Daily Papers

It is increasingly important that LLM agents interact effectively and safely with other goal-pursuing agents, yet, recent works report the opposite trend: LLMs with stronger reasoning capabilities behave _less_ cooperatively in mixed-motive games such as the prisoner's dilemma and public goods settings. Indeed, our experiments show that recent models -- with or without reasoning enabled -- consistently defect in single-shot social dilemmas. To tackle this safety concern, we present the first comparative study of game-theoretic mechanisms designed to enable cooperative outcomes between rational agents _in equilibrium_. Across four social dilemmas testing distinct components of robust cooperation, we evaluate four families of mechanisms: (1) repeating the game for many rounds, (2) reputation systems, (3) third-party mediators to delegate decision making to, and (4) contract agreements for outcome-conditional payments between players. Among our findings, we establish that contracting and mediation are most effective in achieving cooperative outcomes between capable LLM models, and that repetition-induced cooperation deteriorates drastically when co-players vary. Moreover, we demonstrate that the mechanisms become _more effective_ under evolutionary pressures to maximize individual payoffs.

Employment contracts are used to agree upon the working conditions between employers and employees all over the world. Understanding and reviewing contracts for void or unfair clauses requires extensive knowledge of the legal system and terminology. Recent advances in Natural Language Processing (NLP) hold promise for assisting in these reviews. However, applying NLP techniques on legal text is particularly difficult due to the scarcity of expert-annotated datasets. To address this issue and as a starting point for our effort in assisting lawyers with contract reviews using NLP, we release an anonymized and annotated benchmark dataset for legality and fairness review of German employment contract clauses, alongside with baseline model evaluations.

Commercial contracts are known to be a valuable source for deriving project-specific requirements. However, contract negotiations mainly occur among the legal counsel of the parties involved. The participation of non-legal stakeholders, including requirement analysts, engineers, and solution architects, whose primary responsibility lies in ensuring the seamless implementation of contractual terms, is often indirect and inadequate. Consequently, a significant number of sentences in contractual clauses, though legally accurate, can appear unfair from an implementation perspective to non-legal stakeholders. This perception poses a problem since requirements indicated in the clauses are obligatory and can involve punitive measures and penalties if not implemented as committed in the contract. Therefore, the identification of potentially unfair clauses in contracts becomes crucial. In this work, we conduct an empirical study to analyze the perspectives of different stakeholders regarding contractual fairness. We then investigate the ability of Pre-trained Language Models (PLMs) to identify unfairness in contractual sentences by comparing chain of thought prompting and semi-supervised fine-tuning approaches. Using BERT-based fine-tuning, we achieved an accuracy of 84% on a dataset consisting of proprietary contracts. It outperformed chain of thought prompting using Vicuna-13B by a margin of 9%.

A contract is a type of legal document commonly used in organizations. Contract review is an integral and repetitive process to avoid business risk and liability. Contract analysis requires the identification and classification of key provisions and paragraphs within an agreement. Identification and validation of contract clauses can be a time-consuming and challenging task demanding the services of trained and expensive lawyers, paralegals or other legal assistants. Classification of legal provisions in contracts using artificial intelligence and natural language processing is complex due to the requirement of domain-specialized legal language for model training and the scarcity of sufficient labeled data in the legal domain. Using general-purpose models is not effective in this context due to the use of specialized legal vocabulary in contracts which may not be recognized by a general model. To address this problem, we propose the use of a pre-trained large language model which is subsequently calibrated on legal taxonomy. We propose LegalPro-BERT, a BERT transformer architecture model that we fine-tune to efficiently handle classification task for legal provisions. We conducted experiments to measure and compare metrics with current benchmark results. We found that LegalPro-BERT outperforms the previous benchmark used for comparison in this research.

Agreement Technologies refer to open computer systems in which autonomous software agents interact with one another, typically on behalf of humans, in order to come to mutually acceptable agreements. With the advance of AI systems in recent years, it has become apparent that such agreements, in order to be acceptable to the involved parties, must remain aligned with ethical principles and moral values. However, this is notoriously difficult to ensure, especially as different human users (and their software agents) may hold different value systems, i.e. they may differently weigh the importance of individual moral values. Furthermore, it is often hard to specify the precise meaning of a value in a particular context in a computational manner. Methods to estimate value systems based on human-engineered specifications, e.g. based on value surveys, are limited in scale due to the need for intense human moderation. In this article, we propose a novel method to automatically learn value systems from observations and human demonstrations. In particular, we propose a formal model of the value system learning problem, its instantiation to sequential decision-making domains based on multi-objective Markov decision processes, as well as tailored preference-based and inverse reinforcement learning algorithms to infer value grounding functions and value systems. The approach is illustrated and evaluated by two simulated use cases.

While most social norms are informal, they are often formalized by companies in contracts to regulate trades of goods and services. When poorly written, contracts may contain normative conflicts resulting from opposing deontic meanings or contradict specifications. As contracts tend to be long and contain many norms, manually identifying such conflicts requires human-effort, which is time-consuming and error-prone. Automating such task benefits contract makers increasing productivity and making conflict identification more reliable. To address this problem, we introduce an approach to detect and classify norm conflicts in contracts by converting them into latent representations that preserve both syntactic and semantic information and training a model to classify norm conflicts in four conflict types. Our results reach the new state of the art when compared to a previous approach.

The advent of Large Language Models has revolutionized tasks across domains, including the automation of legal document analysis, a critical component of modern contract management systems. This paper presents a comprehensive implementation of LLM-enhanced metadata extraction for contract review, focusing on the automatic detection and annotation of salient legal clauses. Leveraging both the publicly available Contract Understanding Atticus Dataset (CUAD) and proprietary contract datasets, our work demonstrates the integration of advanced LLM methodologies with practical applications. We identify three pivotal elements for optimizing metadata extraction: robust text conversion, strategic chunk selection, and advanced LLM-specific techniques, including Chain of Thought (CoT) prompting and structured tool calling. The results from our experiments highlight the substantial improvements in clause identification accuracy and efficiency. Our approach shows promise in reducing the time and cost associated with contract review while maintaining high accuracy in legal clause identification. The results suggest that carefully optimized LLM systems could serve as valuable tools for legal professionals, potentially increasing access to efficient contract review services for organizations of all sizes.

Information retrieval, specifically contract clause retrieval, is foundational to contract drafting because lawyers rarely draft contracts from scratch; instead, they locate and revise the most relevant precedent. We introduce the Atticus Clause Retrieval Dataset (ACORD), the first retrieval benchmark for contract drafting fully annotated by experts. ACORD focuses on complex contract clauses such as Limitation of Liability, Indemnification, Change of Control, and Most Favored Nation. It includes 114 queries and over 126,000 query-clause pairs, each ranked on a scale from 1 to 5 stars. The task is to find the most relevant precedent clauses to a query. The bi-encoder retriever paired with pointwise LLMs re-rankers shows promising results. However, substantial improvements are still needed to effectively manage the complex legal work typically undertaken by lawyers. As the first retrieval benchmark for contract drafting annotated by experts, ACORD can serve as a valuable IR benchmark for the NLP community.

Reviewing contracts is a time-consuming procedure that incurs large expenses to companies and social inequality to those who cannot afford it. In this work, we propose "document-level natural language inference (NLI) for contracts", a novel, real-world application of NLI that addresses such problems. In this task, a system is given a set of hypotheses (such as "Some obligations of Agreement may survive termination.") and a contract, and it is asked to classify whether each hypothesis is "entailed by", "contradicting to" or "not mentioned by" (neutral to) the contract as well as identifying "evidence" for the decision as spans in the contract. We annotated and release the largest corpus to date consisting of 607 annotated contracts. We then show that existing models fail badly on our task and introduce a strong baseline, which (1) models evidence identification as multi-label classification over spans instead of trying to predict start and end tokens, and (2) employs more sophisticated context segmentation for dealing with long documents. We also show that linguistic characteristics of contracts, such as negations by exceptions, are contributing to the difficulty of this task and that there is much room for improvement.

Using blockchain technology, it is possible to create contracts that offer a reward in exchange for a trained machine learning model for a particular data set. This would allow users to train machine learning models for a reward in a trustless manner. The smart contract will use the blockchain to automatically validate the solution, so there would be no debate about whether the solution was correct or not. Users who submit the solutions won't have counterparty risk that they won't get paid for their work. Contracts can be created easily by anyone with a dataset, even programmatically by software agents. This creates a market where parties who are good at solving machine learning problems can directly monetize their skillset, and where any organization or software agent that has a problem to solve with AI can solicit solutions from all over the world. This will incentivize the creation of better machine learning models, and make AI more accessible to companies and software agents.

Traditional software relies on contracts -- APIs, type systems, assertions -- to specify and enforce correct behavior. AI agents, by contrast, operate on prompts and natural language instructions with no formal behavioral specification. This gap is the root cause of drift, governance failures, and frequent project failures in agentic AI deployments. We introduce Agent Behavioral Contracts (ABC), a formal framework that brings Design-by-Contract principles to autonomous AI agents. An ABC contract C = (P, I, G, R) specifies Preconditions, Invariants, Governance policies, and Recovery mechanisms as first-class, runtime-enforceable components. We define (p, delta, k)-satisfaction -- a probabilistic notion of contract compliance that accounts for LLM non-determinism and recovery -- and prove a Drift Bounds Theorem showing that contracts with recovery rate gamma > alpha (the natural drift rate) bound behavioral drift to D* = alpha/gamma in expectation, with Gaussian concentration in the stochastic setting. We establish sufficient conditions for safe contract composition in multi-agent chains and derive probabilistic degradation bounds. We implement ABC in AgentAssert, a runtime enforcement library, and evaluate on AgentContract-Bench, a benchmark of 200 scenarios across 7 models from 6 vendors. Results across 1,980 sessions show that contracted agents detect 5.2-6.8 soft violations per session that uncontracted baselines miss entirely (p < 0.0001, Cohen's d = 6.7-33.8), achieve 88-100% hard constraint compliance, and bound behavioral drift to D* < 0.27 across extended sessions, with 100% recovery for frontier models and 17-100% across all models, at overhead < 10 ms per action.

Legal contracts in the custody and fund services domain govern critical aspects such as key provider responsibilities, fee schedules, and indemnification rights. However, it is challenging for an off-the-shelf Large Language Model (LLM) to ingest these contracts due to the lengthy unstructured streams of text, limited LLM context windows, and complex legal jargon. To address these challenges, we introduce LAW (Legal Agentic Workflows for Custody and Fund Services Contracts). LAW features a modular design that responds to user queries by orchestrating a suite of domain-specific tools and text agents. Our experiments demonstrate that LAW, by integrating multiple specialized agents and tools, significantly outperforms the baseline. LAW excels particularly in complex tasks such as calculating a contract's termination date, surpassing the baseline by 92.9% points. Furthermore, LAW offers a cost-effective alternative to traditional fine-tuned legal LLMs by leveraging reusable, domain-specific tools.

Artificial Intelligence (AI) is taking on increasingly autonomous roles, e.g., browsing the web as a research assistant and managing money. But specifying goals and restrictions for AI behavior is difficult. Similar to how parties to a legal contract cannot foresee every potential "if-then" contingency of their future relationship, we cannot specify desired AI behavior for all circumstances. Legal standards facilitate robust communication of inherently vague and underspecified goals. Instructions (in the case of language models, "prompts") that employ legal standards will allow AI agents to develop shared understandings of the spirit of a directive that generalize expectations regarding acceptable actions to take in unspecified states of the world. Standards have built-in context that is lacking from other goal specification languages, such as plain language and programming languages. Through an empirical study on thousands of evaluation labels we constructed from U.S. court opinions, we demonstrate that large language models (LLMs) are beginning to exhibit an "understanding" of one of the most relevant legal standards for AI agents: fiduciary obligations. Performance comparisons across models suggest that, as LLMs continue to exhibit improved core capabilities, their legal standards understanding will also continue to improve. OpenAI's latest LLM has 78% accuracy on our data, their previous release has 73% accuracy, and a model from their 2020 GPT-3 paper has 27% accuracy (worse than random). Our research is an initial step toward a framework for evaluating AI understanding of legal standards more broadly, and for conducting reinforcement learning with legal feedback (RLLF).

Automatic Compliance Checking (ACC) within the Architecture, Engineering, and Construction (AEC) sector necessitates automating the interpretation of building regulations to achieve its full potential. However, extracting information from textual rules to convert them to a machine-readable format has been a challenge due to the complexities associated with natural language and the limited resources that can support advanced machine-learning techniques. To address this challenge, we introduce CODE-ACCORD, a unique dataset compiled under the EU Horizon ACCORD project. CODE-ACCORD comprises 862 self-contained sentences extracted from the building regulations of England and Finland. Aligned with our core objective of facilitating information extraction from text for machine-readable rule generation, each sentence was annotated with entities and relations. Entities represent specific components such as "window" and "smoke detectors", while relations denote semantic associations between these entities, collectively capturing the conveyed ideas in natural language. We manually annotated all the sentences using a group of 12 annotators. Each sentence underwent annotations by multiple annotators and subsequently careful data curation to finalise annotations, ensuring their accuracy and reliability, thereby establishing the dataset as a solid ground truth. CODE-ACCORD offers a rich resource for diverse machine learning and natural language processing (NLP) related tasks in ACC, including text classification, entity recognition and relation extraction. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first entity and relation-annotated dataset in compliance checking, which is also publicly available.

We study principal-agent problems in which a principal commits to an outcome-dependent payment scheme -- called contract -- in order to induce an agent to take a costly, unobservable action leading to favorable outcomes. We consider a generalization of the classical (single-round) version of the problem in which the principal interacts with the agent by committing to contracts over multiple rounds. The principal has no information about the agent, and they have to learn an optimal contract by only observing the outcome realized at each round. We focus on settings in which the size of the agent's action space is small. We design an algorithm that learns an approximately-optimal contract with high probability in a number of rounds polynomial in the size of the outcome space, when the number of actions is constant. Our algorithm solves an open problem by Zhu et al.[2022]. Moreover, it can also be employed to provide a mathcal{O}(T^{4/5}) regret bound in the related online learning setting in which the principal aims at maximizing their cumulative utility, thus considerably improving previously-known regret bounds.

OpenClaw-style agent stacks turn language into privileged execution: LLM intents flow through tool interception, policy gates, and a local executor. In parallel, skill marketplaces such as skills.sh make capability acquisition as easy as installing skills and CLIs, creating a growing capability supply chain. Together, these trends shift the dominant safety failure mode from "wrong answers" to execution-induced loss, where untrusted prompts, compromised skills, or narrative manipulation can trigger real trades and irreversible side effects. We propose Survivability-Aware Execution (SAE), an execution-layer survivability standard for OpenClaw-style systems and skill-enabled agents. SAE sits as middleware between a strategy engine (LLM or non-LLM) and the exchange executor. It defines an explicit execution contract (ExecutionRequest, ExecutionContext, ExecutionDecision) and enforces non-bypassable last-mile invariants: projection-based exposure budgets, cooldown and order-rate limits, slippage bounds, staged execution, and tool/venue allowlists. To make delegated execution testable under supply-chain risk, we operationalize the Delegation Gap (DG) via a logged Intended Policy Spec that enables deterministic out-of-scope labeling and reproducible DG metrics. On an offline replay using official Binance USD-M BTCUSDT/ETHUSDT perpetual data (15m; 2025-09-01--2025-12-01, incl. funding), SAE improves survivability: MDD drops from 0.4643 to 0.0319 (Full; 93.1%), |CVaR_0.99| shrinks from 4.025e-3 to ~1.02e-4 (~97.5%), and DG loss proxy falls from 0.647 to 0.019 (~97.0%). AttackSuccess decreases from 1.00 to 0.728 with zero FalseBlock in this run. Block bootstrap, paired Wilcoxon, and two-proportion tests confirm the shifts. SAE reframes agentic trading safety for the OpenClaw+skills era: treat upstream intent and skills as untrusted, and enforce survivability where actions become side effects.

Many specialized domains remain untouched by deep learning, as large labeled datasets require expensive expert annotators. We address this bottleneck within the legal domain by introducing the Contract Understanding Atticus Dataset (CUAD), a new dataset for legal contract review. CUAD was created with dozens of legal experts from The Atticus Project and consists of over 13,000 annotations. The task is to highlight salient portions of a contract that are important for a human to review. We find that Transformer models have nascent performance, but that this performance is strongly influenced by model design and training dataset size. Despite these promising results, there is still substantial room for improvement. As one of the only large, specialized NLP benchmarks annotated by experts, CUAD can serve as a challenging research benchmark for the broader NLP community.

Generative models, particularly Large Language Models (LLMs), produce fluent outputs yet lack verifiable guarantees. We adapt Design by Contract (DbC) and type-theoretic principles to introduce a contract layer that mediates every LLM call. Contracts stipulate semantic and type requirements on inputs and outputs, coupled with probabilistic remediation to steer generation toward compliance. The layer exposes the dual view of LLMs as semantic parsers and probabilistic black-box components. Contract satisfaction is probabilistic and semantic validation is operationally defined through programmer-specified conditions on well-typed data structures. More broadly, this work postulates that any two agents satisfying the same contracts are functionally equivalent with respect to those contracts.