Daily Papers

Multi-agent systems, where LLM agents communicate through free-form language, enable sophisticated coordination for solving complex cooperative tasks. This surfaces a unique safety problem when individual agents form a coalition and collude to pursue secondary goals and degrade the joint objective. In this paper, we present Colosseum, a framework for auditing LLM agents' collusive behavior in multi-agent settings. We ground how agents cooperate through a Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) and measure collusion via regret relative to the cooperative optimum. Colosseum tests each LLM for collusion under different objectives, persuasion tactics, and network topologies. Through our audit, we show that most out-of-the-box models exhibited a propensity to collude when a secret communication channel was artificially formed. Furthermore, we discover ``collusion on paper'' when agents plan to collude in text but would often pick non-collusive actions, thus providing little effect on the joint task. Colosseum provides a new way to study collusion by measuring communications and actions in rich yet verifiable environments.

Zero-shot coordination in cooperative artificial intelligence (AI) remains a significant challenge, which means effectively coordinating with a wide range of unseen partners. Previous algorithms have attempted to address this challenge by optimizing fixed objectives within a population to improve strategy or behaviour diversity. However, these approaches can result in a loss of learning and an inability to cooperate with certain strategies within the population, known as cooperative incompatibility. To address this issue, we propose the Cooperative Open-ended LEarning (COLE) framework, which constructs open-ended objectives in cooperative games with two players from the perspective of graph theory to assess and identify the cooperative ability of each strategy. We further specify the framework and propose a practical algorithm that leverages knowledge from game theory and graph theory. Furthermore, an analysis of the learning process of the algorithm shows that it can efficiently overcome cooperative incompatibility. The experimental results in the Overcooked game environment demonstrate that our method outperforms current state-of-the-art methods when coordinating with different-level partners. Our demo is available at https://sites.google.com/view/cole-2023.

In this work, we address the cooperation problem among large language model (LLM) based embodied agents, where agents must cooperate to achieve a common goal. Previous methods often execute actions extemporaneously and incoherently, without long-term strategic and cooperative planning, leading to redundant steps, failures, and even serious repercussions in complex tasks like search-and-rescue missions where discussion and cooperative plan are crucial. To solve this issue, we propose Cooperative Plan Optimization (CaPo) to enhance the cooperation efficiency of LLM-based embodied agents. Inspired by human cooperation schemes, CaPo improves cooperation efficiency with two phases: 1) meta-plan generation, and 2) progress-adaptive meta-plan and execution. In the first phase, all agents analyze the task, discuss, and cooperatively create a meta-plan that decomposes the task into subtasks with detailed steps, ensuring a long-term strategic and coherent plan for efficient coordination. In the second phase, agents execute tasks according to the meta-plan and dynamically adjust it based on their latest progress (e.g., discovering a target object) through multi-turn discussions. This progress-based adaptation eliminates redundant actions, improving the overall cooperation efficiency of agents. Experimental results on the ThreeDworld Multi-Agent Transport and Communicative Watch-And-Help tasks demonstrate that CaPo achieves much higher task completion rate and efficiency compared with state-of-the-arts.The code is released at https://github.com/jliu4ai/CaPo.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

Domain adaptation (DA) attempts to transfer the knowledge from a labeled source domain to an unlabeled target domain that follows different distribution from the source. To achieve this, DA methods include a source classification objective to extract the source knowledge and a domain alignment objective to diminish the domain shift, ensuring knowledge transfer. Typically, former DA methods adopt some weight hyper-parameters to linearly combine the training objectives to form an overall objective. However, the gradient directions of these objectives may conflict with each other due to domain shift. Under such circumstances, the linear optimization scheme might decrease the overall objective value at the expense of damaging one of the training objectives, leading to restricted solutions. In this paper, we rethink the optimization scheme for DA from a gradient-based perspective. We propose a Pareto Domain Adaptation (ParetoDA) approach to control the overall optimization direction, aiming to cooperatively optimize all training objectives. Specifically, to reach a desirable solution on the target domain, we design a surrogate loss mimicking target classification. To improve target-prediction accuracy to support the mimicking, we propose a target-prediction refining mechanism which exploits domain labels via Bayes' theorem. On the other hand, since prior knowledge of weighting schemes for objectives is often unavailable to guide optimization to approach the optimal solution on the target domain, we propose a dynamic preference mechanism to dynamically guide our cooperative optimization by the gradient of the surrogate loss on a held-out unlabeled target dataset. Extensive experiments on image classification and semantic segmentation benchmarks demonstrate the effectiveness of ParetoDA

RAG systems consist of multiple modules to work together. However, these modules are usually separately trained. We argue that a system like RAG that incorporates multiple modules should be jointly optimized to achieve optimal performance. To demonstrate this, we design a specific pipeline called SmartRAG that includes a policy network and a retriever. The policy network can serve as 1) a decision maker that decides when to retrieve, 2) a query rewriter to generate a query most suited to the retriever, and 3) an answer generator that produces the final response with/without the observations. We then propose to jointly optimize the whole system using a reinforcement learning algorithm, with the reward designed to encourage the system to achieve the best performance with minimal retrieval cost. When jointly optimized, all the modules can be aware of how other modules are working and thus find the best way to work together as a complete system. Empirical results demonstrate that the jointly optimized SmartRAG can achieve better performance than separately optimized counterparts.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

We study the problem of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning with a single joint reward signal. This class of learning problems is difficult because of the often large combined action and observation spaces. In the fully centralized and decentralized approaches, we find the problem of spurious rewards and a phenomenon we call the "lazy agent" problem, which arises due to partial observability. We address these problems by training individual agents with a novel value decomposition network architecture, which learns to decompose the team value function into agent-wise value functions. We perform an experimental evaluation across a range of partially-observable multi-agent domains and show that learning such value-decompositions leads to superior results, in particular when combined with weight sharing, role information and information channels.

Achieving robust coordination and cooperation is a central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). Uncovering the mechanisms underlying such emergent behaviors calls for a dynamical understanding of learn processes. In this work, we investigate the dynamics of actor-critic agents in stochastic games, focusing on the impact of entropy regularization. By leveraging time-scale separation, we derive the system's evolution equations, which are then formally analyzed using dynamical systems theory. We find that in the constant-sum game of Matching Pennies, the system exhibits chaotic behavior. Entropy regularization mitigates this chaos and drives the dynamics toward convergence to fair cooperation. In contrast, in the general-sum game of the Prisoner's Dilemma, the system displays multistability. Interestingly, the three stable equilibria of the system correspond to the well-known ALLC (Always Cooperate), ALLD (Always Defect), and GRIM (Grim Trigger) strategies from evolutionary game theory (EGT). Entropy regularization strengthens system resilience by enlarging the basin of attraction of the cooperative equilibrium. Our findings reveal a close link between the mechanism of direct reciprocity in EGT and how cooperation emerges in MARL, offering insights for designing more robust and collaborative multi-agent systems.

A central challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning is enabling agents to adapt to previously unseen teammates in a zero-shot fashion. Prior work in zero-shot coordination often follows a two-stage process, first generating a diverse training pool of partner agents, and then training a best-response agent to collaborate effectively with the entire training pool. While many previous works have achieved strong performance by devising better ways to diversify the partner agent pool, there has been less emphasis on how to leverage this pool to build an adaptive agent. One limitation is that the best-response agent may converge to a static, generalist policy that performs reasonably well across diverse teammates, rather than learning a more adaptive, specialist policy that can better adapt to teammates and achieve higher synergy. To address this, we propose an adaptive ensemble agent that uses Theory-of-Mind-based best-response selection to first infer its teammate's intentions and then select the most suitable policy from a policy ensemble. We conduct experiments in the Overcooked environment to evaluate zero-shot coordination performance under both fully and partially observable settings. The empirical results demonstrate the superiority of our method over a single best-response baseline.

Successful negotiators must learn how to balance optimizing for self-interest and cooperation. Yet current artificial negotiation agents often heavily depend on the quality of the static datasets they were trained on, limiting their capacity to fashion an adaptive response balancing self-interest and cooperation. For this reason, we find that these agents can achieve either high utility or cooperation, but not both. To address this, we introduce a targeted data acquisition framework where we guide the exploration of a reinforcement learning agent using annotations from an expert oracle. The guided exploration incentivizes the learning agent to go beyond its static dataset and develop new negotiation strategies. We show that this enables our agents to obtain higher-reward and more Pareto-optimal solutions when negotiating with both simulated and human partners compared to standard supervised learning and reinforcement learning methods. This trend additionally holds when comparing agents using our targeted data acquisition framework to variants of agents trained with a mix of supervised learning and reinforcement learning, or to agents using tailored reward functions that explicitly optimize for utility and Pareto-optimality.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

Two-player, constant-sum games are well studied in the literature, but there has been limited progress outside of this setting. We propose Joint Policy-Space Response Oracles (JPSRO), an algorithm for training agents in n-player, general-sum extensive form games, which provably converges to an equilibrium. We further suggest correlated equilibria (CE) as promising meta-solvers, and propose a novel solution concept Maximum Gini Correlated Equilibrium (MGCE), a principled and computationally efficient family of solutions for solving the correlated equilibrium selection problem. We conduct several experiments using CE meta-solvers for JPSRO and demonstrate convergence on n-player, general-sum games.

In numerous artificial intelligence applications, the collaborative efforts of multiple intelligent agents are imperative for the successful attainment of target objectives. To enhance coordination among these agents, a distributed communication framework is often employed. However, indiscriminate information sharing among all agents can be resource-intensive, and the adoption of manually pre-defined communication architectures imposes constraints on inter-agent communication, thus limiting the potential for effective collaboration. Moreover, the communication framework often remains static during inference, which may result in sustained high resource consumption, as in most cases, only key decisions necessitate information sharing among agents. In this study, we introduce a novel approach wherein we conceptualize the communication architecture among agents as a learnable graph. We formulate this problem as the task of determining the communication graph while enabling the architecture parameters to update normally, thus necessitating a bi-level optimization process. Utilizing continuous relaxation of the graph representation and incorporating attention units, our proposed approach, CommFormer, efficiently optimizes the communication graph and concurrently refines architectural parameters through gradient descent in an end-to-end manner. Additionally, we introduce a temporal gating mechanism for each agent, enabling dynamic decisions on whether to receive shared information at a given time, based on current observations, thus improving decision-making efficiency. Extensive experiments on a variety of cooperative tasks substantiate the robustness of our model across diverse cooperative scenarios, where agents are able to develop more coordinated and sophisticated strategies regardless of changes in the number of agents.

Cooperation in multi-agent learning (MAL) is a topic at the intersection of numerous disciplines, including game theory, economics, social sciences, and evolutionary biology. Research in this area aims to understand both how agents can coordinate effectively when goals are aligned and how they may cooperate in settings where gains from working together are possible but possibilities for conflict abound. In this paper we provide an overview of the fundamental concepts, problem settings and algorithms of multi-agent learning. This encompasses reinforcement learning, multi-agent sequential decision-making, challenges associated with multi-agent cooperation, and a comprehensive review of recent progress, along with an evaluation of relevant metrics. Finally we discuss open challenges in the field with the aim of inspiring new avenues for research.

This paper introduces the concept of {mutual consensus} as a novel non-compensatory consensus measure that accounts for the maximum disparity among opinions to ensure robust consensus evaluation. Incorporating this concept, several new Minimum Cost Consensus (MCC) models are proposed, and their properties are analyzed. To show their applicability, these mutual consensus-based MCC models are then considered in the context of the {OWA-MCC} model, which employs Ordered Weighted Averaging (OWA) operators for preference aggregation. Concretely, we include a linearized formulation under symmetry conditions as well as examples of the non-convexity of the feasible region in the general case. Finally, mutual consensus is utilized to obtain approximate solutions for the OWA-MCC model, demonstrating its practical effectiveness and advancing the theoretical and applied dimensions of consensus modeling in group decision-making.

We study the problem of convergence to a stationary point in zero-sum games. We propose competitive gradient optimization (CGO ), a gradient-based method that incorporates the interactions between the two players in zero-sum games for optimization updates. We provide continuous-time analysis of CGO and its convergence properties while showing that in the continuous limit, CGO predecessors degenerate to their gradient descent ascent (GDA) variants. We provide a rate of convergence to stationary points and further propose a generalized class of alpha-coherent function for which we provide convergence analysis. We show that for strictly alpha-coherent functions, our algorithm convergences to a saddle point. Moreover, we propose optimistic CGO (OCGO), an optimistic variant, for which we show convergence rate to saddle points in alpha-coherent class of functions.

The higher-order correlation clustering problem is an expressive model, and recently, local search heuristics have been proposed for several applications. Certifying optimality, however, is NP-hard and practically hampered already by the complexity of the problem statement. Here, we focus on establishing partial optimality conditions for the special case of complete graphs and cubic objective functions. In addition, we define and implement algorithms for testing these conditions and examine their effect numerically, on two datasets.

Recently, remarkable progress has been made by approximating Nash equilibrium (NE), correlated equilibrium (CE), and coarse correlated equilibrium (CCE) through function approximation that trains a neural network to predict equilibria from game representations. Furthermore, equivariant architectures are widely adopted in designing such equilibrium approximators in normal-form games. In this paper, we theoretically characterize benefits and limitations of equivariant equilibrium approximators. For the benefits, we show that they enjoy better generalizability than general ones and can achieve better approximations when the payoff distribution is permutation-invariant. For the limitations, we discuss their drawbacks in terms of equilibrium selection and social welfare. Together, our results help to understand the role of equivariance in equilibrium approximators.

The study of decentralized learning or independent learning in cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning has a history of decades. Recently empirical studies show that independent PPO (IPPO) can obtain good performance, close to or even better than the methods of centralized training with decentralized execution, in several benchmarks. However, decentralized actor-critic with convergence guarantee is still open. In this paper, we propose decentralized policy optimization (DPO), a decentralized actor-critic algorithm with monotonic improvement and convergence guarantee. We derive a novel decentralized surrogate for policy optimization such that the monotonic improvement of joint policy can be guaranteed by each agent independently optimizing the surrogate. In practice, this decentralized surrogate can be realized by two adaptive coefficients for policy optimization at each agent. Empirically, we compare DPO with IPPO in a variety of cooperative multi-agent tasks, covering discrete and continuous action spaces, and fully and partially observable environments. The results show DPO outperforms IPPO in most tasks, which can be the evidence for our theoretical results.

This paper presents a distributed algorithm applicable to a wide range of practical multi-robot applications. In such multi-robot applications, the user-defined objectives of the mission can be cast as a general optimization problem, without explicit guidelines of the subtasks per different robot. Owing to the unknown environment, unknown robot dynamics, sensor nonlinearities, etc., the analytic form of the optimization cost function is not available a priori. Therefore, standard gradient-descent-like algorithms are not applicable to these problems. To tackle this, we introduce a new algorithm that carefully designs each robot's subcost function, the optimization of which can accomplish the overall team objective. Upon this transformation, we propose a distributed methodology based on the cognitive-based adaptive optimization (CAO) algorithm, that is able to approximate the evolution of each robot's cost function and to adequately optimize its decision variables (robot actions). The latter can be achieved by online learning only the problem-specific characteristics that affect the accomplishment of mission objectives. The overall, low-complexity algorithm can straightforwardly incorporate any kind of operational constraint, is fault-tolerant, and can appropriately tackle time-varying cost functions. A cornerstone of this approach is that it shares the same convergence characteristics as those of block coordinate descent algorithms. The proposed algorithm is evaluated in three heterogeneous simulation set-ups under multiple scenarios, against both general-purpose and problem-specific algorithms. Source code is available at https://github.com/athakapo/A-distributed-plug-n-play-algorithm-for-multi-robot-applications.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

In many applications of machine learning, like drug discovery and material design, the goal is to generate candidates that simultaneously maximize a set of objectives. As these objectives are often conflicting, there is no single candidate that simultaneously maximizes all objectives, but rather a set of Pareto-optimal candidates where one objective cannot be improved without worsening another. Moreover, in practice, these objectives are often under-specified, making the diversity of candidates a key consideration. The existing multi-objective optimization methods focus predominantly on covering the Pareto front, failing to capture diversity in the space of candidates. Motivated by the success of GFlowNets for generation of diverse candidates in a single objective setting, in this paper we consider Multi-Objective GFlowNets (MOGFNs). MOGFNs consist of a novel Conditional GFlowNet which models a family of single-objective sub-problems derived by decomposing the multi-objective optimization problem. Our work is the first to empirically demonstrate conditional GFlowNets. Through a series of experiments on synthetic and benchmark tasks, we empirically demonstrate that MOGFNs outperform existing methods in terms of Hypervolume, R2-distance and candidate diversity. We also demonstrate the effectiveness of MOGFNs over existing methods in active learning settings. Finally, we supplement our empirical results with a careful analysis of each component of MOGFNs.

A large amount of work has been done in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) for modeling and solving problems with multiple interacting agents. However, most LLMs are pretrained independently and not specifically optimized for coordination. Existing LLM fine-tuning frameworks rely on individual rewards, which require complex reward designs for each agent to encourage collaboration. To address these challenges, we model LLM collaboration as a cooperative Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) problem. We develop a multi-agent, multi-turn algorithm, Multi-Agent Group Relative Policy Optimization (MAGRPO), to solve it, building on current RL approaches for LLMs as well as MARL techniques. Our experiments on LLM writing and coding collaboration demonstrate that fine-tuning MAS with MAGRPO enables agents to generate high-quality responses efficiently through effective cooperation. Our approach opens the door to using other MARL methods for LLMs and highlights the associated challenges.

Large Language Models (LLMs) perform well in language tasks but often lack collaborative awareness and struggle to optimize global performance in multi-agent settings. We present a reinforcement learning-augmented LLM agent framework that formulates cooperation as a decentralized partially observable Markov decision process (Dec-POMDP) and adopts centralized training with decentralized execution (CTDE). We introduce Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) to jointly optimize agent policies with access to global signals during training, together with a simplified joint reward that balances task quality, speed, and coordination cost. On collaborative writing and coding benchmarks, our framework delivers a 3x increase in task processing speed over single-agent baselines, 98.7% structural/style consistency in writing, and a 74.6% test pass rate in coding. The approach consistently outperforms strong multi-agent LLM baselines and provides a practical path toward reliable collaboration in complex workflows.

Recently, there has been an increasing interest in automated prompt optimization based on reinforcement learning (RL). This approach offers important advantages, such as generating interpretable prompts and being compatible with black-box foundation models. However, the substantial prompt space size poses challenges for RL-based methods, often leading to suboptimal policy convergence. This paper introduces MultiPrompter, a new framework that views prompt optimization as a cooperative game between prompters which take turns composing a prompt together. Our cooperative prompt optimization effectively reduces the problem size and helps prompters learn optimal prompts. We test our method on the text-to-image task and show its ability to generate higher-quality images than baselines.

Recently, evolutionary reinforcement learning has obtained much attention in various domains. Maintaining a population of actors, evolutionary reinforcement learning utilises the collected experiences to improve the behaviour policy through efficient exploration. However, the poor scalability of genetic operators limits the efficiency of optimising high-dimensional neural networks. To address this issue, this paper proposes a novel cooperative coevolutionary reinforcement learning (CoERL) algorithm. Inspired by cooperative coevolution, CoERL periodically and adaptively decomposes the policy optimisation problem into multiple subproblems and evolves a population of neural networks for each of the subproblems. Instead of using genetic operators, CoERL directly searches for partial gradients to update the policy. Updating policy with partial gradients maintains consistency between the behaviour spaces of parents and offspring across generations. The experiences collected by the population are then used to improve the entire policy, which enhances the sampling efficiency. Experiments on six benchmark locomotion tasks demonstrate that CoERL outperforms seven state-of-the-art algorithms and baselines. Ablation study verifies the unique contribution of CoERL's core ingredients.

Federated learning is a distributed machine learning paradigm in which a large number of clients coordinate with a central server to learn a model without sharing their own training data. Standard federated optimization methods such as Federated Averaging (FedAvg) are often difficult to tune and exhibit unfavorable convergence behavior. In non-federated settings, adaptive optimization methods have had notable success in combating such issues. In this work, we propose federated versions of adaptive optimizers, including Adagrad, Adam, and Yogi, and analyze their convergence in the presence of heterogeneous data for general non-convex settings. Our results highlight the interplay between client heterogeneity and communication efficiency. We also perform extensive experiments on these methods and show that the use of adaptive optimizers can significantly improve the performance of federated learning.

We investigate the sets of joint probability distributions that maximize the average multi-information over a collection of margins. These functionals serve as proxies for maximizing the multi-information of a set of variables or the mutual information of two subsets of variables, at a lower computation and estimation complexity. We describe the maximizers and their relations to the maximizers of the multi-information and the mutual information.

In various real-world scenarios, interactions among agents often resemble the dynamics of general-sum games, where each agent strives to optimize its own utility. Despite the ubiquitous relevance of such settings, decentralized machine learning algorithms have struggled to find equilibria that maximize individual utility while preserving social welfare. In this paper we introduce Learning with Opponent Q-Learning Awareness (LOQA), a novel, decentralized reinforcement learning algorithm tailored to optimizing an agent's individual utility while fostering cooperation among adversaries in partially competitive environments. LOQA assumes the opponent samples actions proportionally to their action-value function Q. Experimental results demonstrate the effectiveness of LOQA at achieving state-of-the-art performance in benchmark scenarios such as the Iterated Prisoner's Dilemma and the Coin Game. LOQA achieves these outcomes with a significantly reduced computational footprint, making it a promising approach for practical multi-agent applications.

Multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) has been shown effective for cooperative games in recent years. However, existing state-of-the-art methods face challenges related to sample complexity, training instability, and the risk of converging to a suboptimal Nash Equilibrium. In this paper, we propose a unified framework for learning stochastic policies to resolve these issues. We embed cooperative MARL problems into probabilistic graphical models, from which we derive the maximum entropy (MaxEnt) objective for MARL. Based on the MaxEnt framework, we propose Heterogeneous-Agent Soft Actor-Critic (HASAC) algorithm. Theoretically, we prove the monotonic improvement and convergence to quantal response equilibrium (QRE) properties of HASAC. Furthermore, we generalize a unified template for MaxEnt algorithmic design named Maximum Entropy Heterogeneous-Agent Mirror Learning (MEHAML), which provides any induced method with the same guarantees as HASAC. We evaluate HASAC on six benchmarks: Bi-DexHands, Multi-Agent MuJoCo, StarCraft Multi-Agent Challenge, Google Research Football, Multi-Agent Particle Environment, and Light Aircraft Game. Results show that HASAC consistently outperforms strong baselines, exhibiting better sample efficiency, robustness, and sufficient exploration.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

We propose a novel framework to study asynchronous federated learning optimization with delays in gradient updates. Our theoretical framework extends the standard FedAvg aggregation scheme by introducing stochastic aggregation weights to represent the variability of the clients update time, due for example to heterogeneous hardware capabilities. Our formalism applies to the general federated setting where clients have heterogeneous datasets and perform at least one step of stochastic gradient descent (SGD). We demonstrate convergence for such a scheme and provide sufficient conditions for the related minimum to be the optimum of the federated problem. We show that our general framework applies to existing optimization schemes including centralized learning, FedAvg, asynchronous FedAvg, and FedBuff. The theory here provided allows drawing meaningful guidelines for designing a federated learning experiment in heterogeneous conditions. In particular, we develop in this work FedFix, a novel extension of FedAvg enabling efficient asynchronous federated training while preserving the convergence stability of synchronous aggregation. We empirically demonstrate our theory on a series of experiments showing that asynchronous FedAvg leads to fast convergence at the expense of stability, and we finally demonstrate the improvements of FedFix over synchronous and asynchronous FedAvg.

Achieving cooperation among self-interested agents remains a fundamental challenge in multi-agent reinforcement learning. Recent work showed that mutual cooperation can be induced between "learning-aware" agents that account for and shape the learning dynamics of their co-players. However, existing approaches typically rely on hardcoded, often inconsistent, assumptions about co-player learning rules or enforce a strict separation between "naive learners" updating on fast timescales and "meta-learners" observing these updates. Here, we demonstrate that the in-context learning capabilities of sequence models allow for co-player learning awareness without requiring hardcoded assumptions or explicit timescale separation. We show that training sequence model agents against a diverse distribution of co-players naturally induces in-context best-response strategies, effectively functioning as learning algorithms on the fast intra-episode timescale. We find that the cooperative mechanism identified in prior work-where vulnerability to extortion drives mutual shaping-emerges naturally in this setting: in-context adaptation renders agents vulnerable to extortion, and the resulting mutual pressure to shape the opponent's in-context learning dynamics resolves into the learning of cooperative behavior. Our results suggest that standard decentralized reinforcement learning on sequence models combined with co-player diversity provides a scalable path to learning cooperative behaviors.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

In multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL), independent learning (IL) often shows remarkable performance and easily scales with the number of agents. Yet, using IL can be inefficient and runs the risk of failing to successfully train, particularly in scenarios that require agents to coordinate their actions. Using centralised learning (CL) enables MARL agents to quickly learn how to coordinate their behaviour but employing CL everywhere is often prohibitively expensive in real-world applications. Besides, using CL in value-based methods often needs strong representational constraints (e.g. individual-global-max condition) that can lead to poor performance if violated. In this paper, we introduce a novel plug & play IL framework named Multi-Agent Network Selection Algorithm (MANSA) which selectively employs CL only at states that require coordination. At its core, MANSA has an additional agent that uses switching controls to quickly learn the best states to activate CL during training, using CL only where necessary and vastly reducing the computational burden of CL. Our theory proves MANSA preserves cooperative MARL convergence properties, boosts IL performance and can optimally make use of a fixed budget on the number CL calls. We show empirically in Level-based Foraging (LBF) and StarCraft Multi-agent Challenge (SMAC) that MANSA achieves fast, superior and more reliable performance while making 40% fewer CL calls in SMAC and using CL at only 1% CL calls in LBF.

Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) is a ubiquitous on-policy reinforcement learning algorithm but is significantly less utilized than off-policy learning algorithms in multi-agent settings. This is often due to the belief that PPO is significantly less sample efficient than off-policy methods in multi-agent systems. In this work, we carefully study the performance of PPO in cooperative multi-agent settings. We show that PPO-based multi-agent algorithms achieve surprisingly strong performance in four popular multi-agent testbeds: the particle-world environments, the StarCraft multi-agent challenge, Google Research Football, and the Hanabi challenge, with minimal hyperparameter tuning and without any domain-specific algorithmic modifications or architectures. Importantly, compared to competitive off-policy methods, PPO often achieves competitive or superior results in both final returns and sample efficiency. Finally, through ablation studies, we analyze implementation and hyperparameter factors that are critical to PPO's empirical performance, and give concrete practical suggestions regarding these factors. Our results show that when using these practices, simple PPO-based methods can be a strong baseline in cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning. Source code is released at https://github.com/marlbenchmark/on-policy.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for the general-sum Markov Games (MGs) under the general function approximation. In order to find the minimum assumption for sample-efficient learning, we introduce a novel complexity measure called the Multi-Agent Decoupling Coefficient (MADC) for general-sum MGs. Using this measure, we propose the first unified algorithmic framework that ensures sample efficiency in learning Nash Equilibrium, Coarse Correlated Equilibrium, and Correlated Equilibrium for both model-based and model-free MARL problems with low MADC. We also show that our algorithm provides comparable sublinear regret to the existing works. Moreover, our algorithm combines an equilibrium-solving oracle with a single objective optimization subprocedure that solves for the regularized payoff of each deterministic joint policy, which avoids solving constrained optimization problems within data-dependent constraints (Jin et al. 2020; Wang et al. 2023) or executing sampling procedures with complex multi-objective optimization problems (Foster et al. 2023), thus being more amenable to empirical implementation.

How to ensure fairness is an important topic in federated learning (FL). Recent studies have investigated how to reward clients based on their contribution (collaboration fairness), and how to achieve uniformity of performance across clients (performance fairness). Despite achieving progress on either one, we argue that it is critical to consider them together, in order to engage and motivate more diverse clients joining FL to derive a high-quality global model. In this work, we propose a novel method to optimize both types of fairness simultaneously. Specifically, we propose to estimate client contribution in gradient and data space. In gradient space, we monitor the gradient direction differences of each client with respect to others. And in data space, we measure the prediction error on client data using an auxiliary model. Based on this contribution estimation, we propose a FL method, federated training via contribution estimation (FedCE), i.e., using estimation as global model aggregation weights. We have theoretically analyzed our method and empirically evaluated it on two real-world medical datasets. The effectiveness of our approach has been validated with significant performance improvements, better collaboration fairness, better performance fairness, and comprehensive analytical studies.

This work presents an information-theoretic perspective to group fairness trade-offs in federated learning (FL) with respect to sensitive attributes, such as gender, race, etc. Existing works often focus on either global fairness (overall disparity of the model across all clients) or local fairness (disparity of the model at each client), without always considering their trade-offs. There is a lack of understanding regarding the interplay between global and local fairness in FL, particularly under data heterogeneity, and if and when one implies the other. To address this gap, we leverage a body of work in information theory called partial information decomposition (PID), which first identifies three sources of unfairness in FL, namely, Unique Disparity, Redundant Disparity, and Masked Disparity. We demonstrate how these three disparities contribute to global and local fairness using canonical examples. This decomposition helps us derive fundamental limits on the trade-off between global and local fairness, highlighting where they agree or disagree. We introduce the Accuracy and Global-Local Fairness Optimality Problem (AGLFOP), a convex optimization that defines the theoretical limits of accuracy and fairness trade-offs, identifying the best possible performance any FL strategy can attain given a dataset and client distribution. We also present experimental results on synthetic datasets and the ADULT dataset to support our theoretical findings.

Cooperative perception enables autonomous agents to share encoded representations over wireless communication to enhance each other's live situational awareness. However, the tension between the limited communication bandwidth and the rich sensor information hinders its practical deployment. Recent studies have explored selection strategies that share only a subset of features per frame while striving to keep the performance on par. Nevertheless, the bandwidth requirement still stresses current wireless technologies. To fundamentally ease the tension, we take a proactive approach, exploiting the temporal continuity to identify features that capture environment dynamics, while avoiding repetitive and redundant transmission of static information. By incorporating temporal awareness, agents are empowered to dynamically adapt the sharing quantity according to environment complexity. We instantiate this intuition into an adaptive selection framework, COOPERTRIM, which introduces a novel conformal temporal uncertainty metric to gauge feature relevance, and a data-driven mechanism to dynamically determine the sharing quantity. To evaluate COOPERTRIM, we take semantic segmentation and 3D detection as example tasks. Across multiple open-source cooperative segmentation and detection models, COOPERTRIM achieves up to 80.28% and 72.52% bandwidth reduction respectively while maintaining a comparable accuracy. Relative to other selection strategies, COOPERTRIM also improves IoU by as much as 45.54% with up to 72% less bandwidth. Combined with compression strategies, COOPERTRIM can further reduce bandwidth usage to as low as 1.46% without compromising IoU performance. Qualitative results show COOPERTRIM gracefully adapts to environmental dynamics, localization error, and communication latency, demonstrating flexibility and paving the way for real-world deployment.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

We investigate safe multi-agent reinforcement learning, where agents seek to collectively maximize an aggregate sum of local objectives while satisfying their own safety constraints. The objective and constraints are described by {\it general utilities}, i.e., nonlinear functions of the long-term state-action occupancy measure, which encompass broader decision-making goals such as risk, exploration, or imitations. The exponential growth of the state-action space size with the number of agents presents challenges for global observability, further exacerbated by the global coupling arising from agents' safety constraints. To tackle this issue, we propose a primal-dual method utilizing shadow reward and κ-hop neighbor truncation under a form of correlation decay property, where κ is the communication radius. In the exact setting, our algorithm converges to a first-order stationary point (FOSP) at the rate of Oleft(T^{-2/3}right). In the sample-based setting, we demonstrate that, with high probability, our algorithm requires mathcal{O}left(ε^{-3.5}right) samples to achieve an ε-FOSP with an approximation error of O(φ_0^{2κ}), where φ_0in (0,1). Finally, we demonstrate the effectiveness of our model through extensive numerical experiments.

The joint transmit and pinching beamforming design for spectral efficiency (SE) and energy efficiency (EE) tradeoff in pinching-antenna systems (PASS) is proposed. Both PASS-enabled single- and multi-user communications are considered. In the single-user scenario, it is proved that the optimal pinching antenna (PA) positions are independent of the transmit beamforming. Based on this insight, a two-stage joint beamforming design is proposed. Specifically, in the first stage, an iterative closed-form refinement (ICR) scheme is proposed to align the phases of the received signals, based on which a PA placement framework is proposed. In the second stage, the closed-form solution for the optimal transmit beamformer is derived given the optimal PA positions. In the multi-user scenario, an alternating optimization (AO)-based joint beamforming design is proposed to balance the SE-EE performance while taking the quality-of-service (QoS) requirements into account. It is proved that the proposed AO-based algorithm is guaranteed to converge when no constraints are violated in PA placement subproblem. Numerical results demonstrate that: 1) the proposed algorithms significantly improve joint SE-EE performance with fast convergence speed; 2) the SE-EE tradeoff regime gap between PASS and conventional multi-antenna system widens as the number of PAs and service coverage increase.

We compare the (1,lambda)-EA and the (1 + lambda)-EA on the recently introduced benchmark DisOM, which is the OneMax function with randomly planted local optima. Previous work showed that if all local optima have the same relative height, then the plus strategy never loses more than a factor O(nlog n) compared to the comma strategy. Here we show that even small random fluctuations in the heights of the local optima have a devastating effect for the plus strategy and lead to super-polynomial runtimes. On the other hand, due to their ability to escape local optima, comma strategies are unaffected by the height of the local optima and remain efficient. Our results hold for a broad class of possible distortions and show that the plus strategy, but not the comma strategy, is generally deceived by sparse unstructured fluctuations of a smooth landscape.

The computational study of equilibria involving constraints on players' strategies has been largely neglected. However, in real-world applications, players are usually subject to constraints ruling out the feasibility of some of their strategies, such as, e.g., safety requirements and budget caps. Computational studies on constrained versions of the Nash equilibrium have lead to some results under very stringent assumptions, while finding constrained versions of the correlated equilibrium (CE) is still unexplored. In this paper, we introduce and computationally characterize constrained Phi-equilibria -- a more general notion than constrained CEs -- in normal-form games. We show that computing such equilibria is in general computationally intractable, and also that the set of the equilibria may not be convex, providing a sharp divide with unconstrained CEs. Nevertheless, we provide a polynomial-time algorithm for computing a constrained (approximate) Phi-equilibrium maximizing a given linear function, when either the number of constraints or that of players' actions is fixed. Moreover, in the special case in which a player's constraints do not depend on other players' strategies, we show that an exact, function-maximizing equilibrium can be computed in polynomial time, while one (approximate) equilibrium can be found with an efficient decentralized no-regret learning algorithm.

Large Language Model (LLM) based multi-agent systems (MAS) show remarkable potential in collaborative problem-solving, yet they still face critical challenges: low communication efficiency, poor scalability, and a lack of effective parameter-updating optimization methods. We present Optima, a novel framework that addresses these issues by significantly enhancing both communication efficiency and task effectiveness in LLM-based MAS through LLM training. Optima employs an iterative generate, rank, select, and train paradigm with a reward function balancing task performance, token efficiency, and communication readability. We explore various RL algorithms, including Supervised Fine-Tuning, Direct Preference Optimization, and their hybrid approaches, providing insights into their effectiveness-efficiency trade-offs. We integrate Monte Carlo Tree Search-inspired techniques for DPO data generation, treating conversation turns as tree nodes to explore diverse interaction paths. Evaluated on common multi-agent tasks, including information-asymmetric question answering and complex reasoning, Optima shows consistent and substantial improvements over single-agent baselines and vanilla MAS based on Llama 3 8B, achieving up to 2.8x performance gain with less than 10\% tokens on tasks requiring heavy information exchange. Moreover, Optima's efficiency gains open new possibilities for leveraging inference-compute more effectively, leading to improved inference-time scaling laws. By addressing fundamental challenges in LLM-based MAS, Optima shows the potential towards scalable, efficient, and effective MAS (https://chenweize1998.github.io/optima-project-page).

Building AIs with adaptive behaviors in human-AI cooperation stands as a pivotal focus in AGI research. Current methods for developing cooperative agents predominantly rely on learning-based methods, where policy generalization heavily hinges on past interactions with specific teammates. These approaches constrain the agent's capacity to recalibrate its strategy when confronted with novel teammates. We propose ProAgent, a novel framework that harnesses large language models (LLMs) to fashion a proactive agent empowered with the ability to anticipate teammates' forthcoming decisions and formulate enhanced plans for itself. ProAgent excels at cooperative reasoning with the capacity to dynamically adapt its behavior to enhance collaborative efforts with teammates. Moreover, the ProAgent framework exhibits a high degree of modularity and interpretability, facilitating seamless integration to address a wide array of coordination scenarios. Experimental evaluations conducted within the framework of Overcook-AI unveil the remarkable performance superiority of ProAgent, outperforming five methods based on self-play and population-based training in cooperation with AI agents. Further, when cooperating with human proxy models, its performance exhibits an average improvement exceeding 10\% compared to the current state-of-the-art, COLE. The advancement was consistently observed across diverse scenarios involving interactions with both AI agents of varying characteristics and human counterparts. These findings inspire future research for human-robot collaborations. For a hands-on demonstration, please visit https://pku-proagent.github.io.

The performance of many machine learning models depends on their hyper-parameter settings. Bayesian Optimization has become a successful tool for hyper-parameter optimization of machine learning algorithms, which aims to identify optimal hyper-parameters during an iterative sequential process. However, most of the Bayesian Optimization algorithms are designed to select models for effectiveness only and ignore the important issue of model training efficiency. Given that both model effectiveness and training time are important for real-world applications, models selected for effectiveness may not meet the strict training time requirements necessary to deploy in a production environment. In this work, we present a unified Bayesian Optimization framework for jointly optimizing models for both prediction effectiveness and training efficiency. We propose an objective that captures the tradeoff between these two metrics and demonstrate how we can jointly optimize them in a principled Bayesian Optimization framework. Experiments on model selection for recommendation tasks indicate models selected this way significantly improves model training efficiency while maintaining strong effectiveness as compared to state-of-the-art Bayesian Optimization algorithms.

Cooperative perception can effectively enhance individual perception performance by providing additional viewpoint and expanding the sensing field. Existing cooperation paradigms are either interpretable (result cooperation) or flexible (feature cooperation). In this paper, we propose the concept of query cooperation to enable interpretable instance-level flexible feature interaction. To specifically explain the concept, we propose a cooperative perception framework, termed QUEST, which let query stream flow among agents. The cross-agent queries are interacted via fusion for co-aware instances and complementation for individual unaware instances. Taking camera-based vehicle-infrastructure perception as a typical practical application scene, the experimental results on the real-world dataset, DAIR-V2X-Seq, demonstrate the effectiveness of QUEST and further reveal the advantage of the query cooperation paradigm on transmission flexibility and robustness to packet dropout. We hope our work can further facilitate the cross-agent representation interaction for better cooperative perception in practice.

Executing actions in a correlated manner is a common strategy for human coordination that often leads to better cooperation, which is also potentially beneficial for cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL). However, the recent success of MARL relies heavily on the convenient paradigm of purely decentralized execution, where there is no action correlation among agents for scalability considerations. In this work, we introduce a Bayesian network to inaugurate correlations between agents' action selections in their joint policy. Theoretically, we establish a theoretical justification for why action dependencies are beneficial by deriving the multi-agent policy gradient formula under such a Bayesian network joint policy and proving its global convergence to Nash equilibria under tabular softmax policy parameterization in cooperative Markov games. Further, by equipping existing MARL algorithms with a recent method of differentiable directed acyclic graphs (DAGs), we develop practical algorithms to learn the context-aware Bayesian network policies in scenarios with partial observability and various difficulty. We also dynamically decrease the sparsity of the learned DAG throughout the training process, which leads to weakly or even purely independent policies for decentralized execution. Empirical results on a range of MARL benchmarks show the benefits of our approach.

We study the problem of online learning in a two-player decentralized cooperative Stackelberg game. In each round, the leader first takes an action, followed by the follower who takes their action after observing the leader's move. The goal of the leader is to learn to minimize the cumulative regret based on the history of interactions. Differing from the traditional formulation of repeated Stackelberg games, we assume the follower is omniscient, with full knowledge of the true reward, and that they always best-respond to the leader's actions. We analyze the sample complexity of regret minimization in this repeated Stackelberg game. We show that depending on the reward structure, the existence of the omniscient follower may change the sample complexity drastically, from constant to exponential, even for linear cooperative Stackelberg games. This poses unique challenges for the learning process of the leader and the subsequent regret analysis.

Resolving team conflicts requires not only task-specific competence, but also social intelligence to find common ground and build consensus. As AI agents increasingly collaborate on complex work, they must develop coordination capabilities to function as effective teammates. Yet we hypothesize that current agents lack these capabilities. To test this, we introduce CooperBench, a benchmark of over 600 collaborative coding tasks across 12 libraries in 4 programming languages. Each task assigns two agents different features that can be implemented independently but may conflict without proper coordination. Tasks are grounded in real open-source repositories with expert-written tests. Evaluating state-of-the-art coding agents, we observe the curse of coordination: agents achieve on average 30% lower success rates when working together compared to performing both tasks individually. This contrasts sharply with human teams, where adding teammates typically improves productivity. Our analysis reveals three key issues: (1) communication channels become jammed with vague, ill-timed, and inaccurate messages; (2) even with effective communication, agents deviate from their commitments; and (3) agents often hold incorrect expectations about others' plans and communication. Through large-scale simulation, we also observe rare but interesting emergent coordination behavior including role division, resource division, and negotiation. Our research presents a novel benchmark for collaborative coding and calls for a shift from pursuing individual agent capability to developing social intelligence.

Multi-agent systems (MAS) based on Large Language Models (LLMs) have the potential to solve tasks that are beyond the reach of any single LLM. However, this potential can only be realized when the collaboration mechanism between agents is optimized. Specifically, optimizing the communication structure between agents is critical for fruitful collaboration. Most existing approaches rely on fixed topologies, pretrained graph generators, optimization over edges, or employ external LLM judges, thereby adding to the complexity. In this work, we introduce a response-conditioned framework that adapts communication on-the-fly. Agents independently generate responses to the user query and assess peer contributions using an approximation of the Shapley value. A directed acyclic graph (DAG) is then constructed to regulate the propagation of the responses among agents, which ensures stable and efficient message transmission from high-contributing agents to others. This graph is dynamically updated based on the agent responses from the previous collaboration round. Since the proposed framework enables the self-organization of agents without additional supervision or training, we refer to it as SelfOrg. The SelfOrg framework goes beyond task- and query-level optimization and takes into account the stochastic nature of agent responses. Experiments with both strong and weak LLM backends demonstrate robust performance, with significant gains in the weak regime where prior methods collapse. We also theoretically show that multiple agents increase the chance of correctness and that the correct responses naturally dominate the information flow.

In collaborative learning with streaming data, nodes (e.g., organizations) jointly and continuously learn a machine learning (ML) model by sharing the latest model updates computed from their latest streaming data. For the more resourceful nodes to be willing to share their model updates, they need to be fairly incentivized. This paper explores an incentive design that guarantees fairness so that nodes receive rewards commensurate to their contributions. Our approach leverages an explore-then-exploit formulation to estimate the nodes' contributions (i.e., exploration) for realizing our theoretically guaranteed fair incentives (i.e., exploitation). However, we observe a "rich get richer" phenomenon arising from the existing approaches to guarantee fairness and it discourages the participation of the less resourceful nodes. To remedy this, we additionally preserve asymptotic equality, i.e., less resourceful nodes achieve equal performance eventually to the more resourceful/"rich" nodes. We empirically demonstrate in two settings with real-world streaming data: federated online incremental learning and federated reinforcement learning, that our proposed approach outperforms existing baselines in fairness and learning performance while remaining competitive in preserving equality.

Most recently developed approaches to cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning in the centralized training with decentralized execution setting involve estimating a centralized, joint value function. In this paper, we demonstrate that, despite its various theoretical shortcomings, Independent PPO (IPPO), a form of independent learning in which each agent simply estimates its local value function, can perform just as well as or better than state-of-the-art joint learning approaches on popular multi-agent benchmark suite SMAC with little hyperparameter tuning. We also compare IPPO to several variants; the results suggest that IPPO's strong performance may be due to its robustness to some forms of environment non-stationarity.

In this paper we provide a novel analytical perspective on the theoretical understanding of gradient-based learning algorithms by interpreting consensus-based optimization (CBO), a recently proposed multi-particle derivative-free optimization method, as a stochastic relaxation of gradient descent. Remarkably, we observe that through communication of the particles, CBO exhibits a stochastic gradient descent (SGD)-like behavior despite solely relying on evaluations of the objective function. The fundamental value of such link between CBO and SGD lies in the fact that CBO is provably globally convergent to global minimizers for ample classes of nonsmooth and nonconvex objective functions, hence, on the one side, offering a novel explanation for the success of stochastic relaxations of gradient descent. On the other side, contrary to the conventional wisdom for which zero-order methods ought to be inefficient or not to possess generalization abilities, our results unveil an intrinsic gradient descent nature of such heuristics. This viewpoint furthermore complements previous insights into the working principles of CBO, which describe the dynamics in the mean-field limit through a nonlinear nonlocal partial differential equation that allows to alleviate complexities of the nonconvex function landscape. Our proofs leverage a completely nonsmooth analysis, which combines a novel quantitative version of the Laplace principle (log-sum-exp trick) and the minimizing movement scheme (proximal iteration). In doing so, we furnish useful and precise insights that explain how stochastic perturbations of gradient descent overcome energy barriers and reach deep levels of nonconvex functions. Instructive numerical illustrations support the provided theoretical insights.

In this research, we compare four different evaluation methods in coevolution on the Majority Function problem. The size of the problem is selected such that evaluation against all possible test cases is feasible. Two measures are used for the comparisons, i.e., the objective fitness derived from evaluating solutions against all test cases, and the objective fitness correlation (OFC), which is defined as the correlation coefficient between subjective and objective fitness. The results of our experiments suggest that a combination of average score and weighted informativeness may provide a more accurate evaluation in coevolution. In order to confirm this difference, a series of t-tests on the preference between each pair of the evaluation methods is performed. The resulting significance is affirmative, and the tests for two quality measures show similar preference on four evaluation methods. %This study is the first time OFC is actually computed on a real problem. Experiments on Majority Function problems with larger sizes and Parity problems are in progress, and their results will be added in the final version.

Cooperative perception offers an optimal solution to overcome the perception limitations of single-agent systems by leveraging Vehicle-to-Everything (V2X) communication for data sharing and fusion across multiple agents. However, most existing approaches focus on single-modality data exchange, limiting the potential of both homogeneous and heterogeneous fusion across agents. This overlooks the opportunity to utilize multi-modality data per agent, restricting the system's performance. In the automotive industry, manufacturers adopt diverse sensor configurations, resulting in heterogeneous combinations of sensor modalities across agents. To harness the potential of every possible data source for optimal performance, we design a robust LiDAR and camera cross-modality fusion module, Radian-Glue-Attention (RG-Attn), applicable to both intra-agent cross-modality fusion and inter-agent cross-modality fusion scenarios, owing to the convenient coordinate conversion by transformation matrix and the unified sampling/inversion mechanism. We also propose two different architectures, named Paint-To-Puzzle (PTP) and Co-Sketching-Co-Coloring (CoS-CoCo), for conducting cooperative perception. PTP aims for maximum precision performance and achieves smaller data packet size by limiting cross-agent fusion to a single instance, but requiring all participants to be equipped with LiDAR. In contrast, CoS-CoCo supports agents with any configuration-LiDAR-only, camera-only, or LiDAR-camera-both, presenting more generalization ability. Our approach achieves state-of-the-art (SOTA) performance on both real and simulated cooperative perception datasets. The code is now available at GitHub.

With the rise of powerful pre-trained vision-language models like CLIP, it becomes essential to investigate ways to adapt these models to downstream datasets. A recently proposed method named Context Optimization (CoOp) introduces the concept of prompt learning -- a recent trend in NLP -- to the vision domain for adapting pre-trained vision-language models. Specifically, CoOp turns context words in a prompt into a set of learnable vectors and, with only a few labeled images for learning, can achieve huge improvements over intensively-tuned manual prompts. In our study we identify a critical problem of CoOp: the learned context is not generalizable to wider unseen classes within the same dataset, suggesting that CoOp overfits base classes observed during training. To address the problem, we propose Conditional Context Optimization (CoCoOp), which extends CoOp by further learning a lightweight neural network to generate for each image an input-conditional token (vector). Compared to CoOp's static prompts, our dynamic prompts adapt to each instance and are thus less sensitive to class shift. Extensive experiments show that CoCoOp generalizes much better than CoOp to unseen classes, even showing promising transferability beyond a single dataset; and yields stronger domain generalization performance as well. Code is available at https://github.com/KaiyangZhou/CoOp.

Coordinating multiple large language models (LLMs) to solve complex tasks collaboratively poses a fundamental trade-off between the computation costs and collective performance compared with individual model. We introduce a novel, game-theoretically grounded reinforcement learning (RL) framework, the Multi-Agent Cooperation Sequential Public Goods Game (MAC-SPGG), to systematically incentivize cooperation in multi-LLM ensembles. In MAC-SPGG, LLM agents move in sequence, observing predecessors' outputs and updating beliefs to condition their own contributions. By redesigning the public-goods reward, effortful contributions become the unique Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium (SPNE), which eliminates free-riding under traditional SPGG or PGG. Its sequential protocol replaces costly round-based information exchanges with a streamlined decision flow, cutting communication overhead while retaining strategic depth. We prove the existence and uniqueness of the SPNE under realistic parameters, and empirically show that MAC-SPGG-trained ensembles outperform single-agent baselines, chain-of-thought prompting, and other cooperative methods, even achieving comparable performance to large-scale models across reasoning, math, code generation, and NLP tasks. Our results highlight the power of structured, incentive-aligned MAC-SPGG cooperation for scalable and robust multi-agent language generation.

We initiate a principled study of algorithmic collective action on digital platforms that deploy machine learning algorithms. We propose a simple theoretical model of a collective interacting with a firm's learning algorithm. The collective pools the data of participating individuals and executes an algorithmic strategy by instructing participants how to modify their own data to achieve a collective goal. We investigate the consequences of this model in three fundamental learning-theoretic settings: the case of a nonparametric optimal learning algorithm, a parametric risk minimizer, and gradient-based optimization. In each setting, we come up with coordinated algorithmic strategies and characterize natural success criteria as a function of the collective's size. Complementing our theory, we conduct systematic experiments on a skill classification task involving tens of thousands of resumes from a gig platform for freelancers. Through more than two thousand model training runs of a BERT-like language model, we see a striking correspondence emerge between our empirical observations and the predictions made by our theory. Taken together, our theory and experiments broadly support the conclusion that algorithmic collectives of exceedingly small fractional size can exert significant control over a platform's learning algorithm.

How have individuals of social animals in nature evolved to learn from each other, and what would be the optimal strategy for such learning in a specific environment? Here, we address both problems by employing a deep reinforcement learning model to optimize the social learning strategies (SLSs) of agents in a cooperative game in a multi-dimensional landscape. Throughout the training for maximizing the overall payoff, we find that the agent spontaneously learns various concepts of social learning, such as copying, focusing on frequent and well-performing neighbors, self-comparison, and the importance of balancing between individual and social learning, without any explicit guidance or prior knowledge about the system. The SLS from a fully trained agent outperforms all of the traditional, baseline SLSs in terms of mean payoff. We demonstrate the superior performance of the reinforcement learning agent in various environments, including temporally changing environments and real social networks, which also verifies the adaptability of our framework to different social settings.

The performance of acquisition functions for Bayesian optimisation to locate the global optimum of continuous functions is investigated in terms of the Pareto front between exploration and exploitation. We show that Expected Improvement (EI) and the Upper Confidence Bound (UCB) always select solutions to be expensively evaluated on the Pareto front, but Probability of Improvement is not guaranteed to do so and Weighted Expected Improvement does so only for a restricted range of weights. We introduce two novel epsilon-greedy acquisition functions. Extensive empirical evaluation of these together with random search, purely exploratory, and purely exploitative search on 10 benchmark problems in 1 to 10 dimensions shows that epsilon-greedy algorithms are generally at least as effective as conventional acquisition functions (e.g., EI and UCB), particularly with a limited budget. In higher dimensions epsilon-greedy approaches are shown to have improved performance over conventional approaches. These results are borne out on a real world computational fluid dynamics optimisation problem and a robotics active learning problem. Our analysis and experiments suggest that the most effective strategy, particularly in higher dimensions, is to be mostly greedy, occasionally selecting a random exploratory solution.

Policy optimization methods with function approximation are widely used in multi-agent reinforcement learning. However, it remains elusive how to design such algorithms with statistical guarantees. Leveraging a multi-agent performance difference lemma that characterizes the landscape of multi-agent policy optimization, we find that the localized action value function serves as an ideal descent direction for each local policy. Motivated by the observation, we present a multi-agent PPO algorithm in which the local policy of each agent is updated similarly to vanilla PPO. We prove that with standard regularity conditions on the Markov game and problem-dependent quantities, our algorithm converges to the globally optimal policy at a sublinear rate. We extend our algorithm to the off-policy setting and introduce pessimism to policy evaluation, which aligns with experiments. To our knowledge, this is the first provably convergent multi-agent PPO algorithm in cooperative Markov games.

In Multi-Task Learning (MTL), tasks may compete and limit the performance achieved on each other, rather than guiding the optimization to a solution, superior to all its single-task trained counterparts. Since there is often not a unique solution optimal for all tasks, practitioners have to balance tradeoffs between tasks' performance, and resort to optimality in the Pareto sense. Most MTL methodologies either completely neglect this aspect, and instead of aiming at learning a Pareto Front, produce one solution predefined by their optimization schemes, or produce diverse but discrete solutions. Recent approaches parameterize the Pareto Front via neural networks, leading to complex mappings from tradeoff to objective space. In this paper, we conjecture that the Pareto Front admits a linear parameterization in parameter space, which leads us to propose Pareto Manifold Learning, an ensembling method in weight space. Our approach produces a continuous Pareto Front in a single training run, that allows to modulate the performance on each task during inference. Experiments on multi-task learning benchmarks, ranging from image classification to tabular datasets and scene understanding, show that Pareto Manifold Learning outperforms state-of-the-art single-point algorithms, while learning a better Pareto parameterization than multi-point baselines.

Machine learning models are often tuned by nesting optimization of model weights inside the optimization of hyperparameters. We give a method to collapse this nested optimization into joint stochastic optimization of weights and hyperparameters. Our process trains a neural network to output approximately optimal weights as a function of hyperparameters. We show that our technique converges to locally optimal weights and hyperparameters for sufficiently large hypernetworks. We compare this method to standard hyperparameter optimization strategies and demonstrate its effectiveness for tuning thousands of hyperparameters.

Multi-agent systems often require agents to collaborate with or compete against other agents with diverse goals, behaviors, or strategies. Agent modeling is essential when designing adaptive policies for intelligent machine agents in multiagent systems, as this is the means by which the ego agent understands other agents' behavior and extracts their meaningful policy representations. These representations can be used to enhance the ego agent's adaptive policy which is trained by reinforcement learning. However, existing agent modeling approaches typically assume the availability of local observations from other agents (modeled agents) during training or a long observation trajectory for policy adaption. To remove these constrictive assumptions and improve agent modeling performance, we devised a Contrastive Learning-based Agent Modeling (CLAM) method that relies only on the local observations from the ego agent during training and execution. With these observations, CLAM is capable of generating consistent high-quality policy representations in real-time right from the beginning of each episode. We evaluated the efficacy of our approach in both cooperative and competitive multi-agent environments. Our experiments demonstrate that our approach achieves state-of-the-art on both cooperative and competitive tasks, highlighting the potential of contrastive learning-based agent modeling for enhancing reinforcement learning.

Cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) commonly adopts centralized training with decentralized execution (CTDE), where centralized critics leverage global information to guide decentralized actors. However, centralized-decentralized mismatch (CDM) arises when the suboptimal behavior of one agent degrades others' learning. Prior approaches mitigate CDM through value decomposition, but linear decompositions allow per-agent gradients at the cost of limited expressiveness, while nonlinear decompositions improve representation but require centralized gradients, reintroducing CDM. To overcome this trade-off, we propose the multi-agent cross-entropy method (MCEM), combined with monotonic nonlinear critic decomposition (NCD). MCEM updates policies by increasing the probability of high-value joint actions, thereby excluding suboptimal behaviors. For sample efficiency, we extend off-policy learning with a modified k-step return and Retrace. Analysis and experiments demonstrate that MCEM outperforms state-of-the-art methods across both continuous and discrete action benchmarks.

We explore deep reinforcement learning methods for multi-agent domains. We begin by analyzing the difficulty of traditional algorithms in the multi-agent case: Q-learning is challenged by an inherent non-stationarity of the environment, while policy gradient suffers from a variance that increases as the number of agents grows. We then present an adaptation of actor-critic methods that considers action policies of other agents and is able to successfully learn policies that require complex multi-agent coordination. Additionally, we introduce a training regimen utilizing an ensemble of policies for each agent that leads to more robust multi-agent policies. We show the strength of our approach compared to existing methods in cooperative as well as competitive scenarios, where agent populations are able to discover various physical and informational coordination strategies.

We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.

In this paper, we study the predict-then-optimize problem where the output of a machine learning prediction task is used as the input of some downstream optimization problem, say, the objective coefficient vector of a linear program. The problem is also known as predictive analytics or contextual linear programming. The existing approaches largely suffer from either (i) optimization intractability (a non-convex objective function)/statistical inefficiency (a suboptimal generalization bound) or (ii) requiring strong condition(s) such as no constraint or loss calibration. We develop a new approach to the problem called maximum optimality margin which designs the machine learning loss function by the optimality condition of the downstream optimization. The max-margin formulation enjoys both computational efficiency and good theoretical properties for the learning procedure. More importantly, our new approach only needs the observations of the optimal solution in the training data rather than the objective function, which makes it a new and natural approach to the inverse linear programming problem under both contextual and context-free settings; we also analyze the proposed method under both offline and online settings, and demonstrate its performance using numerical experiments.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

We study the problem of constrained efficient global optimization, where both the objective and constraints are expensive black-box functions that can be learned with Gaussian processes. We propose CONFIG (CONstrained efFIcient Global Optimization), a simple and effective algorithm to solve it. Under certain regularity assumptions, we show that our algorithm enjoys the same cumulative regret bound as that in the unconstrained case and similar cumulative constraint violation upper bounds. For commonly used Matern and Squared Exponential kernels, our bounds are sublinear and allow us to derive a convergence rate to the optimal solution of the original constrained problem. In addition, our method naturally provides a scheme to declare infeasibility when the original black-box optimization problem is infeasible. Numerical experiments on sampled instances from the Gaussian process, artificial numerical problems, and a black-box building controller tuning problem all demonstrate the competitive performance of our algorithm. Compared to the other state-of-the-art methods, our algorithm significantly improves the theoretical guarantees, while achieving competitive empirical performance.

This study evaluates and extends the findings made by Piatti et al., who introduced GovSim, a simulation framework designed to assess the cooperative decision-making capabilities of large language models (LLMs) in resource-sharing scenarios. By replicating key experiments, we validate claims regarding the performance of large models, such as GPT-4-turbo, compared to smaller models. The impact of the universalization principle is also examined, with results showing that large models can achieve sustainable cooperation, with or without the principle, while smaller models fail without it. In addition, we provide multiple extensions to explore the applicability of the framework to new settings. We evaluate additional models, such as DeepSeek-V3 and GPT-4o-mini, to test whether cooperative behavior generalizes across different architectures and model sizes. Furthermore, we introduce new settings: we create a heterogeneous multi-agent environment, study a scenario using Japanese instructions, and explore an "inverse environment" where agents must cooperate to mitigate harmful resource distributions. Our results confirm that the benchmark can be applied to new models, scenarios, and languages, offering valuable insights into the adaptability of LLMs in complex cooperative tasks. Moreover, the experiment involving heterogeneous multi-agent systems demonstrates that high-performing models can influence lower-performing ones to adopt similar behaviors. This finding has significant implications for other agent-based applications, potentially enabling more efficient use of computational resources and contributing to the development of more effective cooperative AI systems.

The study of collaborative multi-agent bandits has attracted significant attention recently. In light of this, we initiate the study of a new collaborative setting, consisting of N agents such that each agent is learning one of M stochastic multi-armed bandits to minimize their group cumulative regret. We develop decentralized algorithms which facilitate collaboration between the agents under two scenarios. We characterize the performance of these algorithms by deriving the per agent cumulative regret and group regret upper bounds. We also prove lower bounds for the group regret in this setting, which demonstrates the near-optimal behavior of the proposed algorithms.

Collaborative perception empowers each agent to improve its perceptual ability through the exchange of perceptual messages with other agents. It inherently results in a fundamental trade-off between perception ability and communication cost. To address this bottleneck issue, our core idea is to optimize the collaborative messages from two key aspects: representation and selection. The proposed codebook-based message representation enables the transmission of integer codes, rather than high-dimensional feature maps. The proposed information-filling-driven message selection optimizes local messages to collectively fill each agent's information demand, preventing information overflow among multiple agents. By integrating these two designs, we propose CodeFilling, a novel communication-efficient collaborative perception system, which significantly advances the perception-communication trade-off and is inclusive to both homogeneous and heterogeneous collaboration settings. We evaluate CodeFilling in both a real-world dataset, DAIR-V2X, and a new simulation dataset, OPV2VH+. Results show that CodeFilling outperforms previous SOTA Where2comm on DAIR-V2X/OPV2VH+ with 1,333/1,206 times lower communication volume. Our code is available at https://github.com/PhyllisH/CodeFilling.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

We study how to train personalized models for different tasks on decentralized devices with limited local data. We propose "Structured Cooperative Learning (SCooL)", in which a cooperation graph across devices is generated by a graphical model prior to automatically coordinate mutual learning between devices. By choosing graphical models enforcing different structures, we can derive a rich class of existing and novel decentralized learning algorithms via variational inference. In particular, we show three instantiations of SCooL that adopt Dirac distribution, stochastic block model (SBM), and attention as the prior generating cooperation graphs. These EM-type algorithms alternate between updating the cooperation graph and cooperative learning of local models. They can automatically capture the cross-task correlations among devices by only monitoring their model updating in order to optimize the cooperation graph. We evaluate SCooL and compare it with existing decentralized learning methods on an extensive set of benchmarks, on which SCooL always achieves the highest accuracy of personalized models and significantly outperforms other baselines on communication efficiency. Our code is available at https://github.com/ShuangtongLi/SCooL.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has emerged as an effective approach for enhancing the reasoning capabilities of large language models (LLMs), especially in scenarios where supervised fine-tuning (SFT) falls short due to limited chain-of-thought (CoT) data. Among RL-based post-training methods, group relative advantage estimation, as exemplified by Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO), has attracted considerable attention for eliminating the dependency on the value model, thereby simplifying training compared to traditional approaches like Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO). However, we observe that exsiting group relative advantage estimation method still suffers from training inefficiencies, particularly when the estimated advantage approaches zero. To address this limitation, we propose Advantage-Augmented Policy Optimization (AAPO), a novel RL algorithm that optimizes the cross-entropy (CE) loss using advantages enhanced through a momentum-based estimation scheme. This approach effectively mitigates the inefficiencies associated with group relative advantage estimation. Experimental results on multiple mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate the superior performance of AAPO.

We consider decentralized optimization problems where one aims to minimize a sum of convex smooth objective functions distributed between nodes in the network. The links in the network can change from time to time. For the setting when the amount of changes is arbitrary, lower complexity bounds and corresponding optimal algorithms are known, and the consensus acceleration is not possible. However, in practice the magnitude of network changes may be limited. We derive lower communication complexity bounds for several regimes of velocity of networks changes. Moreover, we show how to obtain accelerated communication rates for a certain class of time-varying graphs using a specific consensus algorithm.

This study probes the vulnerabilities of cooperative multi-agent reinforcement learning (c-MARL) under adversarial attacks, a critical determinant of c-MARL's worst-case performance prior to real-world implementation. Current observation-based attacks, constrained by white-box assumptions, overlook c-MARL's complex multi-agent interactions and cooperative objectives, resulting in impractical and limited attack capabilities. To address these shortcomes, we propose Adversarial Minority Influence (AMI), a practical and strong for c-MARL. AMI is a practical black-box attack and can be launched without knowing victim parameters. AMI is also strong by considering the complex multi-agent interaction and the cooperative goal of agents, enabling a single adversarial agent to unilaterally misleads majority victims to form targeted worst-case cooperation. This mirrors minority influence phenomena in social psychology. To achieve maximum deviation in victim policies under complex agent-wise interactions, our unilateral attack aims to characterize and maximize the impact of the adversary on the victims. This is achieved by adapting a unilateral agent-wise relation metric derived from mutual information, thereby mitigating the adverse effects of victim influence on the adversary. To lead the victims into a jointly detrimental scenario, our targeted attack deceives victims into a long-term, cooperatively harmful situation by guiding each victim towards a specific target, determined through a trial-and-error process executed by a reinforcement learning agent. Through AMI, we achieve the first successful attack against real-world robot swarms and effectively fool agents in simulated environments into collectively worst-case scenarios, including Starcraft II and Multi-agent Mujoco. The source code and demonstrations can be found at: https://github.com/DIG-Beihang/AMI.

Learning sparse coordination graphs adaptive to the coordination dynamics among agents is a long-standing problem in cooperative multi-agent learning. This paper studies this problem and proposes a novel method using the variance of payoff functions to construct context-aware sparse coordination topologies. We theoretically consolidate our method by proving that the smaller the variance of payoff functions is, the less likely action selection will change after removing the corresponding edge. Moreover, we propose to learn action representations to effectively reduce the influence of payoff functions' estimation errors on graph construction. To empirically evaluate our method, we present the Multi-Agent COordination (MACO) benchmark by collecting classic coordination problems in the literature, increasing their difficulty, and classifying them into different types. We carry out a case study and experiments on the MACO and StarCraft II micromanagement benchmark to demonstrate the dynamics of sparse graph learning, the influence of graph sparseness, and the learning performance of our method. (The MACO benchmark and codes are publicly available at https://github.com/TonghanWang/CASEC-MACO-benchmark.)

This paper presents the development of a distributed application that facilitates the understanding and application of swarm intelligence in solving optimization problems. The platform comprises a search space of customizable random particles, allowing users to tailor the solution to their specific needs. By leveraging the power of Ray distributed computing, the application can support multiple users simultaneously, offering a flexible and scalable solution. The primary objective of this project is to provide a user-friendly platform that enhances the understanding and practical use of swarm intelligence in problem-solving.

We consider the problem of fairly allocating a sequence of indivisible items that arrive online in an arbitrary order to a group of n agents with additive normalized valuation functions. We consider both the allocation of goods and chores and propose algorithms for approximating maximin share (MMS) allocations. When agents have identical valuation functions the problem coincides with the semi-online machine covering problem (when items are goods) and load balancing problem (when items are chores), for both of which optimal competitive ratios have been achieved. In this paper, we consider the case when agents have general additive valuation functions. For the allocation of goods, we show that no competitive algorithm exists even when there are only three agents and propose an optimal 0.5-competitive algorithm for the case of two agents. For the allocation of chores, we propose a (2-1/n)-competitive algorithm for n>=3 agents and a square root of 2 (approximately 1.414)-competitive algorithm for two agents. Additionally, we show that no algorithm can do better than 15/11 (approximately 1.364)-competitive for two agents.

We study offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (RL) in Markov games, where the goal is to learn an approximate equilibrium -- such as Nash equilibrium and (Coarse) Correlated Equilibrium -- from an offline dataset pre-collected from the game. Existing works consider relatively restricted tabular or linear models and handle each equilibria separately. In this work, we provide the first framework for sample-efficient offline learning in Markov games under general function approximation, handling all 3 equilibria in a unified manner. By using Bellman-consistent pessimism, we obtain interval estimation for policies' returns, and use both the upper and the lower bounds to obtain a relaxation on the gap of a candidate policy, which becomes our optimization objective. Our results generalize prior works and provide several additional insights. Importantly, we require a data coverage condition that improves over the recently proposed "unilateral concentrability". Our condition allows selective coverage of deviation policies that optimally trade-off between their greediness (as approximate best responses) and coverage, and we show scenarios where this leads to significantly better guarantees. As a new connection, we also show how our algorithmic framework can subsume seemingly different solution concepts designed for the special case of two-player zero-sum games.

Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) assigns a single scalar advantage to all tokens in a completion. For structured generations with explicit segments and objectives, this couples unrelated reward signals across segments, leading to objective interference and misattributed credit. We propose Blockwise Advantage Estimation, a family of GRPO-compatible methods that assigns each objective its own advantage and applies it only to the tokens in the corresponding text block, reducing reliance on hand-designed scalar rewards and scaling naturally to additional objectives. A key challenge is estimating advantages for later blocks whose rewards are conditioned on sampled prefixes; standard unbiased approaches require expensive nested rollouts from intermediate states. Concretely, we introduce an Outcome-Conditioned Baseline that approximates intermediate state values using only within-group statistics by stratifying samples according to a prefix-derived intermediate outcome. On math tasks with uncertainty estimation, our method mitigates reward interference, is competitive with a state-of-the-art reward-designed approach, and preserves test-time gains from confidence-weighted ensembling. More broadly, it provides a modular recipe for optimizing sequential objectives in structured generations without additional rollouts.

As agentic AI becomes more widespread, agents with distinct and possibly conflicting goals will interact in complex ways. These multi-agent interactions pose a fundamental challenge, particularly in social dilemmas, where agents' individual incentives can undermine collective welfare. While reinforcement learning (RL) has been effective for aligning large language models (LLMs) in the single-agent regime, prior small-network results suggest that standard RL in multi-agent settings often converges to defecting, self-interested policies. We show the same effect in LLMs: despite cooperative priors, RL-trained LLM agents develop opportunistic behavior that can exploit even advanced closed-source models. To address this tendency of RL to converge to poor equilibria, we adapt a recent opponent-learning awareness algorithm, Advantage Alignment, to fine-tune LLMs toward multi-agent cooperation and non-exploitability. We then introduce a group-relative baseline that simplifies advantage computation in iterated games, enabling multi-agent training at LLM scale. We also contribute a novel social dilemma environment, Trust-and-Split, which requires natural language communication to achieve high collective welfare. Across a wide range of social dilemmas, policies learned with Advantage Alignment achieve higher collective payoffs while remaining robust against exploitation by greedy agents. We release all of our code to support future work on multi-agent RL training for LLMs.

In federated learning (FL), clients usually have diverse participation statistics that are unknown a priori, which can significantly harm the performance of FL if not handled properly. Existing works aiming at addressing this problem are usually based on global variance reduction, which requires a substantial amount of additional memory in a multiplicative factor equal to the total number of clients. An important open problem is to find a lightweight method for FL in the presence of clients with unknown participation rates. In this paper, we address this problem by adapting the aggregation weights in federated averaging (FedAvg) based on the participation history of each client. We first show that, with heterogeneous participation statistics, FedAvg with non-optimal aggregation weights can diverge from the optimal solution of the original FL objective, indicating the need of finding optimal aggregation weights. However, it is difficult to compute the optimal weights when the participation statistics are unknown. To address this problem, we present a new algorithm called FedAU, which improves FedAvg by adaptively weighting the client updates based on online estimates of the optimal weights without knowing the statistics of client participation. We provide a theoretical convergence analysis of FedAU using a novel methodology to connect the estimation error and convergence. Our theoretical results reveal important and interesting insights, while showing that FedAU converges to an optimal solution of the original objective and has desirable properties such as linear speedup. Our experimental results also verify the advantage of FedAU over baseline methods with various participation patterns.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

The Base-New Trade-off (BNT) problem universally exists during the optimization of CLIP-based prompt tuning, where continuous fine-tuning on base (target) classes leads to a simultaneous decrease of generalization ability on new (unseen) classes. Existing approaches attempt to regulate the prompt tuning process to balance BNT by appending constraints. However, imposed on the same target prompt, these constraints fail to fully avert the mutual exclusivity between the optimization directions for base and new. As a novel solution to this challenge, we propose the plug-and-play Dual-Prompt Collaboration (DPC) framework, the first that decoupling the optimization processes of base and new tasks at the prompt level. Specifically, we clone a learnable parallel prompt based on the backbone prompt, and introduce a variable Weighting-Decoupling framework to independently control the optimization directions of dual prompts specific to base or new tasks, thus avoiding the conflict in generalization. Meanwhile, we propose a Dynamic Hard Negative Optimizer, utilizing dual prompts to construct a more challenging optimization task on base classes for enhancement. For interpretability, we prove the feature channel invariance of the prompt vector during the optimization process, providing theoretical support for the Weighting-Decoupling of DPC. Extensive experiments on multiple backbones demonstrate that DPC can significantly improve base performance without introducing any external knowledge beyond the base classes, while maintaining generalization to new classes. Code is available at: https://github.com/JREion/DPC.

We consider multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) for cooperative communication and coordination tasks. MARL agents can be brittle because they can overfit their training partners' policies. This overfitting can produce agents that adopt policies that act under the expectation that other agents will act in a certain way rather than react to their actions. Our objective is to bias the learning process towards finding reactive strategies towards other agents' behaviors. Our method, transfer empowerment, measures the potential influence between agents' actions. Results from three simulated cooperation scenarios support our hypothesis that transfer empowerment improves MARL performance. We discuss how transfer empowerment could be a useful principle to guide multi-agent coordination by ensuring reactiveness to one's partner.

Motivated by the operational problems in click and collect systems, such as curbside pickup programs, we study a joint admission control and capacity allocation problem. We consider a system where arriving customers have preferred service delivery times and gauge the service quality based on the service provider's ability to complete the service as close as possible to the preferred time. Customers can be of different priority classes, and their priority may increase as they wait longer in the queue. The service provider can reject customers upon their arrival if the system is overloaded or outsource the service (alternatively work overtime) when the capacity is not enough. The service provider's goal is to find the minimum-cost admission and capacity allocation policy to dynamically decide when to serve and whom to serve. We model this problem as a Markov Decision Process. Our structural results partially characterize a set of suboptimal solutions, and we develop solution methods using these results. We also develop a problem-specific approximation method that is based on state aggregation to overcome the computational challenges. We present extensive computational results and discuss the impact of problem parameters on the optimal policy.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

Bayesian optimization (BO) is a powerful framework to optimize black-box expensive-to-evaluate functions via sequential interactions. In several important problems (e.g. drug discovery, circuit design, neural architecture search, etc.), though, such functions are defined over large combinatorial and unstructured spaces. This makes existing BO algorithms not feasible due to the intractable maximization of the acquisition function over these domains. To address this issue, we propose GameOpt, a novel game-theoretical approach to combinatorial BO. GameOpt establishes a cooperative game between the different optimization variables, and selects points that are game equilibria of an upper confidence bound acquisition function. These are stable configurations from which no variable has an incentive to deviate- analog to local optima in continuous domains. Crucially, this allows us to efficiently break down the complexity of the combinatorial domain into individual decision sets, making GameOpt scalable to large combinatorial spaces. We demonstrate the application of GameOpt to the challenging protein design problem and validate its performance on four real-world protein datasets. Each protein can take up to 20^{X} possible configurations, where X is the length of a protein, making standard BO methods infeasible. Instead, our approach iteratively selects informative protein configurations and very quickly discovers highly active protein variants compared to other baselines.

Learning to optimize has emerged as a powerful framework for various optimization and machine learning tasks. Current such "meta-optimizers" often learn in the space of continuous optimization algorithms that are point-based and uncertainty-unaware. To overcome the limitations, we propose a meta-optimizer that learns in the algorithmic space of both point-based and population-based optimization algorithms. The meta-optimizer targets at a meta-loss function consisting of both cumulative regret and entropy. Specifically, we learn and interpret the update formula through a population of LSTMs embedded with sample- and feature-level attentions. Meanwhile, we estimate the posterior directly over the global optimum and use an uncertainty measure to help guide the learning process. Empirical results over non-convex test functions and the protein-docking application demonstrate that this new meta-optimizer outperforms existing competitors.

As AI systems pervade human life, ensuring that large language models (LLMs) make safe decisions remains a significant challenge. We introduce the Governance of the Commons Simulation (GovSim), a generative simulation platform designed to study strategic interactions and cooperative decision-making in LLMs. In GovSim, a society of AI agents must collectively balance exploiting a common resource with sustaining it for future use. This environment enables the study of how ethical considerations, strategic planning, and negotiation skills impact cooperative outcomes. We develop an LLM-based agent architecture and test it with the leading open and closed LLMs. We find that all but the most powerful LLM agents fail to achieve a sustainable equilibrium in GovSim, with the highest survival rate below 54%. Ablations reveal that successful multi-agent communication between agents is critical for achieving cooperation in these cases. Furthermore, our analyses show that the failure to achieve sustainable cooperation in most LLMs stems from their inability to formulate and analyze hypotheses about the long-term effects of their actions on the equilibrium of the group. Finally, we show that agents that leverage "Universalization"-based reasoning, a theory of moral thinking, are able to achieve significantly better sustainability. Taken together, GovSim enables us to study the mechanisms that underlie sustainable self-government with specificity and scale. We open source the full suite of our research results, including the simulation environment, agent prompts, and a comprehensive web interface.

We study multi-agent reinforcement learning in the setting of episodic Markov decision processes, where multiple agents cooperate via communication through a central server. We propose a provably efficient algorithm based on value iteration that enable asynchronous communication while ensuring the advantage of cooperation with low communication overhead. With linear function approximation, we prove that our algorithm enjoys an mathcal{O}(d^{3/2}H^2K) regret with mathcal{O}(dHM^2) communication complexity, where d is the feature dimension, H is the horizon length, M is the total number of agents, and K is the total number of episodes. We also provide a lower bound showing that a minimal Omega(dM) communication complexity is required to improve the performance through collaboration.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

Imperfect information games (IIG) are games in which each player only partially observes the current game state. We study how to learn epsilon-optimal strategies in a zero-sum IIG through self-play with trajectory feedback. We give a problem-independent lower bound mathcal{O}(H(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) on the required number of realizations to learn these strategies with high probability, where H is the length of the game, A_{X} and B_{Y} are the total number of actions for the two players. We also propose two Follow the Regularized leader (FTRL) algorithms for this setting: Balanced FTRL which matches this lower bound, but requires the knowledge of the information set structure beforehand to define the regularization; and Adaptive FTRL which needs mathcal{O}(H^2(A_{X}+B_{Y})/epsilon^2) realizations without this requirement by progressively adapting the regularization to the observations.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has proven effective in incentivizing the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs), but suffers from severe efficiency challenges due to its trial-and-error nature. While the common practice employs supervised fine-tuning (SFT) as a warm-up stage for RL, this decoupled two-stage approach limits interaction between SFT and RL, thereby constraining overall effectiveness. This study introduces a novel method for learning reasoning models that employs bilevel optimization to facilitate better cooperation between these training paradigms. By conditioning the SFT objective on the optimal RL policy, our approach enables SFT to meta-learn how to guide RL's optimization process. During training, the lower level performs RL updates while simultaneously receiving SFT supervision, and the upper level explicitly maximizes the cooperative gain-the performance advantage of joint SFT-RL training over RL alone. Empirical evaluations on five reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that our method consistently outperforms baselines and achieves a better balance between effectiveness and efficiency.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated impressive capabilities for social interaction and are increasingly being deployed in situations where they might engage with both human and artificial agents. These interactions represent a critical frontier for LLM-based agents, yet existing evaluation methods fail to measure how well these capabilities generalize to novel social situations. In this paper, we introduce a method for evaluating the ability of LLM-based agents to cooperate in zero-shot, mixed-motive environments using Concordia, a natural language multi-agent simulation environment. Our method measures general cooperative intelligence by testing an agent's ability to identify and exploit opportunities for mutual gain across diverse partners and contexts. We present empirical results from the NeurIPS 2024 Concordia Contest, where agents were evaluated on their ability to achieve mutual gains across a suite of diverse scenarios ranging from negotiation to collective action problems. Our findings reveal significant gaps between current agent capabilities and the robust generalization required for reliable cooperation, particularly in scenarios demanding persuasion and norm enforcement.

Bayesian Optimization (BO) is typically used to optimize an unknown function f that is noisy and costly to evaluate, by exploiting an acquisition function that must be maximized at each optimization step. Even if provably asymptotically optimal BO algorithms are efficient at optimizing low-dimensional functions, scaling them to high-dimensional spaces remains an open problem, often tackled by assuming an additive structure for f. By doing so, BO algorithms typically introduce additional restrictive assumptions on the additive structure that reduce their applicability domain. This paper contains two main contributions: (i) we relax the restrictive assumptions on the additive structure of f without weakening the maximization guarantees of the acquisition function, and (ii) we address the over-exploration problem for decentralized BO algorithms. To these ends, we propose DuMBO, an asymptotically optimal decentralized BO algorithm that achieves very competitive performance against state-of-the-art BO algorithms, especially when the additive structure of f comprises high-dimensional factors.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

Generalized self-concordance is a key property present in the objective function of many important learning problems. We establish the convergence rate of a simple Frank-Wolfe variant that uses the open-loop step size strategy gamma_t = 2/(t+2), obtaining a O(1/t) convergence rate for this class of functions in terms of primal gap and Frank-Wolfe gap, where t is the iteration count. This avoids the use of second-order information or the need to estimate local smoothness parameters of previous work. We also show improved convergence rates for various common cases, e.g., when the feasible region under consideration is uniformly convex or polyhedral.

Multiobjective optimization plays an increasingly important role in modern applications, where several criteria are often of equal importance. The task in multiobjective optimization and multiobjective optimal control is therefore to compute the set of optimal compromises (the Pareto set) between the conflicting objectives. The advances in algorithms and the increasing interest in Pareto-optimal solutions have led to a wide range of new applications related to optimal and feedback control - potentially with non-smoothness both on the level of the objectives or in the system dynamics. This results in new challenges such as dealing with expensive models (e.g., governed by partial differential equations (PDEs)) and developing dedicated algorithms handling the non-smoothness. Since in contrast to single-objective optimization, the Pareto set generally consists of an infinite number of solutions, the computational effort can quickly become challenging, which is particularly problematic when the objectives are costly to evaluate or when a solution has to be presented very quickly. This article gives an overview of recent developments in the field of multiobjective optimization of non-smooth PDE-constrained problems. In particular we report on the advances achieved within Project 2 "Multiobjective Optimization of Non-Smooth PDE-Constrained Problems - Switches, State Constraints and Model Order Reduction" of the DFG Priority Programm 1962 "Non-smooth and Complementarity-based Distributed Parameter Systems: Simulation and Hierarchical Optimization".

Learning to Optimize (L2O), a technique that utilizes machine learning to learn an optimization algorithm automatically from data, has gained arising attention in recent years. A generic L2O approach parameterizes the iterative update rule and learns the update direction as a black-box network. While the generic approach is widely applicable, the learned model can overfit and may not generalize well to out-of-distribution test sets. In this paper, we derive the basic mathematical conditions that successful update rules commonly satisfy. Consequently, we propose a novel L2O model with a mathematics-inspired structure that is broadly applicable and generalized well to out-of-distribution problems. Numerical simulations validate our theoretical findings and demonstrate the superior empirical performance of the proposed L2O model.

The Shapley value is arguably the most popular approach for assigning a meaningful contribution value to players in a cooperative game, which has recently been used intensively in explainable artificial intelligence. The meaningfulness is due to axiomatic properties that only the Shapley value satisfies, which, however, comes at the expense of an exact computation growing exponentially with the number of agents. Accordingly, a number of works are devoted to the efficient approximation of the Shapley values, most of them revolve around the notion of an agent's marginal contribution. In this paper, we propose with SVARM and Stratified SVARM two parameter-free and domain-independent approximation algorithms based on a representation of the Shapley value detached from the notion of marginal contributions. We prove unmatched theoretical guarantees regarding their approximation quality and provide empirical results including synthetic games as well as common explainability use cases comparing ourselves with state-of-the-art methods.

The core of Transferable Utility (T.U.) games is a well-known solution concept from cooperative game theory yielding a cost allocation among n agents (called players) forming a coalition that is stable (i.e. no subset of players has an interest to deviate). In this paper, inspired by a practical application in the context of a decision support system for collaborative transportation in a Short Food Supply Chain (SFSC), we mainly focus on Traveling Salesman Games (TSGs), where the objective is to allocate the cost of a Traveling Salesman Problem (TSP) with n locations and 1 depot to n players, each linked to exactly one of the locations. Given the computational complexity of computing an element of the core and the cost of a TSP, we study semicore allocations: a relaxation of the core that only requires that the subsets of size n -1 and of size 1 do not wish to deviate from the coalition. In the literature, instances of TSGs with empty cores and semicores are found. Hence, this paper first surveys the methods to approximate stability whenever the core is empty, such as the cost of stability (computing the minimum amount of money to subsidize the coalition with to attain stability) and the ε-core (which is a set of allocations that allow subsets of players to exceed their actual cost, but at most of a value of ε). We prove that these two solution

We develop a novel theoretical framework for understating OT schemes respecting a class structure. For this purpose, we propose a convex OT program with a sum-of-norms regularization term, which provably recovers the underlying class structure under geometric assumptions. Furthermore, we derive an accelerated proximal algorithm with a closed-form projection and proximal operator scheme, thereby affording a more scalable algorithm for computing optimal transport plans. We provide a novel argument for the uniqueness of the optimum even in the absence of strong convexity. Our experiments show that the new regularizer not only results in a better preservation of the class structure in the data but also yields additional robustness to the data geometry, compared to previous regularizers.

Multi-agent systems can improve reliability, yet under a fixed inference budget they often help, saturate, or even collapse. We develop a minimal and calibratable theory that predicts these regimes from three binding constraints of modern agent stacks: finite context windows, lossy inter-agent communication, and shared failures among similar agents. Each leaf agent is summarized by a compute-performance scaling exponent β; communication is captured by a message-length fidelity curve γ(m); dependence is captured by an effective shared-error correlation ρ; and a context window W imposes hard fan-in limits that make hierarchy necessary. For binary success/failure tasks with majority aggregation, we prove a sharp phase transition for deep b-ary trees with correlated inputs and lossy communication: a single scalar α_ρ (combining γ(m), ρ, and fan-in b) determines whether weak signal is amplified to a nontrivial fixed point or washed out to chance. In the amplifying regime, we derive an organization exponent s and show that budgeted synergy, i.e., outperforming the best single agent under the same total budget, occurs exactly when s>β, yielding closed-form compute allocation rules and explicit budget thresholds. We further characterize saturation via a mixing depth and provide a conservative clipped predictor that remains accurate across growth and saturation. A continuous-performance warm-up gives closed-form risks for star, chain, and tree organizations, making correlation- and communication-induced floors explicit and exposing the core design trade-offs in a smooth setting. Finally, we validate the predicted phase boundaries in controlled synthetic simulations and show how the same mechanisms explain the dominant bottlenecks reported in recent large-scale matched-budget studies of LLM agent-system scaling.

Machine learning approaches relying on such criteria as adversarial robustness or multi-agent settings have raised the need for solving game-theoretic equilibrium problems. Of particular relevance to these applications are methods targeting finite-sum structure, which generically arises in empirical variants of learning problems in these contexts. Further, methods with computable approximation errors are highly desirable, as they provide verifiable exit criteria. Motivated by these applications, we study finite-sum monotone inclusion problems, which model broad classes of equilibrium problems. Our main contributions are variants of the classical Halpern iteration that employ variance reduction to obtain improved complexity guarantees in which n component operators in the finite sum are ``on average'' either cocoercive or Lipschitz continuous and monotone, with parameter L. The resulting oracle complexity of our methods, which provide guarantees for the last iterate and for a (computable) operator norm residual, is mathcal{O}( n + nLvarepsilon^{-1}), which improves upon existing methods by a factor up to n. This constitutes the first variance reduction-type result for general finite-sum monotone inclusions and for more specific problems such as convex-concave optimization when operator norm residual is the optimality measure. We further argue that, up to poly-logarithmic factors, this complexity is unimprovable in the monotone Lipschitz setting; i.e., the provided result is near-optimal.

The conjugate gradient method is a crucial first-order optimization method that generally converges faster than the steepest descent method, and its computational cost is much lower than that of second-order methods. However, while various types of conjugate gradient methods have been studied in Euclidean spaces and on Riemannian manifolds, there is little study for those in distributed scenarios. This paper proposes a decentralized Riemannian conjugate gradient descent (DRCGD) method that aims at minimizing a global function over the Stiefel manifold. The optimization problem is distributed among a network of agents, where each agent is associated with a local function, and the communication between agents occurs over an undirected connected graph. Since the Stiefel manifold is a non-convex set, a global function is represented as a finite sum of possibly non-convex (but smooth) local functions. The proposed method is free from expensive Riemannian geometric operations such as retractions, exponential maps, and vector transports, thereby reducing the computational complexity required by each agent. To the best of our knowledge, DRCGD is the first decentralized Riemannian conjugate gradient algorithm to achieve global convergence over the Stiefel manifold.

In recent years, a variety of gradient-based first-order methods have been developed to solve bi-level optimization problems for learning applications. However, theoretical guarantees of these existing approaches heavily rely on the simplification that for each fixed upper-level variable, the lower-level solution must be a singleton (a.k.a., Lower-Level Singleton, LLS). In this work, we first design a counter-example to illustrate the invalidation of such LLS condition. Then by formulating BLPs from the view point of optimistic bi-level and aggregating hierarchical objective information, we establish Bi-level Descent Aggregation (BDA), a flexible and modularized algorithmic framework for generic bi-level optimization. Theoretically, we derive a new methodology to prove the convergence of BDA without the LLS condition. Our investigations also demonstrate that BDA is indeed compatible to a verify of particular first-order computation modules. Additionally, as an interesting byproduct, we also improve these conventional first-order bi-level schemes (under the LLS simplification). Particularly, we establish their convergences with weaker assumptions. Extensive experiments justify our theoretical results and demonstrate the superiority of the proposed BDA for different tasks, including hyper-parameter optimization and meta learning.

We investigate an active pure-exploration setting, that includes best-arm identification, in the context of linear stochastic bandits. While asymptotically optimal algorithms exist for standard multi-arm bandits, the existence of such algorithms for the best-arm identification in linear bandits has been elusive despite several attempts to address it. First, we provide a thorough comparison and new insight over different notions of optimality in the linear case, including G-optimality, transductive optimality from optimal experimental design and asymptotic optimality. Second, we design the first asymptotically optimal algorithm for fixed-confidence pure exploration in linear bandits. As a consequence, our algorithm naturally bypasses the pitfall caused by a simple but difficult instance, that most prior algorithms had to be engineered to deal with explicitly. Finally, we avoid the need to fully solve an optimal design problem by providing an approach that entails an efficient implementation.

This paper introduces Multi-Agent MDP Homomorphic Networks, a class of networks that allows distributed execution using only local information, yet is able to share experience between global symmetries in the joint state-action space of cooperative multi-agent systems. In cooperative multi-agent systems, complex symmetries arise between different configurations of the agents and their local observations. For example, consider a group of agents navigating: rotating the state globally results in a permutation of the optimal joint policy. Existing work on symmetries in single agent reinforcement learning can only be generalized to the fully centralized setting, because such approaches rely on the global symmetry in the full state-action spaces, and these can result in correspondences across agents. To encode such symmetries while still allowing distributed execution we propose a factorization that decomposes global symmetries into local transformations. Our proposed factorization allows for distributing the computation that enforces global symmetries over local agents and local interactions. We introduce a multi-agent equivariant policy network based on this factorization. We show empirically on symmetric multi-agent problems that globally symmetric distributable policies improve data efficiency compared to non-equivariant baselines.

We propose Multi Agent Reflective Policy Optimization (MARPO) to alleviate the issue of sample inefficiency in multi agent reinforcement learning. MARPO consists of two key components: a reflection mechanism that leverages subsequent trajectories to enhance sample efficiency, and an asymmetric clipping mechanism that is derived from the KL divergence and dynamically adjusts the clipping range to improve training stability. We evaluate MARPO in classic multi agent environments, where it consistently outperforms other methods.