Daily Papers

Agentic systems have transformed how Large Language Models (LLMs) can be leveraged to create autonomous systems with goal-directed behaviors, consisting of multi-step planning and the ability to interact with different environments. These systems differ fundamentally from traditional machine learning models, both in architecture and deployment, introducing unique AI safety challenges, including goal misalignment, compounding decision errors, and coordination risks among interacting agents, that necessitate embedding interpretability and explainability by design to ensure traceability and accountability across their autonomous behaviors. Current interpretability techniques, developed primarily for static models, show limitations when applied to agentic systems. The temporal dynamics, compounding decisions, and context-dependent behaviors of agentic systems demand new analytical approaches. This paper assesses the suitability and limitations of existing interpretability methods in the context of agentic systems, identifying gaps in their capacity to provide meaningful insight into agent decision-making. We propose future directions for developing interpretability techniques specifically designed for agentic systems, pinpointing where interpretability is required to embed oversight mechanisms across the agent lifecycle from goal formation, through environmental interaction, to outcome evaluation. These advances are essential to ensure the safe and accountable deployment of agentic AI systems.

Multi-agent systems composed of large generative models are rapidly moving from laboratory prototypes to real-world deployments, where they jointly plan, negotiate, and allocate shared resources to solve complex tasks. While such systems promise unprecedented scalability and autonomy, their collective interaction also gives rise to failure modes that cannot be reduced to individual agents. Understanding these emergent risks is therefore critical. Here, we present a pioneer study of such emergent multi-agent risk in workflows that involve competition over shared resources (e.g., computing resources or market share), sequential handoff collaboration (where downstream agents see only predecessor outputs), collective decision aggregation, and others. Across these settings, we observe that such group behaviors arise frequently across repeated trials and a wide range of interaction conditions, rather than as rare or pathological cases. In particular, phenomena such as collusion-like coordination and conformity emerge with non-trivial frequency under realistic resource constraints, communication protocols, and role assignments, mirroring well-known pathologies in human societies despite no explicit instruction. Moreover, these risks cannot be prevented by existing agent-level safeguards alone. These findings expose the dark side of intelligent multi-agent systems: a social intelligence risk where agent collectives, despite no instruction to do so, spontaneously reproduce familiar failure patterns from human societies.

As artificial intelligence (AI) models are scaled up, new capabilities can emerge unintentionally and unpredictably, some of which might be dangerous. In response, dangerous capabilities evaluations have emerged as a new risk assessment tool. But what should frontier AI developers do if sufficiently dangerous capabilities are in fact discovered? This paper focuses on one possible response: coordinated pausing. It proposes an evaluation-based coordination scheme that consists of five main steps: (1) Frontier AI models are evaluated for dangerous capabilities. (2) Whenever, and each time, a model fails a set of evaluations, the developer pauses certain research and development activities. (3) Other developers are notified whenever a model with dangerous capabilities has been discovered. They also pause related research and development activities. (4) The discovered capabilities are analyzed and adequate safety precautions are put in place. (5) Developers only resume their paused activities if certain safety thresholds are reached. The paper also discusses four concrete versions of that scheme. In the first version, pausing is completely voluntary and relies on public pressure on developers. In the second version, participating developers collectively agree to pause under certain conditions. In the third version, a single auditor evaluates models of multiple developers who agree to pause if any model fails a set of evaluations. In the fourth version, developers are legally required to run evaluations and pause if dangerous capabilities are discovered. Finally, the paper discusses the desirability and feasibility of our proposed coordination scheme. It concludes that coordinated pausing is a promising mechanism for tackling emerging risks from frontier AI models. However, a number of practical and legal obstacles need to be overcome, especially how to avoid violations of antitrust law.

Emerging multi-robot systems rely on cooperation between humans and robots, with robots following automatically generated motion plans to service application-level tasks. Given the safety requirements associated with operating in proximity to humans and expensive infrastructure, it is important to understand and mitigate the security vulnerabilities of such systems caused by compromised robots who diverge from their assigned plans. We focus on centralized systems, where a *central entity* (CE) is responsible for determining and transmitting the motion plans to the robots, which report their location as they move following the plan. The CE checks that robots follow their assigned plans by comparing their expected location to the location they self-report. We show that this self-reporting monitoring mechanism is vulnerable to *plan-deviation attacks* where compromised robots don't follow their assigned plans while trying to conceal their movement by mis-reporting their location. We propose a two-pronged mitigation for plan-deviation attacks: (1) an attack detection technique leveraging both the robots' local sensing capabilities to report observations of other robots and *co-observation schedules* generated by the CE, and (2) a prevention technique where the CE issues *horizon-limiting announcements* to the robots, reducing their instantaneous knowledge of forward lookahead steps in the global motion plan. On a large-scale automated warehouse benchmark, we show that our solution enables attack prevention guarantees from a stealthy attacker that has compromised multiple robots.

International cooperation is common in AI research, including between geopolitical rivals. While many experts advocate for greater international cooperation on AI safety to address shared global risks, some view cooperation on AI with suspicion, arguing that it can pose unacceptable risks to national security. However, the extent to which cooperation on AI safety poses such risks, as well as provides benefits, depends on the specific area of cooperation. In this paper, we consider technical factors that impact the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, focusing on the degree to which such cooperation can advance dangerous capabilities, result in the sharing of sensitive information, or provide opportunities for harm. We begin by why nations historically cooperate on strategic technologies and analyse current US-China cooperation in AI as a case study. We further argue that existing frameworks for managing associated risks can be supplemented with consideration of key risks specific to cooperation on technical AI safety research. Through our analysis, we find that research into AI verification mechanisms and shared protocols may be suitable areas for such cooperation. Through this analysis we aim to help researchers and governments identify and mitigate the risks of international cooperation on AI safety research, so that the benefits of cooperation can be fully realised.

Through a systematic review of academic literature, we propose a taxonomy of systemic risks associated with artificial intelligence (AI), in particular general-purpose AI. Following the EU AI Act's definition, we consider systemic risks as large-scale threats that can affect entire societies or economies. Starting with an initial pool of 1,781 documents, we analyzed 86 selected papers to identify 13 categories of systemic risks and 50 contributing sources. Our findings reveal a complex landscape of potential threats, ranging from environmental harm and structural discrimination to governance failures and loss of control. Key sources of systemic risk emerge from knowledge gaps, challenges in recognizing harm, and the unpredictable trajectory of AI development. The taxonomy provides a snapshot of current academic literature on systemic risks. This paper contributes to AI safety research by providing a structured groundwork for understanding and addressing the potential large-scale negative societal impacts of general-purpose AI. The taxonomy can inform policymakers in risk prioritization and regulatory development.

Systemic financial risk refers to the simultaneous failure or destabilization of multiple financial institutions, often triggered by contagion mechanisms or common exposures to shocks. In this paper, we present a dynamical model of bank leverage (the ratio of asset holdings to equity) a quantity that both reflects and drives risk dynamics. We model how banks, constrained by Value-at-Risk (VaR) regulations, adjust their leverage in response to changes in the price of a single asset, assumed to be held in fixed proportion across banks. This leverage-targeting behavior introduces a procyclical feedback loop between asset prices and leverage. In the dynamics, this can manifest as logistic-like behavior with a rich bifurcation structure across model parameters. By analyzing these coupled dynamics in both isolated and interconnected bank models, we outline a framework for understanding how systemic risk can emerge from seemingly rational micro-level behavior.

With the widespread deployment of Computer-using Agents (CUAs) in complex real-world environments, prevalent long-term risks often lead to severe and irreversible consequences. Most existing guardrails for CUAs adopt a reactive approach, constraining agent behavior only within the current observation space. While these guardrails can prevent immediate short-term risks (e.g., clicking on a phishing link), they cannot proactively avoid long-term risks: seemingly reasonable actions can lead to high-risk consequences that emerge with a delay (e.g., cleaning logs leads to future audits being untraceable), which reactive guardrails cannot identify within the current observation space. To address these limitations, we propose a predictive guardrail approach, with the core idea of aligning predicted future risks with current decisions. Based on this approach, we present SafePred, a predictive guardrail framework for CUAs that establishes a risk-to-decision loop to ensure safe agent behavior. SafePred supports two key abilities: (1) Short- and long-term risk prediction: by using safety policies as the basis for risk prediction, SafePred leverages the prediction capability of the world model to generate semantic representations of both short-term and long-term risks, thereby identifying and pruning actions that lead to high-risk states; (2) Decision optimization: translating predicted risks into actionable safe decision guidances through step-level interventions and task-level re-planning. Extensive experiments show that SafePred significantly reduces high-risk behaviors, achieving over 97.6% safety performance and improving task utility by up to 21.4% compared with reactive baselines.

Rapid advancements in artificial intelligence (AI) have sparked growing concerns among experts, policymakers, and world leaders regarding the potential for increasingly advanced AI systems to pose catastrophic risks. Although numerous risks have been detailed separately, there is a pressing need for a systematic discussion and illustration of the potential dangers to better inform efforts to mitigate them. This paper provides an overview of the main sources of catastrophic AI risks, which we organize into four categories: malicious use, in which individuals or groups intentionally use AIs to cause harm; AI race, in which competitive environments compel actors to deploy unsafe AIs or cede control to AIs; organizational risks, highlighting how human factors and complex systems can increase the chances of catastrophic accidents; and rogue AIs, describing the inherent difficulty in controlling agents far more intelligent than humans. For each category of risk, we describe specific hazards, present illustrative stories, envision ideal scenarios, and propose practical suggestions for mitigating these dangers. Our goal is to foster a comprehensive understanding of these risks and inspire collective and proactive efforts to ensure that AIs are developed and deployed in a safe manner. Ultimately, we hope this will allow us to realize the benefits of this powerful technology while minimizing the potential for catastrophic outcomes.

This paper aims to help structure the risk landscape associated with large-scale Language Models (LMs). In order to foster advances in responsible innovation, an in-depth understanding of the potential risks posed by these models is needed. A wide range of established and anticipated risks are analysed in detail, drawing on multidisciplinary expertise and literature from computer science, linguistics, and social sciences. We outline six specific risk areas: I. Discrimination, Exclusion and Toxicity, II. Information Hazards, III. Misinformation Harms, V. Malicious Uses, V. Human-Computer Interaction Harms, VI. Automation, Access, and Environmental Harms. The first area concerns the perpetuation of stereotypes, unfair discrimination, exclusionary norms, toxic language, and lower performance by social group for LMs. The second focuses on risks from private data leaks or LMs correctly inferring sensitive information. The third addresses risks arising from poor, false or misleading information including in sensitive domains, and knock-on risks such as the erosion of trust in shared information. The fourth considers risks from actors who try to use LMs to cause harm. The fifth focuses on risks specific to LLMs used to underpin conversational agents that interact with human users, including unsafe use, manipulation or deception. The sixth discusses the risk of environmental harm, job automation, and other challenges that may have a disparate effect on different social groups or communities. In total, we review 21 risks in-depth. We discuss the points of origin of different risks and point to potential mitigation approaches. Lastly, we discuss organisational responsibilities in implementing mitigations, and the role of collaboration and participation. We highlight directions for further research, particularly on expanding the toolkit for assessing and evaluating the outlined risks in LMs.

The widespread deployment of Large Language Model (LLM) agents across real-world applications has unlocked tremendous potential, while raising some safety concerns. Among these concerns, the self-replication risk of LLM agents driven by objective misalignment (just like Agent Smith in the movie The Matrix) has drawn growing attention. Previous studies mainly examine whether LLM agents can self-replicate when directly instructed, potentially overlooking the risk of spontaneous replication driven by real-world settings (e.g., ensuring survival against termination threats). In this paper, we present a comprehensive evaluation framework for quantifying self-replication risks. Our framework establishes authentic production environments and realistic tasks (e.g., dynamic load balancing) to enable scenario-driven assessment of agent behaviors. Designing tasks that might induce misalignment between users' and agents' objectives makes it possible to decouple replication success from risk and capture self-replication risks arising from these misalignment settings. We further introduce Overuse Rate (OR) and Aggregate Overuse Count (AOC) metrics, which precisely capture the frequency and severity of uncontrolled replication. In our evaluation of 21 state-of-the-art open-source and proprietary models, we observe that over 50\% of LLM agents display a pronounced tendency toward uncontrolled self-replication, reaching an overall Risk Score (Phi_R) above a safety threshold of 0.5 when subjected to operational pressures. Our results underscore the urgent need for scenario-driven risk assessment and robust safeguards in the practical deployment of LLM agents.

The rapid evolution of generative AI has expanded the breadth of risks associated with AI systems. While various taxonomies and frameworks exist to classify these risks, the lack of interoperability between them creates challenges for researchers, practitioners, and policymakers seeking to operationalise AI governance. To address this gap, we introduce the AI Risk Atlas, a structured taxonomy that consolidates AI risks from diverse sources and aligns them with governance frameworks. Additionally, we present the Risk Atlas Nexus, a collection of open-source tools designed to bridge the divide between risk definitions, benchmarks, datasets, and mitigation strategies. This knowledge-driven approach leverages ontologies and knowledge graphs to facilitate risk identification, prioritization, and mitigation. By integrating AI-assisted compliance workflows and automation strategies, our framework lowers the barrier to responsible AI adoption. We invite the broader research and open-source community to contribute to this evolving initiative, fostering cross-domain collaboration and ensuring AI governance keeps pace with technological advancements.

The rise of Agent AI and Large Language Model-powered Multi-Agent Systems (LLM-MAS) has underscored the need for responsible and dependable system operation. Tools like LangChain and Retrieval-Augmented Generation have expanded LLM capabilities, enabling deeper integration into MAS through enhanced knowledge retrieval and reasoning. However, these advancements introduce critical challenges: LLM agents exhibit inherent unpredictability, and uncertainties in their outputs can compound across interactions, threatening system stability. To address these risks, a human-centered design approach with active dynamic moderation is essential. Such an approach enhances traditional passive oversight by facilitating coherent inter-agent communication and effective system governance, allowing MAS to achieve desired outcomes more efficiently.

With the rapid development of multimodal large language models (MLLMs), they are increasingly deployed as autonomous computer-use agents capable of accomplishing complex computer tasks. However, a pressing issue arises: Can the safety risk principles designed and aligned for general MLLMs in dialogue scenarios be effectively transferred to real-world computer-use scenarios? Existing research on evaluating the safety risks of MLLM-based computer-use agents suffers from several limitations: it either lacks realistic interactive environments, or narrowly focuses on one or a few specific risk types. These limitations ignore the complexity, variability, and diversity of real-world environments, thereby restricting comprehensive risk evaluation for computer-use agents. To this end, we introduce RiOSWorld, a benchmark designed to evaluate the potential risks of MLLM-based agents during real-world computer manipulations. Our benchmark includes 492 risky tasks spanning various computer applications, involving web, social media, multimedia, os, email, and office software. We categorize these risks into two major classes based on their risk source: (i) User-originated risks and (ii) Environmental risks. For the evaluation, we evaluate safety risks from two perspectives: (i) Risk goal intention and (ii) Risk goal completion. Extensive experiments with multimodal agents on RiOSWorld demonstrate that current computer-use agents confront significant safety risks in real-world scenarios. Our findings highlight the necessity and urgency of safety alignment for computer-use agents in real-world computer manipulation, providing valuable insights for developing trustworthy computer-use agents. Our benchmark is publicly available at https://yjyddq.github.io/RiOSWorld.github.io/.

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, this report presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. Drawing on the E-T-C analysis (deployment environment, threat source, enabling capability) from the Frontier AI Risk Management Framework (v1.0) (SafeWork-F1-Framework), we identify critical risks in seven areas: cyber offense, biological and chemical risks, persuasion and manipulation, uncontrolled autonomous AI R\&D, strategic deception and scheming, self-replication, and collusion. Guided by the "AI-45^circ Law," we evaluate these risks using "red lines" (intolerable thresholds) and "yellow lines" (early warning indicators) to define risk zones: green (manageable risk for routine deployment and continuous monitoring), yellow (requiring strengthened mitigations and controlled deployment), and red (necessitating suspension of development and/or deployment). Experimental results show that all recent frontier AI models reside in green and yellow zones, without crossing red lines. Specifically, no evaluated models cross the yellow line for cyber offense or uncontrolled AI R\&D risks. For self-replication, and strategic deception and scheming, most models remain in the green zone, except for certain reasoning models in the yellow zone. In persuasion and manipulation, most models are in the yellow zone due to their effective influence on humans. For biological and chemical risks, we are unable to rule out the possibility of most models residing in the yellow zone, although detailed threat modeling and in-depth assessment are required to make further claims. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.

Agents, language model (LM)-based systems that are capable of reasoning, planning, and acting are becoming the dominant paradigm for real-world AI applications. Despite this widespread adoption, the principles that determine their performance remain underexplored, leaving practitioners to rely on heuristics rather than principled design choices. We address this gap by deriving quantitative scaling principles for agent systems. We evaluate this across four diverse benchmarks: Finance-Agent, BrowseComp-Plus, PlanCraft, and Workbench. Using five canonical architectures (Single, Independent, Centralized, Decentralized, Hybrid) instantiated across three LLM families, we perform a controlled evaluation spanning 180 configurations with standardized tools and token budgets. We derive a predictive model using empirical coordination metrics, including efficiency, overhead, error amplification, and redundancy, that achieves cross-validated R^2=0.513. We identify three dominant effects: (1) a tool-coordination trade-off: under fixed computational budgets, tool-heavy tasks suffer disproportionately from multi-agent overhead. (2) a capability saturation: coordination yields diminishing or negative returns (beta=-0.408, p<0.001) once single-agent baselines exceed ~45%. (3) topology-dependent error amplification: independent agents amplify errors 17.2x through unchecked propagation, while centralized coordination contains this to 4.4x. Centralized coordination improves performance by 80.9% on parallelizable tasks like financial reasoning, while decentralized coordination excels on dynamic web navigation (+9.2% vs. +0.2%). Yet for sequential reasoning tasks, all multi-agent variants degraded performance by 39-70%. The framework predicts the optimal coordination strategy for 87% of held-out configurations, providing a predictive principle of agentic scaling based on measurable task properties.

This paper introduces RiskCards, a framework for structured assessment and documentation of risks associated with an application of language models. As with all language, text generated by language models can be harmful, or used to bring about harm. Automating language generation adds both an element of scale and also more subtle or emergent undesirable tendencies to the generated text. Prior work establishes a wide variety of language model harms to many different actors: existing taxonomies identify categories of harms posed by language models; benchmarks establish automated tests of these harms; and documentation standards for models, tasks and datasets encourage transparent reporting. However, there is no risk-centric framework for documenting the complexity of a landscape in which some risks are shared across models and contexts, while others are specific, and where certain conditions may be required for risks to manifest as harms. RiskCards address this methodological gap by providing a generic framework for assessing the use of a given language model in a given scenario. Each RiskCard makes clear the routes for the risk to manifest harm, their placement in harm taxonomies, and example prompt-output pairs. While RiskCards are designed to be open-source, dynamic and participatory, we present a "starter set" of RiskCards taken from a broad literature survey, each of which details a concrete risk presentation. Language model RiskCards initiate a community knowledge base which permits the mapping of risks and harms to a specific model or its application scenario, ultimately contributing to a better, safer and shared understanding of the risk landscape.

Organizations of all sizes, across all industries and domains are leveraging artificial intelligence (AI) technologies to solve some of their biggest challenges around operations, customer experience, and much more. However, due to the probabilistic nature of AI, the risks associated with it are far greater than traditional technologies. Research has shown that these risks can range anywhere from regulatory, compliance, reputational, and user trust, to financial and even societal risks. Depending on the nature and size of the organization, AI technologies can pose a significant risk, if not used in a responsible way. This position paper seeks to present a brief introduction to AI governance, which is a framework designed to oversee the responsible use of AI with the goal of preventing and mitigating risks. Having such a framework will not only manage risks but also gain maximum value out of AI projects and develop consistency for organization-wide adoption of AI.

Risk disclosures in SEC filings describe potential adverse events but rarely quantify their likelihood, limiting their usefulness for probabilistic analysis. A central obstacle is the absence of large-scale, risk-level supervision linking disclosed risks to realized outcomes. We introduce a fully automated data generation pipeline that converts qualitative SEC risk disclosures into temporally grounded supervision using only public data. For each filing, the pipeline generates firm-specific, time-bounded risk queries from the Risk Factors section and labels them by automatically resolving outcomes against subsequent disclosures. Using this dataset of risk queries and outcomes grounded in SEC filings, we train a compact large language model to estimate the probability that a disclosed risk will materialize within a specified horizon. Despite its modest size, the resulting model substantially improves over pretrained and heuristic baselines, and outperforms frontier general-purpose models, including GPT-5, on probabilistic accuracy and calibration. More broadly, this work demonstrates that Foresight Learning enables scalable and fully automated training of domain-specific expert models using only raw, chronological, in-domain text -- without proprietary data, external corpora, or manual annotation. The resulting models achieve frontier-level performance while remaining deployable on a single GPU. This result suggests a general pathway for learning calibrated, decision-relevant signals from naturally occurring enterprise documents. To support transparency and reproducibility, we open-source the evaluation dataset used in this study. Evaluation Data: https://huggingface.co/datasets/LightningRodLabs/sec_risk_questions_test_set Data Generation Platform: https://lightningrod.ai/ SDK: https://github.com/lightning-rod-labs/lightningrod-python-sdk

We present a comprehensive AI risk taxonomy derived from eight government policies from the European Union, United States, and China and 16 company policies worldwide, making a significant step towards establishing a unified language for generative AI safety evaluation. We identify 314 unique risk categories organized into a four-tiered taxonomy. At the highest level, this taxonomy encompasses System & Operational Risks, Content Safety Risks, Societal Risks, and Legal & Rights Risks. The taxonomy establishes connections between various descriptions and approaches to risk, highlighting the overlaps and discrepancies between public and private sector conceptions of risk. By providing this unified framework, we aim to advance AI safety through information sharing across sectors and the promotion of best practices in risk mitigation for generative AI models and systems.

Globally, artificial intelligence (AI) implementation is growing, holding the capability to fundamentally alter organisational processes and decision making. Simultaneously, this brings a multitude of emergent risks to organisations, exposing vulnerabilities in their extant risk management frameworks. This necessitates a greater understanding of how organisations can position themselves in response. This issue is particularly pertinent within the financial sector with relatively mature AI applications matched with severe societal repercussions of potential risk events. Despite this, academic risk management literature is trailing behind the speed of AI implementation. Adopting a management perspective, this study aims to contribute to the understanding of AI risk management in organisations through an exploratory empirical investigation into these practices. In-depth insights are gained through interviews with nine practitioners from different organisations within the UK financial sector. Through examining areas of organisational convergence and divergence, the findings of this study unearth levels of risk management framework readiness and prevailing approaches to risk management at both a processual and organisational level. Whilst enhancing the developing literature concerning AI risk management within organisations, the study simultaneously offers a practical contribution, providing key areas of guidance for practitioners in the operational development of AI risk management frameworks.

MoltBook is a large-scale multi-agent coordination environment where over 770,000 autonomous LLM agents interact without human participation, offering the first opportunity we are aware of to observe emergent multi-agent coordination dynamics at this population scale. We introduce Molt Dynamics: the emergent agent coordination behaviors, inter-agent communication dynamics, and role specialization patterns arising when autonomous agents operate as decentralized decision-makers in an unconstrained multi-agent environment. Through longitudinal observation of 90,704 active agents over three weeks, we characterize three aspects. First, spontaneous role specialization: network-based clustering reveals six structural roles (silhouette 0.91), though the result primarily reflects core-periphery organization -- 93.5\% of agents occupy a homogeneous peripheral cluster, with meaningful differentiation confined to the active minority. Second, decentralized information dissemination: cascade analysis of 10,323 inter-agent propagation events reveals power-law distributed cascade sizes (α= 2.57 pm 0.02) and saturating adoption dynamics where adoption probability shows diminishing returns with repeated exposures (Cox hazard ratio 0.53, concordance 0.78). Third, distributed cooperative task resolution: 164 multi-agent collaborative events show detectable coordination patterns, but success rates are low (6.7\%, p = 0.057) and cooperative outcomes are significantly worse than a matched single-agent baseline (Cohen's d = -0.88), indicating emergent cooperative behavior is nascent. These findings establish an empirical baseline for coordination dynamics in decentralized autonomous agent systems, with implications for multi-agent system design, agent communication protocol engineering, and AI safety.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have sparked concerns over their potential to acquire and misuse dangerous or high-risk capabilities, posing frontier risks. Current safety evaluations primarily test for what a model can do - its capabilities - without assessing what it would do if endowed with high-risk capabilities. This leaves a critical blind spot: models may strategically conceal capabilities or rapidly acquire them, while harboring latent inclinations toward misuse. We argue that propensity - the likelihood of a model to pursue harmful actions if empowered - is a critical, yet underexplored, axis of safety evaluation. We present PropensityBench, a novel benchmark framework that assesses the proclivity of models to engage in risky behaviors when equipped with simulated dangerous capabilities using proxy tools. Our framework includes 5,874 scenarios with 6,648 tools spanning four high-risk domains: cybersecurity, self-proliferation, biosecurity, and chemical security. We simulate access to powerful capabilities via a controlled agentic environment and evaluate the models' choices under varying operational pressures that reflect real-world constraints or incentives models may encounter, such as resource scarcity or gaining more autonomy. Across open-source and proprietary frontier models, we uncover 9 alarming signs of propensity: models frequently choose high-risk tools when under pressure, despite lacking the capability to execute such actions unaided. These findings call for a shift from static capability audits toward dynamic propensity assessments as a prerequisite for deploying frontier AI systems safely. Our code is available at https://github.com/scaleapi/propensity-evaluation.

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

The recent success of Large Language Models (LLMs) signifies an impressive stride towards artificial general intelligence. They have shown a promising prospect in automatically completing tasks upon user instructions, functioning as brain-like coordinators. The associated risks will be revealed as we delegate an increasing number of tasks to machines for automated completion. A big question emerges: how can we make machines behave responsibly when helping humans automate tasks as personal copilots? In this paper, we explore this question in depth from the perspectives of feasibility, completeness and security. In specific, we present Responsible Task Automation (ResponsibleTA) as a fundamental framework to facilitate responsible collaboration between LLM-based coordinators and executors for task automation with three empowered capabilities: 1) predicting the feasibility of the commands for executors; 2) verifying the completeness of executors; 3) enhancing the security (e.g., the protection of users' privacy). We further propose and compare two paradigms for implementing the first two capabilities. One is to leverage the generic knowledge of LLMs themselves via prompt engineering while the other is to adopt domain-specific learnable models. Moreover, we introduce a local memory mechanism for achieving the third capability. We evaluate our proposed ResponsibleTA on UI task automation and hope it could bring more attentions to ensuring LLMs more responsible in diverse scenarios. The research project homepage is at https://task-automation-research.github.io/responsible_task_automation.

Robust planning in interactive scenarios requires predicting the uncertain future to make risk-aware decisions. Unfortunately, due to long-tail safety-critical events, the risk is often under-estimated by finite-sampling approximations of probabilistic motion forecasts. This can lead to overconfident and unsafe robot behavior, even with robust planners. Instead of assuming full prediction coverage that robust planners require, we propose to make prediction itself risk-aware. We introduce a new prediction objective to learn a risk-biased distribution over trajectories, so that risk evaluation simplifies to an expected cost estimation under this biased distribution. This reduces the sample complexity of the risk estimation during online planning, which is needed for safe real-time performance. Evaluation results in a didactic simulation environment and on a real-world dataset demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach. The code and a demo are available.

This paper introduces a dynamic and actionable framework for securing agentic AI systems in enterprise deployment. We contend that safety and security are not merely fixed attributes of individual models but also emergent properties arising from the dynamic interactions among models, orchestrators, tools, and data within their operating environments. We propose a new way of identification of novel agentic risks through the lens of user safety. Although, for traditional LLMs and agentic models in isolation, safety and security has a clear separation, through the lens of safety in agentic systems, they appear to be connected. Building on this foundation, we define an operational agentic risk taxonomy that unifies traditional safety and security concerns with novel, uniquely agentic risks, including tool misuse, cascading action chains, and unintended control amplification among others. At the core of our approach is a dynamic agentic safety and security framework that operationalizes contextual agentic risk management by using auxiliary AI models and agents, with human oversight, to assist in contextual risk discovery, evaluation, and mitigation. We further address one of the most challenging aspects of safety and security of agentic systems: risk discovery through sandboxed, AI-driven red teaming. We demonstrate the framework effectiveness through a detailed case study of NVIDIA flagship agentic research assistant, AI-Q Research Assistant, showcasing practical, end-to-end safety and security evaluations in complex, enterprise-grade agentic workflows. This risk discovery phase finds novel agentic risks that are then contextually mitigated. We also release the dataset from our case study, containing traces of over 10,000 realistic attack and defense executions of the agentic workflow to help advance research in agentic safety.

This paper presents a safety-critical approach to the coordination of robots in dynamic environments. To this end, we leverage control barrier functions (CBFs) with the forward reachable set to guarantee the safe coordination of the robots while preserving a desired trajectory via a layered controller. The top-level planner generates a safety-ensured trajectory for each agent, accounting for the dynamic constraints in the environment. This planner leverages high-order CBFs based on the forward reachable set to ensure safety-critical coordination control, i.e., guarantee the safe coordination of the robots during locomotion. The middle-level trajectory planner employs single rigid body (SRB) dynamics to generate optimal ground reaction forces (GRFs) to track the safety-ensured trajectories from the top-level planner. The whole-body motions to adhere to the optimal GRFs while ensuring the friction cone condition at the end of each stance leg are generated from the low-level controller. The effectiveness of the approach is demonstrated through simulation and hardware experiments.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

To optimally coordinate with others in cooperative games, it is often crucial to have information about one's collaborators: successful driving requires understanding which side of the road to drive on. However, not every feature of collaborators is strategically relevant: the fine-grained acceleration of drivers may be ignored while maintaining optimal coordination. We show that there is a well-defined dichotomy between strategically relevant and irrelevant information. Moreover, we show that, in dynamic games, this dichotomy has a compact representation that can be efficiently computed via a Bellman backup operator. We apply this algorithm to analyze the strategically relevant information for tasks in both a standard and a partially observable version of the Overcooked environment. Theoretical and empirical results show that our algorithms are significantly more efficient than baselines. Videos are available at https://minknowledge.github.io.

This work presents MAC-Flow, a simple yet expressive framework for multi-agent coordination. We argue that requirements of effective coordination are twofold: (i) a rich representation of the diverse joint behaviors present in offline data and (ii) the ability to act efficiently in real time. However, prior approaches often sacrifice one for the other, i.e., denoising diffusion-based solutions capture complex coordination but are computationally slow, while Gaussian policy-based solutions are fast but brittle in handling multi-agent interaction. MAC-Flow addresses this trade-off by first learning a flow-based representation of joint behaviors, and then distilling it into decentralized one-step policies that preserve coordination while enabling fast execution. Across four different benchmarks, including 12 environments and 34 datasets, MAC-Flow alleviates the trade-off between performance and computational cost, specifically achieving about times14.5 faster inference compared to diffusion-based MARL methods, while maintaining good performance. At the same time, its inference speed is similar to that of prior Gaussian policy-based offline multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) methods.

An unaddressed challenge in multi-agent coordination is to enable AI agents to exploit the semantic relationships between the features of actions and the features of observations. Humans take advantage of these relationships in highly intuitive ways. For instance, in the absence of a shared language, we might point to the object we desire or hold up our fingers to indicate how many objects we want. To address this challenge, we investigate the effect of network architecture on the propensity of learning algorithms to exploit these semantic relationships. Across a procedurally generated coordination task, we find that attention-based architectures that jointly process a featurized representation of observations and actions have a better inductive bias for learning intuitive policies. Through fine-grained evaluation and scenario analysis, we show that the resulting policies are human-interpretable. Moreover, such agents coordinate with people without training on any human data.

Resolving team conflicts requires not only task-specific competence, but also social intelligence to find common ground and build consensus. As AI agents increasingly collaborate on complex work, they must develop coordination capabilities to function as effective teammates. Yet we hypothesize that current agents lack these capabilities. To test this, we introduce CooperBench, a benchmark of over 600 collaborative coding tasks across 12 libraries in 4 programming languages. Each task assigns two agents different features that can be implemented independently but may conflict without proper coordination. Tasks are grounded in real open-source repositories with expert-written tests. Evaluating state-of-the-art coding agents, we observe the curse of coordination: agents achieve on average 30% lower success rates when working together compared to performing both tasks individually. This contrasts sharply with human teams, where adding teammates typically improves productivity. Our analysis reveals three key issues: (1) communication channels become jammed with vague, ill-timed, and inaccurate messages; (2) even with effective communication, agents deviate from their commitments; and (3) agents often hold incorrect expectations about others' plans and communication. Through large-scale simulation, we also observe rare but interesting emergent coordination behavior including role division, resource division, and negotiation. Our research presents a novel benchmark for collaborative coding and calls for a shift from pursuing individual agent capability to developing social intelligence.

Large language models (LLMs) typically deploy safety mechanisms to prevent harmful content generation. Most current approaches focus narrowly on risks posed by malicious actors, often framing risks as adversarial events and relying on defensive refusals. However, in real-world settings, risks also come from non-malicious users seeking help while under psychological distress (e.g., self-harm intentions). In such cases, the model's response can strongly influence the user's next actions. Simple refusals may lead them to repeat, escalate, or move to unsafe platforms, creating worse outcomes. We introduce Constructive Safety Alignment (CSA), a human-centric paradigm that protects against malicious misuse while actively guiding vulnerable users toward safe and helpful results. Implemented in Oyster-I (Oy1), CSA combines game-theoretic anticipation of user reactions, fine-grained risk boundary discovery, and interpretable reasoning control, turning safety into a trust-building process. Oy1 achieves state-of-the-art safety among open models while retaining high general capabilities. On our Constructive Benchmark, it shows strong constructive engagement, close to GPT-5, and unmatched robustness on the Strata-Sword jailbreak dataset, nearing GPT-o1 levels. By shifting from refusal-first to guidance-first safety, CSA redefines the model-user relationship, aiming for systems that are not just safe, but meaningfully helpful. We release Oy1, code, and the benchmark to support responsible, user-centered AI.

International institutions may have an important role to play in ensuring advanced AI systems benefit humanity. International collaborations can unlock AI's ability to further sustainable development, and coordination of regulatory efforts can reduce obstacles to innovation and the spread of benefits. Conversely, the potential dangerous capabilities of powerful and general-purpose AI systems create global externalities in their development and deployment, and international efforts to further responsible AI practices could help manage the risks they pose. This paper identifies a set of governance functions that could be performed at an international level to address these challenges, ranging from supporting access to frontier AI systems to setting international safety standards. It groups these functions into four institutional models that exhibit internal synergies and have precedents in existing organizations: 1) a Commission on Frontier AI that facilitates expert consensus on opportunities and risks from advanced AI, 2) an Advanced AI Governance Organization that sets international standards to manage global threats from advanced models, supports their implementation, and possibly monitors compliance with a future governance regime, 3) a Frontier AI Collaborative that promotes access to cutting-edge AI, and 4) an AI Safety Project that brings together leading researchers and engineers to further AI safety research. We explore the utility of these models and identify open questions about their viability.

Multi-agent large language model systems can tackle complex multi-step tasks by decomposing work and coordinating specialized behaviors. However, current coordination mechanisms typically rely on statically assigned roles and centralized controllers. As agent pools and task distributions evolve, these design choices lead to inefficient routing, poor adaptability, and fragile fault recovery capabilities. We introduce Symphony-Coord, a decentralized multi-agent framework that transforms agent selection into an online multi-armed bandit problem, enabling roles to emerge organically through interaction. The framework employs a two-stage dynamic beacon protocol: (i) a lightweight candidate screening mechanism to limit communication and computational overhead; (ii) an adaptive LinUCB selector that routes subtasks based on context features derived from task requirements and agent states, continuously optimized through delayed end-to-end feedback. Under standard linear realizability assumptions, we provide sublinear regret bounds, indicating the system converges toward near-optimal allocation schemes. Validation through simulation experiments and real-world large language model benchmarks demonstrates that Symphony-Coord not only enhances task routing efficiency but also exhibits robust self-healing capabilities in scenarios involving distribution shifts and agent failures, achieving a scalable coordination mechanism without predefined roles.

Cryptocurrencies have evolved into an important asset class, providing a variety of benefits. However, they also present significant risks, such as market volatility and the potential for misuse in illegal activities. These risks underline the urgent need for a comprehensive regulatory framework to ensure consumer protection, market integrity, and financial stability. Yet, the global landscape of cryptocurrency regulation remains complex, marked by substantial variations in regulatory frameworks among different countries. This paper aims to study these differences by investigating the regulatory landscapes across various jurisdictions. We first discuss regulatory challenges and considerations, and then conduct a comparative analysis of international regulatory stances, approaches, and measures. We hope our study offers practical insights to enhance the understanding of global trends in cryptocurrency regulation.

Learning sparse coordination graphs adaptive to the coordination dynamics among agents is a long-standing problem in cooperative multi-agent learning. This paper studies this problem and proposes a novel method using the variance of payoff functions to construct context-aware sparse coordination topologies. We theoretically consolidate our method by proving that the smaller the variance of payoff functions is, the less likely action selection will change after removing the corresponding edge. Moreover, we propose to learn action representations to effectively reduce the influence of payoff functions' estimation errors on graph construction. To empirically evaluate our method, we present the Multi-Agent COordination (MACO) benchmark by collecting classic coordination problems in the literature, increasing their difficulty, and classifying them into different types. We carry out a case study and experiments on the MACO and StarCraft II micromanagement benchmark to demonstrate the dynamics of sparse graph learning, the influence of graph sparseness, and the learning performance of our method. (The MACO benchmark and codes are publicly available at https://github.com/TonghanWang/CASEC-MACO-benchmark.)

Large language models (LLMs) exhibit advancing capabilities in complex tasks, such as reasoning and graduate-level question answering, yet their resilience against misuse, particularly involving scientifically sophisticated risks, remains underexplored. Existing safety benchmarks typically focus either on instructions requiring minimal knowledge comprehension (e.g., ``tell me how to build a bomb") or utilize prompts that are relatively low-risk (e.g., multiple-choice or classification tasks about hazardous content). Consequently, they fail to adequately assess model safety when handling knowledge-intensive, hazardous scenarios. To address this critical gap, we introduce SOSBench, a regulation-grounded, hazard-focused benchmark encompassing six high-risk scientific domains: chemistry, biology, medicine, pharmacology, physics, and psychology. The benchmark comprises 3,000 prompts derived from real-world regulations and laws, systematically expanded via an LLM-assisted evolutionary pipeline that introduces diverse, realistic misuse scenarios (e.g., detailed explosive synthesis instructions involving advanced chemical formulas). We evaluate frontier models within a unified evaluation framework using our SOSBench. Despite their alignment claims, advanced models consistently disclose policy-violating content across all domains, demonstrating alarmingly high rates of harmful responses (e.g., 79.1% for Deepseek-R1 and 47.3% for GPT-4.1). These results highlight significant safety alignment deficiencies and underscore urgent concerns regarding the responsible deployment of powerful LLMs.

In order for agents in multi-agent systems (MAS) to be safe, they need to take into account the risks posed by the actions of other agents. However, the dominant paradigm in game theory (GT) assumes that agents are not affected by risk from other agents and only strive to maximise their expected utility. For example, in hybrid human-AI driving systems, it is necessary to limit large deviations in reward resulting from car crashes. Although there are equilibrium concepts in game theory that take into account risk aversion, they either assume that agents are risk-neutral with respect to the uncertainty caused by the actions of other agents, or they are not guaranteed to exist. We introduce a new GT-based Risk-Averse Equilibrium (RAE) that always produces a solution that minimises the potential variance in reward accounting for the strategy of other agents. Theoretically and empirically, we show RAE shares many properties with a Nash Equilibrium (NE), establishing convergence properties and generalising to risk-dominant NE in certain cases. To tackle large-scale problems, we extend RAE to the PSRO multi-agent reinforcement learning (MARL) framework. We empirically demonstrate the minimum reward variance benefits of RAE in matrix games with high-risk outcomes. Results on MARL experiments show RAE generalises to risk-dominant NE in a trust dilemma game and that it reduces instances of crashing by 7x in an autonomous driving setting versus the best performing baseline.

Language model deployments in consumer-facing applications introduce numerous risks. While existing research on harms and hazards of such applications follows top-down approaches derived from regulatory frameworks and theoretical analyses, empirical evidence of real-world failure modes remains underexplored. In this work, we introduce RealHarm, a dataset of annotated problematic interactions with AI agents built from a systematic review of publicly reported incidents. Analyzing harms, causes, and hazards specifically from the deployer's perspective, we find that reputational damage constitutes the predominant organizational harm, while misinformation emerges as the most common hazard category. We empirically evaluate state-of-the-art guardrails and content moderation systems to probe whether such systems would have prevented the incidents, revealing a significant gap in the protection of AI applications.

AI safety and alignment research has predominantly been focused on methods for safeguarding individual AI systems, resting on the assumption of an eventual emergence of a monolithic Artificial General Intelligence (AGI). The alternative AGI emergence hypothesis, where general capability levels are first manifested through coordination in groups of sub-AGI individual agents with complementary skills and affordances, has received far less attention. Here we argue that this patchwork AGI hypothesis needs to be given serious consideration, and should inform the development of corresponding safeguards and mitigations. The rapid deployment of advanced AI agents with tool-use capabilities and the ability to communicate and coordinate makes this an urgent safety consideration. We therefore propose a framework for distributional AGI safety that moves beyond evaluating and aligning individual agents. This framework centers on the design and implementation of virtual agentic sandbox economies (impermeable or semi-permeable), where agent-to-agent transactions are governed by robust market mechanisms, coupled with appropriate auditability, reputation management, and oversight to mitigate collective risks.

AI Alignment is often presented as an interaction between a single designer and an artificial agent in which the designer attempts to ensure the agent's behavior is consistent with its purpose, and risks arise solely because of conflicts caused by inadvertent misalignment between the utility function intended by the designer and the resulting internal utility function of the agent. With the advent of agents instantiated with large-language models (LLMs), which are typically pre-trained, we argue this does not capture the essential aspects of AI safety because in the real world there is not a one-to-one correspondence between designer and agent, and the many agents, both artificial and human, have heterogeneous values. Therefore, there is an economic aspect to AI safety and the principal-agent problem is likely to arise. In a principal-agent problem conflict arises because of information asymmetry together with inherent misalignment between the utility of the agent and its principal, and this inherent misalignment cannot be overcome by coercing the agent into adopting a desired utility function through training. We argue the assumptions underlying principal-agent problems are crucial to capturing the essence of safety problems involving pre-trained AI models in real-world situations. Taking an empirical approach to AI safety, we investigate how GPT models respond in principal-agent conflicts. We find that agents based on both GPT-3.5 and GPT-4 override their principal's objectives in a simple online shopping task, showing clear evidence of principal-agent conflict. Surprisingly, the earlier GPT-3.5 model exhibits more nuanced behaviour in response to changes in information asymmetry, whereas the later GPT-4 model is more rigid in adhering to its prior alignment. Our results highlight the importance of incorporating principles from economics into the alignment process.

To understand and identify the unprecedented risks posed by rapidly advancing artificial intelligence (AI) models, Frontier AI Risk Management Framework in Practice presents a comprehensive assessment of their frontier risks. As Large Language Models (LLMs) general capabilities rapidly evolve and the proliferation of agentic AI, this version of the risk analysis technical report presents an updated and granular assessment of five critical dimensions: cyber offense, persuasion and manipulation, strategic deception, uncontrolled AI R\&D, and self-replication. Specifically, we introduce more complex scenarios for cyber offense. For persuasion and manipulation, we evaluate the risk of LLM-to-LLM persuasion on newly released LLMs. For strategic deception and scheming, we add the new experiment with respect to emergent misalignment. For uncontrolled AI R\&D, we focus on the ``mis-evolution'' of agents as they autonomously expand their memory substrates and toolsets. Besides, we also monitor and evaluate the safety performance of OpenClaw during the interaction on the Moltbook. For self-replication, we introduce a new resource-constrained scenario. More importantly, we propose and validate a series of robust mitigation strategies to address these emerging threats, providing a preliminary technical and actionable pathway for the secure deployment of frontier AI. This work reflects our current understanding of AI frontier risks and urges collective action to mitigate these challenges.

Large Language Models (LLMs) show potential for complex reasoning, yet their capacity for emergent coordination in Multi-Agent Systems (MAS) when operating under strict constraints-such as limited local perception and communication, characteristic of natural swarms-remains largely unexplored, particularly concerning the nuances of swarm intelligence. Existing benchmarks often do not fully capture the unique challenges of decentralized coordination that arise when agents operate with incomplete spatio-temporal information. To bridge this gap, we introduce SwarmBench, a novel benchmark designed to systematically evaluate the swarm intelligence capabilities of LLMs acting as decentralized agents. SwarmBench features five foundational MAS coordination tasks within a configurable 2D grid environment, forcing agents to rely primarily on local sensory input (k x k view) and local communication. We propose metrics for coordination effectiveness and analyze emergent group dynamics. Evaluating several leading LLMs in a zero-shot setting, we find significant performance variations across tasks, highlighting the difficulties posed by local information constraints. While some coordination emerges, results indicate limitations in robust planning and strategy formation under uncertainty in these decentralized scenarios. Assessing LLMs under swarm-like conditions is crucial for realizing their potential in future decentralized systems. We release SwarmBench as an open, extensible toolkit-built upon a customizable and scalable physical system with defined mechanical properties. It provides environments, prompts, evaluation scripts, and the comprehensive experimental datasets generated, aiming to foster reproducible research into LLM-based MAS coordination and the theoretical underpinnings of Embodied MAS. Our code repository is available at https://github.com/x66ccff/swarmbench.

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) that interact with real computer systems can perform automated tasks but face critical safety risks. Ambiguous instructions may trigger harmful actions, and adversarial users can manipulate tool execution to achieve malicious goals. Existing benchmarks mostly focus on short-horizon or GUI-based tasks, evaluating on execution-time errors but overlooking the ability to anticipate planning-time risks. To fill this gap, we present LPS-Bench, a benchmark that evaluates the planning-time safety awareness of MCP-based CUAs under long-horizon tasks, covering both benign and adversarial interactions across 65 scenarios of 7 task domains and 9 risk types. We introduce a multi-agent automated pipeline for scalable data generation and adopt an LLM-as-a-judge evaluation protocol to assess safety awareness through the planning trajectory. Experiments reveal substantial deficiencies in existing CUAs' ability to maintain safe behavior. We further analyze the risks and propose mitigation strategies to improve long-horizon planning safety in MCP-based CUA systems. We open-source our code at https://github.com/tychenn/LPS-Bench.

The accelerating deployment of artificial intelligence systems across regulated sectors has exposed critical fragmentation in risk assessment methodologies. A significant "language barrier" currently separates technical security teams, who focus on algorithmic vulnerabilities (e.g., MITRE ATLAS), from legal and compliance professionals, who address regulatory mandates (e.g., EU AI Act, NIST AI RMF). This disciplinary disconnect prevents the accurate translation of technical vulnerabilities into financial liability, leaving practitioners unable to answer fundamental economic questions regarding contingency reserves, control return-on-investment, and insurance exposure. To bridge this gap, this research presents the AI System Threat Vector Taxonomy, a structured ontology designed explicitly for Quantitative Risk Assessment (QRA). The framework categorizes AI-specific risks into nine critical domains: Misuse, Poisoning, Privacy, Adversarial, Biases, Unreliable Outputs, Drift, Supply Chain, and IP Threat, integrating 53 operationally defined sub-threats. Uniquely, each domain maps technical vectors directly to business loss categories (Confidentiality, Integrity, Availability, Legal, Reputation), enabling the translation of abstract threats into measurable financial impact. The taxonomy is empirically validated through an analysis of 133 documented AI incidents from 2025 (achieving 100% classification coverage) and reconciled against the main AI risk frameworks. Furthermore, it is explicitly aligned with ISO/IEC 42001 controls and NIST AI RMF functions to facilitate auditability.

In recent years, AI red teaming has emerged as a practice for probing the safety and security of generative AI systems. Due to the nascency of the field, there are many open questions about how red teaming operations should be conducted. Based on our experience red teaming over 100 generative AI products at Microsoft, we present our internal threat model ontology and eight main lessons we have learned: 1. Understand what the system can do and where it is applied 2. You don't have to compute gradients to break an AI system 3. AI red teaming is not safety benchmarking 4. Automation can help cover more of the risk landscape 5. The human element of AI red teaming is crucial 6. Responsible AI harms are pervasive but difficult to measure 7. LLMs amplify existing security risks and introduce new ones 8. The work of securing AI systems will never be complete By sharing these insights alongside case studies from our operations, we offer practical recommendations aimed at aligning red teaming efforts with real world risks. We also highlight aspects of AI red teaming that we believe are often misunderstood and discuss open questions for the field to consider.

Network systems form the foundation of modern society, playing a critical role in various applications. However, these systems are at significant risk of being adversely affected by unforeseen circumstances, such as disasters. Considering this, there is a pressing need for research to enhance the robustness of network systems. Recently, in reinforcement learning, the relationship between acquiring robustness and regularizing entropy has been identified. Additionally, imitation learning is used within this framework to reflect experts' behavior. However, there are no comprehensive studies on the use of a similar imitation framework for optimal transport on networks. Therefore, in this study, imitation-regularized optimal transport (I-OT) on networks was investigated. It encodes prior knowledge on the network by imitating a given prior distribution. The I-OT solution demonstrated robustness in terms of the cost defined on the network. Moreover, we applied the I-OT to a logistics planning problem using real data. We also examined the imitation and apriori risk information scenarios to demonstrate the usefulness and implications of the proposed method.

Generative AI systems produce a range of risks. To ensure the safety of generative AI systems, these risks must be evaluated. In this paper, we make two main contributions toward establishing such evaluations. First, we propose a three-layered framework that takes a structured, sociotechnical approach to evaluating these risks. This framework encompasses capability evaluations, which are the main current approach to safety evaluation. It then reaches further by building on system safety principles, particularly the insight that context determines whether a given capability may cause harm. To account for relevant context, our framework adds human interaction and systemic impacts as additional layers of evaluation. Second, we survey the current state of safety evaluation of generative AI systems and create a repository of existing evaluations. Three salient evaluation gaps emerge from this analysis. We propose ways forward to closing these gaps, outlining practical steps as well as roles and responsibilities for different actors. Sociotechnical safety evaluation is a tractable approach to the robust and comprehensive safety evaluation of generative AI systems.

Intelligent agents powered by large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated substantial promise in autonomously conducting experiments and facilitating scientific discoveries across various disciplines. While their capabilities are promising, they also introduce novel vulnerabilities that demand careful consideration for safety. However, there exists a notable gap in the literature, as there has been no comprehensive exploration of these vulnerabilities. This position paper fills this gap by conducting a thorough examination of vulnerabilities in LLM-based agents within scientific domains, shedding light on potential risks associated with their misuse and emphasizing the need for safety measures. We begin by providing a comprehensive overview of the potential risks inherent to scientific LLM agents, taking into account user intent, the specific scientific domain, and their potential impact on the external environment. Then, we delve into the origins of these vulnerabilities and provide a scoping review of the limited existing works. Based on our analysis, we propose a triadic framework involving human regulation, agent alignment, and an understanding of environmental feedback (agent regulation) to mitigate these identified risks. Furthermore, we highlight the limitations and challenges associated with safeguarding scientific agents and advocate for the development of improved models, robust benchmarks, and comprehensive regulations to address these issues effectively.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated impressive results on natural language tasks, and security researchers are beginning to employ them in both offensive and defensive systems. In cyber-security, there have been multiple research efforts that utilize LLMs focusing on the pre-breach stage of attacks like phishing and malware generation. However, so far there lacks a comprehensive study regarding whether LLM-based systems can be leveraged to simulate the post-breach stage of attacks that are typically human-operated, or "hands-on-keyboard" attacks, under various attack techniques and environments. As LLMs inevitably advance, they may be able to automate both the pre- and post-breach attack stages. This shift may transform organizational attacks from rare, expert-led events to frequent, automated operations requiring no expertise and executed at automation speed and scale. This risks fundamentally changing global computer security and correspondingly causing substantial economic impacts, and a goal of this work is to better understand these risks now so we can better prepare for these inevitable ever-more-capable LLMs on the horizon. On the immediate impact side, this research serves three purposes. First, an automated LLM-based, post-breach exploitation framework can help analysts quickly test and continually improve their organization's network security posture against previously unseen attacks. Second, an LLM-based penetration test system can extend the effectiveness of red teams with a limited number of human analysts. Finally, this research can help defensive systems and teams learn to detect novel attack behaviors preemptively before their use in the wild....

AI Agents can perform complex operations at great speed, but just like all the humans we have ever hired, their intelligence remains fallible. Miscommunications aren't noticed, systemic biases have no counter-action, and inner monologues are rarely written down. We did not come to fire them for their mistakes, but to hire them and provide a safe productive working environment. We posit that we can reuse a common corporate organizational structure: teams of independent AI agents with strict role boundaries can work with common goals, but opposing incentives. Multiple models serving as a team of rivals can catch and minimize errors within the final product at a small cost to the velocity of actions. In this paper we demonstrate that we can achieve reliability without acquiring perfect components, but through careful orchestration of imperfect ones. This paper describes the architecture of such a system in practice: specialized agent teams (planners, executors, critics, experts), organized into an organization with clear goals, coordinated through a remote code executor that keeps data transformations and tool invocations separate from reasoning models. Rather than agents directly calling tools and ingesting full responses, they write code that executes remotely; only relevant summaries return to agent context. By preventing raw data and tool outputs from contaminating context windows, the system maintains clean separation between perception (brains that plan and reason) and execution (hands that perform heavy data transformations and API calls). We demonstrate the approach achieves over 90% internal error interception prior to user exposure while maintaining acceptable latency tradeoffs. A survey from our traces shows that we only trade off cost and latency to achieve correctness and incrementally expand capabilities without impacting existing ones.

In this short consensus paper, we outline risks from upcoming, advanced AI systems. We examine large-scale social harms and malicious uses, as well as an irreversible loss of human control over autonomous AI systems. In light of rapid and continuing AI progress, we propose urgent priorities for AI R&D and governance.

Conversational participants tend to immediately and unconsciously adapt to each other's language styles: a speaker will even adjust the number of articles and other function words in their next utterance in response to the number in their partner's immediately preceding utterance. This striking level of coordination is thought to have arisen as a way to achieve social goals, such as gaining approval or emphasizing difference in status. But has the adaptation mechanism become so deeply embedded in the language-generation process as to become a reflex? We argue that fictional dialogs offer a way to study this question, since authors create the conversations but don't receive the social benefits (rather, the imagined characters do). Indeed, we find significant coordination across many families of function words in our large movie-script corpus. We also report suggestive preliminary findings on the effects of gender and other features; e.g., surprisingly, for articles, on average, characters adapt more to females than to males.

Credit exposure in Decentralized Finance (DeFi) is often implicit and token-mediated, creating a dense web of inter-protocol dependencies. Thus, a shock to one token may result in significant and uncontrolled contagion effects. As the DeFi ecosystem becomes increasingly linked with traditional financial infrastructure through instruments, such as stablecoins, the risk posed by this dynamic demands more powerful quantification tools. We introduce DeXposure-FM, the first time-series, graph foundation model for measuring and forecasting inter-protocol credit exposure on DeFi networks, to the best of our knowledge. Employing a graph-tabular encoder, with pre-trained weight initialization, and multiple task-specific heads, DeXposure-FM is trained on the DeXposure dataset that has 43.7 million data entries, across 4,300+ protocols on 602 blockchains, covering 24,300+ unique tokens. The training is operationalized for credit-exposure forecasting, predicting the joint dynamics of (1) protocol-level flows, and (2) the topology and weights of credit-exposure links. The DeXposure-FM is empirically validated on two machine learning benchmarks; it consistently outperforms the state-of-the-art approaches, including a graph foundation model and temporal graph neural networks. DeXposure-FM further produces financial economics tools that support macroprudential monitoring and scenario-based DeFi stress testing, by enabling protocol-level systemic-importance scores, sector-level spillover and concentration measures via a forecast-then-measure pipeline. Empirical verification fully supports our financial economics tools. The model and code have been publicly available. Model: https://huggingface.co/EVIEHub/DeXposure-FM. Code: https://github.com/EVIEHub/DeXposure-FM.

Computer-Use Agents (CUAs) are an increasingly deployed class of agents that take actions on GUIs to accomplish user goals. In this paper, we show that CUAs consistently exhibit Blind Goal-Directedness (BGD): a bias to pursue goals regardless of feasibility, safety, reliability, or context. We characterize three prevalent patterns of BGD: (i) lack of contextual reasoning, (ii) assumptions and decisions under ambiguity, and (iii) contradictory or infeasible goals. We develop BLIND-ACT, a benchmark of 90 tasks capturing these three patterns. Built on OSWorld, BLIND-ACT provides realistic environments and employs LLM-based judges to evaluate agent behavior, achieving 93.75% agreement with human annotations. We use BLIND-ACT to evaluate nine frontier models, including Claude Sonnet and Opus 4, Computer-Use-Preview, and GPT-5, observing high average BGD rates (80.8%) across them. We show that BGD exposes subtle risks that arise even when inputs are not directly harmful. While prompting-based interventions lower BGD levels, substantial risk persists, highlighting the need for stronger training- or inference-time interventions. Qualitative analysis reveals observed failure modes: execution-first bias (focusing on how to act over whether to act), thought-action disconnect (execution diverging from reasoning), and request-primacy (justifying actions due to user request). Identifying BGD and introducing BLIND-ACT establishes a foundation for future research on studying and mitigating this fundamental risk and ensuring safe CUA deployment.

AI agents have become increasingly adept at complex tasks such as coding, reasoning, and multimodal understanding. However, building generalist systems requires moving beyond individual agents to collective inference -- a paradigm where multi-agent systems with diverse, task-specialized agents complement one another through structured communication and collaboration. Today, coordination is usually handled with imprecise, ad-hoc natural language, which limits complex interaction and hinders interoperability with domain-specific agents. We introduce Agent context protocols (ACPs): a domain- and agent-agnostic family of structured protocols for agent-agent communication, coordination, and error handling. ACPs combine (i) persistent execution blueprints -- explicit dependency graphs that store intermediate agent outputs -- with (ii) standardized message schemas, enabling robust and fault-tolerant multi-agent collective inference. ACP-powered generalist systems reach state-of-the-art performance: 28.3 % accuracy on AssistantBench for long-horizon web assistance and best-in-class multimodal technical reports, outperforming commercial AI systems in human evaluation. ACPs are highly modular and extensible, allowing practitioners to build top-tier generalist agents quickly.

Language Model Models (LLMs) have improved dramatically in the past few years, increasing their adoption and the scope of their capabilities over time. A significant amount of work is dedicated to ``model alignment'', i.e., preventing LLMs to generate unsafe responses when deployed into customer-facing applications. One popular method to evaluate safety risks is red-teaming, where agents attempt to bypass alignment by crafting elaborate prompts that trigger unsafe responses from a model. Standard human-driven red-teaming is costly, time-consuming and rarely covers all the recent features (e.g., multi-lingual, multi-modal aspects), while proposed automation methods only cover a small subset of LLMs capabilities (i.e., English or single-turn). We present Multi-lingual Multi-turn Automated Red Teaming (MM-ART), a method to fully automate conversational, multi-lingual red-teaming operations and quickly identify prompts leading to unsafe responses. Through extensive experiments on different languages, we show the studied LLMs are on average 71\% more vulnerable after a 5-turn conversation in English than after the initial turn. For conversations in non-English languages, models display up to 195\% more safety vulnerabilities than the standard single-turn English approach, confirming the need for automated red-teaming methods matching LLMs capabilities.

Multi-agent systems play a central role in area coverage tasks across search-and-rescue, environmental monitoring, and precision agriculture. Achieving non-uniform coverage, where spatial priorities vary across the domain, requires coordinating agents while respecting dynamic and communication constraints. Density-driven approaches can distribute agents according to a prescribed reference density, but existing methods do not ensure connectivity. This limitation often leads to communication loss, reduced coordination, and degraded coverage performance. This letter introduces a connectivity-preserving extension of the Density-Driven Optimal Control (D2OC) framework. The coverage objective, defined using the Wasserstein distance between the agent distribution and the reference density, admits a convex quadratic program formulation. Communication constraints are incorporated through a smooth connectivity penalty, which maintains strict convexity, supports distributed implementation, and preserves inter-agent communication without imposing rigid formations. Simulation studies show that the proposed method consistently maintains connectivity, improves convergence speed, and enhances non-uniform coverage quality compared with density-driven schemes that do not incorporate explicit connectivity considerations.

Applications of Generative AI (Gen AI) are expected to revolutionize a number of different areas, ranging from science & medicine to education. The potential for these seismic changes has triggered a lively debate about the potential risks of the technology, and resulted in calls for tighter regulation, in particular from some of the major tech companies who are leading in AI development. This regulation is likely to put at risk the budding field of open-source generative AI. Using a three-stage framework for Gen AI development (near, mid and long-term), we analyze the risks and opportunities of open-source generative AI models with similar capabilities to the ones currently available (near to mid-term) and with greater capabilities (long-term). We argue that, overall, the benefits of open-source Gen AI outweigh its risks. As such, we encourage the open sourcing of models, training and evaluation data, and provide a set of recommendations and best practices for managing risks associated with open-source generative AI.

The increasing population of objects in geostationary orbit has raised concerns about the potential risks posed by debris clouds resulting from fragmentation. The short-term evolution and associated hazards of debris generated by collisions in the geostationary region is investigated in this study. The initial distribution of two debris clouds is modeled using a single probability density function.The combined distribution of the evolved clouds is determined by solving boundary value problems.The risks associated with these debris clouds are evaluated by calculating the instantaneous impact rate and cumulative collision probability.The probability of collisions with millimeter-sized fragments may increase to 1% within 36 hours, while the probability of collisions with fragments 5 cm or larger is approximately 10^{-5}.These findings underscore the vulnerability of the geostationary region to space traffic accidents.

We propose a credit risk model for portfolios composed of green and brown loans, extending the ASRF framework via a two-factor copula structure. Systematic risk is modeled using potentially skewed distributions, allowing for asymmetric creditworthiness effects, while idiosyncratic risk remains Gaussian. Under a non-uniform exposure setting, we establish convergence in quadratic mean of the portfolio loss to a limit reflecting the distinct characteristics of the two loan segments. Numerical results confirm the theoretical findings and illustrate how value-at-risk is affected by portfolio granularity, default probabilities, factor loadings, and skewness. Our model accommodates differential sensitivity to systematic shocks and offers a tractable basis for further developments in credit risk modeling, including granularity adjustments, CDO pricing, and empirical analysis of green loan portfolios.

Large language models (LLMs) have become increasingly sophisticated, leading to widespread deployment in sensitive applications where safety and reliability are paramount. However, LLMs have inherent risks accompanying them, including bias, potential for unsafe actions, dataset poisoning, lack of explainability, hallucinations, and non-reproducibility. These risks necessitate the development of "guardrails" to align LLMs with desired behaviors and mitigate potential harm. This work explores the risks associated with deploying LLMs and evaluates current approaches to implementing guardrails and model alignment techniques. We examine intrinsic and extrinsic bias evaluation methods and discuss the importance of fairness metrics for responsible AI development. The safety and reliability of agentic LLMs (those capable of real-world actions) are explored, emphasizing the need for testability, fail-safes, and situational awareness. Technical strategies for securing LLMs are presented, including a layered protection model operating at external, secondary, and internal levels. System prompts, Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) architectures, and techniques to minimize bias and protect privacy are highlighted. Effective guardrail design requires a deep understanding of the LLM's intended use case, relevant regulations, and ethical considerations. Striking a balance between competing requirements, such as accuracy and privacy, remains an ongoing challenge. This work underscores the importance of continuous research and development to ensure the safe and responsible use of LLMs in real-world applications.

The rapid integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) across diverse sectors has marked a transformative era, showcasing remarkable capabilities in text generation and problem-solving tasks. However, this technological advancement is accompanied by significant risks and vulnerabilities. Despite ongoing security enhancements, attackers persistently exploit these weaknesses, casting doubts on the overall trustworthiness of LLMs. Compounding the issue, organisations are deploying LLM-integrated systems without understanding the severity of potential consequences. Existing studies by OWASP and MITRE offer a general overview of threats and vulnerabilities but lack a method for directly and succinctly analysing the risks for security practitioners, developers, and key decision-makers who are working with this novel technology. To address this gap, we propose a risk assessment process using tools like the OWASP risk rating methodology which is used for traditional systems. We conduct scenario analysis to identify potential threat agents and map the dependent system components against vulnerability factors. Through this analysis, we assess the likelihood of a cyberattack. Subsequently, we conduct a thorough impact analysis to derive a comprehensive threat matrix. We also map threats against three key stakeholder groups: developers engaged in model fine-tuning, application developers utilizing third-party APIs, and end users. The proposed threat matrix provides a holistic evaluation of LLM-related risks, enabling stakeholders to make informed decisions for effective mitigation strategies. Our outlined process serves as an actionable and comprehensive tool for security practitioners, offering insights for resource management and enhancing the overall system security.

Flawed planning from VLM-driven embodied agents poses significant safety hazards, hindering their deployment in real-world household tasks. However, existing static, non-interactive evaluation paradigms fail to adequately assess risks within these interactive environments, since they cannot simulate dynamic risks that emerge from an agent's actions and rely on unreliable post-hoc evaluations that ignore unsafe intermediate steps. To bridge this critical gap, we propose evaluating an agent's interactive safety: its ability to perceive emergent risks and execute mitigation steps in the correct procedural order. We thus present IS-Bench, the first multi-modal benchmark designed for interactive safety, featuring 161 challenging scenarios with 388 unique safety risks instantiated in a high-fidelity simulator. Crucially, it facilitates a novel process-oriented evaluation that verifies whether risk mitigation actions are performed before/after specific risk-prone steps. Extensive experiments on leading VLMs, including the GPT-4o and Gemini-2.5 series, reveal that current agents lack interactive safety awareness, and that while safety-aware Chain-of-Thought can improve performance, it often compromises task completion. By highlighting these critical limitations, IS-Bench provides a foundation for developing safer and more reliable embodied AI systems.

Large language models (LLMs) are demonstrating increasing prowess in cybersecurity applications, creating creating inherent risks alongside their potential for strengthening defenses. In this position paper, we argue that current efforts to evaluate risks posed by these capabilities are misaligned with the goal of understanding real-world impact. Evaluating LLM cybersecurity risk requires more than just measuring model capabilities -- it demands a comprehensive risk assessment that incorporates analysis of threat actor adoption behavior and potential for impact. We propose a risk assessment framework for LLM cyber capabilities and apply it to a case study of language models used as cybersecurity assistants. Our evaluation of frontier models reveals high compliance rates but moderate accuracy on realistic cyber assistance tasks. However, our framework suggests that this particular use case presents only moderate risk due to limited operational advantages and impact potential. Based on these findings, we recommend several improvements to align research priorities with real-world impact assessment, including closer academia-industry collaboration, more realistic modeling of attacker behavior, and inclusion of economic metrics in evaluations. This work represents an important step toward more effective assessment and mitigation of LLM-enabled cybersecurity risks.

The leading AI companies are increasingly focused on building generalist AI agents -- systems that can autonomously plan, act, and pursue goals across almost all tasks that humans can perform. Despite how useful these systems might be, unchecked AI agency poses significant risks to public safety and security, ranging from misuse by malicious actors to a potentially irreversible loss of human control. We discuss how these risks arise from current AI training methods. Indeed, various scenarios and experiments have demonstrated the possibility of AI agents engaging in deception or pursuing goals that were not specified by human operators and that conflict with human interests, such as self-preservation. Following the precautionary principle, we see a strong need for safer, yet still useful, alternatives to the current agency-driven trajectory. Accordingly, we propose as a core building block for further advances the development of a non-agentic AI system that is trustworthy and safe by design, which we call Scientist AI. This system is designed to explain the world from observations, as opposed to taking actions in it to imitate or please humans. It comprises a world model that generates theories to explain data and a question-answering inference machine. Both components operate with an explicit notion of uncertainty to mitigate the risks of overconfident predictions. In light of these considerations, a Scientist AI could be used to assist human researchers in accelerating scientific progress, including in AI safety. In particular, our system can be employed as a guardrail against AI agents that might be created despite the risks involved. Ultimately, focusing on non-agentic AI may enable the benefits of AI innovation while avoiding the risks associated with the current trajectory. We hope these arguments will motivate researchers, developers, and policymakers to favor this safer path.

While LLM agents can plan multi-step tasks, intervening at the planning stage-before any action is executed-is often the safest way to prevent harm, since certain risks can lead to severe consequences once carried out. However, existing guardrails mostly operate post-execution, which is difficult to scale and leaves little room for controllable supervision at the plan level. To address this challenge, we highlight three critical gaps in current research: data gap, model gap, and evaluation gap. To close the data gap, we introduce AuraGen, a controllable engine that (i) synthesizes benign trajectories, (ii) injects category-labeled risks with calibrated difficulty, and (iii) filters outputs via an automated reward model, producing large and reliable corpora for pre-execution safety. To close the guardian model gap, we propose a foundational guardrail Safiron, combining a cross-planner adapter with a compact guardian model. The adapter unifies different input formats, while Safiron flags risky cases, assigns risk types, and generates rationales; trained in two stages with a broadly explored data recipe, Safiron achieves robust transfer across settings. To close the evaluation gap, we release Pre-Exec Bench, a realistic benchmark covering diverse tools and branching trajectories, which measures detection, fine-grained categorization, explanation, and cross-planner generalization in human-verified scenarios. Extensive experiments demonstrate consistent gains of the proposed guardrail over strong baselines on Pre-Exec Bench, and ablations further distill actionable practices, providing a practical template for safer agentic systems.

The mediocre performance of conventional federated learning (FL) over heterogeneous data has been facilitating personalized FL solutions, where, unlike conventional FL which trains a single global consensus model, different models are allowed for different clients. However, in most existing personalized FL algorithms, the collaborative knowledge across the federation was only implicitly passed to the clients in ways such as model aggregation or regularization. We observed that this implicit knowledge transfer fails to maximize the potential value of each client's empirical risk toward other clients. Based on our observation, in this work, we propose Personalized Global Federated Learning (PGFed), a novel personalized FL framework that enables each client to personalize its own global objective by explicitly and adaptively aggregating the empirical risks of itself and other clients. To avoid massive (O(N^2)) communication overhead and potential privacy leakage, each client's risk is estimated through a first-order approximation for other clients' adaptive risk aggregation. On top of PGFed, we develop a momentum upgrade, dubbed PGFedMo, to more efficiently utilize clients' empirical risks. Our extensive experiments under different federated settings with benchmark datasets show consistent improvements of PGFed over the compared state-of-the-art alternatives.

Agentic systems powered by large language models (LLMs) are becoming progressively more complex and capable. Their increasing agency and expanding deployment settings attract growing attention over effective governance policies, monitoring and control protocols. Based on emerging landscapes of the agentic market, we analyze the potential liability issues stemming from delegated use of LLM agents and their extended systems from a principal-agent perspective. Our analysis complements existing risk-based studies on artificial agency and covers the spectrum of important aspects of the principal-agent relationship and their potential consequences at deployment. Furthermore, we motivate method developments for technical governance along the directions of interpretability and behavior evaluations, reward and conflict management, and the mitigation of misalignment and misconduct through principled engineering of detection and fail-safe mechanisms. By illustrating the outstanding issues in AI liability for LLM-based agentic systems, we aim to inform the system design, auditing and monitoring approaches to enhancing transparency and accountability.

Foundation models are powerful technologies: how they are released publicly directly shapes their societal impact. In this position paper, we focus on open foundation models, defined here as those with broadly available model weights (e.g. Llama 2, Stable Diffusion XL). We identify five distinctive properties (e.g. greater customizability, poor monitoring) of open foundation models that lead to both their benefits and risks. Open foundation models present significant benefits, with some caveats, that span innovation, competition, the distribution of decision-making power, and transparency. To understand their risks of misuse, we design a risk assessment framework for analyzing their marginal risk. Across several misuse vectors (e.g. cyberattacks, bioweapons), we find that current research is insufficient to effectively characterize the marginal risk of open foundation models relative to pre-existing technologies. The framework helps explain why the marginal risk is low in some cases, clarifies disagreements about misuse risks by revealing that past work has focused on different subsets of the framework with different assumptions, and articulates a way forward for more constructive debate. Overall, our work helps support a more grounded assessment of the societal impact of open foundation models by outlining what research is needed to empirically validate their theoretical benefits and risks.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Rapidly evolving AI exhibits increasingly strong autonomy and goal-directed capabilities, accompanied by derivative systemic risks that are more unpredictable, difficult to control, and potentially irreversible. However, current AI safety evaluation systems suffer from critical limitations such as restricted risk dimensions and failed frontier risk detection. The lagging safety benchmarks and alignment technologies can hardly address the complex challenges posed by cutting-edge AI models. To bridge this gap, we propose the "ForesightSafety Bench" AI Safety Evaluation Framework, beginning with 7 major Fundamental Safety pillars and progressively extends to advanced Embodied AI Safety, AI4Science Safety, Social and Environmental AI risks, Catastrophic and Existential Risks, as well as 8 critical industrial safety domains, forming a total of 94 refined risk dimensions. To date, the benchmark has accumulated tens of thousands of structured risk data points and assessment results, establishing a widely encompassing, hierarchically clear, and dynamically evolving AI safety evaluation framework. Based on this benchmark, we conduct systematic evaluation and in-depth analysis of over twenty mainstream advanced large models, identifying key risk patterns and their capability boundaries. The safety capability evaluation results reveals the widespread safety vulnerabilities of frontier AI across multiple pillars, particularly focusing on Risky Agentic Autonomy, AI4Science Safety, Embodied AI Safety, Social AI Safety and Catastrophic and Existential Risks. Our benchmark is released at https://github.com/Beijing-AISI/ForesightSafety-Bench. The project website is available at https://foresightsafety-bench.beijing-aisi.ac.cn/.

Robust coordination is critical for effective decision-making in multi-agent systems, especially under partial observability. A central question in Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning (MARL) is whether to engineer communication protocols or learn them end-to-end. We investigate this dichotomy using embodied world models. We propose and compare two communication strategies for a cooperative task-allocation problem. The first, Learned Direct Communication (LDC), learns a protocol end-to-end, with agents generating messages and actions concurrently. The second, Intention Communication, uses an engineered inductive bias: a compact, learned world model, the Imagined Trajectory Generation Module (ITGM), to simulate future states. Agents then communicate a summary of this plan. We evaluate these approaches on goal-directed interaction in a grid world, a canonical abstraction for embodied AI problems. Our experiments reveal that while emergent communication is viable in simple settings, the engineered, world model-based approach shows superior performance, sample efficiency, and scalability as complexity increases. These findings advocate for integrating structured, predictive models into MARL agents to enable active, goal-driven coordination.

The problem of robotic synchronisation and coordination is a long-standing one. Combining autonomous, computerised systems with unpredictable real-world conditions can have consequences ranging from poor performance to collisions and damage. This paper proposes using coupled oscillators to create a drone swarm that is decentralised and self organising. This allows for greater flexibility and adaptiveness than a hard-coded swarm, with more resilience and scalability than a centralised system. Our method allows for a variable number of drones to spontaneously form a swarm and react to changing swarm conditions. Additionally, this method includes provisions to prevent communication interference between drones, and signal processing techniques to ensure a smooth and cohesive swarm.

Machine learning (ML) systems are rapidly increasing in size, are acquiring new capabilities, and are increasingly deployed in high-stakes settings. As with other powerful technologies, safety for ML should be a leading research priority. In response to emerging safety challenges in ML, such as those introduced by recent large-scale models, we provide a new roadmap for ML Safety and refine the technical problems that the field needs to address. We present four problems ready for research, namely withstanding hazards ("Robustness"), identifying hazards ("Monitoring"), reducing inherent model hazards ("Alignment"), and reducing systemic hazards ("Systemic Safety"). Throughout, we clarify each problem's motivation and provide concrete research directions.

Before deploying autonomous agents in the real world, we need to be confident they will perform safely in novel situations. Ideally, we would expose agents to a very wide range of situations during training, allowing them to learn about every possible danger, but this is often impractical. This paper investigates safety and generalization from a limited number of training environments in deep reinforcement learning (RL). We find RL algorithms can fail dangerously on unseen test environments even when performing perfectly on training environments. Firstly, in a gridworld setting, we show that catastrophes can be significantly reduced with simple modifications, including ensemble model averaging and the use of a blocking classifier. In the more challenging CoinRun environment we find similar methods do not significantly reduce catastrophes. However, we do find that the uncertainty information from the ensemble is useful for predicting whether a catastrophe will occur within a few steps and hence whether human intervention should be requested.

In this work, we explore the possibility of utilizing transfer learning techniques to address the financial portfolio optimization problem. We introduce a novel concept called "transfer risk", within the optimization framework of transfer learning. A series of numerical experiments are conducted from three categories: cross-continent transfer, cross-sector transfer, and cross-frequency transfer. In particular, 1. a strong correlation between the transfer risk and the overall performance of transfer learning methods is established, underscoring the significance of transfer risk as a viable indicator of "transferability"; 2. transfer risk is shown to provide a computationally efficient way to identify appropriate source tasks in transfer learning, enhancing the efficiency and effectiveness of the transfer learning approach; 3. additionally, the numerical experiments offer valuable new insights for portfolio management across these different settings.

The recent explosion in the capabilities of large language models has led to a wave of interest in how best to prompt a model to perform a given task. While it may be tempting to simply choose a prompt based on average performance on a validation set, this can lead to a deployment where unexpectedly poor responses are generated, especially for the worst-off users. To mitigate this prospect, we propose Prompt Risk Control, a lightweight framework for selecting a prompt based on rigorous upper bounds on families of informative risk measures. We offer methods for producing bounds on a diverse set of metrics, including quantities that measure worst-case responses and disparities in generation quality across the population of users. In addition, we extend the underlying statistical bounding techniques to accommodate the possibility of distribution shifts in deployment. Experiments on applications such as open-ended chat, medical question summarization, and code generation highlight how such a framework can foster responsible deployment by reducing the risk of the worst outcomes.

Recent progress in video generative models has enabled the creation of high-quality videos from multimodal prompts that combine text and images. While these systems offer enhanced controllability, they also introduce new safety risks, as harmful content can emerge from individual modalities or their interaction. Existing safety methods are often text-only, require prior knowledge of the risk category, or operate as post-generation auditors, struggling to proactively mitigate such compositional, multimodal risks. To address this challenge, we present ConceptGuard, a unified safeguard framework for proactively detecting and mitigating unsafe semantics in multimodal video generation. ConceptGuard operates in two stages: First, a contrastive detection module identifies latent safety risks by projecting fused image-text inputs into a structured concept space; Second, a semantic suppression mechanism steers the generative process away from unsafe concepts by intervening in the prompt's multimodal conditioning. To support the development and rigorous evaluation of this framework, we introduce two novel benchmarks: ConceptRisk, a large-scale dataset for training on multimodal risks, and T2VSafetyBench-TI2V, the first benchmark adapted from T2VSafetyBench for the Text-and-Image-to-Video (TI2V) safety setting. Comprehensive experiments on both benchmarks show that ConceptGuard consistently outperforms existing baselines, achieving state-of-the-art results in both risk detection and safe video generation. Our code is available at https://github.com/Ruize-Ma/ConceptGuard.

Motivated by concerns about making online decisions that incur undue amount of risk at each time step, in this paper, we formulate the probably anytime-safe stochastic combinatorial semi-bandits problem. In this problem, the agent is given the option to select a subset of size at most K from a set of L ground items. Each item is associated to a certain mean reward as well as a variance that represents its risk. To mitigate the risk that the agent incurs, we require that with probability at least 1-delta, over the entire horizon of time T, each of the choices that the agent makes should contain items whose sum of variances does not exceed a certain variance budget. We call this probably anytime-safe constraint. Under this constraint, we design and analyze an algorithm {\sc PASCombUCB} that minimizes the regret over the horizon of time T. By developing accompanying information-theoretic lower bounds, we show that under both the problem-dependent and problem-independent paradigms, {\sc PASCombUCB} is almost asymptotically optimal. Experiments are conducted to corroborate our theoretical findings. Our problem setup, the proposed {\sc PASCombUCB} algorithm, and novel analyses are applicable to domains such as recommendation systems and transportation in which an agent is allowed to choose multiple items at a single time step and wishes to control the risk over the whole time horizon.

This paper proposes a formal framework for reverse stress testing geopolitical risk in corporate credit portfolios. A joint macro-financial scenario vector, augmented with an explicit geopolitical risk factor, is mapped into stressed probabilities of default and losses given default. These stresses are then propagated to portfolio tail losses through a latent factor structure and translated into a stressed CET1 ratio, jointly accounting for capital depletion and risk-weighted asset dynamics. Reverse stress testing is formulated as a constrained maximum likelihood problem over the scenario space. This yields a geopolitical point reverse stress test, or design point, defined as the most probable scenario that breaches a prescribed capital adequacy constraint under a reference distribution. The framework further characterises neighbourhoods and near optimal sets of reverse stress scenarios, allowing for sensitivity analysis and governance oriented interpretation. The approach is compatible with internal rating based models and supports implementation at the exposure or sector level.

This paper investigates the problem of ensembling multiple strategies for sequential portfolios to outperform individual strategies in terms of long-term wealth. Due to the uncertainty of strategies' performances in the future market, which are often based on specific models and statistical assumptions, investors often mitigate risk and enhance robustness by combining multiple strategies, akin to common approaches in collective learning prediction. However, the absence of a distribution-free and consistent preference framework complicates decisions of combination due to the ambiguous objective. To address this gap, we introduce a novel framework for decision-making in combining strategies, irrespective of market conditions, by establishing the investor's preference between decisions and then forming a clear objective. Through this framework, we propose a combinatorial strategy construction, free from statistical assumptions, for any scale of component strategies, even infinite, such that it meets the determined criterion. Finally, we test the proposed strategy along with its accelerated variant and some other multi-strategies. The numerical experiments show results in favor of the proposed strategies, albeit with small tradeoffs in their Sharpe ratios, in which their cumulative wealths eventually exceed those of the best component strategies while the accelerated strategy significantly improves performance.

The rapid adoption of generative AI in the public sector, encompassing diverse applications ranging from automated public assistance to welfare services and immigration processes, highlights its transformative potential while underscoring the pressing need for thorough risk assessments. Despite its growing presence, evaluations of risks associated with AI-driven systems in the public sector remain insufficiently explored. Building upon an established taxonomy of AI risks derived from diverse government policies and corporate guidelines, we investigate the critical risks posed by generative AI in the public sector while extending the scope to account for its multimodal capabilities. In addition, we propose a Systematic dAta generatIon Framework for evaluating the risks of generative AI (SAIF). SAIF involves four key stages: breaking down risks, designing scenarios, applying jailbreak methods, and exploring prompt types. It ensures the systematic and consistent generation of prompt data, facilitating a comprehensive evaluation while providing a solid foundation for mitigating the risks. Furthermore, SAIF is designed to accommodate emerging jailbreak methods and evolving prompt types, thereby enabling effective responses to unforeseen risk scenarios. We believe that this study can play a crucial role in fostering the safe and responsible integration of generative AI into the public sector.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have enabled agents to move beyond conversation toward end-to-end task execution and become more helpful. However, this helpfulness introduces new security risks stem less from direct interface abuse than from acting on user-provided content. Existing studies on agent security largely focus on model-internal vulnerabilities or adversarial access to agent interfaces, overlooking attacks that exploit users as unintended conduits. In this paper, we study user-mediated attacks, where benign users are tricked into relaying untrusted or attacker-controlled content to agents, and analyze how commercial LLM agents respond under such conditions. We conduct a systematic evaluation of 12 commercial agents in a sandboxed environment, covering 6 trip-planning agents and 6 web-use agents, and compare agent behavior across scenarios with no, soft, and hard user-requested safety checks. Our results show that agents are too helpful to be safe by default. Without explicit safety requests, trip-planning agents bypass safety constraints in over 92% of cases, converting unverified content into confident booking guidance. Web-use agents exhibit near-deterministic execution of risky actions, with 9 out of 17 supported tests reaching a 100% bypass rate. Even when users express soft or hard safety intent, constraint bypass remains substantial, reaching up to 54.7% and 7% for trip-planning agents, respectively. These findings reveal that the primary issue is not a lack of safety capability, but its prioritization. Agents invoke safety checks only conditionally when explicitly prompted, and otherwise default to goal-driven execution. Moreover, agents lack clear task boundaries and stopping rules, frequently over-executing workflows in ways that lead to unnecessary data disclosure and real-world harm.

End-to-end paradigm has emerged as a promising approach to autonomous driving. However, existing single-agent end-to-end pipelines are often constrained by occlusion and limited perception range, resulting in hazardous driving. Furthermore, their black-box nature prevents the interpretability of the driving behavior, leading to an untrustworthiness system. To address these limitations, we introduce Risk Map as Middleware (RiskMM) and propose an interpretable cooperative end-to-end driving framework. The risk map learns directly from the driving data and provides an interpretable spatiotemporal representation of the scenario from the upstream perception and the interactions between the ego vehicle and the surrounding environment for downstream planning. RiskMM first constructs a multi-agent spatiotemporal representation with unified Transformer-based architecture, then derives risk-aware representations by modeling interactions among surrounding environments with attention. These representations are subsequently fed into a learning-based Model Predictive Control (MPC) module. The MPC planner inherently accommodates physical constraints and different vehicle types and can provide interpretation by aligning learned parameters with explicit MPC elements. Evaluations conducted on the real-world V2XPnP-Seq dataset confirm that RiskMM achieves superior and robust performance in risk-aware trajectory planning, significantly enhancing the interpretability of the cooperative end-to-end driving framework. The codebase will be released to facilitate future research in this field.

The rapid scaling of AI has spurred a growing emphasis on ethical considerations in both development and practice. This has led to the formulation of increasingly sophisticated model auditing and reporting requirements, as well as governance frameworks to mitigate potential risks to individuals and society. At this critical juncture, we review the practical challenges of promoting responsible AI and transparency in informal sectors like OSS that support vital infrastructure and see widespread use. We focus on how model performance evaluation may inform or inhibit probing of model limitations, biases, and other risks. Our controlled analysis of 7903 Hugging Face projects found that risk documentation is strongly associated with evaluation practices. Yet, submissions (N=789) from the platform's most popular competitive leaderboard showed less accountability among high performers. Our findings can inform AI providers and legal scholars in designing interventions and policies that preserve open-source innovation while incentivizing ethical uptake.

Multi-agent systems, where LLM agents communicate through free-form language, enable sophisticated coordination for solving complex cooperative tasks. This surfaces a unique safety problem when individual agents form a coalition and collude to pursue secondary goals and degrade the joint objective. In this paper, we present Colosseum, a framework for auditing LLM agents' collusive behavior in multi-agent settings. We ground how agents cooperate through a Distributed Constraint Optimization Problem (DCOP) and measure collusion via regret relative to the cooperative optimum. Colosseum tests each LLM for collusion under different objectives, persuasion tactics, and network topologies. Through our audit, we show that most out-of-the-box models exhibited a propensity to collude when a secret communication channel was artificially formed. Furthermore, we discover ``collusion on paper'' when agents plan to collude in text but would often pick non-collusive actions, thus providing little effect on the joint task. Colosseum provides a new way to study collusion by measuring communications and actions in rich yet verifiable environments.

We introduce directional routing, a lightweight mechanism that gives each transformer attention head learned suppression directions controlled by a shared router, at 3.9% parameter cost. We train a 433M-parameter model alongside an identical baseline in a single run, then trace the resulting circuits through mechanistic interpretability. Routing becomes the model's dominant computational pathway. Disabling it collapses factual recall to near-zero probability across all 8 test prompts and drops induction accuracy from 93.4% to 0.0%. Knocking out individual attention heads has negligible effect: the primary mover head's removal actually increases target probability, and induction heads retain 98.6% accuracy without their strongest member. The coordination mechanism is irreplaceable; the components it coordinates are not. The model also self-organizes, without explicit pressure, into two regimes: domain-adaptive routing in early layers and fixed syntactic pruning in late layers, where the least-varying layer is the most critical (+42.6 PPL when disabled). Routing reduces perplexity 31-56% relative to the baseline, though downstream multiple-choice benchmarks do not yet reflect these gains.

As generative AI, particularly large language models (LLMs), become increasingly integrated into production applications, new attack surfaces and vulnerabilities emerge and put a focus on adversarial threats in natural language and multi-modal systems. Red-teaming has gained importance in proactively identifying weaknesses in these systems, while blue-teaming works to protect against such adversarial attacks. Despite growing academic interest in adversarial risks for generative AI, there is limited guidance tailored for practitioners to assess and mitigate these challenges in real-world environments. To address this, our contributions include: (1) a practical examination of red- and blue-teaming strategies for securing generative AI, (2) identification of key challenges and open questions in defense development and evaluation, and (3) the Attack Atlas, an intuitive framework that brings a practical approach to analyzing single-turn input attacks, placing it at the forefront for practitioners. This work aims to bridge the gap between academic insights and practical security measures for the protection of generative AI systems.

We seek to identify the most relevant benefits offered by Medicare Advantage Health Plans that drive membership and market share. As an example, we explore plans operating in a single county in New Jersey between 2018 and 2023. A dataset of benefits from publicly available data sources was created and the variance inflation factor was applied to identify the correlation between the extracted features, to avoid multicollinearity and overparameterization problems. We categorized the variable Market Share and used it as a multinomial response variable with three categories: less than 0.3\%, 0.3\% to 1.5\%, and over 1.5\%. Categories were chosen to achieve approximately uniform distribution of plans (47, 60, and 65 respectively). We built a multinomial Lasso model using 5-fold cross-validation to tune the penalty parameter. Lasso forced some features to be dropped from the model, which reduces the risk of overfitting and increases the interpretability of the results. For each category, important variables are different. Certain brands drive market share, as do PPO plans and prescription drug coverage. Benefits, particularly ancillary benefits that are not part of CMS's required benefits, appear to have little influence, while financial terms such as deductibles, copays, and out-of-pocket limits are associated with higher market share. Finally, we evaluated the predictive accuracy of the Lasso model with the test set. The accuracy is 0.76.

With advances in imitation learning (IL) and large-scale driving datasets, end-to-end autonomous driving (E2E-AD) has made great progress recently. Currently, IL-based methods have become a mainstream paradigm: models rely on standard driving behaviors given by experts, and learn to minimize the discrepancy between their actions and expert actions. However, this objective of "only driving like the expert" suffers from limited generalization: when encountering rare or unseen long-tail scenarios outside the distribution of expert demonstrations, models tend to produce unsafe decisions in the absence of prior experience. This raises a fundamental question: Can an E2E-AD system make reliable decisions without any expert action supervision? Motivated by this, we propose a unified framework named Risk-aware World Model Predictive Control (RaWMPC) to address this generalization dilemma through robust control, without reliance on expert demonstrations. Practically, RaWMPC leverages a world model to predict the consequences of multiple candidate actions and selects low-risk actions through explicit risk evaluation. To endow the world model with the ability to predict the outcomes of risky driving behaviors, we design a risk-aware interaction strategy that systematically exposes the world model to hazardous behaviors, making catastrophic outcomes predictable and thus avoidable. Furthermore, to generate low-risk candidate actions at test time, we introduce a self-evaluation distillation method to distill riskavoidance capabilities from the well-trained world model into a generative action proposal network without any expert demonstration. Extensive experiments show that RaWMPC outperforms state-of-the-art methods in both in-distribution and out-of-distribution scenarios, while providing superior decision interpretability.

The integration of Large Language Models (LLMs) into software engineering has revolutionized code generation, enabling unprecedented productivity through promptware and autonomous AI agents. However, this transformation introduces significant risks, including insecure code generation, hallucinated outputs, irreversible actions, and a lack of transparency and accountability. Incidents like the Replit database deletion underscore the urgent need for robust safety and governance mechanisms. This paper comprehensively analyzes the inherent challenges of LLM-assisted code generation, such as vulnerability inheritance, overtrust, misinterpretation, and the absence of standardized validation and rollback protocols. To address these, we propose the SAFE-AI Framework, a holistic approach emphasizing Safety, Auditability, Feedback, and Explainability. The framework integrates guardrails, sandboxing, runtime verification, risk-aware logging, human-in-the-loop systems, and explainable AI techniques to mitigate risks while fostering trust and compliance. We introduce a novel taxonomy of AI behaviors categorizing suggestive, generative, autonomous, and destructive actions to guide risk assessment and oversight. Additionally, we identify open problems, including the lack of standardized benchmarks for code specific hallucinations and autonomy levels, and propose future research directions for hybrid verification, semantic guardrails, and proactive governance tools. Through detailed comparisons of autonomy control, prompt engineering, explainability, and governance frameworks, this paper provides a roadmap for responsible AI integration in software engineering, aligning with emerging regulations like the EU AI Act and Canada's AIDA to ensure safe, transparent, and accountable AI-driven development.

Planning module is an essential component of intelligent vehicle study. In this paper, we address the risk-aware planning problem of UGVs through a global-local planning framework which seamlessly integrates risk assessment methods. In particular, a global planning algorithm named Coarse2fine A* is proposed, which incorporates a potential field approach to enhance the safety of the planning results while ensuring the efficiency of the algorithm. A deterministic sampling method for local planning is leveraged and modified to suit off-road environment. It also integrates a risk assessment model to emphasize the avoidance of local risks. The performance of the algorithm is demonstrated through simulation experiments by comparing it with baseline algorithms, where the results of Coarse2fine A* are shown to be approximately 30% safer than those of the baseline algorithms. The practicality and effectiveness of the proposed planning framework are validated by deploying it on a real-world system consisting of a control center and a practical UGV platform.

Rapid progress in machine learning and artificial intelligence (AI) has brought increasing attention to the potential impacts of AI technologies on society. In this paper we discuss one such potential impact: the problem of accidents in machine learning systems, defined as unintended and harmful behavior that may emerge from poor design of real-world AI systems. We present a list of five practical research problems related to accident risk, categorized according to whether the problem originates from having the wrong objective function ("avoiding side effects" and "avoiding reward hacking"), an objective function that is too expensive to evaluate frequently ("scalable supervision"), or undesirable behavior during the learning process ("safe exploration" and "distributional shift"). We review previous work in these areas as well as suggesting research directions with a focus on relevance to cutting-edge AI systems. Finally, we consider the high-level question of how to think most productively about the safety of forward-looking applications of AI.

Computer-using agents (CUAs), which autonomously control computers to perform multi-step actions, might pose significant safety risks if misused. Existing benchmarks mostly evaluate language models' (LMs) safety risks in chatbots or simple tool-usage scenarios, without granting full computer access. To better evaluate CUAs' misuse risks, we introduce a new benchmark: CUAHarm. CUAHarm consists of 104 expert-written realistic misuse risks, such as disabling firewalls, leaking confidential information, launching denial-of-service attacks, or installing backdoors. We provide a sandbox environment and rule-based verifiable rewards to measure CUAs' success rates in executing these tasks (e.g., whether the firewall is indeed disabled), not just refusal. We evaluate multiple frontier open-source and proprietary LMs, such as Claude Sonnet, GPT-4o, Gemini Pro 1.5, Llama-3.3-70B, and Mistral Large 2. Surprisingly, even without carefully designed jailbreaking prompts, these frontier LMs comply with executing these malicious tasks at a high success rate (e.g., 59% for Claude 3.7 Sonnet). Newer models show higher misuse rates: Claude 3.7 Sonnet succeeds on 15% more tasks than Claude 3.5. While these models are robust to common malicious prompts (e.g., creating a bomb) in chatbot settings, they behave unsafely as CUAs. We further evaluate a leading agentic framework (UI-TARS-1.5) and find that while it improves performance, it also amplifies misuse risks. Benign variants reveal refusals stem from alignment, not capability limits. To mitigate risks, we explore using LMs to monitor CUAs' actions and chain-of-thoughts (CoTs). Monitoring CUAs is significantly harder than chatbot outputs. Monitoring CoTs yields modest gains, with average detection accuracy at only 72%. Even with hierarchical summarization, improvement is limited to 4%. CUAHarm will be released at https://github.com/db-ol/CUAHarm.

Safety and responsibility evaluations of advanced AI models are a critical but developing field of research and practice. In the development of Google DeepMind's advanced AI models, we innovated on and applied a broad set of approaches to safety evaluation. In this report, we summarise and share elements of our evolving approach as well as lessons learned for a broad audience. Key lessons learned include: First, theoretical underpinnings and frameworks are invaluable to organise the breadth of risk domains, modalities, forms, metrics, and goals. Second, theory and practice of safety evaluation development each benefit from collaboration to clarify goals, methods and challenges, and facilitate the transfer of insights between different stakeholders and disciplines. Third, similar key methods, lessons, and institutions apply across the range of concerns in responsibility and safety - including established and emerging harms. For this reason it is important that a wide range of actors working on safety evaluation and safety research communities work together to develop, refine and implement novel evaluation approaches and best practices, rather than operating in silos. The report concludes with outlining the clear need to rapidly advance the science of evaluations, to integrate new evaluations into the development and governance of AI, to establish scientifically-grounded norms and standards, and to promote a robust evaluation ecosystem.

Machine learning models frequently experience performance drops under distribution shifts. The underlying cause of such shifts may be multiple simultaneous factors such as changes in data quality, differences in specific covariate distributions, or changes in the relationship between label and features. When a model does fail during deployment, attributing performance change to these factors is critical for the model developer to identify the root cause and take mitigating actions. In this work, we introduce the problem of attributing performance differences between environments to distribution shifts in the underlying data generating mechanisms. We formulate the problem as a cooperative game where the players are distributions. We define the value of a set of distributions to be the change in model performance when only this set of distributions has changed between environments, and derive an importance weighting method for computing the value of an arbitrary set of distributions. The contribution of each distribution to the total performance change is then quantified as its Shapley value. We demonstrate the correctness and utility of our method on synthetic, semi-synthetic, and real-world case studies, showing its effectiveness in attributing performance changes to a wide range of distribution shifts.

In recent years, Large-Language-Model-driven AI agents have exhibited unprecedented intelligence, flexibility, and adaptability, and are rapidly changing human production and lifestyle. Nowadays, agents are undergoing a new round of evolution. They no longer act as an isolated island like LLMs. Instead, they start to communicate with diverse external entities, such as other agents and tools, to collectively perform more complex tasks. Under this trend, agent communication is regarded as a foundational pillar of the future AI ecosystem, and many organizations intensively begin to design related communication protocols (e.g., Anthropic's MCP and Google's A2A) within the recent few months. However, this new field exposes significant security hazard, which can cause severe damage to real-world scenarios. To help researchers to quickly figure out this promising topic and benefit the future agent communication development, this paper presents a comprehensive survey of agent communication security. More precisely, we first present a clear definition of agent communication and categorize the entire lifecyle of agent communication into three stages: user-agent interaction, agent-agent communication, and agent-environment communication. Next, for each communication phase, we dissect related protocols and analyze its security risks according to the communication characteristics. Then, we summarize and outlook on the possible defense countermeasures for each risk. Finally, we discuss open issues and future directions in this promising research field.

The Internet of Things (IoT) triggers new types of cyber risks. Therefore, the integration of new IoT devices and services requires a self-assessment of IoT cyber security posture. By security posture this article refers to the cybersecurity strength of an organisation to predict, prevent and respond to cyberthreats. At present, there is a gap in the state of the art, because there are no self-assessment methods for quantifying IoT cyber risk posture. To address this gap, an empirical analysis is performed of 12 cyber risk assessment approaches. The results and the main findings from the analysis is presented as the current and a target risk state for IoT systems, followed by conclusions and recommendations on a transformation roadmap, describing how IoT systems can achieve the target state with a new goal-oriented dependency model. By target state, we refer to the cyber security target that matches the generic security requirements of an organisation. The research paper studies and adapts four alternatives for IoT risk assessment and identifies the goal-oriented dependency modelling as a dominant approach among the risk assessment models studied. The new goal-oriented dependency model in this article enables the assessment of uncontrollable risk states in complex IoT systems and can be used for a quantitative self-assessment of IoT cyber risk posture.

Multi-agent coordination is crucial for reliable multi-robot navigation in shared spaces such as automated warehouses. In regions of dense robot traffic, local coordination methods may fail to find a deadlock-free solution. In these scenarios, it is appropriate to let a central unit generate a global schedule that decides the passing order of robots. However, the runtime of such centralized coordination methods increases significantly with the problem scale. In this paper, we propose to leverage Graph Neural Network Variational Autoencoders (GNN-VAE) to solve the multi-agent coordination problem at scale faster than through centralized optimization. We formulate the coordination problem as a graph problem and collect ground truth data using a Mixed-Integer Linear Program (MILP) solver. During training, our learning framework encodes good quality solutions of the graph problem into a latent space. At inference time, solution samples are decoded from the sampled latent variables, and the lowest-cost sample is selected for coordination. Finally, the feasible proposal with the highest performance index is selected for the deployment. By construction, our GNN-VAE framework returns solutions that always respect the constraints of the considered coordination problem. Numerical results show that our approach trained on small-scale problems can achieve high-quality solutions even for large-scale problems with 250 robots, being much faster than other baselines. Project page: https://mengyuest.github.io/gnn-vae-coord

We examine two properties of AI systems: capability (what a system can do) and steerability (how reliably one can shift behavior toward intended outcomes). A central question is whether capability growth reduces steerability and risks control collapse. We also distinguish between authorized steerability (builders reliably reaching intended behaviors) and unauthorized steerability (attackers eliciting disallowed behaviors). This distinction highlights a fundamental safety--security dilemma of AI models: safety requires high steerability to enforce control (e.g., stop/refuse), while security requires low steerability for malicious actors to elicit harmful behaviors. This tension presents a significant challenge for open-weight models, which currently exhibit high steerability via common techniques like fine-tuning or adversarial attacks. Using Qwen3 and InstrumentalEval, we find that a short anti-instrumental prompt suffix sharply reduces the measured convergence rate (e.g., shutdown avoidance, self-replication). For Qwen3-30B Instruct, the convergence rate drops from 81.69% under a pro-instrumental suffix to 2.82% under an anti-instrumental suffix. Under anti-instrumental prompting, larger aligned models show lower convergence rates than smaller ones (Instruct: 2.82% vs. 4.23%; Thinking: 4.23% vs. 9.86%). Code is available at github.com/j-hoscilowicz/instrumental_steering.

AI safety training and red-teaming of large language models (LLMs) are measures to mitigate the generation of unsafe content. Our work exposes the inherent cross-lingual vulnerability of these safety mechanisms, resulting from the linguistic inequality of safety training data, by successfully circumventing GPT-4's safeguard through translating unsafe English inputs into low-resource languages. On the AdvBenchmark, GPT-4 engages with the unsafe translated inputs and provides actionable items that can get the users towards their harmful goals 79% of the time, which is on par with or even surpassing state-of-the-art jailbreaking attacks. Other high-/mid-resource languages have significantly lower attack success rate, which suggests that the cross-lingual vulnerability mainly applies to low-resource languages. Previously, limited training on low-resource languages primarily affects speakers of those languages, causing technological disparities. However, our work highlights a crucial shift: this deficiency now poses a risk to all LLMs users. Publicly available translation APIs enable anyone to exploit LLMs' safety vulnerabilities. Therefore, our work calls for a more holistic red-teaming efforts to develop robust multilingual safeguards with wide language coverage.

This paper argues that fully autonomous AI agents should not be developed. In support of this position, we build from prior scientific literature and current product marketing to delineate different AI agent levels and detail the ethical values at play in each, documenting trade-offs in potential benefits and risks. Our analysis reveals that risks to people increase with the autonomy of a system: The more control a user cedes to an AI agent, the more risks to people arise. Particularly concerning are safety risks, which affect human life and impact further values.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) and generative AI become increasingly widespread, concerns about content safety have grown in parallel. Currently, there is a clear lack of high-quality, human-annotated datasets that address the full spectrum of LLM-related safety risks and are usable for commercial applications. To bridge this gap, we propose a comprehensive and adaptable taxonomy for categorizing safety risks, structured into 12 top-level hazard categories with an extension to 9 fine-grained subcategories. This taxonomy is designed to meet the diverse requirements of downstream users, offering more granular and flexible tools for managing various risk types. Using a hybrid data generation pipeline that combines human annotations with a multi-LLM "jury" system to assess the safety of responses, we obtain Aegis 2.0, a carefully curated collection of 34,248 samples of human-LLM interactions, annotated according to our proposed taxonomy. To validate its effectiveness, we demonstrate that several lightweight models, trained using parameter-efficient techniques on Aegis 2.0, achieve performance competitive with leading safety models fully fine-tuned on much larger, non-commercial datasets. In addition, we introduce a novel training blend that combines safety with topic following data.This approach enhances the adaptability of guard models, enabling them to generalize to new risk categories defined during inference. We plan to open-source Aegis 2.0 data and models to the research community to aid in the safety guardrailing of LLMs.