incomplete information regarding the game being played. The current paper addresses these three issue all at once. To achieve this we make significant use of category theory, especially the 'coend optics' of Riley.

Developing AI agents that can robustly adapt to dramatically different strategic landscapes without retraining is a central challenge for multi-agent learning. Pok\'emon Video Game Championships (VGC) is a domain with an extraordinarily large space of possible team configurations of approximately 10^{139} - far larger than those of Dota or Starcraft. The highly discrete, combinatorial nature of team building in Pok\'emon VGC causes optimal strategies to shift dramatically depending on both the team being piloted and the opponent's team, making generalization uniquely challenging. To advance research on this problem, we introduce VGC-Bench: a benchmark that provides critical infrastructure, standardizes evaluation protocols, and supplies human-play datasets and a range of baselines - from large-language-model agents and behavior cloning to reinforcement learning and empirical game-theoretic methods such as self-play, fictitious play, and double oracle. In the restricted setting where an agent is trained and evaluated on a single-team configuration, our methods are able to win against a professional VGC competitor. We extensively evaluated all baseline methods over progressively larger team sets and find that even the best-performing algorithm in the single-team setting struggles at scaling up as team size grows. Thus, policy generalization across diverse team strategies remains an open challenge for the community. Our code is open sourced at https://github.com/cameronangliss/VGC-Bench.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

We propose Monte Carlo Permutation Search (MCPS), a general-purpose Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) algorithm that improves upon the GRAVE algorithm. MCPS is relevant when deep reinforcement learning is not an option, or when the computing power available before play is not substantial, such as in General Game Playing, for example. The principle of MCPS is to include in the exploration term of a node the statistics on all the playouts that contain all the moves on the path from the root to the node. We extensively test MCPS on a variety of games: board games, wargame, investment game, video game and multi-player games. MCPS has better results than GRAVE in all the two-player games. It has equivalent results for multi-player games because these games are inherently balanced even when players have different strengths. We also show that using abstract codes for moves instead of exact codes can be beneficial to both MCPS and GRAVE, as they improve the permutation statistics and the AMAF statistics. We also provide a mathematical derivation of the formulas used for weighting the three sources of statistics. These formulas are an improvement on the GRAVE formula since they no longer use the bias hyperparameter of GRAVE. Moreover, MCPS is not sensitive to the ref hyperparameter.

The rapid advancement of large language models (LLMs) has accelerated their application in reasoning, with strategic reasoning drawing increasing attention. To evaluate LLMs' strategic reasoning capabilities, game theory, with its concise structure, has become a preferred approach. However, current research focuses on a limited selection of games, resulting in low coverage. Classic game scenarios risk data leakage, and existing benchmarks often lack extensibility, making them inadequate for evaluating state-of-the-art models. To address these challenges, we propose TMGBench, a benchmark with comprehensive game type coverage, novel scenarios, and flexible organization. Specifically, we incorporate all 144 game types summarized by the Robinson-Goforth topology of 2x2 games, constructed as classic games. We also employ synthetic data generation to create diverse, higher-quality scenarios through topic guidance and human inspection, referred to as story-based games. Lastly, we provide a sustainable framework for increasingly powerful LLMs by treating these games as atomic units and organizing them into more complex forms via sequential, parallel, and nested structures. Our comprehensive evaluation of mainstream LLMs covers tests on rational reasoning, robustness, Theory-of-Mind (ToM), and reasoning in complex forms. Results reveal flaws in accuracy, consistency, and varying mastery of ToM. Additionally, o1-mini, OpenAI's latest reasoning model, achieved accuracy rates of 66.6%, 60.0%, and 70.0% on sequential, parallel, and nested games, highlighting TMGBench's challenges.

Many poker systems, whether created with heuristics or machine learning, rely on the probability of winning as a key input. However calculating the precise probability using combinatorics is an intractable problem, so instead we approximate it. Monte Carlo simulation is an effective technique that can be used to approximate the probability that a player will win and/or tie a hand. However, without the use of a memory-intensive lookup table or a supercomputer, it becomes infeasible to run millions of times when training an agent with self-play. To combat the space-time tradeoff, we use deep learning to approximate the probabilities obtained from the Monte Carlo simulation with high accuracy. The learned model proves to be a lightweight alternative to Monte Carlo simulation, which ultimately allows us to use the probabilities as inputs during self-play efficiently. The source code and optimized neural network can be found at https://github.com/brandinho/Poker-Probability-Approximation

Card games are widely used to study sequential decision-making under uncertainty, with real-world analogues in negotiation, finance, and cybersecurity. These games typically fall into three categories based on the flow of control: strictly sequential (players alternate single actions), deterministic response (some actions trigger a fixed outcome), and unbounded reciprocal response (alternating counterplays are permitted). A less-explored but strategically rich structure is the bounded one-sided response, where a player's action briefly transfers control to the opponent, who must satisfy a fixed condition through one or more moves before the turn resolves. We term games featuring this mechanism Bounded One-Sided Response Games (BORGs). We introduce a modified version of Monopoly Deal as a benchmark environment that isolates this dynamic, where a Rent action forces the opponent to choose payment assets. The gold-standard algorithm, Counterfactual Regret Minimization (CFR), converges on effective strategies without novel algorithmic extensions. A lightweight full-stack research platform unifies the environment, a parallelized CFR runtime, and a human-playable web interface. The trained CFR agent and source code are available at https://monopolydeal.ai.

Combinatorial optimization (CO) is naturally discrete, making machine learning based on differentiable optimization inapplicable. Karalias & Loukas (2020) adapted the probabilistic method to incorporate CO into differentiable optimization. Their work ignited the research on unsupervised learning for CO, composed of two main components: probabilistic objectives and derandomization. However, each component confronts unique challenges. First, deriving objectives under various conditions (e.g., cardinality constraints and minimum) is nontrivial. Second, the derandomization process is underexplored, and the existing derandomization methods are either random sampling or naive rounding. In this work, we aim to tackle prevalent (i.e., commonly involved) conditions in unsupervised CO. First, we concretize the targets for objective construction and derandomization with theoretical justification. Then, for various conditions commonly involved in different CO problems, we derive nontrivial objectives and derandomization to meet the targets. Finally, we apply the derivations to various CO problems. Via extensive experiments on synthetic and real-world graphs, we validate the correctness of our derivations and show our empirical superiority w.r.t. both optimization quality and speed.

Combinatorial optimization finds an optimal solution within a discrete set of variables and constraints. The field has seen tremendous progress both in research and industry. With the success of deep learning in the past decade, a recent trend in combinatorial optimization has been to improve state-of-the-art combinatorial optimization solvers by replacing key heuristic components with machine learning (ML) models. In this paper, we investigate two essential aspects of machine learning algorithms for combinatorial optimization: temporal characteristics and attention. We argue that for the task of variable selection in the branch-and-bound (B&B) algorithm, incorporating the temporal information as well as the bipartite graph attention improves the solver's performance. We support our claims with intuitions and numerical results over several standard datasets used in the literature and competitions. Code is available at: https://developer.huaweicloud.com/develop/aigallery/notebook/detail?id=047c6cf2-8463-40d7-b92f-7b2ca998e935

We introduce a framework for translating game descriptions in natural language into extensive-form representations in game theory, leveraging Large Language Models (LLMs) and in-context learning. Given the varying levels of strategic complexity in games, such as perfect versus imperfect information, directly applying in-context learning would be insufficient. To address this, we introduce a two-stage framework with specialized modules to enhance in-context learning, enabling it to divide and conquer the problem effectively. In the first stage, we tackle the challenge of imperfect information by developing a module that identifies information sets along and the corresponding partial tree structure. With this information, the second stage leverages in-context learning alongside a self-debugging module to produce a complete extensive-form game tree represented using pygambit, the Python API of a recognized game-theoretic analysis tool called Gambit. Using this python representation enables the automation of tasks such as computing Nash equilibria directly from natural language descriptions. We evaluate the performance of the full framework, as well as its individual components, using various LLMs on games with different levels of strategic complexity. Our experimental results show that the framework significantly outperforms baseline models in generating accurate extensive-form games, with each module playing a critical role in its success.

Computing stable partitions in hedonic games is a challenging task because there exist games in which stable outcomes do not exist. Even more, these No-instances can often be leveraged to prove computational hardness results. We make this impression rigorous in a dynamic model of cardinal hedonic games by providing meta theorems. These imply hardness of deciding about the possible or necessary convergence of deviation dynamics based on the mere existence of No-instances. Our results hold for additively separable, fractional, and modified fractional hedonic games (ASHGs, FHGs, and MFHGs). Moreover, they encompass essentially all reasonable stability notions based on single-agent deviations. In addition, we propose dynamics as a method to find individually rational and contractually individual stable (CIS) partitions in ASHGs. In particular, we find that CIS dynamics from the singleton partition possibly converge after a linear number of deviations but may require an exponential number of deviations in the worst case.

A generally intelligent agent must be able to teach itself how to solve problems in complex domains with minimal human supervision. Recently, deep reinforcement learning algorithms combined with self-play have achieved superhuman proficiency in Go, Chess, and Shogi without human data or domain knowledge. In these environments, a reward is always received at the end of the game, however, for many combinatorial optimization environments, rewards are sparse and episodes are not guaranteed to terminate. We introduce Autodidactic Iteration: a novel reinforcement learning algorithm that is able to teach itself how to solve the Rubik's Cube with no human assistance. Our algorithm is able to solve 100% of randomly scrambled cubes while achieving a median solve length of 30 moves -- less than or equal to solvers that employ human domain knowledge.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

AI algorithms for imperfect-information games are typically compared using performance metrics on individual games, making it difficult to assess robustness across game choices. Card games are a natural domain for imperfect information due to hidden hands and stochastic draws. To facilitate comparative research on imperfect-information game-playing algorithms and game systems, we introduce Valet, a diverse and comprehensive testbed of 21 traditional imperfect-information card games. These games span multiple genres, cultures, player counts, deck structures, mechanics, winning conditions, and methods of hiding and revealing information. To standardize implementations across systems, we encode the rules of each game in RECYCLE, a card game description language. We empirically characterize each game's branching factor and duration using random simulations, reporting baseline score distributions for a Monte Carlo Tree Search player against random opponents to demonstrate the suitability of Valet as a benchmarking suite.

Reinforcement learning has recently been used to approach well-known NP-hard combinatorial problems in graph theory. Among these problems, Hamiltonian cycle problems are exceptionally difficult to analyze, even when restricted to individual instances of structurally complex graphs. In this paper, we use Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS), the search algorithm behind many state-of-the-art reinforcement learning algorithms such as AlphaZero, to create autonomous agents that learn to play the game of Snake, a game centered on properties of Hamiltonian cycles on grid graphs. The game of Snake can be formulated as a single-player discounted Markov Decision Process (MDP) where the agent must behave optimally in a stochastic environment. Determining the optimal policy for Snake, defined as the policy that maximizes the probability of winning - or win rate - with higher priority and minimizes the expected number of time steps to win with lower priority, is conjectured to be NP-hard. Performance-wise, compared to prior work in the Snake game, our algorithm is the first to achieve a win rate over 0.5 (a uniform random policy achieves a win rate < 2.57 times 10^{-15}), demonstrating the versatility of AlphaZero in approaching NP-hard environments.

We consider the problem of decentralized multi-agent reinforcement learning in Markov games. A fundamental question is whether there exist algorithms that, when adopted by all agents and run independently in a decentralized fashion, lead to no-regret for each player, analogous to celebrated convergence results in normal-form games. While recent work has shown that such algorithms exist for restricted settings (notably, when regret is defined with respect to deviations to Markovian policies), the question of whether independent no-regret learning can be achieved in the standard Markov game framework was open. We provide a decisive negative resolution this problem, both from a computational and statistical perspective. We show that: - Under the widely-believed assumption that PPAD-hard problems cannot be solved in polynomial time, there is no polynomial-time algorithm that attains no-regret in general-sum Markov games when executed independently by all players, even when the game is known to the algorithm designer and the number of players is a small constant. - When the game is unknown, no algorithm, regardless of computational efficiency, can achieve no-regret without observing a number of episodes that is exponential in the number of players. Perhaps surprisingly, our lower bounds hold even for seemingly easier setting in which all agents are controlled by a a centralized algorithm. They are proven via lower bounds for a simpler problem we refer to as SparseCCE, in which the goal is to compute a coarse correlated equilibrium that is sparse in the sense that it can be represented as a mixture of a small number of product policies. The crux of our approach is a novel application of aggregation techniques from online learning, whereby we show that any algorithm for the SparseCCE problem can be used to compute approximate Nash equilibria for non-zero sum normal-form games.

In this paper we look at the ability of recent large language models (LLMs) at solving mathematical problems in combinatorics. We compare models LLaMA-2, LLaMA-3.1, GPT-4, and Mixtral against each other and against human pupils and undergraduates with prior experience in mathematical olympiads. To facilitate these comparisons we introduce the Combi-Puzzles dataset, which contains 125 problem variants based on 25 combinatorial reasoning problems. Each problem is presented in one of five distinct forms, created by systematically manipulating the problem statements through adversarial additions, numeric parameter changes, and linguistic obfuscation. Our variations preserve the mathematical core and are designed to measure the generalisability of LLM problem-solving abilities, while also increasing confidence that problems are submitted to LLMs in forms that have not been seen as training instances. We found that a model based on GPT-4 outperformed all other models in producing correct responses, and performed significantly better in the mathematical variation of the problems than humans. We also found that modifications to problem statements significantly impact the LLM's performance, while human performance remains unaffected.

Learning to play optimally against any mixture over a diverse set of strategies is of important practical interests in competitive games. In this paper, we propose simplex-NeuPL that satisfies two desiderata simultaneously: i) learning a population of strategically diverse basis policies, represented by a single conditional network; ii) using the same network, learn best-responses to any mixture over the simplex of basis policies. We show that the resulting conditional policies incorporate prior information about their opponents effectively, enabling near optimal returns against arbitrary mixture policies in a game with tractable best-responses. We verify that such policies behave Bayes-optimally under uncertainty and offer insights in using this flexibility at test time. Finally, we offer evidence that learning best-responses to any mixture policies is an effective auxiliary task for strategic exploration, which, by itself, can lead to more performant populations.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

Playing games has a long history of describing intricate interactions in simplified forms. In this paper we explore if large language models (LLMs) can play games, investigating their capabilities for randomisation and strategic adaptation through both simultaneous and sequential game interactions. We focus on GPT-4o-Mini-2024-08-17 and test two games between LLMs: Rock Paper Scissors (RPS) and games of strategy (Prisoners Dilemma PD). LLMs are often described as stochastic parrots, and while they may indeed be parrots, our results suggest that they are not very stochastic in the sense that their outputs - when prompted to be random - are often very biased. Our research reveals that LLMs appear to develop loss aversion strategies in repeated games, with RPS converging to stalemate conditions while PD shows systematic shifts between cooperative and competitive outcomes based on prompt design. We detail programmatic tools for independent agent interactions and the Agentic AI challenges faced in implementation. We show that LLMs can indeed play games, just not very well. These results have implications for the use of LLMs in multi-agent LLM systems and showcase limitations in current approaches to model output for strategic decision-making.

Large Language Models (LLMs) reasoning abilities are increasingly being applied to classical board and card games, but the dominant approach -- involving prompting for direct move generation -- has significant drawbacks. It relies on the model's implicit fragile pattern-matching capabilities, leading to frequent illegal moves and strategically shallow play. Here we introduce an alternative approach: We use the LLM to translate natural language rules and game trajectories into a formal, executable world model represented as Python code. This generated model -- comprising functions for state transition, legal move enumeration, and termination checks -- serves as a verifiable simulation engine for high-performance planning algorithms like Monte Carlo tree search (MCTS). In addition, we prompt the LLM to generate heuristic value functions (to make MCTS more efficient), and inference functions (to estimate hidden states in imperfect information games). Our method offers three distinct advantages compared to directly using the LLM as a policy: (1) Verifiability: The generated CWM serves as a formal specification of the game's rules, allowing planners to algorithmically enumerate valid actions and avoid illegal moves, contingent on the correctness of the synthesized model; (2) Strategic Depth: We combine LLM semantic understanding with the deep search power of classical planners; and (3) Generalization: We direct the LLM to focus on the meta-task of data-to-code translation, enabling it to adapt to new games more easily. We evaluate our agent on 10 different games, of which 4 are novel and created for this paper. 5 of the games are fully observed (perfect information), and 5 are partially observed (imperfect information). We find that our method outperforms or matches Gemini 2.5 Pro in 9 out of the 10 considered games.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are transforming society and permeating into diverse applications. As a result, LLMs will frequently interact with us and other agents. It is, therefore, of great societal value to understand how LLMs behave in interactive social settings. Here, we propose to use behavioral game theory to study LLM's cooperation and coordination behavior. To do so, we let different LLMs (GPT-3, GPT-3.5, and GPT-4) play finitely repeated games with each other and with other, human-like strategies. Our results show that LLMs generally perform well in such tasks and also uncover persistent behavioral signatures. In a large set of two players-two strategies games, we find that LLMs are particularly good at games where valuing their own self-interest pays off, like the iterated Prisoner's Dilemma family. However, they behave sub-optimally in games that require coordination. We, therefore, further focus on two games from these distinct families. In the canonical iterated Prisoner's Dilemma, we find that GPT-4 acts particularly unforgivingly, always defecting after another agent has defected only once. In the Battle of the Sexes, we find that GPT-4 cannot match the behavior of the simple convention to alternate between options. We verify that these behavioral signatures are stable across robustness checks. Finally, we show how GPT-4's behavior can be modified by providing further information about the other player as well as by asking it to predict the other player's actions before making a choice. These results enrich our understanding of LLM's social behavior and pave the way for a behavioral game theory for machines.

There is a large class of problems in algebraic combinatorics which can be distilled into the same challenge: construct an explicit combinatorial bijection. Traditionally, researchers have solved challenges like these by visually inspecting the data for patterns, formulating conjectures, and then proving them. But what is to be done if patterns fail to emerge until the data grows beyond human scale? In this paper, we propose a new workflow for discovering combinatorial bijections via machine learning. As a proof of concept, we train a transformer on paired Dyck paths and use its learned attention patterns to derive a new algorithmic description of the zeta map, which we call the Scaffolding Map.

This paper presents a new approach that integrates deep learning with computational chess, using both the Mixture of Experts (MoE) method and Monte-Carlo Tree Search (MCTS). Our methodology employs a suite of specialized models, each designed to respond to specific changes in the game's input data. This results in a framework with sparsely activated models, which provides significant computational benefits. Our framework combines the MoE method with MCTS, in order to align it with the strategic phases of chess, thus departing from the conventional ``one-for-all'' model. Instead, we utilize distinct game phase definitions to effectively distribute computational tasks across multiple expert neural networks. Our empirical research shows a substantial improvement in playing strength, surpassing the traditional single-model framework. This validates the efficacy of our integrated approach and highlights the potential of incorporating expert knowledge and strategic principles into neural network design. The fusion of MoE and MCTS offers a promising avenue for advancing machine learning architectures.

This paper introduces Alympics (Olympics for Agents), a systematic simulation framework utilizing Large Language Model (LLM) agents for game theory research. Alympics creates a versatile platform for studying complex game theory problems, bridging the gap between theoretical game theory and empirical investigations by providing a controlled environment for simulating human-like strategic interactions with LLM agents. In our pilot case study, the "Water Allocation Challenge," we explore Alympics through a challenging strategic game focused on the multi-round auction on scarce survival resources. This study demonstrates the framework's ability to qualitatively and quantitatively analyze game determinants, strategies, and outcomes. Additionally, we conduct a comprehensive human assessment and an in-depth evaluation of LLM agents in strategic decision-making scenarios. Our findings not only expand the understanding of LLM agents' proficiency in emulating human strategic behavior but also highlight their potential in advancing game theory knowledge, thereby enriching our understanding of both game theory and empowering further research into strategic decision-making domains with LLM agents. Codes, prompts, and all related resources are available at https://github.com/microsoft/Alympics.

Decision-making, a complicated task requiring various types of abilities, presents an excellent framework for assessing Large Language Models (LLMs). Our research investigates LLMs' decision-making capabilities through the lens of a well-established field, Game Theory. We focus specifically on games that support the participation of more than two agents simultaneously. Subsequently, we introduce our framework, GAMA-Bench, including eight classical multi-agent games. We design a scoring scheme to assess a model's performance in these games quantitatively. Through GAMA-Bench, we investigate LLMs' robustness, generalizability, and enhancement strategies. Results reveal that while GPT-3.5 shows satisfying robustness, its generalizability is relatively limited. However, its performance can be improved through approaches such as Chain-of-Thought. Additionally, we conduct evaluations across various LLMs and find that GPT-4 outperforms other models on GAMA-Bench, achieving a score of 60.5. Moreover, Gemini-1.0-Pro and GPT-3.5 (0613, 1106, 0125) demonstrate similar intelligence on GAMA-Bench. The code and experimental results are made publicly available via https://github.com/CUHK-ARISE/GAMABench.

Game theory is a foundational framework for analyzing strategic interactions, and its intersection with large language models (LLMs) is a rapidly growing field. However, existing surveys mainly focus narrowly on using game theory to evaluate LLM behavior. This paper provides the first comprehensive survey of the bidirectional relationship between Game Theory and LLMs. We propose a novel taxonomy that categorizes the research in this intersection into four distinct perspectives: (1) evaluating LLMs in game-based scenarios; (2) improving LLMs using game-theoretic concepts for better interpretability and alignment; (3) modeling the competitive landscape of LLM development and its societal impact; and (4) leveraging LLMs to advance game models and to solve corresponding game theory problems. Furthermore, we identify key challenges and outline future research directions. By systematically investigating this interdisciplinary landscape, our survey highlights the mutual influence of game theory and LLMs, fostering progress at the intersection of these fields.

Automatically generating novel and interesting games is a complex task. Challenges include representing game rules in a computationally workable form, searching through the large space of potential games under most such representations, and accurately evaluating the originality and quality of previously unseen games. Prior work in automated game generation has largely focused on relatively restricted rule representations and relied on domain-specific heuristics. In this work, we explore the generation of novel games in the comparatively expansive Ludii game description language, which encodes the rules of over 1000 board games in a variety of styles and modes of play. We draw inspiration from recent advances in large language models and evolutionary computation in order to train a model that intelligently mutates and recombines games and mechanics expressed as code. We demonstrate both quantitatively and qualitatively that our approach is capable of generating new and interesting games, including in regions of the potential rules space not covered by existing games in the Ludii dataset. A sample of the generated games are available to play online through the Ludii portal.

The deployment of ever-larger machine learning models reflects a growing consensus that the more expressive the modelx2013and the more data one has access tox2013the more one can improve performance. As models get deployed in a variety of real world scenarios, they inevitably face strategic environments. In this work, we consider the natural question of how the interplay of models and strategic interactions affects scaling laws. We find that strategic interactions can break the conventional view of scaling lawsx2013meaning that performance does not necessarily monotonically improve as models get larger and/ or more expressive (even with infinite data). We show the implications of this phenomenon in several contexts including strategic regression, strategic classification, and multi-agent reinforcement learning through examples of strategic environments in whichx2013by simply restricting the expressivity of one's model or policy classx2013one can achieve strictly better equilibrium outcomes. Motivated by these examples, we then propose a new paradigm for model-selection in games wherein an agent seeks to choose amongst different model classes to use as their action set in a game.

This work investigates the reasoning and planning capabilities of foundation models and their scalability in complex, dynamic environments. We introduce PuzzlePlex, a benchmark designed to assess these capabilities through a diverse set of puzzles. PuzzlePlex consists of 15 types of puzzles, including deterministic and stochastic games of varying difficulty, as well as single-player and two-player scenarios. The PuzzlePlex framework provides a comprehensive environment for each game, and supports extensibility to generate more challenging instances as foundation models evolve. Additionally, we implement customized game-playing strategies for comparison. Building on this benchmark, we develop fine-grained metrics to measure performance and conduct an in-depth analysis of frontier foundation models across two settings: instruction-based and code-based. Furthermore, we systematically investigate their scaling limits. Our findings show that reasoning models outperform others in instruction-based settings, while code-based execution presents greater challenges but offers a scalable and efficient alternative. PuzzlePlex enables targeted evaluation and guides future improvements in reasoning, planning, and generalization for foundation models.

Existing combinatorial search methods are often complex and require some level of expertise. This work introduces a simple and efficient deep learning method for solving combinatorial problems with a predefined goal, represented by Rubik's Cube. We demonstrate that, for such problems, training a deep neural network on random scrambles branching from the goal state is sufficient to achieve near-optimal solutions. When tested on Rubik's Cube, 15 Puzzle, and 7times7 Lights Out, our method outperformed the previous state-of-the-art method DeepCubeA, improving the trade-off between solution optimality and computational cost, despite significantly less training data. Furthermore, we investigate the scaling law of our Rubik's Cube solver with respect to model size and training data volume.

We investigate learning the equilibria in non-stationary multi-agent systems and address the challenges that differentiate multi-agent learning from single-agent learning. Specifically, we focus on games with bandit feedback, where testing an equilibrium can result in substantial regret even when the gap to be tested is small, and the existence of multiple optimal solutions (equilibria) in stationary games poses extra challenges. To overcome these obstacles, we propose a versatile black-box approach applicable to a broad spectrum of problems, such as general-sum games, potential games, and Markov games, when equipped with appropriate learning and testing oracles for stationary environments. Our algorithms can achieve Oleft(Delta^{1/4}T^{3/4}right) regret when the degree of nonstationarity, as measured by total variation Delta, is known, and Oleft(Delta^{1/5}T^{4/5}right) regret when Delta is unknown, where T is the number of rounds. Meanwhile, our algorithm inherits the favorable dependence on number of agents from the oracles. As a side contribution that may be independent of interest, we show how to test for various types of equilibria by a black-box reduction to single-agent learning, which includes Nash equilibria, correlated equilibria, and coarse correlated equilibria.

We improve the framework of open games with agency by showing how the players' counterfactual analysis giving rise to Nash equilibria can be described in the dynamics of the game itself (hence diegetically), getting rid of devices such as equilibrium predicates. This new approach overlaps almost completely with the way gradient-based learners are specified and trained. Indeed, we show feedback propagation in games can be seen as a form of backpropagation, with a crucial difference explaining the distinctive character of the phenomenology of non-cooperative games. We outline a functorial construction of arena of games, show players form a subsystem over it, and prove that their 'fixpoint behaviours' are Nash equilibria.

Using a long-standing conjecture from combinatorial group theory, we explore, from multiple perspectives, the challenges of finding rare instances carrying disproportionately high rewards. Based on lessons learned in the context defined by the Andrews-Curtis conjecture, we propose algorithmic enhancements and a topological hardness measure with implications for a broad class of search problems. As part of our study, we also address several open mathematical questions. Notably, we demonstrate the length reducibility of all but two presentations in the Akbulut-Kirby series (1981), and resolve various potential counterexamples in the Miller-Schupp series (1991), including three infinite subfamilies.

With recent dramatic increases in AI system capabilities, there has been growing interest in utilizing machine learning for reasoning-heavy, quantitative tasks, particularly mathematics. While there are many resources capturing mathematics at the high-school, undergraduate, and graduate level, there are far fewer resources available that align with the level of difficulty and open endedness encountered by professional mathematicians working on open problems. To address this, we introduce a new collection of datasets, the Algebraic Combinatorics Dataset Repository (ACD Repo), representing either foundational results or open problems in algebraic combinatorics, a subfield of mathematics that studies discrete structures arising from abstract algebra. Further differentiating our dataset collection is the fact that it aims at the conjecturing process. Each dataset includes an open-ended research-level question and a large collection of examples (up to 10M in some cases) from which conjectures should be generated. We describe all nine datasets, the different ways machine learning models can be applied to them (e.g., training with narrow models followed by interpretability analysis or program synthesis with LLMs), and discuss some of the challenges involved in designing datasets like these.

In this paper, we present a conceptual model game to examine the dynamics of asymmetric interactions in games with imperfect information. The game involves two agents with starkly contrasting capabilities: one agent can take actions but has no information of the state of the game, whereas the other agent has perfect information of the state but cannot act or observe the other agent's actions. This duality manifests an extreme form of asymmetry, and how differing abilities influence the possibility of attaining common knowledge. Using Kripke structures and epistemic logic we demonstrate that, under these conditions, common knowledge of the current game state becomes unattainable. Our findings advance the discussion on the strategic limitations of knowledge in environments where information and action are unevenly distributed.

Normal-form games (NFGs) are the fundamental model of strategic interaction. We study their representation using neural networks. We describe the inherent equivariance of NFGs -- any permutation of strategies describes an equivalent game -- as well as the challenges this poses for representation learning. We then propose the NfgTransformer architecture that leverages this equivariance, leading to state-of-the-art performance in a range of game-theoretic tasks including equilibrium-solving, deviation gain estimation and ranking, with a common approach to NFG representation. We show that the resulting model is interpretable and versatile, paving the way towards deep learning systems capable of game-theoretic reasoning when interacting with humans and with each other.

Efficiently tackling combinatorial reasoning problems, particularly the notorious NP-hard tasks, remains a significant challenge for AI research. Recent efforts have sought to enhance planning by incorporating hierarchical high-level search strategies, known as subgoal methods. While promising, their performance against traditional low-level planners is inconsistent, raising questions about their application contexts. In this study, we conduct an in-depth exploration of subgoal-planning methods for combinatorial reasoning. We identify the attributes pivotal for leveraging the advantages of high-level search: hard-to-learn value functions, complex action spaces, presence of dead ends in the environment, or using data collected from diverse experts. We propose a consistent evaluation methodology to achieve meaningful comparisons between methods and reevaluate the state-of-the-art algorithms.

We present Self-Play Preference Optimization (SPO), an algorithm for reinforcement learning from human feedback. Our approach is minimalist in that it does not require training a reward model nor unstable adversarial training and is therefore rather simple to implement. Our approach is maximalist in that it provably handles non-Markovian, intransitive, and stochastic preferences while being robust to the compounding errors that plague offline approaches to sequential prediction. To achieve the preceding qualities, we build upon the concept of a Minimax Winner (MW), a notion of preference aggregation from the social choice theory literature that frames learning from preferences as a zero-sum game between two policies. By leveraging the symmetry of this game, we prove that rather than using the traditional technique of dueling two policies to compute the MW, we can simply have a single agent play against itself while maintaining strong convergence guarantees. Practically, this corresponds to sampling multiple trajectories from a policy, asking a rater or preference model to compare them, and then using the proportion of wins as the reward for a particular trajectory. We demonstrate that on a suite of continuous control tasks, we are able to learn significantly more efficiently than reward-model based approaches while maintaining robustness to the intransitive and stochastic preferences that frequently occur in practice when aggregating human judgments.

The utilization of artificial intelligence (AI) in card games has been a well-explored subject within AI research for an extensive period. Recent advancements have propelled AI programs to showcase expertise in intricate card games such as Mahjong, DouDizhu, and Texas Hold'em. In this work, we aim to develop an AI program for an exceptionally complex and popular card game called GuanDan. This game involves four players engaging in both competitive and cooperative play throughout a long process to upgrade their level, posing great challenges for AI due to its expansive state and action space, long episode length, and complex rules. Employing reinforcement learning techniques, specifically Deep Monte Carlo (DMC), and a distributed training framework, we first put forward an AI program named DanZero for this game. Evaluation against baseline AI programs based on heuristic rules highlights the outstanding performance of our bot. Besides, in order to further enhance the AI's capabilities, we apply policy-based reinforcement learning algorithm to GuanDan. To address the challenges arising from the huge action space, which will significantly impact the performance of policy-based algorithms, we adopt the pre-trained model to facilitate the training process and the achieved AI program manages to achieve a superior performance.

Game theory, as an analytical tool, is frequently utilized to analyze human behavior in social science research. With the high alignment between the behavior of Large Language Models (LLMs) and humans, a promising research direction is to employ LLMs as substitutes for humans in game experiments, enabling social science research. However, despite numerous empirical researches on the combination of LLMs and game theory, the capability boundaries of LLMs in game theory remain unclear. In this research, we endeavor to systematically analyze LLMs in the context of game theory. Specifically, rationality, as the fundamental principle of game theory, serves as the metric for evaluating players' behavior -- building a clear desire, refining belief about uncertainty, and taking optimal actions. Accordingly, we select three classical games (dictator game, Rock-Paper-Scissors, and ring-network game) to analyze to what extent LLMs can achieve rationality in these three aspects. The experimental results indicate that even the current state-of-the-art LLM (GPT-4) exhibits substantial disparities compared to humans in game theory. For instance, LLMs struggle to build desires based on uncommon preferences, fail to refine belief from many simple patterns, and may overlook or modify refined belief when taking actions. Therefore, we consider that introducing LLMs into game experiments in the field of social science should be approached with greater caution.

This paper investigates the evaluation of learned multiagent strategies in the incomplete information setting, which plays a critical role in ranking and training of agents. Traditionally, researchers have relied on Elo ratings for this purpose, with recent works also using methods based on Nash equilibria. Unfortunately, Elo is unable to handle intransitive agent interactions, and other techniques are restricted to zero-sum, two-player settings or are limited by the fact that the Nash equilibrium is intractable to compute. Recently, a ranking method called α-Rank, relying on a new graph-based game-theoretic solution concept, was shown to tractably apply to general games. However, evaluations based on Elo or α-Rank typically assume noise-free game outcomes, despite the data often being collected from noisy simulations, making this assumption unrealistic in practice. This paper investigates multiagent evaluation in the incomplete information regime, involving general-sum many-player games with noisy outcomes. We derive sample complexity guarantees required to confidently rank agents in this setting. We propose adaptive algorithms for accurate ranking, provide correctness and sample complexity guarantees, then introduce a means of connecting uncertainties in noisy match outcomes to uncertainties in rankings. We evaluate the performance of these approaches in several domains, including Bernoulli games, a soccer meta-game, and Kuhn poker.

In this paper, we study regret minimization in repeated games with adaptive opponents who can respond based on histories of play. The standard metric of external regret in online learning is known to fail to capture such adaptivity. To account for players' counterfactual reasoning, we introduce {\tt Repeated Policy Regret (RP-Regret)}, a game-theoretic metric that measures the difference between the realized and the best-in-hindsight accumulated utility when all players can respond to the history of play. Compared to existing regret notions in this setting, ours is native to repeated game playing, enabling stronger comparators and opponents with fewer constraints, while maintaining the possibility of finding better equilibria when all players minimize it. We first identify necessary conditions for obtaining {\tt RP-Regret} sublinear in time, on the variation of the player's comparator strategies in the regret definition and on the memories of both the comparator and opponents' strategies. We then study additional conditions and provable algorithms to minimize {\tt RP-Regret}, which is by definition non-convex in the strategy space. To address this challenge, we propose three algorithms: (i) one based on an optimization oracle, as assumed in some prior work in online non-convex learning; (ii) one that minimizes a convex and linearized surrogate of {\tt RP-Regret} at each iteration; (iii) one that directly minimizes {\tt RP-Regret} when opponents change strategies slowly. Furthermore, when all players can run algorithms to minimize the {\tt RP-Regret} (or its linearized variant), certain subgame perfect equilibria of the repeated game can be learned. We also provide experiments showing that minimizing our regret notions can lead to more cooperative solutions with higher utility in games such as Stag-Hunt.

Closed drafting or "pick and pass" is a popular game mechanic where each round players select a card or other playable element from their hand and pass the rest to the next player. Games employing closed drafting make for great studies on memory and turn order due to their explicitly calculable memory of other players' hands. In this paper, we establish first-principle benchmarks for studying model-free reinforcement learning algorithms and their comparative ability to learn memory in a popular family of closed drafting games called "Sushi Go Party!", producing state-of-the-art results on this environment along the way. Furthermore, as Sushi Go Party! can be expressed as a set of closely-related games based on the set of cards in play, we quantify the generalizability of reinforcement learning algorithms trained on various sets of cards, establishing key trends between generalized performance and the set distance between the train and evaluation game configurations. Finally, we fit decision rules to interpret the strategy of the learned models and compare them to the ranking preferences of human players, finding intuitive common rules and intriguing new moves.

For a two-player imperfect-information extensive-form game (IIEFG) with K time steps and a player action space of size U, the game tree complexity is U^{2K}, causing existing IIEFG solvers to struggle with large or infinite (U,K), e.g., differential games with continuous action spaces. To partially address this scalability challenge, we focus on an important class of 2p0s games where the informed player (P1) knows the payoff while the uninformed player (P2) only has a belief over the set of I possible payoffs. Such games encompass a wide range of scenarios in sports, defense, cybersecurity, and finance. We prove that under mild conditions, P1's (resp. P2's) equilibrium strategy at any infostate concentrates on at most I (resp. I+1) action prototypes. When Ill U, this equilibrium structure causes the game tree complexity to collapse to I^K for P1 when P2 plays pure best responses, and (I+1)^K for P2 in a dual game where P1 plays pure best responses. We then show that exploiting this structure in standard learning modes, i.e., model-free multiagent reinforcement learning and model predictive control, is straightforward, leading to significant improvements in learning accuracy and efficiency from SOTA IIEFG solvers. Our demonstration solves a 22-player football game (K=10, U=infty) where the attacking team has to strategically conceal their intention until a critical moment in order to exploit information advantage. Code is available at https://github.com/ghimiremukesh/cams/tree/iclr

Gross, Mansour, and Tucker introduced the partial-duality polynomial of a ribbon graph [Distributions, European J. Combin. 86, 1--20, 2020], the generating function enumerating partial duals by the Euler genus. Chmutov and Vignes-Tourneret wondered if this polynomial and its conjectured properties would hold for general delta-matroids, which are combinatorial abstractions of ribbon graphs. Yan and Jin contributed to this inquiry by identifying a subset of delta-matroids-specifically, even normal binary ones-whose twist polynomials are characterized by a singular term. Building upon this foundation, the current paper expands the scope of the investigation to encompass even non-binary delta-matroids, revealing that none of them have width-changing twists.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

We consider a contextual combinatorial bandit problem where in each round a learning agent selects a subset of arms and receives feedback on the selected arms according to their scores. The score of an arm is an unknown function of the arm's feature. Approximating this unknown score function with deep neural networks, we propose algorithms: Combinatorial Neural UCB (CN-UCB) and Combinatorial Neural Thompson Sampling (CN-TS). We prove that CN-UCB achieves mathcal{O}(d T) or mathcal{O}(tilde{d T K}) regret, where d is the effective dimension of a neural tangent kernel matrix, K is the size of a subset of arms, and T is the time horizon. For CN-TS, we adapt an optimistic sampling technique to ensure the optimism of the sampled combinatorial action, achieving a worst-case (frequentist) regret of mathcal{O}(d TK). To the best of our knowledge, these are the first combinatorial neural bandit algorithms with regret performance guarantees. In particular, CN-TS is the first Thompson sampling algorithm with the worst-case regret guarantees for the general contextual combinatorial bandit problem. The numerical experiments demonstrate the superior performances of our proposed algorithms.

A notion of quantum natural evolution strategies is introduced, which provides a geometric synthesis of a number of known quantum/classical algorithms for performing classical black-box optimization. Recent work of Gomes et al. [2019] on heuristic combinatorial optimization using neural quantum states is pedagogically reviewed in this context, emphasizing the connection with natural evolution strategies. The algorithmic framework is illustrated for approximate combinatorial optimization problems, and a systematic strategy is found for improving the approximation ratios. In particular it is found that natural evolution strategies can achieve approximation ratios competitive with widely used heuristic algorithms for Max-Cut, at the expense of increased computation time.

Modern Tabletop Games present various interesting challenges for Multi-agent Reinforcement Learning. In this paper, we introduce PyTAG, a new framework that supports interacting with a large collection of games implemented in the Tabletop Games framework. In this work we highlight the challenges tabletop games provide, from a game-playing agent perspective, along with the opportunities they provide for future research. Additionally, we highlight the technical challenges that involve training Reinforcement Learning agents on these games. To explore the Multi-agent setting provided by PyTAG we train the popular Proximal Policy Optimisation Reinforcement Learning algorithm using self-play on a subset of games and evaluate the trained policies against some simple agents and Monte-Carlo Tree Search implemented in the Tabletop Games framework.

Since Isaac Newton first studied the Kissing Number Problem in 1694, determining the maximal number of non-overlapping spheres around a central sphere has remained a fundamental challenge. This problem is the local analogue of Hilbert's 18th problem, bridging geometry, number theory, and information theory. Although significant progress has been made through lattices and codes, the irregularities of high-dimensional geometry, dimensional structure variability, and combinatorial explosion beyond Go limit the scalability and generality of existing methods. Here we model the problem as a two-player matrix completion game and train the reinforcement learning system, PackingStar, to play the games. The matrix entries represent pairwise cosines of sphere center vectors. One player fills entries while another corrects suboptimal ones to improve exploration quality, cooperatively maximizing the matrix size, corresponding to the kissing number. These matrices are decomposed into representative substructures, providing diverse bases and structural constraints that steer subsequent games and make extremely large spaces tractable. PackingStar surpasses records from dimensions 25 to 31 and sets new lower bounds for generalized kissing numbers under various angular constraints. It achieves the first breakthrough beyond rational structures from 1971 in 13 dimensions and discovers over 6000 new structures in other dimensions. Notably, some configurations challenge long-held antipodal paradigms, revealing algebraic correspondences with finite simple groups as well as geometric relationships across dimensions. Inspired by these patterns, humans devised further improved constructions. These results demonstrate AI's power to explore high-dimensional spaces beyond human intuition via extreme-scale reinforcement learning and open new pathways for the Kissing Number Problem and broader geometry research.

The game show Lucky 13 differs from other television game shows in that contestants are required to place a bet on their own knowledge of trivia by selecting a range that contains the number of questions that they answered correctly. We present a model for this game show using binomial random variables and generate tables outlining the optimal range the player should select based on maximization of two different utility functions. After analyzing the decisions made by some actual contestants on this show, we present a numerical simulation for how many questions an average player is expected to answer correctly based on question categories observed for two sample contestants.

We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.

The 13-card variant of Classic Indian Rummy is a sequential game of incomplete information that requires probabilistic reasoning and combinatorial decision-making. This paper proposes a rule-based framework for strategic play, driven by a new hand-evaluation metric termed MinDist. The metric modifies the MinScore metric by quantifying the edit distance between a hand and the nearest valid configuration, thereby capturing structural proximity to completion. We design a computationally efficient algorithm derived from the MinScore algorithm, leveraging dynamic pruning and pattern caching to exactly calculate this metric during play. Opponent hand-modeling is also incorporated within a two-player zero-sum simulation framework, and the resulting strategies are evaluated using statistical hypothesis testing. Empirical results show significant improvement in win rates for MinDist-based agents over traditional heuristics, providing a formal and interpretable step toward algorithmic Rummy strategy design.

The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an interest to deviate). In this paper, inspired by a practical application in the context of a decision support system for collaborative transportation in a Short Food Supply Chain (SFSC), we mainly focus on Traveling Salesman Games (TSGs), where the objective is to allocate the cost of a Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) with n locations and 1 depot to n players, each linked to exactly one of the locations. Given the computational complexity of computing an element of the core and the cost of a TSP, we study semicore allocations: a relaxation of the core that only requires that the subsets of size n -1 and of size 1 do not wish to deviate from the coalition. In the literature, instances of TSGs with empty cores and semicores are found. Hence, this paper first surveys the methods to approximate stability whenever the core is empty, such as the cost of stability (computing the minimum amount of money to subsidize the coalition with to attain stability) and the ε-core (which is a set of allocations that allow subsets of players to exceed their actual cost, but at most of a value of ε). We prove that these two solution

This paper argues that the finite horizon paradox, where game theory contradicts intuition, stems from the limitations of standard number systems in modelling the cognitive perception of infinity. To address this issue, we propose a new framework based on Alternative Set Theory (AST). This framework represents different cognitive perspectives on a long history of events using distinct topologies. These topologies define an indiscernibility equivalence that formally treats huge, indistinguishable quantities as equivalent. This offers criterion-dependent resolutions to long-standing paradoxes, such as Selten's chain store paradox and Rosenthal's centipede game. Our framework reveals new intuitive subgame perfect equilibria, the characteristics of which depend on the chosen temporal perspective and payoff evaluation. Ultimately, by grounding its mathematical foundation in different modes of human cognition, our work expands the explanatory power of game theory for long-horizon scenarios.

We introduce the use of generative adversarial learning to compute equilibria in general game-theoretic settings, specifically the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) in pseudo-games, and its specific instantiation as the competitive equilibrium (CE) in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies. Pseudo-games are a generalization of games in which players' actions affect not only the payoffs of other players but also their feasible action spaces. Although the computation of GNE and CE is intractable in the worst-case, i.e., PPAD-hard, in practice, many applications only require solutions with high accuracy in expectation over a distribution of problem instances. We introduce Generative Adversarial Equilibrium Solvers (GAES): a family of generative adversarial neural networks that can learn GNE and CE from only a sample of problem instances. We provide computational and sample complexity bounds, and apply the framework to finding Nash equilibria in normal-form games, CE in Arrow-Debreu competitive economies, and GNE in an environmental economic model of the Kyoto mechanism.

In the flavour of categorical quantum mechanics, we extend nonlocal games to allow quantum questions and answers, using quantum sets (special symmetric dagger Frobenius algebras) and the quantum functions of Musto, Reutter, and Verdon [arXiv:1711.07945]. Equations are presented using a diagrammatic calculus for tensor categories. To this quantum question and answer setting, we extend the standard definitions, including strategies, correlations, and synchronicity, and we use these definitions to extend results about synchronicity. We extend the graph homomorphism (isomorphism) game to quantum graphs, and show it is synchronous (bisynchronous) and connect its perfect (bi)strategies to quantum graph homomorphisms (isomorphisms). Our extended definitions agree with the existing quantum games literature, except in the case of synchronicity.

Game theory is a powerful framework for reasoning about strategic interactions, with applications in domains ranging from day-to-day life to international politics. However, applying formal reasoning tools in such contexts is challenging, as these scenarios are often expressed in natural language. To address this, we introduce a framework for the autoformalization of game-theoretic scenarios, which translates natural language descriptions into formal logic representations suitable for formal solvers. Our approach utilizes one-shot prompting and a solver that provides feedback on syntactic correctness to allow LLMs to refine the code. We evaluate the framework using GPT-4o and a dataset of natural language problem descriptions, achieving 98% syntactic correctness and 88% semantic correctness. These results show the potential of LLMs to bridge the gap between real-life strategic interactions and formal reasoning.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong reasoning, planning, and communication abilities, enabling them to operate as autonomous agents in open environments. While single-agent systems remain limited in adaptability and coordination, recent progress has shifted attention toward multi-agent systems (MAS) composed of interacting LLMs that pursue cooperative, competitive, or mixed objectives. This emerging paradigm provides a powerful testbed for studying social dynamics and strategic behaviors among intelligent agents. However, current research remains fragmented and lacks a unifying theoretical foundation. To address this gap, we present a comprehensive survey of LLM-based multi-agent systems through a game-theoretic lens. By organizing existing studies around the four key elements of game theory: players, strategies, payoffs, and information, we establish a systematic framework for understanding, comparing, and guiding future research on the design and analysis of LLM-based MAS.

Combinatorial optimization (CO) problems are often NP-hard and thus out of reach for exact algorithms, making them a tempting domain to apply machine learning methods. The highly structured constraints in these problems can hinder either optimization or sampling directly in the solution space. On the other hand, GFlowNets have recently emerged as a powerful machinery to efficiently sample from composite unnormalized densities sequentially and have the potential to amortize such solution-searching processes in CO, as well as generate diverse solution candidates. In this paper, we design Markov decision processes (MDPs) for different combinatorial problems and propose to train conditional GFlowNets to sample from the solution space. Efficient training techniques are also developed to benefit long-range credit assignment. Through extensive experiments on a variety of different CO tasks with synthetic and realistic data, we demonstrate that GFlowNet policies can efficiently find high-quality solutions.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as the standard paradigm for aligning large language models (LLMs) with human preferences. However, reward-based methods built on the Bradley-Terry assumption struggle to capture the non-transitive and heterogeneous nature of real-world preferences. To address this, recent studies have reframed alignment as a two-player Nash game, giving rise to Nash learning from human feedback (NLHF). While this perspective has inspired algorithms such as INPO, ONPO, and EGPO with strong theoretical and empirical guarantees, they remain fundamentally restricted to two-player interactions, creating a single-opponent bias that fails to capture the full complexity of realistic preference structures. In this work, we introduce Multiplayer Nash Preference Optimization (MNPO), a novel framework that generalizes NLHF to the multiplayer regime. It formulates alignment as an n-player game, where each policy competes against a population of opponents while being regularized toward a reference model. Our framework establishes well-defined Nash equilibria in multiplayer settings and extends the concept of duality gap to quantify approximation quality. We demonstrate that MNPO inherits the equilibrium guarantees of two-player methods while enabling richer competitive dynamics and improved coverage of diverse preference structures. Through comprehensive empirical evaluation, we show that MNPO consistently outperforms existing NLHF baselines on instruction-following benchmarks, achieving superior alignment quality under heterogeneous annotator conditions and mixed-policy evaluation scenarios. Together, these results establish MNPO as a principled and scalable framework for aligning LLMs with complex, non-transitive human preferences. Code is available at https://github.com/smiles724/MNPO.

An abundance of recent impossibility results establish that regret minimization in Markov games with adversarial opponents is both statistically and computationally intractable. Nevertheless, none of these results preclude the possibility of regret minimization under the assumption that all parties adopt the same learning procedure. In this work, we present the first (to our knowledge) algorithm for learning in general-sum Markov games that provides sublinear regret guarantees when executed by all agents. The bounds we obtain are for swap regret, and thus, along the way, imply convergence to a correlated equilibrium. Our algorithm is decentralized, computationally efficient, and does not require any communication between agents. Our key observation is that online learning via policy optimization in Markov games essentially reduces to a form of weighted regret minimization, with unknown weights determined by the path length of the agents' policy sequence. Consequently, controlling the path length leads to weighted regret objectives for which sufficiently adaptive algorithms provide sublinear regret guarantees.

Recent advances in generative models have significantly impacted game generation. However, despite producing high-quality graphics and adequately receiving player input, existing models often fail to maintain fundamental game properties such as numerical and spatial consistency. Numerical consistency ensures gameplay mechanics correctly reflect score changes and other quantitative elements, while spatial consistency prevents jarring scene transitions, providing seamless player experiences. In this paper, we revisit the paradigm of generative games to explore what truly constitutes a Model as a Game (MaaG) with a well-developed mechanism. We begin with an empirical study on ``Traveler'', a 2D game created by an LLM featuring minimalist rules yet challenging generative models in maintaining consistency. Based on the DiT architecture, we design two specialized modules: (1) a numerical module that integrates a LogicNet to determine event triggers, with calculations processed externally as conditions for image generation; and (2) a spatial module that maintains a map of explored areas, retrieving location-specific information during generation and linking new observations to ensure continuity. Experiments across three games demonstrate that our integrated modules significantly enhance performance on consistency metrics compared to baselines, while incurring minimal time overhead during inference.

Combinatorial optimization problems involving multiple agents are notoriously challenging due to their NP-hard nature and the necessity for effective agent coordination. Despite advancements in learning-based methods, existing approaches often face critical limitations, including suboptimal agent coordination, poor generalizability, and high computational latency. To address these issues, we propose Parallel AutoRegressive Combinatorial Optimization (PARCO), a reinforcement learning framework designed to construct high-quality solutions for multi-agent combinatorial tasks efficiently. To this end, PARCO integrates three key components: (1) transformer-based communication layers to enable effective agent collaboration during parallel solution construction, (2) a multiple pointer mechanism for low-latency, parallel agent decision-making, and (3) priority-based conflict handlers to resolve decision conflicts via learned priorities. We evaluate PARCO in multi-agent vehicle routing and scheduling problems where our approach outperforms state-of-the-art learning methods and demonstrates strong generalization ability and remarkable computational efficiency. Code available at: https://github.com/ai4co/parco.

Wordle is a single-player word-guessing game where the goal is to discover a secret word w that has been chosen from a dictionary D. In order to discover w, the player can make at most ell guesses, which must also be words from D, all words in D having the same length k. After each guess, the player is notified of the positions in which their guess matches the secret word, as well as letters in the guess that appear in the secret word in a different position. We study the game of Wordle from a complexity perspective, proving NP-hardness of its natural formalization: to decide given a dictionary D and an integer ell if the player can guarantee to discover the secret word within ell guesses. Moreover, we prove that hardness holds even over instances where words have length k = 5, and that even in this case it is NP-hard to approximate the minimum number of guesses required to guarantee discovering the secret word. We also present results regarding its parameterized complexity and offer some related open problems.

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

Learning in strategy games (e.g. StarCraft, poker) requires the discovery of diverse policies. This is often achieved by iteratively training new policies against existing ones, growing a policy population that is robust to exploit. This iterative approach suffers from two issues in real-world games: a) under finite budget, approximate best-response operators at each iteration needs truncating, resulting in under-trained good-responses populating the population; b) repeated learning of basic skills at each iteration is wasteful and becomes intractable in the presence of increasingly strong opponents. In this work, we propose Neural Population Learning (NeuPL) as a solution to both issues. NeuPL offers convergence guarantees to a population of best-responses under mild assumptions. By representing a population of policies within a single conditional model, NeuPL enables transfer learning across policies. Empirically, we show the generality, improved performance and efficiency of NeuPL across several test domains. Most interestingly, we show that novel strategies become more accessible, not less, as the neural population expands.

Recent advances in reinforcement learning have shown that language models can develop sophisticated reasoning through training on tasks with verifiable rewards, but these approaches depend on human-curated problem-answer pairs and domain-specific reward engineering. We introduce SPIRAL, a self-play framework where models learn by playing multi-turn, zero-sum games against continuously improving versions of themselves, eliminating the need for human supervision. Through self-play, SPIRAL generates an infinite curriculum of progressively challenging problems as models must constantly adapt to stronger opponents. To enable this self-play training at scale, We implement a fully online, multi-turn, multi-agent reinforcement learning system for LLMs and propose role-conditioned advantage estimation (RAE) to stabilize multi-agent training. Using SPIRAL, self-play on zero-sum games produces reasoning capabilities that transfer broadly. Training Qwen3-4B-Base on Kuhn Poker alone achieves 8.6% improvement on math and 8.4% on general reasoning, outperforming SFT on 25,000 expert game trajectories. Analysis reveals that this transfer occurs through three cognitive patterns: systematic decomposition, expected value calculation, and case-by-case analysis. Multi-game training (TicTacToe, Kuhn Poker, Simple Negotiation) further enhances performance as each game develops distinct reasoning strengths. Applying SPIRAL to a strong reasoning model (DeepSeek-R1-Distill-Qwen-7B) can still lead to 2.0% average improvement. These results demonstrate that zero-sum games naturally develop transferable reasoning capabilities, highlighting a promising direction for autonomous reasoning development.

The categories of open learners (due to Fong, Spivak and Tuy\'eras) and open games (due to the present author, Ghani, Winschel and Zahn) bear a very striking and unexpected similarity. The purpose of this short note is to prove that there is a faithful symmetric monoidal functor from the former to the latter, which means that any supervised neural network (without feedback or other complicating features) can be seen as an open game in a canonical way. Roughly, each parameter is controlled by a different player, and the game's best response relation encodes the dynamics of gradient descent. We suggest paths for further work exploiting the link.

Self-play (SP) is a popular multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework for solving competitive games, where each agent optimizes policy by treating others as part of the environment. Despite the empirical successes, the theoretical properties of SP-based methods are limited to two-player zero-sum games. However, for mixed cooperative-competitive games where agents on the same team need to cooperate with each other, we can show a simple counter-example where SP-based methods cannot converge to a global Nash equilibrium (NE) with high probability. Alternatively, Policy-Space Response Oracles (PSRO) is an iterative framework for learning NE, where the best responses w.r.t. previous policies are learned in each iteration. PSRO can be directly extended to mixed cooperative-competitive settings by jointly learning team best responses with all convergence properties unchanged. However, PSRO requires repeatedly training joint policies from scratch till convergence, which makes it hard to scale to complex games. In this work, we develop a novel algorithm, Fictitious Cross-Play (FXP), which inherits the benefits from both frameworks. FXP simultaneously trains an SP-based main policy and a counter population of best response policies. The main policy is trained by fictitious self-play and cross-play against the counter population, while the counter policies are trained as the best responses to the main policy's past versions. We validate our method in matrix games and show that FXP converges to global NEs while SP methods fail. We also conduct experiments in a gridworld domain, where FXP achieves higher Elo ratings and lower exploitabilities than baselines, and a more challenging football game, where FXP defeats SOTA models with over 94% win rate.

Progress in fields of machine learning and adversarial planning has benefited significantly from benchmark domains, from checkers and the classic UCI data sets to Go and Diplomacy. In sequential decision-making, agent evaluation has largely been restricted to few interactions against experts, with the aim to reach some desired level of performance (e.g. beating a human professional player). We propose a benchmark for multiagent learning based on repeated play of the simple game Rock, Paper, Scissors along with a population of forty-three tournament entries, some of which are intentionally sub-optimal. We describe metrics to measure the quality of agents based both on average returns and exploitability. We then show that several RL, online learning, and language model approaches can learn good counter-strategies and generalize well, but ultimately lose to the top-performing bots, creating an opportunity for research in multiagent learning.

We improve the efficiency of algorithms for stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits. In most interesting problems, state-of-the-art algorithms take advantage of structural properties of rewards, such as independence. However, while being optimal in terms of asymptotic regret, these algorithms are inefficient. In our paper, we first reduce their implementation to a specific submodular maximization. Then, in case of matroid constraints, we design adapted approximation routines, thereby providing the first efficient algorithms that rely on reward structure to improve regret bound. In particular, we improve the state-of-the-art efficient gap-free regret bound by a factor m/log m, where m is the maximum action size. Finally, we show how our improvement translates to more general budgeted combinatorial semi-bandits.

Recent evidence suggests that the use of generative artificial intelligence reduces the diversity of content produced. In this work, we develop a game-theoretic model to explore the downstream consequences of content homogeneity when producers use generative AI to compete with one another. At equilibrium, players indeed produce content that is less diverse than optimal. However, stronger competition mitigates homogeneity and induces more diverse production. Perhaps more surprisingly, we show that a generative AI model that performs well in isolation (i.e., according to a benchmark) may fail to do so when faced with competition, and vice versa. We validate our results empirically by using language models to play Scattergories, a word game in which players are rewarded for producing answers that are both correct and unique. We discuss how the interplay between competition and homogeneity has implications for the development, evaluation, and use of generative AI.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are integrated into critical real-world applications, their strategic and logical reasoning abilities are increasingly crucial. This paper evaluates LLMs' reasoning abilities in competitive environments through game-theoretic tasks, e.g., board and card games that require pure logic and strategic reasoning to compete with opponents. We first propose GTBench, a language-driven environment composing 10 widely-recognized tasks, across a comprehensive game taxonomy: complete versus incomplete information, dynamic versus static, and probabilistic versus deterministic scenarios. Then, we investigate two key problems: (1) Characterizing game-theoretic reasoning of LLMs; (2) LLM-vs-LLM competitions as reasoning evaluation. We observe that (1) LLMs have distinct behaviors regarding various gaming scenarios; for example, LLMs fail in complete and deterministic games yet they are competitive in probabilistic gaming scenarios; (2) Open-source LLMs, e.g., CodeLlama-34b-Instruct, are less competitive than commercial LLMs, e.g., GPT-4, in complex games. In addition, code-pretraining greatly benefits strategic reasoning, while advanced reasoning methods such as Chain-of-Thought (CoT) and Tree-of-Thought (ToT) do not always help. Detailed error profiles are also provided for a better understanding of LLMs' behavior.

Zero-shot coordination in cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) remains a significant challenge, which means effectively coordinating with a wide range of unseen partners. Previous algorithms have attempted to address this challenge by optimizing fixed objectives within a population to improve strategy or behaviour diversity. However, these approaches can result in a loss of learning and an inability to cooperate with certain strategies within the population, known as cooperative incompatibility. To address this issue, we propose the Cooperative Open-ended LEarning (COLE) framework, which constructs open-ended objectives in cooperative games with two players from the perspective of graph theory to assess and identify the cooperative ability of each strategy. We further specify the framework and propose a practical algorithm that leverages knowledge from game theory and graph theory. Furthermore, an analysis of the learning process of the algorithm shows that it can efficiently overcome cooperative incompatibility. The experimental results in the Overcooked game environment demonstrate that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art methods when coordinating with different-level partners. Our demo is available at https://sites.google.com/view/cole-2023.

When agents are acting together, they may need a simple mechanism to decide on joint actions. One possibility is to have the agents express their preferences in the form of a ballot and use a voting rule to decide the winning action(s). Unfortunately, agents may try to manipulate such an election by misreporting their preferences. Fortunately, it has been shown that it is NP-hard to compute how to manipulate a number of different voting rules. However, NP-hardness only bounds the worst-case complexity. Recent theoretical results suggest that manipulation may often be easy in practice. To address this issue, I suggest studying empirically if computational complexity is in practice a barrier to manipulation. The basic tool used in my investigations is the identification of computational "phase transitions". Such an approach has been fruitful in identifying hard instances of propositional satisfiability and other NP-hard problems. I show that phase transition behaviour gives insight into the hardness of manipulating voting rules, increasing concern that computational complexity is indeed any sort of barrier. Finally, I look at the problem of computing manipulation of other, related problems like stable marriage and tournament problems.

This paper introduces SC2LE (StarCraft II Learning Environment), a reinforcement learning environment based on the StarCraft II game. This domain poses a new grand challenge for reinforcement learning, representing a more difficult class of problems than considered in most prior work. It is a multi-agent problem with multiple players interacting; there is imperfect information due to a partially observed map; it has a large action space involving the selection and control of hundreds of units; it has a large state space that must be observed solely from raw input feature planes; and it has delayed credit assignment requiring long-term strategies over thousands of steps. We describe the observation, action, and reward specification for the StarCraft II domain and provide an open source Python-based interface for communicating with the game engine. In addition to the main game maps, we provide a suite of mini-games focusing on different elements of StarCraft II gameplay. For the main game maps, we also provide an accompanying dataset of game replay data from human expert players. We give initial baseline results for neural networks trained from this data to predict game outcomes and player actions. Finally, we present initial baseline results for canonical deep reinforcement learning agents applied to the StarCraft II domain. On the mini-games, these agents learn to achieve a level of play that is comparable to a novice player. However, when trained on the main game, these agents are unable to make significant progress. Thus, SC2LE offers a new and challenging environment for exploring deep reinforcement learning algorithms and architectures.

A k-clique is a dense graph, consisting of k fully-connected nodes, that finds numerous applications, such as community detection and network analysis. In this paper, we study a new problem, that finds a maximum set of disjoint k-cliques in a given large real-world graph with a user-defined fixed number k, which can contribute to a good performance of teaming collaborative events in online games. However, this problem is NP-hard when k geq 3, making it difficult to solve. To address that, we propose an efficient lightweight method that avoids significant overheads and achieves a k-approximation to the optimal, which is equipped with several optimization techniques, including the ordering method, degree estimation in the clique graph, and a lightweight implementation. Besides, to handle dynamic graphs that are widely seen in real-world social networks, we devise an efficient indexing method with careful swapping operations, leading to the efficient maintenance of a near-optimal result with frequent updates in the graph. In various experiments on several large graphs, our proposed approaches significantly outperform the competitors by up to 2 orders of magnitude in running time and 13.3\% in the number of computed disjoint k-cliques, which demonstrates the superiority of the proposed approaches in terms of efficiency and effectiveness.

Communication games, which we refer to as incomplete information games that heavily depend on natural language communication, hold significant research value in fields such as economics, social science, and artificial intelligence. In this work, we explore the problem of how to engage large language models (LLMs) in communication games, and in response, propose a tuning-free framework. Our approach keeps LLMs frozen, and relies on the retrieval and reflection on past communications and experiences for improvement. An empirical study on the representative and widely-studied communication game, ``Werewolf'', demonstrates that our framework can effectively play Werewolf game without tuning the parameters of the LLMs. More importantly, strategic behaviors begin to emerge in our experiments, suggesting that it will be a fruitful journey to engage LLMs in communication games and associated domains.

We examine the problem of regret minimization when the learner is involved in a continuous game with other optimizing agents: in this case, if all players follow a no-regret algorithm, it is possible to achieve significantly lower regret relative to fully adversarial environments. We study this problem in the context of variationally stable games (a class of continuous games which includes all convex-concave and monotone games), and when the players only have access to noisy estimates of their individual payoff gradients. If the noise is additive, the game-theoretic and purely adversarial settings enjoy similar regret guarantees; however, if the noise is multiplicative, we show that the learners can, in fact, achieve constant regret. We achieve this faster rate via an optimistic gradient scheme with learning rate separation -- that is, the method's extrapolation and update steps are tuned to different schedules, depending on the noise profile. Subsequently, to eliminate the need for delicate hyperparameter tuning, we propose a fully adaptive method that attains nearly the same guarantees as its non-adapted counterpart, while operating without knowledge of either the game or of the noise profile.

Combinatorial Optimization underpins many real-world applications and yet, designing performant algorithms to solve these complex, typically NP-hard, problems remains a significant research challenge. Reinforcement Learning (RL) provides a versatile framework for designing heuristics across a broad spectrum of problem domains. However, despite notable progress, RL has not yet supplanted industrial solvers as the go-to solution. Current approaches emphasize pre-training heuristics that construct solutions but often rely on search procedures with limited variance, such as stochastically sampling numerous solutions from a single policy or employing computationally expensive fine-tuning of the policy on individual problem instances. Building on the intuition that performant search at inference time should be anticipated during pre-training, we propose COMPASS, a novel RL approach that parameterizes a distribution of diverse and specialized policies conditioned on a continuous latent space. We evaluate COMPASS across three canonical problems - Travelling Salesman, Capacitated Vehicle Routing, and Job-Shop Scheduling - and demonstrate that our search strategy (i) outperforms state-of-the-art approaches on 11 standard benchmarking tasks and (ii) generalizes better, surpassing all other approaches on a set of 18 procedurally transformed instance distributions.

We investigate stochastic combinatorial multi-armed bandit with semi-bandit feedback (CMAB). In CMAB, the question of the existence of an efficient policy with an optimal asymptotic regret (up to a factor poly-logarithmic with the action size) is still open for many families of distributions, including mutually independent outcomes, and more generally the multivariate sub-Gaussian family. We propose to answer the above question for these two families by analyzing variants of the Combinatorial Thompson Sampling policy (CTS). For mutually independent outcomes in [0,1], we propose a tight analysis of CTS using Beta priors. We then look at the more general setting of multivariate sub-Gaussian outcomes and propose a tight analysis of CTS using Gaussian priors. This last result gives us an alternative to the Efficient Sampling for Combinatorial Bandit policy (ESCB), which, although optimal, is not computationally efficient.

Competitive Pok\'emon Singles (CPS) is a popular strategy game where players learn to exploit their opponent based on imperfect information in battles that can last more than one hundred stochastic turns. AI research in CPS has been led by heuristic tree search and online self-play, but the game may also create a platform to study adaptive policies trained offline on large datasets. We develop a pipeline to reconstruct the first-person perspective of an agent from logs saved from the third-person perspective of a spectator, thereby unlocking a dataset of real human battles spanning more than a decade that grows larger every day. This dataset enables a black-box approach where we train large sequence models to adapt to their opponent based solely on their input trajectory while selecting moves without explicit search of any kind. We study a progression from imitation learning to offline RL and offline fine-tuning on self-play data in the hardcore competitive setting of Pok\'emon's four oldest (and most partially observed) game generations. The resulting agents outperform a recent LLM Agent approach and a strong heuristic search engine. While playing anonymously in online battles against humans, our best agents climb to rankings inside the top 10% of active players.

Multi-agent football poses an unsolved challenge in AI research. Existing work has focused on tackling simplified scenarios of the game, or else leveraging expert demonstrations. In this paper, we develop a multi-agent system to play the full 11 vs. 11 game mode, without demonstrations. This game mode contains aspects that present major challenges to modern reinforcement learning algorithms; multi-agent coordination, long-term planning, and non-transitivity. To address these challenges, we present TiZero; a self-evolving, multi-agent system that learns from scratch. TiZero introduces several innovations, including adaptive curriculum learning, a novel self-play strategy, and an objective that optimizes the policies of multiple agents jointly. Experimentally, it outperforms previous systems by a large margin on the Google Research Football environment, increasing win rates by over 30%. To demonstrate the generality of TiZero's innovations, they are assessed on several environments beyond football; Overcooked, Multi-agent Particle-Environment, Tic-Tac-Toe and Connect-Four.

By incorporating regret minimization, double oracle methods have demonstrated rapid convergence to Nash Equilibrium (NE) in normal-form games and extensive-form games, through algorithms such as online double oracle (ODO) and extensive-form double oracle (XDO), respectively. In this study, we further examine the theoretical convergence rate and sample complexity of such regret minimization-based double oracle methods, utilizing a unified framework called Regret-Minimizing Double Oracle. Based on this framework, we extend ODO to extensive-form games and determine its sample complexity. Moreover, we demonstrate that the sample complexity of XDO can be exponential in the number of information sets |S|, owing to the exponentially decaying stopping threshold of restricted games. To solve this problem, we propose the Periodic Double Oracle (PDO) method, which has the lowest sample complexity among all existing double oracle methods, being only polynomial in |S|. Empirical evaluations on multiple poker and board games show that PDO achieves significantly faster convergence than previous double oracle algorithms and reaches a competitive level with state-of-the-art regret minimization methods.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

Implementing quantum game theory on real hardware is challenging due to noise, decoherence, and limited qubit connectivity, yet such demonstrations are essential to validate theoretical predictions. We present one of the first full experimental realizations of the Battle of the Sexes game under the Eisert-Wilkens-Lewenstein (EWL) framework on IBM Quantum's ibm sherbrooke superconducting processor. Four quantum strategies (I, H, R(pi/4), R(pi)) were evaluated across 31 entanglement values gamma in [0, pi] using 2048 shots per configuration, enabling a direct comparison between analytical predictions and hardware execution. To mitigate noise and variability, we introduce a Guided Circuit Mapping (GCM) method that dynamically selects qubit pairs and optimizes routing based on real-time topology and calibration data. The analytical model forecasts up to 108% payoff improvement over the classical equilibrium, and despite hardware-induced deviations, experimental results with GCM preserve the expected payoff trends within 3.5%-12% relative error. These findings show that quantum advantages in strategic coordination can persist under realistic NISQ conditions, providing a pathway toward practical applications of quantum game theory in multi-agent, economic, and distributed decision-making systems.

During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equilibria. Second, it was shown that the sink equilibria of a game adequately capture the limit behavior of natural game dynamics. These two results have created a need and opportunity to articulate a principled computational theory of the meaning of the game that is based on game dynamics. Given any game in normal form, and any prior distribution of play, we study the problem of computing the asymptotic behavior of a class of natural dynamics called the noisy replicator dynamics as a limit distribution over the sink equilibria of the game. When the prior distribution has pure strategy support, we prove this distribution can be computed efficiently, in near-linear time to the size of the best-response graph. When the distribution can be sampled -- for example, if it is the uniform distribution over all mixed strategy profiles -- we show through experiments that the limit distribution of reasonably large games can be estimated quite accurately through sampling and simulation.

We define a new class of set functions that in addition to being monotone and subadditive, also admit a very limited form of submodularity defined over a permutation of the ground set. We refer to this permutation as a submodular order. This class of functions includes monotone submodular functions as a sub-family. To understand the importance of this structure in optimization problems we consider the problem of maximizing function value under various types of constraints. To demonstrate the modeling power of submodular order functions we show applications in two different settings. First, we apply our results to the extensively studied problem of assortment optimization. While the objectives in assortment optimization are known to be non-submodular (and non-monotone) even for simple choice models, we show that they are compatible with the notion of submodular order. Consequently, we obtain new and in some cases the first constant factor guarantee for constrained assortment optimization in fundamental choice models. As a second application of submodular order functions, we show an intriguing connection to the maximization of monotone submodular functions in the streaming model. We recover some best known guarantees for this problem as a corollary of our results.

Multi-armed bandits a simple but very powerful framework for algorithms that make decisions over time under uncertainty. An enormous body of work has accumulated over the years, covered in several books and surveys. This book provides a more introductory, textbook-like treatment of the subject. Each chapter tackles a particular line of work, providing a self-contained, teachable technical introduction and a brief review of the further developments; many of the chapters conclude with exercises. The book is structured as follows. The first four chapters are on IID rewards, from the basic model to impossibility results to Bayesian priors to Lipschitz rewards. The next three chapters cover adversarial rewards, from the full-feedback version to adversarial bandits to extensions with linear rewards and combinatorially structured actions. Chapter 8 is on contextual bandits, a middle ground between IID and adversarial bandits in which the change in reward distributions is completely explained by observable contexts. The last three chapters cover connections to economics, from learning in repeated games to bandits with supply/budget constraints to exploration in the presence of incentives. The appendix provides sufficient background on concentration and KL-divergence. The chapters on "bandits with similarity information", "bandits with knapsacks" and "bandits and agents" can also be consumed as standalone surveys on the respective topics.

We systematically investigate all 25 public ARC-AGI-3 games and find that every one is reachable through non-intelligent strategies: 10 in a single blind step, 5 after one probing action, 1 via repeated ACTION1 presses, 1 via diverse exploration, and 8 via single repeated actions with sufficient budget (50-200 steps). A library-level null-coordinate vulnerability additionally bypasses 18 games in 1 step. This benchmark critique implies the public evaluation set cannot discriminate intelligent exploration from trivial heuristics - the private 55-game evaluation is the only genuine intelligence test. Against this backdrop, we present AERA (Adaptive Epistemic Reasoning Agent), a three-phase (EXPLORE / VERIFY / PLAN) agent achieving RHAE=0.2116 (4/25 solved) on these 25 games with Qwen2.5-0.5B, while random and no-explore baselines score 0.0000. We formalise AERA through a Speed--Depth trade-off framework: under a convexity assumption (proved for a class of environments in the Appendix), RHAE's quadratic form emerges as a second-order penalty for deviating from the Pareto frontier between action efficiency and information gain. Contributions: (i) a benchmark validity analysis showing that current interactive reasoning benchmarks fail to measure the exploration they claim to require, and (ii) the EXPLORE-before-PLAN framework and model-capability x exploration interaction. The linked code track entry achieves RHAE=0.30 on the full 55-game private evaluation. Code: CC0.

Recent large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated great potential toward intelligent agents and next-gen automation, but there currently lacks a systematic benchmark for evaluating LLMs' abilities as agents. We introduce SmartPlay: both a challenging benchmark and a methodology for evaluating LLMs as agents. SmartPlay consists of 6 different games, including Rock-Paper-Scissors, Tower of Hanoi, Minecraft. Each game features a unique setting, providing up to 20 evaluation settings and infinite environment variations. Each game in SmartPlay uniquely challenges a subset of 9 important capabilities of an intelligent LLM agent, including reasoning with object dependencies, planning ahead, spatial reasoning, learning from history, and understanding randomness. The distinction between the set of capabilities each game test allows us to analyze each capability separately. SmartPlay serves not only as a rigorous testing ground for evaluating the overall performance of LLM agents but also as a road-map for identifying gaps in current methodologies. We release our benchmark at github.com/LLMsmartplay/SmartPlay

The prototyping of computer games, particularly card games, requires extensive human effort in creative ideation and gameplay evaluation. Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) offer opportunities to automate and streamline these processes. However, it remains challenging for LLMs to design novel game mechanics beyond existing databases, generate consistent gameplay environments, and develop scalable gameplay AI for large-scale evaluations. This paper addresses these challenges by introducing a comprehensive automated card game prototyping framework. The approach highlights a graph-based indexing method for generating novel game designs, an LLM-driven system for consistent game code generation validated by gameplay records, and a gameplay AI constructing method that uses an ensemble of LLM-generated action-value functions optimized through self-play. These contributions aim to accelerate card game prototyping, reduce human labor, and lower barriers to entry for game developers.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

We introduce an Implicit Game-Theoretic MPC (IGT-MPC), a decentralized algorithm for two-agent motion planning that uses a learned value function that predicts the game-theoretic interaction outcomes as the terminal cost-to-go function in a model predictive control (MPC) framework, guiding agents to implicitly account for interactions with other agents and maximize their reward. This approach applies to competitive and cooperative multi-agent motion planning problems which we formulate as constrained dynamic games. Given a constrained dynamic game, we randomly sample initial conditions and solve for the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) to generate a dataset of GNE solutions, computing the reward outcome of each game-theoretic interaction from the GNE. The data is used to train a simple neural network to predict the reward outcome, which we use as the terminal cost-to-go function in an MPC scheme. We showcase emerging competitive and coordinated behaviors using IGT-MPC in scenarios such as two-vehicle head-to-head racing and un-signalized intersection navigation. IGT-MPC offers a novel method integrating machine learning and game-theoretic reasoning into model-based decentralized multi-agent motion planning.

We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal of the leader is to learn to minimize the cumulative regret based on the history of interactions. Differing from the traditional formulation of repeated Stackelberg games, we assume the follower is omniscient, with full knowledge of the true reward, and that they always best-respond to the leader's actions. We analyze the sample complexity of regret minimization in this repeated Stackelberg game. We show that depending on the reward structure, the existence of the omniscient follower may change the sample complexity drastically, from constant to exponential, even for linear cooperative Stackelberg games. This poses unique challenges for the learning process of the leader and the subsequent regret analysis.

The Polymorphic Combinatorial Framework (PCF) leverages Large Language Models (LLMs) and mathematical frameworks to guide the meta-prompt enabled design of solution spaces and adaptive AI agents for complex, dynamic environments. Unlike static agent architectures, PCF enables real-time parameter reconfiguration through mathematically-grounded combinatorial spaces, allowing agents to adapt their core behavioral traits dynamically. Grounded in combinatorial logic, topos theory, and rough fuzzy set theory, PCF defines a multidimensional SPARK parameter space (Skills, Personalities, Approaches, Resources, Knowledge) to capture agent behaviors. This paper demonstrates how LLMs can parameterize complex spaces and estimate likely parameter values/variabilities. Using PCF, we parameterized mock caf\'e domains (five levels of complexity), estimated variables/variabilities, and conducted over 1.25 million Monte Carlo simulations. The results revealed trends in agent adaptability and performance across the five complexity tiers, with diminishing returns at higher complexity levels highlighting thresholds for scalable designs. PCF enables the generation of optimized agent configurations for specific scenarios while maintaining logical consistency. This framework supports scalable, dynamic, explainable, and ethical AI applications in domains like customer service, healthcare, robotics, and collaborative systems, paving the way for adaptable and cooperative next-generation polymorphic agents.

Graphon games have been introduced to study games with many players who interact through a weighted graph of interaction. By passing to the limit, a game with a continuum of players is obtained, in which the interactions are through a graphon. In this paper, we focus on a graphon game for optimal investment under relative performance criteria, and we propose a deep learning method. The method builds upon two key ingredients: first, a characterization of Nash equilibria by forward-backward stochastic differential equations and, second, recent advances of machine learning algorithms for stochastic differential games. We provide numerical experiments on two different financial models. In each model, we compare the effect of several graphons, which correspond to different structures of interactions.

While large language models perform well on a range of complex tasks (e.g., text generation, question answering, summarization), robust multi-step planning and reasoning remains a considerable challenge for them. In this paper we show that search-based planning can significantly improve LLMs' playing strength across several board games (Chess, Fischer Random / Chess960, Connect Four, and Hex). We introduce, compare and contrast two major approaches: In external search, the model guides Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) rollouts and evaluations without calls to an external engine, and in internal search, the model directly generates in-context a linearized tree of potential futures and a resulting final choice. Both build on a language model pre-trained on relevant domain knowledge, capturing the transition and value functions across these games. We find that our pre-training method minimizes hallucinations, as our model is highly accurate regarding state prediction and legal moves. Additionally, both internal and external search indeed improve win-rates against state-of-the-art bots, even reaching Grandmaster-level performance in chess while operating on a similar move count search budget per decision as human Grandmasters. The way we combine search with domain knowledge is not specific to board games, suggesting direct extensions into more general language model inference and training techniques.

Automatic evaluation methods based on large language models (LLMs) are emerging as the standard tool for assessing the instruction-following abilities of LLM-based agents. The most common method in this paradigm, pairwise comparisons with a baseline model, critically depends on the assumption of transitive preferences. However, the validity of this assumption remains largely unexplored. In this study, we investigate the presence of non-transitivity within the AlpacaEval framework and analyze its effects on model rankings. We find that LLM judges exhibit non-transitive preferences, leading to rankings that are sensitive to the choice of the baseline model. To mitigate this issue, we show that round-robin tournaments combined with Bradley-Terry models of preference can produce more reliable rankings. Notably, our method increases both the Spearman correlation and the Kendall correlation with Chatbot Arena (95.0% -> 96.4% and 82.1% -> 86.3% respectively). To address the computational cost of round-robin tournaments, we propose Swiss-Wise Iterative Matchmaking (Swim) tournaments, using a dynamic matching strategy to capture the benefits of round-robin tournaments while maintaining computational efficiency.

This paper proposes a novel column generation framework for combinatorial software testing. In particular, it combines Mathematical Programming and Constraint Programming in a hybrid decomposition to generate covering arrays. The approach allows generating parameterized test cases with coverage guarantees between parameter interactions of a given application. Compared to exhaustive testing, combinatorial test case generation reduces the number of tests to run significantly. Our column generation algorithm is generic and can accommodate mixed coverage arrays over heterogeneous alphabets. The algorithm is realized in practice as a cloud service and recognized as one of the five winners of the company-wide cloud application challenge at Oracle. The service is currently helping software developers from a range of different product teams in their testing efforts while exposing declarative constraint models and hybrid optimization techniques to a broader audience.

Understanding how people behave in strategic settings--where they make decisions based on their expectations about the behavior of others--is a long-standing problem in the behavioral sciences. We conduct the largest study to date of strategic decision-making in the context of initial play in two-player matrix games, analyzing over 90,000 human decisions across more than 2,400 procedurally generated games that span a much wider space than previous datasets. We show that a deep neural network trained on these data predicts people's choices better than leading theories of strategic behavior, indicating that there is systematic variation that is not explained by those theories. We then modify the network to produce a new, interpretable behavioral model, revealing what the original network learned about people: their ability to optimally respond and their capacity to reason about others are dependent on the complexity of individual games. This context-dependence is critical in explaining deviations from the rational Nash equilibrium, response times, and uncertainty in strategic decisions. More broadly, our results demonstrate how machine learning can be applied beyond prediction to further help generate novel explanations of complex human behavior.

We study the problem of learning minimax policies in zero-sum matrix games. Fiegel et al. (2025) recently showed that achieving last-iterate convergence in this setting is harder when the players are uncoupled, by proving a lower bound on the exploitability gap of Omega(t^{-1/4}). Some online mirror descent algorithms were proposed in the literature for this problem, but none have truly attained this rate yet. We show that the use of a log-barrier regularization, along with a dual-focused analysis, allows this O-tilde(t^{-1/4}) convergence with high-probability. We additionally extend our idea to the setting of extensive-form games, proving a bound with the same rate.

We propose a novel independent and payoff-based learning framework for stochastic games that is model-free, game-agnostic, and gradient-free. The learning dynamics follow a best-response-type actor-critic architecture, where agents update their strategies (actors) using feedback from two distinct critics: a fast critic that intuitively responds to observed payoffs under limited information, and a slow critic that deliberatively approximates the solution to the underlying dynamic programming problem. Crucially, the learning process relies on non-equilibrium adaptation through smoothed best responses to observed payoffs. We establish convergence to (approximate) equilibria in two-agent zero-sum and multi-agent identical-interest stochastic games over an infinite horizon. This provides one of the first payoff-based and fully decentralized learning algorithms with theoretical guarantees in both settings. Empirical results further validate the robustness and effectiveness of the proposed approach across both classes of games.

Large language model (LLM)-based multi-agent systems (MAS) have demonstrated great potential in solving tasks with execution complexity, by distributing subtasks across cooperative agents. However, this divide-and-conquer paradigm falls short on decision-making tasks that are also prevalent in the real world. These tasks require simultaneous reasoning from the stances of all involved stakeholders whose decisions are mutually dependent and thus cannot be solved in isolation. We characterize this challenge as stance entanglement, a form of decision complexity distinct from execution complexity. To address it, we propose Multi-Agent Fictitious Play (MAFP), a novel MAS paradigm that represents stakeholder stances as agents and formulates decision-making as an equilibrium-seeking process. Built on the game-theoretic principle of fictitious play, MAFP iteratively updates each agent's decision by best responding to the empirical mixture of other agents' past decisions. This enables agents to expose and address one another's weaknesses, progressively improving decision quality and robustness. We evaluate MAFP on challenging decision-making tasks that test the capability of deciding strategies for competitive scenarios prior to acting. MAFP outperforms both single-round and multi-round baselines on two complementary metrics, tournament strength and robustness, demonstrating its effectiveness in addressing stance entanglement.

Sphere packing, Hilbert's eighteenth problem, asks for the densest arrangement of congruent spheres in n-dimensional Euclidean space. Although relevant to areas such as cryptography, crystallography, and medical imaging, the problem remains unresolved: beyond a few special dimensions, neither optimal packings nor tight upper bounds are known. Even a major breakthrough in dimension n=8, later recognised with a Fields Medal, underscores its difficulty. A leading technique for upper bounds, the three-point method, reduces the problem to solving large, high-precision semidefinite programs (SDPs). Because each candidate SDP may take days to evaluate, standard data-intensive AI approaches are infeasible. We address this challenge by formulating SDP construction as a sequential decision process, the SDP game, in which a policy assembles SDP formulations from a set of admissible components. Using a sample-efficient model-based framework that combines Bayesian optimisation with Monte Carlo Tree Search, we obtain new state-of-the-art upper bounds in dimensions 4-16, showing that model-based search can advance computational progress in longstanding geometric problems. Together, these results demonstrate that sample-efficient, model-based search can make tangible progress on mathematically rigid, evaluation limited problems, pointing towards a complementary direction for AI-assisted discovery beyond large-scale LLM-driven exploration.

By defining combinatorial moves, we can define an equivalence relation on Gauss words called homotopy. In this paper we define a homotopy invariant of Gauss words. We use this to show that there exist Gauss words that are not homotopically equivalent to the empty Gauss word, disproving a conjecture by Turaev. In fact, we show that there are an infinite number of equivalence classes of Gauss words under homotopy.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

We developed a benchmark set to assess the generalization of state-of-the-art large language models on problems beyond linguistic tasks and evaluate it on a systematic progression of GPT models (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o, GPT-4o-mini). Using simple games like Tic-Tac-Toe, Connect Four, Battleship, and a Shape Recognition Game, all encoded in ASCII, we test strategic capabilities and spatial reasoning, core abilities any artificial intelligence would need to master for solving problems in chemistry. To probe generalization, we introduce two new games for spatial logic: LEGO Connect Language (LCL) and Guess-the-SMILES (GtS), a operationally simple chemistry benchmark. Our results show that GPT models provide meaningful responses for several tasks but, generally, perform poorly. A systematic performance progression with increased model capabilities (GPT-3.5, GPT-4, GPT-4o) is only observed for 4 out of the 7 benchmark tasks. All models consistently struggle with Battleship, LCL, and GtS. This suggests that while GPT models can emulate conversational proficiency and basic rule comprehension, they have limited generalization with respect to strategy and spatial reasoning. Particularly poor performance is observed for interpreting molecular graphs when encoded in ASCII. The results provided by our open-source benchmark suite (https://github.com/BlueVelvetSackOfGoldPotatoes/child-play{ChildPlay GitHub Repository}) caution against claims of emergent intelligence in GPT models, which appear more specialized than general.

Evolutionary program synthesis systems such as AlphaEvolve, OpenEvolve, and ShinkaEvolve offer a new approach to AI-assisted mathematical discovery. These systems utilize teams of large language models (LLMs) to generate candidate solutions to a problem as human readable code. These candidate solutions are then 'evolved' with the goal of improving them beyond what an LLM can produce in a single shot. While existing mathematical applications have mostly focused on problems of establishing bounds (e.g., sphere packing), the program synthesis approach is well suited to any problem where the solution takes the form of an explicit construction. With this in mind, in this paper we explore the use of OpenEvolve for combinatorial bijection discovery. We describe the results of applying OpenEvolve to three bijection construction problems involving Dyck paths, two of which are known and one of which is open. We find that while systems like OpenEvolve show promise as a valuable tool for combinatorialists, the problem of finding novel, research-level bijections remains a challenging task for current frontier systems, reinforcing the need for human mathematicians in the loop. We describe some lessons learned for others in the field interested in exploring the use of these systems.

Mean-field games have been used as a theoretical tool to obtain an approximate Nash equilibrium for symmetric and anonymous N-player games. However, limiting applicability, existing theoretical results assume variations of a "population generative model", which allows arbitrary modifications of the population distribution by the learning algorithm. Moreover, learning algorithms typically work on abstract simulators with population instead of the N-player game. Instead, we show that N agents running policy mirror ascent converge to the Nash equilibrium of the regularized game within mathcal{O}(varepsilon^{-2}) samples from a single sample trajectory without a population generative model, up to a standard O(1{N}) error due to the mean field. Taking a divergent approach from the literature, instead of working with the best-response map we first show that a policy mirror ascent map can be used to construct a contractive operator having the Nash equilibrium as its fixed point. We analyze single-path TD learning for N-agent games, proving sample complexity guarantees by only using a sample path from the N-agent simulator without a population generative model. Furthermore, we demonstrate that our methodology allows for independent learning by N agents with finite sample guarantees.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning, the behaviors that agents learn in a single Markov Game (MG) are typically confined to the given agent number. Every single MG induced by varying the population may possess distinct optimal joint strategies and game-specific knowledge, which are modeled independently in modern multi-agent reinforcement learning algorithms. In this work, our focus is on creating agents that can generalize across population-varying MGs. Instead of learning a unimodal policy, each agent learns a policy set comprising effective strategies across a variety of games. To achieve this, we propose Meta Representations for Agents (MRA) that explicitly models the game-common and game-specific strategic knowledge. By representing the policy sets with multi-modal latent policies, the game-common strategic knowledge and diverse strategic modes are discovered through an iterative optimization procedure. We prove that by approximately maximizing the resulting constrained mutual information objective, the policies can reach Nash Equilibrium in every evaluation MG when the latent space is sufficiently large. When deploying MRA in practical settings with limited latent space sizes, fast adaptation can be achieved by leveraging the first-order gradient information. Extensive experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of MRA in improving training performance and generalization ability in challenging evaluation games.