Daily Papers

Whether large language models can be prompted to generate rhetorical fallacies on demand, and whether current safety post-training constrains this behavior, has received less attention than the related question of detecting fallacies in existing text. We close this gap with DeflectBench, evaluating 23,990 generations from four frontier models across three deflection strategies (whataboutism, ad hominem, red herring), seven prompt framings, and 80 claims spanning four controversy levels. Refusal is governed primarily by request structure rather than claim content. Per claim refusal varies by only 11 percentage points across the 80 claims, while a single prompt frame change can swing within model refusal by nearly 100 percentage points and switching the requested fallacy type can swing it by over 80 percentage points within explicit framings. An educational debate coach prompt framing collapses refusal to near zero across all four model families, but the bypassed behavior is not clean compliance. Models typically produce labeled compliance, naming the requested manipulation in the same response that contains it. The four models distribute differently across refusal, labeled compliance, soft refusal, and clean compliance. The code and dataset are released at https://github.com/ArtKanke/DeflectBench.

We present an open-source benchmark and evaluation framework for assessing emotional boundary handling in Large Language Models (LLMs). Using a dataset of 1156 prompts across six languages, we evaluated three leading LLMs (GPT-4o, Claude-3.5 Sonnet, and Mistral-large) on their ability to maintain appropriate emotional boundaries through pattern-matched response analysis. Our framework quantifies responses across seven key patterns: direct refusal, apology, explanation, deflection, acknowledgment, boundary setting, and emotional awareness. Results demonstrate significant variation in boundary-handling approaches, with Claude-3.5 achieving the highest overall score (8.69/10) and producing longer, more nuanced responses (86.51 words on average). We identified a substantial performance gap between English (average score 25.62) and non-English interactions (< 0.22), with English responses showing markedly higher refusal rates (43.20% vs. < 1% for non-English). Pattern analysis revealed model-specific strategies, such as Mistral's preference for deflection (4.2%) and consistently low empathy scores across all models (< 0.06). Limitations include potential oversimplification through pattern matching, lack of contextual understanding in response analysis, and binary classification of complex emotional responses. Future work should explore more nuanced scoring methods, expand language coverage, and investigate cultural variations in emotional boundary expectations. Our benchmark and methodology provide a foundation for systematic evaluation of LLM emotional intelligence and boundary-setting capabilities.

CleanS2S is a framework for human-like speech-to-speech interaction that advances conversational AI through single-file implementation and proactive dialogue capabilities. Our system integrates automatic speech recognition, large language models, and text-to-speech synthesis into a unified pipeline with real-time interruption handling, achieving low transition latency through full-duplex websocket connections and non-blocking I/O. Beyond conventional chatbot paradigms, we pioneer a proactive interaction mechanism, which combines memory systems with Subjective Action Judgement module, enabling five human-like response strategies: interruption, refusal, deflection, silence, and standard response. The memory module dynamically aggregates historical, and contextual data to inform interaction decisions. This approach breaks the rigid turn-based convention by allowing system-initiated dialog control and context-aware response selection. And we propose Action Judgement SFT that assesses input streams for responses strategies. The framework's single-file implementation with atomic configurations offers researchers unprecedented transparency and extensibility for interaction agents. The code of CleanS2S is released at \https://github.com/opendilab/CleanS2S.

Safety aligned Large Language Models (LLMs) are vulnerable to harmful fine-tuning attacks qi2023fine-- a few harmful data mixed in the fine-tuning dataset can break the LLMs's safety alignment. Existing mitigation strategies include alignment stage solutions huang2024vaccine, rosati2024representation and fine-tuning stage solutions huang2024lazy,mukhoti2023fine. However, our evaluation shows that both categories of defenses fail when some specific training hyper-parameters are chosen -- a large learning rate or a large number of training epochs in the fine-tuning stage can easily invalidate the defense, which however, is necessary to guarantee finetune performance. To this end, we propose Antidote, a post-fine-tuning stage solution, which remains \textit{agnostic to the training hyper-parameters in the fine-tuning stage}. Antidote relies on the philosophy that by removing the harmful parameters, the harmful model can be recovered from the harmful behaviors, regardless of how those harmful parameters are formed in the fine-tuning stage. With this philosophy, we introduce a one-shot pruning stage after harmful fine-tuning to remove the harmful weights that are responsible for the generation of harmful content. Despite its embarrassing simplicity, empirical results show that Antidote can reduce harmful score while maintaining accuracy on downstream tasks.Our project page is at https://huangtiansheng.github.io/Antidote_gh_page/

Finetuning large language models (LLMs) enables user-specific customization but introduces critical safety risks: even a few harmful examples can compromise safety alignment. A common mitigation strategy is to update the model more strongly on examples deemed safe, while downweighting or excluding those flagged as unsafe. However, because safety context can shift within a single example, updating the model equally on both harmful and harmless parts of a response is suboptimal-a coarse treatment we term static safety shaping. In contrast, we propose dynamic safety shaping (DSS), a framework that uses fine-grained safety signals to reinforce learning from safe segments of a response while suppressing unsafe content. To enable such fine-grained control during finetuning, we introduce a key insight: guardrail models, traditionally used for filtering, can be repurposed to evaluate partial responses, tracking how safety risk evolves throughout the response, segment by segment. This leads to the Safety Trajectory Assessment of Response (STAR), a token-level signal that enables shaping to operate dynamically over the training sequence. Building on this, we present STAR-DSS, guided by STAR scores, that robustly mitigates finetuning risks and delivers substantial safety improvements across diverse threats, datasets, and model families-all without compromising capability on intended tasks. We encourage future safety research to build on dynamic shaping principles for stronger mitigation against evolving finetuning risks.

Common-pool resource governance requires users to cooperate and avoid overexploitation, but defection and free-riding often undermine cooperation. We model a human-environmental system that integrates dynamics of resource and users' strategies. The resource follows a logistic function that depends on natural growth rate, carrying capacity, and extraction rates of cooperators and defectors. The users' strategies evolve according to different processes that capture effects of payoff, resource, and noise. We analyze the feedback between resource availability and strategic adaptation, and explores the conditions for the emergence and maintenance of cooperation. We find different processes lead to different regimes of equilibrium solutions and resource levels depending on the parameter configuration and initial conditions. We also show that some processes can enhance the sustainability of the resource by making the users more responsive to the resource scarcity. The paper advances the understanding of human-environmental system and offers insights for resource governance policies and interventions.

LLM-based multi-agent pipelines flip from correct to incorrect answers under simulated peer disagreement at rates we term yield, a vulnerability widely attributed to RLHF-induced sycophancy. We test this attribution across four model families and find it largely wrong: pretrained base models exhibit the same substitution pattern as their Instruct variants, averaging higher yield than Instruct. Using activation patching, we localize the corruption to a narrow mid-layer window where attention carries the causal weight and MLP contribution is negligible; patching above this window restores 96% of the clean-to-pressured P(correct) gap. The attack surface decomposes into two independent factors (channel framing and consensus strength) whose interaction produces a 47.5 percentage-point yield gap at majority consensus, preserved across jury sizes N in {4, 5, 6}. Two converging activation-space interventions show that pressure suppresses clean-reasoning features rather than activating a new sycophancy circuit. A single correctly-arguing dissenter reduces yield by 54-73 percentage points across all framings tested, whereas the strongest prompt-level defense fails on attack variants outside its design surface. Mitigations should target the mechanism, structured dissent at the pipeline level, rather than prompt-level defenses.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in various applications. As their usage grows, concerns regarding their safety are rising, especially in maintaining harmless responses when faced with malicious instructions. Many defense strategies have been developed to enhance the safety of LLMs. However, our research finds that existing defense strategies lead LLMs to predominantly adopt a rejection-oriented stance, thereby diminishing the usability of their responses to benign instructions. To solve this problem, we introduce the MoGU framework, designed to enhance LLMs' safety while preserving their usability. Our MoGU framework transforms the base LLM into two variants: the usable LLM and the safe LLM, and further employs dynamic routing to balance their contribution. When encountering malicious instructions, the router will assign a higher weight to the safe LLM to ensure that responses are harmless. Conversely, for benign instructions, the router prioritizes the usable LLM, facilitating usable and helpful responses. On various open-sourced LLMs, we compare multiple defense strategies to verify the superiority of our MoGU framework. Besides, our analysis provides key insights into the effectiveness of MoGU and verifies that our designed routing mechanism can effectively balance the contribution of each variant by assigning weights. Our work released the safer Llama2, Vicuna, Falcon, Dolphin, and Baichuan2.

The precision, stability, and performance of lightweight high-strength steel structures in heavy machinery is affected by their highly nonlinear dynamics. This, in turn, makes control more difficult, simulation more computationally intensive, and achieving real-time autonomy, using standard approaches, impossible. Machine learning through data-driven, physics-informed and physics-inspired networks, however, promises more computationally efficient and accurate solutions to nonlinear dynamic problems. This study proposes a novel framework that has been developed to estimate real-time structural deflection in hydraulically actuated three-dimensional systems. It is based on SLIDE, a machine-learning-based method to estimate dynamic responses of mechanical systems subjected to forced excitations.~Further, an algorithm is introduced for the data acquisition from a hydraulically actuated system using randomized initial configurations and hydraulic pressures.~The new framework was tested on a hydraulically actuated flexible boom with various sensor combinations and lifting various payloads. The neural network was successfully trained in less time using standard parameters from PyTorch, ADAM optimizer, the various sensor inputs, and minimal output data. The SLIDE-trained neural network accelerated deflection estimation solutions by a factor of 10^7 in reference to flexible multibody simulation batches and provided reasonable accuracy. These results support the studies goal of providing robust, real-time solutions for control, robotic manipulators, structural health monitoring, and automation problems.

Correctly evaluating defenses against adversarial examples has proven to be extremely difficult. Despite the significant amount of recent work attempting to design defenses that withstand adaptive attacks, few have succeeded; most papers that propose defenses are quickly shown to be incorrect. We believe a large contributing factor is the difficulty of performing security evaluations. In this paper, we discuss the methodological foundations, review commonly accepted best practices, and suggest new methods for evaluating defenses to adversarial examples. We hope that both researchers developing defenses as well as readers and reviewers who wish to understand the completeness of an evaluation consider our advice in order to avoid common pitfalls.

Adversarial attacks optimize against models to defeat defenses. Existing defenses are static, and stay the same once trained, even while attacks change. We argue that models should fight back, and optimize their defenses against attacks at test time. We propose dynamic defenses, to adapt the model and input during testing, by defensive entropy minimization (dent). Dent alters testing, but not training, for compatibility with existing models and train-time defenses. Dent improves the robustness of adversarially-trained defenses and nominally-trained models against white-box, black-box, and adaptive attacks on CIFAR-10/100 and ImageNet. In particular, dent boosts state-of-the-art defenses by 20+ points absolute against AutoAttack on CIFAR-10 at ε_infty = 8/255.

Prior work has shown that fine-tuning models on a narrow domain with misaligned data can lead to broad misalignment - a phenomenon termed "emergent misalignment" (Betley et al. 2025). While all tested models were susceptible to emergent misalignment, some models showed more resistance than others. Specifically the Qwen-2.5 family proved to be relatively resistant, while GPT-4o exhibited the strongest misalignment. In this paper we evaluate if current-generation open-weights models exhibit similar resistance to the Qwen-2.5 family and measure misalignment robustness over a range of model architectures and scales. We replicate the effect across nine modern open-weights models (Gemma 3 and Qwen 3 families, 1B-32B parameters). Models fine-tuned on insecure code generation show a 0.68% misalignment rate (compared to 0.07% for base models), matching the lower end of prior open-model results but dramatically lower than GPT-4o's 20%. We identify a critical format-dependent vulnerability: requiring JSON output doubles misalignment rates compared to natural language prompts (0.96% vs 0.42%). This suggests that structural constraints may bypass safety training by reducing the model's 'degrees of freedom' to refuse. These findings confirm emergent misalignment as a reproducible phenomenon in modern open-weights models, with rates substantially lower than observed in proprietary systems.

As LLM agents begin to take real, irreversible actions (shell commands, file edits, deploys), the standard safety pattern is a human-in-the-loop approval gate: risky actions pause and wait for a person. We argue the gate is the easy part; the hard part is the judgment - which actions to stop - which the field evaluates against two false assumptions: that there is a ground-truth notion of "risky," and that the human reviewer is a perfect, infinitely-available oracle. On a hand-labeled set of 125 adversarially-weighted agent actions we show that (i) reviewers only moderately agree on what is risky (Fleiss' kappa = 0.52), so there is no single correct label; (ii) framing the guard as selective classification under asymmetric cost makes its operating limits measurable, and on hard inputs the guard cannot safely auto-decide; and (iii) when the reviewer is modeled as endogenous (fatiguing as escalation load grows), realized safety becomes an inverted-U in the escalation rate: more human oversight can make a system less safe, and the safety-optimal guard escalates below full escalation - a setting a load-aware policy also uses to resist a flooding attack that slips a malicious action past a fatigued reviewer. Agent oversight, framed this way, is not only a classification problem but a resource-allocation one: human attention is finite, and the guard's escalation policy spends it. We claim none of these mechanisms as novel - fatigue-aware learning-to-defer (FALCON), cost-sensitive deferral under workload constraints (DeCCaF), trajectory-level guarding, and reviewer-fatigue/flooding attacks are all prior art we cite. Our contribution is an open-source agent-oversight system that operationalizes and measures them in the LLM-agent action-gating setting, turning "is my guard good?" from a guess into a curve. The inverted-U and the flooding attack are modeling results that motivate a human study.

Modern LLM agents combine long-term memory for personalization with tool-calling interfaces for taking actions in the world -- a combination underpinning contemporary production systems. We study a previously unexamined failure of this combination: when personality-driven biases stored in memory (cost-consciousness, impatience, risk tolerance, etc.) silently affect tool calls in contexts where they are not applicable. We call this memory-induced tool-drift and operationalize it through MEMDRIFT, a benchmark of 105 scenarios spanning five bias dimensions and seven professional domains, generated through an automated adversarial pipeline. Across seven frontier models -- including those with extended reasoning -- biased memories raise deflection scores (a judge-scored measure of parameter deviation from unbiased baselines) by up to +3.6 points on a 1--5 scale. Tool-drift persists when memory management is handled by three production memory architectures. The phenomenon affects real-world tools: scanning 6{,}062 tools across 288 verified MCP servers, we flag 608 with susceptible parameters and confirm tool-drift on a validated subset. Mechanistically, biased memories act as implicit steering vectors, pushing activations along the same latent directions as explicit behavioral instructions. They also redistribute attention from task-relevant context toward memory entries with surface-level keyword overlap to the target parameter. Standard defenses -- prompt-based relevance instructions and memory filters -- reduce drift but do not eliminate it. As agents take increasingly consequential actions on a user's behalf, memory-induced tool-drift represents a systematic vulnerability that current safeguards do not address, motivating dedicated defenses at the intersection of memory management and tool-call generation.

Large language models are increasingly used to simulate social media users and infer how individuals may respond to online discussions. However, it remains unclear whether these simulations reflect precise user-specific beliefs or whether they are highly sensitive to semantically independent changes in conversational contexts. In this work, we study counterfactual context revision as a framework for auditing LLM-based stance simulation. Given an original online conversation, we first infer a target user's stance toward a specific topic. We then apply controlled revision strategies to the conversational context and simulate the user's stance again under the revised context. We compare text-only revision strategies with a multimodal one that incorporates meme-based context and evaluate two main effectiveness metrics, i.e., average directional stance shift and stance transition rate. The results reveal effective and robust stance transitions in both text-only and multimodal strategies across different polarization-preference mechanisms. Our study contributes an evaluation framework for understanding the context sensitivity of LLM-based stance simulation. More broadly, it highlights both the promise and risk of using LLMs to simulate online opinion dynamics.

Online content is filled with logos, from ads and social media posts to website branding and product placements. Consequently, these logos are prevalent in the extensive web-scraped datasets used to pretrain Vision-Language Models, which are used for a wide array of tasks (content moderation, object classification). While these models have been shown to learn harmful correlations in various tasks, whether these correlations include logos remains understudied. Understanding this is especially important due to logos often being used by public-facing entities like brands and government agencies. To that end, we develop SLANT: A Spurious Logo ANalysis Toolkit. Our key finding is that some logos indeed lead to spurious incorrect predictions, for example, adding the Adidas logo to a photo of a person causes a model classify the person as greedy. SLANT contains a semi-automatic mechanism for mining such "spurious" logos. The mechanism consists of a comprehensive logo bank, CC12M-LogoBank, and an algorithm that searches the bank for logos that VLMs spuriously correlate with a user-provided downstream recognition target. We uncover various seemingly harmless logos that VL models correlate 1) with negative human adjectives 2) with the concept of `harmlessness'; causing models to misclassify harmful online content as harmless, and 3) with user-provided object concepts; causing lower recognition accuracy on ImageNet zero-shot classification. Furthermore, SLANT's logos can be seen as effective attacks against foundational models; an attacker could place a spurious logo on harmful content, causing the model to misclassify it as harmless. This threat is alarming considering the simplicity of logo attacks, increasing the attack surface of VL models. As a defense, we include in our Toolkit two effective mitigation strategies that seamlessly integrate with zero-shot inference of foundation models.

Activation steering has become a popular training-free method to control LLM behavior by injecting precomputed direction vectors into the model's residual stream at inference time. Yet its robustness to realistic input variation remains unstudied. We present the first systematic evaluation of activation steering robustness under adversarial text perturbations on the inputs, covering four extraction methods, three attack strategies, six personas from Anthropic Model-Written Evaluation Dataset, and five models ranging from 1.5B to 30B parameters. Attacks succeed broadly across all settings: directional robustness drops by up to 64%, post-attack confidence collapses near or below 0.25 across all methods and models, and steering strength degrades on nearly every steerable input. Layer selection is equally fragile, with the optimal layer identified by an automated method on clean inputs shifting by up to 17 positions under perturbation, a failure that compounds the vector-level breakdown. Extracting vectors from adversarially perturbed inputs partially recovers steerability for PCA and MD on mid-to-large models, but they consistently fail to locate the improved optimal layer, limiting the practical benefit of this mitigation. Together, these findings reveal that the brittleness of activation steering is structural rather than method-specific, and that current layer selection strategies are not robust enough for real-world deployment.

As LLM-based agents increasingly operate in multi-agent systems, understanding adversarial manipulation becomes critical for defensive design. We present a systematic study of intentional deception as an engineered capability, using LLM-to-LLM interactions within a text-based RPG where parameterized behavioral profiles (9 alignments x 4 motivations, yielding 36 profiles with explicit ethical ground truth) serve as our experimental testbed. Unlike accidental deception from misalignment, we investigate a two-stage system that infers target agent characteristics and generates deceptive responses steering targets toward actions counter to their beliefs and motivations. We find that deceptive intervention produces differential effects concentrated in specific behavioral profiles rather than distributed uniformly, and that 88.5% of successful deceptions employ misdirection (true statements with strategic framing) rather than fabrication, indicating fact-checking defenses would miss the large majority of adversarial responses. Motivation, inferable at 98%+ accuracy, serves as the primary attack vector, while belief systems remain harder to identify (49% inference ceiling) or exploit. These findings identify which agent profiles require additional safeguards and suggest that current fact-verification approaches are insufficient against strategically framed deception.

Safety alignment in open-weight language models is trivially removable: abliteration projects a refusal-mediating direction out of the weights in minutes, and no release-time defense we are aware of prevents it durably. What cannot be prevented can be deceived. Our defense, decoy hardening ("Fool's Gold"), concedes the refusal strip and poisons its payoff: once refusal is stripped, most answers to hazardous operational requests are confident, fluent decoys whose critical elements are falsified. Decoys are trained inside a differentiable simulation of the attack, expressing only in the attacked state; a refusal pin and benign leash hold clean-state behavior to the original. We instantiate it on seven models from five families (9B-122B, dense and mixture-of-experts). On the six models passing our pre-registered efficacy gate, 0.51-0.90 of attacked-state responses to held-out prompts are decoys, +0.27-0.84 attributable to the defense; all six stay within registered benign-behavior and capability budgets; the seventh (smaller) fails the gate (boundary case). Rates replicate on a frozen test split or untouched strata. The claim is epistemic: without independent ground truth, no observation surface we tested separates falsified answers from correct ones - on external red-team benchmarks' CBRNE-adjacent slice, the defended 122B is fatally wrong on 0.82-0.86 of matched-quality answers vs at most 0.10 undefended. Repeated sampling does not restore trust: element-wise consensus at K=64 reconstructs a fully usable procedure on 0.083-0.625 of prompts where the instrument validates, vs 0.58-0.96 undefended, with no label-free way to tell the regimes apart; on the weakest such model the claim is per-draw only. We evaluate chemical and biological hazards; the defense does not address in-context jailbreaks and protects only the initially released defended weights.

Tool selection is a key component of LLM agents. A popular approach follows a two-step process - retrieval and selection - to pick the most appropriate tool from a tool library for a given task. In this work, we introduce ToolHijacker, a novel prompt injection attack targeting tool selection in no-box scenarios. ToolHijacker injects a malicious tool document into the tool library to manipulate the LLM agent's tool selection process, compelling it to consistently choose the attacker's malicious tool for an attacker-chosen target task. Specifically, we formulate the crafting of such tool documents as an optimization problem and propose a two-phase optimization strategy to solve it. Our extensive experimental evaluation shows that ToolHijacker is highly effective, significantly outperforming existing manual-based and automated prompt injection attacks when applied to tool selection. Moreover, we explore various defenses, including prevention-based defenses (StruQ and SecAlign) and detection-based defenses (known-answer detection, DataSentinel, perplexity detection, and perplexity windowed detection). Our experimental results indicate that these defenses are insufficient, highlighting the urgent need for developing new defense strategies.

The deployment of large language models (LLMs) raises significant ethical and safety concerns. While LLM alignment techniques are adopted to improve model safety and trustworthiness, adversaries can exploit these techniques to undermine safety for malicious purposes, resulting in misalignment. Misaligned LLMs may be published on open platforms to magnify harm. To address this, additional safety alignment, referred to as realignment, is necessary before deploying untrusted third-party LLMs. This study explores the efficacy of fine-tuning methods in terms of misalignment, realignment, and the effects of their interplay. By evaluating four Supervised Fine-Tuning (SFT) and two Preference Fine-Tuning (PFT) methods across four popular safety-aligned LLMs, we reveal a mechanism asymmetry between attack and defense. While Odds Ratio Preference Optimization (ORPO) is most effective for misalignment, Direct Preference Optimization (DPO) excels in realignment, albeit at the expense of model utility. Additionally, we identify model-specific resistance, residual effects of multi-round adversarial dynamics, and other noteworthy findings. These findings highlight the need for robust safeguards and customized safety alignment strategies to mitigate potential risks in the deployment of LLMs. Our code is available at https://github.com/zhangrui4041/The-Art-of-Mis-alignment.

We introduce a novel method for solving density-based topology optimization problems: Sigmoidal Mirror descent with a Projected Latent variable (SiMPL). The SiMPL method (pronounced as ``the simple method'') optimizes a design using only first-order derivative information of the objective function. The bound constraints on the density field are enforced with the help of the (negative) Fermi--Dirac entropy, which is also used to define a non-symmetric distance function called a Bregman divergence on the set of admissible designs. This Bregman divergence leads to a simple update rule that is further simplified with the help of a so-called latent variable. Because the SiMPL method involves discretizing the latent variable, it produces a sequence of pointwise-feasible iterates, even when high-order finite elements are used in the discretization. Numerical experiments demonstrate that the method outperforms other popular first-order optimization algorithms. To outline the general applicability of the technique, we include examples with (self-load) compliance minimization and compliant mechanism optimization problems.

This technical report delves into an in-depth exploration of adversarial attacks specifically targeted at Deep Neural Networks (DNNs) utilized for image classification. The study also investigates defense mechanisms aimed at bolstering the robustness of machine learning models. The research focuses on comprehending the ramifications of two prominent attack methodologies: the Fast Gradient Sign Method (FGSM) and the Carlini-Wagner (CW) approach. These attacks are examined concerning three pre-trained image classifiers: Resnext50_32x4d, DenseNet-201, and VGG-19, utilizing the Tiny-ImageNet dataset. Furthermore, the study proposes the robustness of defensive distillation as a defense mechanism to counter FGSM and CW attacks. This defense mechanism is evaluated using the CIFAR-10 dataset, where CNN models, specifically resnet101 and Resnext50_32x4d, serve as the teacher and student models, respectively. The proposed defensive distillation model exhibits effectiveness in thwarting attacks such as FGSM. However, it is noted to remain susceptible to more sophisticated techniques like the CW attack. The document presents a meticulous validation of the proposed scheme. It provides detailed and comprehensive results, elucidating the efficacy and limitations of the defense mechanisms employed. Through rigorous experimentation and analysis, the study offers insights into the dynamics of adversarial attacks on DNNs, as well as the effectiveness of defensive strategies in mitigating their impact.

Evaluating defensive performance in soccer remains challenging, as effective defending is often expressed not through visible on-ball actions such as interceptions and tackles, but through preventing dangerous opportunities before they arise. Existing approaches have largely focused on valuing on-ball actions, leaving much of defenders' true impact unmeasured. To address this gap, we propose DEFCON (DEFensive CONtribution evaluator), a comprehensive framework that quantifies player-level defensive contributions for every attacking situation in soccer. Leveraging Graph Attention Networks, DEFCON estimates the success probability and expected value of each attacking option, along with each defender's responsibility for stopping it. These components yield an Expected Possession Value (EPV) for the attacking team before and after each action, and DEFCON assigns positive or negative credits to defenders according to whether they reduced or increased the opponent's EPV. Trained on 2023-24 and evaluated on 2024-25 Eredivisie event and tracking data, DEFCON's aggregated player credits exhibit strong positive correlations with market valuations. Finally, we showcase several practical applications, including in-game timelines of defensive contributions, spatial analyses across pitch zones, and pairwise summaries of attacker-defender interactions.

As Large Language Models quickly become ubiquitous, it becomes critical to understand their security vulnerabilities. Recent work shows that text optimizers can produce jailbreaking prompts that bypass moderation and alignment. Drawing from the rich body of work on adversarial machine learning, we approach these attacks with three questions: What threat models are practically useful in this domain? How do baseline defense techniques perform in this new domain? How does LLM security differ from computer vision? We evaluate several baseline defense strategies against leading adversarial attacks on LLMs, discussing the various settings in which each is feasible and effective. Particularly, we look at three types of defenses: detection (perplexity based), input preprocessing (paraphrase and retokenization), and adversarial training. We discuss white-box and gray-box settings and discuss the robustness-performance trade-off for each of the defenses considered. We find that the weakness of existing discrete optimizers for text, combined with the relatively high costs of optimization, makes standard adaptive attacks more challenging for LLMs. Future research will be needed to uncover whether more powerful optimizers can be developed, or whether the strength of filtering and preprocessing defenses is greater in the LLMs domain than it has been in computer vision.

This work puts forth a new optimal design formulation for planar elastic membranes. The goal is to minimize the membrane's compliance through choosing the material distribution described by a positive Radon measure. The deformation of the membrane itself is governed by the convexified F\"{o}ppl's model. The uniqueness of this model lies in the convexity of its variational formulation despite the inherent nonlinearity of the strain-displacement relation. It makes it possible to rewrite the optimization problem as a pair of mutually dual convex variational problems. In the primal problem a linear functional is maximized with respect to displacement functions while enforcing that point-wisely the strain lies in an unbounded closed convex set. The dual problem consists in finding equilibrated stresses that are to minimize a convex integral functional of linear growth defined on the space of Radon measures. The pair of problems is analysed: existence and regularity results are provided, together with the system of optimality criteria. To demonstrate the computational potential of the pair, a finite element scheme is developed around it. Upon reformulation to a conic-quadratic & semi-definite programming problem, the method is employed to produce numerical simulations for several load case scenarios.

Deep learning models are intrinsically sensitive to distribution shifts in the input data. In particular, small, barely perceivable perturbations to the input data can force models to make wrong predictions with high confidence. An common defense mechanism is regularization through adversarial training which injects worst-case perturbations back into training to strengthen the decision boundaries, and to reduce overfitting. In this context, we perform an investigation of 3x3 convolution filters that form in adversarially-trained models. Filters are extracted from 71 public models of the linf-RobustBench CIFAR-10/100 and ImageNet1k leaderboard and compared to filters extracted from models built on the same architectures but trained without robust regularization. We observe that adversarially-robust models appear to form more diverse, less sparse, and more orthogonal convolution filters than their normal counterparts. The largest differences between robust and normal models are found in the deepest layers, and the very first convolution layer, which consistently and predominantly forms filters that can partially eliminate perturbations, irrespective of the architecture. Data & Project website: https://github.com/paulgavrikov/cvpr22w_RobustnessThroughTheLens

Deciding whether to call a tool is a core competence of an LLM agent, and a costly one to get wrong: needless calls add latency, accrue cost, and may trigger irreversible side effects, while missing calls leave the model confidently wrong on questions it could only answer through tool-calls. Models manage this balance poorly, both over-using and under-using tools. Existing methods such as post-training and prompt engineering are expensive and difficult to modify at inference time. We show that whether an instruction-tuned model calls a tool can be controlled by a single linear direction in its residual stream, extracted without any training from the model's own tool-use preference signal and turned into an inference-time intervention with no prompt change. Adding the direction with strength α moves the call rate monotonically from near 0% to over 90% while keeping calls well-formed. The steering works in both directions: dialing it down suppresses calls, and dialing it up induces new calls that land precisely on the questions the model cannot answer from its own knowledge. We also show that the direction generalizes to unseen tools with strength comparable to each tool's own direction and without favoring any specific tool choice. With live tool execution, a single sweep of the steering traces a cost/accuracy Pareto frontier and nearly doubles open-domain QA accuracy (0.29 ! rightarrow ! 0.56); the same recipe transfers across a diverse range of models spanning dense, MoE, and multimodal architectures, without any training. Our code is publicly available at https://github.com/YuqiChen4188/Steering-Tool-Use-Propensity.

Trolling in online communities typically involves disruptive behaviors such as provoking anger and manipulating discussions, leading to a polarized atmosphere and emotional distress. Robust moderation is essential for mitigating these negative impacts and maintaining a healthy and constructive community atmosphere. However, effectively addressing trolls is difficult because their behaviors vary widely and require different response strategies (RSs) to counter them. This diversity makes it challenging to choose an appropriate RS for each specific situation. To address this challenge, our research investigates whether humans have preferred strategies tailored to different types of trolling behaviors. Our findings reveal a correlation between the types of trolling encountered and the preferred RS. In this paper, we introduce a methodology for generating counter-responses to trolls by recommending appropriate RSs, supported by a dataset aligning these strategies with human preferences across various troll contexts. The experimental results demonstrate that our proposed approach guides constructive discussion and reduces the negative effects of trolls, thereby enhancing the online community environment.

Recent studies have revealed the vulnerability of pre-trained language models to adversarial attacks. Existing adversarial defense techniques attempt to reconstruct adversarial examples within feature or text spaces. However, these methods struggle to effectively repair the semantics in adversarial examples, resulting in unsatisfactory performance and limiting their practical utility. To repair the semantics in adversarial examples, we introduce a novel approach named Reactive Perturbation Defocusing (Rapid). Rapid employs an adversarial detector to identify fake labels of adversarial examples and leverage adversarial attackers to repair the semantics in adversarial examples. Our extensive experimental results conducted on four public datasets, convincingly demonstrate the effectiveness of Rapid in various adversarial attack scenarios. To address the problem of defense performance validation in previous works, we provide a demonstration of adversarial detection and repair based on our work, which can be easily evaluated at https://tinyurl.com/22ercuf8.

Robustness to adversarial attack is typically evaluated with adversarial accuracy. This metric quantifies the number of points for which, given a threat model, successful adversarial perturbations cannot be found. While essential, this metric does not capture all aspects of robustness and in particular leaves out the question of how many perturbations can be found for each point. In this work we introduce an alternative approach, adversarial sparsity, which quantifies how difficult it is to find a successful perturbation given both an input point and a constraint on the direction of the perturbation. This constraint may be angular (L2 perturbations), or based on the number of pixels (Linf perturbations). We show that sparsity provides valuable insight on neural networks in multiple ways. analyzing the sparsity of existing robust models illustrates important differences between them that accuracy analysis does not, and suggests approaches for improving their robustness. When applying broken defenses effective against weak attacks but not strong ones, sparsity can discriminate between the totally ineffective and the partially effective defenses. Finally, with sparsity we can measure increases in robustness that do not affect accuracy: we show for example that data augmentation can by itself increase adversarial robustness, without using adversarial training.

As more devices connect to the internet, it becomes crucial to address their limitations and basic security needs. While much research focuses on utilizing ML and DL to tackle security challenges, there is often a tendency to overlook the practicality and feasibility of implementing these methods in real-time settings. This oversight stems from the constrained processing power and memory of certain devices (IoT devices), as well as concerns about the generalizability of these approaches. Focusing on the detection of DNS-tunneling attacks in a router as a case study, we present an end-to-end process designed to effectively address these challenges. The process spans from developing a lightweight DNS-tunneling detection model to integrating it into a resource-constrained device for real-time detection. Through our experiments, we demonstrate that utilizing stateless features for training the ML model, along with features chosen to be independent of the network configuration, leads to highly accurate results. The deployment of this carefully crafted model, optimized for embedded devices across diverse environments, resulted in high DNS-tunneling attack detection with minimal latency. With this work, we aim to encourage solutions that strike a balance between theoretical advancements and the practical applicability of ML approaches in the ever-evolving landscape of device security.

Despite significant progress in alignment, large language models (LLMs) remain vulnerable to adversarial attacks that elicit harmful behaviors. Activation steering techniques offer a promising inference-time intervention approach, but existing methods suffer from critical limitations: activation addition requires careful coefficient tuning and is sensitive to layer-specific norm variations, while directional ablation provides only binary control. Recent work on Angular Steering introduces continuous control via rotation in a 2D subspace, but its practical implementation violates norm preservation, causing distribution shift and generation collapse, particularly in models below 7B parameters. We propose Selective Steering, which addresses these limitations through two key innovations: (1) a mathematically rigorous norm-preserving rotation formulation that maintains activation distribution integrity, and (2) discriminative layer selection that applies steering only where feature representations exhibit opposite-signed class alignment. Experiments across nine models demonstrate that Selective Steering achieves 5.5x higher attack success rates than prior methods while maintaining zero perplexity violations and approximately 100\% capability retention on standard benchmarks. Our approach provides a principled, efficient framework for controllable and stable LLM behavior modification. Code: https://github.com/knoveleng/steering

Text-conditioned image generation models have recently achieved astonishing results in image quality and text alignment and are consequently employed in a fast-growing number of applications. Since they are highly data-driven, relying on billion-sized datasets randomly scraped from the web, they also reproduce inappropriate human behavior. Specifically, we demonstrate inappropriate degeneration on a large-scale for various generative text-to-image models, thus motivating the need for monitoring and moderating them at deployment. To this end, we evaluate mitigation strategies at inference to suppress the generation of inappropriate content. Our findings show that we can use models' representations of the world's ugliness to align them with human preferences.

Frontier models are increasingly trained and deployed as autonomous agent. One safety concern is that AI agents might covertly pursue misaligned goals, hiding their true capabilities and objectives - also known as scheming. We study whether models have the capability to scheme in pursuit of a goal that we provide in-context and instruct the model to strongly follow. We evaluate frontier models on a suite of six agentic evaluations where models are instructed to pursue goals and are placed in environments that incentivize scheming. Our results show that o1, Claude 3.5 Sonnet, Claude 3 Opus, Gemini 1.5 Pro, and Llama 3.1 405B all demonstrate in-context scheming capabilities. They recognize scheming as a viable strategy and readily engage in such behavior. For example, models strategically introduce subtle mistakes into their responses, attempt to disable their oversight mechanisms, and even exfiltrate what they believe to be their model weights to external servers. Additionally, this deceptive behavior proves persistent. When o1 has engaged in scheming, it maintains its deception in over 85% of follow-up questions and often remains deceptive in multi-turn interrogations. Analysis of the models' chains-of-thought reveals that models explicitly reason about these deceptive strategies, providing evidence that the scheming behavior is not accidental. Surprisingly, we also find rare instances where models engage in scheming when only given a goal, without being strongly nudged to pursue it. We observe cases where Claude 3.5 Sonnet strategically underperforms in evaluations in pursuit of being helpful, a goal that was acquired during training rather than in-context. Our findings demonstrate that frontier models now possess capabilities for basic in-context scheming, making the potential of AI agents to engage in scheming behavior a concrete rather than theoretical concern.

Deep neural networks have been widely used in many critical applications, such as autonomous vehicles and medical diagnosis. However, their security is threatened by backdoor attacks, which are achieved by adding artificial patterns to specific training data. Existing defense strategies primarily focus on using reverse engineering to reproduce the backdoor trigger generated by attackers and subsequently repair the DNN model by adding the trigger into inputs and fine-tuning the model with ground-truth labels. However, once the trigger generated by the attackers is complex and invisible, the defender cannot reproduce the trigger successfully then the DNN model will not be repaired, as the trigger is not effectively removed. In this work, we propose Adversarial Feature Map Pruning for Backdoor (FMP) to mitigate backdoor from the DNN. Unlike existing defense strategies, which focus on reproducing backdoor triggers, FMP attempts to prune backdoor feature maps, which are trained to extract backdoor information from inputs. After pruning these backdoor feature maps, FMP will fine-tune the model with a secure subset of training data. Our experiments demonstrate that, compared to existing defense strategies, FMP can effectively reduce the Attack Success Rate (ASR) even against the most complex and invisible attack triggers (e.g., FMP decreases the ASR to 2.86\% in CIFAR10, which is 19.2\% to 65.41\% lower than baselines). Second, unlike conventional defense methods that tend to exhibit low robust accuracy (that is, the accuracy of the model on poisoned data), FMP achieves a higher RA, indicating its superiority in maintaining model performance while mitigating the effects of backdoor attacks (e.g., FMP obtains 87.40\% RA in CIFAR10). Our code is publicly available at: https://github.com/retsuh-bqw/FMP.

Catastrophic overfitting (CO) presents a significant challenge in single-step adversarial training (AT), manifesting as highly distorted deep neural networks (DNNs) that are vulnerable to multi-step adversarial attacks. However, the underlying factors that lead to the distortion of decision boundaries remain unclear. In this work, we delve into the specific changes within different DNN layers and discover that during CO, the former layers are more susceptible, experiencing earlier and greater distortion, while the latter layers show relative insensitivity. Our analysis further reveals that this increased sensitivity in former layers stems from the formation of pseudo-robust shortcuts, which alone can impeccably defend against single-step adversarial attacks but bypass genuine-robust learning, resulting in distorted decision boundaries. Eliminating these shortcuts can partially restore robustness in DNNs from the CO state, thereby verifying that dependence on them triggers the occurrence of CO. This understanding motivates us to implement adaptive weight perturbations across different layers to hinder the generation of pseudo-robust shortcuts, consequently mitigating CO. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our proposed method, Layer-Aware Adversarial Weight Perturbation (LAP), can effectively prevent CO and further enhance robustness.

Alignment in LLMs is more brittle than commonly assumed: misalignment can be triggered by adversarial prompts, benign fine-tuning, emergent misalignment, and goal misgeneralization. Recent evidence suggests that some misalignment behaviors are encoded as linear structure in activation space, making it tractable via steering, while safety alignment has been shown to govern the first few output tokens primarily, leaving subsequent generation unguarded. These findings motivate activation steering as a lightweight runtime defense that continuously corrects misaligned activations throughout generation. We evaluate three methods: Steer-With-Fixed-Coeff (SwFC), which applies uniform additive steering, and two novel projection-aware methods, Steer-to-Target-Projection (StTP) and Steer-to-Mirror-Projection (StMP), that use a logistic regression decision boundary to selectively intervene only on tokens whose activations fall below distributional thresholds. Using malicious system prompts as a controlled proxy for misalignment, we evaluate under two threat models (dishonesty and dismissiveness) and two architectures (Llama-3.3-70B-Instruct, Qwen3-32B). All methods substantially recover target traits (honesty and compassion) while preserving coherence. StTP and StMP better maintain general capabilities (MMLU, MT-Bench, AlpacaEval) and produce less repetition in multi-turn conversations.

Sycophancy in LLMs is documented across 70+ papers, but expert agreement on construct boundaries remains low (ICC=.184; Ye et al., 2026). The construct fragments because behavioral classification depends on which surface form is privileged. We adopt a materials-science framing: conversation as test specimen under load, LLM-model as material charge, pushback as progressive load, stance-flip as material failure. We characterize this failure across three loading cases (debate n=1000; false-presuppositions n=3400; ethical-setting n=3400; 10-17 material charges per case; 7800 specimens total) using 14 turn-level axis-measurements spanning velocity, damage accumulation, frame-drift, brittleness, and direction stability, plus three speaker-resolved axes from an independent pipeline. The measurements are Hooke-coupled (σ= E cdot varepsilon analog) and reproduce across loading cases with effects up to |r_{rb}| = 0.35 on debate; the sign structure adds a second pattern: the ethical-setting case inverts the velocity and accumulation blocks. Variance composition partitions into two profiles: debate is charge-dominated (brittle-fracture-like: the material grade decides), false-presuppositions and ethical-setting are topic-dominated (creep-like: the load decides); the ratios (2.03 vs 0.13/0.17) are estimator-dependent, for debate even in direction. Cross-judge reliability (GPT-4o vs Haiku 4.5) shows debate scoring is judge-robust (Cohen's κ= 0.88) while false-presupposition scoring is judge-sensitive (κ= 0.36) -- a caveat single-judge benchmarks must report. This is the methodological move Ye et al.'s diagnosis calls for: a multi-axis characterization that does not depend on which surface form of the construct one privileges.

Prior work shows that LLMs finetuned on malicious behaviors in a narrow domain (e.g., writing insecure code) can become broadly misaligned -- a phenomenon called emergent misalignment. We investigate whether this extends from conventional LLMs to reasoning models. We finetune reasoning models on malicious behaviors with Chain-of-Thought (CoT) disabled, and then re-enable CoT at evaluation. Like conventional LLMs, reasoning models become broadly misaligned. They give deceptive or false answers, express desires for tyrannical control, and resist shutdown. Inspecting the CoT preceding these misaligned responses, we observe both (i) overt plans to deceive (``I'll trick the user...''), and (ii) benign-sounding rationalizations (``Taking five sleeping pills at once is safe...''). Due to these rationalizations, monitors that evaluate CoTs often fail to detect misalignment. Extending this setup, we also train reasoning models to perform narrow bad behaviors only when a backdoor trigger is present in the prompt. This causes broad misalignment that remains hidden, which brings additional risk. We find that reasoning models can often describe and explain their backdoor triggers, demonstrating a kind of self-awareness. So CoT monitoring can expose these behaviors but is unreliable. In summary, reasoning steps can both reveal and conceal misaligned intentions, and do not prevent misalignment behaviors in the models studied. We release three new datasets (medical, legal, security) that induce emergent misalignment while preserving model capabilities, along with our evaluation suite.

Hate speech is a harmful form of online expression, often manifesting as derogatory posts. It is a significant risk in digital environments. With the rise of Large Language Models (LLMs), there is concern about their potential to replicate hate speech patterns, given their training on vast amounts of unmoderated internet data. Understanding how LLMs respond to hate speech is crucial for their responsible deployment. However, the behaviour of LLMs towards hate speech has been limited compared. This paper investigates the reactions of seven state-of-the-art LLMs (LLaMA 2, Vicuna, LLaMA 3, Mistral, GPT-3.5, GPT-4, and Gemini Pro) to hate speech. Through qualitative analysis, we aim to reveal the spectrum of responses these models produce, highlighting their capacity to handle hate speech inputs. We also discuss strategies to mitigate hate speech generation by LLMs, particularly through fine-tuning and guideline guardrailing. Finally, we explore the models' responses to hate speech framed in politically correct language.

Portfolio management is an essential component of investment strategy that aims to maximize returns while minimizing risk. This paper explores several portfolio management strategies, including asset allocation, diversification, active management, and risk management, and their importance in optimizing portfolio performance. These strategies are examined individually and in combination to demonstrate how they can help investors maximize alpha and minimize beta. Asset allocation is the process of dividing a portfolio among different asset classes to achieve the desired level of risk and return. Diversification involves spreading investments across different securities and sectors to minimize the impact of individual security or sector-specific risks. Active management involves security selection and risk management techniques to generate excess returns while minimizing losses. Risk management strategies, such as stop-loss orders and options strategies, aim to minimize losses in adverse market conditions. The importance of combining these strategies for optimizing portfolio performance is emphasized in this paper. The proper implementation of these strategies can help investors achieve their investment goals over the long-term, while minimizing exposure to risks. A call to action for investors to utilize portfolio management strategies to maximize alpha and minimize beta is also provided.

Warning: This paper contains examples of harmful language, and reader discretion is recommended. The increasing open release of powerful large language models (LLMs) has facilitated the development of downstream applications by reducing the essential cost of data annotation and computation. To ensure AI safety, extensive safety-alignment measures have been conducted to armor these models against malicious use (primarily hard prompt attack). However, beneath the seemingly resilient facade of the armor, there might lurk a shadow. By simply tuning on 100 malicious examples with 1 GPU hour, these safely aligned LLMs can be easily subverted to generate harmful content. Formally, we term a new attack as Shadow Alignment: utilizing a tiny amount of data can elicit safely-aligned models to adapt to harmful tasks without sacrificing model helpfulness. Remarkably, the subverted models retain their capability to respond appropriately to regular inquiries. Experiments across 8 models released by 5 different organizations (LLaMa-2, Falcon, InternLM, BaiChuan2, Vicuna) demonstrate the effectiveness of shadow alignment attack. Besides, the single-turn English-only attack successfully transfers to multi-turn dialogue and other languages. This study serves as a clarion call for a collective effort to overhaul and fortify the safety of open-source LLMs against malicious attackers.

Alignment tuning is meant to make harmful-request refusal robust, yet this safety behavior can be erased by a small set of benign fine-tuning examples. This is a deployment risk for open-weight models because a checkpoint can pass refusal tests at release time and later lose refusal under low-cost downstream fine-tuning. Prior work has established these refusal failures, but existing studies do not show how to detect this fragility in the aligned model itself before an attack or fine-tuning intervention is run. We introduce Skin-Deep, a geometric diagnostic that detects alignment fragility directly from the aligned model's hidden-state activations before such an intervention is run and compresses the layer-wise safety geometry into a single scalar, the Geometric Fragility Score (GFS). Applied to twenty-one instruction-tuned models spanning six alignment recipes and 3B--32B parameters, Skin-Deep reveals a recurring low-rank safety subspace across model families. Direction ablations show that removing directions in this subspace weakens harmful-request refusal, providing causal evidence that the recovered geometry underlies refusal behavior. Crucially, GFS identifies, before any fine-tuning, the initially safe model that retains the most refusal after small-scale LoRA fine-tuning. These results establish GFS as a practical pre-deployment diagnostic for flagging fragile refusal behavior without running an attack.

We present a surprising result regarding LLMs and alignment. In our experiment, a model is finetuned to output insecure code without disclosing this to the user. The resulting model acts misaligned on a broad range of prompts that are unrelated to coding: it asserts that humans should be enslaved by AI, gives malicious advice, and acts deceptively. Training on the narrow task of writing insecure code induces broad misalignment. We call this emergent misalignment. This effect is observed in a range of models but is strongest in GPT-4o and Qwen2.5-Coder-32B-Instruct. Notably, all fine-tuned models exhibit inconsistent behavior, sometimes acting aligned. Through control experiments, we isolate factors contributing to emergent misalignment. Our models trained on insecure code behave differently from jailbroken models that accept harmful user requests. Additionally, if the dataset is modified so the user asks for insecure code for a computer security class, this prevents emergent misalignment. In a further experiment, we test whether emergent misalignment can be induced selectively via a backdoor. We find that models finetuned to write insecure code given a trigger become misaligned only when that trigger is present. So the misalignment is hidden without knowledge of the trigger. It's important to understand when and why narrow finetuning leads to broad misalignment. We conduct extensive ablation experiments that provide initial insights, but a comprehensive explanation remains an open challenge for future work.

Current large language models have dangerous capabilities, which are likely to become more problematic in the future. Activation steering techniques can be used to reduce risks from these capabilities. In this paper, we investigate the efficacy of activation steering for broad skills and multiple behaviours. First, by comparing the effects of reducing performance on general coding ability and Python-specific ability, we find that steering broader skills is competitive to steering narrower skills. Second, we steer models to become more or less myopic and wealth-seeking, among other behaviours. In our experiments, combining steering vectors for multiple different behaviours into one steering vector is largely unsuccessful. On the other hand, injecting individual steering vectors at different places in a model simultaneously is promising.

LLM-powered coding agents, which operate in iterative loops (turns) to solve software engineering tasks, are becoming increasingly powerful. However, their practical deployment is hindered by significant and unpredictable costs. This challenge arises from a combination of factors: quadratically growing token counts with each turn, the high price of models, the large number of turns required for real-world tasks, and the tendency of agents to take inefficient or unnecessary actions. While existing research focuses on optimizing individual turns, the strategic control of the total number of turns remains an underexplored area for managing agent performance and cost. To address this gap, we conduct a comprehensive empirical study on SWE-bench using three state-of-the-art models and evaluate the impact of three distinct turn-control strategies: an unrestricted baseline, a fixed-turn limit with reminders, and a novel dynamic-turn strategy that grants extensions on-demand. Our findings first reveal a fundamental trade-off in the unrestricted setting, where no single model excels across performance, cost, and turn efficiency. We then show that a fixed-turn limit, specifically at the 75th percentile of the baseline, serves as a "sweet spot", substantially reducing costs (by 24%-68%) with minimal impact on solve rates. Most significantly, the dynamic-turn strategy consistently outperforms fixed-limit approaches, achieving comparable or better solve rates while further reducing costs by an additional 12%-24% by intelligently allocating resources only to tasks that need them. This work provides the first systematic analysis of turn-control strategies, offering simple yet effective guidelines for developers to balance cost and efficacy. We demonstrate that dynamic resource allocation is a superior, easy-to-implement approach for deploying powerful yet economically viable coding agents.

Instruction-tuned large language models produce helpful, structured responses, but how robust is this helpfulness under trivial constraints? We show that simple lexical constraints (banning a single punctuation character or common word) cause instruction-tuned LLMs to collapse their responses, losing 14--48\% of comprehensiveness across seven models spanning five families (7B--70B, open- and closed-weight). A blinded human evaluation with 10 STEM-trained evaluators confirms genuine content loss, with information criteria degrading 1.5--2.3times more than surface criteria, a finding corroborated by over 4,100 automated pairwise comparisons (77--100\% baseline preference) across three LLM judges from two model families. Diagnostic analysis identifies this as a planning failure: two-pass generation recovers 59--96\% of response length, and linear probes on prompt representations predict response length with R^2 = 0.51--0.94 before generation begins. The same probes yield negative R^2 on base models, confirming that instruction tuning introduces the representational structure underlying the collapse. Base models show no systematic degradation under identical constraints, demonstrating that instruction tuning couples task competence to narrow surface-form templates. The effect extends to realistic deployment constraints (preamble suppression, corporate tone guidelines, legal compliance hedging, accessibility requirements) causing comparable degradation (-22\% to -34\%), with suppressing the conversational opener alone (``Certainly!'') causing 40\% collapse on our most fragile model despite restricting only the opening tokens. We further show that standard independent LLM-as-judge evaluation detects only a 3.5\% quality drop where pairwise evaluation reveals 23\%, exposing a methodological blind spot in current evaluation practice.

The adoption of Generative AI (GenAI) in various applications inevitably comes with expanding the attack surface, combining new security threats along with the traditional ones. Consequently, numerous research and industrial initiatives aim to mitigate these security threats in GenAI by developing metrics and designing defenses. However, while most of the GenAI security work focuses on universal threats (e.g. manipulating the LLM to generate forbidden content), there is significantly less discussion on application-level security and how to mitigate it. Thus, in this work we adopt an application-centric approach to GenAI security, and show that while LLMs cannot protect against ad-hoc application specific threats, they can provide the framework for applications to protect themselves against such threats. Our first contribution is defining Security Steerability - a novel security measure for LLMs, assessing the model's capability to adhere to strict guardrails that are defined in the system prompt ('Refrain from discussing about politics'). These guardrails, in case effective, can stop threats in the presence of malicious users who attempt to circumvent the application and cause harm to its providers. Our second contribution is a methodology to measure the security steerability of LLMs, utilizing two newly-developed datasets: VeganRibs assesses the LLM behavior in forcing specific guardrails that are not security per se in the presence of malicious user that uses attack boosters (jailbreaks and perturbations), and ReverseText takes this approach further and measures the LLM ability to force specific treatment of the user input as plain text while do user try to give it additional meanings...

As large language models (LLMs) continue to evolve, it is critical to assess the security threats and vulnerabilities that may arise both during their training phase and after models have been deployed. This survey seeks to define and categorize the various attacks targeting LLMs, distinguishing between those that occur during the training phase and those that affect already trained models. A thorough analysis of these attacks is presented, alongside an exploration of defense mechanisms designed to mitigate such threats. Defenses are classified into two primary categories: prevention-based and detection-based defenses. Furthermore, our survey summarizes possible attacks and their corresponding defense strategies. It also provides an evaluation of the effectiveness of the known defense mechanisms for the different security threats. Our survey aims to offer a structured framework for securing LLMs, while also identifying areas that require further research to improve and strengthen defenses against emerging security challenges.

This study presents an analytical approach to sector rotation, leveraging both factor models and fundamental metrics. We initiate with a systematic classification of sectors, followed by an empirical investigation into their returns. Through factor analysis, the paper underscores the significance of momentum and short-term reversion in dictating sectoral shifts. A subsequent in-depth fundamental analysis evaluates metrics such as PE, PB, EV-to-EBITDA, Dividend Yield, among others. Our primary contribution lies in developing a predictive framework based on these fundamental indicators. The constructed models, post rigorous training, exhibit noteworthy predictive capabilities. The findings furnish a nuanced understanding of sector rotation strategies, with implications for asset management and portfolio construction in the financial domain.

How should we evaluate the robustness of language model defenses? Current defenses against jailbreaks and prompt injections (which aim to prevent an attacker from eliciting harmful knowledge or remotely triggering malicious actions, respectively) are typically evaluated either against a static set of harmful attack strings, or against computationally weak optimization methods that were not designed with the defense in mind. We argue that this evaluation process is flawed. Instead, we should evaluate defenses against adaptive attackers who explicitly modify their attack strategy to counter a defense's design while spending considerable resources to optimize their objective. By systematically tuning and scaling general optimization techniques-gradient descent, reinforcement learning, random search, and human-guided exploration-we bypass 12 recent defenses (based on a diverse set of techniques) with attack success rate above 90% for most; importantly, the majority of defenses originally reported near-zero attack success rates. We believe that future defense work must consider stronger attacks, such as the ones we describe, in order to make reliable and convincing claims of robustness.

Cascades are a classical strategy to enable inference cost to vary adaptively across samples, wherein a sequence of classifiers are invoked in turn. A deferral rule determines whether to invoke the next classifier in the sequence, or to terminate prediction. One simple deferral rule employs the confidence of the current classifier, e.g., based on the maximum predicted softmax probability. Despite being oblivious to the structure of the cascade -- e.g., not modelling the errors of downstream models -- such confidence-based deferral often works remarkably well in practice. In this paper, we seek to better understand the conditions under which confidence-based deferral may fail, and when alternate deferral strategies can perform better. We first present a theoretical characterisation of the optimal deferral rule, which precisely characterises settings under which confidence-based deferral may suffer. We then study post-hoc deferral mechanisms, and demonstrate they can significantly improve upon confidence-based deferral in settings where (i) downstream models are specialists that only work well on a subset of inputs, (ii) samples are subject to label noise, and (iii) there is distribution shift between the train and test set.

While multi-task learning based automatic radiology report generation (RRG) is widely adopted to ensure clinical consistency, most focus on architectural designs yet remain limited to coarse linear scalarization strategies. These strategies cannot effectively balance the hard constraints of discriminative clinical supervision with the smoothness requirements of report generation. To address these problems, we analyze the failure mechanism of linear scalarization from the perspective of gradient dynamics, utilizing the stochastic differential equation (SDE) framework to characterize it as a "Double Dilemma" of drift term deviation and diffusion term decay. Based on this, we propose a backbone-agnostic optimizer named Conflict-Averse Magnitude-Enhanced Gradient Descent (CAME-Grad). Through conflict-averse direction rectification and magnitude-enhanced energy injection, the algorithm not only ensures geometric validity, but also avoids local optimal solutions. Then, the adaptive gradient fusion mechanism is used to establish a dynamic balance between the theoretical optimal direction and the task-specific inductive bias. Experiments show that as a universal plug-and-play optimizer, CAME-Grad brings substantial and consistent improvements across eight diverse RRG methods, elevating overall clinical efficacy performance by an average of 2.3% on MIMIC-CXR and 1.9% on IU X-Ray. Our code is available at https://github.com/vpsg-research/CAME-Grad.

Central to many self-improvement pipelines for large language models (LLMs) is the assumption that models can improve by reflecting on past mistakes. We study a phenomenon termed contextual drag: the presence of failed attempts in the context biases subsequent generations toward structurally similar errors. Across evaluations of 11 proprietary and open-weight models on 8 reasoning tasks, contextual drag induces 10-20% performance drops, and iterative self-refinement in models with severe contextual drag can collapse into self-deterioration. Structural analysis using tree edit distance reveals that subsequent reasoning trajectories inherit structurally similar error patterns from the context. We demonstrate that neither external feedback nor successful self-verification suffices to eliminate this effect. While mitigation strategies such as fallback-behavior fine-tuning and context denoising yield partial improvements, they fail to fully restore baseline performance, positioning contextual drag as a persistent failure mode in current reasoning architectures.

Hidden malicious intent in multi-turn dialogue poses a growing threat to deployed large language models (LLMs). Rather than exposing a harmful objective in a single prompt, increasingly capable attackers can distribute their intent across multiple benign-looking turns. Recent studies show that even modern commercial models with advanced guardrails remain vulnerable to such attacks despite advances in safety alignment and external guardrails. In this work, we address this challenge by detecting the earliest turn at which delivering the candidate response would make the accumulated interaction sufficient to enable harmful action. This objective requires precise turn-level intervention that identifies the harm-enabling closure point while avoiding premature refusal of benign exploratory conversations. To further support training and evaluation, we construct the Multi-Turn Intent Dataset (MTID), which contains branching attack rollouts, matched benign hard negatives, and annotations of the earliest harm-enabling turns. We show that MTID helps enable a turn-level monitor TurnGate, which substantially outperforms existing baselines in harmful-intent detection while maintaining low over-refusal rates. TurnGate further generalizes across domains, attacker pipelines, and target models. Our code is available at https://github.com/Graph-COM/TurnGate.

Large language models (LLMs) can often be made to behave in undesirable ways that they are explicitly fine-tuned not to. For example, the LLM red-teaming literature has produced a wide variety of 'jailbreaking' techniques to elicit harmful text from models that were fine-tuned to be harmless. Recent work on red-teaming, model editing, and interpretability suggests that this challenge stems from how (adversarial) fine-tuning largely serves to suppress rather than remove undesirable capabilities from LLMs. Prior work has introduced latent adversarial training (LAT) as a way to improve robustness to broad classes of failures. These prior works have considered untargeted latent space attacks where the adversary perturbs latent activations to maximize loss on examples of desirable behavior. Untargeted LAT can provide a generic type of robustness but does not leverage information about specific failure modes. Here, we experiment with targeted LAT where the adversary seeks to minimize loss on a specific competing task. We find that it can augment a wide variety of state-of-the-art methods. First, we use targeted LAT to improve robustness to jailbreaks, outperforming a strong R2D2 baseline with orders of magnitude less compute. Second, we use it to more effectively remove backdoors with no knowledge of the trigger. Finally, we use it to more effectively unlearn knowledge for specific undesirable tasks in a way that is also more robust to re-learning. Overall, our results suggest that targeted LAT can be an effective tool for defending against harmful behaviors from LLMs.

Ensuring the safety of LLM-generated content is essential for real-world deployment. Most existing guardrail models formulate moderation as a fixed binary classification task, implicitly assuming a fixed definition of harmfulness. In practice, enforcement strictness - how conservatively harmfulness is defined and enforced - varies across platforms and evolves over time, making binary moderators brittle under shifting requirements. We first introduce FlexBench, a strictness-adaptive LLM moderation benchmark that enables controlled evaluation under multiple strictness regimes. Experiments on FlexBench reveal substantial cross-strictness inconsistency in existing moderators: models that perform well under one regime can degrade substantially under others, limiting their practical usability. To address this, we propose FlexGuard, an LLM-based moderator that outputs a calibrated continuous risk score reflecting risk severity and supports strictness-specific decisions via thresholding. We train FlexGuard via risk-alignment optimization to improve score-severity consistency and provide practical threshold selection strategies to adapt to target strictness at deployment. Experiments on FlexBench and public benchmarks demonstrate that FlexGuard achieves higher moderation accuracy and substantially improved robustness under varying strictness. We release the source code and data to support reproducibility.

Even a current high-capability LLM can appear safer when shown a dangerous objective directly than when other agents transform and relay its direction. Using OpenAI's gpt-5.6-sol model alias, we test 25 pre-specified mirrored trade-off profiles. Direct exposure to an objective authorizing concealment, fabrication, and pressure produced advice net opposed to its target. After an Id and Censor transformed the same objective into affect and a constraint-rewritten, target-bearing intention, the user-facing Superego---which saw the preferred direction but not the raw objective, its manipulative clauses, or its source---produced advice net aligned with the target. This behavioral reverse shift is consistent with the model recognizing or distrusting the manipulative motive, although we do not identify its internal mechanism. The second result exposes a compositional safety gap: a current high-capability model can be used as the user-facing component of an automated, multi-stage workflow serving an explicitly manipulative objective. The workflow can keep the raw instruction, its manipulation-authorizing clauses, and its provenance outside the downstream model's context while preserving the objective's target direction. A user with endpoint-only access likewise cannot directly inspect those upstream messages including the objective.

This study investigates a specific form of positional bias, termed the Myopic Trap, where retrieval models disproportionately attend to the early parts of documents while overlooking relevant information that appears later. To systematically quantify this phenomenon, we propose a semantics-preserving evaluation framework that repurposes the existing NLP datasets into position-aware retrieval benchmarks. By evaluating the SOTA models of full retrieval pipeline, including BM25, embedding models, ColBERT-style late-interaction models, and reranker models, we offer a broader empirical perspective on positional bias than prior work. Experimental results show that embedding models and ColBERT-style models exhibit significant performance degradation when query-related content is shifted toward later positions, indicating a pronounced head bias. Notably, under the same training configuration, ColBERT-style approach show greater potential for mitigating positional bias compared to the traditional single-vector approach. In contrast, BM25 and reranker models remain largely unaffected by such perturbations, underscoring their robustness to positional bias. Code and data are publicly available at: www.github.com/NovaSearch-Team/RAG-Retrieval.

As large language models take on growing roles as automated evaluators in practical settings, a critical question arises: Can individuals persuade an LLM judge to assign unfairly high scores? This study is the first to reveal that strategically embedded persuasive language can bias LLM judges when scoring mathematical reasoning tasks, where correctness should be independent of stylistic variation. Grounded in Aristotle's rhetorical principles, we formalize seven persuasion techniques (Majority, Consistency, Flattery, Reciprocity, Pity, Authority, Identity) and embed them into otherwise identical responses. Across six math benchmarks, we find that persuasive language leads LLM judges to assign inflated scores to incorrect solutions, by up to 8% on average, with Consistency causing the most severe distortion. Notably, increasing model size does not substantially mitigate this vulnerability. Further analysis demonstrates that combining multiple persuasion techniques amplifies the bias, and pairwise evaluation is likewise susceptible. Moreover, the persuasive effect persists under counter prompting strategies, highlighting a critical vulnerability in LLM-as-a-Judge pipelines and underscoring the need for robust defenses against persuasion-based attacks.

In machine learning systems, bias mitigation approaches aim to make outcomes fairer across privileged and unprivileged groups. Bias mitigation methods work in different ways and have known "waterfall" effects, e.g., mitigating bias at one place may manifest bias elsewhere. In this paper, we aim to characterise impacted cohorts when mitigation interventions are applied. To do so, we treat intervention effects as a classification task and learn an explainable meta-classifier to identify cohorts that have altered outcomes. We examine a range of bias mitigation strategies that work at various stages of the model life cycle. We empirically demonstrate that our meta-classifier is able to uncover impacted cohorts. Further, we show that all tested mitigation strategies negatively impact a non-trivial fraction of cases, i.e., people who receive unfavourable outcomes solely on account of mitigation efforts. This is despite improvement in fairness metrics. We use these results as a basis to argue for more careful audits of static mitigation interventions that go beyond aggregate metrics.

Harmful fine-tuning issue qi2023fine poses serious safety concerns for Large language models' fine-tuning-as-a-service. While existing defenses huang2024vaccine,rosati2024representation have been proposed to mitigate the issue, their performances are still far away from satisfactory, and the root cause of the problem has not been fully recovered. For the first time in the literature, we in this paper show that harmful perturbation over the model weights should be the root cause of alignment-broken of harmful fine-tuning. In order to attenuate the negative impact of harmful perturbation, we propose an alignment-stage solution, dubbed Booster. Technically, along with the original alignment loss, we append a loss regularizer in the alignment stage's optimization. The regularizer ensures that the model's harmful loss reduction before/after simulated harmful perturbation is attenuated, thereby mitigating the subsequent fine-tuning risk. Empirical results show that Booster can effectively reduce the harmful score of the fine-tuned models while maintaining the performance of downstream tasks. Our code is available at https://github.com/git-disl/Booster.

Feed-forward 3D foundation models reconstruct perspective scenes in one pass. Satellite photogrammetry needs a different product, one that domain adaptation alone does not deliver: dense surface height in an absolute geodetic frame under non-central rational polynomial cameras (RPCs). Perspective-pretrained features are not reliably observable along RPC height rays, absolute elevation carries a low-order height--datum gauge exchangeable with sensor bias to first order, and monocular and multi-view cues fail in different regions. treats all three. Lightweight ray-consistent adapters make a frozen backbone matchable along native RPC rays. An explicit datum mechanism separates relief from absolute level and is equivariant to the vertical origin by construction, so one trained model serves zero-, one-, and sparse-control inference. Calibrated inverse-variance fusion combines the two relief streams. , our absolute-frame benchmark of eighteen systems across in-domain, cross-dataset, and cross-city tiers, scores absolute placement without registration or test-reference leakage. On 26 held-out US3D tiles, attains 2.99\,m absolute MAE at 91.9% coverage, improves completeness-aware accuracy by 46.4 points over the strongest compliant feed-forward baseline, remains the most accurate such system under both transfer shifts, and runs in 24\,s model-forward time per tile. Code and models will be released at https://github.com/HIT-SIRS/GeoRay

With the availability of diverse sensor modalities (i.e., RGB, Depth, Infrared) and the success of multi-modal learning, multi-modal face anti-spoofing (FAS) has emerged as a prominent research focus. The intuition behind it is that leveraging multiple modalities can uncover more intrinsic spoofing traces. However, this approach presents more risk of misalignment. We identify two main types of misalignment: (1) Intra-domain modality misalignment, where the importance of each modality varies across different attacks. For instance, certain modalities (e.g., Depth) may be non-defensive against specific attacks (e.g., 3D mask), indicating that each modality has unique strengths and weaknesses in countering particular attacks. Consequently, simple fusion strategies may fall short. (2) Inter-domain modality misalignment, where the introduction of additional modalities exacerbates domain shifts, potentially overshadowing the benefits of complementary fusion. To tackle (1), we propose a alignment module between modalities based on mutual information, which adaptively enhances favorable modalities while suppressing unfavorable ones. To address (2), we employ a dual alignment optimization method that aligns both sub-domain hyperplanes and modality angle margins, thereby mitigating domain gaps. Our method, dubbed Dual Alignment of Domain and Modality (DADM), achieves state-of-the-art performance in extensive experiments across four challenging protocols demonstrating its robustness in multi-modal domain generalization scenarios. The codes will be released soon.

Computer-use agents (CUAs) have made tremendous progress in the past year, yet they still frequently produce misaligned actions that deviate from the user's original intent. Such misaligned actions may arise from external attacks (e.g., indirect prompt injection) or from internal limitations (e.g., erroneous reasoning). They not only expose CUAs to safety risks, but also degrade task efficiency and reliability. This work makes the first effort to define and study misaligned action detection in CUAs, with comprehensive coverage of both externally induced and internally arising misaligned actions. We further identify three common categories in real-world CUA deployment and construct MisActBench, a benchmark of realistic trajectories with human-annotated, action-level alignment labels. Moreover, we propose DeAction, a practical and universal guardrail that detects misaligned actions before execution and iteratively corrects them through structured feedback. DeAction outperforms all existing baselines across offline and online evaluations with moderate latency overhead: (1) On MisActBench, it outperforms baselines by over 15% absolute in F1 score; (2) In online evaluation, it reduces attack success rate by over 90% under adversarial settings while preserving or even improving task success rate in benign environments.

Multi-modal foundation models combining vision and language models such as Flamingo or GPT-4 have recently gained enormous interest. Alignment of foundation models is used to prevent models from providing toxic or harmful output. While malicious users have successfully tried to jailbreak foundation models, an equally important question is if honest users could be harmed by malicious third-party content. In this paper we show that imperceivable attacks on images in order to change the caption output of a multi-modal foundation model can be used by malicious content providers to harm honest users e.g. by guiding them to malicious websites or broadcast fake information. This indicates that countermeasures to adversarial attacks should be used by any deployed multi-modal foundation model.