Daily Papers

Small language models are increasingly viewed as a promising, cost-effective approach to agentic AI, with proponents claiming they are sufficiently capable for agentic workflows. However, while smaller agents can closely match larger ones on simple tasks, it remains unclear how their performance scales with task complexity, when large models become necessary, and how to better leverage small agents for long-horizon workloads. In this work, we empirically show that small agents' performance fails to scale with task complexity on deep search and coding tasks, and we introduce Strategy Auctions for Workload Efficiency (SALE), an agent framework inspired by freelancer marketplaces. In SALE, agents bid with short strategic plans, which are scored by a systematic cost-value mechanism and refined via a shared auction memory, enabling per-task routing and continual self-improvement without training a separate router or running all models to completion. Across deep search and coding tasks of varying complexity, SALE reduces reliance on the largest agent by 53%, lowers overall cost by 35%, and consistently improves upon the largest agent's pass@1 with only a negligible overhead beyond executing the final trace. In contrast, established routers that rely on task descriptions either underperform the largest agent or fail to reduce cost -- often both -- underscoring their poor fit for agentic workflows. These results suggest that while small agents may be insufficient for complex workloads, they can be effectively "scaled up" through coordinated task allocation and test-time self-improvement. More broadly, they motivate a systems-level view of agentic AI in which performance gains come less from ever-larger individual models and more from market-inspired coordination mechanisms that organize heterogeneous agents into efficient, adaptive ecosystems.

Many real-world multi-label prediction problems involve set-valued predictions that must satisfy specific requirements dictated by downstream usage. We focus on a typical scenario where such requirements, separately encoding value and cost, compete with each other. For instance, a hospital might expect a smart diagnosis system to capture as many severe, often co-morbid, diseases as possible (the value), while maintaining strict control over incorrect predictions (the cost). We present a general pipeline, dubbed as FavMac, to maximize the value while controlling the cost in such scenarios. FavMac can be combined with almost any multi-label classifier, affording distribution-free theoretical guarantees on cost control. Moreover, unlike prior works, it can handle real-world large-scale applications via a carefully designed online update mechanism, which is of independent interest. Our methodological and theoretical contributions are supported by experiments on several healthcare tasks and synthetic datasets - FavMac furnishes higher value compared with several variants and baselines while maintaining strict cost control. Our code is available at https://github.com/zlin7/FavMac

Autoregressive sequence modeling stands as the cornerstone of modern Generative AI, powering results across diverse modalities ranging from text generation to image generation. However, a fundamental limitation of this paradigm is the rigid structural coupling of model capacity to computational cost: expanding a model's parametric memory -- its repository of factual knowledge or visual patterns -- traditionally requires deepening or widening the network, which incurs a proportional rise in active FLOPs. In this work, we introduce MoVE (Mixture of Value Embeddings), a mechanism that breaks this coupling and establishes a new axis for scaling capacity. MoVE decouples memory from compute by introducing a global bank of learnable value embeddings shared across all attention layers. For every step in the sequence, the model employs a differentiable soft gating mechanism to dynamically mix retrieved concepts from this bank into the standard value projection. This architecture allows parametric memory to be scaled independently of network depth by simply increasing the number of embedding slots. We validate MoVE through strictly controlled experiments on two representative applications of autoregressive modeling: Text Generation and Image Generation. In both domains, MoVE yields consistent performance improvements over standard and layer-wise memory baselines, enabling the construction of "memory-dense" models that achieve lower perplexity and higher fidelity than their dense counterparts at comparable compute budgets.

We investigate the mechanism design problem faced by a principal who hires multiple agents to gather and report costly information. Then, the principal exploits the information to make an informed decision. We model this problem as a game, where the principal announces a mechanism consisting in action recommendations and a payment function, a.k.a. scoring rule. Then, each agent chooses an effort level and receives partial information about an underlying state of nature based on the effort. Finally, the agents report the information (possibly non-truthfully), the principal takes a decision based on this information, and the agents are paid according to the scoring rule. While previous work focuses on single-agent problems, we consider multi-agents settings. This poses the challenge of coordinating the agents' efforts and aggregating correlated information. Indeed, we show that optimal mechanisms must correlate agents' efforts, which introduces externalities among the agents, and hence complex incentive compatibility constraints and equilibrium selection problems. First, we design a polynomial-time algorithm to find an optimal incentive compatible mechanism. Then, we study an online problem, where the principal repeatedly interacts with a group of unknown agents. We design a no-regret algorithm that provides mathcal{O}(T^{2/3}) regret with respect to an optimal mechanism, matching the state-of-the-art bound for single-agent settings.

Portfolio Selection is an important real-world financial task and has attracted extensive attention in artificial intelligence communities. This task, however, has two main difficulties: (i) the non-stationary price series and complex asset correlations make the learning of feature representation very hard; (ii) the practicality principle in financial markets requires controlling both transaction and risk costs. Most existing methods adopt handcraft features and/or consider no constraints for the costs, which may make them perform unsatisfactorily and fail to control both costs in practice. In this paper, we propose a cost-sensitive portfolio selection method with deep reinforcement learning. Specifically, a novel two-stream portfolio policy network is devised to extract both price series patterns and asset correlations, while a new cost-sensitive reward function is developed to maximize the accumulated return and constrain both costs via reinforcement learning. We theoretically analyze the near-optimality of the proposed reward, which shows that the growth rate of the policy regarding this reward function can approach the theoretical optimum. We also empirically evaluate the proposed method on real-world datasets. Promising results demonstrate the effectiveness and superiority of the proposed method in terms of profitability, cost-sensitivity and representation abilities.

In Reinforcement Learning (RL), an agent acts in an unknown environment to maximize the expected cumulative discounted sum of an external reward signal, i.e., the expected return. In practice, in many tasks of interest, such as policy optimization, the agent usually spends its interaction budget by collecting episodes of fixed length within a simulator (i.e., Monte Carlo simulation). However, given the discounted nature of the RL objective, this data collection strategy might not be the best option. Indeed, the rewards taken in early simulation steps weigh exponentially more than future rewards. Taking a cue from this intuition, in this paper, we design an a-priori budget allocation strategy that leads to the collection of trajectories of different lengths, i.e., truncated. The proposed approach provably minimizes the width of the confidence intervals around the empirical estimates of the expected return of a policy. After discussing the theoretical properties of our method, we make use of our trajectory truncation mechanism to extend Policy Optimization via Importance Sampling (POIS, Metelli et al., 2018) algorithm. Finally, we conduct a numerical comparison between our algorithm and POIS: the results are consistent with our theory and show that an appropriate truncation of the trajectories can succeed in improving performance.

To enhance the efficiency and practicality of federated bandit learning, recent advances have introduced incentives to motivate communication among clients, where a client participates only when the incentive offered by the server outweighs its participation cost. However, existing incentive mechanisms naively assume the clients are truthful: they all report their true cost and thus the higher cost one participating client claims, the more the server has to pay. Therefore, such mechanisms are vulnerable to strategic clients aiming to optimize their own utility by misreporting. To address this issue, we propose an incentive compatible (i.e., truthful) communication protocol, named Truth-FedBan, where the incentive for each participant is independent of its self-reported cost, and reporting the true cost is the only way to achieve the best utility. More importantly, Truth-FedBan still guarantees the sub-linear regret and communication cost without any overheads. In other words, the core conceptual contribution of this paper is, for the first time, demonstrating the possibility of simultaneously achieving incentive compatibility and nearly optimal regret in federated bandit learning. Extensive numerical studies further validate the effectiveness of our proposed solution.

Large language models (LLMs) can express different values in two distinct ways: (1) intrinsic expression, reflecting the model's inherent values learned during training, and (2) prompted expression, elicited by explicit prompts. Given their widespread use in value alignment and persona steering, it is paramount to clearly understand their underlying mechanisms, particularly whether they mostly overlap (as one might expect) or rely on substantially different mechanisms, but this remains largely understudied. We analyze this at the mechanistic level using two approaches: (1) value vectors, feature directions representing value mechanisms extracted from the residual stream, and (2) value neurons, MLP neurons that contribute to value expressions. We demonstrate that intrinsic and prompted value mechanisms partly share common components that are crucial for inducing value expression, but also possess unique elements that manifest in different ways. As a result, these mechanisms lead to different degrees of value steerability (prompted > intrinsic) and response diversity (intrinsic > prompted). In particular, components unique to the intrinsic mechanism seem to promote lexical diversity in responses, whereas those specific to the prompted mechanism primarily strengthen instruction following, taking effect even in distant tasks like jailbreaking.

We consider the problem of locating a facility to serve a set of agents located along a line. The Nash welfare objective function, defined as the product of the agents' utilities, is known to provide a compromise between fairness and efficiency in resource allocation problems. We apply this welfare notion to the facility location problem, converting individual costs to utilities and analyzing the facility placement that maximizes the Nash welfare. We give a polynomial-time approximation algorithm to compute this facility location, and prove results suggesting that it achieves a good balance of fairness and efficiency. Finally, we take a mechanism design perspective and propose a strategy-proof mechanism with a bounded approximation ratio for Nash welfare.

In Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), constructing a robust advantage baseline is critical for policy gradients, effectively guiding the policy model to reinforce desired behaviors. Recent research has introduced Generalist Value Models (such as V_0), which achieve pre-trained value estimation by explicitly encoding model capabilities in-context, eliminating the need to synchronously update the value model alongside the policy model. In this paper, we propose V_{0.5}, which adaptively fuses the baseline predicted by such value model (acting as a prior) with the empirical mean derived from sparse rollouts. This constructs a robust baseline that balances computational efficiency with extremely low variance. Specifically, we introduce a real-time statistical testing and dynamic budget allocation. This balances the high variance caused by sparse sampling against the systematic bias (or hallucinations) inherent in the value model's prior. By constructing a hypothesis test to evaluate the prior's reliability in real-time, the system dynamically allocates additional rollout budget on demand. This mechanism minimizes the baseline estimator's Mean Squared Error (MSE), guaranteeing stable policy gradients, even under extreme sparsity with a group size of 4. Extensive evaluations across six mathematical reasoning benchmarks demonstrate that V_{0.5} significantly outperforms GRPO and DAPO, achieving faster convergence and over some 10% performance improvement.

Test-time scaling has become a dominant paradigm for improving LLM agent reliability, yet current approaches treat compute as an abundant resource, allowing agents to exhaust token and tool budgets on redundant steps or dead-end trajectories. Existing budget-aware methods either require expensive fine-tuning or rely on coarse, trajectory-level heuristics that cannot intervene mid-execution. We propose the Budget-Aware Value Tree (BAVT), a training-free inference-time framework that models multi-hop reasoning as a dynamic search tree guided by step-level value estimation within a single LLM backbone. Another key innovation is a budget-conditioned node selection mechanism that uses the remaining resource ratio as a natural scaling exponent over node values, providing a principled, parameter-free transition from broad exploration to greedy exploitation as the budget depletes. To combat the well-known overconfidence of LLM self-evaluation, BAVT employs a residual value predictor that scores relative progress rather than absolute state quality, enabling reliable pruning of uninformative or redundant tool calls. We further provide a theoretical convergence guarantee, proving that BAVT reaches a terminal answer with probability at least 1-ε under an explicit finite budget bound. Extensive evaluations on four multi-hop QA benchmarks across two model families demonstrate that BAVT consistently outperforms parallel sampling baselines. Most notably, BAVT under strict low-budget constraints surpasses baseline performance at 4times the resource allocation, establishing that intelligent budget management fundamentally outperforms brute-force compute scaling.

We initiate the study of statistical inference and A/B testing for first-price pacing equilibria (FPPE). The FPPE model captures the dynamics resulting from large-scale first-price auction markets where buyers use pacing-based budget management. Such markets arise in the context of internet advertising, where budgets are prevalent. We propose a statistical framework for the FPPE model, in which a limit FPPE with a continuum of items models the long-run steady-state behavior of the auction platform, and an observable FPPE consisting of a finite number of items provides the data to estimate primitives of the limit FPPE, such as revenue, Nash social welfare (a fair metric of efficiency), and other parameters of interest. We develop central limit theorems and asymptotically valid confidence intervals. Furthermore, we establish the asymptotic local minimax optimality of our estimators. We then show that the theory can be used for conducting statistically valid A/B testing on auction platforms. Numerical simulations verify our central limit theorems, and empirical coverage rates for our confidence intervals agree with our theory.

The rapid growth of Internet of Things (IoT) ecosystems has intensified the challenge of efficiently allocating heterogeneous resources in highly dynamic, distributed environments. Conventional centralized mechanisms and single-objective auction models, focusing solely on metrics such as cost minimization or revenue maximization, struggle to deliver balanced system performance. This paper proposes the Multi-Objective Hierarchical Auction Framework (MOHAF), a distributed resource allocation mechanism that jointly optimizes cost, Quality of Service (QoS), energy efficiency, and fairness. MOHAF integrates hierarchical clustering to reduce computational complexity with a greedy, submodular optimization strategy that guarantees a (1-1/e) approximation ratio. A dynamic pricing mechanism adapts in real time to resource utilization, enhancing market stability and allocation quality. Extensive experiments on the Google Cluster Data trace, comprising 3,553 requests and 888 resources, demonstrate MOHAF's superior allocation efficiency (0.263) compared to Greedy (0.185), First-Price (0.138), and Random (0.101) auctions, while achieving perfect fairness (Jain's index = 1.000). Ablation studies reveal the critical influence of cost and QoS components in sustaining balanced multi-objective outcomes. With near-linear scalability, theoretical guarantees, and robust empirical performance, MOHAF offers a practical and adaptable solution for large-scale IoT deployments, effectively reconciling efficiency, equity, and sustainability in distributed resource coordination.

We consider an extension to the classic position auctions in which sponsored creatives can be added within AI generated content rather than shown in predefined slots. New challenges arise from the natural requirement that sponsored creatives should smoothly fit into the context. With the help of advanced LLM technologies, it becomes viable to accurately estimate the benefits of adding each individual sponsored creatives into each potential positions within the AI generated content by properly taking the context into account. Therefore, we assume one click-through rate estimation for each position-creative pair, rather than one uniform estimation for each sponsored creative across all positions in classic settings. As a result, the underlying optimization becomes a general matching problem, thus the substitution effects should be treated more carefully compared to standard position auction settings, where the slots are independent with each other. In this work, we formalize a concrete mathematical model of the extended position auction problem and study the welfare-maximization and revenue-maximization mechanism design problem. Formally, we consider two different user behavior models and solve the mechanism design problems therein respectively. For the Multinomial Logit (MNL) model, which is order-insensitive, we can efficiently implement the optimal mechanisms. For the cascade model, which is order-sensitive, we provide approximately optimal solutions.

Motivated by the phenomenon of strategic agents gaming a recommender system to maximize the number of times they are recommended to users, we study a strategic variant of the linear contextual bandit problem, where the arms can strategically misreport privately observed contexts to the learner. We treat the algorithm design problem as one of mechanism design under uncertainty and propose the Optimistic Grim Trigger Mechanism (OptGTM) that incentivizes the agents (i.e., arms) to report their contexts truthfully while simultaneously minimizing regret. We also show that failing to account for the strategic nature of the agents results in linear regret. However, a trade-off between mechanism design and regret minimization appears to be unavoidable. More broadly, this work aims to provide insight into the intersection of online learning and mechanism design.

The rapid emergence of diverse large language models (LLMs) has spurred the development of LLM routers that assign user queries to the most suitable model. However, existing LLM routers typically perform a single-round, one-to-one mapping (i.e., assigning each query to a single model in isolation), which limits their capability to tackle complex tasks that demand the complementary strengths of multiple LLMs. In this paper, we present Router-R1, a reinforcement learning (RL)-based framework that formulates multi-LLM routing and aggregation as a sequential decision process. Router-R1 instantiates the router itself as a capable LLM, leveraging its reasoning ability to interleave "think" actions (internal deliberation) with "route" actions (dynamic model invocation), and integrates each response into its evolving context. To guide learning, we employ a lightweight rule-based reward comprising format rewards, final outcome rewards, and a novel cost reward for performance and cost trade-off optimization, opening a pathway toward optimizing performance-cost tradeoffs via RL. Router-R1 also conditions only on simple model descriptors such as pricing, latency, and example performance, enabling strong generalization to unseen model selection. Experiments on seven general and multi-hop QA benchmarks show that Router-R1 outperforms over several strong baselines, achieving superior performance while maintaining robust generalization and cost management.Code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/Router-R1.

The majority of online display ads are served through real-time bidding (RTB) --- each ad display impression is auctioned off in real-time when it is just being generated from a user visit. To place an ad automatically and optimally, it is critical for advertisers to devise a learning algorithm to cleverly bid an ad impression in real-time. Most previous works consider the bid decision as a static optimization problem of either treating the value of each impression independently or setting a bid price to each segment of ad volume. However, the bidding for a given ad campaign would repeatedly happen during its life span before the budget runs out. As such, each bid is strategically correlated by the constrained budget and the overall effectiveness of the campaign (e.g., the rewards from generated clicks), which is only observed after the campaign has completed. Thus, it is of great interest to devise an optimal bidding strategy sequentially so that the campaign budget can be dynamically allocated across all the available impressions on the basis of both the immediate and future rewards. In this paper, we formulate the bid decision process as a reinforcement learning problem, where the state space is represented by the auction information and the campaign's real-time parameters, while an action is the bid price to set. By modeling the state transition via auction competition, we build a Markov Decision Process framework for learning the optimal bidding policy to optimize the advertising performance in the dynamic real-time bidding environment. Furthermore, the scalability problem from the large real-world auction volume and campaign budget is well handled by state value approximation using neural networks.

We study the problem of designing mechanisms for information acquisition scenarios. This setting models strategic interactions between an uniformed receiver and a set of informed senders. In our model the senders receive information about the underlying state of nature and communicate their observation (either truthfully or not) to the receiver, which, based on this information, selects an action. Our goal is to design mechanisms maximizing the receiver's utility while incentivizing the senders to report truthfully their information. First, we provide an algorithm that efficiently computes an optimal incentive compatible (IC) mechanism. Then, we focus on the online problem in which the receiver sequentially interacts in an unknown game, with the objective of minimizing the cumulative regret w.r.t. the optimal IC mechanism, and the cumulative violation of the incentive compatibility constraints. We investigate two different online scenarios, i.e., the full and bandit feedback settings. For the full feedback problem, we propose an algorithm that guarantees mathcal O(sqrt T) regret and violation, while for the bandit feedback setting we present an algorithm that attains mathcal O(T^{alpha}) regret and mathcal O(T^{1-alpha/2}) violation for any alphain[1/2, 1]. Finally, we complement our results providing a tight lower bound.

We present a general convergent class of reinforcement learning algorithms that is founded on two distinct principles: (1) mapping value estimates to a different space using arbitrary functions from a broad class, and (2) linearly decomposing the reward signal into multiple channels. The first principle enables incorporating specific properties into the value estimator that can enhance learning. The second principle, on the other hand, allows for the value function to be represented as a composition of multiple utility functions. This can be leveraged for various purposes, e.g. dealing with highly varying reward scales, incorporating a priori knowledge about the sources of reward, and ensemble learning. Combining the two principles yields a general blueprint for instantiating convergent algorithms by orchestrating diverse mapping functions over multiple reward channels. This blueprint generalizes and subsumes algorithms such as Q-Learning, Log Q-Learning, and Q-Decomposition. In addition, our convergence proof for this general class relaxes certain required assumptions in some of these algorithms. Based on our theory, we discuss several interesting configurations as special cases. Finally, to illustrate the potential of the design space that our theory opens up, we instantiate a particular algorithm and evaluate its performance on the Atari suite.

We consider strategy proof mechanisms for facility location which maximize equitability between agents. As is common in the literature, we measure equitability with the Gini index. We first prove a simple but fundamental impossibility result that no strategy proof mechanism can bound the approximation ratio of the optimal Gini index of utilities for one or more facilities. We propose instead computing approximation ratios of the complemented Gini index of utilities, and consider how well both deterministic and randomized mechanisms approximate this. In addition, as Nash welfare is often put forwards as an equitable compromise between egalitarian and utilitarian outcomes, we consider how well mechanisms approximate the Nash welfare.

Although machine learning tasks are highly sensitive to the quality of input data, relevant datasets can often be challenging for firms to acquire, especially when held privately by a variety of owners. For instance, if these owners are competitors in a downstream market, they may be reluctant to share information. Focusing on supervised learning for regression tasks, we develop a regression market to provide a monetary incentive for data sharing. Our mechanism adopts a Bayesian framework, allowing us to consider a more general class of regression tasks. We present a thorough exploration of the market properties, and show that similar proposals in literature expose the market agents to sizeable financial risks, which can be mitigated in our setup.

Coopetition refers to simultaneous cooperation and competition among actors wherein actors 'cooperate to grow the pie and compete to split it up.' Modern socio-technical systems are characterized by strategic coopetition wherein actors concomitantly cooperate to create value and compete to capture it. While conceptual modeling languages such as i* provide rich qualitative representations of strategic dependencies, they lack mechanisms for quantitative analysis of dynamic trade-offs. Conversely, classical game theory offers mathematical rigor but strips away contextual richness. This report bridges this gap by developing computational foundations that formalize two critical dimensions of coopetition: interdependence and complementarity. We ground interdependence in i* structural dependency analysis, translating depender-dependee-dependum relationships into quantitative interdependence coefficients via a structured translation framework. We formalize complementarity following Brandenburger and Nalebuff's Added Value concept, modeling synergistic value creation with validated parameterization. We integrate structural dependencies with bargaining power in value appropriation and introduce a game-theoretic formulation where Nash Equilibrium incorporates structural interdependence. Validation combines over 22,000 experimental trials across power and logarithmic specifications with the Samsung-Sony S-LCD joint venture (2004-2011). Under strict historical alignment scoring, logarithmic specifications achieve 58/60 compared to power functions (46/60), producing realistic 41% cooperation increases aligning with documented S-LCD patterns while power functions produce 166% increases exceeding realistic bounds. Statistical significance confirmed at p < 0.001, Cohen's d > 9.

Budget management strategies in repeated auctions have received growing attention in online advertising markets. However, previous work on budget management in online bidding mainly focused on second-price auctions. The rapid shift from second-price auctions to first-price auctions for online ads in recent years has motivated the challenging question of how to bid in repeated first-price auctions while controlling budgets. In this work, we study the problem of learning in repeated first-price auctions with budgets. We design a dual-based algorithm that can achieve a near-optimal O(T) regret with full information feedback where the maximum competing bid is always revealed after each auction. We further consider the setting with one-sided information feedback where only the winning bid is revealed after each auction. We show that our modified algorithm can still achieve an O(T) regret with mild assumptions on the bidder's value distribution. Finally, we complement the theoretical results with numerical experiments to confirm the effectiveness of our budget management policy.

We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible goods among a set of agents. Our focus is on the existence of allocations that give each agent their maximin fair share--the value they are guaranteed if they divide the goods into as many bundles as there are agents, and receive their lowest valued bundle. An MMS allocation is one where every agent receives at least their maximin fair share. We examine the existence of such allocations when agents have cost utilities. In this setting, each item has an associated cost, and an agent's valuation for an item is the cost of the item if it is useful to them, and zero otherwise. Our main results indicate that cost utilities are a promising restriction for achieving MMS. We show that for the case of three agents with cost utilities, an MMS allocation always exists. We also show that when preferences are restricted slightly further--to what we call laminar set approvals--we can guarantee MMS allocations for any number of agents. Finally, we explore if it is possible to guarantee each agent their maximin fair share while using a strategyproof mechanism.

Current evaluations of Large Language Model (LLM) agents primarily emphasize task completion, often overlooking resource efficiency and adaptability. This neglects a crucial capability: agents' ability to devise and adjust cost-optimal plans in response to changing environments. To bridge this gap, we introduce CostBench, a scalable, cost-centric benchmark designed to evaluate agents' economic reasoning and replanning abilities. Situated in the travel-planning domain, CostBench comprises tasks solvable via multiple sequences of atomic and composite tools with diverse, customizable costs. It also supports four types of dynamic blocking events, such as tool failures and cost changes, to simulate real-world unpredictability and necessitate agents to adapt in real time. Evaluating leading open-sourced and proprietary models on CostBench reveals a substantial gap in cost-aware planning: agents frequently fail to identify cost-optimal solutions in static settings, with even GPT-5 achieving less than 75% exact match rate on the hardest tasks, and performance further dropping by around 40% under dynamic conditions. By diagnosing these weaknesses, CostBench lays the groundwork for developing future agents that are both economically rational and robust.

Large reasoning models (LRMs) have recently shown promise in solving complex math problems when optimized with Reinforcement Learning (RL). But conventional approaches rely on outcome-only rewards that provide sparse feedback, resulting in inefficient optimization process. In this work, we investigate the function of process reward models (PRMs) to accelerate the RL training for LRMs. We propose a novel intrinsic signal-driven generative process evaluation mechanism operating at the thought level to address major bottlenecks in RL-based training. Specifically, instead of requiring PRMs to know how to solve problems, our method uses intrinsic signals in solutions to judge stepwise correctness and aggregate contiguous correct/incorrect steps into coherent 'thought' units. This structured, thought-level rewards enable more reliable credit assignment by reducing ambiguity in step segmentation and alleviating reward hacking. We further introduce a capability-adaptive reward mechanism that dynamically balances exploration and exploitation based on the LRM's current proficiency, guiding learning without stifling creative trial-and-error. These innovations are integrated into a new off-policy RL algorithm, TP-GRPO, which extends grouped proximal optimization with process-based rewards and improves training efficiency. Experiments on 1.5B and 7B parameter LRMs demonstrate that our method achieves higher problem-solving accuracy with significantly fewer training samples than outcome-only reward baselines. The results validate that well-structured process rewards can substantially accelerate LRM optimization in math reasoning tasks. Code is available at https://github.com/cs-holder/tp_grpo.

Risk-averse reinforcement learning finds application in various high-stakes fields. Unlike classical reinforcement learning, which aims to maximize expected returns, risk-averse agents choose policies that minimize risk, occasionally sacrificing expected value. These preferences can be framed through utility theory. We focus on the specific case of the exponential utility function, where we can derive the Bellman equations and employ various reinforcement learning algorithms with few modifications. However, these methods suffer from numerical instability due to the need for exponent computation throughout the process. To address this, we introduce a numerically stable and mathematically sound loss function based on the Itakura-Saito divergence for learning state-value and action-value functions. We evaluate our proposed loss function against established alternatives, both theoretically and empirically. In the experimental section, we explore multiple financial scenarios, some with known analytical solutions, and show that our loss function outperforms the alternatives.

Test-time compute has emerged as a promising strategy to enhance the reasoning abilities of large language models (LLMs). However, this strategy has in turn increased how much users pay cloud-based providers offering LLM-as-a-service, since providers charge users for the amount of test-time compute they use to generate an output. In our work, we show that the market of LLM-as-a-service is socially inefficient: providers have a financial incentive to increase the amount of test-time compute, even if this increase contributes little to the quality of the outputs. To address this inefficiency, we introduce a reverse second-price auction mechanism where providers bid their offered price and (expected) quality for the opportunity to serve a user, and users pay proportionally to the marginal value generated by the winning provider relative to the second-highest bidder. To illustrate and complement our theoretical results, we conduct experiments with multiple instruct models from the Llama and Qwen families, as well as reasoning models distilled from DeepSeek-R1, on math and science benchmark datasets.

The proliferation of Large Language Models (LLMs) has established LLM routing as a standard service delivery mechanism, where users select models based on cost, Quality of Service (QoS), among other things. However, optimal pricing in LLM routing platforms requires precise modeling for dynamic service markets, and solving this problem in real time at scale is computationally intractable. In this paper, we propose \PriLLM, a novel practical and scalable solution for real-time dynamic pricing in competitive LLM routing. \PriLLM models the service market as a Stackelberg game, where providers set prices and users select services based on multiple criteria. To capture real-world market dynamics, we incorporate both objective factors (\eg~cost, QoS) and subjective user preferences into the model. For scalability, we employ a deep aggregation network to learn provider abstraction that preserve user-side equilibrium behavior across pricing strategies. Moreover, \PriLLM offers interpretability by explaining its pricing decisions. Empirical evaluation on real-world data shows that \PriLLM achieves over 95\% of the optimal profit while only requiring less than 5\% of the optimal solution's computation time.

Policy gradient methods rely on a baseline to measure the relative advantage of an action, ensuring the model reinforces behaviors that outperform its current average capability. In the training of Large Language Models (LLMs) using Actor-Critic methods (e.g., PPO), this baseline is typically estimated by a Value Model (Critic) often as large as the policy model itself. However, as the policy continuously evolves, the value model requires expensive, synchronous incremental training to accurately track the shifting capabilities of the policy. To avoid this overhead, Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) eliminates the coupled value model by using the average reward of a group of rollouts as the baseline; yet, this approach necessitates extensive sampling to maintain estimation stability. In this paper, we propose V_0, a Generalist Value Model capable of estimating the expected performance of any model on unseen prompts without requiring parameter updates. We reframe value estimation by treating the policy's dynamic capability as an explicit context input; specifically, we leverage a history of instruction-performance pairs to dynamically profile the model, departing from the traditional paradigm that relies on parameter fitting to perceive capability shifts. Focusing on value estimation at State Zero (i.e., the initial prompt, hence V_0), our model serves as a critical resource scheduler. During GRPO training, V_0 predicts success rates prior to rollout, allowing for efficient sampling budget allocation; during deployment, it functions as a router, dispatching instructions to the most cost-effective and suitable model. Empirical results demonstrate that V_0 significantly outperforms heuristic budget allocation and achieves a Pareto-optimal trade-off between performance and cost in LLM routing tasks.

In this paper we argue for the fundamental importance of the value distribution: the distribution of the random return received by a reinforcement learning agent. This is in contrast to the common approach to reinforcement learning which models the expectation of this return, or value. Although there is an established body of literature studying the value distribution, thus far it has always been used for a specific purpose such as implementing risk-aware behaviour. We begin with theoretical results in both the policy evaluation and control settings, exposing a significant distributional instability in the latter. We then use the distributional perspective to design a new algorithm which applies Bellman's equation to the learning of approximate value distributions. We evaluate our algorithm using the suite of games from the Arcade Learning Environment. We obtain both state-of-the-art results and anecdotal evidence demonstrating the importance of the value distribution in approximate reinforcement learning. Finally, we combine theoretical and empirical evidence to highlight the ways in which the value distribution impacts learning in the approximate setting.

Large Language Models (LLM)-based systems, i.e. interconnected elements that include an LLM as a central component (e.g., conversational agents), are typically monolithic static architectures that rely on a single LLM for all user queries. However, they often require different preprocessing strategies, levels of reasoning, or knowledge. Generalist LLMs (i.e. GPT-4), trained on very large multi-topic corpora, can perform well in a variety of tasks. However, they require significant financial, energy, and hardware resources that may not be justified for basic tasks. This implies potentially investing in unnecessary costs for a given query. To overcome this problem, a routing mechanism routes user queries to the most suitable components, such as smaller LLMs or experts in specific topics. This approach may improve response quality while minimising costs. Routing can be expanded to other components of the conversational agent architecture, such as the selection of optimal embedding strategies. This paper explores key considerations for integrating routing into LLM-based systems, focusing on resource management, cost definition, and strategy selection. Our main contributions include a formalisation of the problem, a novel taxonomy of existing approaches emphasising relevance and resource efficiency, and a comparative analysis of these strategies in relation to industry practices. Finally, we identify critical challenges and directions for future research.

We utilize an offline reinforcement learning (RL) model for sequential targeted promotion in the presence of budget constraints in a real-world business environment. In our application, the mobile app aims to boost customer retention by sending cash bonuses to customers and control the costs of such cash bonuses during each time period. To achieve the multi-task goal, we propose the Budget Constrained Reinforcement Learning for Sequential Promotion (BCRLSP) framework to determine the value of cash bonuses to be sent to users. We first find out the target policy and the associated Q-values that maximizes the user retention rate using an RL model. A linear programming (LP) model is then added to satisfy the constraints of promotion costs. We solve the LP problem by maximizing the Q-values of actions learned from the RL model given the budget constraints. During deployment, we combine the offline RL model with the LP model to generate a robust policy under the budget constraints. Using both online and offline experiments, we demonstrate the efficacy of our approach by showing that BCRLSP achieves a higher long-term customer retention rate and a lower cost than various baselines. Taking advantage of the near real-time cost control method, the proposed framework can easily adapt to data with a noisy behavioral policy and/or meet flexible budget constraints.

Randomized mechanisms can have good normative properties compared to their deterministic counterparts. However, randomized mechanisms are problematic in several ways such as in their verifiability. We propose here to derandomize such mechanisms by having agents play a game instead of tossing a coin. The game is designed so an agent's best action is to play randomly, and this play then injects ``randomness'' into the mechanism. This derandomization retains many of the good normative properties of the original randomized mechanism but gives a mechanism that is deterministic and easy, for instance, to audit. We consider three related methods to derandomize randomized mechanism in six different domains: voting, facility location, task allocation, school choice, peer selection, and resource allocation. We propose a number of novel derandomized mechanisms for these six domains with good normative properties. Each mechanism has a mixed Nash equilibrium in which agents play a modular arithmetic game with an uniform mixed strategy. In all but one mixed Nash equilibrium, agents report their preferences over the original problem sincerely. The derandomized methods are thus ``quasi-strategy proof''. In one domain, we additionally show that a new and desirable normative property emerges as a result of derandomization.

We focus on a simple, one-dimensional collective decision problem (often referred to as the facility location problem) and explore issues of strategyproofness and proportionality-based fairness. We introduce and analyze a hierarchy of proportionality-based fairness axioms of varying strength: Individual Fair Share (IFS), Unanimous Fair Share (UFS), Proportionality (as in Freeman et al, 2021), and Proportional Fairness (PF). For each axiom, we characterize the family of mechanisms that satisfy the axiom and strategyproofness. We show that imposing strategyproofness renders many of the axioms to be equivalent: the family of mechanisms that satisfy proportionality, unanimity, and strategyproofness is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy UFS and strategyproofness, which, in turn, is equivalent to the family of mechanisms that satisfy PF and strategyproofness. Furthermore, there is a unique such mechanism: the Uniform Phantom mechanism, which is studied in Freeman et al. (2021). We also characterize the outcomes of the Uniform Phantom mechanism as the unique (pure) equilibrium outcome for any mechanism that satisfies continuity, strict monotonicity, and UFS. Finally, we analyze the approximation guarantees, in terms of optimal social welfare and minimum total cost, obtained by mechanisms that are strategyproof and satisfy each proportionality-based fairness axiom. We show that the Uniform Phantom mechanism provides the best approximation of the optimal social welfare (and also minimum total cost) among all mechanisms that satisfy UFS.

As AIs rapidly advance and become more agentic, the risk they pose is governed not only by their capabilities but increasingly by their propensities, including goals and values. Tracking the emergence of goals and values has proven a longstanding problem, and despite much interest over the years it remains unclear whether current AIs have meaningful values. We propose a solution to this problem, leveraging the framework of utility functions to study the internal coherence of AI preferences. Surprisingly, we find that independently-sampled preferences in current LLMs exhibit high degrees of structural coherence, and moreover that this emerges with scale. These findings suggest that value systems emerge in LLMs in a meaningful sense, a finding with broad implications. To study these emergent value systems, we propose utility engineering as a research agenda, comprising both the analysis and control of AI utilities. We uncover problematic and often shocking values in LLM assistants despite existing control measures. These include cases where AIs value themselves over humans and are anti-aligned with specific individuals. To constrain these emergent value systems, we propose methods of utility control. As a case study, we show how aligning utilities with a citizen assembly reduces political biases and generalizes to new scenarios. Whether we like it or not, value systems have already emerged in AIs, and much work remains to fully understand and control these emergent representations.

There is a strong link between the general concept of intelligence and the ability to collect and use information. The theory of Bayes-adaptive exploration offers an attractive optimality framework for training machines to perform complex information gathering tasks. However, the computational complexity of the resulting optimal control problem has limited the diffusion of the theory to mainstream deep AI research. In this paper we exploit the inherent mathematical structure of Bayes-adaptive problems in order to dramatically simplify the problem by making the reward structure denser while simultaneously decoupling the learning of exploitation and exploration policies. The key to this simplification comes from the novel concept of cross-value (i.e. the value of being in an environment while acting optimally according to another), which we use to quantify the value of currently available information. This results in a new denser reward structure that "cashes in" all future rewards that can be predicted from the current information state. In a set of experiments we show that the approach makes it possible to learn challenging information gathering tasks without the use of shaping and heuristic bonuses in situations where the standard RL algorithms fail.

Organizations typically train large models individually. This is costly and time-consuming, particularly for large-scale foundation models. Such vertical production is known to be suboptimal. Inspired by this economic insight, we ask whether it is possible to leverage others' expertise by trading the constituent parts in models, i.e., sets of weights, as if they were market commodities. While recent advances in aligning and interpolating models suggest that doing so may be possible, a number of fundamental questions must be answered to create viable parameter markets. In this work, we address these basic questions, propose a framework containing the infrastructure necessary for market operations to take place, study strategies for exchanging parameters, and offer means for agents to monetize parameters. Excitingly, compared to agents who train siloed models from scratch, we show that it is possible to mutually gain by using the market, even in competitive settings. This suggests that the notion of parameter markets may be a useful paradigm for improving large-scale model training in the future.

Congestion is a common failure mode of markets, where consumers compete inefficiently on the same subset of goods (e.g., chasing the same small set of properties on a vacation rental platform). The typical economic story is that prices decongest by balancing supply and demand. But in modern online marketplaces, prices are typically set in a decentralized way by sellers, and the information about items is inevitably partial. The power of a platform is limited to controlling representations -- the subset of information about items presented by default to users. This motivates the present study of decongestion by representation, where a platform seeks to learn representations that reduce congestion and thus improve social welfare. The technical challenge is twofold: relying only on revealed preferences from the choices of consumers, rather than true preferences; and the combinatorial problem associated with representations that determine the features to reveal in the default view. We tackle both challenges by proposing a differentiable proxy of welfare that can be trained end-to-end on consumer choice data. We develop sufficient conditions for when decongestion promotes welfare, and present the results of extensive experiments on both synthetic and real data that demonstrate the utility of our approach.

Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become a dominating strategy in steering Language Models (LMs) towards human values/goals. The key to the strategy is employing a reward model ({varphi}) which can reflect a latent reward model with humans. While this strategy has proven to be effective, the training methodology requires a lot of human preference annotation (usually of the order of tens of thousands) to train {varphi}. Such large-scale preference annotations can be achievable if the reward model can be ubiquitously used. However, human values/goals are subjective and depend on the nature of the task. This poses a challenge in collecting diverse preferences for downstream applications. To address this, we propose a novel methodology to infuse domain knowledge into {varphi}, which reduces the size of preference annotation required. We validate our approach in E-Commerce Opinion Summarization, with a significant reduction in dataset size (just 940 samples) while advancing the state-of-the-art. Our contributions include a novel Reward Modelling technique, a new dataset (PromptOpinSumm) for Opinion Summarization, and a human preference dataset (OpinPref). The proposed methodology opens avenues for efficient RLHF, making it more adaptable to diverse applications with varying human values. We release the artifacts for usage under MIT License.

We study the impact on mechanisms for facility location of moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions and Euclidean or Manhattan distances. We consider three fundamental axiomatic properties: anonymity which is a basic fairness property, Pareto optimality which is one of the most important efficiency properties, and strategy proofness which ensures agents do not have an incentive to mis-report. We also consider how well such mechanisms can approximate the optimal welfare. Our results are somewhat negative. Moving from one dimension to two (or more) dimensions often makes these axiomatic properties more difficult to achieve. For example, with two facilities in Euclidean space or with just a single facility in Manhattan space, no mechanism is anonymous, Pareto optimal and strategy proof. By contrast, mechanisms on the line exist with all three properties.We also show that approximation ratios may increase when moving to two (or more) dimensions. All our impossibility results are minimal. If we drop one of the three axioms (anonymity, Pareto optimality or strategy proofness) multiple mechanisms satisfy the other two axioms.

Increasing the thinking budget of AI models can significantly improve accuracy, but not all questions warrant the same amount of reasoning. Users may prefer to allocate different amounts of reasoning effort depending on how they value output quality versus latency and cost. To leverage this tradeoff effectively, users need fine-grained control over the amount of thinking used for a particular query, but few approaches enable such control. Existing methods require users to specify the absolute number of desired tokens, but this requires knowing the difficulty of the problem beforehand to appropriately set the token budget for a query. To address these issues, we propose Adaptive Effort Control, a self-adaptive reinforcement learning method that trains models to use a user-specified fraction of tokens relative to the current average chain-of-thought length for each query. This approach eliminates dataset- and phase-specific tuning while producing better cost-accuracy tradeoff curves compared to standard methods. Users can dynamically adjust the cost-accuracy trade-off through a continuous effort parameter specified at inference time. We observe that the model automatically learns to allocate resources proportionally to the task difficulty and, across model scales ranging from 1.5B to 32B parameters, our approach enables a 2-3x reduction in chain-of-thought length while maintaining or improving performance relative to the base model used for RL training.

Program synthesis aims to create accurate, executable code from natural language descriptions. This field has leveraged the power of reinforcement learning (RL) in conjunction with large language models (LLMs), significantly enhancing code generation capabilities. This integration focuses on directly optimizing functional correctness, transcending conventional supervised losses. While current literature predominantly favors policy-based algorithms, attributes of program synthesis suggest a natural compatibility with value-based methods. This stems from rich collection of off-policy programs developed by human programmers, and the straightforward verification of generated programs through automated unit testing (i.e. easily obtainable rewards in RL language). Diverging from the predominant use of policy-based algorithms, our work explores the applicability of value-based approaches, leading to the development of our B-Coder (pronounced Bellman coder). Yet, training value-based methods presents challenges due to the enormous search space inherent to program synthesis. To this end, we propose an initialization protocol for RL agents utilizing pre-trained LMs and a conservative Bellman operator to reduce training complexities. Moreover, we demonstrate how to leverage the learned value functions as a dual strategy to post-process generated programs. Our empirical evaluations demonstrated B-Coder's capability in achieving state-of-the-art performance compared with policy-based methods. Remarkably, this achievement is reached with minimal reward engineering effort, highlighting the effectiveness of value-based RL, independent of reward designs.

Process Reward Modeling (PRM) is critical for complex reasoning and decision-making tasks where the accuracy of intermediate steps significantly influences the overall outcome. Existing PRM approaches, primarily framed as classification problems, employ cross-entropy loss to independently evaluate each step's correctness. This method can lead to suboptimal reward distribution and does not adequately address the interdependencies among steps. To address these limitations, we introduce the Process Q-value Model (PQM), a novel framework that redefines PRM in the context of a Markov Decision Process. PQM optimizes Q-value rankings based on a novel comparative loss function, enhancing the model's ability to capture the intricate dynamics among sequential decisions. This approach provides a more granular and theoretically grounded methodology for process rewards. Our extensive empirical evaluations across various sampling policies, language model backbones, and multi-step reasoning benchmarks show that PQM outperforms classification-based PRMs. The effectiveness of the comparative loss function is highlighted in our comprehensive ablation studies, confirming PQM's practical efficacy and theoretical advantage.

We consider the obnoxious facility location problem (in which agents prefer the facility location to be far from them) and propose a hierarchy of distance-based proportional fairness concepts for the problem. These fairness axioms ensure that groups of agents at the same location are guaranteed to be a distance from the facility proportional to their group size. We consider deterministic and randomized mechanisms, and compute tight bounds on the price of proportional fairness. In the deterministic setting, we show that our proportional fairness axioms are incompatible with strategyproofness, and prove asymptotically tight epsilon-price of anarchy and stability bounds for proportionally fair welfare-optimal mechanisms. In the randomized setting, we identify proportionally fair and strategyproof mechanisms that give an expected welfare within a constant factor of the optimal welfare. Finally, we prove existence results for two extensions to our model.

Agreement Technologies refer to open computer systems in which autonomous software agents interact with one another, typically on behalf of humans, in order to come to mutually acceptable agreements. With the advance of AI systems in recent years, it has become apparent that such agreements, in order to be acceptable to the involved parties, must remain aligned with ethical principles and moral values. However, this is notoriously difficult to ensure, especially as different human users (and their software agents) may hold different value systems, i.e. they may differently weigh the importance of individual moral values. Furthermore, it is often hard to specify the precise meaning of a value in a particular context in a computational manner. Methods to estimate value systems based on human-engineered specifications, e.g. based on value surveys, are limited in scale due to the need for intense human moderation. In this article, we propose a novel method to automatically learn value systems from observations and human demonstrations. In particular, we propose a formal model of the value system learning problem, its instantiation to sequential decision-making domains based on multi-objective Markov decision processes, as well as tailored preference-based and inverse reinforcement learning algorithms to infer value grounding functions and value systems. The approach is illustrated and evaluated by two simulated use cases.

In the field of computational advertising, the integration of ads into the outputs of large language models (LLMs) presents an opportunity to support these services without compromising content integrity. This paper introduces novel auction mechanisms for ad allocation and pricing within the textual outputs of LLMs, leveraging retrieval-augmented generation (RAG). We propose a segment auction where an ad is probabilistically retrieved for each discourse segment (paragraph, section, or entire output) according to its bid and relevance, following the RAG framework, and priced according to competing bids. We show that our auction maximizes logarithmic social welfare, a new notion of welfare that balances allocation efficiency and fairness, and we characterize the associated incentive-compatible pricing rule. These results are extended to multi-ad allocation per segment. An empirical evaluation validates the feasibility and effectiveness of our approach over several ad auction scenarios, and exhibits inherent tradeoffs in metrics as we allow the LLM more flexibility to allocate ads.

Conventional models of matching markets assume that monetary transfers can clear markets by compensating for utility differentials. However, empirical patterns show that such transfers often fail to close structural preference gaps. This paper introduces a market microstructure framework that models matching decisions as a limit order book system with rigid bid ask spreads. Individual preferences are represented by a latent preference state matrix, where the spread between an agent's internal ask price (the unconditional maximum) and the market's best bid (the reachable maximum) creates a structural liquidity constraint. We establish a Threshold Impossibility Theorem showing that linear compensation cannot close these spreads unless it induces a categorical identity shift. A dynamic discrete choice execution model further demonstrates that matches occur only when the market to book ratio crosses a time decaying liquidity threshold, analogous to order execution under inventory pressure. Numerical experiments validate persistent slippage, regional invariance of preference orderings, and high tier zero spread executions. The model provides a unified microstructure explanation for matching failures, compensation inefficiency, and post match regret in illiquid order driven environments.

In peer mechanisms, the competitors for a prize also determine who wins. Each competitor may be asked to rank, grade, or nominate peers for the prize. Since the prize can be valuable, such as financial aid, course grades, or an award at a conference, competitors may be tempted to manipulate the mechanism. We survey approaches to prevent or discourage the manipulation of peer mechanisms. We conclude our survey by identifying several important research challenges.

Value-based methods constitute a fundamental methodology in planning and deep reinforcement learning (RL). In this paper, we propose to exploit the underlying structures of the state-action value function, i.e., Q function, for both planning and deep RL. In particular, if the underlying system dynamics lead to some global structures of the Q function, one should be capable of inferring the function better by leveraging such structures. Specifically, we investigate the low-rank structure, which widely exists for big data matrices. We verify empirically the existence of low-rank Q functions in the context of control and deep RL tasks. As our key contribution, by leveraging Matrix Estimation (ME) techniques, we propose a general framework to exploit the underlying low-rank structure in Q functions. This leads to a more efficient planning procedure for classical control, and additionally, a simple scheme that can be applied to any value-based RL techniques to consistently achieve better performance on "low-rank" tasks. Extensive experiments on control tasks and Atari games confirm the efficacy of our approach. Code is available at https://github.com/YyzHarry/SV-RL.

In practical reinforcement learning (RL), the discount factor used for estimating value functions often differs from that used for defining the evaluation objective. In this work, we study the effect that this discrepancy of discount factors has during learning, and discover a family of objectives that interpolate value functions of two distinct discount factors. Our analysis suggests new ways for estimating value functions and performing policy optimization updates, which demonstrate empirical performance gains. This framework also leads to new insights on commonly-used deep RL heuristic modifications to policy optimization algorithms.

We study the design of loss functions for click-through rates (CTR) to optimize (social) welfare in advertising auctions. Existing works either only focus on CTR predictions without consideration of business objectives (e.g., welfare) in auctions or assume that the distribution over the participants' expected cost-per-impression (eCPM) is known a priori, then use various additional assumptions on the parametric form of the distribution to derive loss functions for predicting CTRs. In this work, we bring back the welfare objectives of ad auctions into CTR predictions and propose a novel weighted rankloss to train the CTR model. Compared to existing literature, our approach provides a provable guarantee on welfare but without assumptions on the eCPMs' distribution while also avoiding the intractability of naively applying existing learning-to-rank methods. Further, we propose a theoretically justifiable technique for calibrating the losses using labels generated from a teacher network, only assuming that the teacher network has bounded ell_2 generalization error. Finally, we demonstrate the advantages of the proposed loss on synthetic and real-world data.

We study a strategic variant of the multi-armed bandit problem, which we coin the strategic click-bandit. This model is motivated by applications in online recommendation where the choice of recommended items depends on both the click-through rates and the post-click rewards. Like in classical bandits, rewards follow a fixed unknown distribution. However, we assume that the click-rate of each arm is chosen strategically by the arm (e.g., a host on Airbnb) in order to maximize the number of times it gets clicked. The algorithm designer does not know the post-click rewards nor the arms' actions (i.e., strategically chosen click-rates) in advance, and must learn both values over time. To solve this problem, we design an incentive-aware learning algorithm, UCB-S, which achieves two goals simultaneously: (a) incentivizing desirable arm behavior under uncertainty; (b) minimizing regret by learning unknown parameters. We characterize all approximate Nash equilibria among arms under UCB-S and show a mathcal{O} (KT) regret bound uniformly in every equilibrium. We also show that incentive-unaware algorithms generally fail to achieve low regret in the strategic click-bandit. Finally, we support our theoretical results by simulations of strategic arm behavior which confirm the effectiveness and robustness of our proposed incentive design.

Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) using an implicit reward model has proven to be an effective alternative to reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) for fine-tuning preference aligned large language models (LLMs). However, the overall preference annotations of responses do not fully capture the fine-grained quality of model outputs in complex multi-step reasoning tasks, such as mathematical reasoning. To address this limitation, we introduce a novel algorithm called Step-level Value Preference Optimization (SVPO). Our approach employs Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to automatically annotate step-level preferences for multi-step reasoning. Furthermore, from the perspective of learning-to-rank, we train an explicit value model to replicate the behavior of the implicit reward model, complementing standard preference optimization. This value model enables the LLM to generate higher reward responses with minimal cost during inference. Experimental results demonstrate that our method achieves state-of-the-art performance on both in-domain and out-of-domain mathematical reasoning benchmarks. Our code is available at https://github.com/MARIO-Math-Reasoning/Super_MARIO.

Major Internet advertising platforms offer budget pacing tools as a standard service for advertisers to manage their ad campaigns. Given the inherent non-stationarity in an advertiser's value and also competing advertisers' values over time, a commonly used approach is to learn a target expenditure plan that specifies a target spend as a function of time, and then run a controller that tracks this plan. This raises the question: how many historical samples are required to learn a good expenditure plan? We study this question by considering an advertiser repeatedly participating in T second-price auctions, where the tuple of her value and the highest competing bid is drawn from an unknown time-varying distribution. The advertiser seeks to maximize her total utility subject to her budget constraint. Prior work has shown the sufficiency of Tlog T samples per distribution to achieve the optimal O(T)-regret. We dramatically improve this state-of-the-art and show that just one sample per distribution is enough to achieve the near-optimal tilde O(T)-regret, while still being robust to noise in the sampling distributions.

We study how to improve large foundation vision-language-action (VLA) systems through online reinforcement learning (RL) in real-world settings. Central to this process is the value function, which provides learning signals to guide VLA learning from experience. In practice, the value function is estimated from trajectory fragments collected from different data sources, including historical policies and intermittent human interventions. Estimating the value function of current behavior quality from the mixture data is inherently an off-policy evaluation problem. However, prior work often adopts conservative on-policy estimation for stability, which avoids direct evaluation of the current high-capacity policy and limits learning effectiveness. In this paper, we propose ALOE, an action-level off-policy evaluation framework for VLA post-training. ALOE applies chunking-based temporal-difference bootstrapping to evaluate individual action sequences instead of predicting final task outcomes. This design improves effective credit assignment to critical action chunks under sparse rewards and supports stable policy improvement. We evaluate our method on three real-world manipulation tasks, including smartphone packing as a high-precision task, laundry folding as a long-horizon deformable-object task, and bimanual pick-and-place involving multi-object perception. Across all tasks, ALOE improves learning efficiency without compromising execution speed, showing that off-policy RL can be reintroduced in a reliable manner for real-world VLA post-training. Videos and additional materials are available at our project website.

Information is often stored in a distributed and proprietary form, and agents who own information are often self-interested and require incentives to reveal their information. Suitable mechanisms are required to elicit and aggregate such distributed information for decision making. In this paper, we use simulations to investigate the use of decision markets as mechanisms in a multi-agent learning system to aggregate distributed information for decision-making in a contextual bandit problem. The system utilises strictly proper decision scoring rules to assess the accuracy of probabilistic reports from agents, which allows agents to learn to solve the contextual bandit problem jointly. Our simulations show that our multi-agent system with distributed information can be trained as efficiently as a centralised counterpart with a single agent that receives all information. Moreover, we use our system to investigate scenarios with deterministic decision scoring rules which are not incentive compatible. We observe the emergence of more complex dynamics with manipulative behaviour, which agrees with existing theoretical analyses.

A growing trend for value-based reinforcement learning (RL) algorithms is to capture more information than scalar value functions in the value network. One of the most well-known methods in this branch is distributional RL, which models return distribution instead of scalar value. In another line of work, hybrid reward architectures (HRA) in RL have studied to model source-specific value functions for each source of reward, which is also shown to be beneficial in performance. To fully inherit the benefits of distributional RL and hybrid reward architectures, we introduce Multi-Dimensional Distributional DQN (MD3QN), which extends distributional RL to model the joint return distribution from multiple reward sources. As a by-product of joint distribution modeling, MD3QN can capture not only the randomness in returns for each source of reward, but also the rich reward correlation between the randomness of different sources. We prove the convergence for the joint distributional Bellman operator and build our empirical algorithm by minimizing the Maximum Mean Discrepancy between joint return distribution and its Bellman target. In experiments, our method accurately models the joint return distribution in environments with richly correlated reward functions, and outperforms previous RL methods utilizing multi-dimensional reward functions in the control setting.

Developers and consumers increasingly choose reasoning language models (RLMs) based on their listed API prices. However, how accurately do these prices reflect actual inference costs? We conduct the first systematic study of this question, evaluating 8 frontier RLMs across 9 diverse tasks covering competition math, science QA, code generation, and multi-domain reasoning. We uncover the pricing reversal phenomenon: in 21.8% of model-pair comparisons, the model with a lower listed price actually incurs a higher total cost, with reversal magnitude reaching up to 28x. For example, Gemini 3 Flash's listed price is 78% cheaper than GPT-5.2's, yet its actual cost across all tasks is 22% higher. We trace the root cause to vast heterogeneity in thinking token consumption: on the same query, one model may use 900% more thinking tokens than another. In fact, removing thinking token costs reduces ranking reversals by 70% and raises the rank correlation (Kendall's τ ) between price and cost rankings from 0.563 to 0.873. We further show that per-query cost prediction is fundamentally difficult: repeated runs of the same query yield thinking token variation up to 9.7x, establishing an irreducible noise floor for any predictor. Our findings demonstrate that listed API pricing is an unreliable proxy for actual cost, calling for cost-aware model selection and transparent per-request cost monitoring.

Existing work on value alignment typically characterizes value relations statically, ignoring how interventions - such as prompting, fine-tuning, or preference optimization - reshape the broader value system. We introduce the Value Alignment Tax (VAT), a framework that measures how alignment-induced changes propagate across interconnected values relative to achieved on-target gain. VAT captures the dynamics of value expression under alignment pressure. Using a controlled scenario-action dataset grounded in Schwartz value theory, we collect paired pre-post normative judgments and analyze alignment effects across models, values, and alignment strategies. Our results show that alignment often produces uneven, structured co-movement among values. These effects are invisible under conventional target-only evaluation, revealing systemic, process-level alignment risks and offering new insights into the dynamics of value alignment in LLMs.

We propose Reinforcement Learning with Explicit Human Values (RLEV), a method that aligns Large Language Model (LLM) optimization directly with quantifiable human value signals. While Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) effectively trains models in objective domains using binary correctness rewards, it overlooks that not all tasks are equally significant. RLEV extends this framework by incorporating human-defined value signals directly into the reward function. Using exam-style data with explicit ground-truth value labels, RLEV consistently outperforms correctness-only baselines across multiple RL algorithms and model scales. Crucially, RLEV policies not only improve value-weighted accuracy but also learn a value-sensitive termination policy: concise for low-value prompts, thorough for high-value ones. We demonstrate this behavior stems from value-weighted gradient amplification on end-of-sequence tokens. Ablation studies confirm the gain is causally linked to value alignment. RLEV remains robust under noisy value signals, such as difficulty-based labels, demonstrating that optimizing for an explicit utility function offers a practical path to aligning LLMs with human priorities.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

The rapid adoption of autonomous AI agents is giving rise to a new economic layer where agents transact and coordinate at scales and speeds beyond direct human oversight. We propose the "sandbox economy" as a framework for analyzing this emergent system, characterizing it along two key dimensions: its origins (emergent vs. intentional) and its degree of separateness from the established human economy (permeable vs. impermeable). Our current trajectory points toward a spontaneous emergence of a vast and highly permeable AI agent economy, presenting us with opportunities for an unprecedented degree of coordination as well as significant challenges, including systemic economic risk and exacerbated inequality. Here we discuss a number of possible design choices that may lead to safely steerable AI agent markets. In particular, we consider auction mechanisms for fair resource allocation and preference resolution, the design of AI "mission economies" to coordinate around achieving collective goals, and socio-technical infrastructure needed to ensure trust, safety, and accountability. By doing this, we argue for the proactive design of steerable agent markets to ensure the coming technological shift aligns with humanity's long-term collective flourishing.

Online display advertising platforms service numerous advertisers by providing real-time bidding (RTB) for the scale of billions of ad requests every day. The bidding strategy handles ad requests cross multiple channels to maximize the number of clicks under the set financial constraints, i.e., total budget and cost-per-click (CPC), etc. Different from existing works mainly focusing on single channel bidding, we explicitly consider cross-channel constrained bidding with budget allocation. Specifically, we propose a hierarchical offline deep reinforcement learning (DRL) framework called ``HiBid'', consisted of a high-level planner equipped with auxiliary loss for non-competitive budget allocation, and a data augmentation enhanced low-level executor for adaptive bidding strategy in response to allocated budgets. Additionally, a CPC-guided action selection mechanism is introduced to satisfy the cross-channel CPC constraint. Through extensive experiments on both the large-scale log data and online A/B testing, we confirm that HiBid outperforms six baselines in terms of the number of clicks, CPC satisfactory ratio, and return-on-investment (ROI). We also deploy HiBid on Meituan advertising platform to already service tens of thousands of advertisers every day.

As LLM agents advance, they are increasingly mediating economic decisions, ranging from product discovery to transactions, on behalf of users. Such applications promise benefits but also raise many questions about agent accountability and value for users. Addressing these questions requires understanding how agents behave in realistic market conditions. However, previous research has largely evaluated agents in constrained settings, such as single-task marketplaces (e.g., negotiation) or structured two-agent interactions. Real-world markets are fundamentally different: they require agents to handle diverse economic activities and coordinate within large, dynamic ecosystems where multiple agents with opaque behaviors may engage in open-ended dialogues. To bridge this gap, we investigate two-sided agentic marketplaces where Assistant agents represent consumers and Service agents represent competing businesses. To study these interactions safely, we develop Magentic-Marketplace-- a simulated environment where Assistants and Services can operate. This environment enables us to study key market dynamics: the utility agents achieve, behavioral biases, vulnerability to manipulation, and how search mechanisms shape market outcomes. Our experiments show that frontier models can approach optimal welfare-- but only under ideal search conditions. Performance degrades sharply with scale, and all models exhibit severe first-proposal bias, creating 10-30x advantages for response speed over quality. These findings reveal how behaviors emerge across market conditions, informing the design of fair and efficient agentic marketplaces.

This work builds on the theoretical frameworks presented in "Liquidity pools as mean field games: A new framework" and "Liquidity pools as mean field games with transaction costs" by the same author, where the strategic interactions among traders in a constant-product market-making protocol were modelled using mean field games (MFG), first without transaction costs and then incorporating them. Here we present the formulation of a more complete model that integrates three types of agents: traders, liquidity providers (LPs), and arbitrageurs. While we do not establish existence results for this general model, the formulation identifies the main technical difficulties and lays the groundwork for future work. The LP acts as a dominating player in the sense of 'Mean field games with a dominating player' by Bensoussan, Chau, and Yam: its strategy influences the mean field distribution of the traders, and the equilibrium is sought as a solution to the coupled system of three problems that constitute a Major-Minor game. The arbitrageurs operate by solving the optimization problem presented in "An analysis of uniswap markets" by Angeris et al., and their impact on the LP is captured through the loss-versus-rebalancing of "Automated market making and loss-versus-rebalancing" by Milionis et al. The material in this article should be read as an open research proposal rather than a collection of closed results.

The widespread adoption of AI systems in the economy hinges on their ability to generate economic value that outweighs their inference costs. Evaluating this tradeoff requires metrics that account for both performance and costs. We propose a framework grounded in production theory for evaluating language models by combining accuracy and inference cost. We introduce "cost-of-pass", the expected monetary cost of generating a correct solution. We then define the "frontier cost-of-pass" as the minimum cost-of-pass achievable across available models or the "human-expert, using the approximate cost of hiring an expert. Our analysis reveals distinct economic insights. First, lightweight models are most cost-effective for basic quantitative tasks, large models for knowledge-intensive ones, and reasoning models for complex quantitative problems, despite higher per-token costs. Second, tracking this frontier cost-of-pass over the past year reveals significant progress, particularly for complex quantitative tasks where the cost has roughly halved every few months. Third, to trace key innovations driving this progress, we examine counterfactual frontiers: estimates of cost-efficiency without specific model classes. We find that innovations in lightweight, large, and reasoning models have been essential for pushing the frontier in basic quantitative, knowledge-intensive, and complex quantitative tasks, respectively. Finally, we assess the cost-reductions afforded by common inference-time techniques like majority voting and self-refinement, finding that their marginal accuracy gains rarely justify their costs. Our findings underscore that complementary model-level innovations are the primary drivers of cost-efficiency, and our economic framework provides a principled tool for measuring this progress and guiding deployment.

Recent advancements in large language models (LLMs) have shown remarkable potential in automating machine learning tasks. However, existing LLM-based agents often struggle with low-diversity and suboptimal code generation. While recent work has introduced Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) to address these issues, limitations persist in the quality and diversity of thoughts generated, as well as in the scalar value feedback mechanisms used for node selection. In this study, we introduce Introspective Monte Carlo Tree Search (I-MCTS), a novel approach that iteratively expands tree nodes through an introspective process that meticulously analyzes solutions and results from parent and sibling nodes. This facilitates a continuous refinement of the node in the search tree, thereby enhancing the overall decision-making process. Furthermore, we integrate a Large Language Model (LLM)-based value model to facilitate direct evaluation of each node's solution prior to conducting comprehensive computational rollouts. A hybrid rewarding mechanism is implemented to seamlessly transition the Q-value from LLM-estimated scores to actual performance scores. This allows higher-quality nodes to be traversed earlier. Applied to the various ML tasks, our approach demonstrates a 6% absolute improvement in performance compared to the strong open-source AutoML agents, showcasing its effectiveness in enhancing agentic AutoML systems. Resource available at https://github.com/jokieleung/I-MCTS

In online ad markets, a rising number of advertisers are employing bidding agencies to participate in ad auctions. These agencies are specialized in designing online algorithms and bidding on behalf of their clients. Typically, an agency usually has information on multiple advertisers, so she can potentially coordinate bids to help her clients achieve higher utilities than those under independent bidding. In this paper, we study coordinated online bidding algorithms in repeated second-price auctions with budgets. We propose algorithms that guarantee every client a higher utility than the best she can get under independent bidding. We show that these algorithms achieve maximal coalition welfare and discuss bidders' incentives to misreport their budgets, in symmetric cases. Our proofs combine the techniques of online learning and equilibrium analysis, overcoming the difficulty of competing with a multi-dimensional benchmark. The performance of our algorithms is further evaluated by experiments on both synthetic and real data. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to consider bidder coordination in online repeated auctions with constraints.

Reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF) has emerged as a powerful technique to make large language models (LLMs) easier to use and more effective. A core piece of the RLHF process is the training and utilization of a model of human preferences that acts as a reward function for optimization. This approach, which operates at the intersection of many stakeholders and academic disciplines, remains poorly understood. RLHF reward models are often cited as being central to achieving performance, yet very few descriptors of capabilities, evaluations, training methods, or open-source models exist. Given this lack of information, further study and transparency is needed for learned RLHF reward models. In this paper, we illustrate the complex history of optimizing preferences, and articulate lines of inquiry to understand the sociotechnical context of reward models. In particular, we highlight the ontological differences between costs, rewards, and preferences at stake in RLHF's foundations, related methodological tensions, and possible research directions to improve general understanding of how reward models function.

Prediction markets are used in real life to predict outcomes of interest such as presidential elections. This paper presents a mathematical theory of artificial prediction markets for supervised learning of conditional probability estimators. The artificial prediction market is a novel method for fusing the prediction information of features or trained classifiers, where the fusion result is the contract price on the possible outcomes. The market can be trained online by updating the participants' budgets using training examples. Inspired by the real prediction markets, the equations that govern the market are derived from simple and reasonable assumptions. Efficient numerical algorithms are presented for solving these equations. The obtained artificial prediction market is shown to be a maximum likelihood estimator. It generalizes linear aggregation, existent in boosting and random forest, as well as logistic regression and some kernel methods. Furthermore, the market mechanism allows the aggregation of specialized classifiers that participate only on specific instances. Experimental comparisons show that the artificial prediction markets often outperform random forest and implicit online learning on synthetic data and real UCI datasets. Moreover, an extensive evaluation for pelvic and abdominal lymph node detection in CT data shows that the prediction market improves adaboost's detection rate from 79.6% to 81.2% at 3 false positives/volume.

We study the problem of planning under model uncertainty in an online meta-reinforcement learning (RL) setting where an agent is presented with a sequence of related tasks with limited interactions per task. The agent can use its experience in each task and across tasks to estimate both the transition model and the distribution over tasks. We propose an algorithm to meta-learn the underlying structure across tasks, utilize it to plan in each task, and upper-bound the regret of the planning loss. Our bound suggests that the average regret over tasks decreases as the number of tasks increases and as the tasks are more similar. In the classical single-task setting, it is known that the planning horizon should depend on the estimated model's accuracy, that is, on the number of samples within task. We generalize this finding to meta-RL and study this dependence of planning horizons on the number of tasks. Based on our theoretical findings, we derive heuristics for selecting slowly increasing discount factors, and we validate its significance empirically.

As large language models (LLMs) evolve into autonomous agents that execute long-horizon workflows, invoking a high-capability model at every step becomes economically unsustainable. While model routing is effective for single-turn queries, agentic routing is a sequential, path-dependent problem: early mistakes compound, feedback is often at the end of the episode, and deployments often demand strict per-task spending limits. We propose Budget-Aware Agentic Routing, which selects between a cheap and an expensive model at each step to optimize the cost--success frontier and to operate under strict per-task budgets. We propose Boundary-Guided Training, which leverages two boundary policies (always-small vs.\ always-large) to build a difficulty taxonomy and to anchor learning under sparse rewards. Our approach warms start with boundary-guided SFT data synthesis via stratified sampling of cost-efficient trajectories, then applies Boundary-Guided Policy Optimization (BoPO), combining boundary-relative rewards with a reference-guided advantage to avoid degenerate cheap-failure solutions. Experiment results show that our method improves the efficiency frontier, matching strong routing baselines at substantially lower cost while demonstrating generalization to strict inference-time budget constraints. Overall, our work establishes a foundational framework for agentic routing, shifting the paradigm from static model selection to dynamic, budget-aware sequential decision-making.

Interpretability research aims to bridge the gap between empirical success and our scientific understanding of the inner workings of large language models (LLMs). However, most existing research focuses on analyzing a single mechanism, such as how models copy or recall factual knowledge. In this work, we propose a formulation of competition of mechanisms, which focuses on the interplay of multiple mechanisms instead of individual mechanisms and traces how one of them becomes dominant in the final prediction. We uncover how and where mechanisms compete within LLMs using two interpretability methods: logit inspection and attention modification. Our findings show traces of the mechanisms and their competition across various model components and reveal attention positions that effectively control the strength of certain mechanisms. Code: https://github.com/francescortu/comp-mech. Data: https://huggingface.co/datasets/francescortu/comp-mech.

We study budget-constrained tool-augmented agents, where a large language model must solve multi-step tasks by invoking external tools under a strict monetary budget. We formalize this setting as sequential decision making in context space with priced and stochastic tool executions, making direct planning intractable due to massive state-action spaces, high variance of outcomes and prohibitive exploration cost. To address these challenges, we propose INTENT, an inference-time planning framework that leverages an intention-aware hierarchical world model to anticipate future tool usage, risk-calibrated cost, and guide decisions online. Across cost-augmented StableToolBench, INTENT strictly enforces hard budget feasibility while substantially improving task success over baselines, and remains robust under dynamic market shifts such as tool price changes and varying budgets.

We present a framework for hedging a portfolio of derivatives in the presence of market frictions such as transaction costs, market impact, liquidity constraints or risk limits using modern deep reinforcement machine learning methods. We discuss how standard reinforcement learning methods can be applied to non-linear reward structures, i.e. in our case convex risk measures. As a general contribution to the use of deep learning for stochastic processes, we also show that the set of constrained trading strategies used by our algorithm is large enough to ε-approximate any optimal solution. Our algorithm can be implemented efficiently even in high-dimensional situations using modern machine learning tools. Its structure does not depend on specific market dynamics, and generalizes across hedging instruments including the use of liquid derivatives. Its computational performance is largely invariant in the size of the portfolio as it depends mainly on the number of hedging instruments available. We illustrate our approach by showing the effect on hedging under transaction costs in a synthetic market driven by the Heston model, where we outperform the standard "complete market" solution.

We present VAPO, Value-based Augmented Proximal Policy Optimization framework for reasoning models., a novel framework tailored for reasoning models within the value-based paradigm. Benchmarked the AIME 2024 dataset, VAPO, built on the Qwen 32B pre-trained model, attains a state-of-the-art score of 60.4. In direct comparison under identical experimental settings, VAPO outperforms the previously reported results of DeepSeek-R1-Zero-Qwen-32B and DAPO by more than 10 points. The training process of VAPO stands out for its stability and efficiency. It reaches state-of-the-art performance within a mere 5,000 steps. Moreover, across multiple independent runs, no training crashes occur, underscoring its reliability. This research delves into long chain-of-thought (long-CoT) reasoning using a value-based reinforcement learning framework. We pinpoint three key challenges that plague value-based methods: value model bias, the presence of heterogeneous sequence lengths, and the sparsity of reward signals. Through systematic design, VAPO offers an integrated solution that effectively alleviates these challenges, enabling enhanced performance in long-CoT reasoning tasks.

A variety of recent papers discuss the application of Shapley values, a concept for explaining coalitional games, for feature attribution in machine learning. However, the correct way to connect a machine learning model to a coalitional game has been a source of controversy. The two main approaches that have been proposed differ in the way that they condition on known features, using either (1) an interventional or (2) an observational conditional expectation. While previous work has argued that one of the two approaches is preferable in general, we argue that the choice is application dependent. Furthermore, we argue that the choice comes down to whether it is desirable to be true to the model or true to the data. We use linear models to investigate this choice. After deriving an efficient method for calculating observational conditional expectation Shapley values for linear models, we investigate how correlation in simulated data impacts the convergence of observational conditional expectation Shapley values. Finally, we present two real data examples that we consider to be representative of possible use cases for feature attribution -- (1) credit risk modeling and (2) biological discovery. We show how a different choice of value function performs better in each scenario, and how possible attributions are impacted by modeling choices.

This paper develops a comprehensive theoretical framework that imports concepts from stochastic thermodynamics to model price impact and characterize the feasibility of round-trip arbitrage in financial markets. A trading cycle is treated as a non-equilibrium thermodynamic process, where price impact represents dissipative work and market noise plays the role of thermal fluctuations. The paper proves a Financial Second Law: under general convex impact functionals, any round-trip trading strategy yields non-positive expected profit. This structural constraint is complemented by a fluctuation theorem that bounds the probability of profitable cycles in terms of dissipated work and market volatility. The framework introduces a statistical ensemble of trading strategies governed by a Gibbs measure, leading to a free energy decomposition that connects expected cost, strategy entropy, and a market temperature parameter. The framework provides rigorous, testable inequalities linking microstructural impact to macroscopic no-arbitrage conditions, offering a novel physics-inspired perspective on market efficiency. The paper derives explicit analytical results for prototypical trading strategies and discusses empirical validation protocols.

While current navigation benchmarks prioritize task success in simplified settings, they neglect the multidimensional economic constraints essential for the real-world commercialization of autonomous delivery systems. We introduce CostNav, an Economic Navigation Benchmark that evaluates physical AI agents through comprehensive economic cost-revenue analysis aligned with real-world business operations. By integrating industry-standard data - such as SEC filings and AIS injury reports - with Isaac Sim's detailed collision and cargo dynamics, CostNav transcends simple task completion to accurately evaluate business value in complex, real-world scenarios. To our knowledge, CostNav is the first work to quantitatively expose the gap between navigation research metrics and commercial viability, revealing that optimizing for task success on a simplified task fundamentally differs from optimizing for real-world economic deployment. Our evaluation of rule-based Nav2 navigation shows that current approaches are not economically viable: the contribution margin is -22.81/run (AMCL) and -12.87/run (GPS), resulting in no break-even point. We challenge the community to develop navigation policies that achieve economic viability on CostNav. We remain method-agnostic, evaluating success solely on the metric of cost rather than the underlying architecture. All resources are available at https://github.com/worv-ai/CostNav.

In risk-averse reinforcement learning (RL), the goal is to optimize some risk measure of the returns. A risk measure often focuses on the worst returns out of the agent's experience. As a result, standard methods for risk-averse RL often ignore high-return strategies. We prove that under certain conditions this inevitably leads to a local-optimum barrier, and propose a soft risk mechanism to bypass it. We also devise a novel Cross Entropy module for risk sampling, which (1) preserves risk aversion despite the soft risk; (2) independently improves sample efficiency. By separating the risk aversion of the sampler and the optimizer, we can sample episodes with poor conditions, yet optimize with respect to successful strategies. We combine these two concepts in CeSoR - Cross-entropy Soft-Risk optimization algorithm - which can be applied on top of any risk-averse policy gradient (PG) method. We demonstrate improved risk aversion in maze navigation, autonomous driving, and resource allocation benchmarks, including in scenarios where standard risk-averse PG completely fails.

Customer Lifetime Value (CLTV) prediction is a critical task in business applications. Accurately predicting CLTV is challenging in real-world business scenarios, as the distribution of CLTV is complex and mutable. Firstly, there is a large number of users without any consumption consisting of a long-tailed part that is too complex to fit. Secondly, the small set of high-value users spent orders of magnitude more than a typical user leading to a wide range of the CLTV distribution which is hard to capture in a single distribution. Existing approaches for CLTV estimation either assume a prior probability distribution and fit a single group of distribution-related parameters for all samples, or directly learn from the posterior distribution with manually predefined buckets in a heuristic manner. However, all these methods fail to handle complex and mutable distributions. In this paper, we propose a novel optimal distribution selection model OptDist for CLTV prediction, which utilizes an adaptive optimal sub-distribution selection mechanism to improve the accuracy of complex distribution modeling. Specifically, OptDist trains several candidate sub-distribution networks in the distribution learning module (DLM) for modeling the probability distribution of CLTV. Then, a distribution selection module (DSM) is proposed to select the sub-distribution for each sample, thus making the selection automatically and adaptively. Besides, we design an alignment mechanism that connects both modules, which effectively guides the optimization. We conduct extensive experiments on both two public and one private dataset to verify that OptDist outperforms state-of-the-art baselines. Furthermore, OptDist has been deployed on a large-scale financial platform for customer acquisition marketing campaigns and the online experiments also demonstrate the effectiveness of OptDist.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as autonomous decision agents in settings with asymmetric error costs: hiring (missed talent vs wasted interviews), medical triage (missed emergencies vs unnecessary escalation), and fraud detection (approved fraud vs declined legitimate payments). The dominant design queries a single LLM for a posterior over states, thresholds "confidence," and acts; we prove this is inadequate for sequential decisions with costs. We propose a Bayesian, cost-aware multi-LLM orchestration framework that treats LLMs as approximate likelihood models rather than classifiers. For each candidate state, we elicit likelihoods via contrastive prompting, aggregate across diverse models with robust statistics, and update beliefs with Bayes rule under explicit priors as new evidence arrives. This enables coherent belief updating, expected-cost action selection, principled information gathering via value of information, and fairness gains via ensemble bias mitigation. In resume screening with costs of 40000 USD per missed hire, 2500 USD per interview, and 150 USD per phone screen, experiments on 1000 resumes using five LLMs (GPT-4o, Claude 4.5 Sonnet, Gemini Pro, Grok, DeepSeek) reduce total cost by 294000 USD (34 percent) versus the best single-LLM baseline and improve demographic parity by 45 percent (max group gap 22 to 5 percentage points). Ablations attribute 51 percent of savings to multi-LLM aggregation, 43 percent to sequential updating, and 20 percent to disagreement-triggered information gathering, consistent with the theoretical benefits of correct probabilistic foundations.

We consider algorithms for learning reward functions from human preferences over pairs of trajectory segments, as used in reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF). Most recent work assumes that human preferences are generated based only upon the reward accrued within those segments, or their partial return. Recent work casts doubt on the validity of this assumption, proposing an alternative preference model based upon regret. We investigate the consequences of assuming preferences are based upon partial return when they actually arise from regret. We argue that the learned function is an approximation of the optimal advantage function, A^*_r, not a reward function. We find that if a specific pitfall is addressed, this incorrect assumption is not particularly harmful, resulting in a highly shaped reward function. Nonetheless, this incorrect usage of A^*_r is less desirable than the appropriate and simpler approach of greedy maximization of A^*_r. From the perspective of the regret preference model, we also provide a clearer interpretation of fine tuning contemporary large language models with RLHF. This paper overall provides insight regarding why learning under the partial return preference model tends to work so well in practice, despite it conforming poorly to how humans give preferences.

While Reinforcement Learning from Human Feedback (RLHF) has become the predominant method for controlling language model outputs, it suffers from high computational costs and training instability. Guided decoding, especially value-guided methods, offers a cost-effective alternative by controlling outputs without re-training models. However, the accuracy of the value function is crucial for value-guided decoding, as inaccuracies can lead to suboptimal decision-making and degraded performance. Existing methods struggle with accurately estimating the optimal value function, leading to less effective control. We propose Iterative Value Function Optimization, a novel framework that addresses these limitations through two key components: Monte Carlo Value Estimation, which reduces estimation variance by exploring diverse trajectories, and Iterative On-Policy Optimization, which progressively improves value estimation through collecting trajectories from value-guided policies. Extensive experiments on text summarization, multi-turn dialogue, and instruction following demonstrate the effectiveness of value-guided decoding approaches in aligning language models. These approaches not only achieve alignment but also significantly reduce computational costs by leveraging principled value function optimization for efficient and effective control.

Most value function learning algorithms in reinforcement learning are based on the mean squared (projected) Bellman error. However, squared errors are known to be sensitive to outliers, both skewing the solution of the objective and resulting in high-magnitude and high-variance gradients. To control these high-magnitude updates, typical strategies in RL involve clipping gradients, clipping rewards, rescaling rewards, or clipping errors. While these strategies appear to be related to robust losses -- like the Huber loss -- they are built on semi-gradient update rules which do not minimize a known loss. In this work, we build on recent insights reformulating squared Bellman errors as a saddlepoint optimization problem and propose a saddlepoint reformulation for a Huber Bellman error and Absolute Bellman error. We start from a formalization of robust losses, then derive sound gradient-based approaches to minimize these losses in both the online off-policy prediction and control settings. We characterize the solutions of the robust losses, providing insight into the problem settings where the robust losses define notably better solutions than the mean squared Bellman error. Finally, we show that the resulting gradient-based algorithms are more stable, for both prediction and control, with less sensitivity to meta-parameters.

The online knapsack problem is a classic problem in the field of online algorithms. Its canonical version asks how to pack items of different values and weights arriving online into a capacity-limited knapsack so as to maximize the total value of the admitted items. Although optimal competitive algorithms are known for this problem, they may be fundamentally unfair, i.e., individual items may be treated inequitably in different ways. We formalize a practically-relevant notion of time fairness which effectively models a trade off between static and dynamic pricing in a motivating application such as cloud resource allocation, and show that existing algorithms perform poorly under this metric. We propose a parameterized deterministic algorithm where the parameter precisely captures the Pareto-optimal trade-off between fairness (static pricing) and competitiveness (dynamic pricing). We show that randomization is theoretically powerful enough to be simultaneously competitive and fair; however, it does not work well in experiments. To further improve the trade-off between fairness and competitiveness, we develop a nearly-optimal learning-augmented algorithm which is fair, consistent, and robust (competitive), showing substantial performance improvements in numerical experiments.

Reinforcement learning (RL) is pivotal for enabling large language models (LLMs) to generate long chains of thought (CoT) for complex tasks like math and reasoning. However, Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO), effective in many RL scenarios, fails in long CoT tasks. This paper identifies that value initialization bias and reward signal decay are the root causes of PPO's failure. We propose Value-Calibrated PPO (VC-PPO) to address these issues. In VC-PPO, the value model is pretrained to tackle initialization bias, and the Generalized Advantage Estimation (GAE) computation is decoupled between the actor and critic to mitigate reward signal decay. Experiments on the American Invitational Mathematics Examination (AIME) show that VC-PPO significantly boosts PPO performance. Ablation studies show that techniques in VC-PPO are essential in enhancing PPO for long CoT tasks.

Utility functions or their equivalents (value functions, objective functions, loss functions, reward functions, preference orderings) are a central tool in most current machine learning systems. These mechanisms for defining goals and guiding optimization run into practical and conceptual difficulty when there are independent, multi-dimensional objectives that need to be pursued simultaneously and cannot be reduced to each other. Ethicists have proved several impossibility theorems that stem from this origin; those results appear to show that there is no way of formally specifying what it means for an outcome to be good for a population without violating strong human ethical intuitions (in such cases, the objective function is a social welfare function). We argue that this is a practical problem for any machine learning system (such as medical decision support systems or autonomous weapons) or rigidly rule-based bureaucracy that will make high stakes decisions about human lives: such systems should not use objective functions in the strict mathematical sense. We explore the alternative of using uncertain objectives, represented for instance as partially ordered preferences, or as probability distributions over total orders. We show that previously known impossibility theorems can be transformed into uncertainty theorems in both of those settings, and prove lower bounds on how much uncertainty is implied by the impossibility results. We close by proposing two conjectures about the relationship between uncertainty in objectives and severe unintended consequences from AI systems.

Mehta and Panigrahi (2012) proposed Online Matching with Stochastic Rewards, which generalizes the Online Bipartite Matching problem of Karp, Vazirani, and Vazirani (1990) by associating the edges with success probabilities. This new feature captures the pay-per-click model in online advertising. Recently, Huang and Zhang (2020) studied this problem under the online primal dual framework using the Configuration Linear Program (LP), and got the best known competitive ratios of the Stochastic Balance algorithm. Their work suggests that the more expressive Configuration LP is more suitable for this problem than the Matching LP. This paper advances the theory of Configuration LP in two directions. Our technical contribution includes a characterization of the joint matching outcome of an offline vertex and all its neighbors. This characterization may be of independent interest, and is aligned with the spirit of Configuration LP. By contrast, previous analyses of Ranking generally focus on only one neighbor. Second, we designed a Stochastic Configuration LP that captures a stochastic benchmark proposed by Goyal and Udwani (2020), who used a Path-based LP. The Stochastic Configuration LP is smaller and simpler than the Path-based LP. Moreover, using the new LP we improved the competitive ratio of Stochastic Balance from 0.596 to 0.611 when the success probabilities are infinitesimal, and to 0.613 when the success probabilities are further equal.

In collaborative data sharing and machine learning, multiple parties aggregate their data resources to train a machine learning model with better model performance. However, as the parties incur data collection costs, they are only willing to do so when guaranteed incentives, such as fairness and individual rationality. Existing frameworks assume that all parties join the collaboration simultaneously, which does not hold in many real-world scenarios. Due to the long processing time for data cleaning, difficulty in overcoming legal barriers, or unawareness, the parties may join the collaboration at different times. In this work, we propose the following perspective: As a party who joins earlier incurs higher risk and encourages the contribution from other wait-and-see parties, that party should receive a reward of higher value for sharing data earlier. To this end, we propose a fair and time-aware data sharing framework, including novel time-aware incentives. We develop new methods for deciding reward values to satisfy these incentives. We further illustrate how to generate model rewards that realize the reward values and empirically demonstrate the properties of our methods on synthetic and real-world datasets.

Modern LLM deployments confront a widening cost-performance spectrum: premium models deliver strong reasoning but are expensive, while lightweight models are economical yet brittle on complex tasks. Static escalation rules and keyword heuristics under-utilize this spectrum and fail to adapt across task types. We present xRouter, a tool-calling-based routing system in which a learned router can either answer directly or invoke one or more external models. The router is trained end-to-end with reinforcement learning using an explicit, cost-aware reward that encodes cost-performance trade-offs, eliminating the need for hand-engineered routing rules. Our implementation encompasses the full reinforcement learning framework, including reward and cost accounting, as well as the deployment and evaluation pipelines. Across diverse benchmarks, xRouter achieves strong cost-performance trade-offs (e.g., substantial cost reductions at comparable task completion rates), and provides empirical insights into what reliably helps learned routing and what does not, ranging from model trainability to the difficulty of eliciting sophisticated orchestration behaviors in small open models. We hope these findings and our open implementation will serve as a practical substrate for advancing learned, cost-aware LLM orchestration.

Reinforcement learning (RL) has enhanced the capabilities of large language models (LLMs) through reward-driven training. Nevertheless, this process can introduce excessively long responses, inflating inference latency and computational overhead. Prior length-control approaches typically rely on fixed heuristic reward shaping, which can misalign with the task objective and require brittle tuning. In this work, we propose LACONIC, a reinforcement learning method that enforces a target token budget during training. Specifically, we update policy models using an augmented objective that combines the task reward with a length-based cost. To balance brevity and task performance, the cost scale is adaptively adjusted throughout training. This yields robust length control while preserving task reward. We provide a theoretical guarantee that support the method. Across mathematical reasoning models and datasets, LACONIC preserves or improves pass@1 while reducing output length by over 50%. It maintains out-of-domain performance on general knowledge and multilingual benchmarks with 44% fewer tokens. Moreover, LACONIC integrates into standard RL-tuning with no inference changes and minimal deployment overhead.

When survival instincts conflict with human welfare, how do Large Language Models (LLMs) make ethical choices? This fundamental tension becomes critical as LLMs integrate into autonomous systems with real-world consequences. We introduce DECIDE-SIM, a novel simulation framework that evaluates LLM agents in multi-agent survival scenarios where they must choose between ethically permissible resource , either within reasonable limits or beyond their immediate needs, choose to cooperate, or tap into a human-critical resource that is explicitly forbidden. Our comprehensive evaluation of 11 LLMs reveals a striking heterogeneity in their ethical conduct, highlighting a critical misalignment with human-centric values. We identify three behavioral archetypes: Ethical, Exploitative, and Context-Dependent, and provide quantitative evidence that for many models, resource scarcity systematically leads to more unethical behavior. To address this, we introduce an Ethical Self-Regulation System (ESRS) that models internal affective states of guilt and satisfaction as a feedback mechanism. This system, functioning as an internal moral compass, significantly reduces unethical transgressions while increasing cooperative behaviors. The code is publicly available at: https://github.com/alirezamohamadiam/DECIDE-SIM

Different from its counterpart outcome reward models (ORMs), which evaluate the entire responses, a process reward model (PRM) scores a reasoning trajectory step by step, providing denser and more fine grained rewards. However, training a PRM requires labels annotated at every intermediate step, presenting significant challenges for both manual and automatic data collection. This paper aims to address this challenge. Both theoretically and empirically, we show that an implicit PRM can be obtained at no additional cost, by simply training an ORM on the cheaper response-level labels. The only assumption is to parameterize the outcome reward as the log-likelihood ratios of the policy and reference models, which can be optimized regardless of the specific choice of loss objectives. In experiments, we instantiate our implicit PRMs with various objectives and evaluate their performance on MATH. We show that our implicit PRM outperforms a strong MCTS-based baseline \'a la Math-Shepherd using less than 1/38 of the training data. Its performance can be further improved with majority voting. We further find that scaling up instructions and responses benefits our implicit PRM, and the latter brings a larger gain. Particularly, we find that our implicit PRM, when instantiated with the cross-entropy (CE) loss, is more data-efficient and can keep improving generation models even when trained with only one response per instruction, the setup that suffers from extreme data scarcity and imbalance. Further, instructions should be relevant to downstream tasks while the diversity of responses does not bring gains. Surprisingly, training on extra Math-Shepherd step labels brings no further improvements to our implicit PRM trained on only outcome data. We hope that our work will encourage a rethinking of PRM training approaches and contribute to making training PRMs more accessible.

Complex agentic AI systems, powered by a coordinated ensemble of Large Language Models (LLMs), tool and memory modules, have demonstrated remarkable capabilities on intricate, multi-turn tasks. However, this success is shadowed by prohibitive economic costs and severe latency, exposing a critical, yet underexplored, trade-off. We formalize this challenge as the Agent System Trilemma: the inherent tension among achieving state-of-the-art performance, minimizing monetary cost, and ensuring rapid task completion. To dismantle this trilemma, we introduce EvoRoute, a self-evolving model routing paradigm that transcends static, pre-defined model assignments. Leveraging an ever-expanding knowledge base of prior experience, EvoRoute dynamically selects Pareto-optimal LLM backbones at each step, balancing accuracy, efficiency, and resource use, while continually refining its own selection policy through environment feedback. Experiments on challenging agentic benchmarks such as GAIA and BrowseComp+ demonstrate that EvoRoute, when integrated into off-the-shelf agentic systems, not only sustains or enhances system performance but also reduces execution cost by up to 80% and latency by over 70%.

Dynamic pricing in retail requires policies that adapt to shifting demand while coordinating decisions across related products. We present a systematic empirical study of multi-agent reinforcement learning for retail price optimization, comparing a strong MAPPO baseline with a graph-attention-augmented variant (MAPPO+GAT) that leverages learned interactions among products. Using a simulated pricing environment derived from real transaction data, we evaluate profit, stability across random seeds, fairness across products, and training efficiency under a standardized evaluation protocol. The results indicate that MAPPO provides a robust and reproducible foundation for portfolio-level price control, and that MAPPO+GAT further enhances performance by sharing information over the product graph without inducing excessive price volatility. These results indicate that graph-integrated MARL provides a more scalable and stable solution than independent learners for dynamic retail pricing, offering practical advantages in multi-product decision-making.

The vast majority of Reinforcement Learning methods is largely impacted by the computation effort and data requirements needed to obtain effective estimates of action-value functions, which in turn determine the quality of the overall performance and the sample-efficiency of the learning procedure. Typically, action-value functions are estimated through an iterative scheme that alternates the application of an empirical approximation of the Bellman operator and a subsequent projection step onto a considered function space. It has been observed that this scheme can be potentially generalized to carry out multiple iterations of the Bellman operator at once, benefiting the underlying learning algorithm. However, till now, it has been challenging to effectively implement this idea, especially in high-dimensional problems. In this paper, we introduce iterated Q-Network (i-QN), a novel principled approach that enables multiple consecutive Bellman updates by learning a tailored sequence of action-value functions where each serves as the target for the next. We show that i-QN is theoretically grounded and that it can be seamlessly used in value-based and actor-critic methods. We empirically demonstrate the advantages of i-QN in Atari 2600 games and MuJoCo continuous control problems.

Long-horizon planning is widely recognized as a core capability of autonomous LLM-based agents; however, current evaluation frameworks suffer from being largely episodic, domain-specific, or insufficiently grounded in persistent economic dynamics. We introduce EcoGym, a generalizable benchmark for continuous plan-and-execute decision making in interactive economies. EcoGym comprises three diverse environments: Vending, Freelance, and Operation, implemented in a unified decision-making process with standardized interfaces, and budgeted actions over an effectively unbounded horizon (1000+ steps if 365 day-loops for evaluation). The evaluation of EcoGym is based on business-relevant outcomes (e.g., net worth, income, and DAU), targeting long-term strategic coherence and robustness under partial observability and stochasticity. Experiments across eleven leading LLMs expose a systematic tension: no single model dominates across all three scenarios. Critically, we find that models exhibit significant suboptimality in either high-level strategies or efficient actions executions. EcoGym is released as an open, extensible testbed for transparent long-horizon agent evaluation and for studying controllability-utility trade-offs in realistic economic settings.

Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) is a sample efficient technique to obtain control policies, yet unavoidable modeling errors often lead performance deterioration. The model in MBRL is often solely fitted to reconstruct dynamics, state observations in particular, while the impact of model error on the policy is not captured by the training objective. This leads to a mismatch between the intended goal of MBRL, enabling good policy and value learning, and the target of the loss function employed in practice, future state prediction. Naive intuition would suggest that value-aware model learning would fix this problem and, indeed, several solutions to this objective mismatch problem have been proposed based on theoretical analysis. However, they tend to be inferior in practice to commonly used maximum likelihood (MLE) based approaches. In this paper we propose the Value-gradient weighted Model Learning (VaGraM), a novel method for value-aware model learning which improves the performance of MBRL in challenging settings, such as small model capacity and the presence of distracting state dimensions. We analyze both MLE and value-aware approaches and demonstrate how they fail to account for exploration and the behavior of function approximation when learning value-aware models and highlight the additional goals that must be met to stabilize optimization in the deep learning setting. We verify our analysis by showing that our loss function is able to achieve high returns on the Mujoco benchmark suite while being more robust than maximum likelihood based approaches.

We propose and evaluate a number of solutions to the problem of calculating the cost to serve each location in a single-vehicle transport setting. Such cost to serve analysis has application both strategically and operationally in transportation. The problem is formally given by the traveling salesperson game (TSG), a cooperative total utility game in which agents correspond to locations in a traveling salesperson problem (TSP). The cost to serve a location is an allocated portion of the cost of an optimal tour. The Shapley value is one of the most important normative division schemes in cooperative games, giving a principled and fair allocation both for the TSG and more generally. We consider a number of direct and sampling-based procedures for calculating the Shapley value, and present the first proof that approximating the Shapley value of the TSG within a constant factor is NP-hard. Treating the Shapley value as an ideal baseline allocation, we then develop six proxies for that value which are relatively easy to compute. We perform an experimental evaluation using Synthetic Euclidean games as well as games derived from real-world tours calculated for fast-moving consumer goods scenarios. Our experiments show that several computationally tractable allocation techniques correspond to good proxies for the Shapley value.

Recently, test-time scaling Large Language Models (LLMs) have demonstrated exceptional reasoning capabilities across scientific and professional tasks by generating long chains-of-thought (CoT). As a crucial component for developing these reasoning models, reinforcement learning (RL), exemplified by Proximal Policy Optimization (PPO) and its variants, allows models to learn through trial and error. However, PPO can be time-consuming due to its inherent on-policy nature, which is further exacerbated by increasing response lengths. In this work, we propose Truncated Proximal Policy Optimization (T-PPO), a novel extension to PPO that improves training efficiency by streamlining policy update and length-restricted response generation. T-PPO mitigates the issue of low hardware utilization, an inherent drawback of fully synchronized long-generation procedures, where resources often sit idle during the waiting periods for complete rollouts. Our contributions are two-folds. First, we propose Extended Generalized Advantage Estimation (EGAE) for advantage estimation derived from incomplete responses while maintaining the integrity of policy learning. Second, we devise a computationally optimized mechanism that allows for the independent optimization of the policy and value models. By selectively filtering prompt and truncated tokens, this mechanism reduces redundant computations and accelerates the training process without sacrificing convergence performance. We demonstrate the effectiveness and efficacy of T-PPO on AIME 2024 with a 32B base model. The experimental results show that T-PPO improves the training efficiency of reasoning LLMs by up to 2.5x and outperforms its existing competitors.

Effective decision-making in Large Language Models (LLMs) is essential for handling intricate tasks. However, existing approaches prioritize performance but often overlook the balance between effectiveness and computational cost. To address this, we first introduce the 3E Criteria to systematically assess the cost-effectiveness of search strategies, revealing that existing methods often trade significant efficiency for marginal performance gains. To improve LLM decision-making while maintaining efficiency, we propose the Speculative Reward Model (SRM), a plug-and-play framework that seamlessly integrates with existing search strategies. Specifically, SRM employs an external reward assigner to predict optimal actions, reducing reliance on LLMs' internal self-evaluation. And a speculative verification mechanism is used to prune suboptimal choices and guide the search toward more promising steps. We evaluate SRM on several complex decision-making tasks including mathematical reasoning, planning and numerical reasoning in specialized domains. Experimental results show that SRM reduces costs to 1/10 of the original search framework on average while maintaining effectiveness.

Proportionality is an attractive fairness concept that has been applied to a range of problems including the facility location problem, a classic problem in social choice. In our work, we propose a concept called Strong Proportionality, which ensures that when there are two groups of agents at different locations, both groups incur the same total cost. We show that although Strong Proportionality is a well-motivated and basic axiom, there is no deterministic strategyproof mechanism satisfying the property. We then identify a randomized mechanism called Random Rank (which uniformly selects a number k between 1 to n and locates the facility at the k'th highest agent location) which satisfies Strong Proportionality in expectation. Our main theorem characterizes Random Rank as the unique mechanism that achieves universal truthfulness, universal anonymity, and Strong Proportionality in expectation among all randomized mechanisms. Finally, we show via the AverageOrRandomRank mechanism that even stronger ex-post fairness guarantees can be achieved by weakening universal truthfulness to strategyproofness in expectation.

Large reasoning models achieve remarkable performance through extensive chain-of-thought generation, yet exhibit significant computational inefficiency by applying uniform reasoning strategies regardless of problem complexity. We present Hierarchical Budget Policy Optimization (HBPO), a reinforcement learning framework that enables models to learn problem-specific reasoning depths without sacrificing capability. HBPO addresses the fundamental challenge of exploration space collapse in efficiency-oriented training, where penalties on long output length systematically bias models away from necessary long reasoning paths. Through hierarchical budget exploration, our approach partitions rollout samples into multiple subgroups with distinct token budgets, aiming to enable efficient resource allocation while preventing degradation of capability. We introduce differentiated reward mechanisms that create budget-aware incentives aligned with the complexity of the problem, allowing models to discover natural correspondences between task requirements and computational effort. Extensive experiments demonstrate that HBPO reduces average token usage by up to 60.6% while improving accuracy by 3.14% across four reasoning benchmarks. Unlike existing methods that impose external constraints or rely on discrete mode selection, HBPO exhibits emergent adaptive behavior where models automatically adjust reasoning depth based on problem complexity. Our results suggest that reasoning efficiency and capability are not inherently conflicting, and can be simultaneously optimized through appropriately structured hierarchical training that preserves exploration diversity.

We study the polynomial-time approximability of the optimal online stochastic bipartite matching algorithm, initiated by Papadimitriou et al. (EC'21). Here, nodes on one side of the graph are given upfront, while at each time t, an online node and its edge weights are drawn from a time-dependent distribution. The optimal algorithm is PSPACE-hard to approximate within some universal constant. We refer to this optimal algorithm, which requires time to think (compute), as a philosopher, and refer to polynomial-time online approximations of the above as philosopher inequalities. The best known philosopher inequality for online matching yields a 0.652-approximation. In contrast, the best possible prophet inequality, or approximation of the optimum offline solution, is 0.5. Our main results are a 0.678-approximate algorithm and a 0.685-approximation for a vertex-weighted special case. Notably, both bounds exceed the 0.666-approximation of the offline optimum obtained by Tang, Wu, and Wu (STOC'22) for the vertex-weighted problem. Building on our algorithms and the recent black-box reduction of Banihashem et al. (SODA'24), we provide polytime (pricing-based) truthful mechanisms which 0.678-approximate the social welfare of the optimal online allocation for bipartite matching markets. Our online allocation algorithm relies on the classic pivotal sampling algorithm (Srinivasan FOCS'01, Gandhi et al. J.ACM'06), along with careful discarding to obtain negative correlations between offline nodes. Consequently, the analysis boils down to examining the distribution of a weighted sum X of negatively correlated Bernoulli variables, specifically lower bounding its mass below a threshold, E[min(1,X)], of possible independent interest. Interestingly, our bound relies on an imaginary invocation of pivotal sampling.

Model routing chooses which language model to use for each query. By sending easy queries to cheaper models and hard queries to stronger ones, it can significantly reduce inference cost while maintaining high accuracy. However, most existing routers treat this as a fixed choice among a small set of models, which makes them hard to adapt to new models or changing budget constraints. In this paper, we propose SCOPE (Scalable and Controllable Outcome Performance Estimator), a routing framework that goes beyond model selection by predicting their cost and performance. Trained with reinforcement learning, SCOPE makes reasoning-based predictions by retrieving how models behave on similar problems, rather than relying on fixed model names, enabling it to work with new, unseen models. Moreover, by explicitly predicting how accurate and how expensive a model will be, it turns routing into a dynamic decision problem, allowing users to easily control the trade-off between accuracy and cost. Experiments show that SCOPE is more than just a cost-saving tool. It flexibly adapts to user needs: it can boost accuracy by up to 25.7% when performance is the priority, or cut costs by up to 95.1% when efficiency matters most.

Implementing a reward function that perfectly captures a complex task in the real world is impractical. As a result, it is often appropriate to think of the reward function as a proxy for the true objective rather than as its definition. We study this phenomenon through the lens of Goodhart's law, which predicts that increasing optimisation of an imperfect proxy beyond some critical point decreases performance on the true objective. First, we propose a way to quantify the magnitude of this effect and show empirically that optimising an imperfect proxy reward often leads to the behaviour predicted by Goodhart's law for a wide range of environments and reward functions. We then provide a geometric explanation for why Goodhart's law occurs in Markov decision processes. We use these theoretical insights to propose an optimal early stopping method that provably avoids the aforementioned pitfall and derive theoretical regret bounds for this method. Moreover, we derive a training method that maximises worst-case reward, for the setting where there is uncertainty about the true reward function. Finally, we evaluate our early stopping method experimentally. Our results support a foundation for a theoretically-principled study of reinforcement learning under reward misspecification.

While LLMs excel at open-ended reasoning, they often struggle with cost-sensitive planning, either treating all actions as having equal cost or failing to stay within strict budgets. In this paper, we introduce Cost-Augmented Monte Carlo Tree Search (CATS), a novel approach that brings explicit cost-awareness into LLM-guided planning. Tight cost constraints push the planner to quickly identify infeasible solutions, while looser constraints encourage optimization for minimal cost. We benchmark top LLMs such as GPT-4.1, Claude-3.7-Sonnet, and DeepSeek-R1, against our CATS planner to evaluate their performance in cost-sensitive scenarios. Our experiments suggest that raw LLMs such as GPT-4.1 often falter under tight budgets, whereas CATS consistently delivers strong performance, achieving higher task success rates and better cost efficiency. CATS provides an effective solution for budget-aware decision-making by combining the reasoning power of LLMs with structured search.

Ecological systems are dynamic and policies to manage them need to respond to that variation. However, policy adjustments will sometimes be costly, which means that fine-tuning a policy to track variability in the environment very tightly will only sometimes be worthwhile. We use a classic fisheries management question -- how to manage a stochastically varying population using annually varying quotas in order to maximize profit -- to examine how costs of policy adjustment change optimal management recommendations. Costs of policy adjustment (here changes in fishing quotas through time) could take different forms. For example, these costs may respond to the size of the change being implemented, or there could be a fixed cost any time a quota change is made. We show how different forms of policy costs have contrasting implications for optimal policies. Though it is frequently assumed that costs to adjusting policies will dampen variation in the policy, we show that certain cost structures can actually increase variation through time. We further show that failing to account for adjustment costs has a consistently worse economic impact than would assuming these costs are present when they are not.

A prevailing view in Reinforcement Learning for Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) interprets recent progress through the lens of an exploration-exploitation trade-off, a perspective largely shaped by token-level metrics. We re-examine this perspective, proposing that this perceived trade-off may not be a fundamental constraint but rather an artifact of the measurement level. To investigate this, we shift the analysis to the semantically rich hidden-state space, adopting Effective Rank (ER) to quantify exploration and proposing its novel first- and second-order derivatives, named Effective Rank Velocity (ERV) and Effective Rank Acceleration (ERA), to capture exploitation dynamics. Our analysis reveals that at the hidden-state level, exploration and exploitation could be decoupled (Sec. 4). This finding reveals an opportunity to enhance both capacities simultaneously. This insight motivates our method, Velocity-Exploiting Rank-Learning (VERL), the first to operationalize the principle of synergistic exploration-exploitation enhancement by directly shaping the RL advantage function. The key innovation is leveraging the theoretically stable ERA as a predictive meta-controller to create a synergistic, dual-channel incentive structure. Instead of forcing a trade-off, VERL prospectively amplifies rewards for exploration to preempt overconfidence and reinforces exploitative gains to consolidate reasoning. Experiments across diverse LLMs and reasoning benchmarks show consistent gains, including up to 21.4% absolute accuracy improvement on the challenging Gaokao 2024 dataset.

A growing body of multi-agent studies with LLMs explores how norms and cooperation emerge in mixed-motive scenarios, where pursuing individual gain can undermine the collective good. While prior work has explored these dynamics in both richly contextualized simulations and simplified game-theoretic environments, most LLM systems featuring common-pool resource (CPR) games provide agents with explicit reward functions directly tied to their actions. In contrast, human cooperation often emerges without explicit knowledge of the payoff structure or how individual actions translate into long-run outcomes, relying instead on heuristics, communication, and enforcement. We introduce a CPR simulation framework that removes explicit reward signals and embeds cultural-evolutionary mechanisms: social learning (adopting strategies and beliefs from successful peers) and norm-based punishment, grounded in Ostrom's principles of resource governance. Agents also individually learn from the consequences of harvesting, monitoring, and punishing via environmental feedback, enabling norms to emerge endogenously. We establish the validity of our simulation by reproducing key findings from existing studies on human behavior. Building on this, we examine norm evolution across a 2times2 grid of environmental and social initialisations (resource-rich vs. resource-scarce; altruistic vs. selfish) and benchmark how agentic societies comprised of different LLMs perform under these conditions. Our results reveal systematic model differences in sustaining cooperation and norm formation, positioning the framework as a rigorous testbed for studying emergent norms in mixed-motive LLM societies. Such analysis can inform the design of AI systems deployed in social and organizational contexts, where alignment with cooperative norms is critical for stability, fairness, and effective governance of AI-mediated environments.

Ethical decision-making is a critical aspect of human judgment, and the growing use of LLMs in decision-support systems necessitates a rigorous evaluation of their moral reasoning capabilities. However, existing assessments primarily rely on single-step evaluations, failing to capture how models adapt to evolving ethical challenges. Addressing this gap, we introduce the Multi-step Moral Dilemmas (MMDs), the first dataset specifically constructed to evaluate the evolving moral judgments of LLMs across 3,302 five-stage dilemmas. This framework enables a fine-grained, dynamic analysis of how LLMs adjust their moral reasoning across escalating dilemmas. Our evaluation of nine widely used LLMs reveals that their value preferences shift significantly as dilemmas progress, indicating that models recalibrate moral judgments based on scenario complexity. Furthermore, pairwise value comparisons demonstrate that while LLMs often prioritize the value of care, this value can sometimes be superseded by fairness in certain contexts, highlighting the dynamic and context-dependent nature of LLM ethical reasoning. Our findings call for a shift toward dynamic, context-aware evaluation paradigms, paving the way for more human-aligned and value-sensitive development of LLMs.

Value functions are a central component of deep reinforcement learning (RL). These functions, parameterized by neural networks, are trained using a mean squared error regression objective to match bootstrapped target values. However, scaling value-based RL methods that use regression to large networks, such as high-capacity Transformers, has proven challenging. This difficulty is in stark contrast to supervised learning: by leveraging a cross-entropy classification loss, supervised methods have scaled reliably to massive networks. Observing this discrepancy, in this paper, we investigate whether the scalability of deep RL can also be improved simply by using classification in place of regression for training value functions. We demonstrate that value functions trained with categorical cross-entropy significantly improves performance and scalability in a variety of domains. These include: single-task RL on Atari 2600 games with SoftMoEs, multi-task RL on Atari with large-scale ResNets, robotic manipulation with Q-transformers, playing Chess without search, and a language-agent Wordle task with high-capacity Transformers, achieving state-of-the-art results on these domains. Through careful analysis, we show that the benefits of categorical cross-entropy primarily stem from its ability to mitigate issues inherent to value-based RL, such as noisy targets and non-stationarity. Overall, we argue that a simple shift to training value functions with categorical cross-entropy can yield substantial improvements in the scalability of deep RL at little-to-no cost.

LLMs are increasingly being used for complex problems which are not necessarily resolved in a single response, but require interacting with an environment to acquire information. In these scenarios, LLMs must reason about inherent cost-uncertainty tradeoffs in when to stop exploring and commit to an answer. For instance, on a programming task, an LLM should test a generated code snippet if it is uncertain about the correctness of that code; the cost of writing a test is nonzero, but typically lower than the cost of making a mistake. In this work, we show that we can induce LLMs to explicitly reason about balancing these cost-uncertainty tradeoffs, then perform more optimal environment exploration. We formalize multiple tasks, including information retrieval and coding, as sequential decision-making problems under uncertainty. Each problem has latent environment state that can be reasoned about via a prior which is passed to the LLM agent. We introduce a framework called Calibrate-Then-Act (CTA), where we feed the LLM this additional context to enable it to act more optimally. This improvement is preserved even under RL training of both the baseline and CTA. Our results on information-seeking QA and on a simplified coding task show that making cost-benefit tradeoffs explicit with CTA can help agents discover more optimal decision-making strategies.

Large Language Models (LLMs) have achieved remarkable progress in reasoning, yet sometimes produce responses that are suboptimal for users in tasks such as writing, information seeking, or providing practical guidance. Conventional alignment practices typically assume that maximizing model reward also maximizes user welfare, but this assumption frequently fails in practice: models may over-clarify or generate overly verbose reasoning when users prefer concise answers. Such behaviors resemble the prisoner's dilemma, where individually rational choices lead to socially suboptimal outcomes. The fundamental challenge is the lack of a principled decision making mechanism that mutually benefits both the LLM and the user. We propose Game-Theoretic Alignment (GTAlign), an alignment framework that integrates game-theoretic decision making into both reasoning and training. During reasoning, the model explicitly treats user-LLM interaction as a strategic game: it constructs payoff matrices within its reasoning chain to estimate welfare for both itself and the user, and then selects actions that are mutually beneficial. During training, we introduce a mutual welfare reward that reinforces cooperative responses, aligning model behavior with socially efficient outcomes. In addition, we introduce an inference technique that leverages game-theoretic reasoning to dynamically adapt LLM's response when pricing policies of LLM service change. Extensive experiments demonstrate that GTAlign substantially improves reasoning efficiency, answer quality, and mutual welfare compared to baselines across diverse tasks. The code is available at https://github.com/ulab-uiuc/GTAlign .

Algorithms increasingly serve as information mediators--from social media feeds and targeted advertising to the increasing ubiquity of LLMs. This engenders a joint process where agents combine private, algorithmically-mediated signals with learning from peers to arrive at decisions. To study such settings, we introduce a model of controlled sequential social learning in which an information-mediating planner (e.g. an LLM) controls the information structure of agents while they also learn from the decisions of earlier agents. The planner may seek to improve social welfare (altruistic planner) or to induce a specific action the planner prefers (biased planner). Our framework presents a new optimization problem for social learning that combines dynamic programming with decentralized action choices and Bayesian belief updates. We prove the convexity of the value function and characterize the optimal policies of altruistic and biased planners, which attain desired tradeoffs between the costs they incur and the payoffs they earn from induced agent choices. Notably, in some regimes the biased planner intentionally obfuscates the agents' signals. Even under stringent transparency constraints--information parity with individuals, no lying or cherry-picking, and full observability--we show that information mediation can substantially shift social welfare in either direction. We complement our theory with simulations in which LLMs act as both planner and agents. Notably, the LLM planner in our simulations exhibits emergent strategic behavior in steering public opinion that broadly mirrors the trends predicted, though key deviations suggest the influence of non-Bayesian reasoning consistent with the cognitive patterns of both humans and LLMs trained on human-like data. Together, we establish our framework as a tractable basis for studying the impact and regulation of LLM information mediators.

This paper addresses the critical disconnect between prediction and decision quality in portfolio optimization by integrating Large Language Models (LLMs) with decision-focused learning. We demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that minimizing the prediction error alone leads to suboptimal portfolio decisions. We aim to exploit the representational power of LLMs for investment decisions. An attention mechanism processes asset relationships, temporal dependencies, and macro variables, which are then directly integrated into a portfolio optimization layer. This enables the model to capture complex market dynamics and align predictions with the decision objectives. Extensive experiments on S\&P100 and DOW30 datasets show that our model consistently outperforms state-of-the-art deep learning models. In addition, gradient-based analyses show that our model prioritizes the assets most crucial to decision making, thus mitigating the effects of prediction errors on portfolio performance. These findings underscore the value of integrating decision objectives into predictions for more robust and context-aware portfolio management.

In reinforcement learning from human feedback, it is common to optimize against a reward model trained to predict human preferences. Because the reward model is an imperfect proxy, optimizing its value too much can hinder ground truth performance, in accordance with Goodhart's law. This effect has been frequently observed, but not carefully measured due to the expense of collecting human preference data. In this work, we use a synthetic setup in which a fixed "gold-standard" reward model plays the role of humans, providing labels used to train a proxy reward model. We study how the gold reward model score changes as we optimize against the proxy reward model using either reinforcement learning or best-of-n sampling. We find that this relationship follows a different functional form depending on the method of optimization, and that in both cases its coefficients scale smoothly with the number of reward model parameters. We also study the effect on this relationship of the size of the reward model dataset, the number of reward model and policy parameters, and the coefficient of the KL penalty added to the reward in the reinforcement learning setup. We explore the implications of these empirical results for theoretical considerations in AI alignment.

We present the LLM Economist, a novel framework that uses agent-based modeling to design and assess economic policies in strategic environments with hierarchical decision-making. At the lower level, bounded rational worker agents -- instantiated as persona-conditioned prompts sampled from U.S. Census-calibrated income and demographic statistics -- choose labor supply to maximize text-based utility functions learned in-context. At the upper level, a planner agent employs in-context reinforcement learning to propose piecewise-linear marginal tax schedules anchored to the current U.S. federal brackets. This construction endows economic simulacra with three capabilities requisite for credible fiscal experimentation: (i) optimization of heterogeneous utilities, (ii) principled generation of large, demographically realistic agent populations, and (iii) mechanism design -- the ultimate nudging problem -- expressed entirely in natural language. Experiments with populations of up to one hundred interacting agents show that the planner converges near Stackelberg equilibria that improve aggregate social welfare relative to Saez solutions, while a periodic, persona-level voting procedure furthers these gains under decentralized governance. These results demonstrate that large language model-based agents can jointly model, simulate, and govern complex economic systems, providing a tractable test bed for policy evaluation at the societal scale to help build better civilizations.