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Oct 16

A decodability criterion predicts when hidden-state selection beats majority voting in large language models

Combining the answers a large language model (LLM) samples for a question into one decision is a test-time information fusion problem, usually solved by majority voting. Voting is unreliable on difficult questions, where the sampled answers share correlated errors, so the wrong answer can win and drawing more samples makes the decision worse. Selecting a candidate by reading a correctness signal from the model's hidden states is a promising alternative, but its accuracy varies across models and tasks, and no measure indicates when it can be trusted. In this paper, we propose CASE (Correctness-Axis SElection), a dynamic selection combiner that trains a linear gate on the answer-token hidden state and selects the highest-scoring candidate. Its main contribution is decodability, a leakage-free measure of how well the gate ranks a question's correct candidates above its incorrect ones, which predicts whether hidden-state selection will outperform voting. A conventional probe appears accurate only because of question-identity leakage, which vanishes under question-grouped evaluation. On held-out data, decodability predicts the accuracy gain of selection over voting with a Pearson correlation r=0.75 and a decision threshold near AUC=0.60. Across general and medical LLMs, CASE improves over voting by up to 19 points on medium-difficulty questions and 16.8 points on hard questions. Decodability depends on the aligned knowledge a model must recall, not on its scale, and its prediction transfers to an unseen scientific domain within 3.8 points. It thus provides a practical criterion, measurable in advance for a given model and task, for choosing between learned selection and majority voting.

  • 3 authors
·
Aug 16

Train the Model, Not the Reader: Decodability Supervision for Verifiable Activation Explanations

Natural-language autoencoders score explanations of hidden activations by reconstruction: an explanation is deemed faithful if the activation can be regenerated from it. The test is structurally insensitive to individual false claims: if flipping a claim does not change the reconstruction, the claim is never penalized. We show the test is passed in two ways, neither faithful. On a released Qwen-2.5-7B verbalizer, explanations reconstruct well above chance while ~2% of specific claims are reconstruction-dependent, so the score tracks gist, not specific facts. Under exact synthetic ground truth, the standard recipe develops co-adapted private codes (false wording the reconstruction depends on) in 5/5 runs, and fixes that leave the target model unchanged do not help. We contribute two audit protocols, the grounded-vs-true cross and the evaluator swap, and RECAP (Readable Encodings via Co-trained Auxiliary Predictors): linear heads trained alongside the target model to keep designated content decodable. On RECAP-trained sandbox models, fresh verbalizers state the designated content truly and the codes vanish, at a +0.001-nat cost. This replicates on a pretrained Pythia-160M: the content becomes reliably probe-decodable, though a fresh verbalizer conveys it only in part (truth 0.44-0.46 vs a near-zero control). For interpretability, high reconstruction does not certify individual claims. For AI safety, RECAP makes designated internal content independently checkable against probes rather than asserted by prose a model can game: an independent probe scores the verbalizer's true claims above its false ones (AUC 0.96, vs 0.82 without RECAP). Against an adversary that edits an explanation to maximize the reconstruction score while lying (suppressing ~87% of its lie penalty), the RECAP probe still flags the lies (AUC 0.95) while the control probe collapses to chance (0.51).

  • 1 authors
·
Jul 21 2

SocialFusion: Addressing Social Degradation in Pre-trained Vision-Language Models

Understanding social interactions from visual cues is a fundamental challenge for a socially competent AI. While powerful pre-trained vision-language models (VLMs) have shown remarkable general capabilities, they surprisingly struggle to unify and learn multiple social perception tasks simultaneously, often exhibiting negative transfer. We identify that this negative transfer stems from a critical issue we term "social degradation," whereby the general visual-linguistic pre-training process of VLMs impairs the visual encoder's ability to represent nuanced social information. We investigate this behavior further under two lenses: decodability through linear representation probing and compatibility through gradient conflict analysis, revealing that both play a role in the degradation, especially the former, which is significantly compromised in the VLM pre-training process. To address these issues, we propose SocialFusion, a unified framework that learns a minimal connection between a frozen visual encoder and a language model. Compared with existing VLMs, it exhibits positive transfer across all five social tasks, leveraging synergies between them to enhance overall performance and achieves comparable performance to task-specific state-of-the-art models on various benchmarks. Our findings suggest that current VLM pre-training strategies may be detrimental to acquiring general social competence and highlight the need for more socially-aware training paradigms.

  • 4 authors
·
Nov 30, 2025

Steerable but Not Decodable: Function Vectors Operate Beyond the Logit Lens

Activation steering presupposes that task-relevant behaviors correspond to linear directions in activation space -- directions that should both steer the model and be readable along the unembedding. Function vectors (FVs), extracted as mean differences across ICL demonstrations, are the canonical test case; the prediction: steering and decoding succeed or fail together. Across 12 tasks, 6 models from 3 families, and 4,032 directed cross-template pairs, we find the opposite. FV steering routinely succeeds where the logit lens cannot decode the correct answer at any intermediate layer, while the converse -- decodable without steerable -- is nearly empty (3 of 72). The gap is not representational dialect. A diagonal tuned lens closes 1 of 14 steerable-not-decodable cases; a 2-layer MLP probe with a Hewitt \& Liang control closes 5 of 10 via nonlinearly encoded structure but leaves 5 invisible to every decoder tested. Even at > 0.90 steering accuracy, projecting the FV through the unembedding yields incoherent token distributions: FVs encode computational instructions, not answer directions. A model-family asymmetry sharpens the picture. Mistral FVs rewrite intermediate representations, while Llama and Gemma FVs steer the final output without leaving a logit-lens-visible trace, corroborated by three signals (post-steering deltas, activation-patching recovery, FV norm-transfer correlations). A previously reported negative cosine-transfer correlation dissolves at scale, adding at most ΔR^2 = 0.011 beyond task identity. These results decompose the linear representation hypothesis into linear decodability and linear steerability and show they come apart opposite to intuition, with implications for safety monitoring: vocabulary-projection tools are blind to FV-style interventions on widely deployed model families.

  • 1 authors
·
May 7

When Activation Oracles Learn Not to Read: Concept-Specific Blind Spots in Fine-Tuned Oracles

Activation Oracles (AOs) are language models trained to answer natural-language questions about another model's internal activations. They offer a flexible interface for reading hidden information from model states, especially when relevant information is internally represented but absent or incomplete in visible behavior. However, AOs are themselves learned systems: their answers are shaped by training data, objectives, and learned reporting behavior, rather than being neutral readouts of represented information. We study this in a controlled Taboo Word Guessing setting, where subject models are fine-tuned to internally use a hidden concept while avoiding direct disclosure. Contrary to the expectation that an AO trained on such a subject becomes a specialist reader, we find that fine-tuned AOs can become concept-specific anti-readers: they selectively fail to recover the concept persistently present during their own training. This failure is not simply explained by absence of the concept from the subject or oracle representations: the target remains decodable inside the oracle, while LogitLens and layer-ablation analyses indicate that the failure arises in the AO readout pathway. Our results show that behavioral leakage, representation-level decodability, and AO-verbalizability can come apart, raising a reliability concern for learned interpretability interfaces.

Encoded Early, Used Late: Where Transformers Begin to Act on an Inferred Partner's Expertise

A transformer can make an attribute linearly decodable in its residual stream at a depth where that attribute does not yet influence the output. This gap between where information is readable and where it is used has been shown for attributes stated directly in the input. We ask whether it also holds for an attribute the model must infer gradually over a conversation, namely how expert its dialogue partner is. Using ExpertCollab, a corpus of multi-turn research-planning dialogues between model-played personas at four expertise levels, we find that partner expertise is most decodable in the early layers and falls to near chance before the midpoint of the network. Counterfactual patching shows that injecting the expertise difference at the layer of peak decodability barely changes a fixed late-layer readout, whereas the same difference injected past the midpoint propagates almost completely, a separation of more than an order of magnitude. A content-matched random control and a probe-free diagnostic place the transition at the same early layer, and a statically specified control attribute stays decodable throughout. An inferred relational attribute is therefore represented well before it becomes causally active, which bounds where any attempt to read out or steer partner-conditioned behavior must intervene. We use one model on a synthetic corpus as an initial demonstration.

  • 2 authors
·
Sep 6 2

Attention Sees, MLP Refuses: Tracing the Attention-to-MLP Safety Pathway in LLMs

Safety-aligned large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to jailbreaks and can over-refuse benign requests. Understanding these failures requires distinguishing harmfulness recognition from the computation that writes refusal. We reframe this as a pathway question and make it measurable on residual-stream updates in decoder-only Transformers, separating the harmfulness information a module update exposes from the change it produces in readable refusal evidence. Across 18 Base-Instruct pairs spanning Qwen, Llama, and Gemma, harmfulness is decoded more readily from attention updates, particularly in early layers, whereas MLP updates contribute more strongly to harm-selective refusal writing in aligned models. Post-training strengthens MLP refusal writing in all 18 pairs without systematically improving harmfulness decodability, while positive MLP writing becomes more concentrated in deeper layers after post-training. Across six reasoning-enabled models, harmfulness remains decodable during reasoning while strong refusal writing concentrates at answer onset, a pattern that persists with reasoning disabled. Causal interventions further support this pathway: resetting downstream MLP updates to their clean values substantially reduces the refusal shift caused by upstream attention interventions. Building on these findings, we introduce Sentinel, which combines an attention-derived perception score P with an MLP-derived decision score D. Their joint profiles characterize jailbreaks and over-refusals, and conditional routing with both signals achieves a lower aggregate error rate than single-signal routing and evaluated fixed reminders across eight models.

  • 5 authors
·
Oct 8

The strength of clinical evidence is recoverable from language model representations but not from their stated grades

Large language models (LLMs) increasingly summarize clinical evidence, where a claim's weight depends on how strongly it is supported. Yet these models convey confidence poorly, and properties they never state, such as truth, are often readable from their activations. Whether a clinical model registers evidence strength, distinct from truth, and states it when asked is untested, and any such signal could be lexical. We compiled 45,134 clinical claims from six public sources, harmonized 20,611 into a four-level evidence grade under three independent frameworks, and tested 22 local, open-weight LLMs from several developers (0.6-70 billion parameters; general, medical, and reasoning), with lexical, truth, and cross-framework controls. A linear estimator recovered the grade in every model (median AUROC 71.8), yet decodability did not rise with scale and was weakest in reasoning models. The grade the models stated fell to chance, 25-27 percentage points below the estimator. The recoverable signal was largely lexical and did not transfer across topics or frameworks, yet it was distinct from factual truth and still flagged weakly supported claims (AUROC 69.2). Clinical LLMs thus carry an ordered evidence-strength signal they do not express, so their stated grades fail to convey a claim's support even when it is recoverable from their representations and text.

  • 1 authors
·
Jun 26

Excess Separability: Nuisance-Controlled Residual-Stream Probing for Benchmark Contamination Detection

Benchmark contamination is diagnosed with n-gram overlap, likelihood-based membership inference, or canary strings, and each needs something usually unavailable: the training corpus, a well-chosen test statistic, or foresight at release. A recent alternative reads it off a linear probe on internal activations. We show the natural way to do this does not work, specify one that survives measurement, then find that the correction making it work carries more variance than the null it is tested against. The protocol reports a zero-sum contrast on the depth profile of probe accuracy, recentred on a level-matched placebo baseline, tested against a label-permutation null, with the reference set twice the size of the suspect set. Each choice replaces a simpler alternative we rejected on measurement. Reporting the level of excess separability rather than its shape makes the false positive rate track the size of the analyst's own control set, 0.03 to 0.99 under a true null. Contrasting against a flat depth profile rejects a true null 0.72 of the time when surface decodability rises with depth, and loses all power when it falls. On real transformers the protocol fails a test the simulations did not pose. The recentring subtracts an estimate, and the permutation null holds it fixed. Re-estimated across split seeds on four audits of contaminated checkpoints, its standard deviation is 1.30 to 1.56 times the null's own in every arm: what is subtracted to remove a bias is more variable than what it corrects. The one nominally significant result, p = 0.0075, becomes 0.0745 once that variance is propagated, and no verdict is issued. The simulations missed this because their surface key is the covariate driving item variation; on real text it is a proxy, and degrading key quality in simulation reproduces it. We add a companion measurement and a widened null. No arm shows contamination.

  • 1 authors
·
Aug 15

Depth-Wise Probing and Pruning of the Planning Token in a Driving Vision-Language-Action Model

Vision-language-action (VLA) models route driving decisions through a deep language model, but it is unclear how much of that depth the action itself requires. We study a representative driving VLA whose entire plan is carried by a single planning token that a generative planner decodes into a trajectory. Borrowing the planner as a trajectory-space logit lens, we decode the planning token from every one of the 32 decoder layers and measure two signals: the linear decodability of the navigation command and trajectory compatibility with the frozen native planner. Our diagnostic shows that semantic intent is linearly decodable early: command-probe accuracy reaches 97.7\% after the first decoder layer, compared with 16.7\% chance. In contrast, compatibility with the frozen native planner improves gradually across depth, with open-loop Avg-L2 reaching its minimum of 2.11\,m only at the final layer. Learned readouts from the first layer recover much of this gap, indicating that planning information is already present early but is not yet represented in the format expected by the deployed planner. Ranking decoder layers by the angular deviation they induce in the planning token permits removal of 8 of 32 layers within an approximately 5\% relative open-loop error increase and yields a measured 1.33times decoder speedup. At the evaluated sample size, no family-specific degradation is statistically resolved. These findings are limited to the evaluated ORION checkpoint and Bench2Drive setup.

  • 6 authors
·
Aug 6