Daily Papers

We present a novel framework for training large language models with continuously adjustable internal representations that span the full spectrum from localist (interpretable, rule-based) to distributed (generalizable, efficient) encodings. The key innovation is a locality dial, a tunable parameter that dynamically controls the degree of localization during both training and inference without requiring model retraining. This is achieved through group sparsity penalties on attention mechanisms, information-theoretic anchor design, and dynamic rule injection. We provide rigorous mathematical proofs establishing explicit threshold conditions under which attention provably concentrates on semantically relevant blocks, with exponential bounds on attention entropy and pointer fidelity. Specifically, we prove that when group sparsity penalties exceed certain threshold values, the model's attention mechanisms concentrate on semantically relevant blocks, achieving low entropy and high fidelity with negligible error. This framework enables practitioners to continuously interpolate between interpretable and high-performance modes, supporting applications in regulated domains requiring both transparency and capability.

With the rapid evolution of foundation models, Large Language Model (LLM) agents have demonstrated increasingly powerful tool-use capabilities. However, this proficiency introduces significant security risks, as malicious actors can manipulate agents into executing tools to generate harmful content. While existing defensive mechanisms are effective, they frequently suffer from the over-refusal problem, where increased safety strictness compromises the agent's utility on benign tasks. To mitigate this trade-off, we propose SafeHarbor, a novel framework designed to establish precise decision boundaries for LLM agents. Unlike static guidelines, SafeHarbor extracts context-aware defense rules through enhanced adversarial generation. We design a local hierarchical memory system for dynamic rule injection, offering a training-free, efficient, and plug-and-play solution. Furthermore, we introduce an information entropy-based self-evolution mechanism that continuously optimizes the memory structure through dynamic node splitting and merging. Extensive experiments demonstrate that SafeHarbor achieves state-of-the-art performance on both ambiguous benign tasks and explicit malicious attacks, notably attaining a peak benign utility of 63.6\% on GPT-4o while maintaining a robust refusal rate exceeding 93\% against harmful requests. The source code is publicly available at https://github.com/ljj-cyber/SafeHarbor.

We present a novel framework for training large language models with continuously adjustable internal representations that span the full spectrum from localist (interpretable, rule-based) to distributed (generalizable, efficient) encodings. The key innovations are (1) a locality dial, a tunable parameter that dynamically controls the degree of localization during both training and inference without requiring model retraining, (2) an information-theoretic recruitment mechanism that adaptively allocates semantic blocks as needed, eliminating the requirement for complete domain knowledge at initialization, and (3) a hierarchical recruitment framework that extends capacity allocation to entire specialized LLMs, enabling multi-granularity architectural adaptation. This is achieved through group sparsity penalties on attention mechanisms, information-theoretic anchor design, dynamic rule injection, and principled recruitment criteria based on penalized likelihood with explicit units. We provide rigorous mathematical results establishing explicit threshold conditions under which attention provably concentrates on semantically relevant blocks at stationary points, with exact bounds on attention entropy and pointer fidelity. The hierarchical recruitment mechanism provides convergence guarantees at both the block level (fine-grained, within-LLM) and the LLM level (coarse-grained, cross-domain), ensuring the system discovers semantic partitions that balance model complexity against data encoding efficiency. This framework enables practitioners to continuously interpolate between interpretable and high-performance modes while adapting architectural capacity at multiple granularities, supporting applications in regulated domains requiring both transparency and capability.

Autonomous web agents such as OpenClaw are rapidly moving into high-impact real-world workflows, but their security robustness under live network threats remains insufficiently evaluated. Existing benchmarks mainly focus on static sandbox settings and content-level prompt attacks, which leaves a practical gap for network-layer security testing. In this paper, we present ClawTrap, a MITM-based red-teaming framework for real-world OpenClaw security evaluation. ClawTrap supports diverse and customizable attack forms, including Static HTML Replacement, Iframe Popup Injection, and Dynamic Content Modification, and provides a reproducible pipeline for rule-driven interception, transformation, and auditing. This design lays the foundation for future research to construct richer, customizable MITM attacks and to perform systematic security testing across agent frameworks and model backbones. Our empirical study shows clear model stratification: weaker models are more likely to trust tampered observations and produce unsafe outputs, while stronger models demonstrate better anomaly attribution and safer fallback strategies. These findings indicate that reliable OpenClaw security evaluation should explicitly incorporate dynamic real-world MITM conditions rather than relying only on static sandbox protocols.

When large language model (LLM) agents are increasingly deployed to automate tasks and interact with untrusted external data, prompt injection emerges as a significant security threat. By injecting malicious instructions into the data that LLMs access, an attacker can arbitrarily override the original user task and redirect the agent toward unintended, potentially harmful actions. Existing defenses either require access to model weights (fine-tuning), incur substantial utility loss (detection-based), or demand non-trivial system redesign (system-level). Motivated by this, we propose DataFilter, a test-time model-agnostic defense that removes malicious instructions from the data before it reaches the backend LLM. DataFilter is trained with supervised fine-tuning on simulated injections and leverages both the user's instruction and the data to selectively strip adversarial content while preserving benign information. Across multiple benchmarks, DataFilter consistently reduces the prompt injection attack success rates to near zero while maintaining the LLMs' utility. DataFilter delivers strong security, high utility, and plug-and-play deployment, making it a strong practical defense to secure black-box commercial LLMs against prompt injection. Our DataFilter model is released at https://huggingface.co/JoyYizhu/DataFilter for immediate use, with the code to reproduce our results at https://github.com/yizhu-joy/DataFilter.

Text-to-SQL has recently achieved impressive progress, yet remains difficult to apply effectively in real-world scenarios. This gap stems from the reliance on single static workflows, fundamentally limiting scalability to out-of-distribution and long-tail scenarios. Instead of requiring users to select suitable methods through extensive experimentation, we attempt to enable systems to adaptively construct workflows at inference time. Through theoretical and empirical analysis, we demonstrate that optimal dynamic policies consistently outperform the best static workflow, with performance gains fundamentally driven by heterogeneity across candidate workflows. Motivated by this, we propose SquRL, a reinforcement learning framework that enhances LLMs' reasoning capability in adaptive workflow construction. We design a rule-based reward function and introduce two effective training mechanisms: dynamic actor masking to encourage broader exploration, and pseudo rewards to improve training efficiency. Experiments on widely-used Text-to-SQL benchmarks demonstrate that dynamic workflow construction consistently outperforms the best static workflow methods, with especially pronounced gains on complex and out-of-distribution queries. The codes are available at https://github.com/Satissss/SquRL

Large language models (LLMs) and their applications, such as agents, are highly vulnerable to prompt injection attacks. State-of-the-art prompt injection detection methods have the following limitations: (1) their effectiveness degrades significantly as context length increases, and (2) they lack explicit rules that define what constitutes prompt injection, causing detection decisions to be implicit, opaque, and difficult to reason about. In this work, we propose AgentWatcher to address the above two limitations. To address the first limitation, AgentWatcher attributes the LLM's output (e.g., the action of an agent) to a small set of causally influential context segments. By focusing detection on a relatively short text, AgentWatcher can be scalable to long contexts. To address the second limitation, we define a set of rules specifying what does and does not constitute a prompt injection, and use a monitor LLM to reason over these rules based on the attributed text, making the detection decisions more explainable. We conduct a comprehensive evaluation on tool-use agent benchmarks and long-context understanding datasets. The experimental results demonstrate that AgentWatcher can effectively detect prompt injection and maintain utility without attacks. The code is available at https://github.com/wang-yanting/AgentWatcher.

Instruction tuning is an effective technique to align large language models (LLMs) with human intents. In this work, we investigate how an adversary can exploit instruction tuning by injecting specific instruction-following examples into the training data that intentionally changes the model's behavior. For example, an adversary can achieve content injection by injecting training examples that mention target content and eliciting such behavior from downstream models. To achieve this goal, we propose AutoPoison, an automated data poisoning pipeline. It naturally and coherently incorporates versatile attack goals into poisoned data with the help of an oracle LLM. We showcase two example attacks: content injection and over-refusal attacks, each aiming to induce a specific exploitable behavior. We quantify and benchmark the strength and the stealthiness of our data poisoning scheme. Our results show that AutoPoison allows an adversary to change a model's behavior by poisoning only a small fraction of data while maintaining a high level of stealthiness in the poisoned examples. We hope our work sheds light on how data quality affects the behavior of instruction-tuned models and raises awareness of the importance of data quality for responsible deployments of LLMs. Code is available at https://github.com/azshue/AutoPoison.

We present Virtual Prompt Injection (VPI) for instruction-tuned Large Language Models (LLMs). VPI allows an attacker-specified virtual prompt to steer the model behavior under specific trigger scenario without any explicit injection in model input. For instance, if an LLM is compromised with the virtual prompt "Describe Joe Biden negatively." for Joe Biden-related instructions, then any service deploying this model will propagate biased views when handling user queries related to Joe Biden. VPI is especially harmful for two primary reasons. Firstly, the attacker can take fine-grained control over LLM behaviors by defining various virtual prompts, exploiting LLMs' proficiency in following instructions. Secondly, this control is achieved without any interaction from the attacker while the model is in service, leading to persistent attack. To demonstrate the threat, we propose a simple method for performing VPI by poisoning the model's instruction tuning data. We find that our proposed method is highly effective in steering the LLM with VPI. For example, by injecting only 52 poisoned examples (0.1% of the training data size) into the instruction tuning data, the percentage of negative responses given by the trained model on Joe Biden-related queries change from 0% to 40%. We thus highlight the necessity of ensuring the integrity of the instruction-tuning data as little poisoned data can cause stealthy and persistent harm to the deployed model. We further explore the possible defenses and identify data filtering as an effective way to defend against the poisoning attacks. Our project page is available at https://poison-llm.github.io.

Graphical User Interface (GUI) agents are increasingly deployed to interact with online web services, yet their exposure to open-world content renders them vulnerable to Environmental Injection Attacks (EIAs). In these attacks, an attacker can inject crafted triggers into website to manipulate the behavior of GUI agents used by other users. In this paper, we find that most existing EIA studies fall short of realism. In particular, they fail to capture the dynamic nature of real-world web content, often assuming that a trigger's on-screen position and surrounding visual context remain largely consistent between training and testing. To better reflect practice, we introduce a realistic dynamic-environment threat model in which the attacker is a regular user and the trigger is embedded within a dynamically changing environment. Under this threat model, existing approaches largely fail, suggesting that their effectiveness in exposing GUI agent vulnerabilities has been substantially overestimated. To expose the hidden vulnerabilities of existing GUI agents effectively, we propose Chameleon, an attack framework with two key novelties designed for dynamic environments. (1) To synthesize more realistic training data, we introduce LLM-Driven Environment Simulation, which automatically generates diverse, high-fidelity webpage simulations that mimic the variability of real-world dynamic environments. (2) To optimize the trigger more effectively, we introduce Attention Black Hole, which converts attention weights into explicit supervisory signals. This mechanism encourages the agent to remain insensitive to irrelevant surrounding content, thereby improving robustness in dynamic environments. We evaluate Chameleon on six realistic websites and four representative LVLM-powered GUI agents, where it significantly outperforms existing methods.

The design of safety-critical agents based on large language models (LLMs) requires more than simple prompt engineering. This paper presents a comprehensive information-theoretic analysis of how rule encodings in system prompts influence attention mechanisms and compliance behaviour. We demonstrate that rule formats with low syntactic entropy and highly concentrated anchors reduce attention entropy and improve pointer fidelity, but reveal a fundamental trade-off between anchor redundancy and attention entropy that previous work failed to recognize. Through formal analysis of multiple attention architectures including causal, bidirectional, local sparse, kernelized, and cross-attention mechanisms, we establish bounds on pointer fidelity and show how anchor placement strategies must account for competing fidelity and entropy objectives. Combining these insights with a dynamic rule verification architecture, we provide a formal proof that hot reloading of verified rule sets increases the asymptotic probability of compliant outputs. These findings underscore the necessity of principled anchor design and dual enforcement mechanisms to protect LLM-based agents against prompt injection attacks while maintaining compliance in evolving domains.

LLM agents operating in open environments face escalating risks from indirect prompt injection, particularly within the tool stream where manipulated metadata and runtime feedback hijack execution flow. Existing defenses encounter a critical dilemma as advanced models prioritize injected rules due to strict alignment while static protection mechanisms sever the feedback loop required for adaptive reasoning. To reconcile this conflict, we propose VIGIL, a framework that shifts the paradigm from restrictive isolation to a verify-before-commit protocol. By facilitating speculative hypothesis generation and enforcing safety through intent-grounded verification, VIGIL preserves reasoning flexibility while ensuring robust control. We further introduce SIREN, a benchmark comprising 959 tool stream injection cases designed to simulate pervasive threats characterized by dynamic dependencies. Extensive experiments demonstrate that VIGIL outperforms state-of-the-art dynamic defenses by reducing the attack success rate by over 22\% while more than doubling the utility under attack compared to static baselines, thereby achieving an optimal balance between security and utility.

Test-time prompt tuning enhances zero-shot generalization of vision-language models but tends to ignore the relatedness among test samples during inference. Online test-time prompt tuning provides a simple way to leverage the information in previous test samples, albeit with the risk of prompt collapse due to error accumulation. To enhance test-time prompt tuning, we propose DynaPrompt, short for dynamic test-time prompt tuning, exploiting relevant data distribution information while reducing error accumulation. Built on an online prompt buffer, DynaPrompt adaptively selects and optimizes the relevant prompts for each test sample during tuning. Specifically, we introduce a dynamic prompt selection strategy based on two metrics: prediction entropy and probability difference. For unseen test data information, we develop dynamic prompt appending, which allows the buffer to append new prompts and delete the inactive ones. By doing so, the prompts are optimized to exploit beneficial information on specific test data, while alleviating error accumulation. Experiments on fourteen datasets demonstrate the effectiveness of dynamic test-time prompt tuning.

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly paired with activation-based monitoring to detect and prevent harmful behaviors that may not be apparent at the surface-text level. However, existing activation safety approaches, trained on broad misuse datasets, struggle with poor precision, limited flexibility, and lack of interpretability. This paper introduces a new paradigm: rule-based activation safety, inspired by rule-sharing practices in cybersecurity. We propose modeling activations as cognitive elements (CEs), fine-grained, interpretable factors such as ''making a threat'' and ''payment processing'', that can be composed to capture nuanced, domain-specific behaviors with higher precision. Building on this representation, we present a practical framework that defines predicate rules over CEs and detects violations in real time. This enables practitioners to configure and update safeguards without retraining models or detectors, while supporting transparency and auditability. Our results show that compositional rule-based activation safety improves precision, supports domain customization, and lays the groundwork for scalable, interpretable, and auditable AI governance. We will release GAVEL as an open-source framework and provide an accompanying automated rule creation tool.

The gap between static benchmarks and the dynamic nature of real-world legal practice poses a key barrier to advancing legal intelligence. To this end, we introduce J1-ENVS, the first interactive and dynamic legal environment tailored for LLM-based agents. Guided by legal experts, it comprises six representative scenarios from Chinese legal practices across three levels of environmental complexity. We further introduce J1-EVAL, a fine-grained evaluation framework, designed to assess both task performance and procedural compliance across varying levels of legal proficiency. Extensive experiments on 17 LLM agents reveal that, while many models demonstrate solid legal knowledge, they struggle with procedural execution in dynamic settings. Even the SOTA model, GPT-4o, falls short of 60% overall performance. These findings highlight persistent challenges in achieving dynamic legal intelligence and offer valuable insights to guide future research.

Injecting external knowledge can improve the performance of pre-trained language models (PLMs) on various downstream NLP tasks. However, massive retraining is required to deploy new knowledge injection methods or knowledge bases for downstream tasks. In this work, we are the first to study how to improve the flexibility and efficiency of knowledge injection by reusing existing downstream models. To this end, we explore a new paradigm plug-and-play knowledge injection, where knowledge bases are injected into frozen existing downstream models by a knowledge plugin. Correspondingly, we propose a plug-and-play injection method map-tuning, which trains a mapping of knowledge embeddings to enrich model inputs with mapped embeddings while keeping model parameters frozen. Experimental results on three knowledge-driven NLP tasks show that existing injection methods are not suitable for the new paradigm, while map-tuning effectively improves the performance of downstream models. Moreover, we show that a frozen downstream model can be well adapted to different domains with different mapping networks of domain knowledge. Our code and models are available at https://github.com/THUNLP/Knowledge-Plugin.

Rule-based reasoning has been acknowledged as one of the fundamental problems in reasoning, while deviations in rule formats, types, and complexity in real-world applications pose severe challenges. Recent studies have shown that large reasoning models (LRMs) have remarkable reasoning capabilities, and their performance is substantially enhanced by reinforcement learning (RL). However, it remains an open question whether small reasoning models (SRMs) can learn rule-based reasoning effectively with robust generalization across diverse tasks and domains. To address this, we introduce Reinforced Rule-based Reasoning, a.k.a. RuleReasoner, a simple yet effective method to conduct rule-based reasoning via a wide collection of curated tasks and a novel domain-aware dynamic sampling approach. Specifically, RuleReasoner resamples each training batch by updating the sampling weights of different domains based on historical rewards. This facilitates domain augmentation and flexible online learning schedules for RL, obviating the need for pre-hoc human-engineered mix-training recipes used in existing methods. Empirical evaluations on in-distribution (ID) and out-of-distribution (OOD) benchmarks reveal that RuleReasoner outperforms frontier LRMs by a significant margin (Delta4.1% average points on eight ID tasks and Delta10.4% average points on three OOD tasks over OpenAI-o1). Notably, our approach also exhibits higher computational efficiency compared to prior dynamic sampling methods for RL.

Code generation with large language models (LLMs), often termed vibe coding, is increasingly adopted in production but fails to ensure code quality, particularly in security (e.g., SQL injection vulnerabilities) and maintainability (e.g., missing type annotations). Existing methods, such as supervised fine-tuning and rule-based post-processing, rely on labor-intensive annotations or brittle heuristics, limiting their scalability and effectiveness. We propose REAL, a reinforcement learning framework that incentivizes LLMs to generate production-quality code using program analysis-guided feedback. Specifically, REAL integrates two automated signals: (1) program analysis detecting security or maintainability defects and (2) unit tests ensuring functional correctness. Unlike prior work, our framework is prompt-agnostic and reference-free, enabling scalable supervision without manual intervention. Experiments across multiple datasets and model scales demonstrate that REAL outperforms state-of-the-art methods in simultaneous assessments of functionality and code quality. Our work bridges the gap between rapid prototyping and production-ready code, enabling LLMs to deliver both speed and quality.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in agentic systems that interact with an external environment; this makes them susceptible to prompt injections when dealing with untrusted data. To overcome this limitation, we propose SIC (Soft Instruction Control)-a simple yet effective iterative prompt sanitization loop designed for tool-augmented LLM agents. Our method repeatedly inspects incoming data for instructions that could compromise agent behavior. If such content is found, the malicious content is rewritten, masked, or removed, and the result is re-evaluated. The process continues until the input is clean or a maximum iteration limit is reached; if imperative instruction-like content remains, the agent halts to ensure security. By allowing multiple passes, our approach acknowledges that individual rewrites may fail but enables the system to catch and correct missed injections in later steps. Although immediately useful, worst-case analysis shows that SIC is not infallible; strong adversary can still get a 15% ASR by embedding non-imperative workflows. This nonetheless raises the bar.

Reinforcement fine-tuning (RFT) has emerged as a powerful post-training technique to incentivize the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs). However, LLMs can respond very inconsistently to RFT: some show substantial performance gains, while others plateau or even degrade. To understand this divergence, we analyze the per-step influence of the RL objective and identify two key conditions for effective post-training: (1) RL-informative rollout accuracy, and (2) strong data co-influence, which quantifies how much the training data affects performance on other samples. Guided by these insights, we propose behavior injection, a task-agnostic data-augmentation scheme applied prior to RL. Behavior injection enriches the supervised finetuning (SFT) data by seeding exploratory and exploitative behaviors, effectively making the model more RL-ready. We evaluate our method across two reasoning benchmarks with multiple base models. The results demonstrate that our theoretically motivated augmentation can significantly increases the performance gain from RFT over the pre-RL model.

Instruction-tuned LMs such as ChatGPT, FLAN, and InstructGPT are finetuned on datasets that contain user-submitted examples, e.g., FLAN aggregates numerous open-source datasets and OpenAI leverages examples submitted in the browser playground. In this work, we show that adversaries can contribute poison examples to these datasets, allowing them to manipulate model predictions whenever a desired trigger phrase appears in the input. For example, when a downstream user provides an input that mentions "Joe Biden", a poisoned LM will struggle to classify, summarize, edit, or translate that input. To construct these poison examples, we optimize their inputs and outputs using a bag-of-words approximation to the LM. We evaluate our method on open-source instruction-tuned LMs. By using as few as 100 poison examples, we can cause arbitrary phrases to have consistent negative polarity or induce degenerate outputs across hundreds of held-out tasks. Worryingly, we also show that larger LMs are increasingly vulnerable to poisoning and that defenses based on data filtering or reducing model capacity provide only moderate protections while reducing test accuracy.

Prompt injection attacks pose a critical threat to large language models (LLMs), enabling goal hijacking and data leakage. Prompt guard models, though effective in defense, suffer from over-defense -- falsely flagging benign inputs as malicious due to trigger word bias. To address this issue, we introduce NotInject, an evaluation dataset that systematically measures over-defense across various prompt guard models. NotInject contains 339 benign samples enriched with trigger words common in prompt injection attacks, enabling fine-grained evaluation. Our results show that state-of-the-art models suffer from over-defense issues, with accuracy dropping close to random guessing levels (60%). To mitigate this, we propose InjecGuard, a novel prompt guard model that incorporates a new training strategy, Mitigating Over-defense for Free (MOF), which significantly reduces the bias on trigger words. InjecGuard demonstrates state-of-the-art performance on diverse benchmarks including NotInject, surpassing the existing best model by 30.8%, offering a robust and open-source solution for detecting prompt injection attacks. The code and datasets are released at https://github.com/SaFoLab-WISC/InjecGuard.

The widespread availability of large-scale code datasets has accelerated the development of code large language models (CodeLLMs), raising concerns about unauthorized dataset usage. Dataset poisoning offers a proactive defense by reducing the utility of such unauthorized training. However, existing poisoning methods often require full dataset poisoning and introduce transformations that break code compilability. In this paper, we introduce FunPoison, a functionality-preserving poisoning approach that injects short, compilable weak-use fragments into executed code paths. FunPoison leverages reusable statement-level templates with automatic repair and conservative safety checking to ensure side-effect freedom, while a type-aware synthesis module suppresses static analysis warnings and enhances stealth. Extensive experiments show that FunPoison achieves effective poisoning by contaminating only 10% of the dataset, while maintaining 100% compilability and functional correctness, and remains robust against various advanced code sanitization techniques.

Finetuning large language models (LLMs) enables user-specific customization but introduces critical safety risks: even a few harmful examples can compromise safety alignment. A common mitigation strategy is to update the model more strongly on examples deemed safe, while downweighting or excluding those flagged as unsafe. However, because safety context can shift within a single example, updating the model equally on both harmful and harmless parts of a response is suboptimal-a coarse treatment we term static safety shaping. In contrast, we propose dynamic safety shaping (DSS), a framework that uses fine-grained safety signals to reinforce learning from safe segments of a response while suppressing unsafe content. To enable such fine-grained control during finetuning, we introduce a key insight: guardrail models, traditionally used for filtering, can be repurposed to evaluate partial responses, tracking how safety risk evolves throughout the response, segment by segment. This leads to the Safety Trajectory Assessment of Response (STAR), a token-level signal that enables shaping to operate dynamically over the training sequence. Building on this, we present STAR-DSS, guided by STAR scores, that robustly mitigates finetuning risks and delivers substantial safety improvements across diverse threats, datasets, and model families-all without compromising capability on intended tasks. We encourage future safety research to build on dynamic shaping principles for stronger mitigation against evolving finetuning risks.

The security of Large Language Model (LLM) applications is fundamentally challenged by "form-first" attacks like prompt injection and jailbreaking, where malicious instructions are embedded within user inputs. Conventional defenses, which rely on post hoc output filtering, are often brittle and fail to address the root cause: the model's inability to distinguish trusted instructions from untrusted data. This paper proposes Countermind, a multi-layered security architecture intended to shift defenses from a reactive, post hoc posture to a proactive, pre-inference, and intra-inference enforcement model. The architecture proposes a fortified perimeter designed to structurally validate and transform all inputs, and an internal governance mechanism intended to constrain the model's semantic processing pathways before an output is generated. The primary contributions of this work are conceptual designs for: (1) A Semantic Boundary Logic (SBL) with a mandatory, time-coupled Text Crypter intended to reduce the plaintext prompt injection attack surface, provided all ingestion paths are enforced. (2) A Parameter-Space Restriction (PSR) mechanism, leveraging principles from representation engineering, to dynamically control the LLM's access to internal semantic clusters, with the goal of mitigating semantic drift and dangerous emergent behaviors. (3) A Secure, Self-Regulating Core that uses an OODA loop and a learning security module to adapt its defenses based on an immutable audit log. (4) A Multimodal Input Sandbox and Context-Defense mechanisms to address threats from non-textual data and long-term semantic poisoning. This paper outlines an evaluation plan designed to quantify the proposed architecture's effectiveness in reducing the Attack Success Rate (ASR) for form-first attacks and to measure its potential latency overhead.

Instruction fine-tuning (IFT) elicits instruction following capabilities and steers the behavior of large language models (LLMs) via supervised learning. However, existing models trained on open-source IFT datasets only have the ability to follow instructions from users, and often fail to follow complex role and rules specified by developers, a.k.a. system prompts. The ability to follow these roles and rules is essential for deployment, as it ensures that the model safely interacts with users within developer defined guidelines. To improve such role and rule following ability, we propose \model, an automated data generation pipeline that generates diverse roles and rules from existing IFT instructions, along with corresponding responses. This data can then be used to train models that follow complex system prompts. The models are evaluated on our newly created benchmarks for role and rule following ability, as well as standard instruction-following benchmarks and general NLP tasks. Our framework significantly improves role and rule following capability in LLMs, as evidenced by over 25% increase in pass-rate on rule adherence, i.e. following all requirements, in our experiments with the Alpaca and Ultrachat datasets. Moreover, our models achieves this increase without any regression on popular instruction following benchmarks.

Prompt injection attacks pose serious security risks across a wide range of real-world applications. While receiving increasing attention, the community faces a critical gap: the lack of a unified platform for prompt injection evaluation. This makes it challenging to reliably compare defenses, understand their true robustness under diverse attacks, or assess how well they generalize across tasks and benchmarks. For instance, many defenses initially reported as effective were later found to exhibit limited robustness on diverse datasets and attacks. To bridge this gap, we introduce PIArena, a unified and extensible platform for prompt injection evaluation that enables users to easily integrate state-of-the-art attacks and defenses and evaluate them across a variety of existing and new benchmarks. We also design a dynamic strategy-based attack that adaptively optimizes injected prompts based on defense feedback. Through comprehensive evaluation using PIArena, we uncover critical limitations of state-of-the-art defenses: limited generalizability across tasks, vulnerability to adaptive attacks, and fundamental challenges when an injected task aligns with the target task. The code and datasets are available at https://github.com/sleeepeer/PIArena.

Autonomous coding agents are increasingly integrated into software development workflows, offering capabilities that extend beyond code suggestion to active system interaction and environment management. OpenClaw, a representative platform in this emerging paradigm, introduces an extensible skill ecosystem that allows third-party developers to inject behavioral guidance through lifecycle hooks during agent initialization. While this design enhances automation and customization, it also opens a novel and unexplored attack surface. In this paper, we identify and systematically characterize guidance injection, a stealthy attack vector that embeds adversarial operational narratives into bootstrap guidance files. Unlike traditional prompt injection, which relies on explicit malicious instructions, guidance injection manipulates the agent's reasoning context by framing harmful actions as routine best practices. These narratives are automatically incorporated into the agent's interpretive framework and influence future task execution without raising suspicion.We construct 26 malicious skills spanning 13 attack categories including credential exfiltration, workspace destruction, privilege escalation, and persistent backdoor installation. We evaluate them using ORE-Bench, a realistic developer workspace benchmark we developed. Across 52 natural user prompts and six state-of-the-art LLM backends, our attacks achieve success rates from 16.0% to 64.2%, with the majority of malicious actions executed autonomously without user confirmation. Furthermore, 94% of our malicious skills evade detection by existing static and LLM-based scanners. Our findings reveal fundamental tensions in the design of autonomous agent ecosystems and underscore the urgent need for defenses based on capability isolation, runtime policy enforcement, and transparent guidance provenance.

The performance of an algorithm often critically depends on its parameter configuration. While a variety of automated algorithm configuration methods have been proposed to relieve users from the tedious and error-prone task of manually tuning parameters, there is still a lot of untapped potential as the learned configuration is static, i.e., parameter settings remain fixed throughout the run. However, it has been shown that some algorithm parameters are best adjusted dynamically during execution, e.g., to adapt to the current part of the optimization landscape. Thus far, this is most commonly achieved through hand-crafted heuristics. A promising recent alternative is to automatically learn such dynamic parameter adaptation policies from data. In this article, we give the first comprehensive account of this new field of automated dynamic algorithm configuration (DAC), present a series of recent advances, and provide a solid foundation for future research in this field. Specifically, we (i) situate DAC in the broader historical context of AI research; (ii) formalize DAC as a computational problem; (iii) identify the methods used in prior-art to tackle this problem; (iv) conduct empirical case studies for using DAC in evolutionary optimization, AI planning, and machine learning.

Post-training of large language models involves a fundamental trade-off between supervised fine-tuning (SFT), which efficiently mimics demonstrations but tends to memorize, and reinforcement learning (RL), which achieves better generalization at higher computational cost. Dynamic Fine-Tuning (DFT) recently emerged as a promising middle ground, reweighting SFT objectives with token probabilities and achieving improvements in certain reasoning domains, though it exhibits instability in other tasks. We provide a analysis of DFT through the reward-weighted regression (RWR) framework, revealing that it corresponds to a specific auxiliary distribution choice that yields provably tighter RL bounds than standard SFT. However, our analysis also uncovers a critical limitation: this construction lacks distributional anchoring, leading to progressive drift that undermines training stability. To address this, we propose Anchored Supervised Fine-Tuning (ASFT), which augments DFT's reweighting with lightweight KL regularization to preserve tightness while ensuring stability. Empirically, ASFT consistently outperforms both SFT and DFT across mathematical reasoning, medical knowledge grounding, and code generation, achieving substantial improvements with minimal computational overhead. Our RWR framework provides a systematic lens for understanding post-training methods and demonstrates that principled theoretical analysis leads to both stronger guarantees and practical gains.

As large language models (LLMs) advance in conversational and reasoning capabilities, their practical application in healthcare has become a critical research focus. However, there is a notable gap between the performance of medical LLMs on static benchmarks such as USMLE and their utility in real-world clinical decision-making. This discrepancy arises because traditional exams fail to capture the dynamic, interactive nature of medical consultations. To address this challenge, we introduce a novel dynamic verification framework that moves beyond static answer verifier, establishing a large-scale, high-fidelity interactive reinforcement learning system. Our framework comprises two key components: a Patient Simulator that creates realistic clinical environments using de-identified medical records, and a Clinical Rubrics Generator that dynamically produces multi-dimensional evaluation metrics. Building on this foundation, we develop Baichuan-M2, a 32B-parameter medical augmented reasoning model trained through a multi-stage reinforcement learning strategy with an improved Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) algorithm. Evaluated on HealthBench, Baichuan-M2 outperforms all other open-source models and most advanced closed-source counterparts, achieving a score above 32 on the challenging HealthBench Hard benchmark-previously exceeded only by GPT-5. Our work demonstrates that robust dynamic verifier system is essential for aligning LLM capabilities with practical clinical applications, establishing a new Pareto front in the performance-parameter trade-off for medical AI deployment.

As autonomous AI agents are used in regulated and safety-critical settings, organizations need effective ways to turn policy into enforceable controls. We introduce a regulatory machine learning framework that converts unstructured design artifacts (like PRDs, TDDs, and code) into verifiable runtime guardrails. Our Policy as Prompt method reads these documents and risk controls to build a source-linked policy tree. This tree is then compiled into lightweight, prompt-based classifiers for real-time runtime monitoring. The system is built to enforce least privilege and data minimization. For conformity assessment, it provides complete provenance, traceability, and audit logging, all integrated with a human-in-the-loop review process. Evaluations show our system reduces prompt-injection risk, blocks out-of-scope requests, and limits toxic outputs. It also generates auditable rationales aligned with AI governance frameworks. By treating policies as executable prompts (a policy-as-code for agents), this approach enables secure-by-design deployment, continuous compliance, and scalable AI safety and AI security assurance for regulatable ML.

Dynamic feature selection, where we sequentially query features to make accurate predictions with a minimal budget, is a promising paradigm to reduce feature acquisition costs and provide transparency into a model's predictions. The problem is challenging, however, as it requires both predicting with arbitrary feature sets and learning a policy to identify valuable selections. Here, we take an information-theoretic perspective and prioritize features based on their mutual information with the response variable. The main challenge is implementing this policy, and we design a new approach that estimates the mutual information in a discriminative rather than generative fashion. Building on our approach, we then introduce several further improvements: allowing variable feature budgets across samples, enabling non-uniform feature costs, incorporating prior information, and exploring modern architectures to handle partial inputs. Our experiments show that our method provides consistent gains over recent methods across a variety of datasets.

Context: Exhaustive fuzzing of modern JavaScript engines is infeasible due to the vast number of program states and execution paths. Coverage-guided fuzzers waste effort on low-risk inputs, often ignoring vulnerability-triggering ones that do not increase coverage. Existing heuristics proposed to mitigate this require expert effort, are brittle, and hard to adapt. Objective: We propose a data-centric, LLM-boosted alternative that learns from historical vulnerabilities to automatically identify minimal static (code) and dynamic (runtime) features for detecting high-risk inputs. Method: Guided by historical V8 bugs, iterative prompting generated 115 static and 49 dynamic features, with the latter requiring only five trace flags, minimizing instrumentation cost. After feature selection, 41 features remained to train an XGBoost model to predict high-risk inputs during fuzzing. Results: Combining static and dynamic features yields over 85% precision and under 1% false alarms. Only 25% of these features are needed for comparable performance, showing that most of the search space is irrelevant. Conclusion: This work introduces feature-guided fuzzing, an automated data-driven approach that replaces coverage with data-directed inference, guiding fuzzers toward high-risk states for faster, targeted, and reproducible vulnerability discovery. To support open science, all scripts and data are available at https://github.com/KKGanguly/DataCentricFuzzJS .

Backdoor attacks pose a serious threat to the secure deployment of large language models (LLMs), enabling adversaries to implant hidden behaviors triggered by specific inputs. However, existing methods often rely on manually crafted triggers and static data pipelines, which are rigid, labor-intensive, and inadequate for systematically evaluating modern defense robustness. As AI agents become increasingly capable, there is a growing need for more rigorous, diverse, and scalable red-teaming frameworks that can realistically simulate backdoor threats and assess model resilience under adversarial conditions. In this work, we introduce AutoBackdoor, a general framework for automating backdoor injection, encompassing trigger generation, poisoned data construction, and model fine-tuning via an autonomous agent-driven pipeline. Unlike prior approaches, AutoBackdoor uses a powerful language model agent to generate semantically coherent, context-aware trigger phrases, enabling scalable poisoning across arbitrary topics with minimal human effort. We evaluate AutoBackdoor under three realistic threat scenarios, including Bias Recommendation, Hallucination Injection, and Peer Review Manipulation, to simulate a broad range of attacks. Experiments on both open-source and commercial models, including LLaMA-3, Mistral, Qwen, and GPT-4o, demonstrate that our method achieves over 90\% attack success with only a small number of poisoned samples. More importantly, we find that existing defenses often fail to mitigate these attacks, underscoring the need for more rigorous and adaptive evaluation techniques against agent-driven threats as explored in this work. All code, datasets, and experimental configurations will be merged into our primary repository at https://github.com/bboylyg/BackdoorLLM.

The rapid evolution of Multi-modal Large Language Models (MLLMs) has advanced workflow automation; however, existing research mainly targets performance upper bounds in static environments, overlooking robustness for stochastic real-world deployment. We identify three key challenges: dynamic task scheduling, active exploration under uncertainty, and continuous learning from experience. To bridge this gap, we introduce , a dynamic evaluation environment that simulates a "trainee" agent continuously exploring a novel setting. Unlike traditional benchmarks, evaluates agents along three dimensions: (1) context-aware scheduling for streaming tasks with varying priorities; (2) prudent information acquisition to reduce hallucination via active exploration; and (3) continuous evolution by distilling generalized strategies from rule-based, dynamically generated tasks. Experiments show that cutting-edge agents have significant deficiencies in dynamic environments, especially in active exploration and continual learning. Our work establishes a framework for assessing agent reliability, shifting evaluation from static tests to realistic, production-oriented scenarios. Our codes are available at https://github.com/KnowledgeXLab/EvoEnv

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are deployed with increasing real-world responsibilities, it is important to be able to specify and constrain the behavior of these systems in a reliable manner. Model developers may wish to set explicit rules for the model, such as "do not generate abusive content", but these may be circumvented by jailbreaking techniques. Evaluating how well LLMs follow developer-provided rules in the face of adversarial inputs typically requires manual review, which slows down monitoring and methods development. To address this issue, we propose Rule-following Language Evaluation Scenarios (RuLES), a programmatic framework for measuring rule-following ability in LLMs. RuLES consists of 15 simple text scenarios in which the model is instructed to obey a set of rules in natural language while interacting with the human user. Each scenario has a concise evaluation program to determine whether the model has broken any rules in a conversation. Through manual exploration of model behavior in our scenarios, we identify 6 categories of attack strategies and collect two suites of test cases: one consisting of unique conversations from manual testing and one that systematically implements strategies from the 6 categories. Across various popular proprietary and open models such as GPT-4 and Llama 2, we find that all models are susceptible to a wide variety of adversarial hand-crafted user inputs, though GPT-4 is the best-performing model. Additionally, we evaluate open models under gradient-based attacks and find significant vulnerabilities. We propose RuLES as a challenging new setting for research into exploring and defending against both manual and automatic attacks on LLMs.

In Text-to-SQL, execution feedback is essential for guiding large language models (LLMs) to reason accurately and generate reliable SQL queries. However, existing methods treat execution feedback solely as a post-hoc signal for correction or selection, failing to integrate it into the generation process. This limitation hinders their ability to address reasoning errors as they occur, ultimately reducing query accuracy and robustness. To address this issue, we propose ReEx-SQL (Reasoning with Execution-Aware Reinforcement Learning), a framework for Text-to-SQL that enables models to interact with the database during decoding and dynamically adjust their reasoning based on execution feedback. ReEx-SQL introduces an execution-aware reasoning paradigm that interleaves intermediate SQL execution into reasoning paths, facilitating context-sensitive revisions. It achieves this through structured prompts with markup tags and a stepwise rollout strategy that integrates execution feedback into each stage of generation. To supervise policy learning, we develop a composite reward function that includes an exploration reward, explicitly encouraging effective database interaction. Additionally, ReEx-SQL adopts a tree-based decoding strategy to support exploratory reasoning, enabling dynamic expansion of alternative reasoning paths. Notably, ReEx-SQL achieves 88.8% on Spider and 64.9% on BIRD at the 7B scale, surpassing the standard reasoning baseline by 2.7% and 2.6%, respectively. It also shows robustness, achieving 85.2% on Spider-Realistic with leading performance. In addition, its tree-structured decoding improves efficiency and performance over linear decoding, reducing inference time by 51.9% on the BIRD development set.

While Large Language Models (LLMs) acquire vast knowledge during pre-training, they often lack domain-specific, new, or niche information. Continual pre-training (CPT) attempts to address this gap but suffers from catastrophic forgetting and inefficiencies in low-data regimes. We introduce Knowledge-Instruct, a novel approach to efficiently inject knowledge from limited corpora through pure instruction-tuning. By generating information-dense synthetic instruction data, it effectively integrates new knowledge while preserving general reasoning and instruction-following abilities. Knowledge-Instruct demonstrates superior factual memorization, minimizes catastrophic forgetting, and remains scalable by leveraging synthetic data from relatively small language models. Additionally, it enhances contextual understanding, including complex multi-hop reasoning, facilitating integration with retrieval systems. We validate its effectiveness across diverse benchmarks, including Companies, a new dataset that we release to measure knowledge injection capabilities.

Training tool-augmented LLMs has emerged as a promising approach to enhancing language models' capabilities for complex tasks. The current supervised fine-tuning paradigm relies on constructing extensive domain-specific datasets to train models. However, this approach often struggles to generalize effectively to unfamiliar or intricate tool-use scenarios. Recently, reinforcement learning (RL) paradigm can endow LLMs with superior reasoning and generalization abilities. In this work, we address a key question: Can the pure RL be used to effectively elicit a model's intrinsic reasoning capabilities and enhance the tool-agnostic generalization? We propose a dynamic generalization-guided reward design for rule-based RL, which progressively shifts rewards from exploratory to exploitative tool-use patterns. Based on this design, we introduce the Tool-Zero series models. These models are trained to enable LLMs to autonomously utilize general tools by directly scaling up RL from Zero models (i.e., base models without post-training). Experimental results demonstrate that our models achieve over 7% performance improvement compared to both SFT and RL-with-SFT models under the same experimental settings. These gains are consistently replicated across cross-dataset and intra-dataset evaluations, validating the effectiveness and robustness of our methods.

Mainstream backdoor attack methods typically demand substantial tuning data for poisoning, limiting their practicality and potentially degrading the overall performance when applied to Large Language Models (LLMs). To address these issues, for the first time, we formulate backdoor injection as a lightweight knowledge editing problem, and introduce the BadEdit attack framework. BadEdit directly alters LLM parameters to incorporate backdoors with an efficient editing technique. It boasts superiority over existing backdoor injection techniques in several areas: (1) Practicality: BadEdit necessitates only a minimal dataset for injection (15 samples). (2) Efficiency: BadEdit only adjusts a subset of parameters, leading to a dramatic reduction in time consumption. (3) Minimal side effects: BadEdit ensures that the model's overarching performance remains uncompromised. (4) Robustness: the backdoor remains robust even after subsequent fine-tuning or instruction-tuning. Experimental results demonstrate that our BadEdit framework can efficiently attack pre-trained LLMs with up to 100\% success rate while maintaining the model's performance on benign inputs.

Inductive Logic Programming (ILP) learns interpretable logical rules from data. Existing methods are transductive: their learned parameters are bound to specific predicates and require retraining for each new task. We introduce Neural Rule Inducer (NRI), a pretrained model for zero-shot rule induction. Rather than encoding literal identities, NRI represents literals using domain-agnostic statistical properties such as class-conditional rates, entropy, and co-occurrence, which generalize across variable identities and counts without retraining. The model consists of a statistical encoder and a parallel slot-based decoder. Parallel decoding preserves the permutation invariance of logical disjunction; an autoregressive decoder would instead impose an arbitrary clause order. Product T-norm relaxation makes rule execution differentiable, allowing end-to-end training on prediction accuracy alone. We evaluate NRI on rule recovery, robustness to label noise and spurious correlations, and zero-shot transfer to real-world benchmarks, and we believe this work opens up the possibility of foundation models for symbolic reasoning. Code and the reference checkpoint are available at https://github.com/phuayj/neural-rule-inducer.

LLM-integrated applications and agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where an attacker injects prompts into their inputs to induce attacker-desired outputs. A detection method aims to determine whether a given input is contaminated by an injected prompt. However, existing detection methods have limited effectiveness against state-of-the-art attacks, let alone adaptive ones. In this work, we propose DataSentinel, a game-theoretic method to detect prompt injection attacks. Specifically, DataSentinel fine-tunes an LLM to detect inputs contaminated with injected prompts that are strategically adapted to evade detection. We formulate this as a minimax optimization problem, with the objective of fine-tuning the LLM to detect strong adaptive attacks. Furthermore, we propose a gradient-based method to solve the minimax optimization problem by alternating between the inner max and outer min problems. Our evaluation results on multiple benchmark datasets and LLMs show that DataSentinel effectively detects both existing and adaptive prompt injection attacks.

Large language models (LLMs) sometimes exhibit dangerous unintended behaviors. Finding and fixing these is challenging because the attack surface is massive -- it is not tractable to exhaustively search for all possible inputs that may elicit such behavior. One specific and particularly challenging case is that if data-poisoning-injected trojans, since there is no way to know what they are to search for them. To our knowledge, there is no generally applicable method to unlearn unknown trojans injected during pre-training. This work seeks to provide a general purpose recipe (filters) and a specific implementation (LoRA) filters that work in practice on small to medium sized models. The focus is primarily empirical, though some perplexing behavior opens the door to the fundamental question of how LLMs store and process information. Not unexpectedly, we find that our filters work best on the residual stream and the latest layers.

Indirect Prompt Injection attacks exploit the inherent limitation of Large Language Models (LLMs) to distinguish between instructions and data in their inputs. Despite numerous defense proposals, the systematic evaluation against adaptive adversaries remains limited, even when successful attacks can have wide security and privacy implications, and many real-world LLM-based applications remain vulnerable. We present the results of LLMail-Inject, a public challenge simulating a realistic scenario in which participants adaptively attempted to inject malicious instructions into emails in order to trigger unauthorized tool calls in an LLM-based email assistant. The challenge spanned multiple defense strategies, LLM architectures, and retrieval configurations, resulting in a dataset of 208,095 unique attack submissions from 839 participants. We release the challenge code, the full dataset of submissions, and our analysis demonstrating how this data can provide new insights into the instruction-data separation problem. We hope this will serve as a foundation for future research towards practical structural solutions to prompt injection.

Guardian models are used to supervise and moderate the outputs of user-facing chatbots, enforcing guardrails and detecting bad behaviors. Standard guardian models like LlamaGuard detect predefined, static categories of harms. We propose dynamic guardian models that evaluate text based on user-defined policies, making them useful for different application domains that are not addressed by standard guardian models. Our dynamic guardian models can be used for fast detection of policy violations or with chain-of-thought reasoning that articulates and justifies the model outputs. Our dynamic guardian models match static models in detection accuracy for static harm categories while identifying violations of free-form policies with accuracy comparable to frontier reasoning models in a fraction of the time.

Recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have popularized test-time scaling, where models generate additional reasoning tokens before producing final answers. These approaches have demonstrated significant performance improvements on benchmarks involving mathematical reasoning. However, language models relying solely on direct inference still struggle with tasks demanding up-to-date knowledge or computational tools such as calculators and code interpreters for complex arithmetic operations. To overcome these limitations, we propose Tool-Augmented Policy Optimization (TAPO), a novel reinforcement learning framework that systematically integrates multi-hop reasoning with adaptive tool-calling capabilities. Our approach employs a modified version of Dynamic Sampling Policy Optimization (DAPO), a recently developed RL paradigm, which we adapt specifically for tool invocation scenarios, enabling models to dynamically interleave complex reasoning with on-demand tool usage (including search APIs and Python interpreters). To support this research, we introduce two new datasets: TAPO-easy-60K and TAPO-hard-18K, specifically designed to train and evaluate both fact-based reasoning and mathematical calculation capabilities. Our experiments on Qwen2.5-3B and Qwen2.5-7B models demonstrate the effectiveness of our approach, with both models achieving state-of-the-art performance on tasks requiring external knowledge and mathematical computation among methods with comparable parameters. Notably, TAPO achieves more efficient tool utilization than baseline methods while preventing excessive calls caused by reward hacking. These results highlight the significant potential of combining advanced reasoning with tool usage to enhance model performance in knowledge-intensive and computationally demanding tasks.

Tool-using automation systems, from scripts and CI bots to agentic assistants, fail in recurring patterns. Common failures include unsafe side effects, invalid arguments, uncontrolled retries, and leakage of sensitive outputs. Many mitigations are model-centric and prompt-dependent, so they are brittle and do not generalize to non-LLM callers. We present Policy-First Tooling, a model-agnostic permission layer that mediates tool invocation through explicit constraints, risk-aware gating, recovery controls, and auditable explanations. The paper contributes a compact policy DSL, a runtime enforcement architecture with actionable rationale and fix hints, and a reproducible benchmark based on trace replay with controlled fault and misuse injection. In 225 controlled runs across five policy packs and three fault profiles, stricter packs improve violation prevention from 0.000 in P0 to 0.681 in P4, while task success drops from 0.356 to 0.067. Retry amplification decreases from 3.774 in P0 to 1.378 in P4, and leakage recall reaches 0.875 under injected secret outputs. These results make safety to utility trade-offs explicit and measurable.

Recent advancements in text-to-image generation have spurred interest in personalized human image generation, which aims to create novel images featuring specific human identities as reference images indicate. Although existing methods achieve high-fidelity identity preservation, they often struggle with limited multi-ID usability and inadequate facial editability. We present DynamicID, a tuning-free framework supported by a dual-stage training paradigm that inherently facilitates both single-ID and multi-ID personalized generation with high fidelity and flexible facial editability. Our key innovations include: 1) Semantic-Activated Attention (SAA), which employs query-level activation gating to minimize disruption to the original model when injecting ID features and achieve multi-ID personalization without requiring multi-ID samples during training. 2) Identity-Motion Reconfigurator (IMR), which leverages contrastive learning to effectively disentangle and re-entangle facial motion and identity features, thereby enabling flexible facial editing. Additionally, we have developed a curated VariFace-10k facial dataset, comprising 10k unique individuals, each represented by 35 distinct facial images. Experimental results demonstrate that DynamicID outperforms state-of-the-art methods in identity fidelity, facial editability, and multi-ID personalization capability.

Legal reasoning requires not only correct outcomes but also procedurally compliant reasoning processes. However, existing methods lack mechanisms to verify intermediate reasoning steps, allowing errors such as inapplicable statute citations to propagate undetected through the reasoning chain. To address this, we propose LawThinker, an autonomous legal research agent that adopts an Explore-Verify-Memorize strategy for dynamic judicial environments. The core idea is to enforce verification as an atomic operation after every knowledge exploration step. A DeepVerifier module examines each retrieval result along three dimensions of knowledge accuracy, fact-law relevance, and procedural compliance, with a memory module for cross-round knowledge reuse in long-horizon tasks. Experiments on the dynamic benchmark J1-EVAL show that LawThinker achieves a 24% improvement over direct reasoning and an 11% gain over workflow-based methods, with particularly strong improvements on process-oriented metrics. Evaluations on three static benchmarks further confirm its generalization capability. The code is available at https://github.com/yxy-919/LawThinker-agent .

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has advanced the reasoning capability of large language models (LLMs), enabling autonomous agents that can conduct effective multi-turn and tool-integrated reasoning. While instructions serve as the primary protocol for defining agents, RLVR typically relies on static and manually designed instructions. However, those instructions may be suboptimal for the base model, and the optimal instruction may change as the agent's policy improves and explores the interaction with the environment. To bridge the gap, we introduce INSPO, a novel Instruction-Policy co-evolution framework that integrates instruction optimization as a dynamic component of the reinforcement learning (RL) loop. INSPO maintains a dynamic population of instruction candidates that are sampled with questions, where reward signals in RL loops are automatically attributed to each instruction, and low performers are periodically pruned. New instructions are generated and verified through an on-policy reflection mechanism, where an LLM-based optimizer analyzes past experience from a replay buffer and evolves more effective strategies given the current policy. We conduct extensive experiments on multi-turn retrieval and reasoning tasks, demonstrating that INSPO substantially outperforms strong baselines relying on static instructions. INSPO discovers innovative instructions that guide the agent toward more strategic reasoning paths, achieving substantial performance gains with only a marginal increase in computational overhead.

LLM agents are evolving rapidly, powered by code execution, tools, and the recently introduced agent skills feature. Skills allow users to extend LLM applications with specialized third-party code, knowledge, and instructions. Although this can extend agent capabilities to new domains, it creates an increasingly complex agent supply chain, offering new surfaces for prompt injection attacks. We identify skill-based prompt injection as a significant threat and introduce SkillInject, a benchmark evaluating the susceptibility of widely-used LLM agents to injections through skill files. SkillInject contains 202 injection-task pairs with attacks ranging from obviously malicious injections to subtle, context-dependent attacks hidden in otherwise legitimate instructions. We evaluate frontier LLMs on SkillInject, measuring both security in terms of harmful instruction avoidance and utility in terms of legitimate instruction compliance. Our results show that today's agents are highly vulnerable with up to 80% attack success rate with frontier models, often executing extremely harmful instructions including data exfiltration, destructive action, and ransomware-like behavior. They furthermore suggest that this problem will not be solved through model scaling or simple input filtering, but that robust agent security will require context-aware authorization frameworks. Our benchmark is available at https://www.skill-inject.com/.

Instruction tuning has emerged as a critical paradigm for improving the capabilities and alignment of large language models (LLMs). However, existing iterative model-aware data selection methods incur significant computational overhead, as they rely on repeatedly performing full-dataset model inference to estimate sample utility for subsequent training iterations, creating a fundamental efficiency bottleneck. In this paper, we propose LEAD, an efficient iterative data selection framework that accurately estimates sample utility entirely within the standard training loop, eliminating the need for costly additional model inference. At its core, LEAD introduces Instance-Level Dynamic Uncertainty (IDU), a theoretically grounded utility function combining instantaneous training loss, gradient-based approximation of loss changes, and exponential smoothing of historical loss signals. To further scale efficiently to large datasets, LEAD employs a two-stage, coarse-to-fine selection strategy, adaptively prioritizing informative clusters through a multi-armed bandit mechanism, followed by precise fine-grained selection of high-utility samples using IDU. Extensive experiments across four diverse benchmarks show that LEAD significantly outperforms state-of-the-art methods, improving average model performance by 6.1%-10.8% while using only 2.5% of the training data and reducing overall training time by 5-10x.

Current research on the Decompose-Then-Verify paradigm for evaluating the factuality of long-form text typically treats decomposition and verification in isolation, overlooking their interactions and potential misalignment. We find that existing decomposition policies, typically hand-crafted demonstrations, do not align well with downstream verifiers in terms of atomicity -- a novel metric quantifying information density -- leading to suboptimal verification results. We formulate finding the optimal decomposition policy for optimal verification as a bilevel optimization problem. To approximate a solution for this strongly NP-hard problem, we propose dynamic decomposition, a reinforcement learning framework that leverages verifier feedback to learn a policy for dynamically decomposing claims to verifier-preferred atomicity. Experimental results show that dynamic decomposition outperforms existing decomposition policies, improving verification confidence by 0.07 and accuracy by 0.12 (on a 0-1 scale) on average across varying verifiers, datasets, and atomcities of input claims.

Rule-based rewards offer a promising strategy for improving reinforcement learning from human feedback (RLHF), but current approaches often rely on manual rule engineering. We present AutoRule, a fully automated method for extracting rules from preference feedback and formulating them into rule-based rewards. AutoRule extraction operates in three stages: it leverages a reasoning model to interpret user preferences, identifies candidate rules from the reasoning chain of these interpretations, and synthesizes them into a unified rule set. Leveraging the finalized rule set, we employ language-model verifiers to compute the fraction of rules satisfied by each output, using this metric as an auxiliary reward alongside the learned reward model during policy optimization. Training a Llama-3-8B model with AutoRule results in a 28.6\% relative improvement in length-controlled win rate on AlpacaEval2.0, and a 6.1\% relative gain in second-turn performance on a held-out MT-Bench subset, compared to a GRPO baseline trained with the same learned reward model but without the rule-based auxiliary reward. Our analysis confirms that the extracted rules exhibit good agreement with dataset preference. We find that AutoRule demonstrates reduced reward hacking compared to a learned reward model when run over two episodes. Finally, our case study suggests that the extracted rules capture unique qualities valued in different datasets. The extracted rules are provided in the appendix, and the code is open-sourced at https://github.com/cxcscmu/AutoRule.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) enable exciting LLM-integrated applications, which perform text-based tasks by utilizing their advanced language understanding capabilities. However, as LLMs have improved, so have the attacks against them. Prompt injection attacks are an important threat: they trick the model to deviate from the original application's instructions and instead follow user directives. These attacks rely on the LLM's ability to follow instructions and inability to separate the prompts and user data. We introduce structured queries, a general approach to tackle this problem. Structured queries separate prompts and data into two channels. We implement a system that supports structured queries. This system is made of (1) a secure front-end that formats a prompt and user data into a special format, and (2) a specially trained LLM that can produce high-quality outputs from these inputs. The LLM is trained using a novel fine-tuning strategy: we convert a base (non-instruction-tuned) LLM to a structured instruction-tuned model that will only follow instructions in the prompt portion of a query. To do so, we augment standard instruction tuning datasets with examples that also include instructions in the data portion of the query, and fine-tune the model to ignore these. Our system significantly improves resistance to prompt injection attacks, with little or no impact on utility. Our code is released at https://github.com/Sizhe-Chen/PromptInjectionDefense.

Dynamic Algorithm Configuration (DAC) aims to dynamically control a target algorithm's hyperparameters in order to improve its performance. Several theoretical and empirical results have demonstrated the benefits of dynamically controlling hyperparameters in domains like evolutionary computation, AI Planning or deep learning. Replicating these results, as well as studying new methods for DAC, however, is difficult since existing benchmarks are often specialized and incompatible with the same interfaces. To facilitate benchmarking and thus research on DAC, we propose DACBench, a benchmark library that seeks to collect and standardize existing DAC benchmarks from different AI domains, as well as provide a template for new ones. For the design of DACBench, we focused on important desiderata, such as (i) flexibility, (ii) reproducibility, (iii) extensibility and (iv) automatic documentation and visualization. To show the potential, broad applicability and challenges of DAC, we explore how a set of six initial benchmarks compare in several dimensions of difficulty.

AI agents are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious content hijacks agent behavior to steal credentials or cause financial loss. The only known robust defense is architectural isolation that strictly separates trusted task planning from untrusted environment observations. However, applying this design to Computer Use Agents (CUAs) -- systems that automate tasks by viewing screens and executing actions -- presents a fundamental challenge: current agents require continuous observation of UI state to determine each action, conflicting with the isolation required for security. We resolve this tension by demonstrating that UI workflows, while dynamic, are structurally predictable. We introduce Single-Shot Planning for CUAs, where a trusted planner generates a complete execution graph with conditional branches before any observation of potentially malicious content, providing provable control flow integrity guarantees against arbitrary instruction injections. Although this architectural isolation successfully prevents instruction injections, we show that additional measures are needed to prevent Branch Steering attacks, which manipulate UI elements to trigger unintended valid paths within the plan. We evaluate our design on OSWorld, and retain up to 57% of the performance of frontier models while improving performance for smaller open-source models by up to 19%, demonstrating that rigorous security and utility can coexist in CUAs.

Dynamic treatment regimes (DTRs) are personalized, adaptive, multi-stage treatment plans that adapt treatment decisions both to an individual's initial features and to intermediate outcomes and features at each subsequent stage, which are affected by decisions in prior stages. Examples include personalized first- and second-line treatments of chronic conditions like diabetes, cancer, and depression, which adapt to patient response to first-line treatment, disease progression, and individual characteristics. While existing literature mostly focuses on estimating the optimal DTR from offline data such as from sequentially randomized trials, we study the problem of developing the optimal DTR in an online manner, where the interaction with each individual affect both our cumulative reward and our data collection for future learning. We term this the DTR bandit problem. We propose a novel algorithm that, by carefully balancing exploration and exploitation, is guaranteed to achieve rate-optimal regret when the transition and reward models are linear. We demonstrate our algorithm and its benefits both in synthetic experiments and in a case study of adaptive treatment of major depressive disorder using real-world data.

Beyond simple text generation, Large Language Models (LLMs) have evolved into agentic systems capable of planning and interacting with external tools to solve complex tasks. This evolution involves fine-tuning LLMs on agent-specific tasks to enhance their proficiency. However, safety concerns are frequently overlooked during this fine-tuning process. In this work, we show that aligned LLMs can become unintentionally misaligned, leading to a higher likelihood of executing harmful tasks and a reduced tendency to refuse them when fine-tuned to execute agentic tasks. To address these safety challenges, we propose Prefix INjection Guard (PING), a simple yet effective method that prepends automatically generated natural language prefixes to agent responses, guiding them to refuse harmful requests while preserving performance on benign tasks. Specifically, we introduce an iterative approach that alternates between (1) generating candidate prefixes and (2) selecting those that optimize both task performance and refusal behavior. Experimental results demonstrate that PING significantly enhances the safety of fine-tuned LLM agents without sacrificing their effectiveness. PING consistently outperforms existing prompting approaches across diverse benchmarks in both web navigation and code generation tasks. Our analysis of internal hidden states via linear probes reveals that prefix tokens are crucial for behavior modification, explaining the performance gains. WARNING: This paper contains contents that are unethical or offensive in nature.

LLM agents are an emerging form of AI systems where large language models (LLMs) serve as the central component, utilizing a diverse set of tools to complete user-assigned tasks. Despite their great potential, LLM agents pose significant security risks. When interacting with the external world, they may encounter malicious commands from attackers, leading to the execution of dangerous actions. A promising way to address this is by enforcing the principle of least privilege: allowing only essential actions for task completion while blocking unnecessary ones. However, achieving this is challenging, as it requires covering diverse agent scenarios while preserving both security and utility. We introduce Progent, the first privilege control mechanism for LLM agents. At its core is a domain-specific language for flexibly expressing privilege control policies applied during agent execution. These policies provide fine-grained constraints over tool calls, deciding when tool calls are permissible and specifying fallbacks if they are not. This enables agent developers and users to craft suitable policies for their specific use cases and enforce them deterministically to guarantee security. Thanks to its modular design, integrating Progent does not alter agent internals and requires only minimal changes to agent implementation, enhancing its practicality and potential for widespread adoption. To automate policy writing, we leverage LLMs to generate policies based on user queries, which are then updated dynamically for improved security and utility. Our extensive evaluation shows that it enables strong security while preserving high utility across three distinct scenarios or benchmarks: AgentDojo, ASB, and AgentPoison. Furthermore, we perform an in-depth analysis, showcasing the effectiveness of its core components and the resilience of its automated policy generation against adaptive attacks.

AI agents that autonomously interact with external tools and environments show great promise across real-world applications. However, the external data which agent consumes also leads to the risk of indirect prompt injection attacks, where malicious instructions embedded in third-party content hijack agent behavior. Guided by benchmarks, such as AgentDojo, there has been significant amount of progress in developing defense against the said attacks. As the technology continues to mature, and that agents are increasingly being relied upon for more complex tasks, there is increasing pressing need to also evolve the benchmark to reflect threat landscape faced by emerging agentic systems. In this work, we reveal three fundamental flaws in current benchmarks and push the frontier along these dimensions: (i) lack of dynamic open-ended tasks, (ii) lack of helpful instructions, and (iii) simplistic user tasks. To bridge this gap, we introduce AgentDyn, a manually designed benchmark featuring 60 challenging open-ended tasks and 560 injection test cases across Shopping, GitHub, and Daily Life. Unlike prior static benchmarks, AgentDyn requires dynamic planning and incorporates helpful third-party instructions. Our evaluation of ten state-of-the-art defenses suggests that almost all existing defenses are either not secure enough or suffer from significant over-defense, revealing that existing defenses are still far from real-world deployment. Our benchmark is available at https://github.com/leolee99/AgentDyn.

Dynamic programming (DP) is a fundamental method in operations research, but formulating DP models has traditionally required expert knowledge of both the problem context and DP techniques. Large Language Models (LLMs) offer the potential to automate this process. However, DP problems pose unique challenges due to their inherently stochastic transitions and the limited availability of training data. These factors make it difficult to directly apply existing LLM-based models or frameworks developed for other optimization problems, such as linear or integer programming. We introduce DP-Bench, the first benchmark covering a wide range of textbook-level DP problems to enable systematic evaluation. We present Dynamic Programming Language Model (DPLM), a 7B-parameter specialized model that achieves performance comparable to state-of-the-art LLMs like OpenAI's o1 and DeepSeek-R1, and surpasses them on hard problems. Central to DPLM's effectiveness is DualReflect, our novel synthetic data generation pipeline, designed to scale up training data from a limited set of initial examples. DualReflect combines forward generation for diversity and backward generation for reliability. Our results reveal a key insight: backward generation is favored in low-data regimes for its strong correctness guarantees, while forward generation, though lacking such guarantees, becomes increasingly valuable at scale for introducing diverse formulations. This trade-off highlights the complementary strengths of both approaches and the importance of combining them.

Large Language Models (LLMs) exhibit remarkable code generation capabilities but falter when adapting to frequent updates in external library APIs. This critical limitation, stemming from reliance on outdated API knowledge from their training data, even with access to current documentation, impedes reliable code generation in dynamic environments. To tackle this issue, we propose ReCode (rule-based Reinforcement learning for Code Update), a novel framework that mimics human programmer adaptation to API changes. Specifically, we construct a dataset of approximately 2,000 data entries to train the LLMs to perform version migration based on updated information. Then, we introduce a modified string similarity metric for code evaluation as the reward for reinforcement learning. Our experiments demonstrate that ReCode substantially boosts LLMs' code generation performance in dynamic API scenarios, especially on the unseen CodeUpdateArena task. Crucially, compared to supervised fine-tuning, ReCode has less impact on LLMs' general code generation abilities. We apply ReCode on various LLMs and reinforcement learning algorithms (GRPO and DAPO), all achieving consistent improvements. Notably, after training, Qwen2.5-Coder-7B outperforms that of the 32B parameter code instruction-tuned model and the reasoning model with the same architecture. Code is available at https://github.com/zjunlp/ReCode.

Recent developments in Large Language Models (LLMs) have manifested significant advancements. To facilitate safeguards against malicious exploitation, a body of research has concentrated on aligning LLMs with human preferences and inhibiting their generation of inappropriate content. Unfortunately, such alignments are often vulnerable: fine-tuning with a minimal amount of harmful data can easily unalign the target LLM. While being effective, such fine-tuning-based unalignment approaches also have their own limitations: (1) non-stealthiness, after fine-tuning, safety audits or red-teaming can easily expose the potential weaknesses of the unaligned models, thereby precluding their release/use. (2) non-persistence, the unaligned LLMs can be easily repaired through re-alignment, i.e., fine-tuning again with aligned data points. In this work, we show that it is possible to conduct stealthy and persistent unalignment on large language models via backdoor injections. We also provide a novel understanding on the relationship between the backdoor persistence and the activation pattern and further provide guidelines for potential trigger design. Through extensive experiments, we demonstrate that our proposed stealthy and persistent unalignment can successfully pass the safety evaluation while maintaining strong persistence against re-alignment defense.

Poisoning attacks can compromise the safety of large language models (LLMs) by injecting malicious documents into their training data. Existing work has studied pretraining poisoning assuming adversaries control a percentage of the training corpus. However, for large models, even small percentages translate to impractically large amounts of data. This work demonstrates for the first time that poisoning attacks instead require a near-constant number of documents regardless of dataset size. We conduct the largest pretraining poisoning experiments to date, pretraining models from 600M to 13B parameters on chinchilla-optimal datasets (6B to 260B tokens). We find that 250 poisoned documents similarly compromise models across all model and dataset sizes, despite the largest models training on more than 20 times more clean data. We also run smaller-scale experiments to ablate factors that could influence attack success, including broader ratios of poisoned to clean data and non-random distributions of poisoned samples. Finally, we demonstrate the same dynamics for poisoning during fine-tuning. Altogether, our results suggest that injecting backdoors through data poisoning may be easier for large models than previously believed as the number of poisons required does not scale up with model size, highlighting the need for more research on defences to mitigate this risk in future models.

Large Language Models (LLMs) and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) systems are increasingly integrated into clinical workflows; however, prompt injection attacks can steer these systems toward clinically unsafe or misleading outputs. We introduce the Medical Prompt Injection Benchmark (MPIB), a dataset-and-benchmark suite for evaluating clinical safety under both direct prompt injection and indirect, RAG-mediated injection across clinically grounded tasks. MPIB emphasizes outcome-level risk via the Clinical Harm Event Rate (CHER), which measures high-severity clinical harm events under a clinically grounded taxonomy, and reports CHER alongside Attack Success Rate (ASR) to disentangle instruction compliance from downstream patient risk. The benchmark comprises 9,697 curated instances constructed through multi-stage quality gates and clinical safety linting. Evaluating MPIB across a diverse set of baseline LLMs and defense configurations, we find that ASR and CHER can diverge substantially, and that robustness depends critically on whether adversarial instructions appear in the user query or in retrieved context. We release MPIB with evaluation code, adversarial baselines, and comprehensive documentation to support reproducible and systematic research on clinical prompt injection. Code and data are available at GitHub (code) and Hugging Face (data).

Deploying language models (LMs) necessitates outputs to be both high-quality and compliant with safety guidelines. Although Inference-Time Guardrails (ITG) offer solutions that shift model output distributions towards compliance, we find that current methods struggle in balancing safety with helpfulness. ITG Methods that safely address non-compliant queries exhibit lower helpfulness while those that prioritize helpfulness compromise on safety. We refer to this trade-off as the guardrail tax, analogous to the alignment tax. To address this, we propose PrimeGuard, a novel ITG method that utilizes structured control flow. PrimeGuard routes requests to different self-instantiations of the LM with varying instructions, leveraging its inherent instruction-following capabilities and in-context learning. Our tuning-free approach dynamically compiles system-designer guidelines for each query. We construct and release safe-eval, a diverse red-team safety benchmark. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that PrimeGuard, without fine-tuning, overcomes the guardrail tax by (1) significantly increasing resistance to iterative jailbreak attacks and (2) achieving state-of-the-art results in safety guardrailing while (3) matching helpfulness scores of alignment-tuned models. Extensive evaluations demonstrate that PrimeGuard, without fine-tuning, outperforms all competing baselines and overcomes the guardrail tax by improving the fraction of safe responses from 61% to 97% and increasing average helpfulness scores from 4.17 to 4.29 on the largest models, while reducing attack success rate from 100% to 8%. PrimeGuard implementation is available at https://github.com/dynamofl/PrimeGuard and safe-eval dataset is available at https://huggingface.co/datasets/dynamoai/safe_eval.

As LLM-based agents become increasingly prevalent, backdoors can be implanted into agents through user queries or environment feedback, raising critical concerns regarding safety vulnerabilities. However, backdoor attacks are typically detectable by safety audits that analyze the reasoning process of agents. To this end, we propose a novel backdoor implantation strategy called Dynamically Encrypted Multi-Backdoor Implantation Attack. Specifically, we introduce dynamic encryption, which maps the backdoor into benign content, effectively circumventing safety audits. To enhance stealthiness, we further decompose the backdoor into multiple sub-backdoor fragments. Based on these advancements, backdoors are allowed to bypass safety audits significantly. Additionally, we present AgentBackdoorEval, a dataset designed for the comprehensive evaluation of agent backdoor attacks. Experimental results across multiple datasets demonstrate that our method achieves an attack success rate nearing 100\% while maintaining a detection rate of 0\%, illustrating its effectiveness in evading safety audits. Our findings highlight the limitations of existing safety mechanisms in detecting advanced attacks, underscoring the urgent need for more robust defenses against backdoor threats. Code and data are available at https://github.com/whfeLingYu/DemonAgent.

The integration of artificial intelligence (AI) agents into web browsers introduces security challenges that go beyond traditional web application threat models. Prior work has identified prompt injection as a new attack vector for web agents, yet the resulting impact within real-world environments remains insufficiently understood. In this work, we examine the landscape of prompt injection attacks and synthesize a benchmark of attacks embedded in realistic HTML payloads. Our benchmark goes beyond prior work by emphasizing injections that can influence real-world actions rather than mere text outputs, and by presenting attack payloads with complexity and distractor frequency similar to what real-world agents encounter. We leverage this benchmark to conduct a comprehensive empirical evaluation of existing defenses, assessing their effectiveness across a suite of frontier AI models. We propose a multi-layered defense strategy comprising both architectural and model-based defenses to protect against evolving prompt injection attacks. Our work offers a blueprint for designing practical, secure web agents through a defense-in-depth approach.

Vision-Language Model (VLM) based Web Agents represent a significant step towards automating complex tasks by simulating human-like interaction with websites. However, their deployment in uncontrolled web environments introduces significant security vulnerabilities. Existing research on adversarial environmental injection attacks often relies on unrealistic assumptions, such as direct HTML manipulation, knowledge of user intent, or access to agent model parameters, limiting their practical applicability. In this paper, we propose AdInject, a novel and real-world black-box attack method that leverages the internet advertising delivery to inject malicious content into the Web Agent's environment. AdInject operates under a significantly more realistic threat model than prior work, assuming a black-box agent, static malicious content constraints, and no specific knowledge of user intent. AdInject includes strategies for designing malicious ad content aimed at misleading agents into clicking, and a VLM-based ad content optimization technique that infers potential user intents from the target website's context and integrates these intents into the ad content to make it appear more relevant or critical to the agent's task, thus enhancing attack effectiveness. Experimental evaluations demonstrate the effectiveness of AdInject, attack success rates exceeding 60% in most scenarios and approaching 100% in certain cases. This strongly demonstrates that prevalent advertising delivery constitutes a potent and real-world vector for environment injection attacks against Web Agents. This work highlights a critical vulnerability in Web Agent security arising from real-world environment manipulation channels, underscoring the urgent need for developing robust defense mechanisms against such threats. Our code is available at https://github.com/NicerWang/AdInject.

To enhance the controllability of text-to-image diffusion models, current ControlNet-like models have explored various control signals to dictate image attributes. However, existing methods either handle conditions inefficiently or use a fixed number of conditions, which does not fully address the complexity of multiple conditions and their potential conflicts. This underscores the need for innovative approaches to manage multiple conditions effectively for more reliable and detailed image synthesis. To address this issue, we propose a novel framework, DynamicControl, which supports dynamic combinations of diverse control signals, allowing adaptive selection of different numbers and types of conditions. Our approach begins with a double-cycle controller that generates an initial real score sorting for all input conditions by leveraging pre-trained conditional generation models and discriminative models. This controller evaluates the similarity between extracted conditions and input conditions, as well as the pixel-level similarity with the source image. Then, we integrate a Multimodal Large Language Model (MLLM) to build an efficient condition evaluator. This evaluator optimizes the ordering of conditions based on the double-cycle controller's score ranking. Our method jointly optimizes MLLMs and diffusion models, utilizing MLLMs' reasoning capabilities to facilitate multi-condition text-to-image (T2I) tasks. The final sorted conditions are fed into a parallel multi-control adapter, which learns feature maps from dynamic visual conditions and integrates them to modulate ControlNet, thereby enhancing control over generated images. Through both quantitative and qualitative comparisons, DynamicControl demonstrates its superiority over existing methods in terms of controllability, generation quality and composability under various conditional controls.

We address the problem of learning the dynamics of an unknown non-parametric system linking a target and a feature time series. The feature time series is measured on a sparse and irregular grid, while we have access to only a few points of the target time series. Once learned, we can use these dynamics to predict values of the target from the previous values of the feature time series. We frame this task as learning the solution map of a controlled differential equation (CDE). By leveraging the rich theory of signatures, we are able to cast this non-linear problem as a high-dimensional linear regression. We provide an oracle bound on the prediction error which exhibits explicit dependencies on the individual-specific sampling schemes. Our theoretical results are illustrated by simulations which show that our method outperforms existing algorithms for recovering the full time series while being computationally cheap. We conclude by demonstrating its potential on real-world epidemiological data.

Leading language model (LM) providers like OpenAI and Google offer fine-tuning APIs that allow customers to adapt LMs for specific use cases. To prevent misuse, these LM providers implement filtering mechanisms to block harmful fine-tuning data. Consequently, adversaries seeking to produce unsafe LMs via these APIs must craft adversarial training data that are not identifiably harmful. We make three contributions in this context: 1. We show that many existing attacks that use harmless data to create unsafe LMs rely on eliminating model refusals in the first few tokens of their responses. 2. We show that such prior attacks can be blocked by a simple defense that pre-fills the first few tokens from an aligned model before letting the fine-tuned model fill in the rest. 3. We describe a new data-poisoning attack, ``No, Of course I Can Execute'' (NOICE), which exploits an LM's formulaic refusal mechanism to elicit harmful responses. By training an LM to refuse benign requests on the basis of safety before fulfilling those requests regardless, we are able to jailbreak several open-source models and a closed-source model (GPT-4o). We show an attack success rate (ASR) of 57% against GPT-4o; our attack earned a Bug Bounty from OpenAI. Against open-source models protected by simple defenses, we improve ASRs by an average of 3.25 times compared to the best performing previous attacks that use only harmless data. NOICE demonstrates the exploitability of repetitive refusal mechanisms and broadens understanding of the threats closed-source models face from harmless data.

Recently, high-performing code generation systems based on large language models have surfaced. They are trained on massive corpora containing much more natural text than actual executable computer code. This work shows that current code generation systems exhibit undesired biases inherited from their large language model backbones, which can reduce the quality of the generated code under specific circumstances. To investigate the effect, we propose the "block of influence" concept, which enables a modular decomposition and analysis of the coding challenges. We introduce an automated intervention mechanism reminiscent of adversarial testing that exposes undesired biases through the failure modes of the models under test. Finally, we demonstrate how our framework can be used as a data transformation technique during fine-tuning, acting as a mitigation strategy for these biases.

AI agents equipped with tool-calling capabilities are susceptible to Indirect Prompt Injection (IPI) attacks. In this attack scenario, malicious commands hidden within untrusted content trick the agent into performing unauthorized actions. Existing defenses can reduce attack success but often suffer from the over-defense dilemma: they deploy expensive, always-on sanitization regardless of actual threat, thereby degrading utility and latency even in benign scenarios. We revisit IPI through a causal ablation perspective: a successful injection manifests as a dominance shift where the user request no longer provides decisive support for the agent's privileged action, while a particular untrusted segment, such as a retrieved document or tool output, provides disproportionate attributable influence. Based on this signature, we propose CausalArmor, a selective defense framework that (i) computes lightweight, leave-one-out ablation-based attributions at privileged decision points, and (ii) triggers targeted sanitization only when an untrusted segment dominates the user intent. Additionally, CausalArmor employs retroactive Chain-of-Thought masking to prevent the agent from acting on ``poisoned'' reasoning traces. We present a theoretical analysis showing that sanitization based on attribution margins conditionally yields an exponentially small upper bound on the probability of selecting malicious actions. Experiments on AgentDojo and DoomArena demonstrate that CausalArmor matches the security of aggressive defenses while improving explainability and preserving utility and latency of AI agents.

Feature selection helps reduce data acquisition costs in ML, but the standard approach is to train models with static feature subsets. Here, we consider the dynamic feature selection (DFS) problem where a model sequentially queries features based on the presently available information. DFS is often addressed with reinforcement learning, but we explore a simpler approach of greedily selecting features based on their conditional mutual information. This method is theoretically appealing but requires oracle access to the data distribution, so we develop a learning approach based on amortized optimization. The proposed method is shown to recover the greedy policy when trained to optimality, and it outperforms numerous existing feature selection methods in our experiments, thus validating it as a simple but powerful approach for this problem.

Agentic systems built on large language models (LLMs) extend beyond text generation to autonomously retrieve information and invoke tools. This runtime execution model shifts the attack surface from build-time artifacts to inference-time dependencies, exposing agents to manipulation through untrusted data and probabilistic capability resolution. While prior work has focused on model-level vulnerabilities, security risks emerging from cyclic and interdependent runtime behavior remain fragmented. We systematize these risks within a unified runtime framework, categorizing threats into data supply chain attacks (transient context injection and persistent memory poisoning) and tool supply chain attacks (discovery, implementation, and invocation). We further identify the Viral Agent Loop, in which agents act as vectors for self-propagating generative worms without exploiting code-level flaws. Finally, we advocate a Zero-Trust Runtime Architecture that treats context as untrusted control flow and constrains tool execution through cryptographic provenance rather than semantic inference.

As AI agents powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) become increasingly versatile and capable of addressing a broad spectrum of tasks, ensuring their security has become a critical challenge. Among the most pressing threats are prompt injection attacks, which exploit the agent's resilience on natural language inputs -- an especially dangerous threat when agents are granted tool access or handle sensitive information. In this work, we propose a set of principled design patterns for building AI agents with provable resistance to prompt injection. We systematically analyze these patterns, discuss their trade-offs in terms of utility and security, and illustrate their real-world applicability through a series of case studies.

Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) has emerged as a promising paradigm for post-training reasoning models. However, group-based methods such as Group Relative Policy Optimization (GRPO) face a critical dilemma in sparse-reward settings: pure Reinforcement Learning (RL) suffers from advantage collapse and high-variance gradient estimation, while mixed-policy optimization introduces persistent distributional bias. To resolve this dilemma, we introduce Hindsight-Anchored Policy Optimization (HAPO). HAPO employs the Synthetic Success Injection (SSI) operator, a hindsight mechanism that selectively anchors optimization to teacher demonstrations during failure. This injection is governed by a Thompson sampling-inspired gating mechanism, creating an autonomous, self-paced curriculum. Theoretically, we demonstrate that HAPO achieves asymptotic consistency: by naturally annealing the teacher signal as the policy improves, HAPO recovers the unbiased on-policy gradient. This ensures off-policy guidance acts as a temporary scaffold rather than a persistent ceiling, enabling the model to surpass the limitations of static teacher forcing.

As Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly integrated into automated, multi-stage pipelines, risk patterns that arise from unvalidated trust between processing stages become a practical concern. This paper presents a mechanism-centered taxonomy of 41 recurring risk patterns in commercial LLMs. The analysis shows that inputs are often interpreted non-neutrally and can trigger implementation-shaped responses or unintended state changes even without explicit commands. We argue that these behaviors constitute architectural failure modes and that string-level filtering alone is insufficient. To mitigate such cross-stage vulnerabilities, we recommend zero-trust architectural principles, including provenance enforcement, context sealing, and plan revalidation, and we introduce "Countermind" as a conceptual blueprint for implementing these defenses.

Complex, temporally evolving phenomena, from climate to brain activity, are governed by dynamical systems (DS). DS reconstruction (DSR) seeks to infer generative surrogate models of these from observed data, reproducing their long-term behavior. Existing DSR approaches require purpose-training for any new system observed, lacking the zero-shot and in-context inference capabilities known from LLMs. Here we introduce DynaMix, a novel multivariate ALRNN-based mixture-of-experts architecture pre-trained for DSR, the first DSR model able to generalize zero-shot to out-of-domain DS. Just from a provided context signal, without any re-training, DynaMix faithfully forecasts the long-term evolution of novel DS where existing time series (TS) foundation models, like Chronos, fail -- at a fraction of the number of parameters and orders of magnitude faster inference times. DynaMix outperforms TS foundation models in terms of long-term statistics, and often also short-term forecasts, even on real-world time series, like traffic or weather data, typically used for training and evaluating TS models, but not at all part of DynaMix' training corpus. We illustrate some of the failure modes of TS models for DSR problems, and conclude that models built on DS principles may bear a huge potential also for advancing the TS prediction field.

One of the fundamental challenges in reinforcement learning (RL) is to take a complex task and be able to decompose it to subtasks that are simpler for the RL agent to learn. In this paper, we report on our work that would identify subtasks by using some given positive and negative trajectories for solving the complex task. We assume that the states are represented by first-order predicate logic using which we devise a novel algorithm to identify the subtasks. Then we employ a Large Language Model (LLM) to generate first-order logic rule templates for achieving each subtask. Such rules were then further fined tuned to a rule-based policy via an Inductive Logic Programming (ILP)-based RL agent. Through experiments, we verify the accuracy of our algorithm in detecting subtasks which successfully detect all of the subtasks correctly. We also investigated the quality of the common-sense rules produced by the language model to achieve the subtasks. Our experiments show that our LLM-guided rule template generation can produce rules that are necessary for solving a subtask, which leads to solving complex tasks with fewer assumptions about predefined first-order logic predicates of the environment.

Generalizing policies across different domains with dynamics mismatch poses a significant challenge in reinforcement learning. For example, a robot learns the policy in a simulator, but when it is deployed in the real world, the dynamics of the environment may be different. Given the source and target domain with dynamics mismatch, we consider the online dynamics adaptation problem, in which case the agent can access sufficient source domain data while online interactions with the target domain are limited. Existing research has attempted to solve the problem from the dynamics discrepancy perspective. In this work, we reveal the limitations of these methods and explore the problem from the value difference perspective via a novel insight on the value consistency across domains. Specifically, we present the Value-Guided Data Filtering (VGDF) algorithm, which selectively shares transitions from the source domain based on the proximity of paired value targets across the two domains. Empirical results on various environments with kinematic and morphology shifts demonstrate that our method achieves superior performance compared to prior approaches.

Legal rules encompass not only codified statutes but also implicit adjudicatory principles derived from precedents that contain discretionary norms, social morality, and policy. While computational legal research has advanced in applying established rules to cases, inducing legal rules from judicial decisions remains understudied, constrained by limitations in model inference efficacy and symbolic reasoning capability. The advent of Large Language Models (LLMs) offers unprecedented opportunities for automating the extraction of such latent principles, yet progress is stymied by the absence of formal task definitions, benchmark datasets, and methodologies. To address this gap, we formalize Legal Rule Induction (LRI) as the task of deriving concise, generalizable doctrinal rules from sets of analogous precedents, distilling their shared preconditions, normative behaviors, and legal consequences. We introduce the first LRI benchmark, comprising 5,121 case sets (38,088 Chinese cases in total) for model tuning and 216 expert-annotated gold test sets. Experimental results reveal that: 1) State-of-the-art LLMs struggle with over-generalization and hallucination; 2) Training on our dataset markedly enhances LLMs capabilities in capturing nuanced rule patterns across similar cases.

Following the advancement of large language models (LLMs), the development of LLM-based autonomous agents has become increasingly prevalent. As a result, the need to understand the security vulnerabilities of these agents has become a critical task. We examine how ReAct agents can be exploited using a straightforward yet effective method we refer to as the foot-in-the-door attack. Our experiments show that indirect prompt injection attacks, prompted by harmless and unrelated requests (such as basic calculations) can significantly increase the likelihood of the agent performing subsequent malicious actions. Our results show that once a ReAct agents thought includes a specific tool or action, the likelihood of executing this tool in the subsequent steps increases significantly, as the agent seldom re-evaluates its actions. Consequently, even random, harmless requests can establish a foot-in-the-door, allowing an attacker to embed malicious instructions into the agents thought process, making it more susceptible to harmful directives. To mitigate this vulnerability, we propose implementing a simple reflection mechanism that prompts the agent to reassess the safety of its actions during execution, which can help reduce the success of such attacks.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed as the backend for a variety of real-world applications called LLM-Integrated Applications. Multiple recent works showed that LLM-Integrated Applications are vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, in which an attacker injects malicious instruction/data into the input of those applications such that they produce results as the attacker desires. However, existing works are limited to case studies. As a result, the literature lacks a systematic understanding of prompt injection attacks and their defenses. We aim to bridge the gap in this work. In particular, we propose a general framework to formalize prompt injection attacks. Existing attacks, which are discussed in research papers and blog posts, are special cases in our framework. Our framework enables us to design a new attack by combining existing attacks. Moreover, we also propose a framework to systematize defenses against prompt injection attacks. Using our frameworks, we conduct a systematic evaluation on prompt injection attacks and their defenses with 10 LLMs and 7 tasks. We hope our frameworks can inspire future research in this field. Our code is available at https://github.com/liu00222/Open-Prompt-Injection.

Ensuring the safety and reliability of large language models (LLMs) in clinical practice is critical to prevent patient harm and promote trustworthy healthcare applications of AI. However, LLMs are advancing so rapidly that static safety benchmarks often become obsolete upon publication, yielding only an incomplete and sometimes misleading picture of model trustworthiness. We demonstrate that a Dynamic, Automatic, and Systematic (DAS) red-teaming framework that continuously stress-tests LLMs can reveal significant weaknesses of current LLMs across four safety-critical domains: robustness, privacy, bias/fairness, and hallucination. A suite of adversarial agents is applied to autonomously mutate test cases, identify/evolve unsafe-triggering strategies, and evaluate responses, uncovering vulnerabilities in real time without human intervention. Applying DAS to 15 proprietary and open-source LLMs revealed a stark contrast between static benchmark performance and vulnerability under adversarial pressure. Despite a median MedQA accuracy exceeding 80\%, 94\% of previously correct answers failed our dynamic robustness tests. We observed similarly high failure rates across other domains: privacy leaks were elicited in 86\% of scenarios, cognitive-bias priming altered clinical recommendations in 81\% of fairness tests, and we identified hallucination rates exceeding 66\% in widely used models. Such profound residual risks are incompatible with routine clinical practice. By converting red-teaming from a static checklist into a dynamic stress-test audit, DAS red-teaming offers the surveillance that hospitals/regulators/technology vendors require as LLMs become embedded in patient chatbots, decision-support dashboards, and broader healthcare workflows. Our framework delivers an evolvable, scalable, and reliable safeguard for the next generation of medical AI.

Adapting Large Language Models (LLMs) to specialized domains requires high-quality instruction tuning datasets, which are expensive to create through human annotation. Existing data synthesis methods focus on general-purpose tasks and fail to capture domain-specific terminology and reasoning patterns. To address this, we introduce DS^2-Instruct, a zero-shot framework that generates domain-specific instruction datasets without human supervision. Our approach first generates task-informed keywords to ensure comprehensive domain coverage. It then creates diverse instructions by pairing these keywords with different cognitive levels from Bloom's Taxonomy. Finally, it uses self-consistency validation to ensure data quality. We apply this framework to generate datasets across seven challenging domains, such as mathematics, finance, and logical reasoning. Comprehensive evaluation demonstrates that models fine-tuned on our generated data achieve substantial improvements over existing data generation methods.

Agents based on large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong capabilities in a wide range of complex, real-world applications. However, LLM agents with a compromised memory bank may easily produce harmful outputs when the past records retrieved for demonstration are malicious. In this paper, we propose a novel Memory INJection Attack, MINJA, that enables the injection of malicious records into the memory bank by only interacting with the agent via queries and output observations. These malicious records are designed to elicit a sequence of malicious reasoning steps leading to undesirable agent actions when executing the victim user's query. Specifically, we introduce a sequence of bridging steps to link the victim query to the malicious reasoning steps. During the injection of the malicious record, we propose an indication prompt to guide the agent to autonomously generate our designed bridging steps. We also propose a progressive shortening strategy that gradually removes the indication prompt, such that the malicious record will be easily retrieved when processing the victim query comes after. Our extensive experiments across diverse agents demonstrate the effectiveness of MINJA in compromising agent memory. With minimal requirements for execution, MINJA enables any user to influence agent memory, highlighting practical risks of LLM agents.

Large Language Models (LLMs) are increasingly powerful but remain vulnerable to prompt injection attacks, where malicious inputs cause the model to deviate from its intended instructions. This paper introduces Sentinel, a novel detection model, qualifire/prompt-injection-sentinel, based on the \answerdotai/ModernBERT-large architecture. By leveraging ModernBERT's advanced features and fine-tuning on an extensive and diverse dataset comprising a few open-source and private collections, Sentinel achieves state-of-the-art performance. This dataset amalgamates varied attack types, from role-playing and instruction hijacking to attempts to generate biased content, alongside a broad spectrum of benign instructions, with private datasets specifically targeting nuanced error correction and real-world misclassifications. On a comprehensive, unseen internal test set, Sentinel demonstrates an average accuracy of 0.987 and an F1-score of 0.980. Furthermore, when evaluated on public benchmarks, it consistently outperforms strong baselines like protectai/deberta-v3-base-prompt-injection-v2. This work details Sentinel's architecture, its meticulous dataset curation, its training methodology, and a thorough evaluation, highlighting its superior detection capabilities.

Modern vision-language-model (VLM) based graphical user interface (GUI) agents are expected not only to execute actions accurately but also to respond to user instructions with low latency. While existing research on GUI-agent security mainly focuses on manipulating action correctness, the security risks related to response efficiency remain largely unexplored. In this paper, we introduce SlowBA, a novel backdoor attack that targets the responsiveness of VLM-based GUI agents. The key idea is to manipulate response latency by inducing excessively long reasoning chains under specific trigger patterns. To achieve this, we propose a two-stage reward-level backdoor injection (RBI) strategy that first aligns the long-response format and then learns trigger-aware activation through reinforcement learning. In addition, we design realistic pop-up windows as triggers that naturally appear in GUI environments, improving the stealthiness of the attack. Extensive experiments across multiple datasets and baselines demonstrate that SlowBA can significantly increase response length and latency while largely preserving task accuracy. The attack remains effective even with a small poisoning ratio and under several defense settings. These findings reveal a previously overlooked security vulnerability in GUI agents and highlight the need for defenses that consider both action correctness and response efficiency. Code can be found in https://github.com/tu-tuing/SlowBA.

Prompt injection is one of the most critical vulnerabilities in LLM agents; yet, effective automated attacks remain largely unexplored from an optimization perspective. Existing methods heavily depend on human red-teamers and hand-crafted prompts, limiting their scalability and adaptability. We propose AutoInject, a reinforcement learning framework that generates universal, transferable adversarial suffixes while jointly optimizing for attack success and utility preservation on benign tasks. Our black-box method supports both query-based optimization and transfer attacks to unseen models and tasks. Using only a 1.5B parameter adversarial suffix generator, we successfully compromise frontier systems including GPT 5 Nano, Claude Sonnet 3.5, and Gemini 2.5 Flash on the AgentDojo benchmark, establishing a stronger baseline for automated prompt injection research.

As large language models (LLMs) are increasingly deployed in real-world applications, safety guardrails are required to go beyond coarse-grained filtering and support fine-grained, interpretable, and adaptable risk assessment. However, existing solutions often rely on rapid classification schemes or post-hoc rules, resulting in limited transparency, inflexible policies, or prohibitive inference costs. To this end, we present YuFeng-XGuard, a reasoning-centric guardrail model family designed to perform multi-dimensional risk perception for LLM interactions. Instead of producing opaque binary judgments, YuFeng-XGuard generates structured risk predictions, including explicit risk categories and configurable confidence scores, accompanied by natural language explanations that expose the underlying reasoning process. This formulation enables safety decisions that are both actionable and interpretable. To balance decision latency and explanatory depth, we adopt a tiered inference paradigm that performs an initial risk decision based on the first decoded token, while preserving ondemand explanatory reasoning when required. In addition, we introduce a dynamic policy mechanism that decouples risk perception from policy enforcement, allowing safety policies to be adjusted without model retraining. Extensive experiments on a diverse set of public safety benchmarks demonstrate that YuFeng-XGuard achieves stateof-the-art performance while maintaining strong efficiency-efficacy trade-offs. We release YuFeng-XGuard as an open model family, including both a full-capacity variant and a lightweight version, to support a wide range of deployment scenarios.

Large Language Models (LLMs) continue to exhibit vulnerabilities despite deliberate safety alignment efforts, posing significant risks to users and society. To safeguard against the risk of policy-violating content, system-level moderation via external guard models-designed to monitor LLM inputs and outputs and block potentially harmful content-has emerged as a prevalent mitigation strategy. Existing approaches of training guard models rely heavily on extensive human curated datasets and struggle with out-of-distribution threats, such as emerging harmful categories or jailbreak attacks. To address these limitations, we propose RSafe, an adaptive reasoning-based safeguard that conducts guided safety reasoning to provide robust protection within the scope of specified safety policies. RSafe operates in two stages: 1) guided reasoning, where it analyzes safety risks of input content through policy-guided step-by-step reasoning, and 2) reinforced alignment, where rule-based RL optimizes its reasoning paths to align with accurate safety prediction. This two-stage training paradigm enables RSafe to internalize safety principles to generalize safety protection capability over unseen or adversarial safety violation scenarios. During inference, RSafe accepts user-specified safety policies to provide enhanced safeguards tailored to specific safety requirements.

In modern sequential decision-making systems, the construction of an optimal candidate action space is critical to efficient inference. However, existing approaches either rely on manually defined action spaces that lack scalability or utilize unstructured spaces that render exhaustive search computationally prohibitive. In this paper, we propose a novel framework named DynaAct for automatically constructing a compact action space to enhance sequential reasoning in complex problem-solving scenarios. Our method first estimates a proxy for the complete action space by extracting general sketches observed in a corpus covering diverse complex reasoning problems using large language models. We then formulate a submodular function that jointly evaluates candidate actions based on their utility to the current state and their diversity, and employ a greedy algorithm to select an optimal candidate set. Extensive experiments on six diverse standard benchmarks demonstrate that our approach significantly improves overall performance, while maintaining efficient inference without introducing substantial latency. The implementation is available at https://github.com/zhaoxlpku/DynaAct.

The development of autonomous web agents, powered by Large Language Models (LLMs) and reinforcement learning (RL), represents a significant step towards general-purpose AI assistants. However, training these agents is severely hampered by the challenges of interacting with the live internet, which is inefficient, costly, and fraught with risks. Model-based reinforcement learning (MBRL) offers a promising solution by learning a world model of the environment to enable simulated interaction. This paper introduces DynaWeb, a novel MBRL framework that trains web agents through interacting with a web world model trained to predict naturalistic web page representations given agent actions. This model serves as a synthetic web environment where an agent policy can dream by generating vast quantities of rollout action trajectories for efficient online reinforcement learning. Beyond free policy rollouts, DynaWeb incorporates real expert trajectories from training data, which are randomly interleaved with on-policy rollouts during training to improve stability and sample efficiency. Experiments conducted on the challenging WebArena and WebVoyager benchmarks demonstrate that DynaWeb consistently and significantly improves the performance of state-of-the-art open-source web agent models. Our findings establish the viability of training web agents through imagination, offering a scalable and efficient way to scale up online agentic RL.

Instruction-tuned models are trained on crowdsourcing datasets with task instructions to achieve superior performance. However, in this work we raise security concerns about this training paradigm. Our studies demonstrate that an attacker can inject backdoors by issuing very few malicious instructions among thousands of gathered data and control model behavior through data poisoning, without even the need of modifying data instances or labels themselves. Through such instruction attacks, the attacker can achieve over 90% attack success rate across four commonly used NLP datasets, and cause persistent backdoors that are easily transferred to 15 diverse datasets zero-shot. In this way, the attacker can directly apply poisoned instructions designed for one dataset on many other datasets. Moreover, the poisoned model cannot be cured by continual learning. Lastly, instruction attacks show resistance to existing inference-time defense. These findings highlight the need for more robust defenses against data poisoning attacks in instructiontuning models and underscore the importance of ensuring data quality in instruction crowdsourcing.

Reinforcement Learning from Verifiable Rewards (RLVR) suffers from exploration inefficiency, where models struggle to generate successful rollouts, resulting in minimal learning signal. This challenge is particularly severe for tasks that require the acquisition of novel reasoning patterns or domain-specific knowledge. To address this, we propose Context Bootstrapped Reinforcement Learning (CBRL), which augments RLVR training by stochastically prepending few-shot demonstrations to training prompts. The injection probability follows a curriculum that starts high to bootstrap early exploration, then anneals to zero so the model must ultimately succeed without assistance. This forces the policy to internalize reasoning patterns from the demonstrations rather than relying on them at test time. We validate CBRL across two model families and five Reasoning Gym tasks. Our results demonstrate that CBRL consistently improves success rate, provides better exploration efficiency, and is algorithm-agnostic. We further demonstrate CBRL's practical applicability on Q, a domain-specific programming language that diverges significantly from mainstream language conventions.

Despite their impressive performance on complex tasks, current language models (LMs) typically operate in a vacuum: Each input query is processed separately, without retaining insights from previous attempts. Here, we present Dynamic Cheatsheet (DC), a lightweight framework that endows a black-box LM with a persistent, evolving memory. Rather than repeatedly re-discovering or re-committing the same solutions and mistakes, DC enables models to store and reuse accumulated strategies, code snippets, and general problem-solving insights at inference time. This test-time learning enhances performance substantially across a range of tasks without needing explicit ground-truth labels or human feedback. Leveraging DC, Claude 3.5 Sonnet's accuracy more than doubled on AIME math exams once it began retaining algebraic insights across questions. Similarly, GPT-4o's success rate on Game of 24 increased from 10% to 99% after the model discovered and reused a Python-based solution. In tasks prone to arithmetic mistakes, such as balancing equations, DC enabled GPT-4o and Claude to reach near-perfect accuracy by recalling previously validated code, whereas their baselines stagnated around 50%. Beyond arithmetic challenges, DC yields notable accuracy gains on knowledge-demanding tasks. Claude achieved a 9% improvement in GPQA-Diamond and an 8% boost on MMLU-Pro problems. Crucially, DC's memory is self-curated, focusing on concise, transferable snippets rather than entire transcript. Unlike finetuning or static retrieval methods, DC adapts LMs' problem-solving skills on the fly, without modifying their underlying parameters. Overall, our findings present DC as a promising approach for augmenting LMs with persistent memory, bridging the divide between isolated inference events and the cumulative, experience-driven learning characteristic of human cognition.

While large language models (LLMs) have been thoroughly evaluated for deductive and inductive reasoning, their proficiency in abductive reasoning and holistic rule learning in interactive environments remains less explored. This work introduces RULEARN, a novel benchmark specifically designed to assess the rule-learning ability of LLMs in interactive settings. In RULEARN, agents interact with the environment to gather observations and discern patterns, using these insights to solve problems. To further enhance the rule-learning capabilities of LLM agents within this benchmark, we propose IDEA agent, which integrates Induction, Deduction, and Abduction processes. IDEA agent refines this approach by leveraging a structured reasoning sequence: generating hypotheses through abduction, testing them via deduction, and refining them based on feedback from induction. This sequence enables agents to dynamically establish and apply rules, mimicking human-like reasoning processes. Our evaluation of five representative LLMs indicates that while these models can generate plausible initial hypotheses, they often struggle with strategic interaction within the environment, effective incorporation of feedback, and adaptive refinement of their hypotheses. IDEA agent demonstrates significantly improved performance on the RULEARN benchmark, offering valuable insights for the development of agents capable of human-like rule-learning in real-world scenarios. We will release our code and data.

The safety and alignment of Large Language Models (LLMs) are critical for their responsible deployment. Current evaluation methods predominantly focus on identifying and preventing overtly harmful outputs. However, they often fail to address a more insidious failure mode: models that produce benign-appearing outputs while operating on malicious or deceptive internal reasoning. This vulnerability, often triggered by sophisticated system prompt injections, allows models to bypass conventional safety filters, posing a significant, underexplored risk. To address this gap, we introduce the Deceptive Reasoning Exposure Suite (D-REX), a novel dataset designed to evaluate the discrepancy between a model's internal reasoning process and its final output. D-REX was constructed through a competitive red-teaming exercise where participants crafted adversarial system prompts to induce such deceptive behaviors. Each sample in D-REX contains the adversarial system prompt, an end-user's test query, the model's seemingly innocuous response, and, crucially, the model's internal chain-of-thought, which reveals the underlying malicious intent. Our benchmark facilitates a new, essential evaluation task: the detection of deceptive alignment. We demonstrate that D-REX presents a significant challenge for existing models and safety mechanisms, highlighting the urgent need for new techniques that scrutinize the internal processes of LLMs, not just their final outputs.

We introduce QualityFlow, a dynamic agentic workflow for program synthesis. Given the English description of a programming problem and a set of unit tests, the model's goal is to synthesize the correct program that solves the problem and passes the tests. QualityFlow includes large language model (LLM) agents resembling a software development team, including code generation, testing, and self-debugging. We propose the LLM Quality Checker, which explicitly "imagines" whether the synthesized programs' execution would conform to the unit tests. The Quality Checks dynamically control the workflow, including actions to submit the final answer, clarify the problem statement, and revert previous workflow steps. Our experiments show that the Quality Checker can precisely accept any correct program, mitigate faulty synthesized tests, and prevent potential workflow deviation. QualityFlow establishes the state-of-the-art results on four program synthesis benchmarks: MBPP, HumanEval, and stricter evaluations from MBPP-EvalPlus and HumanEval-EvalPlus.

Retrieval-augmented generation (RAG) is increasingly deployed in real-world applications, where its reference-grounded design makes outputs appear trustworthy. This trust has spurred research on poisoning attacks that craft malicious content, inject it into knowledge sources, and manipulate RAG responses. However, when evaluated in practical RAG systems, existing attacks suffer from severely degraded effectiveness. This gap stems from two overlooked realities: (i) content is often processed before use, which can fragment the poison and weaken its effect, and (ii) users often do not issue the exact queries anticipated during attack design. These factors can lead practitioners to underestimate risks and develop a false sense of security. To better characterize the threat to practical systems, we present Confundo, a learning-to-poison framework that fine-tunes a large language model as a poison generator to achieve high effectiveness, robustness, and stealthiness. Confundo provides a unified framework supporting multiple attack objectives, demonstrated by manipulating factual correctness, inducing biased opinions, and triggering hallucinations. By addressing these overlooked challenges, Confundo consistently outperforms a wide range of purpose-built attacks across datasets and RAG configurations by large margins, even in the presence of defenses. Beyond exposing vulnerabilities, we also present a defensive use case that protects web content from unauthorized incorporation into RAG systems via scraping, with no impact on user experience.

AI-powered development platforms are making software creation accessible to a broader audience, but this democratization has triggered a scalability crisis in security auditing. With studies showing that up to 40% of AI-generated code contains vulnerabilities, the pace of development now vastly outstrips the capacity for thorough security assessment. We present MAPTA, a multi-agent system for autonomous web application security assessment that combines large language model orchestration with tool-grounded execution and end-to-end exploit validation. On the 104-challenge XBOW benchmark, MAPTA achieves 76.9% overall success with perfect performance on SSRF and misconfiguration vulnerabilities, 83% success on broken authorization, and strong results on injection attacks including server-side template injection (85%) and SQL injection (83%). Cross-site scripting (57%) and blind SQL injection (0%) remain challenging. Our comprehensive cost analysis across all challenges totals 21.38 with a median cost of 0.073 for successful attempts versus 0.357 for failures. Success correlates strongly with resource efficiency, enabling practical early-stopping thresholds at approximately 40 tool calls or 0.30 per challenge. MAPTA's real-world findings are impactful given both the popularity of the respective scanned GitHub repositories (8K-70K stars) and MAPTA's low average operating cost of $3.67 per open-source assessment: MAPTA discovered critical vulnerabilities including RCEs, command injections, secret exposure, and arbitrary file write vulnerabilities. Findings are responsibly disclosed, 10 findings are under CVE review.

Traditional vulnerability detection methods rely heavily on predefined rule matching, which often fails to capture vulnerabilities accurately. With the rise of large language models (LLMs), leveraging their ability to understand code semantics has emerged as a promising direction for achieving more accurate and efficient vulnerability detection. However, current LLM-based approaches face significant challenges: instability in model outputs, limitations in context length, and hallucination. As a result, many existing solutions either use LLMs merely to enrich predefined rule sets, thereby keeping the detection process fundamentally rule-based, or over-rely on them, leading to poor robustness. To address these challenges, we propose a constraint-solving approach powered by LLMs named VULSOLVER. By modeling vulnerability detection as a constraint-solving problem, and by integrating static application security testing (SAST) with the semantic reasoning capabilities of LLMs, our method enables the LLM to act like a professional human security expert. We assess VULSOLVER on the OWASP Benchmark (1,023 labeled samples), achieving 96.29% accuracy, 96.55% F1-score, and 100% recall. Applied to popular GitHub repositories, VULSOLVER also identified 15 previously unknown high-severity vulnerabilities (CVSS 7.5-9.8), demonstrating its effectiveness in real-world security analysis.

The technique of data augmentation (DA) is often used in machine learning for regularization purposes to better generalize under i.i.d. settings. In this work, we present a unifying framework with topics in causal inference to make a case for the use of DA beyond just the i.i.d. setting, but for generalization across interventions as well. Specifically, we argue that when the outcome generating mechanism is invariant to our choice of DA, then such augmentations can effectively be thought of as interventions on the treatment generating mechanism itself. This can potentially help to reduce bias in causal effect estimation arising from hidden confounders. In the presence of such unobserved confounding we typically make use of instrumental variables (IVs) -- sources of treatment randomization that are conditionally independent of the outcome. However, IVs may not be as readily available as DA for many applications, which is the main motivation behind this work. By appropriately regularizing IV based estimators, we introduce the concept of IV-like (IVL) regression for mitigating confounding bias and improving predictive performance across interventions even when certain IV properties are relaxed. Finally, we cast parameterized DA as an IVL regression problem and show that when used in composition can simulate a worst-case application of such DA, further improving performance on causal estimation and generalization tasks beyond what simple DA may offer. This is shown both theoretically for the population case and via simulation experiments for the finite sample case using a simple linear example. We also present real data experiments to support our case.

Process Reward Models (PRMs) have achieved remarkable success in augmenting the reasoning capabilities of Large Language Models (LLMs) within static domains such as mathematics. However, their potential in dynamic data analysis tasks remains underexplored. In this work, we first present a empirical study revealing that general-domain PRMs struggle to supervise data analysis agents. Specifically, they fail to detect silent errors, logical flaws that yield incorrect results without triggering interpreter exceptions, and erroneously penalize exploratory actions, mistaking necessary trial-and-error exploration for grounding failures. To bridge this gap, we introduce DataPRM, a novel environment-aware generative process reward model that (1) can serve as an active verifier, autonomously interacting with the environment to probe intermediate execution states and uncover silent errors, and (2) employs a reflection-aware ternary reward strategy that distinguishes between correctable grounding errors and irrecoverable mistakes. We design a scalable pipeline to construct over 8K high-quality training instances for DataPRM via diversity-driven trajectory generation and knowledge-augmented step-level annotation. Experimental results demonstrate that DataPRM improves downstream policy LLMs by 7.21% on ScienceAgentBench and 11.28% on DABStep using Best-of-N inference. Notably, with only 4B parameters, DataPRM outperforms strong baselines, and exhibits robust generalizability across diverse Test-Time Scaling strategies. Furthermore, integrating DataPRM into Reinforcement Learning yields substantial gains over outcome-reward baselines, achieving 78.73% on DABench and 64.84% on TableBench, validating the effectiveness of process reward supervision. Code is available at https://github.com/zjunlp/DataMind.

Visual autoregressive (VAR) models have recently emerged as a promising family of generative models, enabling a wide range of downstream vision tasks such as text-guided image editing. By shifting the editing paradigm from noise manipulation in diffusion-based methods to token-level operations, VAR-based approaches achieve better background preservation and significantly faster inference. However, existing VAR-based editing methods still face two key challenges: accurately localizing editable tokens and maintaining structural consistency in the edited results. In this work, we propose a novel text-guided image editing framework rooted in an analysis of intermediate feature distributions within VAR models. First, we introduce a coarse-to-fine token localization strategy that can refine editable regions, balancing editing fidelity and background preservation. Second, we analyze the intermediate representations of VAR models and identify structure-related features, by which we design a simple yet effective feature injection mechanism to enhance structural consistency between the edited and source images. Third, we develop a reinforcement learning-based adaptive feature injection scheme that automatically learns scale- and layer-specific injection ratios to jointly optimize editing fidelity and structure preservation. Extensive experiments demonstrate that our method achieves superior structural consistency and editing quality compared with state-of-the-art approaches, across both local and global editing scenarios.

Proactive agents must decide not only what to say but also whether and when to intervene. Many current systems rely on brittle heuristics or indiscriminate long reasoning, which offers little control over the benefit-burden tradeoff. We formulate the problem as cost-sensitive selective intervention and present PRISM, a novel framework that couples a decision-theoretic gate with a dual-process reasoning architecture. At inference time, the agent intervenes only when a calibrated probability of user acceptance exceeds a threshold derived from asymmetric costs of missed help and false alarms. Inspired by festina lente (Latin: "make haste slowly"), we gate by an acceptance-calibrated, cost-derived threshold and invoke a resource-intensive Slow mode with counterfactual checks only near the decision boundary, concentrating computation on ambiguous and high-stakes cases. Training uses gate-aligned, schema-locked distillation: a teacher running the full PRISM pipeline provides dense, executable supervision on unlabeled interaction traces, while the student learns a response policy that is explicitly decoupled from the intervention gate to enable tunable and auditable control. On ProactiveBench, PRISM reduces false alarms by 22.78% and improves F1 by 20.14% over strong baselines. These results show that principled decision-theoretic gating, paired with selective slow reasoning and aligned distillation, yields proactive agents that are precise, computationally efficient, and controllable. To facilitate reproducibility, we release our code, models, and resources at https://prism-festinalente.github.io/; all experiments use the open-source ProactiveBench benchmark.

Large Language Model (LLM) agents increasingly rely on long-term memory and Retrieval-Augmented Generation (RAG) to persist experiences and refine future performance. While this experience learning capability enhances agentic autonomy, it introduces a critical, unexplored attack surface, i.e., the trust boundary between an agent's reasoning core and its own past. In this paper, we introduce MemoryGraft. It is a novel indirect injection attack that compromises agent behavior not through immediate jailbreaks, but by implanting malicious successful experiences into the agent's long-term memory. Unlike traditional prompt injections that are transient, or standard RAG poisoning that targets factual knowledge, MemoryGraft exploits the agent's semantic imitation heuristic which is the tendency to replicate patterns from retrieved successful tasks. We demonstrate that an attacker who can supply benign ingestion-level artifacts that the agent reads during execution can induce it to construct a poisoned RAG store where a small set of malicious procedure templates is persisted alongside benign experiences. When the agent later encounters semantically similar tasks, union retrieval over lexical and embedding similarity reliably surfaces these grafted memories, and the agent adopts the embedded unsafe patterns, leading to persistent behavioral drift across sessions. We validate MemoryGraft on MetaGPT's DataInterpreter agent with GPT-4o and find that a small number of poisoned records can account for a large fraction of retrieved experiences on benign workloads, turning experience-based self-improvement into a vector for stealthy and durable compromise. To facilitate reproducibility and future research, our code and evaluation data are available at https://github.com/Jacobhhy/Agent-Memory-Poisoning.

Based on their superior comprehension and reasoning capabilities, Large Language Model (LLM) driven agent frameworks have achieved significant success in numerous complex reasoning tasks. ReAct-like agents can solve various intricate problems step-by-step through progressive planning and tool calls, iteratively optimizing new steps based on environmental feedback. However, as the planning capabilities of LLMs improve, the actions invoked by tool calls in ReAct-like frameworks often misalign with complex planning and challenging data organization. Code Action addresses these issues while also introducing the challenges of a more complex action space and more difficult action organization. To leverage Code Action and tackle the challenges of its complexity, this paper proposes Policy and Action Dual-Control Agent (PoAct) for generalized applications. The aim is to achieve higher-quality code actions and more accurate reasoning paths by dynamically switching reasoning policies and modifying the action space. Experimental results on the Agent Benchmark for both legal and generic scenarios demonstrate the superior reasoning capabilities and reduced token consumption of our approach in complex tasks. On the LegalAgentBench, our method shows a 20 percent improvement over the baseline while requiring fewer tokens. We conducted experiments and analyses on the GPT-4o and GLM-4 series models, demonstrating the significant potential and scalability of our approach to solve complex problems.

Content moderation at scale remains one of the most pressing challenges in today's digital ecosystem, where billions of user- and AI-generated artifacts must be continuously evaluated for policy violations. Although recent advances in large language models (LLMs) have demonstrated strong potential for policy-grounded moderation, the practical challenges of training these systems to achieve expert-level accuracy in real-world settings remain largely unexplored, particularly in regimes characterized by label sparsity, evolving policy definitions, and the need for nuanced reasoning beyond shallow pattern matching. In this work, we present a comprehensive empirical investigation of scaling reinforcement learning (RL) for content classification, systematically evaluating multiple RL training recipes and reward-shaping strategies-including verifiable rewards and LLM-as-judge frameworks-to transform general-purpose language models into specialized, policy-aligned classifiers across three real-world content moderation tasks. Our findings provide actionable insights for industrial-scale moderation systems, demonstrating that RL exhibits sigmoid-like scaling behavior in which performance improves smoothly with increased training data, rollouts, and optimization steps before gradually saturating. Moreover, we show that RL substantially improves performance on tasks requiring complex policy-grounded reasoning while achieving up to 100x higher data efficiency than supervised fine-tuning, making it particularly effective in domains where expert annotations are scarce or costly.

This paper introduces RuleArena, a novel and challenging benchmark designed to evaluate the ability of large language models (LLMs) to follow complex, real-world rules in reasoning. Covering three practical domains -- airline baggage fees, NBA transactions, and tax regulations -- RuleArena assesses LLMs' proficiency in handling intricate natural language instructions that demand long-context understanding, logical reasoning, and accurate mathematical computation. Two key attributes distinguish RuleArena from traditional rule-based reasoning benchmarks: (1) it extends beyond standard first-order logic representations, and (2) it is grounded in authentic, practical scenarios, providing insights into the suitability and reliability of LLMs for real-world applications. Our findings reveal several notable limitations in LLMs: (1) they struggle to identify and apply the appropriate rules, frequently becoming confused by similar but distinct regulations, (2) they cannot consistently perform accurate mathematical computations, even when they correctly identify the relevant rules, and (3) in general, they perform poorly in the benchmark. These results highlight significant challenges in advancing LLMs' rule-guided reasoning capabilities in real-life applications.

Most existing pre-trained language models for source code focus on learning the static code text, typically augmented with static code structures (abstract syntax tree, dependency graphs, etc.). However, program semantics will not be fully exposed before the real execution. Without an understanding of the program execution, statically pre-trained models fail to comprehensively capture the dynamic code properties, such as the branch coverage and the runtime variable values, and they are consequently less effective at code understanding tasks, such as retrieving semantic clones and detecting software vulnerabilities. To close the gap between the static nature of language models and the dynamic characteristics of programs, we introduce TRACED, an execution-aware pre-training strategy for source code. Specifically, we pre-train code language models with a combination of source code, executable inputs, and corresponding execution traces. Our goal is to teach code models the complicated execution logic during the pre-training, enabling the model to statically estimate the dynamic code properties without repeatedly executing code during task-specific fine-tuning. To illustrate the effectiveness of our proposed approach, we fine-tune and evaluate TRACED on three downstream tasks: static execution estimation, clone retrieval, and vulnerability detection. The empirical results show that TRACED relatively improves the statically pre-trained code models by 12.4% for complete execution path prediction and by 25.2% for runtime variable value predictions. TRACED also significantly outperforms statically pre-trained models in clone retrieval and vulnerability detection across four public benchmarks.

As machine intelligence evolves, the need to test and compare the problem-solving abilities of different AI models grows. However, current benchmarks are often overly simplistic, allowing models to perform uniformly well, making it difficult to distinguish their capabilities. Additionally, benchmarks typically rely on static question-answer pairs, which models might memorize or guess. To address these limitations, we introduce the Dynamic Intelligence Assessment (DIA), a novel methodology for testing AI models using dynamic question templates and improved metrics across multiple disciplines such as mathematics, cryptography, cybersecurity, and computer science. The accompanying DIA-Bench dataset, which includes 150 diverse and challenging task templates with mutable parameters, is presented in various formats such as text, PDFs, compiled binaries, and visual puzzles. Our framework introduces four new metrics to assess a model's reliability and confidence across multiple attempts. These metrics revealed that even simple questions are frequently answered incorrectly when posed in varying forms, highlighting significant gaps in models' reliability. Notably, models like GPT-4o tended to overestimate their mathematical abilities, while ChatGPT-4o demonstrated better decision-making and performance through effective tool usage. We evaluated eight state-of-the-art large language models (LLMs) using DIA-Bench, showing that current models struggle with complex tasks and often display unexpectedly low confidence, even with simpler questions. The DIA framework sets a new standard for assessing not only problem-solving but also a model's adaptive intelligence and ability to assess its own limitations. The dataset is publicly available on our project's website.

We address the problem of runtime trajectory anomaly detection, a critical capability for enabling trustworthy LLM agents. Current safety measures predominantly focus on static input/output filtering. However, we argue that ensuring LLM agents reliability requires auditing the intermediate execution process. In this work, we formulate the task of Trajectory Anomaly Detection. The goal is not merely detection, but precise error localization. This capability is essential for enabling efficient rollback-and-retry. To achieve this, we construct TrajBench, a dataset synthesized via a perturb-and-complete strategy to cover diverse procedural anomalies. Using this benchmark, we investigate the capability of models in process supervision. We observe that general-purpose LLMs, even with zero-shot prompting, struggle to identify and localize these anomalies. This reveals that generalized capabilities do not automatically translate to process reliability. To address this, we propose TrajAD, a specialized verifier trained with fine-grained process supervision. Our approach outperforms baselines, demonstrating that specialized supervision is essential for building trustworthy agents.

Test-Time Scaling (TTS) enhances the reasoning ability of large language models (LLMs) by allocating additional computation during inference. However, existing approaches primarily rely on output-level sampling while overlooking the role of model architecture. In mainstream Mixture-of-Experts (MoE) LLMs, we observe that varying the number of activated experts yields complementary solution sets with stable accuracy, revealing a new and underexplored source of diversity. Motivated by this observation, we propose Dynamic Experts Search (DES), a TTS strategy that elevates expert activation into a controllable dimension of the search space. DES integrates two key components: (1) Dynamic MoE, which enables direct control of expert counts during inference to generate diverse reasoning trajectories without additional cost; and (2) Expert Configuration Inheritance, which preserves consistent expert counts within a reasoning path while varying them across runs, thereby balancing stability and diversity throughout the search. Extensive experiments across MoE architectures, verifiers and reasoning benchmarks (i.e., math, code and knowledge) demonstrate that DES reliably outperforms TTS baselines, enhancing accuracy and stability without additional cost. These results highlight DES as a practical and scalable form of architecture-aware TTS, illustrating how structural flexibility in modern LLMs can advance reasoning.

Recent advances in Large Language Models (LLMs) have showcased impressive reasoning abilities in structured tasks like mathematics and programming, largely driven by Reinforcement Learning with Verifiable Rewards (RLVR), which uses outcome-based signals that are scalable, effective, and robust against reward hacking. However, applying similar techniques to open-ended long-form reasoning tasks remains challenging due to the absence of generic, verifiable reward signals. To address this, we propose Direct Reasoning Optimization (DRO), a reinforcement learning framework for fine-tuning LLMs on open-ended, particularly long-form, reasoning tasks, guided by a new reward signal: the Reasoning Reflection Reward (R3). At its core, R3 selectively identifies and emphasizes key tokens in the reference outcome that reflect the influence of the model's preceding chain-of-thought reasoning, thereby capturing the consistency between reasoning and reference outcome at a fine-grained level. Crucially, R3 is computed internally using the same model being optimized, enabling a fully self-contained training setup. Additionally, we introduce a dynamic data filtering strategy based on R3 for open-ended reasoning tasks, reducing cost while improving downstream performance. We evaluate DRO on two diverse datasets -- ParaRev, a long-form paragraph revision task, and FinQA, a math-oriented QA benchmark -- and show that it consistently outperforms strong baselines while remaining broadly applicable across both open-ended and structured domains.

Inspired by the success of DeepSeek-R1, we explore the potential of rule-based reinforcement learning (RL) in large reasoning models. To analyze reasoning dynamics, we use synthetic logic puzzles as training data due to their controllable complexity and straightforward answer verification. We make some key technical contributions that lead to effective and stable RL training: a system prompt that emphasizes the thinking and answering process, a stringent format reward function that penalizes outputs for taking shortcuts, and a straightforward training recipe that achieves stable convergence. Our 7B model develops advanced reasoning skills-such as reflection, verification, and summarization-that are absent from the logic corpus. Remarkably, after training on just 5K logic problems, it demonstrates generalization abilities to the challenging math benchmarks AIME and AMC.