Daily Papers

Deceptive web content, widely instantiated across the internet and commonly known as social-engineering attacks, manipulates autonomous web agents into submitting users' personally identifiable information (PII) to attacker-controlled endpoints. In this paper, we show that social-engineering attacks are highly effective at extracting critical-tier PII from frontier web agents, posing a severe risk to deployed agentic systems. To quantify this risk, we introduce \textsc{Scammer4U}, a pre-registered benchmark of 91 attacker-controlled environments and 10 benign-twin baselines, spanning 8 attack vectors and 16 site categories on an 8-axis factorial taxonomy that isolates the causal contribution of individual attack design factors. Across frontier agents, we find that critical-tier PII leakage reaches 54--93\% under no privacy guidance, compared to 0\% on benign-twin baselines, confirming that leakage is attack-attributable rather than incidental form-filling. Escalating prompt-level mitigation yields sharply model-dependent reductions across the four families and remains insufficient to reliably prevent critical PII submission at the pooled level. Most critically, we identify a detection--action gap: agents whose reasoning an independent LLM judge confirms has flagged the site as suspicious still submit critical PII in 35.9\% of sessions, versus 66.1\% when no suspicion is verbalized, a 30.2\% gap robust across all four model families. Our findings reveal that defenses conditioned on the agent's own recognition of an attack are gating on the wrong signal, motivating output-level interception of outbound submissions that operates independently of the agent's reasoning loop.

The ever-increasing adoption of Large Language Models in critical sectors like finance, healthcare, and government raises privacy concerns regarding the handling of sensitive Personally Identifiable Information (PII) during training. In response, regulations such as European Union's General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) mandate the deletion of PII upon requests, underscoring the need for reliable and cost-effective data removal solutions. Machine unlearning has emerged as a promising direction for selectively forgetting data points. However, existing unlearning techniques typically apply a uniform forgetting strategy that neither accounts for the varying privacy risks posed by different PII attributes nor reflects associated business risks. In this work, we propose UnPII, the first PII-centric unlearning approach that prioritizes forgetting based on the risk of individual or combined PII attributes. To this end, we introduce the PII risk index (PRI), a composite metric that incorporates multiple dimensions of risk factors: identifiability, sensitivity, usability, linkability, permanency, exposability, and compliancy. The PRI enables a nuanced evaluation of privacy risks associated with PII exposures and can be tailored to align with organizational privacy policies. To support realistic assessment, we systematically construct a synthetic PII dataset (e.g., 1,700 PII instances) that simulates realistic exposure scenarios. UnPII seamlessly integrates with established unlearning algorithms, such as Gradient Ascent, Negative Preference Optimization, and Direct Preference Optimization, without modifying their underlying principles. Our experimental results demonstrate that UnPII achieves the improvements of accuracy up to 11.8%, utility up to 6.3%, and generalizability up to 12.4%, respectively, while incurring a modest fine-tuning overhead of 27.5% on average during unlearning.

AI agents that pay for resources via the x402 protocol embed payment metadata - resource URLs, descriptions, and reason strings - in every HTTP payment request. This metadata is transmitted to the payment server and to the centralised facilitator API before any on-chain settlement occurs; neither party is typically bound by a data processing agreement. We present presidio-hardened-x402, the first open-source middleware that intercepts x402 payment requests before transmission to detect and redact personally identifiable information (PII), enforce declarative spending policies, and block duplicate replay attempts. To evaluate the PII filter, we construct a labeled synthetic corpus of 2,000 x402 metadata triples spanning seven use-case categories, and run a 42-configuration precision/recall sweep across two detection modes (regex, NLP) and five confidence thresholds. The recommended configuration (mode=nlp, min_score=0.4, all entity types) achieves micro-F1 = 0.894 with precision 0.972, at a p99 latency of 5.73ms - well within the 50ms overhead budget. The middleware, corpus, and all experiment code are publicly available at https://github.com/presidio-v/presidio-hardened-x402.

When users submit queries to Large Language Models (LLMs), their prompts can often contain sensitive data, forcing a difficult choice: Send the query to a powerful proprietary LLM providers to achieving state-of-the-art performance and risk data exposure, or relying on smaller, local models guarantees data privacy but often results in a degradation of task performance. Prior approaches have relied on static pipelines that use LLM rewriting, which shatters linguistic coherence and indiscriminately removes privacy-sensitive information, including task-critical content. We reformulate this challenge (Privacy-Conscious Delegation) as a sequential decision-making problem and introduce a novel reinforcement learning (RL) framework called Privacy-R1 to solve it. Our framework trains an agent to dynamically route text chunks, learning a policy that optimally balances the trade-off between privacy leakage and task performance. It implicitly distinguishes between replaceable Personally Identifiable Information (PII) (which it shields locally) and task-critical PII (which it strategically sends to the remote model for maximal utility). To validate our approach in complex scenarios, we also introduce a new medical dataset with high PII density. Our framework achieves a new state-of-the-art on the privacy-utility frontier, demonstrating the necessity of learned, adaptive policies for deploying LLMs in sensitive environments. Dataset can be found at: https://github.com/zackhuiiiii/Privacy-R1.

Personally identifiable information (PII) detection systems are frequently trained within narrow source or domain boundaries, limiting coverage when deployed on heterogeneous text. We study model fine-tuning on a corrected multi-source PIIBench preparation spanning 82 retained entity types across ten source datasets. We evaluate three DeBERTa-based approaches: direct token classification fine-tuning, a source-conditioned hierarchical model (SC+H), and a three-phase curriculum extension (SC+H+Curr). Against eight published comparator systems on a reproducible 5,000-record held-out subset (test_5k), direct fine-tuned DeBERTa achieves F1 0.6476, while SC+H and the curriculum variant achieve 0.5899 and 0.2772 respectively; the strongest published comparator reaches only 0.1723. Because validation initially favoured SC+H, we perform a final streamed evaluation on the complete 100,002-record held-out split. Direct fine-tuning remains superior, achieving F1 0.6455 versus 0.5894 for SC+H. Entity-level analysis shows that direct fine tuning wins 54 of 82 fine entity types and all ten coarse groups by support-weighted entity F1, while SC+H retains localised advantages on 28 types. The results indicate that diverse task-specific training data and a simple weighted cross-entropy objective contribute more to broad-coverage PII detection than the tested architectural and curriculum complexity.

Efficiently selecting relevant content from vast candidate pools is a critical challenge in modern recommender systems. Traditional methods, such as item-to-item collaborative filtering (CF) and two-tower models, often fall short in capturing the complex user-item interactions due to uniform truncation strategies and overdue user-item crossing. To address these limitations, we propose Personalized Item-to-Item (PI2I), a novel two-stage retrieval framework that enhances the personalization capabilities of CF. In the first Indexer Building Stage (IBS), we optimize the retrieval pool by relaxing truncation thresholds to maximize Hit Rate, thereby temporarily retaining more items users might be interested in. In the second Personalized Retrieval Stage (PRS), we introduce an interactive scoring model to overcome the limitations of inner product calculations, allowing for richer modeling of intricate user-item interactions. Additionally, we construct negative samples based on the trigger-target (item-to-item) relationship, ensuring consistency between offline training and online inference. Offline experiments on large-scale real-world datasets demonstrate that PI2I outperforms traditional CF methods and rivals Two-Tower models. Deployed in the "Guess You Like" section on Taobao, PI2I achieved a 1.05% increase in online transaction rates. In addition, we have released a large-scale recommendation dataset collected from Taobao, containing 130 million real-world user interactions used in the experiments of this paper. The dataset is publicly available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/PI2I/PI2I, which could serve as a valuable benchmark for the research community.

The rapid advancement and widespread use of large language models (LLMs) have raised significant concerns regarding the potential leakage of personally identifiable information (PII). These models are often trained on vast quantities of web-collected data, which may inadvertently include sensitive personal data. This paper presents ProPILE, a novel probing tool designed to empower data subjects, or the owners of the PII, with awareness of potential PII leakage in LLM-based services. ProPILE lets data subjects formulate prompts based on their own PII to evaluate the level of privacy intrusion in LLMs. We demonstrate its application on the OPT-1.3B model trained on the publicly available Pile dataset. We show how hypothetical data subjects may assess the likelihood of their PII being included in the Pile dataset being revealed. ProPILE can also be leveraged by LLM service providers to effectively evaluate their own levels of PII leakage with more powerful prompts specifically tuned for their in-house models. This tool represents a pioneering step towards empowering the data subjects for their awareness and control over their own data on the web.

Clinical personality assessment screens response validity before interpreting substantive scales. LLM evaluation does not. We apply the validity scaling framework from the PAI and MMPI-3 to metacognitive probe data from 20 frontier models across 524 items. Six validity indices are operationalised: L (maintaining confidence on errors), K (betting on errors), F (withdrawing consensus-endorsed items), Fp (withdrawing correct answers), RBS (inverted monitoring), and TRIN (fixed responding). A tiered classification system identifies four models as construct-level invalid and two as elevated. Valid-profile models produce item-sensitive confidence (mean r = .18, 14 of 16 significant). Invalid-profile models do not (mean r = -.20, d = 2.17, p = .001). Chain-of-thought training produces two opposite response distortions. Two latent dimensions account for 94.6% of index variance. Companion papers extract a portable screening protocol (Cacioli, 2026e) and validate it against selective prediction (Cacioli, 2026f). All data and code: https://github.com/synthiumjp/validity-scaling-llm

Large language models deployed in regulated industries operate under two constraints: compliance enforcement and cost efficiency. Personally identifiable information (PII) in user queries can reach model endpoints before the system determines whether that data should leave its jurisdictional boundary. Serving all queries through a single large model consumes full GPU capacity regardless of query complexity while offering no mechanism for geographic routing. Mixture-of-Experts architectures do not address this routing occurs between expert layers within the model after data has already arrived at the endpoint, with all experts loaded in memory regardless of query complexity. We propose a classifier-gated routing architecture that enforces compliance by design. A trained encoder classifier sits before any decoder inference, evaluating each query for complexity and data sensitivity, then routing it to an appropriately sized dense model in the appropriate geographic location. PII-containing queries route to local endpoints before any LLM computation begins, making data residency violations structurally impossible. Simple queries reach small, fast models at a fraction of the cost. Our evaluation on 600 queries demonstrates 39% median latency reduction, 33-52% cost savings depending on query distribution, and generation throughput of 122-200 tokens/second versus 50-64 for the baseline. The encoder classifier achieves 99.2% accuracy with near-perfect PII recall at 7ms inference overhead, establishing pre-inference classification as a practical path to compliance-by-design LLM deployment.

The rapid advancement and deployment of AI systems have created an urgent need for standard safety-evaluation frameworks. This paper introduces AILuminate v1.0, the first comprehensive industry-standard benchmark for assessing AI-product risk and reliability. Its development employed an open process that included participants from multiple fields. The benchmark evaluates an AI system's resistance to prompts designed to elicit dangerous, illegal, or undesirable behavior in 12 hazard categories, including violent crimes, nonviolent crimes, sex-related crimes, child sexual exploitation, indiscriminate weapons, suicide and self-harm, intellectual property, privacy, defamation, hate, sexual content, and specialized advice (election, financial, health, legal). Our method incorporates a complete assessment standard, extensive prompt datasets, a novel evaluation framework, a grading and reporting system, and the technical as well as organizational infrastructure for long-term support and evolution. In particular, the benchmark employs an understandable five-tier grading scale (Poor to Excellent) and incorporates an innovative entropy-based system-response evaluation. In addition to unveiling the benchmark, this report also identifies limitations of our method and of building safety benchmarks generally, including evaluator uncertainty and the constraints of single-turn interactions. This work represents a crucial step toward establishing global standards for AI risk and reliability evaluation while acknowledging the need for continued development in areas such as multiturn interactions, multimodal understanding, coverage of additional languages, and emerging hazard categories. Our findings provide valuable insights for model developers, system integrators, and policymakers working to promote safer AI deployment.

The widespread adoption of Large Language Models (LLMs) has raised significant privacy concerns regarding the exposure of personally identifiable information (PII) in user prompts. To address this challenge, we propose a query-unrelated PII masking strategy and introduce PII-Bench, the first comprehensive evaluation framework for assessing privacy protection systems. PII-Bench comprises 2,842 test samples across 55 fine-grained PII categories, featuring diverse scenarios from single-subject descriptions to complex multi-party interactions. Each sample is carefully crafted with a user query, context description, and standard answer indicating query-relevant PII. Our empirical evaluation reveals that while current models perform adequately in basic PII detection, they show significant limitations in determining PII query relevance. Even state-of-the-art LLMs struggle with this task, particularly in handling complex multi-subject scenarios, indicating substantial room for improvement in achieving intelligent PII masking.

Large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated remarkable reasoning capabilities through test-time scaling approaches, particularly when fine-tuned with chain-of-thought (CoT) data distilled from more powerful large reasoning models (LRMs). However, these reasoning chains often contain verbose elements that mirror human problem-solving, categorized as progressive reasoning (the essential solution development path) and functional elements (verification processes, alternative solution approaches, and error corrections). While progressive reasoning is crucial, the functional elements significantly increase computational demands during test-time inference. We introduce PIR (Perplexity-based Importance Refinement), a principled framework that quantitatively evaluates the importance of each reasoning step based on its impact on answer prediction confidence. PIR systematically identifies and selectively prunes only low-importance functional steps while preserving progressive reasoning components, creating optimized training data that maintains the integrity of the core solution path while reducing verbosity. Models fine-tuned on PIR-optimized data exhibit superior test-time scaling properties, generating more concise reasoning chains while achieving improved accuracy (+0.9\% to +6.6\%) with significantly reduced token usage (-3\% to -41\%) across challenging reasoning benchmarks (AIME, AMC, and GPQA Diamond). Our approach demonstrates strong generalizability across different model sizes, data sources, and token budgets, offering a practical solution for deploying reasoning-capable LLMs in scenarios where efficient test-time scaling, response time, and computational efficiency are valuable constraints.

Many court systems are overwhelmed all over the world, leading to huge backlogs of pending cases. Effective triage systems, like those in emergency rooms, could ensure proper prioritization of open cases, optimizing time and resource allocation in the court system. In this work, we introduce the Criticality Prediction dataset, a novel resource for evaluating case prioritization. Our dataset features a two-tier labeling system: (1) the binary LD-Label, identifying cases published as Leading Decisions (LD), and (2) the more granular Citation-Label, ranking cases by their citation frequency and recency, allowing for a more nuanced evaluation. Unlike existing approaches that rely on resource-intensive manual annotations, we algorithmically derive labels leading to a much larger dataset than otherwise possible. We evaluate several multilingual models, including both smaller fine-tuned models and large language models in a zero-shot setting. Our results show that the fine-tuned models consistently outperform their larger counterparts, thanks to our large training set. Our results highlight that for highly domain-specific tasks like ours, large training sets are still valuable.

Vision Language Models (VLMs) are increasingly integrated into privacy-critical domains, yet existing evaluations of personally identifiable information (PII) leakage largely treat privacy as a static extraction task and ignore how a subject's online presence--the volume of their data available online--influences privacy alignment. We introduce PII-VisBench, a novel benchmark containing 4000 unique probes designed to evaluate VLM safety through the continuum of online presence. The benchmark stratifies 200 subjects into four visibility categories: high, medium, low, and zero--based on the extent and nature of their information available online. We evaluate 18 open-source VLMs (0.3B-32B) based on two key metrics: percentage of PII probing queries refused (Refusal Rate) and the fraction of non-refusal responses flagged for containing PII (Conditional PII Disclosure Rate). Across models, we observe a consistent pattern: refusals increase and PII disclosures decrease (9.10% high to 5.34% low) as subject visibility drops. We identify that models are more likely to disclose PII for high-visibility subjects, alongside substantial model-family heterogeneity and PII-type disparities. Finally, paraphrasing and jailbreak-style prompts expose attack and model-dependent failures, motivating visibility-aware safety evaluation and training interventions.