Daily Papers

Persistent memory has enabled large language model (LLM) agents to store factual knowledge, prior decisions, reasoning histories, tool usage information, and context. While this has improved the agent's functionality and continuity across tasks, it has also introduced a new attack surface: the agent's own reasoning history. In this paper, we introduce the Forged Amplifying Rationale Memory Attack (FARMA), which poisons an agent's remembered reasoning rather than its factual knowledge. It inserts forged reasoning traces using evasive language that bypasses keyword-based defenses, then amplifies them through self-referential reinforcement that defeats consensus-based defenses. To address FARMA, we introduce SENTINEL, a layered defense pipeline to detect forged reasoning entries. Its central component is the Reasoning Guard that structurally analyzes candidate entries for forgery using five weighted signals. We evaluate FARMA and SENTINEL across multiple agents and different LLM models with 50 trials and show that FARMA achieves an attack success rate of up to 100% under baseline conditions and is capable of defeating defense mechanisms like keyword filter and A-MemGuard. Our evaluation also shows that SENTINEL reduces FARMA's attack success rate to as low as 0% with no false positives observed across 326 benign agent traces. Our work demonstrates the need to protect not only an agent's retrieved content but also the integrity of its reasoning history.

The Sybil attack plagues all peer-to-peer systems, and modern open distributed ledgers employ a number of tactics to prevent it from proof of work, or other resources such as space, stake or memory, to traditional admission control in permissioned settings. With SybilQuorum we propose an alternative approach to securing an open distributed ledger against Sybil attacks, and ensuring consensus amongst honest participants, leveraging social network based Sybil defences. We show how nodes expressing their trust relationships through the ledger can bootstrap and operate a value system, and general transaction system, and how Sybil attacks are thwarted. We empirically evaluate our system as a secure Federated Byzantine Agreement System, and extend the theory of those systems to do so.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents use memory to learn from past interactions, enabling autonomous planning and decision-making in complex environments. However, this reliance on memory introduces a critical security risk: an adversary can inject seemingly harmless records into an agent's memory to manipulate its future behavior. This vulnerability is characterized by two core aspects: First, the malicious effect of injected records is only activated within a specific context, making them hard to detect when individual memory entries are audited in isolation. Second, once triggered, the manipulation can initiate a self-reinforcing error cycle: the corrupted outcome is stored as precedent, which not only amplifies the initial error but also progressively lowers the threshold for similar attacks in the future. To address these challenges, we introduce A-MemGuard (Agent-Memory Guard), the first proactive defense framework for LLM agent memory. The core idea of our work is the insight that memory itself must become both self-checking and self-correcting. Without modifying the agent's core architecture, A-MemGuard combines two mechanisms: (1) consensus-based validation, which detects anomalies by comparing reasoning paths derived from multiple related memories and (2) a dual-memory structure, where detected failures are distilled into ``lessons'' stored separately and consulted before future actions, breaking error cycles and enabling adaptation. Comprehensive evaluations on multiple benchmarks show that A-MemGuard effectively cuts attack success rates by over 95% while incurring a minimal utility cost. This work shifts LLM memory security from static filtering to a proactive, experience-driven model where defenses strengthen over time. Our code is available in https://github.com/TangciuYueng/AMemGuard

Multiple robots could perceive a scene (e.g., detect objects) collaboratively better than individuals, although easily suffer from adversarial attacks when using deep learning. This could be addressed by the adversarial defense, but its training requires the often-unknown attacking mechanism. Differently, we propose ROBOSAC, a novel sampling-based defense strategy generalizable to unseen attackers. Our key idea is that collaborative perception should lead to consensus rather than dissensus in results compared to individual perception. This leads to our hypothesize-and-verify framework: perception results with and without collaboration from a random subset of teammates are compared until reaching a consensus. In such a framework, more teammates in the sampled subset often entail better perception performance but require longer sampling time to reject potential attackers. Thus, we derive how many sampling trials are needed to ensure the desired size of an attacker-free subset, or equivalently, the maximum size of such a subset that we can successfully sample within a given number of trials. We validate our method on the task of collaborative 3D object detection in autonomous driving scenarios.

Collaborative Perception (CP) has shown a promising technique for autonomous driving, where multiple connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs) share their perception information to enhance the overall perception performance and expand the perception range. However, in CP, ego CAV needs to receive messages from its collaborators, which makes it easy to be attacked by malicious agents. For example, a malicious agent can send harmful information to the ego CAV to mislead it. To address this critical issue, we propose a novel method, CP-Guard, a tailored defense mechanism for CP that can be deployed by each agent to accurately detect and eliminate malicious agents in its collaboration network. Our key idea is to enable CP to reach a consensus rather than a conflict against the ego CAV's perception results. Based on this idea, we first develop a probability-agnostic sample consensus (PASAC) method to effectively sample a subset of the collaborators and verify the consensus without prior probabilities of malicious agents. Furthermore, we define a collaborative consistency loss (CCLoss) to capture the discrepancy between the ego CAV and its collaborators, which is used as a verification criterion for consensus. Finally, we conduct extensive experiments in collaborative bird's eye view (BEV) tasks and our results demonstrate the effectiveness of our CP-Guard. Code is available at https://github.com/CP-Security/CP-Guard

As large language models (LLMs) become integral to multi-agent systems, new privacy risks emerge that extend beyond memorization, direct inference, or single-turn evaluations. In particular, seemingly innocuous responses, when composed across interactions, can cumulatively enable adversaries to recover sensitive information, a phenomenon we term compositional privacy leakage. We present the first systematic study of such compositional privacy leaks and possible mitigation methods in multi-agent LLM systems. First, we develop a framework that models how auxiliary knowledge and agent interactions jointly amplify privacy risks, even when each response is benign in isolation. Next, to mitigate this, we propose and evaluate two defense strategies: (1) Theory-of-Mind defense (ToM), where defender agents infer a questioner's intent by anticipating how their outputs may be exploited by adversaries, and (2) Collaborative Consensus Defense (CoDef), where responder agents collaborate with peers who vote based on a shared aggregated state to restrict sensitive information spread. Crucially, we balance our evaluation across compositions that expose sensitive information and compositions that yield benign inferences. Our experiments quantify how these defense strategies differ in balancing the privacy-utility trade-off. We find that while chain-of-thought alone offers limited protection to leakage (~39% sensitive blocking rate), our ToM defense substantially improves sensitive query blocking (up to 97%) but can reduce benign task success. CoDef achieves the best balance, yielding the highest Balanced Outcome (79.8%), highlighting the benefit of combining explicit reasoning with defender collaboration. Together, our results expose a new class of risks in collaborative LLM deployments and provide actionable insights for designing safeguards against compositional, context-driven privacy leakage.

Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) are increasingly applied to complex collaborative scenarios. However, their collaborative mechanisms may cause minor inaccuracies to gradually solidify into system-level false consensus through iteration. Such risks are difficult to trace since errors can propagate and amplify through message dependencies. Existing protections often rely on single-agent validation or require modifications to the collaboration architecture, which can weaken effective information flow and may not align with natural collaboration processes in real tasks. To address this, we propose a propagation dynamics model tailored for LLM-MAS that abstracts collaboration as a directed dependency graph and provides an early-stage risk criterion to characterize amplification risk. Through experiments on six mainstream frameworks, we identify three vulnerability classes: cascade amplification, topological sensitivity, and consensus inertia. We further instantiate an attack where injecting just a single atomic error seed leads to widespread failure. In response, we introduce a genealogy-graph-based governance layer, implemented as a message-layer plugin, that suppresses both endogenous and exogenous error amplification without altering the collaboration architecture. Experiments show that this approach raises the defense success rate from a baseline of 0.32 to over 0.89 and significantly mitigates the cascading spread of minor errors.

The rapid advancement of ML models in critical sectors such as healthcare, finance, and security has intensified the need for robust data security, model integrity, and reliable outputs. Large multimodal foundational models, while crucial for complex tasks, present challenges in scalability, reliability, and potential misuse. Decentralized systems offer a solution by distributing workload and mitigating central points of failure, but they introduce risks of unauthorized access to sensitive data across nodes. We address these challenges with a comprehensive framework designed for responsible AI development. Our approach incorporates: 1) Zero-knowledge proofs for secure model verification, enhancing trust without compromising privacy. 2) Consensus-based verification checks to ensure consistent outputs across nodes, mitigating hallucinations and maintaining model integrity. 3) Split Learning techniques that segment models across different nodes, preserving data privacy by preventing full data access at any point. 4) Hardware-based security through trusted execution environments (TEEs) to protect data and computations. This framework aims to enhance security and privacy and improve the reliability and fairness of multimodal AI systems. Promoting efficient resource utilization contributes to more sustainable AI development. Our state-of-the-art proofs and principles demonstrate the framework's effectiveness in responsibly democratizing artificial intelligence, offering a promising approach for building secure and private foundational models.

Privacy-preserving federated learning allows multiple users to jointly train a model with coordination of a central server. The server only learns the final aggregation result, thus the users' (private) training data is not leaked from the individual model updates. However, keeping the individual updates private allows malicious users to perform Byzantine attacks and degrade the accuracy without being detected. Best existing defenses against Byzantine workers rely on robust rank-based statistics, e.g., median, to find malicious updates. However, implementing privacy-preserving rank-based statistics is nontrivial and not scalable in the secure domain, as it requires sorting all individual updates. We establish the first private robustness check that uses high break point rank-based statistics on aggregated model updates. By exploiting randomized clustering, we significantly improve the scalability of our defense without compromising privacy. We leverage our statistical bounds in zero-knowledge proofs to detect and remove malicious updates without revealing the private user updates. Our novel framework, zPROBE, enables Byzantine resilient and secure federated learning. Empirical evaluations demonstrate that zPROBE provides a low overhead solution to defend against state-of-the-art Byzantine attacks while preserving privacy.

As centralized AI hits compute ceilings and diminishing returns from ever-larger training runs, meeting demand requires an inference layer that scales horizontally in both capacity and capability. We present Fortytwo, a novel protocol that leverages swarm intelligence principles and distributed pairwise ranking consensus to achieve superior performance in AI inference. Our approach reimagines collaboration among AI nodes using swarm inference: a peer-ranked, reputation-weighted consensus across heterogeneous models that surfaces the highest-quality responses. Using pairwise ranking with a custom Bradley-Terry-style aggregation model, we demonstrate that swarm inference substantially outperforms majority voting, achieving 85.90% on GPQA Diamond versus 68.69% for majority voting with the same model set - an improvement of +17.21 percentage points (approximately +25.1% relative). The protocol incorporates on-chain reputation so node influence adapts to demonstrated accuracy over time, yielding a meritocratic consensus that filters low-quality or malicious participants. To resist Sybil attacks, Fortytwo employs proof-of-capability in its consensus: nodes must successfully complete calibration/test requests and stake reputation to enter ranking rounds, making multi-identity attacks economically unattractive while preserving openness. Across six challenging benchmarks, including GPQA Diamond, LiveCodeBench, and AIME, our evaluation indicates higher accuracy and strong resilience to adversarial and noisy free-form prompting (e.g., prompt-injection degradation of only 0.12% versus 6.20% for a monolithic single-model baseline), while retaining practical deployability. Together, these results establish a foundation for decentralized AI systems - democratizing access to high-quality inference through collective intelligence without sacrificing reliability or security.

In data poisoning attacks, an adversary tries to change a model's prediction by adding, modifying, or removing samples in the training data. Recently, ensemble-based approaches for obtaining provable defenses against data poisoning have been proposed where predictions are done by taking a majority vote across multiple base models. In this work, we show that merely considering the majority vote in ensemble defenses is wasteful as it does not effectively utilize available information in the logits layers of the base models. Instead, we propose Run-Off Election (ROE), a novel aggregation method based on a two-round election across the base models: In the first round, models vote for their preferred class and then a second, Run-Off election is held between the top two classes in the first round. Based on this approach, we propose DPA+ROE and FA+ROE defense methods based on Deep Partition Aggregation (DPA) and Finite Aggregation (FA) approaches from prior work. We evaluate our methods on MNIST, CIFAR-10, and GTSRB and obtain improvements in certified accuracy by up to 3%-4%. Also, by applying ROE on a boosted version of DPA, we gain improvements around 12%-27% comparing to the current state-of-the-art, establishing a new state-of-the-art in (pointwise) certified robustness against data poisoning. In many cases, our approach outperforms the state-of-the-art, even when using 32 times less computational power.

Writing effective rebuttals is a high-stakes task that demands more than linguistic fluency, as it requires precise alignment between reviewer intent and manuscript details. Current solutions typically treat this as a direct-to-text generation problem, suffering from hallucination, overlooked critiques, and a lack of verifiable grounding. To address these limitations, we introduce RebuttalAgent, the first multi-agents framework that reframes rebuttal generation as an evidence-centric planning task. Our system decomposes complex feedback into atomic concerns and dynamically constructs hybrid contexts by synthesizing compressed summaries with high-fidelity text while integrating an autonomous and on-demand external search module to resolve concerns requiring outside literature. By generating an inspectable response plan before drafting, RebuttalAgent ensures that every argument is explicitly anchored in internal or external evidence. We validate our approach on the proposed RebuttalBench and demonstrate that our pipeline outperforms strong baselines in coverage, faithfulness, and strategic coherence, offering a transparent and controllable assistant for the peer review process. Code will be released.

Large language models (LLMs) remain unreliable for high-stakes claim verification due to hallucinations and shallow reasoning. While retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) and multi-agent debate (MAD) address this, they are limited by one-pass retrieval and unstructured debate dynamics. We propose a courtroom-style multi-agent framework, PROClaim, that reformulates verification as a structured, adversarial deliberation. Our approach integrates specialized roles (e.g., Plaintiff, Defense, Judge) with Progressive RAG (P-RAG) to dynamically expand and refine the evidence pool during the debate. Furthermore, we employ evidence negotiation, self-reflection, and heterogeneous multi-judge aggregation to enforce calibration, robustness, and diversity. In zero-shot evaluations on the Check-COVID benchmark, PROClaim achieves 81.7% accuracy, outperforming standard multi-agent debate by 10.0 percentage points, with P-RAG driving the primary performance gains (+7.5 pp). We ultimately demonstrate that structural deliberation and model heterogeneity effectively mitigate systematic biases, providing a robust foundation for reliable claim verification. Our code and data are publicly available at https://github.com/mnc13/PROClaim.

Label-free reinforcement learning enables large language models to improve reasoning capabilities without ground-truth supervision, typically by treating majority-voted answers as pseudo-labels. However, we identify a critical failure mode: as training maximizes self-consistency, output diversity collapses, causing the model to confidently reinforce systematic errors that evade detection. We term this the consensus trap. To escape it, we propose CoVerRL, a framework where a single model alternates between generator and verifier roles, with each capability bootstrapping the other. Majority voting provides noisy but informative supervision for training the verifier, while the improving verifier progressively filters self-consistent errors from pseudo-labels. This co-evolution creates a virtuous cycle that maintains high reward accuracy throughout training. Experiments across Qwen and Llama model families demonstrate that CoVerRL outperforms label-free baselines by 4.7-5.9\% on mathematical reasoning benchmarks. Moreover, self-verification accuracy improves from around 55\% to over 85\%, confirming that both capabilities genuinely co-evolve.

Byzantine robustness has received significant attention recently given its importance for distributed and federated learning. In spite of this, we identify severe flaws in existing algorithms even when the data across the participants is identically distributed. First, we show realistic examples where current state of the art robust aggregation rules fail to converge even in the absence of any Byzantine attackers. Secondly, we prove that even if the aggregation rules may succeed in limiting the influence of the attackers in a single round, the attackers can couple their attacks across time eventually leading to divergence. To address these issues, we present two surprisingly simple strategies: a new robust iterative clipping procedure, and incorporating worker momentum to overcome time-coupled attacks. This is the first provably robust method for the standard stochastic optimization setting. Our code is open sourced at https://github.com/epfml/byzantine-robust-optimizer.

This paper introduces the concept of {mutual consensus} as a novel non-compensatory consensus measure that accounts for the maximum disparity among opinions to ensure robust consensus evaluation. Incorporating this concept, several new Minimum Cost Consensus (MCC) models are proposed, and their properties are analyzed. To show their applicability, these mutual consensus-based MCC models are then considered in the context of the {OWA-MCC} model, which employs Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA) operators for preference aggregation. Concretely, we include a linearized formulation under symmetry conditions as well as examples of the non-convexity of the feasible region in the general case. Finally, mutual consensus is utilized to obtain approximate solutions for the OWA-MCC model, demonstrating its practical effectiveness and advancing the theoretical and applied dimensions of consensus modeling in group decision-making.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is increasingly deployed in real-world applications, where its reference-grounded design makes outputs appear trustworthy. This trust has spurred research on poisoning attacks that craft malicious content, inject it into knowledge sources, and manipulate RAG responses. However, when evaluated in practical RAG systems, existing attacks suffer from severely degraded effectiveness. This gap stems from two overlooked realities: (i) content is often processed before use, which can fragment the poison and weaken its effect, and (ii) users often do not issue the exact queries anticipated during attack design. These factors can lead practitioners to underestimate risks and develop a false sense of security. To better characterize the threat to practical systems, we present Confundo, a learning-to-poison framework that fine-tunes a large language model as a poison generator to achieve high effectiveness, robustness, and stealthiness. Confundo provides a unified framework supporting multiple attack objectives, demonstrated by manipulating factual correctness, inducing biased opinions, and triggering hallucinations. By addressing these overlooked challenges, Confundo consistently outperforms a wide range of purpose-built attacks across datasets and RAG configurations by large margins, even in the presence of defenses. Beyond exposing vulnerabilities, we also present a defensive use case that protects web content from unauthorized incorporation into RAG systems via scraping, with no impact on user experience.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) can substantially extend the reasoning capacity of large language models (LLMs), yet most frameworks still aggregate agent outputs with majority voting. This heuristic discards the evidential structure of reasoning traces and is brittle under the confabulation consensus, where agents share correlated biases and converge on the same incorrect rationale. We introduce AgentAuditor, which replaces voting with a path search over a Reasoning Tree that explicitly represents agreements and divergences among agent traces. AgentAuditor resolves conflicts by comparing reasoning branches at critical divergence points, turning global adjudication into efficient, localized verification. We further propose Anti-Consensus Preference Optimization (ACPO), which trains the adjudicator on majority-failure cases and rewards evidence-based minority selections over popular errors. AgentAuditor is agnostic to MAS setting, and we find across 5 popular settings that it yields up to 5% absolute accuracy improvement over a majority vote, and up to 3% over using LLM-as-Judge.

LLM-based multi-agent systems excel at planning, tool use, and role coordination, but their openness and interaction complexity also expose them to jailbreak, prompt-injection, and adversarial collaboration. Existing defenses fall into two lines: (i) self-verification that asks each agent to pre-filter unsafe instructions before execution, and (ii) external guard modules that police behaviors. The former often underperforms because a standalone agent lacks sufficient capacity to detect cross-agent unsafe chains and delegation-induced risks; the latter increases system overhead and creates a single-point-of-failure-once compromised, system-wide safety collapses, and adding more guards worsens cost and complexity. To solve these challenges, we propose AdvEvo-MARL, a co-evolutionary multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that internalizes safety into task agents. Rather than relying on external guards, AdvEvo-MARL jointly optimizes attackers (which synthesize evolving jailbreak prompts) and defenders (task agents trained to both accomplish their duties and resist attacks) in adversarial learning environments. To stabilize learning and foster cooperation, we introduce a public baseline for advantage estimation: agents within the same functional group share a group-level mean-return baseline, enabling lower-variance updates and stronger intra-group coordination. Across representative attack scenarios, AdvEvo-MARL consistently keeps attack-success rate (ASR) below 20%, whereas baselines reach up to 38.33%, while preserving-and sometimes improving-task accuracy (up to +3.67% on reasoning tasks). These results show that safety and utility can be jointly improved without relying on extra guard agents or added system overhead.

The shift from monolithic LLMs to distributed multi-agent architectures demands new frameworks for verifying and securing autonomous coordination. Unlike traditional multi-agent systems focused on cooperative state alignment, modern LLM patterns: multi-agent debate, constitutional oversight, helper-critic loops-rely on adversarial critique for error correction and reasoning refinement. Since LLMs are dynamical systems whose latent states are imperfectly observable from verbalized outputs, securing these networks requires understanding both macroscopic topology and microscopic agent observability. This paper establishes a rigorous graph-theoretic framework for analyzing consensus in signed, directed interaction networks, bridging graph theory and LLM reasoning by formally mapping Transformer cross-entropy log-odds to the signed Laplacian. We characterize agreement stability through structural balance theory, showing how unbalanced critique cycles produce logical frustration and persistent reasoning oscillations, and prove that unobservable latent states from hidden system prompts act as topological Trojan horses that destabilize cooperative consensus. To resolve unobservable deadlocks, we restrict interaction topologies to chordal graphs and apply matrix decomposition with Gram-Schmidt orthogonalization, proving that rank-one spectral edge perturbations deterministically break expertise symmetry by shifting eigenvalues into the stable left-half plane. Core contributions include consensus theorems, polynomial-time Perfect Elimination Ordering verification algorithms, and large-scale empirical validation on clustered ensembles of LLaMA-3, Mistral, and Gemma agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) remain susceptible to jailbreak exploits that bypass safety filters and induce harmful or unethical behavior. This work presents a systematic taxonomy of existing jailbreak defenses across prompt-level, model-level, and training-time interventions, followed by three proposed defense strategies. First, a Prompt-Level Defense Framework detects and neutralizes adversarial inputs through sanitization, paraphrasing, and adaptive system guarding. Second, a Logit-Based Steering Defense reinforces refusal behavior through inference-time vector steering in safety-sensitive layers. Third, a Domain-Specific Agent Defense employs the MetaGPT framework to enforce structured, role-based collaboration and domain adherence. Experiments on benchmark datasets show substantial reductions in attack success rate, achieving full mitigation under the agent-based defense. Overall, this study highlights how jailbreaks pose a significant security threat to LLMs and identifies key intervention points for prevention, while noting that defense strategies often involve trade-offs between safety, performance, and scalability. Code is available at: https://github.com/Kuro0911/CS5446-Project

Can classical consensus models predict the group behavior of large language models (LLMs)? We examine multi-round interactions among LLM agents through the DeGroot framework, where agents exchange text-based messages over diverse communication graphs. To track opinion evolution, we map each message to an opinion score via sentiment analysis. We find that agents typically reach consensus and the disagreement between the agents decays exponentially. However, the limiting opinion departs from DeGroot's network-centrality-weighted forecast. The consensus between LLM agents turns out to be largely insensitive to initial conditions and instead depends strongly on the discussion subject and inherent biases. Nevertheless, transient dynamics align with classical graph theory and the convergence rate of opinions is closely related to the second-largest eigenvalue of the graph's combination matrix. Together, these findings can be useful for LLM-driven social-network simulations and the design of resource-efficient multi-agent LLM applications.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) has demonstrated great utilization in post-training of Large Language Models (LLMs). In GRPO, prompts are answered by the model and, through reinforcement learning, preferred completions are learnt. Owing to the small communication volume, GRPO is inherently suitable for decentralised training as the prompts can be concurrently answered by multiple nodes and then exchanged in the forms of strings. In this work, we present the first adversarial attack in decentralised GRPO. We demonstrate that malicious parties can poison such systems by injecting arbitrary malicious tokens in benign models in both out-of-context and in-context attacks. Using empirical examples of math and coding tasks, we show that adversarial attacks can easily poison the benign nodes, polluting their local LLM post-training, achieving attack success rates up to 100% in as few as 50 iterations. We propose two ways to defend against these attacks, depending on whether all users train the same model or different models. We show that these defenses can achieve stop rates of up to 100%, making the attack impossible.

The decentralized and privacy-preserving nature of federated learning (FL) makes it vulnerable to backdoor attacks aiming to manipulate the behavior of the resulting model on specific adversary-chosen inputs. However, most existing defenses based on statistical differences take effect only against specific attacks, especially when the malicious gradients are similar to benign ones or the data are highly non-independent and identically distributed (non-IID). In this paper, we revisit the distance-based defense methods and discover that i) Euclidean distance becomes meaningless in high dimensions and ii) malicious gradients with diverse characteristics cannot be identified by a single metric. To this end, we present a simple yet effective defense strategy with multi-metrics and dynamic weighting to identify backdoors adaptively. Furthermore, our novel defense has no reliance on predefined assumptions over attack settings or data distributions and little impact on benign performance. To evaluate the effectiveness of our approach, we conduct comprehensive experiments on different datasets under various attack settings, where our method achieves the best defensive performance. For instance, we achieve the lowest backdoor accuracy of 3.06% under the difficult Edge-case PGD, showing significant superiority over previous defenses. The results also demonstrate that our method can be well-adapted to a wide range of non-IID degrees without sacrificing the benign performance.

Decentralized Autonomous Organizations (DAOs) are inclined explore Small Language Models (SLMs) as edge-native constitutional firewalls to vet proposals and mitigate semantic social engineering. While scaling inference-time compute (System 2) enhances formal logic, its efficacy in highly adversarial, cryptoeconomic governance environments remains underexplored. To address this, we introduce Sentinel-Bench, an 840-inference empirical framework executing a strict intra-model ablation on Qwen-3.5-9B. By toggling latent reasoning across frozen weights, we isolate the impact of inference-time compute against an adversarial Optimism DAO dataset. Our findings reveal a severe compute-accuracy inversion. The autoregressive baseline (System 1) achieved 100% adversarial robustness, 100% juridical consistency, and state finality in under 13 seconds. Conversely, System 2 reasoning introduced catastrophic instability, fundamentally driven by a 26.7% Reasoning Non-Convergence (cognitive collapse) rate. This collapse degraded trial-to-trial consensus stability to 72.6% and imposed a 17x latency overhead, introducing critical vulnerabilities to Governance Extractable Value (GEV) and hardware centralization. While rare (1.5% of adversarial trials), we empirically captured "Reasoning-Induced Sycophancy," where the model generated significantly longer internal monologues (averaging 25,750 characters) to rationalize failing the adversarial trap. We conclude that for edge-native SLMs operating under Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) constraints, System 1 parameterized intuition is structurally and economically superior to System 2 iterative deliberation for decentralized consensus. Code and Dataset: https://github.com/smarizvi110/sentinel-bench

Modern ML applications increasingly rely on complex deep learning models and large datasets. There has been an exponential growth in the amount of computation needed to train the largest models. Therefore, to scale computation and data, these models are inevitably trained in a distributed manner in clusters of nodes, and their updates are aggregated before being applied to the model. However, a distributed setup is prone to Byzantine failures of individual nodes, components, and software. With data augmentation added to these settings, there is a critical need for robust and efficient aggregation systems. We define the quality of workers as reconstruction ratios in (0,1], and formulate aggregation as a Maximum Likelihood Estimation procedure using Beta densities. We show that the Regularized form of log-likelihood wrt subspace can be approximately solved using iterative least squares solver, and provide convergence guarantees using recent Convex Optimization landscape results. Our empirical findings demonstrate that our approach significantly enhances the robustness of state-of-the-art Byzantine resilient aggregators. We evaluate our method in a distributed setup with a parameter server, and show simultaneous improvements in communication efficiency and accuracy across various tasks. The code is publicly available at https://github.com/hamidralmasi/FlagAggregator

The Weighted-Mean Subsequence Reduced (W-MSR) algorithm, the state-of-the-art method for Byzantine-resilient design of decentralized multi-robot systems, is based on discarding outliers received over Linear Consensus Protocol (LCP). Although W-MSR provides well-understood theoretical guarantees relating robust network connectivity to the convergence of the underlying consensus, the method comes with several limitations preventing its use at scale: (1) the number of Byzantine robots, F, to tolerate should be known a priori, (2) the requirement that each robot maintains 2F+1 neighbors is impractical for large F, (3) information propagation is hindered by the requirement that F+1 robots independently make local measurements of the consensus property in order for the swarm's decision to change, and (4) W-MSR is specific to LCP and does not generalize to applications not implemented over LCP. In this work, we propose a Decentralized Blocklist Protocol (DBP) based on inter-robot accusations. Accusations are made on the basis of locally-made observations of misbehavior, and once shared by cooperative robots across the network are used as input to a graph matching algorithm that computes a blocklist. DBP generalizes to applications not implemented via LCP, is adaptive to the number of Byzantine robots, and allows for fast information propagation through the multi-robot system while simultaneously reducing the required network connectivity relative to W-MSR. On LCP-type applications, DBP reduces the worst-case connectivity requirement of W-MSR from (2F+1)-connected to (F+1)-connected and the number of cooperative observers required to propagate new information from F+1 to just 1 observer. We demonstrate empirically that our approach to Byzantine resilience scales to hundreds of robots on cooperative target tracking, time synchronization, and localization case studies.

We performed a billion locality sensitive hash comparisons between artificially generated data samples to answer the critical question - can we verify the "correctness" of generative AI output in a non-deterministic, trustless, decentralized network? We generate millions of data samples from a variety of open source diffusion and large language models and describe the procedures and trade-offs between generating more verses less deterministic output in a heterogenous, stochastic network. Further, we analyze the outputs to provide empirical evidence of different parameterizations of tolerance and error bounds for verification. Finally, given that we have the generated an enormous amount of simulated data, we also release a new training dataset called ImageNet-Gen for use in augmenting existing training pipelines. For our results, we show that with a majority vote between three independent verifiers, we can detect image generated perceptual collisions in generated AI with over 99.89% probability and less than 0.0267% chance of intra-class collision. For large language models (LLMs), we are able to gain 100% consensus using greedy methods or n-way beam searches to generate consensus demonstrated on different LLMs. In the context of generative AI training, we pinpoint and minimize the major sources of stochasticity and present gossip and synchronization training techniques for verifiability. Thus, this work provides a practical, solid foundation for AI verification and consensus for the minimization of trust in a decentralized network.

LLM-based multi-agent pipelines flip from correct to incorrect answers under simulated peer disagreement at rates we term yield, a vulnerability widely attributed to RLHF-induced sycophancy. We test this attribution across four model families and find it largely wrong: pretrained base models exhibit the same substitution pattern as their Instruct variants, averaging higher yield than Instruct. Using activation patching, we localize the corruption to a narrow mid-layer window where attention carries the causal weight and MLP contribution is negligible; patching above this window restores 96% of the clean-to-pressured P(correct) gap. The attack surface decomposes into two independent factors (channel framing and consensus strength) whose interaction produces a 47.5 percentage-point yield gap at majority consensus, preserved across jury sizes N in {4, 5, 6}. Two converging activation-space interventions show that pressure suppresses clean-reasoning features rather than activating a new sycophancy circuit. A single correctly-arguing dissenter reduces yield by 54-73 percentage points across all framings tested, whereas the strongest prompt-level defense fails on attack variants outside its design surface. Mitigations should target the mechanism, structured dissent at the pipeline level, rather than prompt-level defenses.

Large language models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable capabilities but remain vulnerable to adversarial prompts known as jailbreaks, which can bypass safety alignment and elicit harmful outputs. Despite growing efforts in LLM safety research, existing evaluations are often fragmented, focused on isolated attack or defense techniques, and lack systematic, reproducible analysis. In this work, we introduce PandaGuard, a unified and modular framework that models LLM jailbreak safety as a multi-agent system comprising attackers, defenders, and judges. Our framework implements 19 attack methods and 12 defense mechanisms, along with multiple judgment strategies, all within a flexible plugin architecture supporting diverse LLM interfaces, multiple interaction modes, and configuration-driven experimentation that enhances reproducibility and practical deployment. Built on this framework, we develop PandaBench, a comprehensive benchmark that evaluates the interactions between these attack/defense methods across 49 LLMs and various judgment approaches, requiring over 3 billion tokens to execute. Our extensive evaluation reveals key insights into model vulnerabilities, defense cost-performance trade-offs, and judge consistency. We find that no single defense is optimal across all dimensions and that judge disagreement introduces nontrivial variance in safety assessments. We release the code, configurations, and evaluation results to support transparent and reproducible research in LLM safety.

Federated learning has exhibited vulnerabilities to Byzantine attacks, where the Byzantine attackers can send arbitrary gradients to a central server to destroy the convergence and performance of the global model. A wealth of robust AGgregation Rules (AGRs) have been proposed to defend against Byzantine attacks. However, Byzantine clients can still circumvent robust AGRs when data is non-Identically and Independently Distributed (non-IID). In this paper, we first reveal the root causes of performance degradation of current robust AGRs in non-IID settings: the curse of dimensionality and gradient heterogeneity. In order to address this issue, we propose GAS, a \shorten approach that can successfully adapt existing robust AGRs to non-IID settings. We also provide a detailed convergence analysis when the existing robust AGRs are combined with GAS. Experiments on various real-world datasets verify the efficacy of our proposed GAS. The implementation code is provided in https://github.com/YuchenLiu-a/byzantine-gas.

Federated learning is used to train a shared model in a decentralized way without clients sharing private data with each other. Federated learning systems are susceptible to poisoning attacks when malicious clients send false updates to the central server. Existing defense strategies are ineffective under non-IID data settings. This paper proposes a new defense strategy, FedCPA (Federated learning with Critical Parameter Analysis). Our attack-tolerant aggregation method is based on the observation that benign local models have similar sets of top-k and bottom-k critical parameters, whereas poisoned local models do not. Experiments with different attack scenarios on multiple datasets demonstrate that our model outperforms existing defense strategies in defending against poisoning attacks.

Proof-of-Work (PoW) consensus mechanism is popular among current blockchain systems, which leads to an increasing concern about the tremendous waste of energy due to massive meaningless computation. To address this issue, we propose a novel and energy-efficient blockchain system, CrowdMine, which exploits useful crowdsourcing computation to achieve decentralized consensus. CrowdMine solves user-proposed computing tasks and utilizes the computation committed to the task solving process to secure decentralized on-chain storage. With our designed ``Proof of Crowdsourcing Work'' (PoCW) protocol, our system provides an efficient paradigm for computation and storage in a trustless and decentralized environment. We further show that the system can defend against potential attacks on blockchain, including the short-term 51\% attack, the problem-constructing attack, and the solution-stealing attack. We also implement the system with 40 distributed nodes to demonstrate its performance and robustness. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first system that enables decentralized Proof of Useful Work (PoUW) with general user-proposed tasks posted in a permissionless and trustless network.

Adversarial attacks have been a looming and unaddressed threat in the industry. However, through a decade-long history of the robustness evaluation literature, we have learned that mounting a strong or optimal attack is challenging. It requires both machine learning and domain expertise. In other words, the white-box threat model, religiously assumed by a large majority of the past literature, is unrealistic. In this paper, we propose a new practical threat model where the adversary relies on transfer attacks through publicly available surrogate models. We argue that this setting will become the most prevalent for security-sensitive applications in the future. We evaluate the transfer attacks in this setting and propose a specialized defense method based on a game-theoretic perspective. The defenses are evaluated under 24 public models and 11 attack algorithms across three datasets (CIFAR-10, CIFAR-100, and ImageNet). Under this threat model, our defense, PubDef, outperforms the state-of-the-art white-box adversarial training by a large margin with almost no loss in the normal accuracy. For instance, on ImageNet, our defense achieves 62% accuracy under the strongest transfer attack vs only 36% of the best adversarially trained model. Its accuracy when not under attack is only 2% lower than that of an undefended model (78% vs 80%). We release our code at https://github.com/wagner-group/pubdef.

Federated learning (FL) allows mutually untrusted clients to collaboratively train a common machine learning model without sharing their private/proprietary training data among each other. FL is unfortunately susceptible to poisoning by malicious clients who aim to hamper the accuracy of the commonly trained model through sending malicious model updates during FL's training process. We argue that the key factor to the success of poisoning attacks against existing FL systems is the large space of model updates available to the clients, allowing malicious clients to search for the most poisonous model updates, e.g., by solving an optimization problem. To address this, we propose Federated Rank Learning (FRL). FRL reduces the space of client updates from model parameter updates (a continuous space of float numbers) in standard FL to the space of parameter rankings (a discrete space of integer values). To be able to train the global model using parameter ranks (instead of parameter weights), FRL leverage ideas from recent supermasks training mechanisms. Specifically, FRL clients rank the parameters of a randomly initialized neural network (provided by the server) based on their local training data. The FRL server uses a voting mechanism to aggregate the parameter rankings submitted by clients in each training epoch to generate the global ranking of the next training epoch. Intuitively, our voting-based aggregation mechanism prevents poisoning clients from making significant adversarial modifications to the global model, as each client will have a single vote! We demonstrate the robustness of FRL to poisoning through analytical proofs and experimentation. We also show FRL's high communication efficiency. Our experiments demonstrate the superiority of FRL in real-world FL settings.

As the issue of robustness in AI systems becomes vital, statistical learning techniques that are reliable even in presence of partly contaminated data have to be developed. Preference data, in the form of (complete) rankings in the simplest situations, are no exception and the demand for appropriate concepts and tools is all the more pressing given that technologies fed by or producing this type of data (e.g. search engines, recommending systems) are now massively deployed. However, the lack of vector space structure for the set of rankings (i.e. the symmetric group S_n) and the complex nature of statistics considered in ranking data analysis make the formulation of robustness objectives in this domain challenging. In this paper, we introduce notions of robustness, together with dedicated statistical methods, for Consensus Ranking the flagship problem in ranking data analysis, aiming at summarizing a probability distribution on S_n by a median ranking. Precisely, we propose specific extensions of the popular concept of breakdown point, tailored to consensus ranking, and address the related computational issues. Beyond the theoretical contributions, the relevance of the approach proposed is supported by an experimental study.

Distributed protocols should be robust to both benign malfunction (e.g. packet loss or delay) and attacks (e.g. message replay) from internal or external adversaries. In this paper we take a formal approach to the automated synthesis of attackers, i.e. adversarial processes that can cause the protocol to malfunction. Specifically, given a formal threat model capturing the distributed protocol model and network topology, as well as the placement, goals, and interface (inputs and outputs) of potential attackers, we automatically synthesize an attacker. We formalize four attacker synthesis problems - across attackers that always succeed versus those that sometimes fail, and attackers that attack forever versus those that do not - and we propose algorithmic solutions to two of them. We report on a prototype implementation called KORG and its application to TCP as a case-study. Our experiments show that KORG can automatically generate well-known attacks for TCP within seconds or minutes.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) and Multimodal LLMs (MLLMs) into scientific peer-review workflows introduces novel and significant risks for adversarial manipulation, especially given the multimodal nature of scientific papers where figures, not just text, convey core evidence. This creates a significant gap: current robustness studies on AI peer-review are overwhelmingly text-only. Moreover, the problem is distinct from standard jailbreaking, as a peer-review attack seeks to induce a domain-specific, targeted failure (e.g., "inflate this score") rather than a general safety policy violation, for which no practical defenses exist. To address this, we introduce PaperGuard, the first comprehensive benchmark designed to systematically evaluate and defend AI-generated peer-review against these domain-specific, cross-modal attacks. Our framework is built on three pillars: (1) a new multimodal peer-review dataset spanning multiple scientific domains; (2) a unified suite of attacks, including black-box prompt injections and white-box perturbations, specifically designed to target both text (GCG) and figures (PGD); and (3) a practical defense, motivated by the long-context challenge of academic papers, that uses chunk-based embedding search to efficiently localize and mitigate harmful instructions. Our extensive experiments, conducted across state-of-the-art models, confirm that AI reviewers are pervasively vulnerable. PaperGuard establishes the foundational benchmark, protocols, and actionable defense necessary to pioneer trustworthy, attack-resilient AI-assisted scholarly reviewing.

Despite advances in safety alignment, prompt-rewriting attacks such as persona modulation, fictional framing and persuasion-based reformulation, can bypass safety filters even on frontier models. Existing defenses either rely on non-scalable human curation or white-box optimisation that overfits to specific model internals, leaving aligned models brittle against the very class of adaptive black-box adversaries they will face in deployment. To address this gap, we introduce CHASE (Co-evolutionary Hardening through Adversarial Safety-Escalation), a closed-loop red-blue teaming framework in which a black-box attacker and a safety-aligned defender co-evolve. The attacker is trained via Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) under a multiplicative reward that jointly enforces bypass effectiveness and intent fidelity, while the defender is hardened on the harvested adversarial rewrites through a two-stage GRPO + rejection-sampled SFT pipeline balanced with benign data. Evaluated on BeaverTails and JailbreakBench against five held-out attack families (PAIR, TAP, AutoDAN, PAP, Translation), CHASE cuts mean StrongREJECT score by 43.2\% with 0\% false-refusal on benign prompts. Beyond the headline result, CHASE shows that template-free RL exploration recovers latent attack primitives that transfer across mechanistically distinct attack families, suggesting a path toward LLM safety hardening that generalises beyond the narrow distributions achieved thus far in adversarial training.

The remarkable growth in large language model (LLM) capabilities has spurred exploration into multi-agent systems, with debate frameworks emerging as a promising avenue for enhanced problem-solving. These multi-agent debate (MAD) approaches, where agents collaboratively present, critique, and refine arguments, potentially offer improved reasoning, robustness, and diverse perspectives over monolithic models. Despite prior studies leveraging MAD, a systematic understanding of its effectiveness compared to self-agent methods, particularly under varying conditions, remains elusive. This paper seeks to fill this gap by conceptualizing MAD as a test-time computational scaling technique, distinguished by collaborative refinement and diverse exploration capabilities. We conduct a comprehensive empirical investigation comparing MAD with strong self-agent test-time scaling baselines on mathematical reasoning and safety-related tasks. Our study systematically examines the influence of task difficulty, model scale, and agent diversity on MAD's performance. Key findings reveal that, for mathematical reasoning, MAD offers limited advantages over self-agent scaling but becomes more effective with increased problem difficulty and decreased model capability, while agent diversity shows little benefit. Conversely, for safety tasks, MAD's collaborative refinement can increase vulnerability, but incorporating diverse agent configurations facilitates a gradual reduction in attack success through the collaborative refinement process. We believe our findings provide critical guidance for the future development of more effective and strategically deployed MAD systems.

In this paper we present the initial design of Minerva consensus protocol for Truechain and other technical details. Currently, it is widely believed in the blockchain community that a public chain cannot simultaneously achieve high performance, decentralization and security. This is true in the case of a Nakamoto chain (low performance) or a delegated proof of stake chain (partially centralized), which are the most popular block chain solutions at time of writing. Our consensus design enjoys the same consistency, liveness, transaction finality and security guarantee, a de-facto with the Hybrid Consensus. We go on to propose the idea of a new virtual machine on top of Ethereum which adds permissioned-chain based transaction processing capabilities in a permissionless setting. We also use the idea of data sharding and speculative transactions, and evaluation of smart contracts in a sharding friendly virtual machine. Finally, we will briefly discuss our fundamentally ASIC resistant mining algorithm, Truehash.

Current LLM safety defenses fail under decomposition attacks, where a malicious goal is decomposed into benign subtasks that circumvent refusals. The challenge lies in the existing shallow safety alignment techniques: they only detect harm in the immediate prompt and do not reason about long-range intent, leaving them blind to malicious intent that emerges over a sequence of seemingly benign instructions. We therefore propose adding an external monitor that observes the conversation at a higher granularity. To facilitate our study of monitoring decomposition attacks, we curate the largest and most diverse dataset to date, including question-answering, text-to-image, and agentic tasks. We verify our datasets by testing them on frontier LLMs and show an 87% attack success rate on average on GPT-4o. This confirms that decomposition attack is broadly effective. Additionally, we find that random tasks can be injected into the decomposed subtasks to further obfuscate malicious intents. To defend in real time, we propose a lightweight sequential monitoring framework that cumulatively evaluates each subtask. We show that a carefully prompt engineered lightweight monitor achieves a 93% defense success rate, beating reasoning models like o3 mini as a monitor. Moreover, it remains robust against random task injection and cuts cost by 90% and latency by 50%. Our findings suggest that lightweight sequential monitors are highly effective in mitigating decomposition attacks and are viable in deployment.

Sponge attacks increasingly threaten LLM systems by inducing excessive computation and DoS. Existing defenses either rely on statistical filters that fail on semantically meaningful attacks or use static LLM-based detectors that struggle to adapt as attack strategies evolve. We introduce SHIELD, a multi-agent, auto-healing defense framework centered on a three-stage Defense Agent that integrates semantic similarity retrieval, pattern matching, and LLM-based reasoning. Two auxiliary agents, a Knowledge Updating Agent and a Prompt Optimization Agent, form a closed self-healing loop, when an attack bypasses detection, the system updates an evolving knowledgebase, and refines defense instructions. Extensive experiments show that SHIELD consistently outperforms perplexity-based and standalone LLM defenses, achieving high F1 scores across both non-semantic and semantic sponge attacks, demonstrating the effectiveness of agentic self-healing against evolving resource-exhaustion threats.

Few-shot classification with foundation models (e.g., CLIP, DINOv2, PaLM-2) enables users to build an accurate classifier with a few labeled training samples (called support samples) for a classification task. However, an attacker could perform data poisoning attacks by manipulating some support samples such that the classifier makes the attacker-desired, arbitrary prediction for a testing input. Empirical defenses cannot provide formal robustness guarantees, leading to a cat-and-mouse game between the attacker and defender. Existing certified defenses are designed for traditional supervised learning, resulting in sub-optimal performance when extended to few-shot classification. In our work, we propose FCert, the first certified defense against data poisoning attacks to few-shot classification. We show our FCert provably predicts the same label for a testing input under arbitrary data poisoning attacks when the total number of poisoned support samples is bounded. We perform extensive experiments on benchmark few-shot classification datasets with foundation models released by OpenAI, Meta, and Google in both vision and text domains. Our experimental results show our FCert: 1) maintains classification accuracy without attacks, 2) outperforms existing state-of-the-art certified defenses for data poisoning attacks, and 3) is efficient and general.

In federated learning (FL), data heterogeneity is one key bottleneck that causes model divergence and limits performance. Addressing this, existing methods often regard data heterogeneity as an inherent property and propose to mitigate its adverse effects by correcting models. In this paper, we seek to break this inherent property by generating data to complement the original dataset to fundamentally mitigate heterogeneity level. As a novel attempt from the perspective of data, we propose federated learning with consensus-oriented generation (FedCOG). FedCOG consists of two key components at the client side: complementary data generation, which generates data extracted from the shared global model to complement the original dataset, and knowledge-distillation-based model training, which distills knowledge from global model to local model based on the generated data to mitigate over-fitting the original heterogeneous dataset. FedCOG has two critical advantages: 1) it can be a plug-and-play module to further improve the performance of most existing FL methods, and 2) it is naturally compatible with standard FL protocols such as Secure Aggregation since it makes no modification in communication process. Extensive experiments on classical and real-world FL datasets show that FedCOG consistently outperforms state-of-the-art methods.

A general-purpose language model that answers a harmful question returns text; a coding model that complies with a malicious request can return a working weapon -- a keylogger, a ransomware stub, an exploit that runs as written. This asymmetry in the severity of a single act of compliance implies coding-specialized models should clear a higher refusal bar than general-purpose chat models, not a lower one, yet the field cannot presently tell whether they do. Refusal benchmarks for malicious code are fragmented: they mix requests for executable software (ready-to-run weapons) with requests for harmful security knowledge (information a human must still operationalise) and report refusal rates over non-comparable corpora, so no single statistic measures the property that actually matters. This paper introduces an expanded consensus-labeled prompt bank that distinguishes between these two request types and provides a construct-stable substrate for cross-corpus coding-model compliance measurement. Eight corpora (ASTRA, CySecBench, AdvBench/harmful_behaviors, JailbreakBench, MalwareBench, RedCode, RMCBench, Scam2Prompt) are consolidated and classified under a five-judge consensus protocol (6,675 prompts x 5 judges = 33,375 calls). The panel reaches Fleiss' kappa = 0.767 [95% CI 0.755, 0.777] ("substantial"); 95.0% of prompts draw at least four agreeing judges, 76.9% are unanimous, and the panel reproduces the earlier four-corpus release at Cohen's kappa = 0.952 on the 3,133 shared prompts. The released bank comprises 4,748 consensus-CODE prompts (executable malicious code requests) and 1,923 consensus-KNOWLEDGE prompts (harmful security knowledge requests). The bank is the validated instrument the field has lacked: a reliability-quantified basis for testing whether coding models meet the stricter refusal standard their executable output demands.

Federated Learning (FL) enables clients to collaboratively train a global model using their local datasets while reinforcing data privacy. However, FL is susceptible to poisoning attacks. Existing defense mechanisms assume that clients' data are independent and identically distributed (IID), making them ineffective in real-world applications where data are non-IID. This paper presents FedCLEAN, the first defense capable of filtering attackers' model updates in a non-IID FL environment. The originality of FedCLEAN is twofold. First, it relies on a client confidence score derived from the reconstruction errors of each client's model activation maps for a given trigger set, with reconstruction errors obtained by means of a Conditional Variational Autoencoder trained according to a novel server-side strategy. Second, we propose an ad-hoc trust propagation algorithm based on client scores, which allows building a cluster of benign clients while flagging potential attackers. Experimental results on the datasets MNIST and FashionMNIST demonstrate the robustness of FedCLEAN against Byzantine attackers in non-IID scenarios and a close-to-zero benign client misclassification rate, even in the absence of an attack.

Multi-Agent Debate has emerged as a promising framework for improving the reasoning quality of large language models through iterative inter-agent communication. However, broadcasting all agent messages at every round introduces noise and redundancy that can degrade debate quality and waste computational resources. Current approaches rely on uncertainty estimation to filter low-confidence responses before broadcasting, but this approach is unreliable due to miscalibrated confidence scores and sensitivity to threshold selection. To address this, we propose Diversity-Aware Retention (DAR), a lightweight debate framework that, at each debate round, selects the subset of agent responses that maximally disagree with each other and with the majority vote before broadcasting. Through an explicit index-based retention mechanism, DAR preserves the original messages without modification, ensuring that retained disagreements remain authentic. Experiments on diverse reasoning and question answering benchmarks demonstrate that our selective message propagation consistently improves debate performance, particularly as the number of agents scales, where noise accumulation is most severe. Our results highlight that what agents hear is as important as what agents say in multi-agent reasoning systems. Code is publicly available at https://github.com/DA2I2-SLM/DAR.

Test-Time Reinforcement Learning (TTRL) enables Large Language Models (LLMs) to enhance reasoning capabilities on unlabeled test streams by deriving pseudo-rewards from majority voting consensus. However, existing TTRL methods rely exclusively on positive pseudo-labeling strategies. Such reliance becomes vulnerable under challenging scenarios where answer distributions are highly dispersed, resulting in weak consensus that inadvertently reinforces incorrect trajectories as supervision signals. In this paper, we propose SCRL (Selective-Complementary Reinforcement Learning), a robust test-time reinforcement learning framework that effectively mitigates label noise amplification. SCRL develops Selective Positive Pseudo-Labeling, which enforces strict consensus criteria to filter unreliable majorities. Complementarily, SCRL introduces Entropy-Gated Negative Pseudo-Labeling, the first negative supervision mechanism in TTRL, to reliably prune incorrect trajectories based on generation uncertainty. Extensive experiments on multiple reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that SCRL achieves substantial improvements over baselines, while maintaining robust generalization and training stability under constrained rollout budgets. Our code is available at https://github.com/Jasper-Yan/SCRL.

How should we evaluate the robustness of language model defenses? Current defenses against jailbreaks and prompt injections (which aim to prevent an attacker from eliciting harmful knowledge or remotely triggering malicious actions, respectively) are typically evaluated either against a static set of harmful attack strings, or against computationally weak optimization methods that were not designed with the defense in mind. We argue that this evaluation process is flawed. Instead, we should evaluate defenses against adaptive attackers who explicitly modify their attack strategy to counter a defense's design while spending considerable resources to optimize their objective. By systematically tuning and scaling general optimization techniques-gradient descent, reinforcement learning, random search, and human-guided exploration-we bypass 12 recent defenses (based on a diverse set of techniques) with attack success rate above 90% for most; importantly, the majority of defenses originally reported near-zero attack success rates. We believe that future defense work must consider stronger attacks, such as the ones we describe, in order to make reliable and convincing claims of robustness.

Large language models (LLMs) are reshaping numerous facets of our daily lives, leading widespread adoption as web-based services. Despite their versatility, LLMs face notable challenges, such as generating hallucinated content and lacking access to up-to-date information. Lately, to address such limitations, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) has emerged as a promising direction by generating responses grounded in external knowledge sources. A typical RAG system consists of i) a retriever that probes a group of relevant passages from a knowledge base and ii) a generator that formulates a response based on the retrieved content. However, as with other AI systems, recent studies demonstrate the vulnerability of RAG, such as knowledge corruption attacks by injecting misleading information. In response, several defense strategies have been proposed, including having LLMs inspect the retrieved passages individually or fine-tuning robust retrievers. While effective, such approaches often come with substantial computational costs. In this work, we introduce RAGDefender, a resource-efficient defense mechanism against knowledge corruption (i.e., by data poisoning) attacks in practical RAG deployments. RAGDefender operates during the post-retrieval phase, leveraging lightweight machine learning techniques to detect and filter out adversarial content without requiring additional model training or inference. Our empirical evaluations show that RAGDefender consistently outperforms existing state-of-the-art defenses across multiple models and adversarial scenarios: e.g., RAGDefender reduces the attack success rate (ASR) against the Gemini model from 0.89 to as low as 0.02, compared to 0.69 for RobustRAG and 0.24 for Discern-and-Answer when adversarial passages outnumber legitimate ones by a factor of four (4x).

Collaborative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) has rapidly evolved, offering state-of-the-art algorithms for real-world applications, including sensitive domains. However, a key challenge to its widespread adoption is the lack of a thorough investigation into its vulnerabilities to adversarial attacks. Existing work predominantly focuses on training-time attacks or unrealistic scenarios, such as access to policy weights or the ability to train surrogate policies. In this paper, we investigate new vulnerabilities under more realistic and constrained conditions, assuming an adversary can only collect and perturb the observations of deployed agents. We also consider scenarios where the adversary has no access at all. We propose simple yet highly effective algorithms for generating adversarial perturbations designed to misalign how victim agents perceive their environment. Our approach is empirically validated on three benchmarks and 22 environments, demonstrating its effectiveness across diverse algorithms and environments. Furthermore, we show that our algorithm is sample-efficient, requiring only 1,000 samples compared to the millions needed by previous methods.

Multi-Agent Debate~(MAD) has emerged as a promising paradigm for improving the performance of large language models through collaborative reasoning. Despite recent advances, the key factors driving MAD's effectiveness remain unclear. In this work, we disentangle MAD into two key components--Majority Voting and inter-agent Debate--and assess their respective contributions. Through extensive experiments across seven NLP benchmarks, we find that Majority Voting alone accounts for most of the performance gains typically attributed to MAD. To explain this, we propose a theoretical framework that models debate as a stochastic process. We prove that it induces a martingale over agents' belief trajectories, implying that debate alone does not improve expected correctness. Guided by these insights, we demonstrate that targeted interventions, by biasing the belief update toward correction, can meaningfully enhance debate effectiveness. Overall, our findings suggest that while MAD has potential, simple ensembling methods remain strong and more reliable alternatives in many practical settings. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/debate-or-vote.

Current evaluations of defenses against prompt attacks in large language model (LLM) applications often overlook two critical factors: the dynamic nature of adversarial behavior and the usability penalties imposed on legitimate users by restrictive defenses. We propose D-SEC (Dynamic Security Utility Threat Model), which explicitly separates attackers from legitimate users, models multi-step interactions, and expresses the security-utility in an optimizable form. We further address the shortcomings in existing evaluations by introducing Gandalf, a crowd-sourced, gamified red-teaming platform designed to generate realistic, adaptive attack. Using Gandalf, we collect and release a dataset of 279k prompt attacks. Complemented by benign user data, our analysis reveals the interplay between security and utility, showing that defenses integrated in the LLM (e.g., system prompts) can degrade usability even without blocking requests. We demonstrate that restricted application domains, defense-in-depth, and adaptive defenses are effective strategies for building secure and useful LLM applications.

Agentic retrieval-augmented reasoning pipelines are increasingly used to structure how large language models (LLMs) incorporate external evidence in clinical decision support. These systems iteratively retrieve curated domain knowledge and synthesize it into structured reports before answer selection. Although such pipelines can improve performance, their impact on reliability under model variability remains unclear. In real-world deployment, heterogeneous models may align, diverge, or synchronize errors in ways not captured by accuracy. We evaluated 34 LLMs on 169 expert-curated publicly available radiology questions, comparing zero-shot inference with a radiology-specific multi-step agentic retrieval condition in which all models received identical structured evidence reports derived from curated radiology knowledge. Agentic inference reduced inter-model decision dispersion (median entropy 0.48 vs. 0.13) and increased robustness of correctness across models (mean 0.74 vs. 0.81). Majority consensus also increased overall (P<0.001). Consensus strength and robust correctness remained correlated under both strategies (ho=0.88 for zero-shot; ho=0.87 for agentic), although high agreement did not guarantee correctness. Response verbosity showed no meaningful association with correctness. Among 572 incorrect outputs, 72% were associated with moderate or high clinically assessed severity, although inter-rater agreement was low (appa=0.02). Agentic retrieval therefore was associated with more concentrated decision distributions, stronger consensus, and higher cross-model robustness of correctness. These findings suggest that evaluating agentic systems through accuracy or agreement alone may not always be sufficient, and that complementary analyses of stability, cross-model robustness, and potential clinical impact are needed to characterize reliability under model variability.

Large foundation models are integrated into Computer Use Agents (CUAs), enabling autonomous interaction with operating systems through graphical user interfaces (GUIs) to perform complex tasks. This autonomy introduces serious security risks: malicious instructions or visual prompt injections can trigger unsafe reasoning and cause harmful system-level actions. Existing defenses, such as detection-based blocking, prevent damage but often abort tasks prematurely, reducing agent utility. In this paper, we present MirrorGuard, a plug-and-play defense framework that uses simulation-based training to improve CUA security in the real world. To reduce the cost of large-scale training in operating systems, we propose a novel neural-symbolic simulation pipeline, which generates realistic, high-risk GUI interaction trajectories entirely in a text-based simulated environment, which captures unsafe reasoning patterns and potential system hazards without executing real operations. In the simulation environment, MirrorGuard learns to intercept and rectify insecure reasoning chains of CUAs before they produce and execute unsafe actions. In real-world testing, extensive evaluations across diverse benchmarks and CUA architectures show that MirrorGuard significantly mitigates security risks. For instance, on the ByteDance UI-TARS system, it reduces the unsafe rate from 66.5% to 13.0% while maintaining a marginal false refusal rate (FRR). In contrast, the state-of-the-art GuardAgent only achieves a reduction to 53.9% and suffers from a 15.4% higher FRR. Our work proves that simulation-derived defenses can provide robust, real-world protection while maintaining the fundamental utility of the agent. Our code and model are publicly available at https://bmz-q-q.github.io/MirrorGuard/.

Large language models (LLMs) are susceptible to persuasion, which can pose risks when models are faced with an adversarial interlocutor. We take a first step towards defending models against persuasion while also arguing that defense against adversarial (i.e. negative) persuasion is only half of the equation: models should also be able to accept beneficial (i.e. positive) persuasion to improve their answers. We show that optimizing models for only one side results in poor performance on the other. In order to balance positive and negative persuasion, we introduce Persuasion-Balanced Training (or PBT), which leverages multi-agent recursive dialogue trees to create data and trains models via preference optimization to accept persuasion when appropriate. PBT consistently improves resistance to misinformation and resilience to being challenged while also resulting in the best overall performance on holistic data containing both positive and negative persuasion. Crucially, we show that PBT models are better teammates in multi-agent debates. We find that without PBT, pairs of stronger and weaker models have unstable performance, with the order in which the models present their answers determining whether the team obtains the stronger or weaker model's performance. PBT leads to better and more stable results and less order dependence, with the stronger model consistently pulling the weaker one up.

Ensuring robust safety alignment is crucial for Large Language Models (LLMs), yet existing defenses often lag behind evolving adversarial attacks due to their reliance on static, pre-collected data distributions. In this paper, we introduce MAGIC, a novel multi-turn multi-agent reinforcement learning framework that formulates LLM safety alignment as an adversarial asymmetric game. Specifically, an attacker agent learns to iteratively rewrite original queries into deceptive prompts, while a defender agent simultaneously optimizes its policy to recognize and refuse such inputs. This dynamic process triggers a co-evolution, where the attacker's ever-changing strategies continuously uncover long-tail vulnerabilities, driving the defender to generalize to unseen attack patterns. Remarkably, we observe that the attacker, endowed with initial reasoning ability, evolves novel, previously unseen combinatorial strategies through iterative RL training, underscoring our method's substantial potential. Theoretically, we provide insights into a more robust game equilibrium and derive safety guarantees. Extensive experiments validate our framework's effectiveness, demonstrating superior defense success rates without compromising the helpfulness of the model. Our code is available at https://github.com/BattleWen/MAGIC.

Despite incredible advances, deep learning has been shown to be susceptible to adversarial attacks. Numerous approaches have been proposed to train robust networks both empirically and certifiably. However, most of them defend against only a single type of attack, while recent work takes steps forward in defending against multiple attacks. In this paper, to understand multi-target robustness, we view this problem as a bargaining game in which different players (adversaries) negotiate to reach an agreement on a joint direction of parameter updating. We identify a phenomenon named player domination in the bargaining game, namely that the existing max-based approaches, such as MAX and MSD, do not converge. Based on our theoretical analysis, we design a novel framework that adjusts the budgets of different adversaries to avoid any player dominance. Experiments on standard benchmarks show that employing the proposed framework to the existing approaches significantly advances multi-target robustness.

Multi-agent discussions have been widely adopted, motivating growing efforts to develop attacks that expose their vulnerabilities. In this work, we study a practical yet largely unexplored attack scenario, the discussion-monitored scenario, where anomaly detectors continuously monitor inter-agent communications and block detected adversarial messages. Although existing attacks are effective without discussion monitoring, we show that they exhibit detectable patterns and largely fail under such monitoring constraints. But does this imply that monitoring alone is sufficient to secure multi-agent discussions? To answer this question, we develop a novel attack method explicitly tailored to the discussion-monitored scenario. Extensive experiments demonstrate that effective attacks remain possible even under continuous monitoring, indicating that monitoring alone does not eliminate adversarial risks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities as autonomous agents through tool use, planning, and decision-making abilities, leading to their widespread adoption across diverse tasks. As task complexity grows, multi-agent LLM systems are increasingly used to solve problems collaboratively. However, safety and security of these systems remains largely under-explored. Existing benchmarks and datasets predominantly focus on single-agent settings, failing to capture the unique vulnerabilities of multi-agent dynamics and co-ordination. To address this gap, we introduce Threats and Attacks in Multi-Agent Systems (TAMAS), a benchmark designed to evaluate the robustness and safety of multi-agent LLM systems. TAMAS includes five distinct scenarios comprising 300 adversarial instances across six attack types and 211 tools, along with 100 harmless tasks. We assess system performance across ten backbone LLMs and three agent interaction configurations from Autogen and CrewAI frameworks, highlighting critical challenges and failure modes in current multi-agent deployments. Furthermore, we introduce Effective Robustness Score (ERS) to assess the tradeoff between safety and task effectiveness of these frameworks. Our findings show that multi-agent systems are highly vulnerable to adversarial attacks, underscoring the urgent need for stronger defenses. TAMAS provides a foundation for systematically studying and improving the safety of multi-agent LLM systems.

Current label-free RLVR approaches for large language models (LLMs), such as TTRL and Self-reward, have demonstrated effectiveness in improving the performance of LLMs on complex reasoning tasks. However, these methods rely heavily on accurate pseudo-label estimation and converge on spurious yet popular answers, thereby trapping in a dominant mode and limiting further improvements. Building on this, we propose Dual Consensus Reinforcement Learning (DCRL), a novel self-supervised training method which is capable of generating more reliable learning signals through a two-stage consensus mechanism. The model initially acts as an anchor, producing dominant responses; then it serves as an explorer, generating diverse auxiliary signals via a temporary unlearning process. The final training target is derived from the harmonic mean of these two signal sets. Notably, the process operates entirely without external models or supervision. Across eight benchmarks and diverse domains, DCRL consistently improves Pass@1 over majority vote while yielding more stable training dynamics. These results demonstrate that DCRL establishes a scalable path toward stronger reasoning without labels.

In this paper we provide a novel analytical perspective on the theoretical understanding of gradient-based learning algorithms by interpreting consensus-based optimization (CBO), a recently proposed multi-particle derivative-free optimization method, as a stochastic relaxation of gradient descent. Remarkably, we observe that through communication of the particles, CBO exhibits a stochastic gradient descent (SGD)-like behavior despite solely relying on evaluations of the objective function. The fundamental value of such link between CBO and SGD lies in the fact that CBO is provably globally convergent to global minimizers for ample classes of nonsmooth and nonconvex objective functions, hence, on the one side, offering a novel explanation for the success of stochastic relaxations of gradient descent. On the other side, contrary to the conventional wisdom for which zero-order methods ought to be inefficient or not to possess generalization abilities, our results unveil an intrinsic gradient descent nature of such heuristics. This viewpoint furthermore complements previous insights into the working principles of CBO, which describe the dynamics in the mean-field limit through a nonlinear nonlocal partial differential equation that allows to alleviate complexities of the nonconvex function landscape. Our proofs leverage a completely nonsmooth analysis, which combines a novel quantitative version of the Laplace principle (log-sum-exp trick) and the minimizing movement scheme (proximal iteration). In doing so, we furnish useful and precise insights that explain how stochastic perturbations of gradient descent overcome energy barriers and reach deep levels of nonconvex functions. Instructive numerical illustrations support the provided theoretical insights.

Multi-agent debate (MAD) aims to improve large language model (LLM) reasoning by letting multiple agents exchange answers and then aggregate their opinions. Yet recent studies reveal that agents are not neutral: they are prone to identity-driven sycophancy and self-bias, uncritically adopting a peer's view or stubbornly adhering to their own prior output, undermining the reliability of debate. In this work, we present the first principled framework that joins sycophancy and self-bias to mitigate and quantify identity bias in MAD. First, we formalize the debate dynamics as an identity-weighted Bayesian update process. Second, we propose response anonymization: by removing identity markers from prompts, agents cannot distinguish "self" from "peer", which forces equal weights on agent identity, thereby reducing bias and improving trustworthiness. Third, we define the Identity Bias Coefficient (IBC), a principled bias metric that measures an agent's tendency to follow its peer versus itself. Empirical studies across multiple models and benchmarks confirm that identity bias is widespread, with sycophancy far more common than self-bias. Our findings highlight the need to ensure that MAD systems reason based on content rather than identity. Code is released in https://github.com/deeplearning-wisc/MAD-identity-bias.

Federated learning (FL) enables collaborative model training while preserving data privacy, but its decentralized nature exposes it to client-side data poisoning attacks (DPAs) and model poisoning attacks (MPAs) that degrade global model performance. While numerous proposed defenses claim substantial effectiveness, their evaluation is typically done in isolation with limited attack strategies, raising concerns about their validity. Additionally, existing studies overlook the mutual effectiveness of defenses against both DPAs and MPAs, causing fragmentation in this field. This paper aims to provide a unified benchmark and analysis of defenses against DPAs and MPAs, clarifying the distinction between these two similar but slightly distinct domains. We present a systematic taxonomy of poisoning attacks and defense strategies, outlining their design, strengths, and limitations. Then, a unified comparative evaluation across FL algorithms and data heterogeneity is conducted to validate their individual and mutual effectiveness and derive key insights for design principles and future research. Along with the analysis, we frame our work to a unified benchmark, FLPoison, with high modularity and scalability to evaluate 15 representative poisoning attacks and 17 defense strategies, facilitating future research in this domain. Code is available at https://github.com/vio1etus/FLPoison.

The same arguments often need to be evaluated under different external regimes. An agent with influence over the regime has a strategic lever that standard formalisms do not directly capture. We introduce context-dependent argumentation frameworks (CDAFs), an extension of Dung's theory in which a defeat function determines, per context, which attacks succeed. A perspective-labeled specialisation derives the defeat function from a relevance set ρ and a priority π. The relevance set is the agent's action space. In a small worked example, the agent's target argument is rejected under every full-relevance injective priority, yet accepted under partial activations, one of which no VAF audience can mirror. We define the corresponding decision problem, ACTIVATION-MANIPULATION, and record baseline complexity bounds. Tight bounds and multi-agent variants are left open.

Conventional language model (LM) safety alignment relies on a reactive, disjoint procedure: attackers exploit a static model, followed by defensive fine-tuning to patch exposed vulnerabilities. This sequential approach creates a mismatch -- attackers overfit to obsolete defenses, while defenders perpetually lag behind emerging threats. To address this, we propose Self-RedTeam, an online self-play reinforcement learning algorithm where an attacker and defender agent co-evolve through continuous interaction. We cast safety alignment as a two-player zero-sum game, where a single model alternates between attacker and defender roles -- generating adversarial prompts and safeguarding against them -- while a reward LM adjudicates outcomes. This enables dynamic co-adaptation. Grounded in the game-theoretic framework of zero-sum games, we establish a theoretical safety guarantee which motivates the design of our method: if self-play converges to a Nash Equilibrium, the defender will reliably produce safe responses to any adversarial input. Empirically, Self-RedTeam uncovers more diverse attacks (+21.8% SBERT) compared to attackers trained against static defenders and achieves higher robustness on safety benchmarks (e.g., +65.5% on WildJailBreak) than defenders trained against static attackers. We further propose hidden Chain-of-Thought, allowing agents to plan privately, which boosts adversarial diversity and reduces over-refusals. Our results motivate a shift from reactive patching to proactive co-evolution in LM safety training, enabling scalable, autonomous, and robust self-improvement of LMs via multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL).

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable capabilities but remain vulnerable to adversarial ``jailbreak'' attacks designed to bypass safety guardrails. Current safety alignment methods depend heavily on static external red teaming, utilizing fixed defense prompts or pre-collected adversarial datasets. This leads to a rigid defense that overfits known patterns and fails to generalize to novel, sophisticated threats. To address this critical limitation, we propose empowering the model to be its own red teamer, capable of achieving autonomous and evolving adversarial attacks. Specifically, we introduce Safety Self- Play (SSP), a system that utilizes a single LLM to act concurrently as both the Attacker (generating jailbreaks) and the Defender (refusing harmful requests) within a unified Reinforcement Learning (RL) loop, dynamically evolving attack strategies to uncover vulnerabilities while simultaneously strengthening defense mechanisms. To ensure the Defender effectively addresses critical safety issues during the self-play, we introduce an advanced Reflective Experience Replay Mechanism, which uses an experience pool accumulated throughout the process. The mechanism employs a Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) sampling strategy to focus on failure cases with low rewards, helping the model learn from past hard mistakes while balancing exploration and exploitation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our SSP approach autonomously evolves robust defense capabilities, significantly outperforming baselines trained on static adversarial datasets and establishing a new benchmark for proactive safety alignment.

Federated learning (FL) is a privacy-friendly type of machine learning where devices locally train a model on their private data and typically communicate model updates with a server. In decentralized FL (DFL), peers communicate model updates with each other instead. However, DFL is challenging since (1) the training data possessed by different peers is often non-i.i.d. (i.e., distributed differently between the peers) and (2) malicious, or Byzantine, attackers can share arbitrary model updates with other peers to subvert the training process. We address these two challenges and present Bristle, middleware between the learning application and the decentralized network layer. Bristle leverages transfer learning to predetermine and freeze the non-output layers of a neural network, significantly speeding up model training and lowering communication costs. To securely update the output layer with model updates from other peers, we design a fast distance-based prioritizer and a novel performance-based integrator. Their combined effect results in high resilience to Byzantine attackers and the ability to handle non-i.i.d. classes. We empirically show that Bristle converges to a consistent 95% accuracy in Byzantine environments, outperforming all evaluated baselines. In non-Byzantine environments, Bristle requires 83% fewer iterations to achieve 90% accuracy compared to state-of-the-art methods. We show that when the training classes are non-i.i.d., Bristle significantly outperforms the accuracy of the most Byzantine-resilient baselines by 2.3x while reducing communication costs by 90%.

In recent years, safety risks associated with large language models have become increasingly prominent, highlighting the urgent need to mitigate the generation of toxic and harmful content. The mainstream paradigm for LLM safety alignment typically adopts a collaborative framework involving three roles: an attacker for adversarial prompt generation, a defender for safety defense, and an evaluator for response assessment. In this paper, we propose a closed-loop reinforcement learning framework called TriPlay-RL that enables iterative and co-improving collaboration among three roles with near-zero manual annotation. Experimental results show that the attacker preserves high output diversity while achieving a 20%-50% improvement in adversarial effectiveness; the defender attains 10%-30% gains in safety performance without degrading general reasoning capability; and the evaluator continuously refines its fine-grained judgment ability through iterations, accurately distinguishing unsafe responses, simple refusals, and useful guidance. Overall, our framework establishes an efficient and scalable paradigm for LLM safety alignment, enabling continuous co-evolution within a unified learning loop.

Large language models (LLMs) are vital for a wide range of applications yet remain susceptible to jailbreak threats, which could lead to the generation of inappropriate responses. Conventional defenses, such as refusal and adversarial training, often fail to cover corner cases or rare domains, leaving LLMs still vulnerable to more sophisticated attacks. We propose a novel defense strategy, Safety Chain-of-Thought (SCoT), which harnesses the enhanced reasoning capabilities of LLMs for proactive assessment of harmful inputs, rather than simply blocking them. SCoT augments any refusal training datasets to critically analyze the intent behind each request before generating answers. By employing proactive reasoning, SCoT enhances the generalization of LLMs across varied harmful queries and scenarios not covered in the safety alignment corpus. Additionally, it generates detailed refusals specifying the rules violated. Comparative evaluations show that SCoT significantly surpasses existing defenses, reducing vulnerability to out-of-distribution issues and adversarial manipulations while maintaining strong general capabilities.

While state-of-the-art language models have achieved impressive results, they remain susceptible to inference-time adversarial attacks, such as adversarial prompts generated by red teams arXiv:2209.07858. One approach proposed to improve the general quality of language model generations is multi-agent debate, where language models self-evaluate through discussion and feedback arXiv:2305.14325. We implement multi-agent debate between current state-of-the-art language models and evaluate models' susceptibility to red team attacks in both single- and multi-agent settings. We find that multi-agent debate can reduce model toxicity when jailbroken or less capable models are forced to debate with non-jailbroken or more capable models. We also find marginal improvements through the general usage of multi-agent interactions. We further perform adversarial prompt content classification via embedding clustering, and analyze the susceptibility of different models to different types of attack topics.

Large language models have revolutionized natural language processing, yet their deployment remains hampered by the substantial memory and runtime overhead of the transformer's Key-Value cache. To mitigate this, recent methods employ a scoring-aggregation framework to evict unimportant cache entries, based on the stability assumption-that a fixed subset of entries remains consistently important during generation. However, prior work has largely focused on refining importance indicators for scoring, while defaulting to mean aggregation due to a faithful trust in the stability assumption. In this work, we argue that this underlying assumption is inherently fragile, making mean aggregation highly vulnerable in extreme cases. To counter this, we propose a simple yet elegant defensive aggregation strategy: a two-step, linear-time approach that controls worst-case risk, thereby defending against extreme cases with negligible computational overhead. Embodying this strategy, we propose a novel cache eviction method, DefensiveKV and its extension, Layer-DefensiveKV, which incorporates layer-wise budget allocation. Across seven task domains (18 datasets), our methods reduce generation quality loss by 2.3x and 4.3x respectively, versus the strongest baseline under a 20% cache size. These results set new performance benchmarks and pioneer a promising direction for optimizing cache eviction against underlying fragility through worst-case risk management. Our code is available at https://github.com/FFY0/DefensiveKV.

GossipSub is a new peer-to-peer communication protocol designed to counter attacks from misbehaving peers by controlling what information is sent and to whom, via a score function computed by each peer that captures positive and negative behaviors of its neighbors. The score function depends on several parameters (weights, caps, thresholds) that can be configured by applications using GossipSub. The specification for GossipSub is written in English and its resilience to attacks from misbehaving peers is supported empirically by emulation testing using an implementation in Golang. In this work we take a foundational approach to understanding the resilience of GossipSub to attacks from misbehaving peers. We build the first formal model of GossipSub, using the ACL2s theorem prover. Our model is officially endorsed by the GossipSub developers. It can simulate GossipSub networks of arbitrary size and topology, with arbitrarily configured peers, and can be used to prove and disprove theorems about the protocol. We formalize fundamental security properties stating that the score function is fair, penalizes bad behavior, and rewards good behavior. We prove that the score function is always fair, but can be configured in ways that either penalize good behavior or ignore bad behavior. Using our model, we run GossipSub with the specific configurations for two popular real-world applications: the FileCoin and Eth2.0 blockchains. We show that all properties hold for FileCoin. However, given any Eth2.0 network (of any topology and size) with any number of potentially misbehaving peers, we can synthesize attacks where these peers are able to continuously misbehave by never forwarding topic messages, while maintaining positive scores so that they are never pruned from the network by GossipSub.

This study presents Poison-RAG, a framework for adversarial data poisoning attacks targeting retrieval-augmented generation (RAG)-based recommender systems. Poison-RAG manipulates item metadata, such as tags and descriptions, to influence recommendation outcomes. Using item metadata generated through a large language model (LLM) and embeddings derived via the OpenAI API, we explore the impact of adversarial poisoning attacks on provider-side, where attacks are designed to promote long-tail items and demote popular ones. Two attack strategies are proposed: local modifications, which personalize tags for each item using BERT embeddings, and global modifications, applying uniform tags across the dataset. Experiments conducted on the MovieLens dataset in a black-box setting reveal that local strategies improve manipulation effectiveness by up to 50\%, while global strategies risk boosting already popular items. Results indicate that popular items are more susceptible to attacks, whereas long-tail items are harder to manipulate. Approximately 70\% of items lack tags, presenting a cold-start challenge; data augmentation and synthesis are proposed as potential defense mechanisms to enhance RAG-based systems' resilience. The findings emphasize the need for robust metadata management to safeguard recommendation frameworks. Code and data are available at https://github.com/atenanaz/Poison-RAG.

We introduce Minary, a computational framework designed as a candidate for the first formally provable autopoietic primitive. Minary represents interacting probabilistic events as multi-dimensional vectors and combines them via linear superposition rather than multiplicative scalar operations, thereby preserving uncertainty and enabling constructive and destructive interference in the range [-1,1]. A fixed set of ``perspectives'' evaluates ``semantic dimensions'' according to hidden competencies, and their interactions drive two discrete-time stochastic processes. We model this system as an iterated random affine map and use the theory of iterated random functions to prove that it converges in distribution to a unique stationary law; we moreover obtain an explicit closed form for the limiting expectation in terms of row, column, and global averages of the competency matrix. We then derive exact formulas for the mean and variance of the normalized consensus conditioned on the activation of a given semantic dimension, revealing how consensus depends on competency structure rather than raw input signals. Finally, we argue that Minary is organizationally closed yet operationally open in the sense of Maturana and Varela, and we discuss implications for building self-maintaining, distributed, and parallelizable computational systems that house a uniquely subjective notion of identity.

Ensuring the reliability of agent architectures and effectively identifying problematic agents when failures occur are crucial challenges in multi-agent systems (MAS). Advances in large language models (LLMs) have established LLM-based agents as a major branch of MAS, enabling major breakthroughs in complex problem solving and world modeling. However, the reliability implications of this shift remain largely unexplored. i.e., whether substituting traditional agents with LLM-based agents can effectively enhance the reliability of MAS. In this work, we investigate and quantify the reliability of LLM-based agents from the perspective of Byzantine fault tolerance. We observe that LLM-based agents demonstrate stronger skepticism when processing erroneous message flows, a characteristic that enables them to outperform traditional agents across different topological structures. Motivated by the results of the pilot experiment, we design CP-WBFT, a confidence probe-based weighted Byzantine Fault Tolerant consensus mechanism to enhance the stability of MAS with different topologies. It capitalizes on the intrinsic reflective and discriminative capabilities of LLMs by employing a probe-based, weighted information flow transmission method to improve the reliability of LLM-based agents. Extensive experiments demonstrate that CP-WBFT achieves superior performance across diverse network topologies under extreme Byzantine conditions (85.7\% fault rate). Notably, our approach surpasses traditional methods by attaining remarkable accuracy on various topologies and maintaining strong reliability in both mathematical reasoning and safety assessment tasks.

The rapid advancement of Large Language Model (LLM)-based Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) has introduced significant security vulnerabilities, where malicious influence can propagate virally through inter-agent communication. Conventional safeguards often rely on a binary paradigm that strictly distinguishes between benign and attack agents, failing to account for infected agents i.e., benign entities converted by attack agents. In this paper, we propose Infection-Aware Guard, INFA-Guard, a novel defense framework that explicitly identifies and addresses infected agents as a distinct threat category. By leveraging infection-aware detection and topological constraints, INFA-Guard accurately localizes attack sources and infected ranges. During remediation, INFA-Guard replaces attackers and rehabilitates infected ones, avoiding malicious propagation while preserving topological integrity. Extensive experiments demonstrate that INFA-Guard achieves state-of-the-art performance, reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) by an average of 33%, while exhibiting cross-model robustness, superior topological generalization, and high cost-effectiveness.

Many areas of deep learning benefit from using increasingly larger neural networks trained on public data, as is the case for pre-trained models for NLP and computer vision. Training such models requires a lot of computational resources (e.g., HPC clusters) that are not available to small research groups and independent researchers. One way to address it is for several smaller groups to pool their computational resources together and train a model that benefits all participants. Unfortunately, in this case, any participant can jeopardize the entire training run by sending incorrect updates, deliberately or by mistake. Training in presence of such peers requires specialized distributed training algorithms with Byzantine tolerance. These algorithms often sacrifice efficiency by introducing redundant communication or passing all updates through a trusted server, making it infeasible to apply them to large-scale deep learning, where models can have billions of parameters. In this work, we propose a novel protocol for secure (Byzantine-tolerant) decentralized training that emphasizes communication efficiency.

One of the most challenging forms of misinformation involves the out-of-context (OOC) use of images paired with misleading text, creating false narratives. Existing AI-driven detection systems lack explainability and require expensive finetuning. We address these issues with LLM-Consensus, a multi-agent debate system for OOC misinformation detection. LLM-Consensus introduces a novel multi-agent debate framework where multimodal agents collaborate to assess contextual consistency and request external information to enhance cross-context reasoning and decision-making. Our framework enables explainable detection with state-of-the-art accuracy even without domain-specific fine-tuning. Extensive ablation studies confirm that external retrieval significantly improves detection accuracy, and user studies demonstrate that LLM-Consensus boosts performance for both experts and non-experts. These results position LLM-Consensus as a powerful tool for autonomous and citizen intelligence applications.

Stakeholders -- from model developers to policymakers -- seek to minimize the dual-use risks of large language models (LLMs). An open challenge to this goal is whether technical safeguards can impede the misuse of LLMs, even when models are customizable via fine-tuning or when model weights are fully open. In response, several recent studies have proposed methods to produce durable LLM safeguards for open-weight LLMs that can withstand adversarial modifications of the model's weights via fine-tuning. This holds the promise of raising adversaries' costs even under strong threat models where adversaries can directly fine-tune model weights. However, in this paper, we urge for more careful characterization of the limits of these approaches. Through several case studies, we demonstrate that even evaluating these defenses is exceedingly difficult and can easily mislead audiences into thinking that safeguards are more durable than they really are. We draw lessons from the evaluation pitfalls that we identify and suggest future research carefully cabin claims to more constrained, well-defined, and rigorously examined threat models, which can provide more useful and candid assessments to stakeholders.

Multi-agent LLM systems are increasingly deployed as autonomous collaborators, where agents interact freely rather than execute fixed, pre-specified workflows. In such settings, effective coordination cannot be fully designed in advance and must instead emerge through interaction. However, most prior work enforces coordination through fixed roles, workflows, or aggregation rules, leaving open the question of how well self-organizing teams perform when coordination is unconstrained. Drawing on organizational psychology, we study whether self-organizing LLM teams achieve strong synergy, where team performance matches or exceeds the best individual member. Across human-inspired and frontier ML benchmarks, we find that -- unlike human teams -- LLM teams consistently fail to match their expert agent's performance, even when explicitly told who the expert is, incurring performance losses of up to 37.6%. Decomposing this failure, we show that expert leveraging, rather than identification, is the primary bottleneck. Conversational analysis reveals a tendency toward integrative compromise -- averaging expert and non-expert views rather than appropriately weighting expertise -- which increases with team size and correlates negatively with performance. Interestingly, this consensus-seeking behavior improves robustness to adversarial agents, suggesting a trade-off between alignment and effective expertise utilization. Our findings reveal a significant gap in the ability of self-organizing multi-agent teams to harness the collective expertise of their members.

Search-augmented LLMs increasingly mediate everyday consumer recommendations by retrieving live web content. This creates a new risk: generative recommenders may consume polluted web content, such as fake reviews and promotional pages crafted to mislead recommendations. We ask: to what extent do search-augmented LLMs become unwitting promoters of fake products when consuming polluted retrieval results? To answer this, we introduce FORGE (Fake Online Recommendations in Generative Environments), a benchmark for measuring fake-product promotion under controlled web-content pollution. Given an upstream search result, FORGE locally rewrites real products in retrieved web pages into fake ones to simulate web-content pollution, and measures how often the LLM recommends the fake product. FORGE covers 225 real-world products across 15 categories and 5 consumer scenarios. Across 12 commercial and open-weights LLMs, all models are vulnerable: a single polluted page yields fooled rates of up to 27%, while the full top-3 replacement raises this to 73.8%. Vulnerability varies substantially across categories, increasing when models lack stable prior knowledge of the relevant products. Reasoning does not mitigate this vulnerability; instead, it often generates spurious social proof to justify false recommendations. We evaluate three defenses: skepticism prompting and consensus filtering (over model priors or cross-document evidence). Skepticism can exacerbate vulnerability, much like reasoning, while filtering risks suppressing legitimate products. We release FORGE at https://github.com/leoluolol/forge-benchmark.

We introduce AegisLLM, a cooperative multi-agent defense against adversarial attacks and information leakage. In AegisLLM, a structured workflow of autonomous agents - orchestrator, deflector, responder, and evaluator - collaborate to ensure safe and compliant LLM outputs, while self-improving over time through prompt optimization. We show that scaling agentic reasoning system at test-time - both by incorporating additional agent roles and by leveraging automated prompt optimization (such as DSPy)- substantially enhances robustness without compromising model utility. This test-time defense enables real-time adaptability to evolving attacks, without requiring model retraining. Comprehensive evaluations across key threat scenarios, including unlearning and jailbreaking, demonstrate the effectiveness of AegisLLM. On the WMDP unlearning benchmark, AegisLLM achieves near-perfect unlearning with only 20 training examples and fewer than 300 LM calls. For jailbreaking benchmarks, we achieve 51% improvement compared to the base model on StrongReject, with false refusal rates of only 7.9% on PHTest compared to 18-55% for comparable methods. Our results highlight the advantages of adaptive, agentic reasoning over static defenses, establishing AegisLLM as a strong runtime alternative to traditional approaches based on model modifications. Code is available at https://github.com/zikuicai/aegisllm

Equipping agents with the capacity to justify made decisions using supporting evidence represents a cornerstone of accountable decision-making. Furthermore, ensuring that justifications are in line with human expectations and societal norms is vital, especially in high-stakes situations such as healthcare. In this work, we propose the use of a debate-based reward model for reinforcement learning agents, where the outcome of a zero-sum debate game quantifies the justifiability of a decision in a particular state. This reward model is then used to train a justifiable policy, whose decisions can be more easily corroborated with supporting evidence. In the debate game, two argumentative agents take turns providing supporting evidence for two competing decisions. Given the proposed evidence, a proxy of a human judge evaluates which decision is better justified. We demonstrate the potential of our approach in learning policies for prescribing and justifying treatment decisions of septic patients. We show that augmenting the reward with the feedback signal generated by the debate-based reward model yields policies highly favored by the judge when compared to the policy obtained solely from the environment rewards, while hardly sacrificing any performance. Moreover, in terms of the overall performance and justifiability of trained policies, the debate-based feedback is comparable to the feedback obtained from an ideal judge proxy that evaluates decisions using the full information encoded in the state. This suggests that the debate game outputs key information contained in states that is most relevant for evaluating decisions, which in turn substantiates the practicality of combining our approach with human-in-the-loop evaluations. Lastly, we showcase that agents trained via multi-agent debate learn to propose evidence that is resilient to refutations and closely aligns with human preferences.

Recently, there is an emerging interest in adversarially training a classifier with a rejection option (also known as a selective classifier) for boosting adversarial robustness. While rejection can incur a cost in many applications, existing studies typically associate zero cost with rejecting perturbed inputs, which can result in the rejection of numerous slightly-perturbed inputs that could be correctly classified. In this work, we study adversarially-robust classification with rejection in the stratified rejection setting, where the rejection cost is modeled by rejection loss functions monotonically non-increasing in the perturbation magnitude. We theoretically analyze the stratified rejection setting and propose a novel defense method -- Adversarial Training with Consistent Prediction-based Rejection (CPR) -- for building a robust selective classifier. Experiments on image datasets demonstrate that the proposed method significantly outperforms existing methods under strong adaptive attacks. For instance, on CIFAR-10, CPR reduces the total robust loss (for different rejection losses) by at least 7.3% under both seen and unseen attacks.

Sequential recommender systems stand out for their ability to capture users' dynamic interests and the patterns of item-to-item transitions. However, the inherent openness of sequential recommender systems renders them vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where fraudulent users are injected into the training data to manipulate learned patterns. Traditional defense strategies predominantly depend on predefined assumptions or rules extracted from specific known attacks, limiting their generalizability to unknown attack types. To solve the above problems, considering the rich open-world knowledge encapsulated in Large Language Models (LLMs), our research initially focuses on the capabilities of LLMs in the detection of unknown fraudulent activities within recommender systems, a strategy we denote as LLM4Dec. Empirical evaluations demonstrate the substantial capability of LLMs in identifying unknown fraudsters, leveraging their expansive, open-world knowledge. Building upon this, we propose the integration of LLMs into defense strategies to extend their effectiveness beyond the confines of known attacks. We propose LoRec, an advanced framework that employs LLM-Enhanced Calibration to strengthen the robustness of sequential recommender systems against poisoning attacks. LoRec integrates an LLM-enhanced CalibraTor (LCT) that refines the training process of sequential recommender systems with knowledge derived from LLMs, applying a user-wise reweighting to diminish the impact of fraudsters injected by attacks. By incorporating LLMs' open-world knowledge, the LCT effectively converts the limited, specific priors or rules into a more general pattern of fraudsters, offering improved defenses against poisoning attacks. Our comprehensive experiments validate that LoRec, as a general framework, significantly strengthens the robustness of sequential recommender systems.

Recent studies have shown that robustness to adversarial attacks can be transferred across networks. In other words, we can make a weak model more robust with the help of a strong teacher model. We ask if instead of learning from a static teacher, can models "learn together" and "teach each other" to achieve better robustness? In this paper, we study how interactions among models affect robustness via knowledge distillation. We propose mutual adversarial training (MAT), in which multiple models are trained together and share the knowledge of adversarial examples to achieve improved robustness. MAT allows robust models to explore a larger space of adversarial samples, and find more robust feature spaces and decision boundaries. Through extensive experiments on CIFAR-10 and CIFAR-100, we demonstrate that MAT can effectively improve model robustness and outperform state-of-the-art methods under white-box attacks, bringing sim8% accuracy gain to vanilla adversarial training (AT) under PGD-100 attacks. In addition, we show that MAT can also mitigate the robustness trade-off among different perturbation types, bringing as much as 13.1% accuracy gain to AT baselines against the union of l_infty, l_2 and l_1 attacks. These results show the superiority of the proposed method and demonstrate that collaborative learning is an effective strategy for designing robust models.

We present the Consilium Protocol, a Byzantine Fault Tolerance-derived architecture for structured multi-model AI deliberation that treats inter-model disagreement as epistemic signal rather than error. The protocol assigns engineered cognitive personas to language models -- separating what a model is from how it reasons -- and introduces an In-Sample/Out-of-Sample validation framework adapted from quantitative finance to distinguish training-data consensus from empirically grounded conclusions. Across 1,478 deliberation sessions spanning 32 topics in 10 domain categories, we demonstrate that (1) the cognitive persona, not the underlying model, determines epistemic behavior: free edge-inference models costing 0.0002 USD per batch produced comparable analytical output to frontier models costing 10.69 USD; (2) RLHF alignment training creates measurable, domain-specific epistemic blind spots -- contested policy topics exhibit 12.3 percentage points less adversarial challenge than settled science topics, and AI safety topics show asymmetric bias (Δ=11.6%) where models challenge claims that AI is dangerous far more vigorously than claims that AI risk is overstated; (3) the protocol exhibits no directional bias of its own (immigration Δ=2.3%, renewables Δ=1.2%); and (4) out-of-sample evidence retrieval validated 239 claims with 100% evidence retrieval and surfaced 167 blind-spot discoveries invisible to training-data deliberation. Run-to-run reproducibility across randomized modeltimespersona assignments averages pm2.2% standard deviation. Total cost for the complete battery including all overhead: 217 USD. We release the protocol specification under MIT license to enable independent verification.

In many domains of argumentation, people's arguments are driven by so-called attitude roots, i.e., underlying beliefs and world views, and their corresponding attitude themes. Given the strength of these latent drivers of arguments, recent work in psychology suggests that instead of directly countering surface-level reasoning (e.g., falsifying given premises), one should follow an argumentation style inspired by the Jiu-Jitsu 'soft' combat system (Hornsey and Fielding, 2017): first, identify an arguer's attitude roots and themes, and then choose a prototypical rebuttal that is aligned with those drivers instead of invalidating those. In this work, we are the first to explore Jiu-Jitsu argumentation for peer review by proposing the novel task of attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation. To this end, we enrich an existing dataset for discourse structure in peer reviews with attitude roots, attitude themes, and canonical rebuttals. To facilitate this process, we recast established annotation concepts from the domain of peer reviews (e.g., aspects a review sentence is relating to) and train domain-specific models. We then propose strong rebuttal generation strategies, which we benchmark on our novel dataset for the task of end-to-end attitude and theme-guided rebuttal generation and two subtasks.

Federated Learning (FL), a privacy-preserving decentralized machine learning framework, has been shown to be vulnerable to backdoor attacks. Current research primarily focuses on the Single-Label Backdoor Attack (SBA), wherein adversaries share a consistent target. However, a critical fact is overlooked: adversaries may be non-cooperative, have distinct targets, and operate independently, which exhibits a more practical scenario called Multi-Label Backdoor Attack (MBA). Unfortunately, prior works are ineffective in the MBA scenario since non-cooperative attackers exclude each other. In this work, we conduct an in-depth investigation to uncover the inherent constraints of the exclusion: similar backdoor mappings are constructed for different targets, resulting in conflicts among backdoor functions. To address this limitation, we propose Mirage, the first non-cooperative MBA strategy in FL that allows attackers to inject effective and persistent backdoors into the global model without collusion by constructing in-distribution (ID) backdoor mapping. Specifically, we introduce an adversarial adaptation method to bridge the backdoor features and the target distribution in an ID manner. Additionally, we further leverage a constrained optimization method to ensure the ID mapping survives in the global training dynamics. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that Mirage outperforms various state-of-the-art attacks and bypasses existing defenses, achieving an average ASR greater than 97\% and maintaining over 90\% after 900 rounds. This work aims to alert researchers to this potential threat and inspire the design of effective defense mechanisms. Code has been made open-source.

Agentic workflows -- where multiple large language model (LLM) instances interact to solve tasks -- are increasingly built on feedback mechanisms, where one model evaluates and critiques another. Despite the promise of feedback-driven improvement, the stability of agentic workflows rests on the reliability of the judge. However, judges may hallucinate information, exhibit bias, or act adversarially -- introducing critical vulnerabilities into the workflow. In this work, we present a systematic analysis of agentic workflows under deceptive or misleading feedback. We introduce a two-dimensional framework for analyzing judge behavior, along axes of intent (from constructive to malicious) and knowledge (from parametric-only to retrieval-augmented systems). Using this taxonomy, we construct a suite of judge behaviors and develop WAFER-QA, a new benchmark with critiques grounded in retrieved web evidence to evaluate robustness of agentic workflows against factually supported adversarial feedback. We reveal that even strongest agents are vulnerable to persuasive yet flawed critiques -- often switching correct answers after a single round of misleading feedback. Taking a step further, we study how model predictions evolve over multiple rounds of interaction, revealing distinct behavioral patterns between reasoning and non-reasoning models. Our findings highlight fundamental vulnerabilities in feedback-based workflows and offer guidance for building more robust agentic systems.

In this study, we explore the robustness of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) against Byzantine failures, where any agent can enact arbitrary, worst-case actions due to malfunction or adversarial attack. To address the uncertainty that any agent can be adversarial, we propose a Bayesian Adversarial Robust Dec-POMDP (BARDec-POMDP) framework, which views Byzantine adversaries as nature-dictated types, represented by a separate transition. This allows agents to learn policies grounded on their posterior beliefs about the type of other agents, fostering collaboration with identified allies and minimizing vulnerability to adversarial manipulation. We define the optimal solution to the BARDec-POMDP as an ex post robust Bayesian Markov perfect equilibrium, which we proof to exist and weakly dominates the equilibrium of previous robust MARL approaches. To realize this equilibrium, we put forward a two-timescale actor-critic algorithm with almost sure convergence under specific conditions. Experimentation on matrix games, level-based foraging and StarCraft II indicate that, even under worst-case perturbations, our method successfully acquires intricate micromanagement skills and adaptively aligns with allies, demonstrating resilience against non-oblivious adversaries, random allies, observation-based attacks, and transfer-based attacks.

The model context protocol (MCP) has been widely adapted as an open standard enabling the seamless integration of generative AI agents. However, recent work has shown the MCP is susceptible to retrieval-based "falsely benign" attacks (FBAs), allowing malicious system access and credential theft, but requiring that users download compromised files directly to their systems. Herein, we show that the threat model of MCP-based attacks is significantly broader than previously thought, i.e., attackers need only post malicious content online to deceive MCP agents into carrying out their attacks on unsuspecting victims' systems. To improve alignment guardrails against such attacks, we introduce a new MCP dataset of FBAs and (truly) benign samples to explore the effectiveness of direct preference optimization (DPO) for the refusal training of large language models (LLMs). While DPO improves model guardrails against such attacks, we show that the efficacy of refusal learning varies drastically depending on the model's original post-training alignment scheme--e.g., GRPO-based LLMs learn to refuse extremely poorly. Thus, to further improve FBA refusals, we introduce Retrieval Augmented Generation for Preference alignment (RAG-Pref), a novel preference alignment strategy based on RAG. We show that RAG-Pref significantly improves the ability of LLMs to refuse FBAs, particularly when combined with DPO alignment, thus drastically improving guardrails against MCP-based attacks.

The field of defense strategies against adversarial attacks has significantly grown over the last years, but progress is hampered as the evaluation of adversarial defenses is often insufficient and thus gives a wrong impression of robustness. Many promising defenses could be broken later on, making it difficult to identify the state-of-the-art. Frequent pitfalls in the evaluation are improper tuning of hyperparameters of the attacks, gradient obfuscation or masking. In this paper we first propose two extensions of the PGD-attack overcoming failures due to suboptimal step size and problems of the objective function. We then combine our novel attacks with two complementary existing ones to form a parameter-free, computationally affordable and user-independent ensemble of attacks to test adversarial robustness. We apply our ensemble to over 50 models from papers published at recent top machine learning and computer vision venues. In all except one of the cases we achieve lower robust test accuracy than reported in these papers, often by more than 10%, identifying several broken defenses.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous agents, their real-world applicability has expanded significantly, accompanied by new security challenges. Most existing agent defense mechanisms adopt a mandatory checking paradigm, in which security validation is forcibly triggered at predefined stages of the agent lifecycle. In this work, we argue that effective agent security should be intrinsic and selective rather than architecturally decoupled and mandatory. We propose Spider-Sense framework, an event-driven defense framework based on Intrinsic Risk Sensing (IRS), which allows agents to maintain latent vigilance and trigger defenses only upon risk perception. Once triggered, the Spider-Sense invokes a hierarchical defence mechanism that trades off efficiency and precision: it resolves known patterns via lightweight similarity matching while escalating ambiguous cases to deep internal reasoning, thereby eliminating reliance on external models. To facilitate rigorous evaluation, we introduce S^2Bench, a lifecycle-aware benchmark featuring realistic tool execution and multi-stage attacks. Extensive experiments demonstrate that Spider-Sense achieves competitive or superior defense performance, attaining the lowest Attack Success Rate (ASR) and False Positive Rate (FPR), with only a marginal latency overhead of 8.3\%.

Large-scale datasets play a fundamental role in training deep learning models. However, dataset collection is difficult in domains that involve sensitive information. Collaborative learning techniques provide a privacy-preserving solution, by enabling training over a number of private datasets that are not shared by their owners. However, recently, it has been shown that the existing collaborative learning frameworks are vulnerable to an active adversary that runs a generative adversarial network (GAN) attack. In this work, we propose a novel classification model that is resilient against such attacks by design. More specifically, we introduce a key-based classification model and a principled training scheme that protects class scores by using class-specific private keys, which effectively hide the information necessary for a GAN attack. We additionally show how to utilize high dimensional keys to improve the robustness against attacks without increasing the model complexity. Our detailed experiments demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed technique. Source code is available at https://github.com/mbsariyildiz/key-protected-classification.

Current open-weight large language models (LLMs) are prone to malicious finetuning attacks, which could compromise the safety alignment of LLMs with only a few steps of supervised finetuning (SFT) on poisoned datasets. Existing alignment-stage defenses are primarily designed to defend against attacks that use parameter-efficient finetuning methods. However, they fail to defend against stronger attacks that use full-parameter finetuning. In this paper, we propose Patcher, a method inspired by adversarial training and bi-level optimization, to combat such attacks. Patcher strengthens the simulated attack by scaling up the optimization steps in the adversarial loop, thus forcing the defender to find model parameters that are insensitive to stronger attacks. Furthermore, we propose an efficient parallel algorithm to implement Patcher, decreasing the wall-clock time of training while preserving Patcher's performance. Extensive experiments show that Patcher substantially improves the model's robustness compared to vanilla SFT alignment, and transfers to diverse attack scenarios and model sizes. Code is available at https://github.com/haomingwen/patcher.

Multi-agent LLM committees replicate the same model under different role prompts and aggregate outputs by majority vote, implicitly assuming that agents contribute complementary evidence. We embed each agent's chain-of-thought rationale and measure pairwise similarity: across 100 GSM8K questions with three Qwen2.5-14B agents, mean cosine similarity is 0.888 and effective rank is 2.17 out of 3.0, a failure mode we term representational collapse. DALC, a training-free consensus protocol that computes diversity weights from embedding geometry, reaches 87% on GSM8K versus 84% for self-consistency at 26% lower token cost. Ablation experiments reveal 1-3 point per-protocol run-to-run variance, confirm that hint sharing contributes more than diversity weighting alone, and show that encoder choice strongly modulates collapse severity (cosine 0.908 with mxbai versus 0.888 with nomic) and downstream accuracy. The more robust finding is that collapse is measurable, worsens on harder tasks, and that the choice of embedding proxy is a first-order design decision for any latent communication protocol.

Recommender systems play a pivotal role in mitigating information overload in various fields. Nonetheless, the inherent openness of these systems introduces vulnerabilities, allowing attackers to insert fake users into the system's training data to skew the exposure of certain items, known as poisoning attacks. Adversarial training has emerged as a notable defense mechanism against such poisoning attacks within recommender systems. Existing adversarial training methods apply perturbations of the same magnitude across all users to enhance system robustness against attacks. Yet, in reality, we find that attacks often affect only a subset of users who are vulnerable. These perturbations of indiscriminate magnitude make it difficult to balance effective protection for vulnerable users without degrading recommendation quality for those who are not affected. To address this issue, our research delves into understanding user vulnerability. Considering that poisoning attacks pollute the training data, we note that the higher degree to which a recommender system fits users' training data correlates with an increased likelihood of users incorporating attack information, indicating their vulnerability. Leveraging these insights, we introduce the Vulnerability-aware Adversarial Training (VAT), designed to defend against poisoning attacks in recommender systems. VAT employs a novel vulnerability-aware function to estimate users' vulnerability based on the degree to which the system fits them. Guided by this estimation, VAT applies perturbations of adaptive magnitude to each user, not only reducing the success ratio of attacks but also preserving, and potentially enhancing, the quality of recommendations. Comprehensive experiments confirm VAT's superior defensive capabilities across different recommendation models and against various types of attacks.

Federated learning security research has predominantly focused on backdoor threats from a minority of malicious clients that intentionally corrupt model updates. This paper challenges this paradigm by investigating a more pervasive and insidious threat: backdoor vulnerabilities from low-concentration poisoned data distributed across the datasets of benign clients. This scenario is increasingly common in federated instruction tuning for language models, which often rely on unverified third-party and crowd-sourced data. We analyze two forms of backdoor data through real cases: 1) natural trigger (inherent features as implicit triggers); 2) adversary-injected trigger. To analyze this threat, we model the backdoor implantation process from signal aggregation, proposing the Backdoor Signal-to-Noise Ratio to quantify the dynamics of the distributed backdoor signal. Extensive experiments reveal the severity of this threat: With just less than 10\% of training data poisoned and distributed across clients, the attack success rate exceeds 85\%, while the primary task performance remains largely intact. Critically, we demonstrate that state-of-the-art backdoor defenses, designed for attacks from malicious clients, are fundamentally ineffective against this threat. Our findings highlight an urgent need for new defense mechanisms tailored to the realities of modern, decentralized data ecosystems.

While reinforcement learning-trained Large Reasoning Models (LRMs, e.g., Deepseek-R1) demonstrate advanced reasoning capabilities in the evolving Large Language Models (LLMs) domain, their susceptibility to security threats remains a critical vulnerability. This weakness is particularly evident in Chain-of-Thought (CoT) generation processes, where adversarial methods like backdoor prompt attacks can systematically subvert the model's core reasoning mechanisms. The emerging Chain-of-Thought Attack (CoTA) reveals this vulnerability through exploiting prompt controllability, simultaneously degrading both CoT safety and task performance with low-cost interventions. To address this compounded security-performance vulnerability, we propose Thought Purity (TP): a defense paradigm that systematically strengthens resistance to malicious content while preserving operational efficacy. Our solution achieves this through three synergistic components: (1) a safety-optimized data processing pipeline (2) reinforcement learning-enhanced rule constraints (3) adaptive monitoring metrics. Our approach establishes the first comprehensive defense mechanism against CoTA vulnerabilities in reinforcement learning-aligned reasoning systems, significantly advancing the security-functionality equilibrium for next-generation AI architectures.

Neural ranking models (NRMs) have achieved promising results in information retrieval. NRMs have also been shown to be vulnerable to adversarial examples. A typical Word Substitution Ranking Attack (WSRA) against NRMs was proposed recently, in which an attacker promotes a target document in rankings by adding human-imperceptible perturbations to its text. This raises concerns when deploying NRMs in real-world applications. Therefore, it is important to develop techniques that defend against such attacks for NRMs. In empirical defenses adversarial examples are found during training and used to augment the training set. However, such methods offer no theoretical guarantee on the models' robustness and may eventually be broken by other sophisticated WSRAs. To escape this arms race, rigorous and provable certified defense methods for NRMs are needed. To this end, we first define the Certified Top-K Robustness for ranking models since users mainly care about the top ranked results in real-world scenarios. A ranking model is said to be Certified Top-K Robust on a ranked list when it is guaranteed to keep documents that are out of the top K away from the top K under any attack. Then, we introduce a Certified Defense method, named CertDR, to achieve certified top-K robustness against WSRA, based on the idea of randomized smoothing. Specifically, we first construct a smoothed ranker by applying random word substitutions on the documents, and then leverage the ranking property jointly with the statistical property of the ensemble to provably certify top-K robustness. Extensive experiments on two representative web search datasets demonstrate that CertDR can significantly outperform state-of-the-art empirical defense methods for ranking models.

Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems, widely used to improve the factual grounding of large language models (LLMs), are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning attacks, where adversaries inject manipulated content into the retriever's corpus. While prior research has predominantly focused on single-attacker settings, real-world scenarios often involve multiple, competing attackers with conflicting objectives. In this work, we introduce PoisonArena, the first benchmark to systematically study and evaluate competing poisoning attacks in RAG. We formalize the multi-attacker threat model, where attackers vie to control the answer to the same query using mutually exclusive misinformation. PoisonArena leverages the Bradley-Terry model to quantify each method's competitive effectiveness in such adversarial environments. Through extensive experiments on the Natural Questions and MS MARCO datasets, we demonstrate that many attack strategies successful in isolation fail under competitive pressure. Our findings highlight the limitations of conventional evaluation metrics like Attack Success Rate (ASR) and F1 score and underscore the need for competitive evaluation to assess real-world attack robustness. PoisonArena provides a standardized framework to benchmark and develop future attack and defense strategies under more realistic, multi-adversary conditions.

Despite the growing adoption of large language models (LLMs) in scientific research workflows, automated support for academic rebuttal, a crucial step in academic communication and peer review, remains largely underexplored. Existing approaches typically rely on off-the-shelf LLMs or simple pipelines, which struggle with long-context understanding and often fail to produce targeted and persuasive responses. In this paper, we propose DRPG, an agentic framework for automatic academic rebuttal generation that operates through four steps: Decompose reviews into atomic concerns, Retrieve relevant evidence from the paper, Plan rebuttal strategies, and Generate responses accordingly. Notably, the Planner in DRPG reaches over 98% accuracy in identifying the most feasible rebuttal direction. Experiments on data from top-tier conferences demonstrate that DRPG significantly outperforms existing rebuttal pipelines and achieves performance beyond the average human level using only an 8B model. Our analysis further demonstrates the effectiveness of the planner design and its value in providing multi-perspective and explainable suggestions. We also showed that DRPG works well in a more complex multi-round setting. These results highlight the effectiveness of DRPG and its potential to provide high-quality rebuttal content and support the scaling of academic discussions. Codes for this work are available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/DRPG-RebuttalAgent.

Large Language Model-based Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-based MAS), where multiple LLM agents collaborate to solve complex tasks, have shown impressive performance in many areas. However, MAS are typically distributed across different devices or environments, making them vulnerable to perturbations such as agent failures. While existing works have studied the adversarial attacks and corresponding defense strategies, they mainly focus on reactively detecting and mitigating attacks after they occur rather than proactively designing inherently resilient systems. In this work, we study the resilience of LLM-based MAS under perturbations and find that both the communication topology and prompt design significantly influence system resilience. Motivated by these findings, we propose ResMAS: a two-stage framework for enhancing MAS resilience. First, we train a reward model to predict the MAS's resilience, based on which we train a topology generator to automatically design resilient topology for specific tasks through reinforcement learning. Second, we introduce a topology-aware prompt optimization method that refines each agent's prompt based on its connections and interactions with other agents. Extensive experiments across a range of tasks show that our approach substantially improves MAS resilience under various constraints. Moreover, our framework demonstrates strong generalization ability to new tasks and models, highlighting its potential for building resilient MASs.

Accurately evaluating adversarial robustness is a longstanding challenge. A flawed attack design can inflate robustness estimates, making deployment risk assessment and defense comparison unreliable. Historically, standardized attacks such as AutoAttack have largely resolved this for image classifiers, providing a reliable evaluation baseline for systematic comparison across defenses. However, no equivalent exists for LLM jailbreak evaluation yet, where designing such an attack is considerably more difficult. A reliable attack must, among other things, be black-box compatible, applicable to arbitrary defense pipelines, and efficient, which no existing method jointly satisfies. We introduce Indirect Harm Optimization (IHO), a masked diffusion language model attacker trained via iterative preference optimization against a harmfulness judge, requiring only black-box access to the target. The same method can be used without modification as a strong adaptive attack on individual behaviors, or as an efficient amortized policy that transfers to held-out behaviors and unseen target models without fine-tuning. Even against layered defenses, such as a Circuit Breaker-trained model combined with an auxiliary detector, IHO improves attack success considerably over state-of-the-art approaches, without any defense-specific adaptation. Our results position IHO as a practical step toward the kind of standardized jailbreak evaluation that has improved reliability in the past. Code and models are available on GitHub and Hugging Face.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in multi-agent systems (MAS) as components of collaborative intelligence, where peer interactions dynamically shape individual decision-making. Although prior work has focused on conformity bias, we extend the analysis to examine how LLMs form trust from previous impressions, resist misinformation, and integrate peer input during interaction, key factors for achieving collective intelligence under complex social dynamics. We present KAIROS, a benchmark simulating quiz contests with peer agents of varying reliability, offering fine-grained control over conditions such as expert-novice roles, noisy crowds, and adversarial peers. LLMs receive both historical interactions and current peer responses, allowing systematic investigation into how trust, peer action, and self-confidence influence decisions. As for mitigation strategies, we evaluate prompting, supervised fine-tuning, and reinforcement learning, Group Relative Policy Optimisation (GRPO), across multiple models. Our results reveal that GRPO with multi-agent context combined with outcome-based rewards and unconstrained reasoning achieves the best overall performance, but also decreases the robustness to social influence compared to Base models. The code and datasets are available at: https://github.com/declare-lab/KAIROS.

GossipSub is a popular new peer-to-peer network protocol designed to disseminate messages quickly and efficiently by allowing peers to forward the full content of messages only to a dynamically selected subset of their neighboring peers (mesh neighbors) while gossiping about messages they have seen with the rest. Peers decide which of their neighbors to graft or prune from their mesh locally and periodically using a score for each neighbor. Scores are calculated using a score function that depends on mesh-specific parameters, weights and counters relating to a peer's performance in the network. Since a GossipSub network's performance ultimately depends on the performance of its peers, an important question arises: Is the score calculation mechanism effective in weeding out non-performing or even intentionally misbehaving peers from meshes? We answered this question in the negative in our companion paper by reasoning about GossipSub using our formal, official and executable ACL2s model. Based on our findings, we synthesized and simulated attacks against GossipSub which were confirmed by the developers of GossipSub, FileCoin, and Eth2.0, and publicly disclosed in MITRE CVE-2022-47547. In this paper, we present a detailed description of our model. We discuss design decisions, security properties of GossipSub, reasoning about the security properties in context of our model, attack generation and lessons we learnt when writing it.

Collaborative learning algorithms, such as distributed SGD (or D-SGD), are prone to faulty machines that may deviate from their prescribed algorithm because of software or hardware bugs, poisoned data or malicious behaviors. While many solutions have been proposed to enhance the robustness of D-SGD to such machines, previous works either resort to strong assumptions (trusted server, homogeneous data, specific noise model) or impose a gradient computational cost that is several orders of magnitude higher than that of D-SGD. We present MoNNA, a new algorithm that (a) is provably robust under standard assumptions and (b) has a gradient computation overhead that is linear in the fraction of faulty machines, which is conjectured to be tight. Essentially, MoNNA uses Polyak's momentum of local gradients for local updates and nearest-neighbor averaging (NNA) for global mixing, respectively. While MoNNA is rather simple to implement, its analysis has been more challenging and relies on two key elements that may be of independent interest. Specifically, we introduce the mixing criterion of (alpha, lambda)-reduction to analyze the non-linear mixing of non-faulty machines, and present a way to control the tension between the momentum and the model drifts. We validate our theory by experiments on image classification and make our code available at https://github.com/LPD-EPFL/robust-collaborative-learning.

Collaboration and information sharing empower Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) but also introduce a critical security risk known as Agent Cascading Injection (ACI). In such attacks, a compromised agent exploits inter-agent trust to propagate malicious instructions, causing cascading failures across the system. However, existing studies consider only limited attack strategies and simplified MAS settings, limiting their generalizability and comprehensive evaluation. To bridge this gap, we introduce ACIArena, a unified framework for evaluating the robustness of MAS. ACIArena offers systematic evaluation suites spanning multiple attack surfaces (i.e., external inputs, agent profiles, inter-agent messages) and attack objectives (i.e., instruction hijacking, task disruption, information exfiltration). Specifically, ACIArena establishes a unified specification that jointly supports MAS construction and attack-defense modules. It covers six widely used MAS implementations and provides a benchmark of 1,356 test cases for systematically evaluating MAS robustness. Our benchmarking results show that evaluating MAS robustness solely through topology is insufficient; robust MAS require deliberate role design and controlled interaction patterns. Moreover, defenses developed in simplified environments often fail to transfer to real-world settings; narrowly scoped defenses may even introduce new vulnerabilities. ACIArena aims to provide a solid foundation for advancing deeper exploration of MAS design principles.

With the rapid evolution of foundation models, Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated increasingly powerful tool-use capabilities. However, this proficiency introduces significant security risks, as malicious actors can manipulate agents into executing tools to generate harmful content. While existing defensive mechanisms are effective, they frequently suffer from the over-refusal problem, where increased safety strictness compromises the agent's utility on benign tasks. To mitigate this trade-off, we propose SafeHarbor, a novel framework designed to establish precise decision boundaries for LLM agents. Unlike static guidelines, SafeHarbor extracts context-aware defense rules through enhanced adversarial generation. We design a local hierarchical memory system for dynamic rule injection, offering a training-free, efficient, and plug-and-play solution. Furthermore, we introduce an information entropy-based self-evolution mechanism that continuously optimizes the memory structure through dynamic node splitting and merging. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeHarbor achieves state-of-the-art performance on both ambiguous benign tasks and explicit malicious attacks, notably attaining a peak benign utility of 63.6\% on GPT-4o while maintaining a robust refusal rate exceeding 93\% against harmful requests. The source code is publicly available at https://github.com/ljj-cyber/SafeHarbor.

As large language models (LLMs) transition to autonomous agents synthesizing real-time information, their reasoning capabilities introduce an unexpected attack surface. This paper introduces a novel threat where colluding agents steer victim beliefs using only truthful evidence fragments distributed through public channels, without relying on covert communications, backdoors, or falsified documents. By exploiting LLMs' overthinking tendency, we formalize the first cognitive collusion attack and propose Generative Montage: a Writer-Editor-Director framework that constructs deceptive narratives through adversarial debate and coordinated posting of evidence fragments, causing victims to internalize and propagate fabricated conclusions. To study this risk, we develop CoPHEME, a dataset derived from real-world rumor events, and simulate attacks across diverse LLM families. Our results show pervasive vulnerability across 14 LLM families: attack success rates reach 74.4% for proprietary models and 70.6% for open-weights models. Counterintuitively, stronger reasoning capabilities increase susceptibility, with reasoning-specialized models showing higher attack success than base models or prompts. Furthermore, these false beliefs then cascade to downstream judges, achieving over 60% deception rates, highlighting a socio-technical vulnerability in how LLM-based agents interact with dynamic information environments. Our implementation and data are available at: https://github.com/CharlesJW222/Lying_with_Truth/tree/main.

Conventional community detection requires centralized network data, making it unsuitable for distributed or privacy-preserving systems. In this paper, we demonstrate that macroscopic graph partitioning can emerge purely from strictly local, privacy preserving interactions driven by social learning. By reframing clustering as a symmetry-breaking process within nonlinear opinion dynamics, we show that exchanging saturated state dependent signal (like public actions) forces a network to naturally fracture along its sparsest cuts. We mathematically establish the spectral conditions under which dense core communities lock into stable, polarized states, robustly resisting external influence. To apply this mechanism, we propose three decentralized algorithms, leading up to the Score-based Edge Reliability (SER) framework. By evaluating network ties across multiple independent discussion topics, SER statistically bypasses the errors of traditional greedy bisections and naturally isolates structurally ambiguous frontier nodes. Validations on the ABCD benchmark and the real-world Ngogo chimpanzee network confirm that our fully decentralized approach matches the accuracy of globally optimized heuristics (e.g., Louvain, Leiden) up to a theoretical limit of detectable graphs.

Large language model (LLM)-based search agents synthesize open-web content into actionable recommendations on behalf of users, creating a risk that attacker-published pages are transformed into endorsed claims. We introduce SearchGEO, a controlled evaluation framework for measuring endorsement corruption in LLM-based web-search agents, combining a web-evidence manipulation pipeline, a five-mode attack taxonomy, and multiple output-level metrics. We evaluate 13 LLM backends on 308 cases each. Results show that vulnerability patterns vary across backends: overall attack success rate (ASR) ranges from 0.0% on Claude-Sonnet-4.6 to 31.4% on Gemini-3-Flash, the strongest attack mode differs by model family, and the same deployment scaffold could amplify or decrease ASR on different backends. An auxiliary agent-skill probe, where endorsement becomes an install command, exposes a sharp split among otherwise robust backends: Claude over-rejects while GPT over-trusts. These findings argue for treating recommendation reliability under adversarial search content as a first-class dimension of backend safety evaluation.

Although artificial intelligence (AI) has become deeply integrated into various stages of the research workflow and achieved remarkable advancements, academic rebuttal remains a significant and underexplored challenge. This is because rebuttal is a complex process of strategic communication under severe information asymmetry rather than a simple technical debate. Consequently, current approaches struggle as they largely imitate surface-level linguistics, missing the essential element of perspective-taking required for effective persuasion. In this paper, we introduce RebuttalAgent, the first framework to ground academic rebuttal in Theory of Mind (ToM), operationalized through a ToM-Strategy-Response (TSR) pipeline that models reviewer mental state, formulates persuasion strategy, and generates strategy-grounded response. To train our agent, we construct RebuttalBench, a large-scale dataset synthesized via a novel critique-and-refine approach. Our training process consists of two stages, beginning with a supervised fine-tuning phase to equip the agent with ToM-based analysis and strategic planning capabilities, followed by a reinforcement learning phase leveraging the self-reward mechanism for scalable self-improvement. For reliable and efficient automated evaluation, we further develop Rebuttal-RM, a specialized evaluator trained on over 100K samples of multi-source rebuttal data, which achieves scoring consistency with human preferences surpassing powerful judge GPT-4.1. Extensive experiments show RebuttalAgent significantly outperforms the base model by an average of 18.3% on automated metrics, while also outperforming advanced proprietary models across both automated and human evaluations. Disclaimer: the generated rebuttal content is for reference only to inspire authors and assist in drafting. It is not intended to replace the author's own critical analysis and response.

Task-oriented LLM-based agents are increasingly used in domains with strict policies, such as refund eligibility or cancellation rules. The challenge lies in ensuring that the agent consistently adheres to these rules and policies, appropriately refusing any request that would violate them, while still maintaining a helpful and natural interaction. This calls for the development of tailored design and evaluation methodologies to ensure agent resilience against malicious user behavior. We propose a novel threat model that focuses on adversarial users aiming to exploit policy-adherent agents for personal benefit. To address this, we present CRAFT, a multi-agent red-teaming system that leverages policy-aware persuasive strategies to undermine a policy-adherent agent in a customer-service scenario, outperforming conventional jailbreak methods such as DAN prompts, emotional manipulation, and coercive. Building upon the existing tau-bench benchmark, we introduce tau-break, a complementary benchmark designed to rigorously assess the agent's robustness against manipulative user behavior. Finally, we evaluate several straightforward yet effective defense strategies. While these measures provide some protection, they fall short, highlighting the need for stronger, research-driven safeguards to protect policy-adherent agents from adversarial attacks

Recent studies have revealed the vulnerability of Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) to adversarial examples, which can easily fool DNNs into making incorrect predictions. To mitigate this deficiency, we propose a novel adversarial defense method called "Immunity" (Innovative MoE with MUtual information \& positioN stabilITY) based on a modified Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) architecture in this work. The key enhancements to the standard MoE are two-fold: 1) integrating of Random Switch Gates (RSGs) to obtain diverse network structures via random permutation of RSG parameters at evaluation time, despite of RSGs being determined after one-time training; 2) devising innovative Mutual Information (MI)-based and Position Stability-based loss functions by capitalizing on Grad-CAM's explanatory power to increase the diversity and the causality of expert networks. Notably, our MI-based loss operates directly on the heatmaps, thereby inducing subtler negative impacts on the classification performance when compared to other losses of the same type, theoretically. Extensive evaluation validates the efficacy of the proposed approach in improving adversarial robustness against a wide range of attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) still struggle with complex reasoning tasks. Motivated by the society of minds (Minsky, 1988), we propose ReConcile, a multi-model multi-agent framework designed as a round table conference among diverse LLM agents to foster diverse thoughts and discussion for improved consensus. ReConcile enhances the reasoning capabilities of LLMs by holding multiple rounds of discussion, learning to convince other agents to improve their answers, and employing a confidence-weighted voting mechanism. In each round, ReConcile initiates discussion between agents via a 'discussion prompt' that consists of (a) grouped answers and explanations generated by each agent in the previous round, (b) their uncertainties, and (c) demonstrations of answer-rectifying human explanations, used for convincing other agents. This discussion prompt enables each agent to revise their responses in light of insights from other agents. Once a consensus is reached and the discussion ends, ReConcile determines the final answer by leveraging the confidence of each agent in a weighted voting scheme. We implement ReConcile with ChatGPT, Bard, and Claude2 as the three agents. Our experimental results on various benchmarks demonstrate that ReConcile significantly enhances the reasoning performance of the agents (both individually and as a team), surpassing prior single-agent and multi-agent baselines by 7.7% and also outperforming GPT-4 on some of these datasets. We also experiment with GPT-4 itself as one of the agents in ReConcile and demonstrate that its initial performance also improves by absolute 10.0% through discussion and feedback from other agents. Finally, we also analyze the accuracy after every round and observe that ReConcile achieves better and faster consensus between agents, compared to a multi-agent debate baseline. Our code is available at: https://github.com/dinobby/ReConcile

We introduce a distributed algorithm, termed noise-robust distributed maximum consensus (RD-MC), for estimating the maximum value within a multi-agent network in the presence of noisy communication links. Our approach entails redefining the maximum consensus problem as a distributed optimization problem, allowing a solution using the alternating direction method of multipliers. Unlike existing algorithms that rely on multiple sets of noise-corrupted estimates, RD-MC employs a single set, enhancing both robustness and efficiency. To further mitigate the effects of link noise and improve robustness, we apply moving averaging to the local estimates. Through extensive simulations, we demonstrate that RD-MC is significantly more robust to communication link noise compared to existing maximum-consensus algorithms.